Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-engine Airplanes

Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.

[Federal Register: November 14, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 220)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 64729-64798]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr14no03-41]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, 135
[Docket No. FAA-2002-6717; Notice No. 03-11]
RIN 2120-AI03

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to issue regulations governing the design,
maintenance, and operation of airplanes and engines for flights that go
beyond certain distances from an adequate airport. This proposal would
extend some requirements that previously applied only to two-engine
airplanes to airplanes with more than two-engines. The proposed rule
implements existing policy, industry best practices and
recommendations, and international standards to ensure that long-range
flights will operate safely.

DATES: Send your comments on or before January 13, 2004.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to DOT DMS Docket Number FAA-2002-
6717 by any of the following methods:
? Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions
for submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
? Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
? Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590-0001.
? Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif
Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
? Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change
to http://dms.dot.gov. including any personal information
provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading under Regulatory Notices.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to
Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric vanOpstal, Flight Standards
Service, Air Transportation Division, AFS-200, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-3774; facsimile (202) 267-5229.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments Invited. The FAA invites interested
persons to participate in this proposed rulemaking by submitting
written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to
the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impact that might
result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask
that you send us two copies of written comments.
We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public
inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section
of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the
Internet at the web address in the ADDRESSES section.
Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments
we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the
postcard and mail it to you.

Regulatory Notices

Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit
http://dms.dot.gov.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the
following steps:
(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page
(http://dms.dot.gov/search).
(2) On the search page type in the last five digits of the Docket
number shown at the beginning of this notice. Click on ``search.''
(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information
for the Docket you selected, click on the document number of the item
you wish to view.
You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through
FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Federal
Register's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/index.html

You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number
of this rulemaking.

Background

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has long-standing
regulations that restrict the operations of two-engine air carrier
airplanes operated under part 121, Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR). Under current regulations these airplanes may not
be operated on routes that lie more than sixty minutes from an airport
unless authorized by the Administrator. The premise for these
restrictions was that two-engine airplanes were less safe than three
and four engine airplanes particularly over very long distances.

History of ETOPS

In the 1980s, a new generation of very reliable, two engine
airplanes came into service and changed the underlying premise that
restricted the operations of these airplanes. The airline industry
sought to take advantage of the

[[Page 64731]]

improvements in reliability, range, and payload capabilities that these
new airplanes offered. Beginning in 1985, the FAA allowed air carriers
to operate certain twin-engine airplanes on routes that included points
more than sixty-minutes from an adequate airport under a formal program
known as Extended Range Operation with Two Engine Airplanes
(``ETOPS''). The regulatory basis of ETOPS was the deviation authority
contained in 14 CFR section 121.161. With the cooperation of the
airlines, manufacturers, and other interested groups, the FAA carefully
controlled and monitored this new type of flight operation.

Historical Documents

Advisory Circulars 120-42 and 120-42A

In support of ETOPS, the FAA issued two Advisory Circulars (AC)
120-42 and 120-42A in 1985 and 1988 respectively. These two AC
documents have been the basis for type design and operational practices
for ETOPS to date. Initially, the FAA set a maximum approval of 120
minutes from an airport for ETOPS. During the nascent stage of ETOPS,
air carriers gained significant service experience; the safety and
efficiency of ETOPS became apparent. In 1988, the FAA increased that
approval to 180 minutes based on demonstrated safety record of these
operations.

Deviation Authority From Sec. 121.161 Prior to ETOPS

Since the 1970s, the FAA has authorized two-engine operations on
routes up to 75 minutes away from an airport exclusively in the
Caribbean. These were not considered ETOPS flights. These flights were
approved by the FAA as deviations under section 121.161, but were
authorized before a formal ETOPS program was developed. These
deviations were approved after a safety evaluation of the areas of
operation, the airplanes, and the operators conducting them.

207 Minute ETOPS

In March 1999, the Air Transport Association (ATA) asked the FAA to
extend the 180-minute ETOPS authorization an additional fifteen percent
to 207-minutes. The FAA published the ATA letter and asked for comments
(64 FR 22667, April 27, 1999). Several commenters suggested that the
FAA should formalize ETOPS in the regulations rather than continuing to
rely on the deviation authority in section 121.161 and advisory
materials. In January 2000, the FAA approved 207 minute ETOPS and
stated its intent to task an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC) Working Group to study the issues and to recommend regulations
for ETOPS (65 FR 3522, January 21, 2000). In this same notice, the FAA
solicited comments from the public on its decision to approve 207
minute ETOPS.

Polar Operations Letter

The increasing use of Polar flights, while creating economic
benefits, has brought new challenges to extended operations such as
climactic extremes. Due to these new challenges and to the increasing
similarity among all long-range operations, experience began to show
that ETOPS requirements and processes are generally applicable to all
long-range operations including those by three and four engine
airplanes and would improve their safety.

Harmonization With International Standards

Related International Activity
Two related activities should be noted. First, the Joint Aviation
Authorities (JAA) of European nations has chartered a working group
that is also developing standards and guidance material for extended
operations. In ongoing efforts of both the FAA and JAA to coordinate
regulatory requirements, one of the ARAC ETOPS Working Group tasks was
to ``harmonize * * * standardized requirements across national
boundaries and regulatory bodies.'' Toward that end, there are
representatives who are members of both the ARAC ETOPS Working Group
and the JAA Working Group. Also, the two groups met together twice in
Europe to facilitate joint action and harmonization. Second, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Air Navigation
Commission (ANC) Operations Panel has decided to develop standards and
recommended practices (SARPS) for extended range operations. In May of
2001, the ARAC ETOPS Working Group held one of its meetings in
Montreal, Quebec, Canada (ICAO's headquarters city) for the purpose of
briefing members of the ANC and ICAO Air Navigation Bureau staff.

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Task Statement

The FAA established the ARAC ETOPS Working Group through a notice
in the Federal Register at 65 FR 37447, dated June 14, 2000. It was
given the following tasks:
1. Review the existing policy and requirements found in Advisory
Circular (AC) 120-42A, applicable ETOPS special conditions, and policy
memorandums and notices, for certification and operational regulations
and guidance material for ETOPS approvals up to 180 minutes.
2. Develop comprehensive ETOPS airworthiness standards for 14 CFR
parts 25, 33, 121, and 135, as appropriate, to codify the existing
policies and practices.
3. Develop ETOPS requirements for operations in excess of 180
minutes up to whatever extent that may be justified. Develop those
requirements such that incremental approvals up to a maximum may be
approved.
4. Develop standardized requirements for extended range operations
for all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, including all
turbojet and turbopropeller commercial twin-engine airplanes (business
jets), excluding reciprocating engine powered commercial airplanes.
This effort should establish criteria for diversion times up to 180
minutes that is consistent with existing ETOPS policy and procedures.
It should also develop criteria for diversion times beyond 180 minutes
that is consistent with the ETOPS criteria developed by the Working
Group.
5. Develop additional guidance and/or advisory material as the ARAC
finds appropriate.
6. Harmonize such standardized requirements across national
boundaries and regulatory bodies.
7. Any proposal to increase the safety requirements for existing
ETOPS approvals up to 207 minutes must contain data defining the unsafe
conditions that would warrant the safety requirements.
8. The Working Group will provide briefings to the Transport
Airplane and Engine Issues group.
9. The recommendations should consider the comments received as a
result of the April 27, 1999 and January 21, 2000 Federal Register
notices.
10. Within one year of publication of the ARAC task in the Federal
Register, submit recommendations to the FAA in the form of a proposed
rule.

Formation and Membership of the ETOPS Working Group

Formation
Following the formal tasking notice in the Federal Register, the
ARAC organized an ETOPS Working Group.
Membership
The ETOPS Working Group consisted of over 50 representatives of
U.S. and foreign airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers, pilots'
unions, industry groups, air disaster support groups, and

[[Page 64732]]

representatives from the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the FAA.
In accordance with the task statement and the Working Group's work
plan approved by the ARAC Air Carrier Operations Issues Group on August
15, 2000, the Working Group reviewed existing ETOPS documents and
developed a risk assessment method for ETOPS and other long-range
flights. The risk assessment method is comprised of three parts: a loss
of thrust model; a system safety analysis using the FAR/JAR 25.1309
process; and an operational assessment assuring that pertinent
operational considerations are taken into account.
On the basis of the risk model and their review of long-range
operations, the Working Group used the following general concepts as
the basis for proposed regulations and advisory material.
? Special considerations must be given for extended range
flights to prevent the need for a diversion and to protect the airplane
and passengers during the diversion when it cannot be prevented;
? Airplanes must be designed and built for the intended
mission.
? Airplanes must be designed, manufactured, and maintained at
a level that ensures the original reliability throughout the life of
the airplane.
? When engine reliability reaches a certain level, as
measured by the In Flight Shut Down (IFSD) rate (IFSD=0.01/1,000
hours), the risk of independent failures leading to loss of all thrust
is not significant enough to require limiting the allowed time from an
airport and other limiting factors come into play.
? For part 121 air carrier operations, ETOPS should be
defined as flights more than 60 minutes from an adequate airport for
two-engine airplanes and more than 180 minutes from an adequate airport
for air carrier airplanes with more than two engines. For part 135
operations ETOPS should be defined as flights more than 180 minutes
from an adequate airport.
? Because of extreme climactic conditions certain ETOPS
requirements should be applied to Polar operations even if those
operations would not otherwise be considered ETOPS
? Part 135 operations have unique considerations
Improvements in airplane engine and system reliability have reached
a point that they may no longer be the constraining factor on the long-
range flight operations. The Working Group found, however, and the FAA
agrees, that it would be prudent for two-engine airplanes to remain
within 180 minutes of an adequate airport whenever possible. There is a
positive correlation between risk and diversion length. Thus the FAA
believes that diversion lengths should be kept to a minimum.

ARAC ETOPS Working Group Concept General Observations

As already noted, the working group acknowledged that the
reliability of aircraft engines and systems has improved to the point
that it may not be limiting to the operation. The Working Group
recommended that two-engine airplanes should be approved in many cases
for 180 minutes ETOPS and ETOPS beyond 180 minutes may be appropriate
in some situations. The Working Group recommended that airplanes with
more than two engines should be approved for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes
in many cases. Even though engine reliability has significantly
improved, diversions are sometimes necessary for reasons that are
unrelated to the number of engines on an aircraft and their
reliability, such as passenger illness or other occurrences.
Regarding extended range operations by jet-powered airplanes under
part 135, FAA policy for many years has permitted such flights up to
180 minutes from an airport, without additional ETOPS-like
requirements. Operational experience has validated that policy, and the
Working Group proposal continues existing policy and provides for
flights with longer diversion times with appropriate additional
requirements.
Regarding extended range operations by air carrier airplanes with
more than two engines, those flights have been conducted without any
ETOPS-like requirements since the air carrier jet era began. The
Working Group's proposals would ensure the continued safety of those
flights by adding requirements in areas that are not dependent upon the
number of engines on the airplane, such as cargo fire protection
duration.
The ETOPS Working Group has proposed regulations and guidance
material in three specific areas: Type Design (parts 25 and 33); part
121 Operations; and part 135 Operations.

General Discussion of the Proposal

FAA Approach to the ARAC Recommendations

In developing this proposal the FAA has accepted ARAC
recommendations without change where possible. The FAA made changes for
clarity, to correct for incomplete ARAC recommendations, to ensure that
requirements are legally sufficient, and to make improvements in style
of presentation. The FAA provides explanation in this notice for any
substantial differences with the ARAC recommendation.

General Issues

Terminology--Extended Operations (ETOPS)
This proposal has two primary objectives: (1) To create new
regulations and amend existing regulations for the design, maintenance,
and operation of aircraft used in ETOPS; thus far ETOPS has been
allowed by the FAA's discretionary authority and supported by an
Advisory Circular and; (2) To apply the lessons learned from ETOPS to
all airplanes that are operated in Extended Operations (ETOPS)
regardless of the number of engines. The acronym ETOPS would apply to
all airplanes in Extended Operations and not just twin-engine
airplanes. These rules would apply equally to airplanes operating over
oceanic areas or routes entirely over land.
Risk Model
Item 3 of the ARAC tasking was to ``develop ETOPS requirements for
operations in excess of 180 minutes up to whatever extent that may be
justified.'' At the early ARAC ETOPS Working Group meetings, the FAA
presented a new risk model for assessing risk on an ETOPS flight. The
new approach for assessing the overall risk of critical thrust loss on
an ETOPS flight considers such factors as the length of the flight and
engine reliability in addition to the more traditional maximum
diversion time.
The ARAC ETOPS Working Group adopted the FAA's proposed risk model
and further developed it to apply it to three and four engine
airplanes. It did this by including the corresponding engine failure
rate that would be required to achieve an equivalent risk of critical
thrust loss due to independent failures on three and four engine
airplanes. We will now summarize the risk model used in the development
of this proposed rule.
The basic premise that the FAA used in developing its risk model is
that ETOPS service experience is excellent and that any changes to
allow further expansion of ETOPS need to preserve this record. With
this premise in mind, the basic objective is to define a risk model
that would allow an expansion of two engine airplane operations to use
the same routes as three and four engine airplanes with no substantial
change in the overall risk.

[[Page 64733]]

Currently, we manage dual engine shut down risk on two engine
airplanes by limiting the maximum allowable diversion distance and
requiring a low engine in-flight shutdown rate. This is a one-
dimensional risk model in that with a constant in-flight shutdown rate,
the existing ETOPS requirements and policy consider only the maximum
distance that an operator may plan a route from an enroute diversion
airport. It assumes that there is a constant risk during the course of
a flight with no consideration of how the actual diversion times vary
along the track as different alternate airports come into and out of
range of the airplane. This approach also does not consider the
increase in overall risk that is created by increasing an airplane's
range, and thus time aloft, by adding fuel. Further, this model
provides no means to assess the effect on overall risk with changes
with engine failure rates. Actual ETOPS involve continuously changing
distances to alternates. Current ETOPS limits on maximum diversion time
don't represent real world risk because diversions can occur anywhere
along the track, not just at the maximum point. The new ETOPS risk
model adopted for the development of this new proposed rule is based on
the introduction of a ``two dimensional'' model to replace the ``one
dimensional'' maximum diversion time/distance model currently in use.
The new ETOPS Exposure Index is a simplified form of several risk
equations that have been developed over the past forty years. All share
similar characteristics. The ARAC ETOPS Working Group compared several
different mathematical representations for allowable risk versus engine
failure rate. Each showed that an engine failure rate on the order of
0.01 per 1,000 engine flight hours was adequate to allow diversion
times for two engine airplanes that for all practical purposes could be
considered as unrestricted.
The new risk model consists of a comparative risk index based on a
combination of range, average diversion distance, and engine failure
rate. Independent cause dual engine shut down risk is driven by the
footprint area of the route multiplied by the engine failure rate (E)
squared. The footprint area is defined as the route length (L)
multiplied by the average diversion distance (D). Note that the engine
shut down rate is squared to account for loss of first engine and then
loss of second engine. Therefore, we define ``ETOPS Exposure Index''
(EEI) as a function of:
? Footprint Area (Route Length x Average Diversion Distance)
(L x D) and
? E2 (Engine Failure Rate Squared)

EEI = L x D x E2

The ETOPS Exposure Index can be used as an evaluation tool to
assess risk of ETOPS operations due to independent engine failure
causes. Assuming the following values for each of the terms of the
equation:
? Route Length = 5500 nautical miles,
? Average Distance for 180 minute ETOPS = 800 nautical miles,
and
? Engine failure rate at the current required level = 0.02
shutdowns/1,000 engine-hours or 50,000 hours time between shutdowns.
The EEI would then be:

EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760

With the ETOPS Exposure Index fixed at this level, longer flights
and greater maximum diversion distances can be offset by decreased
engine failure rate. In other words, as E becomes smaller, L and/or D
can increase appropriately. An engine failure rate of one-half the
current requirement (E = 0.01/1,000 engine-hours) would allow a four
times increase in ``footprint'' area.

EEI = L x D x E2
EEI = 5500 x 800 x 0.022 = 1760 equals
EEI = 5500 x 3200 x 0.012 = 1760 equals
EEI = 11,000 x 1600 x 0.012 = 1760

In other words, with an engine failure rate that is one-half the
current requirement for 180 minute ETOPS we could allow four times the
average diversion distance or a combination of increased route length
and average diversion distance with no change in the current ETOPS
risk.
For a two engine airplane, engine failure rate has the biggest
impact on ETOPS risk because the factor is squared. A reduction in the
engine failure rate has a large impact on the size of an allowable
footprint area for the same risk. Using the ETOPS Exposure Index
concept with a reduction in the engine failure rate standard allows the
development of ETOPS rules for two engine airplanes that minimize
restrictions on airline operations while maintaining the current
excellent ETOPS safety record.
Current in-service engines are capable of achieving better than
100,000 hours time between shutdowns (.01/1,000 engine-hours), or
double the current ETOPS reliability standard. This represents two in-
flight shutdowns in the entire life of a typical transport airplane. It
is not reasonable to expect that two in-flight shutdowns due to
independent causes in the entire life of a typical transport airplane
would occur on the same flight.
With an IFSD rate of 0.01/1,000 hours, the probability of complete
loss of thrust due to independent failures will be sufficiently low so
that the main focus of long-range operational safety can be on reducing
the possibility of other risk factors.
We emphasize that this risk model represents a good tool for
evaluating the risk of critical thrust loss due to ``independent''
failure causes. The biggest threat to long-range operational safety
continues to be the loss of thrust from multiple engines resulting
from:

Common Cause Multiple Failures
Cascading Multiple Failures
Fuel Exhaustion

These threats are common to all long-range operations, regardless of
the number of engines on the airplane.
Examples of common cause multiple failure events:

Eastern Airlines L1011 nearly lost all engines after improper
installation of engine magnetic chip detectors.
B-747 volcanic ash cloud encounter during volcanic eruption in Alaska--
All engines severely damaged by ash.

Example of potential cascading failure:
Worn-out second engine fails after application of higher power
following failure of first engine

Examples of Fuel Exhaustion events:

Air Canada 767--No power landing into Gimli, Canada
Air Transat A330--No power landing in the Azores

Sources of Common Cause and Cascading Failures:

Common Design Faults
Hardware
Software
Environmental Exposures
Weather
Volcanic Ash Clouds
Bird Strikes
High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)
Lightning
Simultaneous Maintenance on More than One Engine
Contaminated Fuel

Sources of Fuel Exhaustion:
Operational Errors
Fuel System Mismanagement
Fuel Loading Errors
Misleading Fuel Quantity Indications
Misleading Fuel Loading Procedures particularly during a non-normal
(MEL) dispatch

Constant awareness of potential sources of common cause failures,
cascading failures, and fuel exhaustion is the key to continued long-
range operational safety. This awareness, growing from operating
experience, is the basis for continued ETOPS safety. ETOPS safety
enhancements focus on defining methods to prevent potential threats
caused by known sources.
Examples of Common Cause/Cascading Failure Prevention Strategies:

[[Page 64734]]

1. No single person performing simultaneous engine maintenance or
servicing
2. Conservative fuel loading requirements
3. Intense rain/hail ingestion engine design requirements
4. Constant adherence to established ETOPS procedures without exception
5. Robust engine condition monitoring program

The FAA incorporated prevention strategies for these types of failures
into airworthiness requirements and ETOPS policy as we learned of them.
This proposal would codify those prevention strategies for known
sources of common cause, cascading and fuel exhaustion failures that
have not been incorporated into the regulations.
The ARAC ETOPS Working Group also looked at how the new risk model
could be applied to airplanes with more than two engines. For these
types of airplanes, the working group had to decide what a critical
loss of thrust was in order to determine the impact that engine failure
rate would have on overall risk. For a two-engine airplane, the risk
model assumes that a loss of both engines is a critical thrust loss.
This is because there is a general expectation that the result of such
an occurrence would be a catastrophic loss of the airplane; though
there are examples of safe landings following the loss of both engines.
The working group applied a similar approach to define a critical
thrust loss for airplanes with more than two engines.
The operating rules contained in 14 CFR part 121 have minimum
performance requirements with two engines inoperative for airplanes
that have more than two engines. Using this as a guide, the working
group assumed that critical thrust loss for both three and four engine
airplanes would be three engines. If three engines fail on either kind
of airplane, there is a general expectation that the result would be a
catastrophic loss of the airplane. In other words, the risk model
assumes the fourth engine on a four-engine airplane provides no
additional safety benefit compared to the loss of all engines on a
three-engine airplane. As is the case for two-engine airplanes, there
are examples where a flight crew was able to safely land a four-engine
airplane following the loss of three of the engines. However, the ETOPS
risk model makes the conservative assumption that this would result in
loss of the airplane.
This assumption for three and four engine airplanes changes the
risk model equations so that for these types of airplanes, the
probability of the loss of three engines would be much more remote than
the loss of both engines on a two engine airplane. Under this
assumption there is a higher probability of losing three engines on a
four-engine airplane than on a three-engine airplane. The following
example illustrates the concept. A three-engine and a four-engine
airplane are in-flight. Both airplanes suffer the loss of two-engines
due to independent causes but can reach a diversion airport. However
the loss of an additional engine for either airplane at this point
would be catastrophic for the airplane. The three-engine airplane has a
single engine that could possibly fail while the four-engine airplane
has two engines that could possibly fail. In this unlikely situation,
the four-engine airplane is at greater risk because the probability of
experiencing an engine failure event increases with the number of
engines. Assuming that the engine failure rate is the same for each
type of airplane, a four-engine airplane would have twice the
probability of losing one of the two remaining engines than the three-
engine airplane would have of losing the one remaining engine.
Using the available risk model equations with these considerations,
the ARAC ETOPS Working Group determined that the in-flight shutdown
rate for a three engine airplane would be approximately 0.2 shutdowns
per 1,000 engine-hours to have an equivalent risk of critical thrust
loss compared to a two engine airplane with an in-flight shutdown rate
of 0.01 per 1,000 engine-hours. On a four-engine airplane, the
equivalent in-flight shutdown rate would be 0.1 per 1,000 engine-hours.
Because these rates are so high compared to the failure rates
currently achieved by today's turbine engines, the FAA does not
consider it necessary to specify in-flight shutdown rates for three and
four engine airplanes other than as part of an operator's propulsion
system monitoring program. Under these programs, the operator must
notify the FAA and take corrective action if these rates are exceeded.
In-flight Shutdown (IFSD) Rate
Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights.
A propulsion system monitoring program is intended to detect adverse
trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for
when corrective action may be necessary. The certificate holder would
have to ensure that its ETOPS airplanes have In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD)
rates commensurate with the world fleet's operation for that airplane
type. Propulsion system monitoring at the operator level has been
accomplished via the guidance of AC 120-42A which defined specific IFSD
rates for ETOPS.
Propulsion system problems and IFSD may be caused by type design
deficiencies, ineffective maintenance or operational procedures. It is
very important to identify the root cause of events so that appropriate
corrective action may be determined. The diverse causes of propulsion
system problems require different solutions. For example, type design
problems may affect the world fleet of aircraft. If an individual
certificate holder experiences a problem caused by a type design issue,
it may not be appropriate for the FAA to reduce or withdraw the
particular operator's ETOPS authority. However, maintenance or
operational problems may be wholly, or partially, the responsibility of
the certificate holder. If a certificate holder has an unacceptable
IFSD rate risk attributed to maintenance or operational practices, then
action carefully tailored to that certificate holder may be required.
The FAA does not use IFSD rate as the sole means to determine a
certificate holder's ETOPS authority. The FAA considers the 12-month
rolling average standard that occurs for a mature fleet after the
commencement of ETOPS. A high IFSD rate could be due to the limited
number of engine operating hours used as the denominator for the rate
calculation or a small fleet. The effect may be an IFSD rate jump well
above the standard rate due to a single IFSD event. The underlying
causes for such a jump in the rate will have to be considered by the
Administrator. Conversely, there may be occasions when a single ETOPS
event may warrant corrective action even though the overall IFSD rate
is not exceeded. In such a case, the cause would be certificate holder
specific and may require changes to their operational, dispatch or
maintenance procedures.
Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) Document
The use of a CMP document has been in the ETOPS criteria from AC
120-42, and later 120-42A, from the very first ETOPS airplane
approvals. The CMP document defines airplane and propulsion system
design configurations, maintenance procedures, and operational
procedures required to comply with the ETOPS requirements that are not
already a part of the original type design approved by the original
issuance of the airplane and engine type certificates.
The CMP document is comprised of service bulletins, service
letters,

[[Page 64735]]

maintenance manual references, and other pertinent documents which
define the alterations, maintenance or operational requirements and
limitations that the FAA requires to make an airplane type design
suitable for ETOPS. The CMP is an amendment to the airplane type design
defined in 14 CFR 21.31. The initial CMP approval, as a change to the
type design, is analogous to other type design approvals for specific
operations such as Category III autoland approval for autopilot systems
that could involve design changes to a previously certified system.
After ETOPS approval, the CMP may be modified by any airworthiness
directives (ADs) issued in accordance with part 39 that supersede
existing CMP requirements. CMP document requirements will not increase
except by AD.
Misconceptions about the criteria for revising CMP documents
generated some of the biggest discussions in the ARAC ETOPS Working
Group meetings. The FAA approved airplanes for ETOPS under the original
AC 120-42 between 1985 and 1989 without a defined propulsion system
reliability standard. The approach used in AC 120-42 to assess the
suitability of an airplane-engine combination for ETOPS was to use a
``fix all problems'' approach. This process involved identifying the
causes of propulsion system problems in service on the candidate
airplane and including identified corrective actions into an approved
CMP document as a condition for ETOPS approval. This was an ongoing
process and the FAA conducted regular reviews to determine additional
corrective actions as new problems occurred in service. As a result,
the FAA routinely required the airplane manufacturer to revise the CMP
documents during this period.
The ``fix all problems'' approach to airplane propulsion system
assessment was carried over into the revised AC 120-42A at the end of
1988, and continues on in this notice in proposed part 25 Appendix L
paragraph II(a)(ii). However, revision A of the AC added a propulsion
system reliability standard as a provision for ETOPS type design
approval that did not exist in the original AC. With an established
propulsion system reliability standard, the FAA now had a gauge to
monitor the safety of the approved ETOPS fleet without a need to
continually update the CMP as new problems occurred. Also, several
ETOPS operators began objecting to the FAA requiring them to
continually upgrade existing ETOPS approved airplanes without any input
to the changes being required.
The FAA recognized that our previous practice of requiring upgrades
to already approved airplanes without prior public review created an
undue burden on operators. As a result, the FAA changed its approval
process for revisions to CMP documents. The FAA documented this change
in an internal memorandum signed by the managers of the Transport
Airplane Directorate, and the Engine and Propeller Directorate on April
3, 1990. In that memo, the directorate managers noted that the AC gave
them the responsibility for the continuing airworthiness of the type
design CMP standard and that the CMP should not be changed unless the
reliability of the airplane-engine combination is not achieving or
maintaining the reliability objective, or some other unsafe condition
arises. As with any type design, the FAA permits manufacturers and
operators to incorporate minor changes and routine enhancements by
service bulletins or production design changes. However, the FAA will
not mandate such enhancements in a revision to the CMP standard. The
memo concludes by stating that the Transport Airplane and the Engine
and Propeller Directorates plan to use the AD process to control the
continuing airworthiness type design requirements of the ETOPS CMP
standard.
As a result of the joint memo, the FAA established strict
guidelines for CMP revisions to ensure that the requirements of the
basic CMP standard originally approved for an airplane-engine
combination are not increased without going through the AD process.
The FAA approves revisions to an airplane's CMP document for the
following reasons:
1. When incorporating the CMP standard for a newly approved
airplane-engine combination into an existing CMP document.
2. When correcting errors in previous revisions.
3. When ADs are issued that supersede existing CMP requirements.
4. When approving optional alternatives to existing requirements.
5. When mandating changes to the CMP by an AD.
The FAA aircraft certification offices have used these guidelines
since issuance of the joint memo to approve CMP revisions. Because
operators had already complied with several revisions to previously
approved CMP documents in force at the time the FAA issued the new CMP
guidelines, the FAA worked with the airlines and the manufacturers to
establish ``baseline'' CMP requirements for each ETOPS approved
airplane-engine combination. The affected operators agreed to ensure
that all of the requirements of these baseline CMPs are incorporated
into their ETOPS fleets. Thereafter, the new CMP revision guidelines
would be the standard way of making subsequent revisions.
Summary of the Proposed Changes
The following chart summarizes which operations would be affected
by the proposed rule changes:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current requirements Proposed rule
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond 60 min up to
Up to 60 minutes Beyond 60 minutes Up to 60 minutes 180 minutes Beyond 180 minutes
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 121 two engine................ Section 121.161 Advisory material and No change............ Would apply (Would Would apply.
applies. policy letters. codify previous
practice).
Part 121 more than two engine...... No current regulation. No current regulation No change............ No change............ Would apply.
Part 135........................... No current regulation. No current regulation No change............ No change............ Would apply.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

[[Page 64736]]

The chart below summarizes ETOPS regulations before and after the
proposed changes.
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TP14NO03.002

BILLING CODE 4910-13-C

[[Page 64737]]

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposal

We begin the discussion by clarifying the term ``ETOPS''. Since its
inception eighteen years ago, the term ``ETOPS'' has described
extended-range operations of two-engine air carrier airplanes under a
deviation from 14 CFR 121.161. The term has gained broad acceptance
among operators and regulators throughout much of the world.
This proposal would create regulatory requirements for extended
operations for all air carrier airplanes. As described previously, the
thresholds for applicability would vary by the number of engines and
type of operation. In its deliberations, the Working Group stated that
it struggled with the question of whether to use a new term to describe
the operations of airplanes beyond 180 minutes from an adequate
airport. Early on, the Working Group considered and agreed to the term
``LROPS'' which stands for Long Range Operations to describe flights
beyond the 180-minute threshold. However, as their efforts progressed
the Working Group found that the use of two terms (ETOPS and LROPS) for
two-engine airplanes flying beyond 60 minutes and 180 minutes from an
airport quickly became awkward and cumbersome. Further, the Working
Group members representing the maintenance community expressed great
concern that the introduction of the LROPS term would needlessly create
confusion among the maintenance community and would also require
painstaking and potentially expensive revisions to numerous maintenance
manuals and programs. In order to avoid any potential confusion, the
Working Group recommended the use of the term ETOPS for all air carrier
extended range operations irrespective of the number of engines.
The FAA strongly agrees with this recommendation. The FAA also
believes that the addition of a new term could needlessly create
confusion. Further it would potentially dilute the intent of this
proposal, which is to codify existing ETOPS standards and procedures
and to extend those concepts to airplanes with more than two engines.
The FAA believes that the introduction of a new term could be
misinterpreted as creating a new operational concept as opposed to the
extension of an existing one.
The proposed amendments to the Type Design Rules 14 CFR parts 25
and 33 and supporting advisory material are a consolidation of
requirements taken from AC 120-42A, the 777 Special Conditions, and JAA
Information Leaflet (IL) 20. The materials contained in the proposed
Airplane Type Design Rule (part 25) and AC are a compilation of the
existing AC120-42A, 777 Special Condition, and JAA IL20.
The following discussion takes each of the Rule sections and
attempts to capture all of the comments and discussion from the ARAC
activities.

Part 1

Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 1

Section 1.1--General Definitions
The proposed definitions were adopted directly from the ARAC
recommendation. This proposal would establish three different
definitions of ETOPS in three significant ways. In each case, the
acronym would stand for ``extended operations'' for all airplanes
regardless of the number of engines. The definition would vary in part
121, however, depending on whether the airplane involved has two
engines or more than two engines. This proposal also would introduce
ETOPS into part 135 for the first time, where ETOPS would have a third
definition. The FAA believes the remainder of the proposed definitions
for section 1.1 are self-explanatory.

Part 21

The amendments to part 21 would create reporting requirements for
the holders of type certificate for two-engine ETOPS airplanes and
ETOPS eligible engines. This would require type certificate holders to
closely monitor the performance of their products to ensure their
continuing reliability. These amendments would also ensure that the FAA
is kept apprised of any existing or potential problems in a timely
manner.

Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 21

Proposed New Section 21.4--ETOPS Reporting Requirements
This proposal would add a new regulation consisting of two parts,
Early ETOPS Problem Reporting & Tracking for all ETOPS airplanes, and
ETOPS Operational Service Reliability Reporting for two-engine
airplanes.
Explanation
1. Reporting for all ETOPS airplanes. The proposed rule is a
codification of what the FAA considers to be one of the essential and
objective elements of the early ETOPS Special Conditions (SC) for the
B777 aircraft; specifically as they pertain to problem tracking and
reporting. The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendation and proposes it as a
new section 21.4. Section 21.4 would require the type certificate
holder to establish an early ETOPS problem reporting system. The
proposed system would contain a means for the prompt identification of
those problems that could impact the safety of ETOPS operations in
order that they may be resolved in a timely manner. The system would
also contain the process for the timely notification to the responsible
FAA office of all relevant problems encountered, and identification of
corrective actions deemed necessary and provide for appropriate FAA
review of all planned corrective actions. The system would be in place
for the first 250,000 engine-hours of fleet operating experience after
the airplane enters service.
For two-engine ETOPS airplanes the system would remain in effect
beyond 250,000 engine-hours of fleet operating experience until the
fleet has demonstrated a specified and stable IFSD rate consistent with
the approved diversion time of the aircraft. For the service period,
this system would define the sources and content of in-service data
that will be made available to the type certificate holder in support
of the problem tracking system. The content of the data provided would
include the data necessary to evaluate the specific cause of all
service events reportable under section 21.3(c) of part 21, in addition
to any other failure or malfunction that could affect the safety of
ETOPS operation. Ten event occurrences, specifically defined with
respect to reliable, safe ETOPS operation that would require reporting
are defined in the proposal.
2. Reporting for two engine ETOPS airplanes. Paragraph (b)(1) of
the proposed section 21.4 would require engine and airplane
manufacturers to report periodically on the reliability of their two-
engine airplane fleets. Reporting would include: IFSD events, IFSD
rates, and ETOPS fleet statistics. This reporting may be combined with
the reporting required by section 21.3. The proposed rule also would
require the identification of cause and appropriate corrective action
to assure reliable, safe ETOPS operations.
The periodic reporting of the reliability required of the
manufacturers of engines and airplanes approved for ETOPS service would
begin at the introduction of the product into service and continue
throughout its product life. The interval of the reporting would be
more frequent early in its product cycle and generally longer later in
its product service life, especially after the product has achieved
maturity with regard to engine reliability. Reliability would be
indicated by a stable engine

[[Page 64738]]

shutdown event rate at or below the target values.
Generally, early product service life reporting on a quarterly
basis is adequate, especially considering the fact that the
manufacturers report engine failure events as they occur under the
requirements of section 21.3. Event rates may fluctuate considerably
early in the product's service life cycle because, although the fleet
is growing in numbers of engine-airplane combinations in service, the
accumulation of engine flight hours is generally slow. Typically, event
rates are not very stable when the fleet cumulative time is less than 1
or 2 million engine flight hours. Therefore the focus should be on
event occurrences, not failure rates, with a small fleet typical of
early service time.
After maturity (a stable engine shutdown event rate at or below the
target values) with a large fleet, reporting intervals continue on a
quarterly basis. Regardless of fleet size, fleet age, and state of
maturity, engine failures are reported under the requirements of
section 21.3.
3. Paragraph (b)(2) of the proposed section 21.4 identifies world
fleet IFSD rate/reliability requirements. The standards in section
21.4(b)(2)(i) are the IFSD rates compatible with the current FAA ETOPS
AC and Policy for operation up to 180 minutes (including North Pacific
operation). The standard in section 21.4(b)(2)(ii) is an IFSD rate
compatible with operation beyond 180 minutes to 240 minutes and beyond,
as contained in the proposed Operational rule and guidance material.
As discussed in this proposed NPRM, an IFSD rate of 0.01/1,000
Engine Flight Hours (EFH) is consistent with an extremely improbable
risk of a dual in-flight power loss from independent causes for a two-
engine airplane, even assuming a decision of practically unlimited
duration. The rates given are not operator specific, but rather apply
across the fleet of a given airplane-engine combination.
The FAA expects implementation of corrective action will maintain
an acceptable in-flight shutdown rate below the required levels. This
is borne out by the current ETOPS fleet in-flight shutdown rates, which
have achieved and consistently maintained rates at or below 0.01 per
1,000 engine-hours. If the normal airworthiness monitoring process is
not sufficient by itself to maintain an acceptable propulsion system
reliability for a particular airplane-engine combination, then the FAA
may require additional corrective actions, or reduce or withdraw the
ETOPS diversion authority as described in section 21.4(c), if the risk
of dual power loss is unacceptably high. Before such action is taken,
however, the certificate holder and the FAA will assess the fleet-wide
risk based upon the risk model developed for ETOPS presented in this
preamble.

Part 25

Section by Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 25

Proposed Change to Paragraph 25.857(c)(2)--Cargo Fire Suppression
The proposed change to section 25.857(c)(2) would require that the
applicant furnish the certified time capability of a Class C cargo fire
suppression system in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) in accordance
with section 25.1581(a)(2). The time capability of a system is the
maximum length of time a system can suppress a fire.
Explanation
The proposed new section 121.633 and part 135, Appendix H,
paragraph E would specify that the time that an operator needs to fly
to a planned ETOPS alternate may not exceed the maximum time capability
specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane's most time
limited system. This change to section 25.857(c)(2) and a similar
requirement in the new Appendix L, section I, paragraph (e)(4) will
ensure that the Airplane Flight Manual provides the information that
the operators will need regarding the fire suppression system to comply
with the operating requirements. The justification for these changes is
further discussed in the explanations for those proposed operating
rules.
Proposed New Section 25.1535--ETOPS Approval
A proposed new section 25.1535 would prescribe the requirements for
obtaining ETOPS type design approval.
Explanation
This new rule in the body of part 25 is effectively a pointer to a
new Appendix L, which sets out additional design, analysis and test
requirements for ETOPS type design approval. This rule also requires
that in showing compliance with part 25 rules the applicant must
consider the maximum length ETOPS mission. The applicant must also
consider the effects of airplane system failure on crew workload and
passenger physiological needs during a diversion of the maximum time
considered. The system safety assessment required by section 25.1309 is
an example of a rule where the ETOPS mission profile would be
considered in an analysis to determine compliance. The ETOPS mission
profile (including the maximum diversion time) could also affect the
compliance analysis for section 25.1011(b) concerning oil endurance,
and section 25.571 governing structural fatigue and damage tolerance.
This proposed rule is crucial to ensure that throughout the
airplane design, the ETOPS mission profile is properly considered, and
the standard of compliance is high because of it. The ``ETOPS
Scenario'' diagram and the ETOPS significant systems definition that
would be provided in the associated advisory circular for this rule are
good tools that system designers can use to assess all conditions
although they are not regulatory. There are also additional
requirements in Appendix L to provide focus on those airplane systems
that have, historically, been important to ETOPS operations such as
electrical power, APU, and fuel systems. The emphasis on these specific
airplane systems does not mean that these are the only airplane systems
that are important to ETOPS. The section 25.1535 and Appendix L
requirements along with the advisory circular guidance for ETOPS
significant systems and the ETOPS mission profile provide the basis for
assessing other airplane systems for ETOPS approval.
Proposed New Part 25 Appendix L--Extended Operations
A proposed new appendix L to part 25 defines additional
airworthiness requirements for ETOPS approval.
Explanation
Appendix L would codify the airworthiness standards unique to ETOPS
from Advisory Circular 120-42A, the Boeing 777 ETOPS special
conditions, and the 207-minute ETOPS Policy Letter EPL 20-01. The
requirements of Appendix L would go beyond simply considering the ETOPS
mission in applying the basic part 25 requirements.
Since we would not require an applicant to comply with these ETOPS
requirements in order to receive a basic part 25 type certificate, we
decided that a separate appendix to part 25 would be the best location
for these additional requirements for ETOPS.
Appendix L Format
Appendix L is organized into three sections. Section I sets out
design requirements that all airplanes must comply with for ETOPS
approval. Section II prescribes specific requirements for two engine
airplanes. Section III prescribes specific

[[Page 64739]]

requirements for airplanes with more than two engines.
The proposed numbering system and organization of Appendix L is a
significant departure from the ARAC recommendation. As an aid to
readers familiar with the original ARAC proposal, Tables 1 and 2 cross-
reference the original Appendix L paragraph numbers recommended by ARAC
to the reorganized appendix proposed in this notice.

Table 1.--Cross-Reference of ARAC Proposed and New Appendix L Paragraph Numbers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Original ARAC Proposal New
----------------------------------------------------------
L25.1............................. ..................... Appendix L.......... Applicability
L25.2............................. (a).................. Section I........... (a)
(a)(i)............... Section I........... (a)(1)
(a)(i)(1)............ Section I........... (a)(1)(i)
(a)(i)(2)............ Section I........... (a)(1)(ii)
(a)(ii).............. Section I........... (a)(2)
(a)(ii)(1)........... Section I........... (a)(2)(i)
(a)(ii)(2)........... Section I........... (a)(2)(ii)
(a)(ii)(3)........... Section I........... (a)(2)(iii)
(a)(iii)............. Section I........... (a)(3)
(b).................. Section I........... (b)
(b)(i)............... Section I........... (b)(1)
(b)(i)(1)............ Section I........... (b)(1)(i)
(b)(ii).............. Section I........... (b)(1)
(b)(iii)............. Section I........... (b)(1)(ii)
(b)(iv).............. Section I........... (b)(2)
(b)(iv)(1)........... Section I........... (b)(2)(i)
(b)(iv)(2)........... Section I........... (b)(2)(ii)
L25.3............................. (i).................. Section II.......... (b)(1)
(ii)................. Section II.......... (b)(2)(ii)
(iii)................ Section I........... (c)
L25.4............................. Section II, Section ...............................
III
(a).................. Section II, Section (a)
III.
(a)(i)............... Section II, Section (a)(1)
III.
(a)(ii).............. Section II, Section (a)(1)
III.
(a)(iii)............. Section II.......... (a)(2), (a)(3)
Section III......... (a)(2)
(a)(iv).............. Section II.......... (a)(4)
(a)(iv)(a)........... Section II.......... (a)(4)(i)
(a)(iv)(b)........... Section II.......... (a)(4)(ii)
(a)(iv)(c)........... Section II.......... (a)(4)(iii)
(a)(v)............... Section II.......... (a)(3)
Section III......... (a)(2)
(a)(vi).............. Section II.......... (a)(5)
Section III......... (a)(3)
(a)(vii)............. Section I........... (d)
(b).................. Omit ...............................
(b)(i)............... Section II.......... (b)(9)
Section III......... (b)(6)
(b)(i)(1)............ Section II.......... (b)(4)
(b)(i)(1)(a)......... Section II.......... (b)(4)(i)
(b)(i)(1)(b)......... Section II.......... (b)(4)(ii)
(b)(i)(2)............ Section II.......... (b)(6)
(b)(i)(2)............ Section III......... (b)(3)
(b)(i)(3)............ Section II.......... (b)(7)
(b)(i)(3)............ Section III......... (b)(4)
(b)(i)(3)(a)......... Section II.......... (b)(7)(i)
Section III......... (b)(4)(i)
(b)(i)(3)(a)(i)...... Section II.......... (b)(7)(i)(1)
Section III......... (b)(4)(i)(1)
(b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)..... Section II.......... (b)(7)(i)(2)
Section III......... (b)(4)(i)(2)
(b)(i)(3)(a)(iii).... Section II.......... (b)(7)(i)(3)
Section III......... (b)(4)(i)(3)
(b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)..... Section II.......... (b)(7)(i)(4)
Section III......... (b)(4)(i)(4)
(b)(i)(3)(a)(v)...... Section II.......... (b)(7)(i)(5)
Section III......... (b)(4)(i)(5)
(b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)..... Section II.......... (b)(7)(i)(6)
Section III......... (b)(4)(i)(6)
(b)(i)(3)(b)......... Section II.......... (b)(7)(ii)
Section III......... (b)(4)(ii)
(b)(i)(3)(c)......... Section II.......... (b)(7)(iii)
Section III......... (b)(4)(iii)
(b)(i)(3)(d)......... Section II.......... (b)(7)(iv)
Section III......... (b)(4)(iv)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 64740]]

Table 1.--Cross-Reference of ARAC Proposed and New Appendix L Paragraph Numbers--Continued
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 2.--Cross-Reference of New and ARAC Proposed Appendix L Paragraph Numbers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Original ARAC Proposal
----------------------------------------------------------
Appendix L........................ Applicability........ L25.1...............
Section I......................... ..................... L25.2...............
(a).................. L25.2............... (a)
(a)(1)............... L25.2............... (a)(i)
(a)(1)(i)............ L25.2............... (a)(i)(1)
(a)(1)(ii)........... L25.2............... (a)(i)(2)
(a)(1)(iii).......... New.................
(a)(2)............... L25.2............... (a)(ii)
(a)(2)(i)............ L25.2............... (a)(ii)1
(a)(2)(ii)........... L25.2............... (a)(ii)(2)
(a)(2)(iii).......... L25.2............... (a)(ii)(3)
(a)(3)............... L25.2............... (a)(iii)
(b).................. L25.2............... (b)
(b)(1)............... L25.2............... (b)(i), (b)(ii)
(b)(1)(i)............ L25.2............... (b)(i)(1)
(b)(1)(ii)........... L25.2............... (b)(iii)
(b)(2)............... L25.2............... (b)(iv)
(b)(2)(i)............ L25.2............... (b)(iv)(1)
(b)(2)(ii)........... L25.2............... (b)(iv)(2)
(b)(3)............... New.................
(c).................. L25.3............... (iii)
(d).................. L25.4............... (a)(vii)
(e).................. New.................
(e)(1)............... New.................
(e)(2)............... New.................
(e)(3)............... New.................
(e)(4)............... L25.5...............
(e)(5)............... New.................
Section II........................ ..................... L25.4...............
(a).................. L25.4............... (a)
(a)(1)............... L25.4............... (a)(i), (a)(ii)
(a)(2)............... L25.4............... (a)(iii)
(a)(3)............... L25.4............... (a)(iii), (a)(v)
(a)(4)............... L25.4............... (a)(iv)
(a)(4)(i)............ L25.4............... (a)(iv)(a)
(a)(4)(ii)........... L25.4............... (a)(iv)(b)
(a)(4)(iii).......... L25.4............... (a)(iv)(c)
(a)(5)............... L25.4............... (a)(vi)
(b)(1)............... L25.3............... (i)
(b)(2)(i)............ New.................
(b)(2)(ii)........... L25.3............... (ii)
(b)(3)............... L25.4............... (b)(iii)
(b)(4)............... L25.4............... (b)(i)(1)
(b)(4)(i)............ L25.4............... (b)(i)(1)(a)
(b)(4)(ii)........... L25.4............... (b)(i)(1)(b)
(b)(5)............... New.................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 64741]]

Table 2.--Cross-Reference of New and ARAC Proposed Appendix L Paragraph Numbers--Continued
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Original ARAC Proposal
----------------------------------------------------------
(b)(6)............... L25.4............... (b)(i)(2)
(b)(7)............... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)
(b)(7)(i)............ L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)
(b)(7)(i)(1)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(i)
(b)(7)(i)(2)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)
(b)(7)(i)(3)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(iii)
(b)(7)(i)(4)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)
(b)(7)(i)(5)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(v)
(b)(7)(i)(6)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)
(b)(7)(ii)........... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(b)
(b)(7)(iii).......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(c)
(b)(7)(iv)........... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(d)
(b)(7)(v)............ L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(e)
(b)(8)............... L25.4............... (b)(ii)
(b)(8)(i)............ L25.4............... (b)(ii)(a)
(b)(8)(ii)........... L25.4............... (b)(ii)(b)
(b)(8)(iii).......... L25.4............... (b)(ii)(c)
(b)(8)(iv)........... L25.4............... (b)(ii)(d)
(b)(9)............... L25.4............... (b)(i)
(c).................. L25.4............... (c)
(c)(1)............... L25.4............... (c)(i)
(c)(2)............... L25.4............... (c)(ii)
Section III....................... ..................... L25.4...............
(a).................. L25.4............... (a)
(a)(1)............... L25.4............... (a)(i), (a)(ii)
(a)(2)............... L25.4............... (a)(iii), (a)(v)
(a)(3)............... L25.4............... (a)(vi)
(b)(1)............... L25.4............... (b)(iii)
(b)(2)............... New.................
(b)(3)............... L25.4............... (b)(i)(2)
(b)(4)............... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)
(b)(4)(i)............ L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)
(b)(4)(i)(1)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(i)
(b)(4)(i)(2)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(ii)
(b)(4)(i)(3)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(iii)
(b)(4)(i)(4)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(iv)
(b)(4)(i)(5)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(v)
(b)(4)(i)(6)......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(a)(vi)
(b)(4)(ii)........... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(b)
(b)(4)(iii).......... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(c)
(b)(4)(iv)........... L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(d)
(b)(4)(v)............ L25.4............... (b)(i)(3)(e)
(b)(5)............... L25.4............... (b)(ii)
(b)(5)(i)............ L25.4............... (b)(ii)(a)
(b)(5)(ii)........... L25.4............... (b)(ii)(b)
(b)(5)(iii).......... L25.4............... (b)(ii)(c)
(b)(5)(iv)........... L25.4............... (b)(ii)(d)
(b)(6)............... L25.4............... (b)(i)
(c).................. L25.4............... (c)
(c)(1)............... L25.4............... (c)(i)
(c)(2)............... L25.4............... (c)(ii)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We discuss each paragraph of the proposed new Appendix L below.

Section I--Design Requirements

I(a) Airplane Systems

I(a)(1) Operation in Icing Conditions
I(a)(1)(i)
ETOPS airplanes would have to comply with the requirements of
section 25.1419 for operation in icing conditions.
Explanation
Section 25.1419 sets out the requirements for certifying a
transport category airplane for flight into icing conditions. This
requirement is optional in that an applicant may choose to not apply
for approval in icing conditions. However, from a practical standpoint
no one would request certification of an airplane that did not meet
this requirement. This proposed new regulation makes this approval
mandatory for ETOPS approval.
I(a)(1)(ii)
The airframe and propulsion system ice protection would have to be
capable of continued safe flight and landing at engine-inoperative and
decompression altitudes in icing conditions. Following the loss of an
engine at cruising altitude, an airplane will drift down to a lower
(engine-inoperative) altitude. A decompression altitude is an altitude
to which an airplane must descend following the loss of cabin pressure.
Decompression altitudes are 10,000 feet MSL and below.
Explanation
This paragraph would codify AC 120-42A, paragraph 8(b)(11) for
airframe ice protection. The applicant would have to demonstrate that
the airplane is capable of continued safe flight and landing at

[[Page 64742]]

the decompression altitudes. This rule would require the applicant to
demonstrate to the FAA that the anti-icing systems on the airplane will
assure the airplane's capability to continue to operate during a worst-
case diversion. The ARAC Working Group recommended a standard that
would require the capability to safely divert if anti-icing cannot be
shown available for all scenarios. This recommended standard tacitly
assumes that airplane ice protection is not necessarily required during
an ETOPS diversion. We disagree with this recommendation. Paragraph
8(b)(11) of AC 120-42A says that the airframe and propulsion ice
protection should be shown to provide adequate capability for the
intended operation. The AC says that this should account for prolonged
exposure to lower altitudes associated with the engine-out diversion,
cruise, holding, approach and landing. We do not interpret this
paragraph as allowing circumstances where anti-icing would not normally
be available during an ETOPS diversion. An applicant would have to
address any failure conditions where the ice-protection systems would
not be available during an ETOPS diversion as part of the safety
analysis required by section 25.1309.
The preamble justification provided in the ARAC proposal stated
that this rule ``will also require the applicant to demonstrate that
the non-heated (or ``non-deiced'') areas of the airplane will not pick
up a load of ice that would make the airplane uncontrollable or create
too much drag to complete the diversion.'' This statement is consistent
with how the FAA has applied the criteria of AC 120-42A paragraph
8.(b)(11) for all airplanes certified using that policy. However, the
ARAC recommendation did not include this specific provision. We have
added this requirement into the proposed rule as a new paragraph
I(a)(1)(iii). It is consistent with ARAC's recommendation and
consistent with what has been standard ETOPS type certification
practice to consider the accumulation of ice on the non-heated or non-
deiced areas of the airplane.
The associated advisory material for this proposed requirement will
describe the conditions and assumptions that an applicant may use in
simulating a diversion icing environment for showing compliance with
the proposed rule. The advisory material will also provide guidance for
developing analyses or testing that would justify not having to assume
that the entire diversion would be in icing conditions.
I(a)(2) Electrical Power Supply
I(a)(2)(i) and (ii)
These paragraphs would establish reliability requirements for the
electrical power supply system on an ETOPS flight.
Explanation
Paragraphs I(a)(2)(i) and (ii) are basically a restatement of
section 25.1309 for the electrical power supply system in consideration
of the ETOPS mission. We agree with the ARAC's apparent intent that
these paragraphs, in conjunction with the new sections 25.1535(a) and
(b), codify paragraphs 8(b)(1), 8(b)(6), 8(b)(7) and 8(c)(4) of AC 120-
42A for the electrically powered ETOPS significant systems. These
paragraphs establish the overall system safety objectives for these
systems in extended operations.
The proposed rule is not as explicit as AC 120-42A in stating the
types of functions that an applicant would need to consider in applying
the safety objectives of section 25.1309 for an ETOPS mission. The
general philosophy of the proposed rule is to let the existing policy
associated with section 25.1309 compliance determine the design
analysis for ETOPS. This philosophy is consistent with paragraph (c)(1)
of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions, which requires the
applicant to comply with part 25 with regards to the ETOPS mission.
Although we discuss this regulatory philosophy here in reference to the
specific electrical power supply system requirements, it also applies
to other ETOPS significant systems that are not specifically addressed
in the proposed rule.
The FAA's intent for paragraphs I(a)(2)(i) and (ii) is to assure
that the applicant properly focuses on electrical power redundancy and
reliability when considering ETOPS mission scenarios in showing
compliance with section 25.1309. On a two-engine airplane, the
potential lack of redundancy available for electrical power generation
makes this requirement especially important. However, the new emphasis
is in paragraph (ii). It will be up to the applicant to demonstrate
which functions would reduce the capability of the airplane or the
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. It is
not realistic, for instance, for an applicant to state that operating
for an extended period of time on suction feed would not reduce the
capability of the airplane to cope with adverse operating conditions
(for example, negative g or turbulence). Additionally, the applicant
would have to determine what navigation and communication systems must
be powered by emergency generation sources during a worst case ETOPS
diversion.
I(a)(2)(iii)
This paragraph would require at least three independent electrical
generation sources for airplanes being certified for greater than 180
minutes.
Explanation
Paragraph I(a)(2)(iii) would codify the three generator requirement
of paragraph 8.(b)(8) in AC 120-42A. However, the ARAC recommendation
only applies this requirement to airplanes being certified for greater
than 180-minute ETOPS. The AC specifies three generators for any ETOPS
approval. This specific requirement created much discussion within the
ARAC ETOPS Working Group. Paragraph I(a)(2)(iii) as proposed in this
notice represents the compromise position that allowed working group
consensus. The following paragraphs are the ARAC's recommended
justification for this requirement. The FAA is publishing them without
comment.
This topic is inextricably linked to the discussion about MMELs.
The MMEL or Master Minimum Equipment List allows an airplane operator
to fly without equipment not on this fully functioning. There is
concern that without a specific number of generators required in the
rule, the MMEL could strip away some of the redundancy required for
long-range flight. The arguments against a prescriptive number are
generally as follows:
(1) Defining a number of generators would not assure proper system
reliability (for example, is it better to have three generators with a
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 20,000 hours each, or four
generators with an MTBF of 3,000 each?)
(2) Defining a number of generators would either artificially
constrain or give a ``pass'' to future airplane designs. For instance,
if a new airplane had a system architectural need for 8 generating
systems, requiring three in the ETOPS rule would not assure an
adequately safe design.
(3) Trying to address the formation of the MMEL in part 25 is
impractical and inconsistent with agreed-to policies for MMEL
development.
``Nonetheless, it was agreed that there should be a tie-in between
the analysis performed for Part 25 ETOPS approval and the analysis the
Flight Operations Evaluation Review Board (FOEB), who develop the MMEL,
used in determining dispatch criteria. This is almost always the case
in today's process, but

[[Page 64743]]

formalizing the process would be a positive step.
``Therefore, an additional paragraph has been added to the ETOPS
regulation to require a minimum number of electrical generators. This
requirement codifies the existing AC 120-42A electrical generator
redundancy criteria. The intent of this requirement is to ensure future
airplanes to be certified for ETOPS have an electrical generation
system architecture equivalent to the 737, 757, 767, 777 and A310, 320,
A330 era airplanes. Future airplane electrical system architectures may
be significantly different from today's airplanes, but the architecture
must be equivalent from the perspective of robustness to independent
failure scenarios.''
I(a)(3) Time Limited Systems
This paragraph would require that the applicant state the
capability of most time limiting ETOPS significant system in the
airplane flight manual.
Explanation
As stated previously for the revised paragraph 25.857(c)(2), this
requirement would provide the information that the operators would need
to comply with the applicable operating requirements. Advisory Circular
120-42A has two main categories of ETOPS approval (120 minutes and 180
minutes) based on demonstrated propulsion system reliability. The ETOPS
approval, as stated in the airplane flight manual in currently approved
ETOPS airplanes, identifies the maximum approved diversion time based
as one of these two times. In order to qualify for the ETOPS type
design approval, the applicant must design the airplane time-limited
systems to support this maximum approved diversion time with an
additional 15 minutes capability to allow for airplane holding,
approach and landing.
In the context of proposed paragraph I(a)(3), we do not consider
the propulsion system as a time-limited ETOPS significant system.
Proposed Appendix L, section II(a), codifies the service experience
method for ETOPS approval from AC 120-42A. Paragraph II(a)(4) of this
section defines the required world fleet in-flight shutdown rate with
each level of ETOPS operational approval. In this particular case, the
level of ETOPS approval refers to the operational approval authority
defined in the operating rules, not the time-limited system capability
required in paragraph I(a)(3).

I(b) Propulsion System

I(b)(1) Fuel System Design
This paragraph would require design features to ensure that fuel
necessary to complete an ETOPS mission will be available at the flow
and pressure required for the engine, during a diversion for the
longest time being approved for the airplane. The proposed rule
includes a requirement for alerts to the crew when the fuel available
to the engines falls below the level required to complete the mission
which can occur because of fuel mismanagement, abnormal transfer
between tanks, and fuel loss.
Explanation
Fuel system design and the ability of the crew to properly deal
with fuel system malfunctions are arguably the most important issues
facing the designer of ETOPS airplanes. The proposed rule (with
corresponding AC guidance) addresses the need for:
(1) Positive fuel pressure at the engine fuel pump (no suction
feed);
(2) Fuel availability following system failures (no hidden/trapped
fuel, functional crossfeed valves, etc.); and
(3) Flight deck alerts when fuel available to the engines falls
below the level required to complete the mission.
The proposed requirements would codify the intent of paragraph
8.(b)(2)(iii) of AC 120-42A, paragraph (c)(3)(i)(C) of the Boeing 777
ETOPS special conditions, and items 7 and 8 of the type design
provisions of the 207 minute ETOPS Policy Letter EPL 20-1.
There has been some discussion regarding newer generation airplanes
(B777) and their system architecture being the standard by which
operations beyond 180 minutes will be judged. Currently, all transport
category aircraft are required to perform suction feed testing as part
of basic part 25 certification, which requires the applicant to
simulate an all Alternating Current (AC) power loss at the highest
altitude the airplane is used in service (``service ceiling''). The
testing is performed to demonstrate that in the event of an all AC
power loss, there is still ability (at some safe altitude) to re-start
the engines after flameout on suction feed and generate thrust to a
safe landing. This demonstration does not, however, provide any
assurance that the engines can operate on suction feed for the long
duration diversion times envisioned for ETOPS. The engines are
certified with a minimum engine fuel pump inlet pressure limit of
typically one-half pound per square inch (0.5 psi) above the ambient
air pressure, or the fuel vapor pressure, whichever is higher. Section
25.955 requires that the airplane fuel system deliver fuel to the
engine at this minimum pressure for the maximum fuel flow required by
the engine. Without the fuel boost pressure, airplanes cannot comply
with Sec. 25.955. The fuel system design requirements proposed in this
notice are intended to ensure that continued operation on suction feed
is not a practical possibility on ETOPS airplanes. Paragraph I(b)(1)
would be applicable to all ETOPS airplanes irrespective of the number
of engines.
Loss of normal electrical power to the boost pumps is the primary
cause of the loss of fuel system boost pressure. A specific fuel feed
capability requirement has been added for twin-engine ETOPS operations
beyond 180 minutes that is intended to address the concerns about loss
of fuel boost pressure raised in the development of the 207 minute
ETOPS policy. The 207-minute policy included a provision to also
address fuel cross-feed capability following the failure of normal
electrical power. Proposed paragraph I(b)(1)(i) would require that the
applicant design the airplane fuel system with a fuel boost pump in
each main tank and the capability to operate at least one crossfeed
valve by a back-up electrical generation source other than the primary
engine driven or APU driven generators. There is an exception in the
proposed rule for fuel system designs for situations when electrical
power does not provide required fuel boost pressure or crossfeed valve
actuation. Although this is a specific design requirement applicable to
two engine airplanes for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the overall design
objective underlying paragraph I(b)(1) is applicable to all ETOPS
airplanes. The applicant may use the same design features required by
paragraph I(b)(1)(i) as part of their compliance with paragraph I(b)(1)
for airplanes not specifically covered by this subparagraph.
The other possible source of the loss of fuel boost pressure is
mechanical failure of fuel system components. These include pump
failures or performance degradation, valve failures, and plumbing
failures causing internal or external fuel leaks that result in
significant fuel pressure loss. Possible design alternatives to address
mechanical failures as a source of loss of fuel system boost pressure
are:
1. Redundancy (additional boost pumps, cross-feed valves, etc.)
2. Improved component reliability (including any instructions for
continued airworthiness necessary to maintain that level of
reliability)

[[Page 64744]]

3. Enlarged main fuel tank capacity (to minimize the effect of loss
of boost pressure in other fuel tanks)
4. A time-limited engine fuel inlet pressure limit at which the
engine can demonstrate acceptable operation and integrity for the
longest diversion time for which the airplane manufacturer is
requesting approval.
Each of these design alternatives has advantages and disadvantages
that the manufacturer would need to consider in designing an airplane
to comply with the proposed rule.
We intend that the proposed paragraph I(b)(1) would preclude all
causes of loss of system boost pressure in extended operations. This is
consistent with the overall safety objectives established by the part
25 airworthiness standards for potentially catastrophic failure
conditions.
Proposed paragraph I(b)(1)(ii) would require flight deck alerts
when the fuel available to the engines falls below that required to
complete the mission. The FAA's intent is that the required flight deck
alerts would give flight crews clear warning of impending fuel
exhaustion with enough time to safely land the airplane before the
condition becomes critical. As a minimum, the manufacturer would have
to design the flight deck alerts to address the types of failures or
human errors that have resulted in airline fuel exhaustion events in
service.
Examples of fuel exhaustion events include an Air Canada Boeing 767
that landed on an abandoned runway after both engines flamed out from
fuel exhaustion. In this case, the normal low fuel alerts did not
function because of a fuel quantity indication system failure. The fuel
exhaustion was caused by the crew not receiving a low fuel alert, in
combination with an unapproved airplane dispatch and a fueling error.
An Air Tran Airbus A330 landed in the Azores following flameout of both
engines caused by fuel exhaustion due to an unrecognized engine fuel
leak. The AC provides guidance on critical fuel system alerts derived
from these types of fuel loss events that have occurred in the current
generation of aircraft.
I(b)(2) APU design
If operation of an auxiliary power unit (APU) were needed to comply
with the ETOPS requirements, the applicant would have to demonstrate
that the APU has adequate reliability for that operation. Also, if in-
flight start and run capability is necessary, the APU in-flight
operating envelope would have to extend to the maximum operating
altitude of the airplane or 45,000 feet, whichever is lower.
Explanation
The electrical system reliability standard contained in AC 120-42A
envisions three independent alternating current (AC) electrical
generators. Besides the two engine driven generators, an auxiliary
power unit (APU) could drive a third generator to meet this standard.
Auxiliary power units are separately controlled small engines that are
installed on an aircraft to power services when the main aircraft
engines are not running. Airlines normally use an airplane APU at the
gate to provide electrical power for onboard lighting and an air source
for the air conditioning system between flights. Besides this normal
function, the FAA may allow an airline to use an APU powered electrical
generator during a revenue flight when a main engine generator is not
working.
The electrical system reliability requirements proposed in this
notice do not specifically require three independent generators except
for airplanes being certified for ETOPS diversion times greater than
180 minutes. Current two engine aircraft that the FAA has approved for
ETOPS would only be able to comply with the proposed requirement for
electrical system reliability by having three independent generators.
Other required aircraft system functions also may be powered by an APU.
Proposed paragraph I(b)(2) of the rule would require that if the
applicant is going to rely on the APU for compliance with the ETOPS
requirements:
(1) The APU has to have adequate reliability; and
(2) If it must be started and run in-flight, the APU must
demonstrate that it has the capability to start and perform its
intended function up to the maximum operating altitude of the airplane,
or 45,000 feet, whichever is lower.
The major reason for wanting high altitude APU in-flight start
capability is to avoid having flight level changes that would cause the
flight to have to cross through established flight track systems just
to start the APU. Also, once the flight leaves the established track
system it can be very difficult, or impossible to re-enter the track
system, reducing the pilot's flexibility to fly the optimum flight
plan. Having an in-flight start capability up to 45,000 feet mitigates
these concerns.
``Adequate'' reliability consumed much of the Working Group's
discussion time during development of the rule. This term can only be
placed in context by understanding the overall electrical and pneumatic
system architecture of the airplane. For instance, if an applicant has
installed generators with inadequate reliability, their mean time
between failure (MTBF) may require an extremely reliable APU generator
in order to comply with the electrical system reliability objectives of
Sec. 25.1309. This would drive the applicant into a significant APU
reliability demonstration program. The reverse could also be true. An
electrical system may have generators with an excellent MTBF of 100,000
hours with additional non-APU back-up sources. In this case, the
``required'' reliability of the APU would be less than for current
airplane electrical systems with APU driven generators. However, the
applicant would have to present a convincing system level reliability
analysis backed by validated component reliability data before the FAA
would accept an assumption of lower APU reliability from that required
for today's airplanes.
An APU has traditionally been used only to ``back-up'' the
electrical system, and the proposed new regulatory and advisory
material focuses on this function. No current aircraft utilizes an APU
to provide ``back-up'' pneumatic system capability to meet ETOPS
significant system reliability standards. However, the associated
advisory circular addresses the possible operational need for APU
pneumatics on the ground to power the cabin air conditioning system
following an airplane diversion. If the APU is necessary as a bleed
source to comply with section 25.1309 or the new section 25.1535, the
applicant would have to define the operating envelope of where it can
perform this intended function. The FAA requires this for any APU
required function under the existing airworthiness standards of part
25. Currently most APUs can only provide both bleed air and electrical
power at lower cruise altitudes, and cannot provide enough bleed air to
power an air conditioning pack at the airplane service ceiling. The
applicant would have to fully account for the use of a ``limited''
ETOPS APU operating envelope in substantiating compliance with section
25.1309 or section 25.1535. In accounting for a limited APU operating
envelope, the applicant would have to address the operational
implications, including air traffic control, of having to descend to a
lower altitude in order to use the required APU function.
ARAC recommended the following language for paragraph I(b)(2): ``If
operation of the APU installation is required to comply with this
appendix, the applicant must * * *''. Except for

[[Page 64745]]

the electrical system, which has specific requirements in proposed
Appendix L, all other potential airplane system functions that could be
powered by an APU are addressed by the overall ETOPS requirement
contained in section 25.1535(a). Examples include the cabin
pressurization and hydraulic systems, which may be powered by an APU.
The ARAC recommended proposed rule and preamble states the intent that
this requirement should not be limited to just electrical system
reliability. We have corrected this oversight by replacing ``this
appendix'' with section 25.1535 in proposed paragraph I(b)(2).
I(b)(3) Engine Oil Tank Design
The engine oil filler cap design would have to comply with a
proposed change to section 33.71(c)(4), which will require oil tank cap
designs that prevent hazardous oil loss in the event of an oil tank cap
installation error.
Explanation
See the proposed change to section 33.71(c)(4) for an explanation
of the reasons for this change. We added paragraph I(b)(3) to Appendix
L to ensure that engines installed on ETOPS airplanes comply with the
part 33 requirement.
I(c) Engine Condition Monitoring
The applicant would have to define and validate, as required, an
engine condition monitoring process in accordance with part 33,
Appendix A, paragraph A33.4.
Explanation
This requirement would codify paragraph a(5) of Appendix A of AC
120-42A and paragraph (b)(2) of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions.
With the propulsion system reliabilities existing on today's long
range airplanes, the FAA is very concerned that the biggest threat to
ETOPS safety is the risk associated with common cause, cascading
failures and fuel exhaustion. Several of the proposed requirements in
this notice would address these threats. The engine condition
monitoring process requirement specifically addresses the potential of
additional engine failure or failures resulting from the increased
thrust or service demands on the remaining engine or engines.
Operators would be required, in the proposed changes to parts 121
and 135, to have an engine condition monitoring program as part of
their ETOPS maintenance program. Paragraph I(c) of Appendix L and
paragraph A33.4 in part 33 would require the airplane and engine
manufacturer to provide the instructions necessary for an operator to
develop this program.
Since the potential for a catastrophic loss of thrust is greater on
a two engine airplane than on airplanes with more than two engines,
this proposed rule would require that the applicant validate the engine
condition monitoring process for use on two engine airplanes before
ETOPS approval. For airplanes with more than two engines, the applicant
would need only to define the process.
I(d) Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures
The applicant would have to identify configuration, maintenance, or
operational standards necessary to maintain appropriate reliability or
to obtain required capability for ETOPS in a Configuration,
Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) document.
Explanation
Paragraph I(d) of the proposed rule would codify material AC 120-
42A. All existing policy on revising CMP documents would remain in
force under the new rule. This is discussed more fully previously under
general issues in the general discussion of the proposal.
I(e) Airplane Flight Manual
This paragraph would specify certain information that the airplane
flight manual (AFM) must contain for ETOPS approval.
Explanation
This proposed requirement would codify paragraph 8(f)(1) of AC 120-
42A. ARAC did not include this paragraph in their proposed rule draft.
However, there are provisions within the AC paragraph that the FAA has
required in all ETOPS type design approvals issued since 1985. The
ETOPS approval statement contained in AC subparagraph 8(f)(1)(vi) is
particularly important as applicants have based their airplane flight
manual ETOPS approval statements on this wording. We are proposing to
add the relevant provisions from AC paragraph 8(f)(1) into this notice
in order to maintain continuity with the historical AFM ETOPS
requirements.
The two provisions from AC 120-42A that we are not proposing to
incorporate directly into proposed paragraph I(e) are subparagraphs
8(f)(1)(iii) and (v). Subparagraph 8(f)(1)(iii) addresses inclusion of
the performance data used to comply with the engine-inoperative
diversion criteria of the flight dispatch considerations in the
operational approval section of the advisory circular. Contrary to this
advisory circular provision, the FAA has not required that the
performance data be included in the approved parts of the AFM and have
not included this provision in the proposed rule. Subparagraph
8(f)(1)(v) asks for a description or reference to a document containing
the approved airplane configuration CMP standard. The CMP document
identification has traditionally been included in the ETOPS approval
statement defined in subparagraph 8(f)(1)(vi) for ETOPS airplanes
approved under the existing policy. Therefore, we have combined
subparagraphs 8(f)(1)(v) and 8(f)(1)(vi) from the AC into the new
proposed paragraph I(e)(5).
We are also proposing to add the original AFM requirement from the
ARAC proposal into paragraph I(e)(4). This proposed requirement is not
in AC 120-42A. This proposed paragraph would require the applicant to
define the maximum ETOPS diversion time capability required by
paragraph I(a)(3) into the airplane flight manual in accordance with
Sec. 25.1581(a)(2), ``Furnishing Information.'' This proposed
requirement provides a cross-reference to proposed paragraph I(a)(3),
which would require that the ETOPS capability defined by most limiting
ETOPS significant system capability be stated in the airplane flight
manual.

Section II--Two Engine Airplanes

In addition to the requirements of section I, an applicant for a
two engine airplane would have to also show compliance with one of
three proposed requirements of section II.

II(a) Service Experience Method

The applicant would have to demonstrate that the airplane and
engine combination for which approval is sought has the required
airplane and propulsion system capability to safely conduct an ETOPS
mission with the maximum diversion for which approval is sought, and
has achieved required airframe and propulsion system reliability based
upon fleet in-service experience.
Explanation
Proposed sub-section II(a) would codify part of the existing
approval process based on service experience, as contained in AC 120-
42A for two engine airplanes. This includes the most significant aspect
of this process, the propulsion system assessment contained in Appendix
1 of the advisory circular. The AC process is predicated on having a
sufficient amount of service

[[Page 64746]]

experience to give the FAA enough data to assess the overall
suitability of a two-engine airplane for ETOPS approval.
The AC type design assessment criteria are divided into two parts.
The first part defines specific system design capability and safety
objectives in order to provide a minimum design standard for airplanes
operating in ETOPS. This part of the AC criteria is addressed in
proposed section 25.1535(a) and (b), and section I of proposed part 25
appendix L.
The second part of the AC process is a review of in-service
problems and identification of appropriate corrective actions to
prevent problems that could have an adverse effect on ETOPS safety.
Part of this review is to establish that the airplane and propulsion
systems have an appropriate level of reliability to meet the safety
objectives defined in the AC. Appendix 1 of the AC defines an amount of
service experience that would normally be required in order to give a
sufficient database to evaluate propulsion system reliability. We are
proposing to address this second part of the AC type design assessment
process in sub-section II(b) of this notice.
II(a)(1) Required Service Experience
This paragraph would require that an applicant who desires to
obtain ETOPS type design approval using service experience conduct a
reliability review after accumulating 250,000 worldwide fleet engine
hours on the airplane and engine combination for which approval is
being sought. The number of hours could be reduced if adequate
compensating factors are identified which give a reasonable equivalent
database. A significant portion of the 250,000 engine hours would have
to be obtained on the candidate airplane.
Explanation
Proposed paragraph II(a)(1) would codify the service experience
eligibility criteria from paragraph a(1) of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A.
II(a)(2) Propulsion System Assessment
Paragraph II(a)(2)(i) would require an applicant to conduct a
propulsion system assessment based on data collected from the entire
fleet of the specific airplane and engine combination for which
approval is sought. Paragraph II(a)(2)(ii) would require an applicant
to identify corrective actions to prevent future occurrences of engine
in-flight shutdowns or loss of thrust control.
Explanation
Paragraph II(a)(2)(i) would codify the reliability data base
criteria from paragraph b. of Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A. ARAC did not
include the reliability data base criteria in their proposed rule
draft, but did have it in their associated draft advisory material. In
paragraph 10(a)(iii) of the draft part 25 advisory circular, ARAC
stated ``A propulsion system assessment must be based on the following
data, collected from the entire fleet of the specific airplane/engine
combination type for which approval is sought* * *''. Since ARAC
clearly stated its intent that an applicant ``must'' conduct a
propulsion system assessment on the specific list that follows, and
based on the clear reference to the existing policy from Appendix 1 of
AC 120-42A, we have incorporated this section from the ARAC draft
advisory circular into proposed paragraph II(a)(2)(i) of this notice.
Paragraph II(a)(2)(ii) would codify the intent of the propulsion
system assessment criteria from paragraph 3 of Appendix 1 of AC 120-
42A. This is the so-called ``fix-all-problems'' requirement that has
been the practice for all ETOPS type design approvals that the FAA has
given using the service experience approval process defined in AC 120-
42A.
The corrective actions that the applicant identifies in compliance
with proposed paragraph II(a)(2) would be included in the approved
configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document as a
condition of the ETOPS approval.
II(a)(3) Airplane systems assessment
The applicant would have to show compliance with section 25.1535(a)
using available in-service reliability data for ETOPS significant
systems. The applicant would have to identify corrective actions to
prevent future occurrences of ETOPS significant system failures
occurring in service.
Explanation
The first part of this paragraph would codify the intent of
paragraph 8(c)(1) of AC 120-42A for those ETOPS significant airplane
systems addressed in proposed Sec. 25.1535(a). This AC paragraph
states that the analysis and demonstration of airframe and propulsion
system failure effects and reliability provided by the applicant should
be based on in-service experience and the longest diversion time for
the airplane.
The second part of proposed paragraph II(a)(3) is an extension of
the ``fix-all-problems'' approach used in the propulsion system
assessment that we are proposing in paragraph II(a)(2). For all
airplanes approved using the policy contained in AC 120-42A, the FAA
has required an applicant to define effective corrective actions for
all in-service problems known to result in, or potentially result in,
airplane diversions. The FAA has required this in order to enter ETOPS
service with the highest quality airplane. An applicant rarely
considers known system failure conditions to be acceptable occurrences
in service that they account for in their system failure analyses
submitted for compliance with section 25.1309. Therefore, this fix all
problems approach is appropriate in reassessing compliance with the
applicable airworthiness requirements of proposed section 25.1535(a).
The corrective actions that the applicant identifies in compliance
with proposed paragraph II(a)(3) would be included in the approved
configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document as a
condition of the ETOPS approval.
II(a)(4) In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD) Rates
This proposed paragraph defines propulsion system reliability
standards for three levels of ETOPS type design approval.
(i) For operations up to 120 minutes: a rate of approximately 0.05
or less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with a CMP intended to bring the
rate down to 0.02.
(ii) For operations up to 180 minutes: a rate of approximately 0.02
or less per 1,000 engine hours with an existing 120 minute CMP
standard, or new or additional CMP requirements that have been
demonstrated to achieve this in-flight shutdown rate.
(iii) For operations greater than 180 minutes: a rate of
approximately 0.01 or less per 1,000 engine hours with an existing 120
minute or 180 minute CMP standard, or new or additional CMP
requirements that have been demonstrated to achieve this in-flight
shutdown rate.
Explanation
This proposed paragraph would codify the propulsion system
reliability standards from Appendix 1 of AC 120-42A. In addition, we
are proposing to add the reliability standard of 0.01 per 1,000 engine
hours for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes that ARAC proposed in their
recommended draft ETOPS rule.
The original ARAC recommendation refers to ``target threshold'' or
``target'' rate. These terms do not adequately define what would
constitute an acceptable or unacceptable in-flight shutdown rate for
showing compliance with this proposed requirement. The FAA has similar
concerns about the term ``approximately'' as used in this

[[Page 64747]]

proposal, but this term is in the existing AC 120-42A policy and has
been applied successfully since issuance of the AC. Therefore, the FAA
has tentatively chosen to retain the term ``approximately'' as used in
the existing AC policy in this proposed rule.
We have added the qualifier ``or less'' to the proposed in-flight
shutdown rate requirement. Without this term, the rule could be
interpreted to mean that the in-flight shutdown rate ``must'' be the
approximate value specified. We clearly do not intend that an applicant
with an in-flight shutdown rate well below the requirement would not be
in compliance with the rule. We have added this additional qualifier in
order to clarify this intent.
The original ARAC recommendation for operations up to 120 minutes
was written in the following manner: ``with a required list of
corrective actions that would result in continuing improvement toward
an IFSD rate of 0.02 per 1000 fleet engine-hours.'' We have added ``in
the CMP document'' in order to clarify where the list of corrective
actions must be contained.
For the proposed requirements for both operations up to 180 minutes
and operations greater than 180 minutes we have added a provision that
considers the effect that existing or new CMP standards have on
compliance with the required in-flight shutdown rate. In the past, we
granted ETOPS approvals using a 180-minute CMP standard developed from
the 120 minute ETOPS CMP documents. This has occurred when the
applicant has substantiated, through service experience, additional
requirements that would achieve the desired in-flight shutdown rate for
those airplanes incorporating the additional requirements. The added
provision proposed in this notice is a statement of existing practice
for granting 180-minute ETOPS approval where the 120-minute standard
had to be modified. This notice proposes to codify this existing
practice into the rule as noted above.
II(a)(5) Airplane Flight Test Requirements
This paragraph would require a flight test to validate the adequacy
of the airplane's flying qualities, performance, and the flight crew's
ability to deal with engine inoperative and non-normal worst case
system failure conditions expected to occur in service.
Explanation
This paragraph would codify the intent of paragraph 8(d)(3) of AC
120-42A. The original ARAC proposed paragraph stated that the proposed
flight test would validate ``non-normal worst case probable system
failure conditions.'' This proposed wording would not adequately
reflect how the FAA has applied the AC paragraph being codified.
The term ``probable'' as used in the original ARAC proposal would
have a specific meaning within the type certification community. As
defined by Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A, probable failures are those
anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire operational
life of each airplane. Probable failures would most likely only include
significant single failures, or more frequent double failures. However,
we have required applicants for ETOPS type design approval under AC
paragraph 8(d)(3) to demonstrate multiple failure conditions that are
much less frequent in service, such as
(i) the loss of all normal electrical power;
(ii) flight controls powered by an emergency backup hydraulic
source; and
(iii) loss of normal flight instruments.
These types of failure conditions would be expected to occur during
the life of a fleet of airplanes, but not necessarily on each airplane.
We believe that ARAC may have intended to include these failure
conditions by using the qualifying term ``worst case'' in their
proposal, however, we are not confident that it would be interpreted
correctly with the wording as ARAC proposed. We have deleted the word
``probable'' and replaced it with system failure conditions ``expected
to occur in service'' in the proposed rule. This clarification more
accurately reflects how the FAA has applied the paragraph 8(d)(3) of AC
120-42A.
II(b) Early ETOPS Method
This part of section II defines requirements that an applicant
would have to comply with to certify an airplane for ETOPS without
first accumulating the service experience that would be required in
section II(a).
Explanation
This section would codify the early ETOPS process defined in the
Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions 25-ANM-84 for two engine
airplanes. These special conditions defined requirements that allowed
the FAA to approve the Boeing Model 777 airplane for ETOPS without the
service experience normally expected under the policy in AC 120-42A.
The intent of this proposed sub-section of Appendix L is to define
requirements that would allow the FAA to grant ETOPS approval
concurrent with the original type certification of an airplane.
II(b)(1) Relevant Experience Assessment
The applicant would have to identify specific corrective actions
taken on the airplane design to address relevant design, manufacturing,
operational and maintenance problems experienced on previously
certified part 25 airplanes manufactured by the applicant. Specific
corrective actions would not be required if the nature of the problem
is such that it would not have a significant impact on the safety or
reliability of the system. The proposed rule would require that this
assessment include the relevant experience of supplier provided ETOPS
Group 1 significant systems and similar or identical equipment utilized
on aircraft built by other manufacturers.
Explanation
This proposed rule would codify paragraph (c)(2) of the Boeing
Model 777 ETOPS special conditions 25-ANM-84. The term ``relevant
experience'' as used in the proposed rule means the design,
manufacturing, operational or maintenance problems that have, or could
have, resulted in the types of occurrences that would be included in
propulsion system and airplane system assessments conducted in
accordance with a service experience based ETOPS approval process
proposed in section II(a).
The intent of this proposed requirement is to take advantage of
service experience on other airplane types built by the applicant as
much as is practical. This relevant experience assessment is in lieu of
service experience on the actual airplane to be approved and is a major
compensating factor for that direct service experience.
One of the five key elements of the early ETOPS process on the
Boeing Model 777 was the ``relevant experience assessment,'' or
``lessons learned.'' Simply stated, the intent is for the applicant to
review the failures on previous airplane/engine combinations, and
assure that the causes of those failures are mitigated. While simple in
concept, the execution of this assessment is significant in scope. One
of the most significant aspects of this proposed rule is that an
applicant with no previous transport category manufacturing experience
would not be eligible to receive early ETOPS approval. The FAA
considers the relevant experience assessment as elemental to the early
ETOPS process. Without the ability to perform this assessment including
lessons learned on manufacturing and engineering processes, the FAA
could not

[[Page 64748]]

confidently grant an early ETOPS approval.
Beyond a certain level of commonality, past experience may not be
relevant to a new design. This is particularly true where a specific
design feature that contributed to problems in previous airplanes is
not a part of the new airplane design. However, the demonstration of
the applicability of past experience to the new design is inherent in
the relevant experience assessment.
This proposed rule would require that the applicant identify
corrective actions taken to preclude similar problems from occurring on
the new airplane. Removal from the design of a system, sub-system, or
component that has had problems in the past may be an acceptable
corrective action, as long as it precludes similar problems from
occurring.
Where new technology is introduced, the lessons learned assessment
becomes impractical, as there is no previous experience with this
technology. While this is true, there may still be applicable relevant
experience. For example, an applicant's previous experience with new
technology introductions may lead to changes in manufacturing and
quality control processes. Further, lessons learned of general
applicability can be introduced into the new technology design, such as
a general design practice to prevent cross-connector installation.
II(b)(2) Propulsion System Design
II(b)(2)(i) Engine ETOPS Eligibility
This paragraph would require that the engines to be installed on
the airplane be approved for ETOPS eligibility in accordance with
proposed new section 33.200.
Explanation
Proposed new section 33.200 would require that an engine intended
for a two engine ETOPS airplane that does not have the service
experience required by part 25, section II(a), would have to comply
with certain requirements. The ARAC proposed rule draft did not
specifically state that the engines installed in an early ETOPS
airplane must be certified in accordance with section 33.200. We have
corrected that oversight in this notice.
We intend that section II(b) of this notice apply to all new
airplanes and engines. We have considered the possibility that an
applicant may install an already certified engine with existing service
experience onto a new airplane. In this case, the combined service
experience and early ETOPS approval method of proposed section II(c)
would provide a way of certifying this type of mixed configuration.
II(b)(2)(ii) Design To Preclude In-Flight Shutdowns
The applicant would have to design the propulsion system to
preclude failures and malfunctions that could result in an engine in-
flight shutdown. In addition, the applicant would have to substantiate
compliance with this requirement by analysis, test, in-service
experience on other airplanes, or other means that the propulsion
system will minimize failures and malfunctions with the objective of
achieving the following in-flight shutdown rates:
(i) 0.02 or less per 1,000 engine fleet hours for 180 minute ETOPS
or less;
(ii) 0.01 or less per 1,000 engine fleet hours for ETOPS beyond 180
minutes.
Explanation
ARAC provided the following justification for this proposed rule.
``This rule section requires that the propulsion system be designed to
preclude failures and malfunctions that could result in an engine in-
flight shutdown. Propulsion systems on previous airplanes were designed
and certified to be ``fail-safe,'' in compliance with section 25.901 of
part 25; in other words, any single failure, or probable combination of
failures, would not jeopardize continued safe flight and landing of the
airplane. Because safe flight following an engine shutdown is required
by part 25, preventing engine in-flight shutdowns has not been a major
design objective on some previous airplane designs. The additional
design requirement in this section to preclude failures and
malfunctions that could result in an engine in-flight shutdown has an
enormous effect on propulsion system reliability in that normal design
decisions must now consider whether a failure or malfunction might
result in an engine in-flight shutdown. The method of compliance to
this section may vary from applicant to applicant, but the intent
remains--all design features of the propulsion system must preclude
shutdowns or power losses. This intent is also captured in the proposed
part 33 rule.''
We agree with the justification that ARAC provided. The ``design to
preclude failures and malfunctions that could result in an engine in-
flight shutdown'' is one of the most important features of the early
ETOPS special conditions that we required for the Boeing Model 777
airplane. The FAA had a similar justification for this requirement in
the preamble to those special conditions. However, the proposed rule
that ARAC recommended did not clearly state this intent. We have
modified the original ARAC proposal to clarify this stated ARAC intent
and bring the proposed rule in line with the existing Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions.
ARAC did not provide a specific justification for the proposed in-
flight shutdown rate analysis requirement. Boeing has submitted such an
analysis under compliance with paragraph (c)(5) of the ETOPS special
conditions for the Model 777 airplane. Paragraph (c)(5) of those
special conditions requires the applicant to define specific new
analyses that will be used to assure engine and airplane system design
integrity. The addition of a predicted in-flight shutdown rate analysis
into this proposed rule would codify this method of compliance with the
Boeing ETOPS special conditions.
Since in-service experience does not exist on a new airplane, we
have also changed the ARAC proposed rule language for the in-flight
shutdown rate analysis to clarify that the in-service experience to be
considered in this analysis would be from other airplanes. Applicable
service experience would include the same basic engine design or other
propulsion system components on other airplanes manufactured by the
applicant, or by other manufacturers if the applicant has access to
that data and can substantiate its applicability to the new airplane
design.
II(b)(3) Maintenance and Operational Procedures
The applicant would have to validate all ETOPS significant systems
maintenance and operational procedures. Any problems found would have
to be tracked and resolved through the problem tracking system and
resolution system proposed in paragraph (II)(b)(8).
Explanation
This proposed rule would codify the intent of paragraph (d)(2) of
the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions. The special conditions
paragraph requires the applicant to have a program to systematically
detect and correct problems occurring as a result of improper execution
of maintenance and flight operations. Boeing has complied with this
requirement by validating maintenance and operational procedures
important to the safety of ETOPS operations. This proposed rule would
codify this method of compliance.
Human error continues to be a major cause of engine in-flight
shutdowns and forced airplane diversions. The proposed maintenance
validation requirement, combined with the proposed requirement to
operate and

[[Page 64749]]

maintain the test airplane during the airplane demonstrate test in
paragraph II(b)(7) using the recommended operations and maintenance
manual procedures, are part of the FAA's overall regulatory objective
to minimize human errors in the ETOPS rule. The FAA intends that the
proposed ETOPS type design requirements would result in an airplane
entering service with validated maintenance and operational procedures
that minimize the possibility of human error in ETOPS operations.
II(b)(4) Propulsion System Validation Test
This paragraph would require the applicant for an early ETOPS
airplane to comply with the 3,000-cycle engine test in the proposed new
Sec. 33.200(c) with the installed engine configuration. The test
engine would have to be configured with a complete airplane nacelle
package, including engine-mounted equipment except for any
configuration differences necessary to accommodate test stand
interfaces with the engine nacelle package. At the conclusion of the
test, the test hardware would have to be:
(i) visually inspected in according to the applicant's on-wing
inspection recommendations and limits; and
(ii) completely disassembled and inspected in accordance with the
service limits submitted in compliance with Sec. 25.1529.
Explanation
Proposed paragraph II(b)(4) would codify paragraphs (e)(3) and
(e)(6) of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions for the
airplane propulsion system installation. These special conditions
paragraphs require vibration testing and a 3,000-cycle engine
demonstration test on the installed engine configuration. The proposed
Sec. 33.200(c) would combine these two special conditions test
requirements into one test based on how Boeing complied with these
paragraphs for the Model 777 airplane.
The original ARAC recommended rule draft proposed the following
wording for the first sentence of this paragraph: ``The propulsion
system for which approval is being sought * * *'' The FAA defines the
airplane propulsion system based on the definition of the powerplant
installation contained in Sec. 25.901(a), which states:
``For the purpose of this part, the airplane powerplant
installation includes each component that--
(1) Is necessary for propulsion;
(2) Affects the control of the major propulsive units; or
(3) Affects the safety of the major propulsive units between normal
inspections or overhauls.''
The components and systems covered by the overall definition of
``propulsion system'' include the fuel system and the engine and fuel
system flight deck controls. We do not intend that the proposed
propulsion system validation test in paragraph II(b)(4) would include
any propulsion system components outside of the airplane nacelle
package. We have made two changes to the original ARAC wording in order
to clarify the intended test configuration. We have replaced
``propulsion system'' with ``installed engine configuration'' in the
first sentence. We have changed the second sentence to clarify that the
test engine must be configured with a complete airplane nacelle
package, including engine-mounted equipment except for any
configuration differences necessary to accommodate test stand
interfaces with the engine nacelle package. These proposed changes are
consistent with a recent revision of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions.
The Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions did not originally
require a post-test teardown inspection. However, all three-engine
companies, in cooperation with Boeing, conducted post-test teardown
inspections on the original baseline engines installed on the Model 777
series airplanes based on their own experience of what would constitute
an adequate evaluation.
The FAA reviewed the data from the 3,000-cycle tests for the three
original engine types installed on the Model 777 and found that most of
the early in-service 777 engine failure modes could have been
discovered with additional inspection and analysis of the 3,000-cycle
test engine and propulsion system hardware. Part conditions noted in
the teardown inspection reports for the three baseline 777 engine types
did later occur in service, and they resulted in engine in-flight
shutdowns or airplane diversions.
In order to provide a consistent standard for a post-test
evaluation of the 3,000-cycle test hardware, the FAA is proposing an
enhanced 3,000-cycle test requirement in proposed paragraph II(b)(4) of
Appendix L and Sec. 33.200(c). The standard would require a complete
teardown inspection of the engine and airplane nacelle test hardware
after completion of the test. The FAA intends that the enhanced
teardown inspection requirement for the 3,000-cycle test hardware would
catch potential sources of engine in-flight shutdowns or diversions.
An enhanced post-test teardown inspection requirement is part of a
revision to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions that the FAA
developed for the Model 777-300ER program. The ARAC ETOPS Working Group
had knowledge of our intent to revise the Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions in this manner as they developed their recommendations.
Even though paragraphs II(b)(4) and Sec. 33.200(c) address the
same proposed post-test teardown inspection requirement, the wording
for the requirement in paragraph II(b)(4) is different from that in
Sec. 33.200(c). The FAA considers that the intent of the proposed
post-test teardown and inspection requirement in parts 25 and 33 to be
identical. However, the specific language used in each part is tailored
to the unique aspects of the engine and airplane type certification
processes used to show compliance with this requirement.
See the discussion for the proposed new Sec. 33.200(c) for a
complete explanation of the proposed 3,000-cycle engine test
requirement.
Proposed paragraph II(b)(4) is largely a ``pointer'' to the
proposed requirements to perform an engine cyclic endurance test in
part 33. The purpose of this paragraph in the rule is to assure that
the entire installed engine configuration (engine accessories, nacelle,
thrust reverser, etc.) is installed on the test vehicle during the part
33 testing. Since the proposed part 33 requirement only covers the
engine type design, this proposed rule is necessary.
II(b)(5) New Technology Demonstration Testing
The applicant would have to conduct testing to demonstrate the
suitability of any technology new to the applicant.
Explanation
This paragraph would codify paragraph (e)(4) of the Boeing Model
777 ETOPS special conditions. The ARAC left this requirement from the
special conditions out of its recommended rule proposal, even though
the associated part 25 draft advisory circular provided with their
recommendation refers to this as a requirement. We propose to add the
new technology demonstration testing requirement to the notice for
completeness.
II(b)(6) APU Validation Test
This paragraph would require an applicant to complete a test
consisting of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles on an
auxiliary power unit that the applicant uses to comply with the

[[Page 64750]]

electrical power supply system requirements of paragraph I(a)(2) of
this proposed appendix.
Explanation
This paragraph would codify paragraph (e)(5) of the Boeing Model
777 ETOPS special conditions.
As we stated in the section on APU design for proposed paragraph
I(b)(2), current twin engine airplanes approved for ETOPS only comply
with the proposed requirement for electrical system reliability
contained in this notice by having three independent electrical
generators. On these airplanes, the third independent electrical
generator is normally powered by an auxiliary power unit. To assure
that an APU would have the proper reliability at entry into service,
the proposed rule would require the applicant to conduct an APU
endurance test in a similar manner to that proposed in paragraph
II(b)(4) for the main engines. The phrase ``equivalent airplane
operational cycles'' requires the applicant to test the APU in an
environment that the APU would be operating in an airline ETOPS
operation. In most cases this would include starting and operating the
APU in extremely cold temperatures representative of high altitude
operation or ground operations in extremely cold climates. This would
also include operation in high temperature environments, and with
simulated pneumatic and electrical loads. Further amplification of the
interpretation of ``equivalent airplane operational cycles'' is found
in the draft part 25 advisory circular.
II(b)(7) Airplane Demonstration Test
This paragraph would require the applicant to conduct an airplane
flight test to demonstrate that the airplane, its components and
equipment are capable of and function properly during ETOPS and ETOPS
diversions. This flight test may be coordinated with, but would not be
in place of the function and reliability flight testing required for
compliance with Sec. 21.35(b)(2).
The proposed requirement includes several conditions that the
applicant would have to comply with in conducting this test. Among
these are:

(1) The flight test program would have to include:
(i) Flights simulating actual ETOPS operation;
(ii) demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversions;
(iii) maximum time engine inoperative diversions;
(iv) non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplanes capability
to safely; conduct an ETOPS diversion,
(v) diversions into representative operational diversionary
airports; and
(vi) repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the ground
followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.
(2) The flight testing would have to validate the adequacy of the
airplane's flying qualities, performance and the flight crew's ability
to deal with adverse operating conditions.
(3) The engine-inoperative diversions would have to be evenly
distributed among the number of engines in the applicant's flight test
program.
(4) The test airplane would have to be operated and maintained using
the recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures during the
test.
(5) At the completion of the test, the ETOPS Group 1 significant
systems would have to undergo an airplane visual inspection and the
engines would have to also undergo an internal gas path inspection.
Explanation
This paragraph would codify the airplane demonstration test
requirement of paragraph (e)(7) of the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions. The original version of the special conditions effective
July 1, 1994 required the applicant to fly one complete airplane for at
least 1,000 flight-cycles simulating an actual airline operation.
The FAA developed the 1,000-cycle airplane demonstration test
requirement with the intent of exposing the candidate airplane to the
conditions where the greatest numbers of in-flight shutdowns occur.
Most in-flight shutdowns occur during takeoff and climb. Failures that
tend to occur only during certain portions of a flight are known as
``cyclic'' failures. An example of a cyclic failure would be a tire
failure where exposure to the high tire speeds that could lead to a
tire failure would only occur during takeoff or landing. These are in
contrast to failures that are more likely to occur as components age,
which are known as ``hourly'' failures. An example of an hourly failure
is an electric cooling fan failure where the fan runs continuously to
cool electronic components.
The failure modes associated with takeoff- and climb-related in-
flight shutdowns tend to be cyclic in nature for a couple of reasons.
In cases where the loads and stresses on engine or airplane hardware
increase as engine power or thrust increases, the takeoff portion of
the flight is most critical. Failure modes that occur due to improper
maintenance or engine servicing, for instance loss of engine oil due to
improper assembly of an oil tube connection, also tend to occur early
in the flight. A larger number of airplane flights increases the
exposure to these types of failures. Therefore, the FAA considered a
cyclic type of test to be the most appropriate airplane validation test
for the original 777 ETOPS special conditions.
Although the fewest in-flight shutdowns occur during cruise, this
is the phase of flight that is most important to an ETOPS operation.
Traditionally, the FAA and industry have avoided trying to
differentiate between those in-flight shutdowns that may occur during
cruise from those that would only occur in a non-ETOPS environment. The
main reason for this approach in existing ETOPS policy is that by
correcting all causes of in-flight shutdowns, we gain confidence in the
overall integrity of the propulsion system design. Since an enhanced
3,000-cycle engine demonstration test proposed for paragraph II(b)(4)
of Appendix L and Sec. 33.200(c) would provide adequate cyclic
exposure, the FAA has concluded that the airplane validation program
should emphasize exposure to the cruise phase of flight.
During the three 1,000-cycle tests conducted for the original 777
engine installation certification programs, only 91 of the total 1,000
cycles were of durations of two hours or more. Since we intend for the
airplane demonstration test to simulate an actual airline operation,
this would better be accomplished through longer duration flight
cycles. Long duration flight exposure provides additional confidence
that the design accounts for cruise-related failure modes that cannot
be evaluated in a cyclic test environment. Such failure modes could
include freezing of entrapped water condensation or binding of
propulsion system components, neither of which would likely occur in a
sea level test facility.
Based on these considerations, the FAA has determined that the
airplane demonstration test requirement should be refocused on those
conditions that are most prevalent in an ETOPS operating environment.
Those conditions include long flights to a variety of airports with
broad variations of airport elevation, temperature, and humidity. It is
also important that these flights expose the airplane to several
enroute climbs, such as may occur with a fully loaded 777-300ER on a
long-

[[Page 64751]]

range flight, and a number of engine-inoperative diversions. As such,
the FAA proposes that the specific test conditions described in the
sub-paragraphs to proposed paragraph II(b)(7) more clearly state the
objectives of the test program. Those objectives include demonstrations
that the aircraft, its components, and equipment are capable of and
function properly during long-range operations and airplane diversions,
including engine-inoperative diversions.
This change in focus constitutes a significant departure from the
original purpose of the 1,000-cycle airplane demonstration test
requirement discussed in the preamble to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS
special conditions. However, the proposed changes to the 3,000 cycle
test requirement and the airplane demonstration test that we propose
for this rule would provide an overall better evaluation of a new
airplane design for ETOPS approval.
The original ARAC proposal recommended the following wording for
paragraph II(b)(7)(i)(4): ``Non-normal conditions to demonstrate the
airplane's capability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under worst
case probable system failure conditions.'' This is similar language for
a flight test demonstration of non-normal operating conditions to
Section III--Airplanes with more than two engines that proposed for
paragraph II(a)(5). For similar reasons to those in the explanation for
paragraph II(a)(5), we have deleted the word ``probable'' in proposed
paragraph II(b)(7)(i)(4) and replaced it with system failure conditions
``expected to occur in service'' in the proposed rule.
Human error continues to be a major cause of engine in-flight
shutdowns and forced airplane diversions. The proposed requirement in
paragraph II(b)(7)(iv) to operate and maintain the test airplane using
the recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures, combined
with the proposed maintenance validation requirement in paragraph
II(b)(3), are part of the FAA's overall regulatory objective to
minimize human errors in the ETOPS rule. The FAA intends that the
proposed ETOPS type design requirements would result in an airplane
entering service with validated maintenance and operational procedures
that minimize the possibility of human error in ETOPS operations.
During the certification of the B777 for early ETOPS, the special
conditions required that the airplane demonstration test be conducted
using the airline maintenance and operations manuals. The purpose of
this requirement was three-fold: (1) To assure that the airplane test
was as close to an airline simulation as possible, (2) to assure that
the maintenance and operations products were mature at entry into
service, and (3) to assure that no maintenance or operations procedures
would erroneously contribute to system failures.
In developing their draft rule, the ARAC ETOPS Working Group fully
concurred with the proposed requirement to assure maintenance and
operational product maturity at entry into service. However, the
working group also recognized that validation of these products could
be accomplished in different fashions. Nonetheless, ARAC noted that the
proposed associated advisory circular (AC) recommends that the
maintenance manual should be used for all testing necessary for ETOPS
validation (component, engine and airplane). Tasks such as LRU
replacement, testing following removal/replacement of parts, etc., must
be validated per the requirements of the rule. The proposed AC does
provide amplification, however, on what maintenance manual sections
should be validated, namely only those sections pertinent to Groups 1
and 2 ETOPS significant systems. For instance, while validation of a
landing gear maintenance task may be prudent for product readiness, the
landing gear is not considered ETOPS critical, and therefore validation
of related maintenance procedures would not be required.
As we said in the discussion for the proposed 3,000 cycle test
requirement in paragraph II(b)(4), the FAA has concluded from a review
of in-service experience of the Model 777 series airplanes that the
3,000-cycle engine and propulsion system test in proposed paragraph
II(b)(4) of Appendix L and Sec. 33.200(c) provides an adequate
opportunity to discover cyclic-related failure modes associated with
the design, provided that the engine and airplane manufacturers conduct
an adequate post-test evaluation. For similar reasons, proposed
subparagraph II(b)(7)(v) would require a post-test external and
internal visual inspection of the airplane demonstration test engines
and propulsion system hardware. The applicant would have to identify,
track and resolve any abnormal conditions found during these
inspections in accordance with the provisions of the proposed problem
tracking and resolution system requirement of paragraph II(b)(8).
The proposed paragraph II(b)(7)(v) would require the manufacturer
to visually inspect the airplane ETOPS significant systems per the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of section 25.1529 following
the airplane demonstration test. The stated objective for this
inspection in the proposed rule is to identify any abnormal conditions
that could result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion. We have
proposed this paragraph as ARAC recommended. However, many of the
airplane ETOPS significant systems have components that are not
amenable to visual inspection. An example is an electronic controller
for airplane electrical load management. We request comments on this
specific aspect of the proposed rule. If a visual inspection alone is
not a sufficient post-test inspection requirement, what additional
post-test inspections or tests should be incorporated into the final
rule? If certain ETOPS significant systems should not be covered by
this post-test inspection requirement, then what should be the criteria
in the final rule for their exclusion? We invite commenters to respond
to other commenters' suggestions because the FAA may select one or more
commenter recommended approaches for the final rule.
The FAA proposed a change to the airplane demonstration flight test
requirement in a revision to the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special
conditions for the Model 777-300ER type certification program. The ARAC
ETOPS Working Group had knowledge of our intent to revise the Model 777
ETOPS special conditions in this manner as they developed their
recommendations. We have provided a more detailed justification of the
airplane demonstration test requirement changes proposed in this notice
in the preamble for that special conditions revision.
II(b)(8) Problem Tracking and Resolution System
This paragraph would require the applicant to establish a problem
tracking and resolution system to address problems, as identified in
proposed 21.4(a)(5), encountered on ETOPS significant systems during
airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety of ETOPS
operations.
Explanation. This paragraph would codify the problem tracking
system requirements of paragraph (f) from the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS
special conditions.
The special conditions problem tracking system requirement is
divided into two parts: the problem tracking/reporting required during
type certification testing, and that required during the ``early
ETOPS'' period of the first 250,000 hours of operation after the

[[Page 64752]]

airplane enters service. The proposed paragraph II(b)(8) addresses the
first part of the special conditions requirement. The second part is
captured in the proposed new Sec. 21.4(a).
The original ARAC recommendation would have required the problem
tracking and resolution system to address ``relevant'' problems
encountered. The term ``relevant'' is subjective and may result in
inconsistent application of the proposed rule. Furthermore, we have
identified the types of problems that must be reported in the post type
certification period in proposed new Sec. 21.4(a)(5). In order to
assure consistency with the companion post type certification problem
reporting requirement contained in proposed Sec. 21.4(a), we have
replaced the term ``relevant'' with the phrase ``as identified in Sec.
21.4(a)(5)''.
In evaluating the importance of this proposed rule, the FAA has
reviewed the experience on the first early ETOPS airplane. The FAA
approved the Model 777-200 powered by Pratt & Whitney PW4077 engines
for ETOPS on May 30, 1995 and the airplane entered airline service in
June 1995. By all accounts, it was a very successful new model
introduction. This was followed by the FAA ETOPS approval of the Model
777-200 powered by General Electric GE90-77B and Rolls-Royce RB211-
Trent 877-17 engines in October 1996. Based on data supplied by Boeing,
the in-flight shutdown (IFSD) rate for all three-engine types was zero
for at least the first year in service. The Pratt & Whitney PW4000
reached a peak 12-month rolling average IFSD rate of 0.018/1,000 hours
in October 1996. The General Electric GE90 reached a peak of 0.021 for
one month in July 1998 and the Rolls-Royce Trent reached a peak of
0.016 in December 1997.
Although the in-flight shutdown rates stayed within the allowable
0.02/1,000 hour standard for 180 minute ETOPS, Boeing and the engine
manufacturers reported to the FAA new design problems that they
discovered on each engine type after ETOPS approval. The FAA was
concerned that the design problems being discovered may have been an
indication of a failure of the early ETOPS process to identify these
failure modes before they occurred in service. Some failure modes had
the potential of resulting in in-flight shutdowns had they occurred
under different circumstances or they had not been detected during
maintenance for unassociated reasons. Had every one of these events
resulted in an engine in-flight shutdown, the resulting IFSD rates for
each engine type would have been significantly higher. However, Boeing,
the engine manufacturers, the FAA, the airlines, and other regulatory
authorities worked together to prevent in-flight occurrences of these
failure types.
The FAA did not expect that the early ETOPS process would eliminate
ALL failures. That is why the FAA required a problem tracking system in
the Model 777 ETOPS special conditions. The actual in-flight shutdown
rates prove that Boeing and the engine manufacturers successfully
managed these early in-service problems to maintain the safety of B777
ETOPS operations worldwide. A robust problem tracking, reporting, and
resolution process was key to the continued safe operation of the
Boeing Model 777 and will be an essential component of future early
ETOPS programs. The proposed problem reporting and resolution
requirements in paragraph II(b)(8) and new Sec. 21.4(a) are important
to the continued success of airplanes approved for ETOPS using the
early ETOPS process proposed in this notice.
II(b)(9) Reliability Demonstration Acceptance Criteria
The applicant would have to show that the type and frequency of
failures that occur during the airplane flight test program and the
airplane demonstration test proposed by paragraph II(b)(7), are
consistent with the type and frequency of failures or malfunctions that
would be expected to occur on currently certified ETOPS airplanes.
Explanation
This paragraph would codify paragraph (h)(1) of the Boeing Model
777 ETOPS special conditions. This proposed paragraph is the so-called
``type and frequency'' requirement that is the final indicator of ETOPS
suitability in the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions.
The FAA's intent for the type and frequency requirement is that it
would provide an objective standard that we could use to assess an
airplane's suitability for ETOPS. Significant propulsion system
failures occurring during type certification testing, including the
additional ETOPS testing that would be required in section II of
proposed Appendix L, are an indicator that an airplane may not yet be
ready to enter ETOPS service. Our intent is that the proposed type and
frequency requirement would identify when an airplane is not suitable
based on available test data.
We did not intend that the proposed type and frequency requirement
would provide a meaningful measurement of reliability. It is not
possible to measure system reliability with any degree of statistical
confidence with the limited amount of test experience obtained during a
reasonable type certification program.
A lack of significant failures during type certification testing
does not assure an ETOPS-suitable design at entry into service. It is
for this reason that the proposed problem tracking system requirement
exists. As we said in the explanation for proposed paragraph II(b)(8),
the FAA concludes from the Boeing Model 777 experience that a
manufacturer can successfully manage early in-service problems to
maintain the safety of worldwide ETOPS operations during the initial
introductory service period with the data provided by the enhanced
problem tracking system that would be required by proposed in paragraph
II(b)(8).
The combination of these two proposed requirements form the key
supports of the early ETOPS safety standard for two-engine airplanes
proposed in this notice. The proposed type and frequency requirement
gives the basis for denying ETOPS approval for airplanes with known
significant design problems. The proposed problem tracking and
resolution system gives the FAA confidence that we have the means to
safely manage a fleet of airplanes and engines that do not experience
significant problems until after ETOPS approval.
The original ARAC proposed wording for paragraph II(b)(9) referred
to failures that occur during the ``airplane and engine validation
programs.'' This wording is inconsistent with the Boeing Model 777
ETOPS special conditions, which refers to failures that occur during
``the airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration
test.'' Nowhere does the proposed rule use the term ``validation
program.'' We think that the special conditions wording more accurately
describes what testing is covered by this proposed requirement and have
changed the proposal accordingly.
The ARAC draft had an additional qualifying phrase on the airplane
models that the candidate airplane's failures and malfunctions would be
compared to. In addition to ``presently certified ETOPS airplanes,''
the ARAC draft added the phrase ``or any non-ETOPS derivative models of
those aircraft or engines.'' This added phrase is not in the existing
Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special conditions. We are proposing that the
proposed type and frequency requirement for two engine airplanes
include a comparison with an existing fleet of ETOPS approved

[[Page 64753]]

airplanes that are currently operating at a stable level of reliability
in ETOPS service. It would not be appropriate to make this comparison
with a non-ETOPS approved fleet. The FAA does not require the operators
of non-ETOPS fleets to maintain a level of reliability consistent with
the ETOPS standard for two-engine airplanes.
We speculate that the ARAC may have intended that the added phrase
``or any non-ETOPS derivative models of those aircraft or engines''
would address a manufacturer that initially would have no previously
approved ETOPS airplanes in service from which to base a type and
frequency comparison. The proposed rule would not specifically require
that the comparison be with currently certified ETOPS airplanes by that
manufacturer. If an applicant does not currently have an existing ETOPS
approved airplane in service from which to base a type and frequency
comparison, the proposed rule would allow the manufacturer to use
available data for ETOPS approved airplanes of other manufacturers. It
is not necessary that the applicant use a single existing airplane
model in the comparison that would be required by proposed paragraph
II(b)(9). We have not included this phrase in proposed paragraph
II(b)(9).
In finding compliance with the proposed type and frequency
requirement, we would be looking at the significance of the problems
that occur during the type certification testing and whether or not
they would require a design change prior to type certification of the
airplane. Manufacturers continually make improvements to enhance their
designs based on in-service experience. These design improvements may
eliminate nuisance problems that are not, in themselves, safety
related. In addition, certain failures that occur in service are
expected during the life of the product at a known low rate of
occurrence and are not indicative of a significant design shortcoming.
We could find compliance with the proposed reliability demonstration
acceptance criteria even though we might expect that these types of
failures or problems occurring during airplane flight testing could
also occur on a mature ETOPS fleet.
In contrast, the types of failures or problems that would give the
FAA concern about compliance with the proposed reliability
demonstration acceptance criteria would fall into two categories:
(1) A major failure that would require a significant redesign
before the airplane could receive a basic part 25 type certificate. In
other words, a problem that makes the airplane unsafe without a
significant redesign and testing.
(2) Random ETOPS significant failures occurring during the test
program at a frequency greater than would be expected on a mature ETOPS
fleet. ETOPS significant failures would be those that result in the
events listed in proposed Sec. 21.4(a)(5).

II(c) Combined Service Experience and Early ETOPS Method

This proposed paragraph would allow an applicant to combine certain
elements of the early ETOPS process proposed in section II(b) with a
reduced amount of service experience from what would be required by
paragraph II(a)(1) to obtain ETOPS approval.
Explanation
The early ETOPS process proposed in section II(b) of Appendix L
would define requirements for obtaining ETOPS type design approval
without the service experience that would be required by section II(a).
Proposed sub-section II(c) would define requirements for obtaining
ETOPS approval with a combination of service experience and elements of
the early ETOPS process.
The FAA has accepted, in principle, the concept of trading a
limited amount of service experience for the airplane demonstration
test requirements contained in the 777 early ETOPS special conditions.
The FAA did this based on a concept already contained in Advisory
Circular 120-42A, which allows a reduction in the normal amount of
service experience if ``adequate compensating factors exist which give
a reasonable equivalent database.'' The FAA considers that elements of
the early ETOPS process may be used to provide ``adequate compensating
factors.'' Since the 777 early ETOPS process provides a method for
obtaining ETOPS approval without any service experience, a minimum
amount of actual service experience would provide an adequate
evaluation if the applicant complies with the other elements of the
early ETOPS process.
Proposed section II(c) would codify this concept into the ETOPS
rule. The proposed rule would allow two methods of reduced service
experience in place of the complete early ETOPS process contained in
section II(b). Paragraph II(c)(1) would specifically require only
15,000 engine hours of service experience if the applicant complies
with the following elements of sections II(a) and (b):

(a)(5) Airplane flight test requirements,
(b)(1) Relevant experience assessment,
(b)(2) Propulsion system design,
(b)(3) Maintenance and operational procedures,
(b)(4) Propulsion system validation test,
(b)(5) New technology demonstration testing,
(b)(6) APU validation test,
(b)(8) Problem tracking and resolution system, and
(b)(9) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria.

In addition to the airplane flight test requirement from the
service experience method, paragraph II(a)(5), these are all of the
elements of the early ETOPS process except for the airplane
demonstration test in proposed paragraph II(b)(7). We have added three
paragraphs to the original ARAC proposal. The first is the airplane
flight test requirement from the service experience method, paragraph
II(a)(5). Without some required airplane flight-testing, the ARAC
proposal would not result in an equivalent demonstration of a
capability to safely operate in an ETOPS environment. Paragraph
II(a)(5) would require an applicant for ETOPS approval based on service
experience to conduct a flight test to validate the adequacy of the
airplane's flying qualities, performance and the flight crew's ability
to deal with engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system
failure conditions expected to occur in service. The FAA considers that
an applicant who does not complete the airplane demonstration flight
test requirement in accordance with proposed paragraph II(b)(7) as part
of a combined ETOPS approval method must as a minimum complete the
flight testing that would be required if the applicant were using
service experience only.
The second is proposed paragraph (b)(5), new technology testing. We
have added the new technology testing requirement here and in section
III because we could find no valid reason to exclude it when every
other requirement of proposed early ETOPS section is included except
for the airplane demonstration test requirement. Since ARAC overlooked
the new technology testing requirement in their original proposal as
discussed above for proposed paragraph II(b)(5), we assume that it
would have been included in proposed paragraph II(c)(a) had they not
overlooked it.
The third paragraph we have added is the reliability demonstration
acceptance criteria in proposed paragraph II(b)(9). In section II(a)
for a service experience based approval, in-flight shutdown rate
provides the FAA with a reliability objective to assess a design's
suitability.

[[Page 64754]]

In the early ETOPS method proposed in section II(b), the reliability
demonstration acceptance criteria provides a way to compare the
airplane flight test history to existing ETOPS approved airplanes as a
way to assess design suitability. Without some defined criteria for
assessing the suitability of a design for ETOPS approval, we would have
no way of determining if a candidate airplane were acceptable when an
applicant chooses to use the combined approach. Therefore, we have
added the reliability demonstration acceptance criteria requirement to
proposed paragraph II(c)(1). Since we consider this to be a significant
departure from ARAC's original recommendation and ARAC did not clearly
state their intent for this section, we request specific comments on
this particular proposal.
The second method for reduced service experience proposed in
paragraph II(c)(2) would allow some level of service experience other
than 15,000 engine hours, provided the applicant defines compensating
factors that provide an equivalent level of safety to that provided
using any of the other methods. This method would allow an applicant
some latitude to create an ETOPS approval program tailored to the
unique aspects of the airplane model.

Section III--Airplanes With More Than Two Engines

In addition to the requirements of section I, an applicant for an
airplane with more than two engines would have to show compliance with
the proposed requirements of section III.
Explanation
This section of Appendix L would define those specific requirements
that would be applicable to airplanes with more than two engines. In
order to achieve an equivalent risk of a critical loss of thrust during
an ETOPS flight due to independent failure causes, the in-flight
shutdown rate for twins needs to be ten times lower than four engine
airplanes and 20 times lower than three engine airplanes to achieve an
equivalent level of safety for ETOPS. For maximum diversion times
greater than 180 minutes, the proposed standard for two engine
airplanes is 0.01 shutdowns per 1,000 engine-hours. The associated in-
flight shutdown rate to achieve the same level of safety would be 0.2
for three engine airplanes and 0.1 for four engine airplanes. These
levels of reliability are inherent in current generation turbine
engines without the need for specific propulsion system requirements
beyond those now in parts 33 and 25. The FAA is concerned that we may
inadvertently encourage a lower standard than is already normally
achieved by specifying these high in-flight shutdown rates in the
proposed rule for three and four engine airplanes. Therefore, we have
not included any of the proposed propulsion system requirements that
would be applicable to two engine airplanes into proposed Appendix L,
section III.
What remains for section III are the proposed airplane level system
requirements from section II including a flight test demonstration of
airplane and propulsion system capability during a maximum ETOPS
diversion. Since we are equally concerned about human error caused
critical multiple failures for airplanes with more than two engines as
we are for twins, we are also proposing a maintenance and operational
procedure validation requirement in section III. Except as noted, the
explanation for each of the proposed paragraphs in section III is the
same as for section II.

III(a) Service Experience Method

The applicant would have to demonstrate that the airplane and
engine combination for which approval is sought has the required
airplane and propulsion system capability to safely conduct an ETOPS
mission and maximum diversion and has achieved required airplane system
reliability based upon fleet in-service experience.
Explanation
This proposed requirement is the same as in section II with the
exception that ``propulsion system'' has been removed from the last
phrase of the proposed requirement. Otherwise, the explanation is the
same as for paragraph II(a).
III(a)(1) Required Service Experience
This paragraph would require that an applicant who desires to
obtain ETOPS type design approval using service experience conduct a
reliability review after accumulating 250,000 worldwide fleet engine
hours on the airplane and engine combination for which approval is
being sought. The number of hours would be allowed to be reduced if
adequate compensating factors are identified which give a reasonable
equivalent database. A significant portion of the 250,000 engine hours
would have to be obtained on the candidate airplane.
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(a)(1).
III(a)(2) Airplane Systems Assessment
The applicant would have to show compliance with section 25.1535(a)
using available in-service reliability data for ETOPS significant
systems. The applicant would have to identify corrective actions for
all causes or potential causes of ETOPS significant system failures
occurring in service that are shown to be effective in preventing
future occurrences.
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(a)(3).
III(a)(3) Airplane Flight Test Requirements
This paragraph would require a flight test to validate the adequacy
of the airplane's flying qualities, performance and the flight crew's
ability to deal with engine inoperative and non-normal worst case
system failure conditions expected to occur in service.
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(a)(5).
III(b) Early ETOPS Method
This part of section II defines requirements that an applicant
would have to comply with to certify an airplane for ETOPS without
first accumulating the service experience that would be required in
section III(a).
Explanation
Proposed section III(b) is the same as proposed section II(b)
except that the relevant experience assessment and propulsion system
design requirements have been removed from the proposed section III
requirements. Otherwise, the explanation is the same as for paragraph
II(b).
III(b)(1) Maintenance and Operational Procedures
Under this proposed requirement, the applicant would have to
validate maintenance and operational procedures for ETOPS Significant
Systems. The applicant would have to track and resolve any problems
discovered during the validation process using the proposed Problem
Tracking and Resolution System as described by paragraph (b)(5).
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(b)(3).

[[Page 64755]]

III(b)(2) New Technology Demonstration Testing
The applicant would have to validate all ETOPS significant systems
maintenance and operational procedures. Any problems found would have
to be tracked and resolved through the problem tracking system and
resolution system proposed in paragraph III(b)(5).
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(b)(5).
III(b)(3) APU Validation Test
This paragraph would require an applicant to complete a test
consisting of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles on an
auxiliary power unit that the applicant uses to comply with the
electrical power supply system requirements of paragraph I(a)(2) of
this proposed appendix.
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(b)(6).
III(b)(4) Airplane Demonstration Test
This paragraph would require the applicant to conduct an airplane
flight test to demonstrate that the airplane, its components and
equipment are capable of and function properly during ETOPS and ETOPS
diversions. This flight test may be coordinated with, but would not be
in place of the function and reliability flight testing required for
compliance with Sec. 21.35(b)(2).
The proposed requirement includes several conditions that the
applicant would have to comply with in conducting this test. Among
these are:

(1) The flight test program would have to include:
(i) flights simulating actual ETOPS operation;
(ii) demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversions;
(iii) maximum time engine inoperative diversions;
(iv) non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplanes capability
to safely conduct and ETOPS diversion;
(v) diversions into representative operational diversionary
airports; and
(vi) repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the ground
followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.
(2) The flight testing would have to validate the adequacy of the
airplane's flying qualities, performance and the flight crew's ability
to deal with adverse operating conditions.
(3) The engine-inoperative diversions would have to be evenly
distributed among the number of engines in the applicant's flight test
program.
(4) The test airplane would have to be operated and maintained using
the recommended operations and maintenance manual procedures during the
test.
(5) At the completion of the test, the ETOPS Group 1 significant
systems would have to undergo an airplane visual inspection and the
engines would have to also undergo an internal gas path inspection.
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(b)(7).
III(b)(5) Problem Tracking and Resolution System
This paragraph would require the applicant to establish a problem
tracking and resolution system to address problems, as identified in
proposed section 21.4(a)(5), encountered on ETOPS significant systems
during airplane and engine testing that could affect the safety of
ETOPS operations.
Explanation
The explanation for this proposed paragraph is the same as for
proposed paragraph II(b)(8).
III(b)(6) Reliability Demonstration Acceptance Criteria
The applicant would have to show that the type and frequency of
failures that occur during the airplane flight test program and the
airplane demonstration test proposed by paragraph III(b)(4), are
consistent with the type and frequency of failures or malfunctions that
would be expected to occur on presently certified ETOPS airplanes, or
any non-ETOPS derivative models of those aircraft or engines.
Explanation
As discussed above for proposed paragraph II(b)(9), the original
ARAC draft did not differentiate between two engine airplanes from
airplanes with more than two engines in the applicability of the type
and frequency requirement. The ARAC proposal for this paragraph
included the added phrase ``or any non-ETOPS derivative models of those
airplanes or engines'' for those airplanes and engines that could be
included in this comparison of reliability. As we discussed above for
proposed paragraph II(b)(9), we have deleted this phrase from the
proposed rule for two engine airplanes because an applicant would not
necessarily have to do the comparison to previously approved airplanes
manufactured by that applicant. We are now proposing to separately
state the requirements for airplanes with more than two engines in
proposed section III of Appendix L. We have retained this provision in
the proposed requirement for airplanes with more than two engines in
paragraph III(b)(6) since previous ETOPS experience may not exist on
airplanes with more than two engines at the time this proposed rule
becomes effective.

III(c) Combined Service Experience and Early ETOPS Method

Explanation
With the exception of any specific propulsion system requirements
that are being applied to airplanes with more than two engines as
discussed above, the explanation for proposed section III(c) is the
same as for proposed section II(c).

Part 33

Global Issues for Part 33

The overall philosophy behind ETOPS type design approval is to
build upon the improved reliability observed in today's engines,
resulting in an even higher level of reliability for future engine
products. However, the FAA recognizes that even with the advances in
design and manufacturing technology, loss of thrust control (LOTC), in-
flight shutdown (IFSD), or other power loss events will continue to
occur. Therefore the overall intent of these ETOPS type design
requirements are to minimize the likelihood of an engine power loss
during ETOPS operations.
Specifically, the part 33 ETOPS related amendments require the
engine manufacturers to use their best design and manufacturing
practices, skills and lessons learned in designing and manufacturing
the new product. The intent is to eliminate from the design all known
ETOPS relevant failures, malfunctions, or design related maintenance
errors experienced in their other relevant FAA certified engine models.
These failures include but are not limited to loss of thrust control,
in-flight shutdown, or other power loss events.
It is important to note that complying with the part 33 ETOPS
requirements for certification makes the product ``eligible'' for ETOPS
operation only, and in no way implies an approval

[[Page 64756]]

separate from the aircraft or operator. Therefore, compliance with
these requirements does not constitute an operational or aircraft level
approval for ETOPS operations.

Discussion of General Issues in Part 33

ETOPS Engine Testing
A 3,000-cycle test would be required for ETOPS engine eligibility.
This test simulates 3,000 flights from engine startup to engine
shutdown. A 3,000-cycle test was first required for the early ETOPS
approval of two-engine aircraft under an FAA Early ETOPS Special
Condition. However, prior to and subsequent to that Special Condition,
other aircraft types with new engines, and others with derivative
engine types, have successfully demonstrated the requisite level of
reliability in service for ETOPS using normal certification procedures.
However, the FAA considers that new two-engine airplane-engine
combinations intended for immediate ETOPS operations should be required
to undergo a cyclic endurance ground test to give confidence that the
requisite level of reliability for such operations will be achieved at
entry into service.
The technical basis for applying this test to two-engine airplanes
rather than all airplanes, is that the allowable IFSD rate needed to
maintain safe flight throughout the diversion and landing is an order
of magnitude greater for a three or four engine aircraft as compared to
a two-engine aircraft (assuming equivalent risk and flight duration).
This also assumes that the aircraft can maintain safe flight throughout
the diversion and land with one engine inoperative.
The FAA has concluded from a review of in-service experience that
the 3,000-cycle engine and propulsion system test provides an adequate
opportunity to discover cyclic-related failure modes associated with
the design. However this is predicated upon an adequate post-test
evaluation to identify conditions that could result in an in-flight
shutdown, power loss, or inability to control engine thrust. An FAA
review of the data from the 3,000-cycle tests for three new engine
types has shown that most of the early in-service engine failure modes
could have been discovered using a more thorough teardown inspection
and analysis of a 3,000-cycle test engine and propulsion system
hardware. This would include evaluating hardware condition against the
required lessons learned analysis, and also to evaluate abnormal or
other wear or distress conditions not currently addressed in the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA).
In light of the FAA experience certifying and monitoring the Boeing
777, and in order to provide a consistent standard for post-test
evaluation, the FAA proposes to require a complete teardown inspection
of the engine hardware after completion of the test. The inspection
would include an analysis of any abnormal conditions found. The
analysis would consider the possible consequences of similar
occurrences in service to determine if they might become sources of
engine in-flight shutdowns, power loss, or inability to control engine
thrust. The intent of this requirement is to identify potential sources
of engine in-flight shutdowns or diversions and prevent these from
occurring in the future.
The basic premise behind the engine demonstration tests required by
this proposal is that the tests will provide a useful validation of the
inherent level of reliability that was the product of an enhanced
design and test process. The FAA's expectation for these tests is that
significant failures will not occur. The probability of significant
failures occurring on a single engine test program is so low that if
any do occur, it would be indicative of a design that is not suitable
for ETOPS approval. This expectation is addressed in the ``type and
frequency'' requirement of the rule.
FAA General Changes to the ARAC Proposal for Part 33
The ARAC ETOPS recommendations for part 33 engine rulemaking
addresses the Tasking Statement objectives for part 33 and incorporates
the fundamental elements to achieve the Tasking Statement's stated
objective. The FAA has concluded that the fundamental elements of the
ARAC Recommendations, along with the identified changes, supports
achieving the target level of safety and reliability necessary for safe
ETOPS operations for engines installed in two-engine aircraft at entry-
into-service.
However the FAA has identified a number of areas where the level of
detail in the ARAC rule recommendation is not adequate to fully address
a fundamental element, or has details that the FAA believes are
inappropriate or lacking in adequate detail. Also, for the purpose of
clarity, completeness, and terminology usage, and to follow required
rule format, the ARAC rule recommendation has been reorganized within
part 33.
FAA Changes From the ARAC Part 33 Rule Recommendations
1. Format and Organization
The Rule has been reformatted and reorganized to include all early
ETOPS design, lessons learned, and test requirements under one specific
rule. The rule number is 33.200, which resides in new part 33 subpart
G, Special Requirements. The ARAC recommendations divided the ETOPS
requirements between existing Sec. 33.90 Initial Maintenance
Inspection (IMI) and a specific ETOPS rule. Section 33.90 retains the
provision to utilize the ETOPS testing for compliance purposes. The
reorganization is generally as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARAC recommendation paragraph number New paragraph number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
33.90(a).................................. Same
33.90(b).................................. Same
33.90(b)(1)............................... 33.200(c)(1)
33.90(b)(2)............................... 33.200(c)(2)
33.90(b)(3)............................... 33.200(f)
33.100(a)(1).............................. 33.200(a)
33.100(a)(2).............................. 33.200(b)
33.100(b)................................. 33.200(c)/(d)/(e)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Revision of the 10-Year Limit on Service Data To Be Reviewed for the
Lessons Learned Analysis From Section 33.200(b)
The ARAC proposal for section 33.200(b) limited the assessment of
past design problems that have resulted in loss of thrust control, in-
flight shutdown, or other power loss to ``the applicant's other
relevant type design approvals provided within the past ten years.''
``Ten years'' as used in the rule, is considered to be the time
frame relevant to design/manufacture evolving technology for which the
applicant must show that problems especially relevant to ETOPS have
been addressed in the design for which early ETOPS eligibility is
sought. For example, an early 1980's certified engine with a relatively
lower level of reliability, would not be appropriate to use the
applicant's experience base of lessons learned for compliance with
section 33.200(b) for an engine certified in year 2000; a much better
experience base would be engines certified from 1990, which as an
industry group have very good reliability. The intent is to
continuously build upon the improved reliability seen in today's
engines into even higher levels of reliability.''
The corresponding part 25 requirement proposed by ARAC does not
contain such a time limit on the relevant experience assessment, nor

[[Page 64757]]

does the Boeing 777 ETOPS Special Condition, which is the basis for
this proposed requirement. The relevant experience assessment that
Boeing submitted for compliance with the Special Condition's
requirement consisted of data from a ten year time period immediately
prior to the B777 design development. The FAA approved this ten-year
period at the time because it included three previous major airplane
certification programs (Models 757, 767, and 737-300). For the current
Model 777-300ER type certification program, the assessment was updated
to include the additional relevant experience that has occurred since
the original database was developed. Coincidentally, this covers a ten-
year time period. However, the FAA cannot draw a conclusion from this
experience that a ten-year period will always provide adequate data for
all manufacturers that may apply for an early ETOPS approval.
Therefore, the FAA has included a provision that the 10-year limit
applies if adequate data exists to do the assessment. If the FAA
determines that the applicant's other relevant type design approvals
provided within the past ten years do not constitute an adequate
database, the FAA will determine the extent of additional data required
to be included in the relevant experience assessment based on the
following factors:
a. The manufacturer's level of experience in certifying engines
installed on Transport Category airplanes,
b. Recent experience certifying new engines,
c. Completeness of the manufacturer's design practices/manuals used
in the development of new engines, and
d. Any other factors that the manufacturer may want to present to
the FAA for consideration.
3. Insertion of the Word ``Independently'' in the Test Section of
Section 33.200(c)(2)
The ARAC Recommendation 3,000 cycle test requires all rotors to be
unbalanced to 90% of a limit value, however the actual rule text is not
specific as to whether each rotor is to be unbalanced independently.
The FAA has verified that it was the ARAC's intent that each rotor must
be unbalanced independently relative to its individual rotor limit. So
the word ``independently'' is inserted to clarify that each individual
rotor must be unbalanced to the specified 90% limit value.
4. Addition of Inspection Criteria for Post 3,000 Test [See
33.200(e)(3)(i)(C)]
The ARAC Recommendations specify hardware layout inspections in
accordance with the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) and
the Lessons Learned analysis. The FAA proposes to add a third
inspection criteria as follows: ``Inspect in a manner to identify wear
or distress conditions which could result in IFSD, LOTC or other power
loss, and which are not specifically identified by 33.200(b) or
addressed within the current ICA.'' It should be noted that the ARAC
Recommendation's AC material discusses such an inspection method and
that the recent FAA B777 Special Condition for ETOPS also included a
similar inspection requirement.
5. Clarification of an Incomplete Statement Relating to Post-Test
Hardware Condition [See Sec. 33.200(e)(3)(ii)]
The ARAC Recommendation contains a requirement that post-test
hardware condition be such that no distress is observed that could
result in a power loss. However many engine parts if distressed and
operated long enough will fail and potentially cause a power loss. As
written, distress in many parts could be predicted to result in power
loss over an inappropriately long period of operation. Therefore the
FAA proposes to define the period of operation to make this judgment as
follows; `` * * * within a period of operation before the component,
assembly or system would likely have been inspected or functionally
tested for integrity while in service''.
6. Revision of Interim Inspection To Be Used for Sec. 33.90 Compliance
The ARAC Recommendations propose to use the 3,000-cycle test for
Sec. 33.90 compliance by means of an interim on-wing inspection
method. The FAA concurs with the basic on-wing inspection approach.
However, the ARAC Recommendations only specify a visual inspection for
Sec. 33.90 compliance purposes. This Recommendation does not meet the
most basic existing Method of Compliance (MoC) for a Sec. 33.90
inspection. The FAA proposes to revise the ``visual only'' inspection
to be an inspection acceptable to the Administrator, and specify an
acceptable MoC within the AC. Currently for an on-wing type inspection
for Sec. 33.90 compliance, the FAA would accept an inspection that
does all of the following:
(1) Full borescope inspection of accessible gas path stages or
areas of the fan, compressor, combustor, and turbine modules, to the
serviceable limits of the ICA.
(2) For Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) equipped
engines, observe and interrogate the FADEC system for fault messages
and status messages, both current or previously recorded, to the
serviceable limits of the ICA.
(3) Inspect all oil system chip detectors and filters for
contamination.
(4) Inspect all fuel system filters for contamination.
(5) Test a sample of main engine oil for contaminants that might
indicate impending internal failure.
(6) Conduct a complete visual inspection of the inlet, exhaust, and
externals, to the serviceable limits of the ICA.
(7) Conduct a power calibration to show that the engine can produce
power or thrust within established limits, and is free of surge or
stall when operated in accordance with the Operating Instructions.
General pass/fail criteria for the above items is serviceable in
accordance with the ICA, unless otherwise approved by the
Administrator.
The above method of compliance has been established for
conventionally designed engines, and is discussed further in the
companion AC. Other inspections or checks, or deletion of non-
applicable items may be necessary for new or unconventional designs.
7. Addition of Oil Tank Design Requirement
The FAA is proposing to revise the current requirements of Sec.
33.71(c)(4), which addresses oil tank caps. The proposed revision would
incorporate a new ETOPS eligibility design requirement for oil tanks
intended to prevent hazardous oil loss in the event of an oil tank cap
installation error. The FAA is aware of a number of single and dual
engine oil loss events due to oil tank cap installation errors, and is
concerned that these types of problems will continue to occur,
potentially resulting in an unsafe condition during extended
operations. The FAA believes it prudent to address this situation by
requiring oil tanks to be designed to accommodate cap installation
errors without hazardous oil loss. The proposed rule would not allow
compliance by maintenance procedures; the necessary physical features
or characteristics must be part of the oil tank design. The rule is
intended to protect against hazardous oil loss when oil tank cap
installation errors occur.

[[Page 64758]]

8. Engine Endurance Test With Vibration
The ARAC Recommendations include a 3,000-cycle endurance test with
main rotor unbalance. The Recommendations specify the minimum unbalance
as being an ``average value'' of the peak vibration level observed
during required vibration surveys. In section 33.200(c)(2)(iv), the
term ``average value'' is being replaced by the term ``equivalent
value'' to better address the concept of cumulative damage. For
example, utilizing an average value could result in less cumulative
damage due to vibration then if the 90% requirement was precisely
maintained over the test duration. By computing and working to an
equivalent value of rotor unbalance, cumulative damage will always be
equal to or greater then a test conducted with a steady value of 90%
unbalance. The equivalent value is a Miner's rule summation
calculation, and is further described in the companion AC.

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposal

Proposed New Appendix A, Paragraph A33.3(c), Extended Operations
(ETOPS) Requirements
A proposed new Appendix A Paragraph A33.3(c) would define new
engine condition monitoring requirements necessary for obtaining ETOPS
type design eligibility approval.
Explanation
This section requires inclusion of a power assurance check
methodology into the ICA for all engine models requiring ETOPS
eligibility. A special requirement exists for engines to be installed
in twin-engine aircraft applications, that being the power assurance
method must be validated by test or experience.
Proposed Revision to Section 33.71(c)(4)--Oil Tanks
A proposed revision to section 33.71(c)(4) would define new oil
tank design requirements necessary for obtaining ETOPS type design
eligibility approval.
Explanation
See the explanation in paragraph 7 of this section, above.
Proposed Revision to Section 33.90--Initial Maintenance Inspection
(IMI)
A proposed revision of section 33.90 would define requirements for
utilizing ETOPS type design eligibility test data obtained during
section 33.200 testing for section 33.90 compliance purposes.
Explanation
The fundamental requirements of section 33.90 are unchanged; except
for the inclusion of a provision to allow utilization of data obtained
under section 33.200 testing to show compliance to section 33.90 IMI.
Proposed New Section 33.200--Early Extended Operations (ETOPS)
Eligibility and Test Requirements
A proposed new section 33.200 would define overall requirements for
obtaining ETOPS type design eligibility approval.
Explanation
Compliance with this section results in an engine model that is
eligible for two-engine ETOPS operation before the service experience
required under 14 CFR part 25, Appendix L, Section II, paragraph (a) is
achieved. The individual subparagraphs are discussed below:

Sections 33.200(a) and 33.200(b)

These sections require an applicant to establish a design quality
process acceptable to the Administrator that will ensure that the type
design minimizes the possibility of power loss failure events.
These rule sections require the applicant to use its best design
practices, including all its corporate knowledge, skills and lessons
learned in the design and manufacture of the engine. The intent is to
eliminate from the design all known failures, malfunctions or design
related maintenance errors experienced in other relevant FAA certified
engines, and that are especially relevant to ETOPS. Such events include
loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or other power loss events.
Compliance may be shown by evidence acceptable to the Administrator
that the applicant's design quality assurance process has demonstrated
the capability to eliminate causes of engine failures, malfunctions,
and design related maintenance problems known to have occurred within
the applicant's commercial engine experience base. The applicant should
also show that the design quality process would preclude the recurrence
of that cause in the new design. Also, the design quality process and
design features must address all applicable failures, malfunctions, and
maintenance problems that could affect ETOPS even if they occurred on
taxi, if such an event could have occurred in-flight.
The FAA will determine the extent of data required to be included
in the relevant experience assessment based on the following factors:
(1) The manufacturer's level of experience in certifying engines
installed on Transport Category airplanes;
(2) Recent experience certifying new engines;
(3) Completeness of the manufacturer's design practices and manuals
used in the development of new engines; and
(4) Any other factors that the manufacturer may want to present to
the FAA for consideration.
If adequate data exists the time period of consideration will be
the prior 10 years of applicant experience.

Section 33.200(c)

The intent of this testing is to simulate in-service operation; and
to simulate the extent of time that the engine will operate at maximum
continuous power for the longest diversion time in an ETOPS scenario,
and at a level of engine vibration that exceeds expected service
operation. The test is not intended to duplicate or repeat or replace
the endurance test required by section 33.87.
Explanation
This 3,000-cycle test requirement simulates the typical field
service operation expected to be encountered in the first 250,000 fleet
hours (typically two years of service) and the extent of time that an
engine will operate in the event of a diversion at maximum continuous
power for the longest diversion time expected. In addition, the test is
required to be conducted at a level of vibration for the complete test
that exceeds expected service exposure. The new test is an important
part of the early ETOPS eligibility determination for both the engine
and propulsion system of the airplane. No other type of engine
vibration testing can simulate the vibration induced by imbalance of
its rotors running through the speed and power ranges experienced in
service. The test is required to simulate 3,000 cycles of service
operation (typically two years) in a short time span. This test is
similar to that conducted for the original certification of the three
engine types used on the B777 under the Special Conditions. Those tests
were also a combination of engine cyclic endurance with high cycle
fatigue (HCF) vibration induced by way of imbalancing the main rotors
of the engine.

Section 33.200(d)

The purpose of this test is to establish thrust characteristics,
and ensure that

[[Page 64759]]

the engine can deliver rated takeoff power or thrust within approved
limits prior to the start of the test.

Section 33.200(e)

This section establishes what the required inspections are and what
the pass/fail criteria is for section 33.200 compliance. Further detail
on a MoC for this section can be found in the companion advisory
circular.

Section 33.200(f)

This section establishes the requirements for utilizing paragraph
33.200(c) 3,000-cycle test data to show compliance to section 33.90
Initial Maintenance Inspection. The companion AC provides details of an
acceptable MoC.

Part 121

Global Issues for Part 121

FAA General Changes to the ARAC Proposal for Part 121
(1) Section 121.368 Has Become 121.374
The ARAC proposed rule number had to be changed due to other FAA
rule writing projects. The content and concepts from the proposal were
retained wherever possible within the new rule. Specific format changes
and the differences between this proposed rule and the ARAC proposal
are discussed in each section below.

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 121

Proposed New Section 121.7 Definitions and Designations
The FAA proposes to add a new section in part 121 for definitions
applicable to ETOPS.
Explanation
Many of the terms used in the proposed regulatory and guidance
material for ETOPS under this part are unique to these operations.
Requirements and concepts for ETOPS require precise definition to
assure common understanding and compliance. Definitions are added for:

Adequate Airport
ETOPS Alternate
ETOPS Area of Operation
ETOPS Dual Maintenance
ETOPS Entry Point
ETOPS Maintenance Significant System
ETOPS Qualified Personnel
Maximum Diversion Time
One Engine Inoperative Cruise Speed (Approved)

The following areas are designated as ETOPS areas by the
Administrator in which the planning, operational, and equipage
requirements for ETOPS apply. The areas are defined as:

NOPAC
North Pacific
Polar Areas
North Pole
South Pole
Proposed New Section 121.97 (b)(1)(ii) Airports: Required Data
The FAA proposes to clarify the ``public protection'' requirement
of section 121.97 to include consideration of facilities available for
public safety, protection, and welfare during regular and irregular
operations (including diversions to the airport).
Explanation
Airlines must consider passenger facilities when selecting an ETOPS
Alternate and in diversion planning. The facilities at an airport or in
the immediate area must be sufficient to protect the passengers and
crew from the elements and to see to their welfare during the time
required to transport them onward.
By definition, ETOPS operations are those with long segments over
water or remote areas. Some of these remote areas are affected by
severe weather conditions such as, but not limited to, extreme cold or
high winds and cold temperatures. Some of the airports that are well
positioned for use as enroute alternates are in remote areas. These
airports may have only limited or seasonal facilities that could be
used to shelter passengers and crew after an unscheduled landing. As
ETOPS operations have expanded in scope and extended in length,
operations over more remote areas with more extreme weather
possibilities have become routine. Northern Canada and the Russian Far
East are typical examples. Facilities at some of the airports in those
areas have not been maintained because of political, economic and
military changes. It cannot be assumed that the passengers and crew of
an aircraft will be safe simply because a safe landing can be made at
an airport. Therefore, certificate holders are obligated to be aware of
the available facilities and satisfy them that there will be adequate
facilities to protect the passengers and crew should it be necessary to
make an unscheduled landing for any reason.
These are new requirements. The FAA is proposing to add these
additional requirements to this regulation because it has learned that
not all certificate holders have planned for these contingencies in the
past, apparently because the current wording of the regulation did not
require them to do so. The FAA believes regulations are needed to
prudently insure carriers recognize ``the duty of an air carrier to
provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the
public interest * * *'' 49 U.S.C. sec. 44701 (d)(1)(A). The ARAC
recommendation included arguments that since ETOPS flights are
generally international flights, treaties limit damages for negligence
that passengers on international flights may recover from airlines. The
ARAC further stated that absent the compelling motivation of unlimited
liability for proven damages available to domestic passengers, carrier
motivation to avoid findings of negligence may also be lessened
somewhat.
Others have pointed out that in the Polar Policy letter the FAA has
already included instructions and requirements detailing the treatment
of passengers in case of diversions or accidents and the facilities to
be made available for them. Further, the addition of passenger related
contingencies are based on rules, regulations and International
Treaties, which have been and are in the process of being enacted for
the protection of passengers well being such as: ``Aviation Disaster
Family Assistance Act of 1996'', the DOT/NTSB Task Force Report on
Assistance to Families of Aviation Disasters of 1997, Public Law 105-
148 of 1997 (105th Congress), ICAO Circular 285-AN166 (33rd Assembly,
2001), European Union Regulation (EG) 2027/97, the ``Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air'' of
1999 and others. Providing for the safety, security, comfort and well
being of all of the occupants of an airplane has become especially
important on long range flights because of increasing medical
consequences. It was also pointed out that ignoring those requirements
expose the carriers to increasing liability claims and to loss of
business because of passengers' discomfort.
Proposed New Sections 121.99(c) and (d) Communications Facilities
The FAA proposes to add sections 121.99(c) and 121.99(d). Section
121.99(c) would create a baseline ETOPS equipage requirement for flag
operations. Section 121.99(d) would create an additional equipage
requirement for operations beyond 180-minutes.
Explanation
Under this proposal a certificate holder would have to provide for
voice communication between the crew and air traffic services and the
crew and the certificate holder wherever and whenever it is available.
In areas where voice communication is not possible,

[[Page 64760]]

the certificate holder would have to provide a non-voice communication
system, such as High Frequency (HF) data link, to ensure communication
capability.
Paragraph 121.99(d) would apply on to ETOPS flights planned on
greater than 180-minutes and would require the installation of an
additional communication system. This communication system would have
to be capable of providing immediate satellite based voice
communication of land-line telephone-fidelity between the flight crew
and air traffic services and between the flight crew and the company.
The term ``immediate'' in the context of this section would mean the
time period required to connect an ordinary land-line telephone call.
The modifiers ``land-line telephone-fidelity'' are included as
performance standards to describe the faithful reproduction of sound.
The FAA is essentially describing Satellite Communication (SATCOM). At
this time, only SATCOM provides this capability and compliance with
this proposed rule. The FAA acknowledges that technological innovation
may create alternatives to SATCOM or render the system obsolete.
Certificate holders would be required to equip airplanes used in ETOPS
beyond 180 minutes with SATCOM or other system that offers equivalent
or enhanced capability. The FAA notes that the ARAC consolidated these
requirements in a single paragraph (c) in their recommendation. The FAA
elected to reformat for clarity.
Both paragraphs (c) and (d) would require the certificate holder to
consider ``potential routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to
ETOPS alternates'' when assessing the availability of voice
communication facilities. The ARAC recommended that the FAA amend
paragraph 121.99(a) to include the above-quoted language. The FAA has
elected not to amend paragraph 121.99(a). Paragraph 121.99(a) is the
baseline requirement for all domestic and flag certificate holders
operating under part 121. The FAA believes the equipage and
communication performance requirements for ETOPS should be separate and
distinct from the baseline communication requirement for part 121.
Further, the FAA has proposed amending paragraph 121.99(a) in the Area
Navigation (RNAV) proposed rulemaking. See 67 FR 77326 (December 17,
2002).
The origin of paragraph 121.99(d) is the 207-minute policy letter,
which conditioned extension of section 121.161 deviation authority upon
the installation SATCOM for operation on those routes. See 65 FR 3520
(January 21, 2000). The purpose of this proposal is to ensure that
flight crews have the best communication capability in the event of an
extended diversion. During a diversion, crew workload increases
considerably. The use of an unwieldy communication system during a
diversion would needlessly distract the crew from more important
cockpit duties. SATCOM is not available in all regions of the world. In
those regions, flight crews must have another means to communicate with
the certificate holder and air traffic services.
Proposed New Section 121.106 Required Rescue Fire Fighting Capability
at ETOPS Alternate Airports
The FAA proposes to add new section 121.106, requiring a rescue
fire fighting capability at an airport designated as an ETOPS
alternate.
Explanation
Currently, part 139 does not require any aircraft rescue fire
fighting (RFF) capability at airports designated as Takeoff and
Destination alternates. Alternate airports are referred to in part 139
but not defined. The common perception of an alternate airport is that
it is an airport that is used infrequently, when diversions occur. The
original use of the definition was limited to the destination or
takeoff airports. There was no specific mention of the en route
alternate until Advisory Circular 120-42, Extended Range Operation With
Two Engine Airplanes (ETOPS), was issued in 1985. The airport
regulations specified in part 139 were first published in 1972 prior to
the inception of ETOPS. For these reasons, and as outlined further, we
propose new section 121.106 to include the requirement for RFF at an en
route alternate airport.
Normally a flight diverts to its destination alternate airport
because of poor weather at the destination airport or the aircraft
having a low fuel state. In contrast, a diversion to an ETOPS en route
alternate is likely attributable to an engine or system failure or
medical emergency. Throughout the ETOPS flight the designation of the
en route alternate may be revised, with consideration of the designated
en route alternate airport maintaining an adequate level of weather and
runway conditions to safely land the airplane. At the most critical
point of an ETOPS en route diversion there is no other choice as to the
diversion airport. It remains necessary to ensure that all the
facilities and services are adequate to ensure that a safe landing can
be made at the diversion airport in the event that it is necessary to
divert. Thus, some have argued that there is an increased importance of
a rescue fire fighting service at airports designated as an ETOPS en
route alternate. Further, they have argued that establishing such a
requirement in the Federal Aviation Regulations is consistent with ICAO
Annex 6, Part I, Attachment E, wherein an ``adequate alternate
aerodrome'' is defined. The definition includes a list of various
facilities and services, including ``rescue and fire fighting'', as
being necessary. (An attachment to ICAO Annex is intended as a guide or
supplementary material to ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and
as such, is not a requirement.)
The fact that en route diversions have occurred in the past and
will continue to occur necessitates evaluation of the facts surrounding
those events and the needs they identify. ETOPS operators in the United
States (as well as Europe) operating across the North Atlantic have
encountered difficulties in being able to designate certain Canadian
airports as ETOPS en route alternates due to the reduction of RFF
service capability (Canadian airport privatization) and numerous
military base closures.
History has shown that in-flight diversions occur for a variety of
reasons, other than In-Flight Shutdown (IFSD) of two engine aircraft.
Any aircraft conducting extended range operations could experience a
critical emergency requiring diversion to an en route alternate
airport. Thus, it is proposed by some that a regulation be established
to require an en route alternate for all extended range flight
operations (aircraft with 2, 3, and 4 engines) because, in such an
event requiring a diversion, a simple emergency evacuation in a hostile
environment (for example, due to cold temperatures) could be deadly, or
in a similar way, a mechanical event requiring a need to land could
result in an unanticipated accident, such as a runway overrun and thus
become catastrophic. It is further argued by some that these
considerations have led to the conclusion that some level of accident
mitigation systems should be required for airports designated as en
route alternate airports. This accident mitigation protection is
provided for at airports designated as origin and destination airports
in the regulations of part 121, and the appropriate levels of
protection are specified in the airport certification regulations
designated as part 139.
Part 139 specifies the level of aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting
(RFF) as a function of aircraft size. This level of protection is
deemed the ``Index'' and

[[Page 64761]]

specifies the amount of agent for fire extinguishment and the number of
vehicles to deliver the agent proportionate to the size of the largest
airplane using the airport. In the international Standards of ICAO, the
length and width of the aircraft fuselage determines the ``RFF
Category''. An allowance for reducing the index/category is provided in
the event that the aircraft only uses the airport infrequently i.e.,
less than 700 movements in the busiest consecutive three months with
the airplane in the highest category. This is termed a remission
factor. Even though frequency of operations may allow a reduction of
service levels by 1 Category, this reduction will no longer be allowed
after January 2005 under the ICAO Standards. ICAO RFF category range
from 1 to 10. As an example, the ICAO category of RFF 4, which is
nearly equivalent to Index A in part 139, provides at least 1
firefighter and 1 vehicle with the ability for immediate fire
suppression or ground assistance to occupants.
Contradicting the arguments of those who support RFF at enroute
alternates, some have stated that based on the last sixteen years of
ETOPS operations with well over 2.5 million ETOPS flights around the
world, there is no record of a single incident where a twin on an ETOPS
phase of flight with a mechanical event diverted to an ETOPS alternate
and the landing resulted in an unanticipated accident, such as a runway
overrun and thus became catastrophic, and required the RFF services. It
was further argued that the probability of an ETOPS flight diverting on
the ETOPS portion of the flight, landing at an ETOPS alternate,
resulting in an accident or a catastrophic situation is very remote,
and need not be considered. However, some have pointed out that the
fact that an event has not happened does not mean it will never happen,
and industry needs to be proactive and provide a level of safety as a
margin, should the situation arise.
Some have pointed out that requiring high levels of RFF protection
for the enroute alternate airports would either severely limit the
selection of diversion airports necessitating longer divert times, or
demand the communities supporting these enroute alternate airports
increase their level of emergency service beyond that currently
available. However, it can be argued that for airplanes on long
diversions a pad may need to be built in so that a minimum level of RFF
capability is assured at the time of landing.
Even though currently not required by part 139, the FAA considers
it very desirable to have some minimum level of RFF protection at the
ETOPS alternates. Taking into account the various opinions expressed in
the ARAC recommendations, the FAA proposes to establish a minimum RFF
of 4 for ETOPS operations below 180 minutes, and a minimum RFF of 7 for
diversion times greater than 180 minutes. This reflects the RFF
requirements stated in FAA Order 8400.10, Flight Standards Handbook
Bulletins for Air Transportation, HBAT 99-15 titled Level of Rescue and
Fire Fighting Services (RFFS) for ETOPS En Route Alternates, and the
207-Minute ETOPS Policy.
Similar to the allowance contained in HBAT 99-15, the proposed
regulation allows for an off airport response time of thirty minutes,
however, the required equipment must be available on-scene for the
arrival of the diverting airplane and should remain for as long as
their services are needed. In contrast to a destination or departure
airport, the diversion airport has time to muster community emergency
service assets to provide the necessary emergency response following
notification of the aircraft diversion. This provision for the use of
off-airport emergency services necessitates that a robust
communications link must be established in order to provide sufficient
time to muster the necessary RFF personnel and equipment. Further,
local community emergency services support of required RFF response in
providing equipment and personnel is considered prudent.
In all cases the certificate holder must ensure that the flight
crews are provided current information (in plain language) concerning
the RFF capability for those airports designated as alternate airports
Proposed New Section 121.122 Communication Facilities
The FAA proposes to add a communication facilities requirement for
supplemental operators. This section would mirror section 121.99, which
applies to flag and domestic operators.
Explanation
The FAA believes it is necessary to create comparable communication
requirement for supplemental operators to ensure consistency among part
121 operations. To this end, the FAA proposes communication
requirements similar to those in section 121.99. For example, paragraph
121.122(a) is based on the existing paragraph 121.99(a), which is the
basic communication requirement for domestic and flag operators.
Similarly paragraphs 121.122(b) and (c) are based on the proposed
sections 121.99(c) and (d) respectively which would establish
communication requirements for ETOPS. See discussion above for
121.99(c) and (d) for the rationale of ETOPS communication
requirements.
Proposed New Paragraph 121.135(b)(10) Contents
Add a new 14 CFR 121.135(b)(10) to require performance data to
support ETOPS.
Explanation
The FAA proposes to insert a new requirement for performance data
in the manual required by this section to support ETOPS as paragraph
(b)(10), and to renumber existing paragraphs 121.135(b)(10) through
(24) to new paragraphs 121.135(b)(11) through (25). Since ETOPS are
conducted under a special authorization, there is an additional
performance data requirement to support these operations. The flight
crew and dispatchers should have available the engine inoperative and
cabin depressurization cruise data used by the certificate holder to
plan flights and operate under ETOPS.
Proposed New Paragraph 121.135(b)(26) Contents (New)
Add paragraph 121.135(b)(26) to require a passenger recovery plan
for flag and supplemental operations in the certificate holder's
manual.
Explanation
The FAA proposes to add paragraph 121.135(b)(24) to require a
passenger recovery plan for flag and supplemental operations in the
certificate holder's manual. The FAA introduced the requirement for an
airline to develop and maintain a passenger recovery plan for flights
authorized in the North Pole area of operation by policy letter in
March 2001.
It is incumbent that a carrier account for contingencies when
diversions occur to airports not normally served by the carrier. When a
diversion occurs in an area where the carrier has a substantial
operational infrastructure, (that is, a carrier serves many
destinations in Europe but is forced by operational circumstances to
divert to an airport not served by the carrier but within the region)
that diversion plan becomes a simple matter of describing how the
carrier's assets within the region can supply immediate logistical
support to the diversion aircraft. This can be called a regional
passenger recovery plan applicable to a stated geographical area.
However, a carrier with an extensive route system extending over
remote areas has a responsibility to devise a

[[Page 64762]]

plan of substance to recover the passengers, crew, and aircraft in the
event of a diversion within a remote area. The plan should be of
sufficient detail to demonstrate that the recovery operation can be
readily affected, and the basic needs of the diverted customers and
crew can be provided for in the interim.
The certificate holder must demonstrate that a regional plan is
robust enough to handle diversion scenarios within that region by
showing the effectiveness and adequacy of communications; coordination;
facilities; accuracy of NOTAM and weather information; and operability
of support ground equipment. The recovery plan should also address the
care and safety of passengers and crew at the diversion airport, and
include the plan of operation to extract the passengers and crew from
that airport. The certificate holder must maintain the accuracy and
completeness of its recovery plan as part of its annual audit.
Proposed Change to Section 121.161 Airplane Limitations: Type of Route
The FAA proposes to revise section 121.161(a) to create ETOPS route
authority within the regulations and to move away from ETOPS conducted
under the Administrator's deviation authority.
Explanation
As discussed earlier in this proposal, deviation from section
121.161(a) has been the regulatory basis of ETOPS since its inception.
The FAA issued AC 120-42 and AC 120-42A to provide guidance for
carriers seeking to conduct ETOPS. However as ETOPS evolved from an
exceptional kind of operation to a prevalent kind of operation, the
need for amending paragraph 121.161(a) has become became apparent. The
proposed paragraph 121.161(a) would describe when and where the
requirements of ETOPS would apply and furthermore would contain a
pointer to the new Appendix O. Appendix O would contain the approval
requirements for the different ETOPS time thresholds and ETOPS areas of
applicability. ETOPS would no longer be conducted under the
Administrator's deviation authority under this proposal but would have
a distinct regulatory basis.
The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph 121.161(d) that would limit
operations of reciprocating engine powered airplanes to routes no more
than 60 minutes away from an adequate airport at single-engine
inoperative speed in still air and standard conditions. This new
section would have language allowing the Administrator to grant
deviations. The FAA believes that, although not possible at present,
reciprocating engines may someday achieve the reliability necessary for
operations beyond 60 minutes.
Proposed New Section 121.374 ETOPS Maintenance Requirements
(1) Format changes

------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARAC proposal NPRM draft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
121.368 ETOPS Maintenance.............. 121.374 ETOPS Maintenance
Elements.
(a) CMP................................ (a) CMP.
(b) Initial maintenance and training (b) CAMP.
procedures.
(g) Maintenance training.
(c)(1) CMP requirements................ Deleted.
(c)(2) Pre-departure service check..... (b)(1) Pre-departure service
check.
(c)(3) Verification procedures......... (b)(3) Verification program.
(c)(4) Preclude dual maintenance....... (b)(2)(i) Preclude dual
maintenance.
(c)(5) Procedures if dual maintenance (b)(2)(ii) Procedures if dual
cannot be avoided. maintenance cannot be avoided.
(c)(6) APU in-flight start program..... (f) APU in-flight start
program.
(d) Centralized maintenance control.... (b)(5) Centralized maintenance
control.
(e) Changes to maintenance and training (h) Procedural changes.
procedures.
(f) ETOPS task identification.......... (b)(4) ETOPS task
identification.
(g) ETOPS document..................... (b)(6) ETOPS document.
(h) ETOPS parts control................ (b)(7) ETOPS parts control.
(i) ETOPS reliability program.......... (b)(8) ETOPS reliability
program.
None................................... (b)(8)(i) Reporting
requirements.
(j) Investigate each IFSD.............. (b)(8)(ii) Investigation
requirements.
(j) Also contained IFSD rates.......... (c) Propulsion system
monitoring.
(k) Engine condition monitoring........ (d) Engine condition
monitoring.
(l) Oil consumption program............ (e) Oil consumption monitoring.
(m) APU in-flight start program........ (f) APU in-flight start
program.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Explanation
A crucial element of ETOPS is a robust maintenance program that
complements the standard airplane-engine maintenance program. ETOPS
maintenance practices are designed to preclude and protect diversions
through closely controlled procedures such as engine condition
monitoring, oil consumption monitoring, the aggressive resolution of
reliability issues, and procedures to reduce the risks of human error
during maintenance of airplane systems and engines. For the past 18
years, AC 120-42 and AC 120-42A have provided guidance describing the
specialized maintenance requirements necessary for ETOPS. The FAA
proposes to codify the guidance from the AC. These requirements would
apply to all airplanes used in ETOPS regardless of the number of the
engines installed.
This proposal would require operators to develop an ETOPS
maintenance program that addresses or incorporates the following
elements:
(a) Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) Compliance
Each certificate holder would have to establish a system to ensure
compliance with the CMP. The importance of the CMP is discussed more
fully above in the General Discussion of the Proposal.
(b) Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program (CAMP)
A CAMP is a comprehensive oversight program to ensure the
continuing airworthiness of an airplane. A CAMP includes but is not
limited to maintenance tasks, inspection tasks, auditing requirements,
and data analysis. CAMP is required by part 121 Subpart L. The proposed
regulation would expand the scope of the CAMP for ETOPS operators to
encompass issues unique to ETOPS. The following are considered basic
additional

[[Page 64763]]

elements of a CAMP for an ETOPS operator:
(1) ETOPS Pre-Departure Service Check
The pre-departure service check is designed to ensure that ETOPS
significant systems will perform their intended function throughout the
flight. An ETOPS pre-departure service check would have to verify the
status of ETOPS significant systems. Some certificate holders
conducting ETOPS flights have elected to add other items to their check
as a result of operational experience and knowledge gained from their
reliability programs. Regardless of any additional items an operator
may add to a check, the focal point of this check must be inspection,
servicing, and maintenance of ETOPS significant systems.
(2) Dual Maintenance
Dual maintenance is a concept relating to repetition of maintenance
errors on redundant systems. There have been instances of a single
mechanic repeating a maintenance error on multiple systems. An example
of dual maintenance error is failing to install o-rings on engine oil
or fuel components on multiple engines. Establishing procedures to
avoid dual maintenance can minimize the probability of such errors. The
use of two or more mechanics reduces the risk of this type of error.
Routine tasks on multiple similar elements, such as oil and fuel filter
changes, should never be scheduled and assigned on the same maintenance
visit.
However, the FAA is aware that under some limited circumstances,
dual maintenance may be unavoidable. For instance, a pilot's report of
a discrepancy on an ETOPS significant system may require maintenance on
one engine at the same time as a scheduled maintenance event for the
other engine. In such cases, the certificate holder must establish and
follow procedures to mitigate the risk of a common cause human error.
(3) Verification Program
The verification program ensures the effectiveness of ETOPS
maintenance actions. Verification programs are designed to identify any
potential problems and may consist of ground tests, flight tests, use
of built in test equipment (BITE), and other tests as appropriate.
Verification action must be accomplished following corrective action to
an ETOPS significant system, primary system failure, IFSD or in
response to significant adverse trends. The certificate holder must
establish procedures to clearly indicate who is going to initiate the
action and what verification action is necessary. A verification flight
may be performed in combination with an ETOPS revenue flight, provided
the verification phase is documented as satisfactorily completed upon
reaching the ETOPS entry point.
(4) Task Identification
ETOPS maintenance programs include numerous tasks that are critical
to ETOPS. Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to
identify specific tasks that must be accomplished by ETOPS qualified
personnel. These ETOPS-specific tasks are performed during all phases
of maintenance. On the other hand, some tasks in an ETOPS maintenance
program are identical to tasks on a non-ETOPS airplane. The FAA
realizes that tasks, such as checking seat belts prior to a flight, do
not involve ETOPS significant systems and may be performed by non-ETOPS
qualified personnel. ETOPS specific tasks would either be identified on
the certificate holder's routine work forms and related instructions or
parceled together and identified as an ``ETOPS package.''
(5) Centralized Maintenance Control Procedures
The certificate holder would have to develop and clearly define in
their program ETOPS related procedures, duties, and responsibilities,
such as the involvement of centralized maintenance control. The
function of centralized maintenance control is to be a focal point for
operational aspects of ETOPS maintenance and to ensure that ETOPS
aircraft are airworthy. Procedures and centralized control processes
would be established which would preclude an airplane being dispatched
for ETOPS flights after a propulsion system shut-down, significant
primary airframe system failure, or significant adverse trends in
system performance without appropriate corrective action having been
taken. Confirmation of corrective maintenance would require appropriate
verification action prior to an ETOPS flight. Depending on the size and
scope of the ETOPS operation, the maintenance control entity could be
an entire department or one ETOPS-qualified individual for a small
operation. ``Centralized maintenance control'' is also referred to as
``technical services center'', ``maintenance operations control
(MOC)'', and ``maintenance coordination center'' among other terms
within industry.
(6) ETOPS Program Document
The certificate holder would have to develop a document that
identifies all ETOPS requirements, including supportive programs,
procedures, duties, and responsibilities. The ETOPS program document
would be for use by personnel involved in ETOPS and would be readily
accessible to those personnel. This document need not be inclusive but
should at least reference the maintenance program and other
requirements, and clearly indicate where they are located in the
certificate holder's document system. The ETOPS program document would
have to be submitted to the CHDO for approval at least 60 days before
beginning ETOPS flights and be subject to revision control.
(7) ETOPS Parts Control
Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to develop a
parts control program that ensures the proper parts and configurations
are maintained for ETOPS airplanes. The program would have to include
procedures to verify that the parts installed on ETOPS airplanes during
parts borrowing or pooling arrangements, as well as those parts used
after repair or overhaul, maintains the necessary ETOPS configuration.
In many cases, certificate holders utilize the Illustrated Parts
Catalog (IPC) as the ETOPS parts controlling document. However, other
methods may be used provided that the configuration standard of the
airplane and engine is maintained.
(8) Reliability Program
The certificate holder would have to develop an ETOPS Reliability
Program or the certificate holder's existing Reliability Program would
have to be supplemented. This program should be designed to identify
and prevent ETOPS related problems. The program would be event-oriented
and incorporate reporting procedures for critical events detrimental to
ETOPS flights. For those certificate holders that do not have a FAA
approved reliability program, their Continuing Analysis and
Surveillance (CAS) would have to be enhanced to achieve ETOPS
reliability goals. Reliability data would have to be readily available
for use by the certificate holder and the FAA to ensure that an
acceptable level of reliability is achieved and maintained.
The reporting requirements differ from the ARAC recommendation. The
ARAC proposal indicated that the reporting requirements for ETOPS would
be satisfied through reporting required by sections 121.363, 121.703,
121.704 and 121.705. Due to other FAA rulemaking activity to amend
sections 121.703 and 121.704, the reporting requirements of 121.703 and
121.704

[[Page 64764]]

would not apply in the manner as understood by the Working Group. In
order to adjust for these changes, the FAA proposes to codify the
existing list of reportable events from Advisory Circular 120-42A.
(1) The following are in addition to the reporting requirements in
section 121.703 and would include:
(a) In-flight shutdowns.
(b) Diversions or turnback.
(c) Uncommanded power changes or surges.
(d) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.
(e) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.
(f) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.
(2) Certificate holders would also be required to furnish the
following information:
(a) Airplane identification (type and N-number).
(b) Engine identification (make and serial number).
(c) Total time, cycles and time since last shop visit.
(d) For systems, time since overhaul or last inspection of the
discrepant unit.
(e) Phase of flight.
(f) Corrective action.
This proposed regulation would require certificate holders to
conduct an investigation into the cause of the occurrence of any event
listed above in addition to any event described in section 121.703. The
certificate holder would have to submit findings and description of
corrective action taken to the CHDO. The FAA expects certificate
holders to investigate events above in conjunction with manufacturers.
The report must be submitted in the manner prescribed by section
121.703(e).
(c) Propulsion System Monitoring
Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights.
A propulsion system-monitoring program is intended to detect adverse
trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for
when corrective action may be necessary. Propulsion system problems and
IFSD may be caused by type design deficiencies, ineffective
maintenance, or operational procedures. It is very important to
identify the root cause of events so that corrective action may be
determined. The diverse causes of propulsion system problems require
different solutions. For example, type design problems may affect an
entire fleet of aircraft. If an individual certificate holder
experiences a problem caused by a type design issue, it may not be
appropriate for the FAA to withdraw ETOPS authority. Fundamental design
problems that require an effective hardware (or software) final fix
will normally be corrected by an FAA Airworthiness Directive.
Inspections may be satisfactory as an interim solution but long-term
design solutions are required for terminating action. However,
maintenance or operational problems may be wholly, or partially, the
responsibility of the certificate holder. In these cases, the cause
would be specific to that certificate holder and may require changes to
their operational, dispatch or maintenance procedures. Propulsion
system monitoring should be used to ensure that airplane and engine
reliability stay within approximate IFSD rates as described in the
proposed regulation.
(d) Engine Condition Monitoring
The certificate holder would have to monitor the condition of
engines on ETOPS airplanes. The monitoring program would describe the
engine performance parameters to be tracked, method of data collection,
analysis, and corrective action processes. It would detect
deterioration in engine performance by tracking parameters such as
rotor speeds, exhaust gas temperatures, and fuel flow and to allow for
corrective action before safe operation is affected. The program should
reflect the manufacturer's instructions and industry practices. Engine
limit margins must be maintained so that prolonged engine inoperative
diversions may be conducted without exceeding approved engine limits at
all approved power levels and expected environmental conditions. Engine
margins are maintained through this program to account for the effects
of additional engine loading demands such as electrical and pneumatic
systems that may be required during a diversion. If oil analysis such
as Spectrographic Oil Analysis Program (SOAP) would be relevant, it
should be included.
(e) Oil Consumption Monitoring
The certificate holder would have to establish an engine oil
consumption monitoring program to ensure that there is enough oil to
complete any ETOPS flight. The certificate holder's consumption limit
would not be allowed to exceed the manufacturer's recommendations, and
would have to be sensitive to oil consumption trends. The program would
have to track the amount of oil added at the departing ETOPS station
with reference to the running average consumption. The monitoring must
be continuous up to and including the oil added at the ETOPS departure
station. For example, after servicing, the oil consumption may be
calculated by maintenance personnel as part of the pre-departure check
or may be automatically calculated by the certificate holder's computer
software program. The amount of oil added could also be reported to
centralized maintenance control for calculation prior to the ETOPS
flight. If an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) is required for ETOPS, then
its oil consumption for the APU must be included in the program.
(f) APU In-Flight Start Program
If APU in-flight start capability is required for ETOPS, the
certificate holder would be required to establish an in flight start
and run monitoring program. The primary function of an APU is to
provide backup electrical power in the event of a main system failure
such as engine in-flight shut down or generator loss. This program
would have to ensure that the APU in-flight start capability would
continue at a level of performance and reliability established by the
manufacturer or the FAA. The program would have to be acceptable to the
Administrator and include periodic sampling of each ETOPS airplane's
APU in-flight starting capabilities. Certificate holders with existing
approved programs may continue under that authority under this
proposal. Sampling intervals may be adjusted according to system
performance and fleet maturity. The Advisory Circular accompanying this
proposal contains guidance for APU reliability and performance
assessment.
(g) Maintenance Training
The certificate holder would have to develop additional ETOPS
specific training that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is
required for all personnel involved in ETOPS. This training would be in
addition to the certificate holder's accepted maintenance training
program to qualify individuals for specific airplane and engines. This
program may be incorporated into the accepted maintenance training
curricula. The certificate holder would have to review the entire
maintenance-training program with the CHDO to ensure that it adequately
supports ETOPS training requirements. The goal of this program is to
ensure that all personnel involved in ETOPS are provided the necessary
training so that the ETOPS maintenance requirements are properly
accomplished.
The program must establish a system to qualify ETOPS maintenance
personnel. ETOPS qualified maintenance personnel are those who

[[Page 64765]]

have successfully completed the certificate holder's ETOPS training
program and who have satisfactorily performed extended range tasks
under the direct supervision of an FAA certificated maintenance person
who has had previous experience with maintaining the particular make
and model aircraft being utilized under the certificate holder's
maintenance program. For new aircraft introduction, the previous
experience for training can be obtained from the manufacturers training
program.
(h) Procedural Changes
Following approval of the maintenance and training procedures
established to qualify for ETOPS; substantial changes to those
procedures must be submitted to the Certificate Holding District Office
(CHDO) and approved before they may be adopted. The determination of
what constitutes substantial changes should be negotiated between the
certificate holder and the CHDO. This is to allow some flexibility
depending on the certificate holder's ETOPS experience and performance
history. The CHDO may require submission of all changes for a new ETOPS
operator or for an operator experiencing difficulties. However, as
experience is gained the CHDO may reevaluate what changes it needs to
approve.

Continuing Surveillance

As with all other operations, the CHDO may also monitor all aspects
of the ETOPS operations it has authorized, to ensure that the levels of
reliability achieved in ETOPS operations remain at acceptable levels,
and that the operation continues to be conducted safely. In the event
that an acceptable level of reliability is not maintained, if
significant adverse trends exists, or if critical deficiencies are
detected in the type design or in the conduct of ETOPS operations, the
CHDO may initiate a special evaluation, impose operational
restrictions, and ensure the operator adopts corrective actions in
order to resolve the problems in a timely manner. The CHDO should alert
the appropriate FAA Aircraft Certification Office and Aircraft
Evaluation Group when problems associated with airplane design or
operations are identified.
Proposed New Paragraph 121.415(a)(4) Crewmember and Dispatcher Training
Requirements
The FAA proposes to add a new requirement to train crewmembers and
dispatchers in their roles and responsibilities in the certificate
holder's passenger recovery plan to the certificate holder's approved
training program.
Explanation
Crewmember and dispatcher involvement in seeing to the welfare of
passengers following a diversion often is an important factor in the
success of post diversion passenger handling. With ETOPS and the
possibility of diversion to a remote foreign airport with reduced
services and facilities available for passenger welfare, it is
increasingly important that the certificate holder have a passenger
recovery plan and that crew members and dispatchers understand their
role in that plan. Current regulations do not require training for
crewmembers or dispatchers in their role in a certificate holder's
passenger recovery plan. The role of the crewmembers and dispatchers
must be defined and the training program tailored around those defined
roles.
Proposed Change to Paragraph 121.565(a) Engine Inoperative: Landing;
Reporting Below
Explanation
The FAA proposes a minor revision to paragraph 121.565(a) to delete
the reference to stopping the rotation of an engine, which applies only
to propeller driven airplanes. This is to be replaced with terminology
* * * ``whenever an engine is shut down * * *'' that applies to all
reciprocating engines and turbine powered engines.
Proposed New Section 121.624 Dispatch Requirements for an ETOPS
Alternate Airport
The FAA proposes to add a regulation, which specifies the dispatch
requirements for an ETOPS alternate, and the requirements for a valid
ETOPS alternate after takeoff.
Explanation
Most airplanes operate in an environment where there is usually a
choice of diversion airports available within a close proximity to the
route of flight. The available airports usually have significant
infrastructure and facilities for routine handling of aircraft, crews,
and passengers. An airplane conducting ETOPS may have only one
alternate within a range dictated by the endurance of a particular
airframe system (for example, cargo fire suppressant) and therefore the
approved maximum diversion time for that route. Additionally, the
alternates may be isolated and less completely equipped to deal with
passenger aircraft. Therefore, it is important that any airport
designated as an ETOPS alternate has the capabilities, services and
facilities to safely support the airplane and its passengers and crew
during the diversion.
A regulatory requirement for an ETOPS alternate meets a prudent
planning requirement for an en route diversion alternative for all
long-range aircraft in the event of an engine failure, an airplane
system failure or a serious passenger problem. A new regulation is
required to specify the dispatch and en route requirements for ETOPS
alternates. In addition, past experience in ETOPS operations of twin-
engine aircraft with en route diversions for reasons other than engine
failure justify the imposition of a requirement to designate en route
alternate for all long-range operations with airplanes with two or more
engines. The additional operational challenges of these routes are
equally demanding of all airplanes, regardless of the number of
engines, and include such issues as extremes in terrain and
meteorology, as well as limited navigation and communications
infrastructure.
At dispatch, an enroute alternate must meet the alternate weather
requirements specified in the certificate holder's operations
specifications. Due to the natural variability of weather conditions
with time, as well as the need to determine the suitability of a
particular enroute alternate prior to departure, such requirements are
higher than the weather minimums required to initiate an instrument
approach. This is necessary to assure that the instrument approach can
be conducted safely if the flight must divert to an alternate airport.
The visual reference necessary to safely complete an approach and
landing is determined, among other things, by the accuracy with which
the airplane can be controlled along the approach path by reference to
instruments and the accuracy of the ground-based instrument aids, as
well as the tasks the pilot is required to accomplish to maneuver the
airplane so as to complete the landing. For these reasons the weather
minima for non-precision approaches are generally higher than for
precision approaches.
The weather conditions at the time of arrival should provide a high
assurance that adequate visual references are available upon arrival at
decision height (DH) or minimum descent altitude (MDA), and the surface
wind conditions and corresponding runway surface conditions must be
within acceptable limits to permit the approach and landing to be
safely completed with an engine and/or systems inoperative.
The proposed section (d) would require operators to designate only
those airports as ETOPS alternates that

[[Page 64766]]

adequately protect the passengers and crew from the elements and see to
their welfare.
Proposed Change to Section 121.625 Alternate Airport Weather Minimums
Explanation
The purpose of the proposed amendment to section 121.625 is to
clarify the intent of this regulation as being applicable to
destination and takeoff alternates only and not to ETOPS alternates
requirements. ETOPS alternate requirements are the subject of proposed
new regulation, section 121.624 ETOPS Alternates.
Proposed Change to Section 121.631 Original Dispatch or Flight Release,
Redispatch or Amendment of Dispatch or Flight Release
The FAA proposes to modify section 121.631 to specify weather
requirements for ETOPS alternates while a flight is en route and the
availability of the option to amend the dispatch or flight release to
add another ETOPS alternate if a required ETOPS alternate becomes
unavailable.
Explanation
The FAA proposes to modify section 121.631 to address weather
conditions required at designated ETOPS alternates while a flight is en
route. This regulation is consistent with the standards and practices
of AC 120-42A, the advisory circular that provided guidance for ETOPS
since 1985.
The proposed regulation also specifies the action required of the
pilot in command and, in the case of flag operations, the dispatcher,
in the event a required, designated alternate becomes unavailable and
no other qualifying airport is available. In that event, the flight may
not continue as an ETOPS flight unless another track that qualifies is
available. The FAA recognizes that this may sometimes cause disruptions
in scheduled operations and anticipates that carriers will adjust the
enroute alternate weather minimums upward on routes on which this
becomes more than a very infrequent problem.
Proposed New Section 121.633 Planned ETOPS Diversion Time Limitations
The FAA proposes to add new regulation section 121.633 to require
that planned ETOPS diversion times not exceed the time limit specified
in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) for the airplanes most time-limited
system minus 15 minutes. For airplanes with more than two engines and
type certificated before the effective date of this regulation, the
effective date for compliance with paragraph 121.633(b) is proposed to
be not later than six years following the date on which this rule
becomes effective.
Explanation
Section 121.633 has been developed to codify the two-engine
airplane operating practices with regard to diversion time and time
critical systems and to expand those regulations to include airplanes
with more than two engines in long-range operations.
The premise of ETOPS has been to preclude a diversion and, if it
were to occur, to have programs in place that protect the diversion.
Under this concept, propulsion systems are designed and tested to
assure an acceptable level of in-flight shutdown; other airplane
systems are designed and tested to ensure their reliability. However,
despite the best design/testing, and maintenance practices, situations
have occurred which required an airplane to divert. In-service data has
also shown that all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines,
divert from time to time for various causes. Airplanes with more than
two engines currently are operated in areas where there are a limited
number of enroute airports, where the support infrastructure is
marginal or with challenging weather conditions. All such operations
should adopt the same `preclude and protect' concept.
Under the `preclude and protect' concept, various failure scenarios
need to be considered. For example, during the design of the airplane,
time limited systems such as cargo compartment fire suppression/
containment capability are considered. The fuel planning process
accounts for the possibility of decompression and/or the failure of an
engine with considerations for icing.
If airplanes with more than two engines plan to operate in areas
where en route airports are farther than 180 minutes or in north polar
areas where weather conditions can be challenging at certain times of
the year, these operations should be required to meet the standards to
ensure that all efforts are made to preclude a diversion and, if a
diversion were to occur, procedures are in place to protect that
diversion. This would include systems capability to protect the
aircraft and its occupants during the entire length of the diversion.
As such, for ETOPS operations less than 180 minutes the one engine
inoperative cruise speed maximum diversion time to any ETOPS alternate
may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
for the airplane's most time-limited system, minus 15 minutes. The 15
minutes allows time for approach and landing. The cruise speed is
calculated as if in still air under standard temperature conditions.
In ETOPS operations wind becomes an increasingly significant factor
with increasing diversion times and should be considered in ETOPS
operations beyond 180 minutes to assure that AFM system time limits are
not exceeded. For example, while diverting with an engine inoperative,
it is essential to ensure that there is sufficient amount of oil in the
tank for continuous operation of the remaining engines at Maximum
Continuous Thrust for the actual duration of divert. As a result, for
ETOPS operations with approved diversion times greater than 180 minutes
the one engine inoperative cruise speed (approved) maximum diversion
time is calculated by taking into account forecast wind and
temperature. The maximum diversion time may not exceed the time
specified in the airplane flight manual for the airplane's most time-
limited system, minus 15 minutes for approach and landing.
However, there are some other time limited systems, like cargo fire
suppression, which may not have as much relevance to the one engine
inoperative diversion time. The FAA believes that the likelihood of an
engine failure at the critical point followed by cargo fire to be
extremely remote. Thus ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo fire suppression
requirement would be based on covering the diversion distance
authorized (maximum diversion time authorized at the approved one
engine inoperative speed) at the all engine operating speed. It has
already been stated that for ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes wind
becomes an increasingly significant factor with increasing diversion
times and should be considered. Therefore this proposed rule requires
that for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo fire suppression time required
be based on the airplane operating at all engine operating speed with
actual wind. For ETOPS at or below 180 min, there is precedent in AC
120-42, for cargo fire suppression for the maximum diversion time based
on one engine inoperative speed. This proposal would codify that
practice. The cargo fire suppression time in all cases shall also
include 15 minutes allowance for holding, approach and landing.
During development of their recommendation the ARAC ETOPS Working
Group had much discussion regarding aircraft utilized in long haul
operations. Some three and four-engine airplanes routinely operate on
routes with diversion times that exceed aircraft

[[Page 64767]]

system capabilities such as cargo fire suppression. The FAA believes
equivalent cargo fire suppression capabilities should exist among the
entire fleet of airplanes conducting ETOPS. The proposed regulation
would require the modification of those airplanes. The FAA recognizes
that a transition period to gain full compliance with the proposed rule
is necessary for the industry. The FAA finds that these modifications
can be accomplished within the scheduled maintenance D check cycle (6
years) based on ARAC recommendations. This proposal would grant the
operator sufficient time to adequately plan for and incorporate
necessary modifications in the 6-year time frame proposed.
The FAA recognizes this proposal would allow three and four engine
airplanes to continue to operate on routes with diversion times up to
and including 180 minutes without having to update time-limited system
capabilities. The FAA seeks comment on how it should address this
discrepancy in the future.
Proposed New Section 121.646 Fuel Supply Required Following
Depressurization
We propose to add a new rule, section 121.646, to specify the fuel
supply required following depressurization. Current regulations contain
no requirement for a fuel supply sufficient to reach an en route
diversion airport.
Explanation
ICAO Annex 6, Part I, section 4.3.6.4(d) requires consideration of
additional fuel in the event of loss of pressurization. Fuel
consumption increases considerably at the lower altitudes flown
following a loss of pressurization. Although section 121.329 requires
descent following cabin depressurization ``to an altitude that will
allow successful termination of the flight,'' there is no explicit
requirement in part 121 for a fuel supply in the event of cabin
depressurization to assure a safe landing. It should be noted that an
interpretation can be made that fuel to provide for cabin
pressurization is required because of the requirement of section
121.329.
Both AC 120-42 and 120-42A considered the fuel supply required at
the most critical point in the ETOPS area of operation in the event of
the cabin depressurization, and also considered the possibility of a
simultaneous failure of an engine. As the probability of
depressurization is comparable between two, three, and four-engine
airplanes, the proposed section 121.646 would retain the AC conditions
for fuel supply to an ETOPS alternate in the event of cabin
depressurization for all ETOPS operations.
For airplanes with more than two engines the section 121.329
implied fuel supply requirement becomes a proposed regulatory
requirement. Paragraph 121.646(a) applies to operations more than 90
minutes (with all engines operating at cruising power) and less than
180 minutes (at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed) from
an adequate airport, while the requirements in paragraph 121.646(b)
apply for operations greater than 180 minutes (at the approved one
engine inoperative cruise speed) from an adequate airport.
Further, the AC required consideration of fuel for icing at the
cabin depressurization cruise altitude and consideration of errors in
wind forecasting. Studies done by the Atmospheric Environment Service
of Canada with the assistance of airplane manufacturers under the
second Canadian Atlantic Storms Program (CASP II) confirm that the
probability of a continuous or repetitive significant icing encounter
is very small on a long flight segment. The airspeeds associated with
cruise at cabin depressurization altitude are not conducive to ice
build-up. Moreover, pilots can avoid icing with minor changes in
altitude or by changing the cruise speed, either of which can have a
large effect on ice accretion. Based on the CASP II study, considering
the probability of encountering depressurization at the critical point
and icing on the same flight, an argument was made that fuel for icing
in addition to fuel for depressurization is not deemed necessary.
However, as a conservative measure, paragraph 121.646(b)(C)(iv)
requires fuel to compensate for the greater of the effect of airframe
icing (including the fuel used by engine and wing anti-ice during this
period) during 10 percent of the time for which icing is forecast, or a
combination of fuel for engine anti-ice, and for some models of
airplanes based on their characteristics and the manufacturer's
recommended procedures fuel for wing anti-ice for the time during which
icing is forecast.
Based on the weather forecasting techniques of the early 1980s, the
AC required a five percent fuel pad to account for wind forecast
errors. However, winds aloft forecasting has improved dramatically in
the last twenty years as a result of the following:
? The sophistication of wind forecast models have experienced
a quantum improvement. These models provide forecasts based on a wider
range of inputs and more accurate extrapolation throughout the altitude
profile.
? Wind forecasting responsibilities have been assigned to
computers with vastly increased capacity, capability, and speed.
? The flow of input data has significantly increased; largely
as a result of systems that automatically downlink weather information
at much more frequent intervals. Additionally, weather is measured on a
worldwide grid of collection points. This grid has nearly four times
the collection points compared to the grid used previously.
? Information gleaned from satellite downlinks and satellite
depictions of air mass movement are added to the data stream, not only
to fine tune forecasting at frequently flown altitudes, but also to
provide more accurate forecasts at lower altitudes (10,000 to 15,000
feet) where the decompression profiles are flown.
This information is collected, analyzed, and distributed worldwide
by the World Area Forecast System (WAFS). This centralized distribution
of weather information provides for a consistent level of accuracy that
can eliminate the assignment of arbitrary penalties, provided that
individual airlines subscribe to the service and make use of this level
of information.
Therefore, given the documented improvements in forecasting
accuracy when using WAFS, a more accurate means of determining the fuel
used during a decompression profile involves adding a pad to the actual
forecast winds in making the fuel calculation rather than adding an
arbitrary fuel penalty. The addition of a five-percent wind error pad
provides an accurate case-by-case adjustment as compared with a five-
percent fuel penalty, while preserving the necessary level of safety.
However, if a certificate holder elects not to use such accurate winds
in the computation of decompression fuel, then the proposed rule will
require the operator to continue applying the five percent fuel pad to
account for wind forecast errors.
Section 121.646 requires accounting for any airplane performance
degradation on the fuel requirement. In addition, if APU is a required
power source, then its fuel consumption also must be accounted for.
Proposed New Paragraph 121.687(a)(6) Dispatch Release: Flag and
Domestic Operations
We propose to add new paragraph 121.687(a)(6), which would add the
ETOPS approval basis to the content of the dispatch release under which
the flight is being dispatched.

[[Page 64768]]

Explanation
The proposal assures that the pilot in command of an ETOPS flight
is notified as to the time basis, (for example, 120-minute or 180-
minute ETOPS) including the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) limitations,
under which the flight is dispatched.
Proposed New Paragraph 121.689(a)(8) Flight Release Form: Supplemental
Operations
The FAA proposes to add a new paragraph 121.689(a)(8) to add the
ETOPS time basis to the content of the flight release of each ETOPS
flight.
Explanation
The proposal assures that the pilot in command of an ETOPS flight
is aware of the limitations (for example, 120-minute or 180-minute
ETOPS) including the minimum Equipment List (MEL) limitations, under
which the flight is released.
Proposed New 14 CFR 121 Appendix O Requirements for ETOPS Approvals
Appendix O to Part 121 would establish the operational requirements
and limitations for the various ETOPS diversion time thresholds and
areas of ETOPS applicability. In very general terms, Appendix O would
codify existing approvals and operational practices that have been
developed since 1985 and it would also establish requirements for ETOPS
flights that certificate holders may elect to operate in the future.
These latter ETOPS flights would have diversion time bases exceeding
180 minutes and are not authorized at this time. The FAA points out
again that 207-minute ETOPS flights are an extension of the 180-minute
authority and not an independent diversion time authority.
A. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes With 2 engines
(a) 75 Minutes ETOPS
The proposed 75-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a codification
of the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A. This deviation
authority has traditionally been used for operations in the Caribbean,
Western Atlantic, and less frequently, in the North Atlantic areas of
operation.
(b) 90-Minute ETOPS (Micronesia)
This ARAC recommendation for a new diversion authorization is to
establish a 90-minute ETOPS authority for exclusive use on Micronesia
routes. This geographical area has been served with ETOPS approved
airplanes with operational authority to dispatch at 120 minutes. The
only difference between the proposed 90-minute level in comparison to
120-minute ETOPS is to require the ETOPS pre-departure check on the
outbound segment only. The nature of flights to serve this area
involves destinations to islands at frequencies such that it becomes
unreasonable for the operator to have an ETOPS certified mechanic
stationed at the arrival location. An alternative means is for the
operator to carry on board each flight a certified ETOPS mechanic that
would conduct the ETOPS pre-departure check prior to the return to the
return flight. This option is an inefficient use of a certified
mechanic. The Micronesia route structure is such that it lies beyond a
75-minute authority (which would allow for the operation to be
conducted without requiring the ETOPS pre-departure check for the
return flight), but short of requiring the full 120-minute diversion.
The Micronesia area in terms of weather and airport availability is
similar to the area associated with ETOPS conducted in the Caribbean
area.
The FAA proposes to allow for a 90-minute ETOPS diversion authority
for use in Micronesia routes provided that the airplane is type design
approved, and configured to the CMP standards for 120-minutes. The
operations are to be conducted to 120-minute ETOPS standards and
requirements and MEL requirements, with the exception that the ETOPS
pre-departure check will not be required for the return leg of the
round trip flight.
(c) 120 Minutes
The FAA proposed 120-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a
codification of the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A. The
airplane and engine combination would have to be ETOPS type design
approved for a minimum of 120-minutes and configured to the standards
specified in the CMP document. All flight operations dispatched or
released to 120-minute ETOPS standards would have to comply with MEL
requirements specified for the operation.
(d) 138 Minutes
The FAA proposed 138-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a
codification of the criteria that is specified in the 138-minute ETOPS
policy letter. No changes to the present existing requirements are
proposed. Operators may request 138-minute ETOPS operational approval
on an airplane engine combination that has an ETOPS type design
approval of 120-minutes provided that the airplane engine combination
has been assessed by the FAA for the extended diversion length. In such
cases the dispatch authority may only be exercised on a flight-by-
flight exception basis. The operator will be required to amend and use
a MEL that has been amended to include those items that are specified
for operations beyond 120-minutes. Operators approved to conduct 138-
minute ETOPS with an airplane and engine combination that has 180-
minute ETOPS type design approval may do so without any restriction to
frequency of use. The operator must dispatch or release such flights in
accordance with the MEL provisions for ETOPS beyond 120 minutes.
(e) 180 Minutes
The FAA proposed 180-minute ETOPS diversion authority is a
codification of the criteria that was specified in AC 120-42A. The
airplane and engine combination would have to be ETOPS type design
approved for a minimum of 180-minutes and configured to the standards
specified in the CMP document for 180-minutes. All flight operations
dispatched or released to 180-minute ETOPS standards would have to
comply with MEL requirements specified for the operation.
(f) Greater Than 180 Minutes
The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendations to include the increased
ETOPS diversion authorizations beyond 180-minutes. ETOPS beyond 180
minutes has been in use on a limited, flight by flight exception basis,
since March 2000 with the issuance of the 207-minute ETOPS policy. The
industry has demonstrated its capability to maintain the necessary
engine and systems reliability for such operations using the B-777
airplane. Certain geographical areas of the world have few adequate
airports along flight routing, and are separated by a distance that is
farther than what could be flown within 180-minutes. Other geographical
areas have severe weather patterns and weather systems that at times
would not allow for the designation and use of area airports as ETOPS
alternates. In these cases the air carrier would benefit with better
dispatch reliability and added safety of the flight with the ability to
flight plan with diversion times that exceed 180-minutes to avoid
exposure to such conditions.
The authority for this increased diversion distance flight planning
is dependent on the demonstrated capability of the operator's ETOPS
program, and the use of an airplane and engine combination that is
approved for such operations. The FAA therefore

[[Page 64769]]

proposes that eligibility of an air carrier to conduct ETOPS beyond 180
minutes will be dependant on the air carrier already having ETOPS
approval to conduct 180-minute ETOPS with the requested airplane and
engine combination. It will therefore not be possible for the air
carrier to bypass the 180-minute ETOPS approval process before making
application for ETOPS approvals beyond 180-minutes.
Air carriers that are authorized to conduct ETOPS beyond 180-
minutes will be required to consider all available airports that are
within 180-minutes of the routing being planned for use as ETOPS
alternates. This is to minimize the dispatch diversion time to 180-
minutes when possible, and thereby minimizes the risk of the extended
exposure when possible. The proposed rule in Appendix O requires that:
``In conducting all such operations, operators shall make every
attempt to minimize diversion time along the preferred track and plan
ETOPS at maximum diversion distances of 180 minutes or less. If
conditions prevent the use of adequate airports within 180 minutes as
ETOPS alternates, the route may be flown beyond 180 minutes subject to
the requirements provided for the specific area of operations.''
In March 2000 the FAA implemented the 207-minute ETOPS policy that
required certain airplane system capabilities and that specific
equipment be operable at time of dispatch or flight release for a 207-
minute planned route. This included enhanced communication capability
with the use of SATCOM, or with the use of SATCOM data link. It also
required that the flight crew before entering the extended range entry
point receive company communication to update the flight plan
information based on a review of the airplane status and systems
capability, as well as an update on all available alternates along the
flight route. For airplane capabilities, single engine autoland is
required to be operative at dispatch for a 207-minute ETOPS flight. The
policy letter also specified additional system and equipment
operability that cannot be deferred for such operations through the use
of a minimum equipment list (MEL). This includes the fuel quantity
indicating system (FQIS), the auxiliary power unit (APU) to its full
electrical and pneumatic designed capability, and the autothrottle
system.
The ETOPS ARAC recommended that the additional requirements that
were introduced by the FAA for 207-minute ETOPS continue as
requirements for all ETOPS diversion authorizations greater than 180-
minutes. The FAA accepts the recommendation.
(1) North Pacific
ETOPS authority for the North Pacific area of operation is a
codification of the FAA 207-minute ETOPS policy letter. This authority
allows on a flight by flight exception basis flight planning to an
ETOPS alternate up to 207-minutes, when an ETOPS alternate within 180-
minutes is not available. As with the previous 207-minute ETOPS policy,
this exception is limited to circumstances such as political or
military concern, volcanic activity, airport weather below dispatch
requirements, temporary airport conditions and other weather related
events. The airplane and engine combination must as a minimum be ETOPS
type design approved for 180-minutes and configured to the standards
specified in the CMP document for 180-minutes. All flight operations
dispatched or released to 207-minute ETOPS standards have to comply
with an approved MEL required for 180-minutes that includes the
additional items specified in this part for operations beyond 180-
minutes. In all cases, the time required to fly the distance to the
planned ETOPS alternate or alternates, at the approved one engine
inoperative cruise speed, in still air and standard day temperature,
may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the
airplane's most time limited system time minus 15 minutes. This means
that the most time limiting system on the airplane used for a 207-
minute ETOPS flight cannot be less than 222-minutes.
(2) Polar Area (North Pole) and North of NOPAC
This authorization for use in the North Pole allows for a diversion
authority of 240-minutes on a flight-by-flight exception basis. This
dispatch authority may be used when the area experiences temporary
extreme weather conditions that cause airport closures, extreme cold
temperatures, or weather below dispatch minimums. Consideration for
other weather related conditions and events such as volcanic activity
that are particular to this area of the world may be given.
The operator will be required to establish criteria to be used when
flight planning in order to determine if the use of a 240-minute
authority is appropriate in order to designate an ETOPS alternate.
These criteria and procedures developed must be accepted by the FAA and
published in the certificate holder's manual for the use of dispatchers
and pilots.
For such operations, the airframe and engine combination must be
type design approved for a minimum of 240 minute ETOPS and configured
to the standards as specified in the Configuration Maintenance and
Procedures (CMP) Standard for such operations. For such operations, the
requirements in paragraph C, Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS
beyond 180 minutes North of the NOPAC area, of this appendix apply.
(3) 240 Minutes Area of Operations
There are several geographical areas that have few airports
available for use as an ETOPS alternate, and those airports are
situated at a distance beyond what could be flown in 180-minutes. These
areas include the Pacific oceanic areas between the U.S. west coast and
Australia, New Zealand and Polynesia; the south Atlantic oceanic areas;
the Indian Oceanic areas; and the oceanic areas between Australia and
South America. The FAA proposes that a diversion authority of up to
240-minutes be established for use in these geographical areas.
Operators that apply for this authority must have as a prerequisite
180-minute ETOPS authority and experience with the requested airframe
and engine combination.
When planning flight routes in these areas, the operator will be
required to designate the nearest available ETOPS alternate along the
planned flight route, and always within a maximum of 240-minutes.
Whenever possible along the planned route, designated ETOPS alternates
should be within 180-minutes. In all cases for ETOPS beyond 180
minutes, the time required to fly the distance to the planned ETOPS
alternate(s), at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed,
correcting for wind and temperature, may not exceed the time specified
in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplanes most time limited
system time (except for cargo fire suppression), minus 15 minutes. The
flight routing must also be within the time required to fly the
distance to the planned ETOPS alternate or alternates, at the all
engines operating cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature,
that is specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane's
cargo fire suppression system time minus, 15 minutes.
For such operations, the airframe/engine combination must be type
design approved for a minimum of 240 minute ETOPS and configured to the
standards as specified in the Configuration Maintenance and Procedures
(CMP) Standard for such operations.

[[Page 64770]]

(4) Beyond 240 Minutes Area of Operations
The FAA proposes a new ETOPS diversion limit that is beyond 240-
minutes. This authority would be available only to those operators that
have considerable experience with ETOPS, including operations with
routes requiring 240-minutes ETOPS. At a minimum, the operator would
have to have 24 consecutive months of ETOPS experience with operations
180 minutes and greater, of which at least 12 consecutive months were
at 240-minute ETOPS on the airframe and engine combination for which
the authority is requested.
There are only a few routes that would require a diversion time
greater than 240-minutes from an ETOPS alternate. The geographical
areas with routes that would be best flown with such an authority are
the Pacific oceanic areas between the U.S. west coast and Australia,
New Zealand and Polynesia; the south Atlantic oceanic areas; the Indian
Oceanic areas; the oceanic areas between Australia and South America,
and South Pole area. The FAA proposes that for such routes, the
authority to dispatch or release a flight that would be more than 240-
minutes from an ETOPS alternate would be granted only for specific city
pairs served. In planning the route, the operator would be required to
always designate the nearest available ETOPS alternate(s). In all cases
for ETOPS flight segments that are beyond 180 minutes, the time
required to fly the distance to the planned ETOPS alternate(s), at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, correcting for wind and
temperature, may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight
Manual for the airplanes most time limited system time (except for
cargo fire suppression), minus 15 minutes. The flight routing must also
be within the time required to fly the distance to the planned ETOPS
alternate or alternates, at the all engines operating cruise speed,
correcting for wind and temperature, that is specified in the Airplane
Flight Manual for the airplane's cargo fire suppression system time
minus, 15 minutes.
For such operations, the airframe and engine combination would have
to be type design approved for the maximum authorized ETOPS diversion
time. All requirements specified in the Configuration Maintenance and
Procedures (CMP) Standard for beyond 240 minute ETOPS would be
applicable to such operations.
B. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes With More Than 2 Engines
The flight planning for long-range flights traversing remote areas
with few airports available for a non-scheduled landing should not be
different because of the number of engines installed. Flights in all
engine configurations have experienced conditions requiring landings
short of the planned destination. The conditions included onboard
technical failures, adverse atmospheric flight conditions, and
increasingly, passengers that develop life threatening medical
conditions that require prompt medical care. The preclude and protect
philosophy that has been a foundation for two-engine airplane ETOPS has
similar application and benefit to flight operations that are conducted
with 3 and 4-engine airplanes.
The FAA proposes that ETOPS practices apply to flights conducted
with 3 and 4-engine airplanes on routes where the flight will be more
than 180-minutes from an adequate airport. Operations in any area up to
a maximum diversion time up to 240-minutes (based on the one-engine
inoperative speed flown in still air) may be conducted on a routine
basis. For all such operations, the nearest available ETOPS alternate
within 240 minutes diversion time must be specified. If an ETOPS
alternate is not available within 240 minutes, the operator may conduct
the flight by designating the nearest ETOPS alternate on the planned
route that is within the airplanes most time limited system capability
as specified by Sec. 121.633 of this chapter.
On all such operations, MEL limitations for ETOPS apply and in
addition, the Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) and the
communication requirements specified in Sec. 121.99 and Sec. 121.122
as appropriate must be operational. The airframe/engine combination
must be type design approved for the maximum authorized ETOPS diversion
time.
C. Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS Beyond 180 Minutes North
of the NOPAC Area
The ARAC ETOPS recommendation includes the adoption of the FAA
Polar Policy that was issued March 2001. Because of extreme cold
weather during the winter months and the limited availability of
supporting services and facilities, it is proposed that the Polar, the
area north of N 78[deg]00'', be designated as an area of ETOPS
applicability. Except for intrastate operations within the State of
Alaska, ETOPS requirements would apply regardless of the number of
engines or an airplane's proximity to an airport. Support of a
necessary diversion and subsequent recovery in such areas would require
the following items to be addressed by the operator:

(1) Designation and requirements for airports that may be used for
enroute diversions
(2) Recovery plan for passengers at diversion alternates
(3) Fuel freeze strategy and monitoring requirements for Polar
operations
(4) Communication capability for Polar operations
(5) MEL considerations for Polar operations
(6) Training issues for Polar operations
(7) Crew considerations during solar flare activity
(8) Special equipment for Polar operations such as cold weather anti-
exposure suits.

In order to receive authorization to conduct polar operations, the
operator would be required to conduct an FAA observed validation of its
polar program. As part of the validation, the operator would be
required to exercise its reaction and recovery plan that would be
implemented in the event of a diversion to a designated polar area
alternate airport.

Part 135

Global Issues for Part 135

Discussion of General Issues in Part 135
(1) Defining a safe operation for ETOPS
The intent of the proposed amendments to part 135 is to establish
ETOPS safety standards for commuter and on-demand operators that are
adapted for the unique nature of those operations. Regardless of
whether a commercial flight is operated under part 121 or part 135, the
same safety considerations of ETOPS apply. The FAA believes that these
proposals would preclude and protect any diversions.
The applicability of ETOPS requirements would differ from part 121
to part 135. Part 135 casts a wider net than part 121. Part 135
operators range from one or two person companies operating a single
Cessna 172 to larger companies that operate fleets of turbojets. As a
practical matter, these amendments would not affect the vast majority
of part 135 operators. Unlike a typical part 121 operator, a part 135
on-demand operators may fly on a given route only once or twice in a
year. This proposal takes into account these differences.
Under this proposal, ETOPS requirement under part 135 would

[[Page 64771]]

apply to: (1) Flights that operate on routes containing a point greater
than 180 minutes from an adequate airport based on a single-engine
inoperative speed in still air and standard conditions; (2) and flights
that operate in designated geographical areas. In contrast to part 121,
there would be no distinction between airplanes with two engines and
those with more than two engines.
Recent Changes to Part 135
In 1998, the FAA added part 119 to 14 CFR. This amendment modified
the types of operations permitted in accordance with part 135. Among
the changes was an allowance for infrequent scheduled operations with
airplanes with 9 or fewer seats and a maximum payload capacity of 7,500
pounds. These airplanes often do not have the range capability to
operate on routes to which ETOPS requirements would apply to this
proposal. This proposal would not allow the use of many of these
aircraft in ETOPS even if they are modified with additional fuel tanks
that would give them additional range. The reason is that range
capability is necessary but not sufficient for ETOPS. There are other
airplane system capabilities and redundancies that are required for
safe ETOPS flights. These issues are discussed in further detail in the
following section.
ICAO Standards
This proposal would make part 135 regulations more consistent with
paragraph 4.7.1 of Annex 6 of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs). That paragraph states: ``Unless the operation has been
specifically approved by the State of the Operators, an aeroplane with
two turbine power-units shall not, except as provided in 4.7.4, be
operated on a route where the flight time at single engine cruise speed
to an adequate en-route alternate aerodrome exceeds a threshold time
established for such operations by that State.'' This SARP does not
specify a time threshold for two-engine ETOPS but clearly assumes the
existence of one. The SARP was written to give signatory States the
flexibility to determine appropriate time thresholds.
Safety Study
In 2000, Robert Breiling of the National Business Aviation
Association (NBAA) conducted a study of airplane accidents between 1964
and 1999. This study may be purchased directly from NBAA, 1200 18th
Street, NW.; Washington, DC 20036-2506. This study revealed that there
was not a single accident with a two-engine airplane in long-range
operations. Historically the vast majority of airplanes operated in
accordance with part 135 have not had the range capability for routes
that would require ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, thus the FAA never found
sufficient safety justification for proposing rules.
In 1996, manufacturers began delivering airplanes to part 135
operators that had vastly improved range capability. These new-
generation two-engine airplanes have ranges up to 6,500 nautical miles
and are capable of operating on routes that would require diversion
times in excess of 180 minutes. Thus the FAA believes that regulations
are necessary to assure the safe operation of such flights if an
operator elects to conduct them.
Existing FAA Policy
In 1996, the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) proposed a
regulation that would have limited commercial operations of small
airplanes to less than 120 minutes from an aerodrome, unless
specifically approved by the State authority. In our response, we
expressed our view that 180-minutes would be the U.S. threshold for
these type of operations. The FAA disagreed with the JAA 120-minute
threshold because it would have shut down a number of part 135
operators that have been conducting these operations safely for many
years. By policy the FAA has not authorized operations beyond 180
minutes for part 135 operators.
(2) Specific Differences Between Part 121 ETOPS
As noted earlier the ETOPS requirements for part 135 would differ
from those of part 121 due to the differing nature of those operations.
For instance, the presence of adequate crash, fire and rescue equipment
is an important consideration for part 121 operations, which may
operate many times per year to a single location with a relatively
large number of passengers. Although adequate RFF service is desirable
for any long-range operations, it is not feasible to require the
presence of crash, fire and rescue equipment at an airport before
authorizing an on-demand operation that may operate only once a year
with very few passengers. Therefore, no such requirement exists in part
135.
Another difference is that part 135 would not identify specific
IFSD rates for authorization. IFSD rates have less predictive value in
small fleets of airplanes with lower annual cycles that are prevalent
among part 135 operators.
(3) Nomenclature
The issue of nomenclature was controversial among ARAC participants
from the part 135 community. The consensus decision was the use of the
term ETOPS in lieu of alternatives including Commercial On-Demand
Operations (CODEOPS). The FAA accepts the ARAC recommendation and
proposes to use the acronym ETOPS defined as Extended Operations for
part 135 operations.
(4) Airplane and Engine ETOPS Type Design and Transition Period
Type-Design
No specific type design approval has ever been required by part 25
or part 33 before an airplane can be flown over long-ranges in
accordance with part 135. The proposed ETOPS rule was drafted to allow
currently-certified airplanes to operate in accordance with ETOPS
procedures without requiring a new type design approval. However, when
an operator first applies to the FAA for approval to use a certain
airplane in ETOPS (beyond 180 minutes from an airport), the operator
must demonstrate that the airplane meets certain system and equipment
requirements specified the proposed Appendix H and the guidance
contained in the ETOPS Advisory Circular.
The proposed changes to airplane and engine certification rules in
this NPRM will apply to any new airplane certified under part 25,
regardless of whether the airplane is to be operated in accordance with
part 135 or part 121. As newly designed airplanes are granted type-
design approvals incorporating the requirements for ETOPS contained in
part 25 or part 33, the flight manual will specify each time-limited
system, and the maximum time that system can safely operate.
Transition
The proposed rule allows a transition period of eight years from
the date the revised part 25 and part 33 are published during which
certificate holders may continue to add airplanes of current designs to
their part 135 fleets. After that date, the proposed rule requires that
airplanes added to a certificate holder's fleet be type-certificated in
accordance with the new ETOPS design requirements. This method of
transition recognizes the excellent safety record of current airplane
designs, and avoids penalizing certificate holders who may have made
significant capital investments in airplanes. The length of this
transition period was set at eight years because it is typical of the
time required for a new,

[[Page 64772]]

long-range turbine-powered airplane to go from initial design to the
time it is commonly available to the majority of certificate holders.
However, this transition period applies only to type design. The
transition period will allow manufacturers to produce newly compliant
aircraft and for those aircraft to become readily available in the
aircraft marketplace. The operational practices required in part 135
Subpart H would become effective immediately. These standards for
operation, maintenance and dispatching of ETOPS would contribute to the
continued safe operation of part 135 long-range aircraft operations.
(5) Approved One-Engine Inoperative Speed
When scheduled air carriers apply for route authority over a route
requiring ETOPS, FAA approves a one-engine inoperative speed for a
specific route flown by that operator in a specific airplane model.
This speed is then used to determine fuel reserves and maximum
diversion distances for all subsequent flights. Unlike scheduled air
carriers, an on-demand operator may only operate once over any given
route-of-flight, and they must be able to do so with relatively short
notice. Flexibility is required for ETOPS conducted in accordance with
part 135. It is therefore not feasible to require pre-approval of a
single one-engine inoperative speed for certificate holders operating
ETOPS on each route in accordance with part 135. Instead, when a
certificate holder applies for ETOPS approval, the operator will
suggest a range of speeds within the certified limits for a specific
model of airplane. The FAA will approve this range of speeds for that
operator. When planning for a specific flight, the certificate holder
will select a single speed within this range and ensure that this
selected speed is used to determine both fuel reserves and maximum
diversion distances.
(6) Polar Operations
The increasing use of Polar flights, while creating economic
benefits, has brought new challenges to the extended operations. Due to
these pressures and to the increasing commonality of all long-range
operations, the data began to show that ETOPS requirements and
processes are generally applicable to all long-range operations
including those by three and four engine airplanes and would improve
the safety and viability of all long range operations. The FAA polar
policy issued March 2001 provides the requirements for approval to
conduct these operations. Given the nature of part 135 on-demand
operations, it is conceivable that flights in the designated polar area
may occur. Polar operations require the designation of airports that
may be used in the event a diversion is necessary, and it requires that
the operator have a passenger recovery plan. The recovery plan should
address the care and safety of passengers and crew at the diversion
airport, and include the plan of operation to extract the passengers
and crew from that airport. The certificate holder would have to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of its recovery plan. As the
rule would apply to those part 135 on-demand operations that can be
conducted less than 180 minutes from an airport as well as those
operations conducted as ETOPS, the FAA proposes section 135.98 to be a
separate requirement from ETOPS requirements. The proposed section
135.98 for polar operations excludes intrastate operations within the
State of Alaska.
FAA General Changes to the ARAC Proposal for Part 135
The following table cross-references the ARAC proposed rules with
what the FAA has proposed in this NPRM. The ARAC proposal included
several requirements that were in their Advisory Circular, but were not
included in their proposed rules. The FAA has therefore included these
ARAC Advisory Circular requirements into this NPRM in order to codify
the ARAC proposal.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARAC proposal NPRM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
135 Appendix H ETOPS................... 135 Appendix H ETOPS.
Paragraph H Maintenance Program Paragraph Maintenance. Program
Requirements. Requirements.
None................................... H(a) Configuration, Maintenance
& Procedures (CMP).
H(a) CAMP.............................. H(b) CAMP.
None................................... H(b)(1) ETOPS Pre-departure
service check.
H(2)(a) procedures to preclude dual H(b)(2) procedures to preclude
maintenance. dual maintenance.
H(2)(b) verification procedures........ H(b)(3) verification program.
None................................... H(b)(4) task identification.
None................................... H(b)(5) centralized maintenance
control procedures.
None................................... H(b)(6) ETOPS program document.
None................................... H(b)(7) ETOPS parts control.
None................................... H(b)(8) Enhanced CAS.
H(3) reporting requirements............ H(b)(8)(a) reporting
requirements.
H(4) periodic report of engine hours & None.
cycles.
H(5) corrective action................. H(b)(8)(b) corrective action.
None................................... H(c) propulsion system
monitoring.
None................................... H(d) engine condition
monitoring.
None................................... H(e) oil consumption
monitoring.
H(2)(c) APU in-flight start program.... H(f) APU in-flight start
program.
None................................... H(g) maintenance training.
None................................... H(h) procedural changes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section-by-Section Discussion of the Proposed Changes to Part 135

Proposed New Section 135.98 Polar Operations
The FAA proposes a new rule for the conduct of flights in the North
Pole area as defined as the region north of N 78[deg]00[min].
Explanation
Operations in this defined area, with the exception of intrastate
operations within the State of Alaska, would require specific approval.
Operators applying for polar authority would be required to address
specific areas identified in proposed paragraphs 135.98 (1) through
(8). All certificate holders conducting polar operations would have to
develop a plan for recovering passengers at designated diversion
airports. The recovery plan

[[Page 64773]]

should address the care and safety of passengers and crew at the
diversion airport.
Proposed Change to Section 135.345 Pilots: Initial, Transition, and
Upgrade Ground Training
The FAA proposes to amend section 135.345 by adding subject
material to be included in the pilot training requirement.
Explanation
The additional training includes ETOPS for those operators that
will have ETOPS authority. It would also add the requirement for
training on the operator's passenger recovery plan that would apply for
those operators conducting ETOPS, and those operators conducting non-
ETOPS polar flights. The recovery plan should address the care and
safety of passengers and crew at the diversion airport, and include the
plan of operation to extract the passengers and crew from that airport.
It is therefore important that crew members are adequately trained so
that they understand their role in the certificate holder's passenger
recovery plan.
Proposed New Section 135.364 Multi-Engine Airplane Limitations:
Maximum Distance From an Airport
The FAA proposes to add a new rule, section 135.364, which
establishes the maximum distance that a multi-engine airplane may be
operated from an airport that meets the requirements of part 135.
Explanation
The rule would allow flight operations beyond 180-minutes when
approved by the FAA, and conducted to the ETOPS requirements specified
in part 135, Appendix H.
Proposed Change to Section 135.411 Applicability
The proposal would add paragraph (d) to require ETOPS operators to
maintain the aircraft under a maintenance program in accordance with
paragraph (a)(2) and the additional requirements of Appendix H of this
part.
Explanation
The ARAC proposed that part 135 operators could maintain their
airplanes under paragraph 135.411(a)(1) for 9 or less passenger seats
with an approved aircraft inspection program under section 135.419 or
under paragraph 135.411(a)(2) for ten or more passenger seats. This
proposal differs from ARAC's proposal in that it would require all part
135 operators to maintain their aircraft in accordance with paragraph
135.411(a)(2). The FAA does not feel that an inspection program
approved under section 135.419 will support the ETOPS requirement. A
CAMP approved under paragraph 135.411(a)(2) sets the same foundation to
support ETOPS operations as part 121.
The ARAC recommended periodic reporting of airplane and engine
operating hours and cycles. The FAA did not include this recommendation
because the information is currently available and reported to the FAA
by the engine manufacturers.
Proposed New Part 135 Appendix H
Appendix H to part 135 would establish the certification, airplane,
operation and maintenance requirements for ETOPS operations.
A. Definitions
The FAA proposes to use the following definitions applicable to
ETOPS. Many of the terms used in the proposed regulatory and guidance
material for ETOPS under this part are unique to these operations.
Requirements and concepts for ETOPS require precise definition to
assure common understanding and compliance.
1. ETOPS: Extended Operations.
2. ETOPS Dual Maintenance.
B. Certificate Holder Experience Prior To Conducting ETOPS
Safety is enhanced when, prior to conducting ETOPS, a certificate
holder gains operational experience in the type of airplane capable of
ETOPS, and with the operational environment typically encountered on
longer range flights (up to 180 minutes) in areas where airports
available for an enroute diversion are limited. Typically, this
involves prior operational experience on overwater flights to
international areas of operation in accordance with part 135.
Operators requesting authority to operate ETOPS would have to show
operating experience on international routes with a transport category
turbine powered airplane. For this particular case, experience with
international operations does not include operations from the 48
contiguous States to Canada and Mexico. This experience can only be
obtained on extended flight operations that involve oceanic crossings.
A minimum 12 months operating experience is required. The proposal
allows for up to 6 months credit toward the 12-month requirement for
those operators that were certificated under part 135 or part 121 prior
to the effective date of this rule. Additionally, for operators with
previous ETOPS experience with other airplane types may have that
experience credited in whole, or in part to the 12 month experience
requirement.
C. Airplane Requirements
The proposed regulation would require that airplanes operated in
ETOPS be certificated to the new section 25.1535 standards. In order to
allow for a smooth industry transition to this requirement for a period
of 8 years following the effective date of the new part 25 regulation
with airplanes certificated to the present part 25 standards could be
used in ETOPS if they have specific electrical and fuel system
capabilities. Such an airplane would have to be found acceptable to the
FAA after consultation with the type certificate holder. The
determination that an airplane is acceptable for ETOPS is a simply a
verification that the airplane electrical and fuel systems are capable
of supporting the intended operation. This provision would apply to
airplanes added to the operator operations specifications on or before
the date that is 8 years after the new part 25 is in effect. Airplanes
added to the operating certificate after the 8-year period would have
to be certificated to the new part 25 standards.
D. Certificate Holder Requirements
The ARAC recommended that part 135 flights conducted under ETOPS
authority be limited to a maximum diversion time of 240 minutes from an
enroute alternate airport, at a speed selected by the certificate
holder from a range of speeds approved by the FAA that is within the
certificated operating limits of the airplane, with one engine
inoperative (under standard conditions in still air). This was deemed
to be sufficient for the routes that could be expected for an on-demand
type operation. Having an upper limit would enable an operator to
maintain an operational readiness and the required reliability
especially when these types of operations may occur infrequently. The
FAA accepts the recommendation and reflects it in the proposed rule.
The proposed rule would require the certificate holder to have the
means and the procedure to allow flight crews to have in-flight access
to current weather and operational information on all enroute
alternate, destination and destination alternate airports proposed for
each ETOPS flight. By validated ETOPS practices, flights can be
launched on the basis of weather forecasts that are revised and updated
while the flight is enroute. It is essential

[[Page 64774]]

that the flight crew be informed and aware of changing weather as well
as airport status.
E. Operational Requirements
The proposed rule would require that the flight crew only plan and
conduct ETOPS on instrument flight rules. The FAA believes that ETOPS
cannot be conducted safely under visual flight rules. The flight crew
may not proceed beyond the ETOPS entry point unless the weather and
operating conditions at the required enroute alternate airports are
reviewed and expected to be at or above the operating minimums
specified in the operations specifications during the period in which
that airport may be expected to be used based on expected estimated
times of arrival at that airport. The planned route of flight may be
amended while en route to allow use of additional enroute alternate
airports provided weather is forecast to be at or above operating
minima and the airport is within the maximum ETOPS diversion time.
In ETOPS operations wind becomes an increasingly significant factor
with increasing diversion times and should be considered in ETOPS
operations beyond 180 minutes to assure that Airplane Flight Manual
(AFM) system time limits are not exceeded. For example, while diverting
with an engine inoperative, it is essential to ensure that there is
sufficient amount of oil in the tank for continuous operation of the
remaining engines at Maximum Continuous Thrust for the actual duration
of divert. As a result, for ETOPS operations with approved diversion
times greater than 180 minutes the one engine inoperative cruise speed
(approved) maximum diversion time, taking forecast wind and temperature
into account, to each ETOPS alternate may not exceed the time specified
in the airplane flight manual for the airplane's most time-limited
system minus 15 minutes (for approach and landing). However, there are
some other time limited systems like cargo fire suppression, where the
use of cargo fire suppression may not have as much relevance to the one
engine inoperative diversion time. Data was presented that showed the
likelihood of an engine failure at the critical point followed by cargo
fire is extremely remote. Hence for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, cargo
fire suppression requirement would be based on covering the diversion
distance authorized (maximum diversion time authorized at the approved
one engine inoperative speed) at the all engine operating speed.
Therefore this proposed rule requires that for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes
with airplanes equipped with a Class C cargo fire suppression system,
the cargo fire suppression time required be based on the airplane
operating at all engine operating speed with actual wind.
The certificate holder may continue ETOPS with airplanes that lack
the airplane flight manual information regarding time-limited systems
(e.g. cargo fire suppression) for a period not to exceed 8 years from
the effective date of this rule. See the discussion in the airplane
requirements above.
F. Communications Requirements
The proposal would establish the minimum standard for communication
for ETOPS. Two independent transmitters and two independent receivers,
appropriate to the planned route, would be required for ETOPS flights.
At least one of each would have to be capable of voice communication.
If operating in areas where voice communication is not possible or of
poor quality, alternate systems (data link, SATCOM, etc.) may be used.
G. Fuel Planning Requirements
An airplane should not be released for an ETOPS flight unless it
carries sufficient fuel and oil to meet the requirements of section
135.223, and any additional fuel that may be determined in accordance
with the critical fuel reserves of this section. In establishing the
critical fuel reserves, the operator would determine the fuel necessary
to fly to the most critical point and execute a diversion to an ETOPS
alternate under the conditions outlined in paragraph 1(b) of this
section for the critical fuel scenario. The computed critical fuel
reserve would be compared to the normal section 135.223 fuel
requirements for the flight. If it is determined by this comparison
that the fuel to complete the critical fuel scenario exceeds the fuel
that would be on board at the most critical point, as determined by
section 135.223 requirements, additional fuel should be included to the
extent necessary to safely complete the critical fuel scenario.
To determine the critical fuel reserves necessary, the operator
would plan on that which is operationally the most critical considering
both time and the airplane configuration, such as one engine
inoperative or all engines running. For those airplanes that are not
certificated to operate above Flight Level (FL) 450, the flight would
also be planned for failure of the pressurization system to an altitude
of 10,000 feet or at an altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply
requirements of section 135.157. (ICAO Annex 6, Part I, section
4.3.6.4(d) for fuel planning requires consideration of additional fuel
in the event of loss of pressurization).
The critical fuel scenario would require an immediate descent to
the determined altitude and continued cruise at the planned one-engine
inoperative speed to the enroute alternate and upon reaching the
alternate airport, a descent to 1,500 feet, hold for 15 minutes, and
then conduct an instrument approach and land.
A pad for wind speed error would be required. Based on the weather
forecasting techniques of the early 1980s, ETOPS critical fuel planning
required a five percent fuel pad to account for wind forecast errors.
However, winds aloft forecasting has improved dramatically in the last
twenty years as a result of sophisticated wind modeling with super
computers, and weather information that is automatically down linked at
much more frequent intervals. There are many more collection points, as
well as satellite depictions of air mass movement. This information is
collected, analyzed, and distributed worldwide by the World Area
Forecast System (WAFS). This centralized distribution of weather
information provides for a consistent level of accuracy that can
eliminate the assignment of arbitrary penalties, provided that
individual airlines subscribe to the service and make use of this level
of information. Therefore, given the documented improvements in
forecasting accuracy when using WAFS, a more accurate means of
determining the fuel used during a decompression profile involves
adding a pad to the actual forecast winds in making the fuel
calculation rather than adding an arbitrary fuel penalty. The addition
of a five-percent wind error pad provides an accurate case-by-case
adjustment as compared with a five-percent fuel penalty, while
preserving the necessary level of safety. However, if a certificate
holder elects not to use such accurate winds in the computation of
decompression fuel, then the proposed rule will require the operator to
continue applying the five percent fuel pad to account for wind
forecast errors.
Consideration of fuel for icing at the cabin depressurization
cruise altitude is also required. Studies done by the Atmospheric
Environment Service of Canada with the assistance of airplane
manufacturers under the second Canadian Atlantic Storms Program (CASP
II) confirm that the probability of a continuous or repetitive
significant icing encounter is very small on a long

[[Page 64775]]

flight segment. The airspeeds associated with cruise at cabin
depressurization altitude are not conducive to ice build-up. Moreover,
pilots can avoid icing with minor changes in altitude or by changing
the cruise speed, either of which can have a large effect on ice
accretion. Based on the CASP II study, considering the probability of
encountering depressurization at the critical point and icing on the
same flight, an argument was made that fuel for icing in addition to
fuel for depressurization is not necessary. However, as a conservative
measure, this section requires fuel to compensate for the greater of
the effect of airframe icing (including the fuel used by engine and
wing anti-ice during this period) during 10 percent of the time for
which icing is forecast, or a combination of fuel for engine anti-ice,
and for some models of airplanes based on their characteristics and the
manufacturer's recommended procedures fuel for wing anti-ice for the
time during which icing is forecast.
The proposal also requires that the fuel supply be increased by 5
percent to account for deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance
unless the certificate holder has a program established to monitor
airplane in-service deterioration of cruise fuel burn performance and
includes in fuel supply calculations fuel sufficient to compensate for
any such deterioration.
Finally, if the APU is a power source required by this appendix,
then its fuel consumption must be accounted for.
H. Maintenance Program Requirements
(a) Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP)
This type design document establishes the baseline configuration
standard for each specific airplane and engine combination used in
ETOPS. The importance of the CMP is discussed more fully above in the
discussion of part 25 amendments of this proposal.
(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP)
A CAMP is a comprehensive oversight program to ensure the
continuing airworthiness of an airplane. A CAMP includes but is not
limited to maintenance tasks, inspection tasks, auditing requirements,
and data analysis. CAMP is required by section 135.411(a)(2). The
proposed regulation would expand the scope of CAMP for ETOPS operators
to encompass issues unique to ETOPS. The following are considered basic
additional elements of a CAMP for an ETOPS operator.
(1) ETOPS pre-departure service check
The pre-departure service check is designed to ensure that ETOPS
significant systems will perform their intended function throughout the
flight. An ETOPS pre-departure service check would have to verify the
status of ETOPS significant systems. Some certificate holders
conducting ETOPS flights have elected to add other items to their check
as a result of operational experience and knowledge gained through
reliability data. Regardless of any additional items an operator may
add to a check, the focal point of this check must be inspection,
servicing, and maintenance of ETOPS significant systems.
(2) Dual Maintenance
There have been instances of a single mechanic repeating a
maintenance error on multiple systems. An example of dual maintenance
is failing to install o-rings on engine oil or fuel components on
multiple engines. Establishing procedures to avoid dual maintenance can
minimize the probability of such errors. The use of two or more
mechanics reduces the risk of this type of error. Routine tasks on
multiple similar elements, such as oil and fuel filter changes, should
never be assigned on the same maintenance visit.
However, the FAA is aware that under some limited circumstances,
dual maintenance may be unavoidable. For instance, a pilot's report of
a discrepancy on an ETOPS significant system may require maintenance on
one engine at the same time as a scheduled maintenance event for the
other engine. In such cases, the certificate holder must establish and
follow procedures to mitigate the risk of a common cause human error
jeopardizing the ETOPS flight.
(3) Verification Program
The verification program ensures the effectiveness of ETOPS
maintenance actions. Verification programs are designed to identify any
potential problems and may consist of ground tests, flight tests, use
of built in test equipment (BITE), and other tests as appropriate.
Verification action must be accomplished following corrective action to
an ETOPS significant system, primary system failure, IFSD or in
response to significant adverse trends. The certificate holder must
establish procedures to clearly indicate who is going to initiate the
action, what verification action is necessary. A verification flight
may be performed in combination with an ETOPS revenue flight, provided
the verification phase is documented as satisfactorily completed upon
reaching the ETOPS entry point.
(4) Task Identification
ETOPS maintenance programs include numerous tasks. Under this
proposal, the certificate holder would have to identify specific tasks
that must be accomplished by ETOPS qualified personnel. These ETOPS-
specific tasks are performed during all phases of maintenance. On the
other hand, some tasks in an ETOPS maintenance program are identical to
tasks on a non-ETOPS airplane. The FAA realizes that tasks, such as
checking seat belts prior to a flight, do not involve ETOPS significant
systems and may be performed by non-ETOPS qualified personnel. ETOPS
specific tasks would either be identified on the certificate holder's
routine work forms and related instructions or parceled together and
identified as an ``ETOPS package.''
(5) Centralized Maintenance Control Procedures
The certificate holder would have to develop and clearly define in
their program ETOPS related procedures, duties, and responsibilities,
such as involvement of centralized maintenance control. The function of
centralized maintenance control is to be a focal point for operational
aspects of ETOPS maintenance and to ensure that ETOPS aircraft are
airworthy. Procedures and centralized control processes would be
established which would preclude an airplane being dispatched for ETOPS
flights after a propulsion system shut-down, significant primary
airframe system failure, or significant adverse trends in system
performance without appropriate corrective action having been taken.
Confirmation of corrective maintenance would require appropriate
verification action prior to dispatch on an ETOPS flight. Depending on
the size and scope of the ETOPS operation, the maintenance control
entity could be an entire department or one ETOPS-qualified individual
for a small operation. ``Centralized maintenance control'' is also
referred to as ``technical services center'', ``maintenance operations
control (MOC)'', and ``maintenance coordination center'' among other
terms within industry.
(6) ETOPS Program Document
The certificate holder would have to develop a document that
identifies all ETOPS requirements, including supportive programs,
procedures, duties, and responsibilities for use. The ETOPS program
document would be for use by personnel involved in ETOPS and would be
readily accessible to those

[[Page 64776]]

personnel. This document need not be inclusive but should at least
reference the maintenance program and other requirements, and clearly
indicate where they are located in the certificate holder's document
system. The ETOPS program document would have to be submitted to the
CHDO for approval at least 60 days before beginning ETOPS flights and
be subject to revision control.
(7) ETOPS Parts Control
Under this proposal, the certificate holder would have to develop a
parts control program that ensures the proper parts and configurations
are maintained for ETOPS airplanes. The program should include
procedures to verify that the parts installed on ETOPS airplanes during
parts borrowing or pooling arrangements, as well as those parts used
after repair or overhaul, maintains the necessary ETOPS configuration.
In many cases, certificate holders utilize the Illustrated Parts
Catalog (IPC) as the ETOPS parts controlling document. However, other
methods may be used provided that the configuration standard of the
airplane and engine is maintained.
(8) Enhanced Continuing Analysis and Surveillance (CAS)
The certificate holder would have to enhance their existing CAS in
order to achieve ETOPS reliability goals. This program should be
designed to identify and prevent ETOPS related problems. The program
would be event-oriented and incorporate reporting procedures for
critical events detrimental to ETOPS flights. Reliability data would
have to be readily available for use by the certificate holder and the
FAA to ensure that an acceptable level of reliability is achieved and
maintained.
In addition to the reporting requirements in section 135.415, the
following items would have to be reported within 72 hours to the CHDO.
(a) In-flight shutdowns.
(b) Diversions or turnback.
(c) Uncommanded power changes or surges.
(d) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.
(e) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.
(f) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.
(2) Certificate holders would also be required to furnish the
following information:
(a) Airplane identification (type and N-number)
(b) Engine identification (make and serial number)
(c) Total time, cycles and time since last shop visit.
(d) For systems, time since overhaul or last inspection of the
discrepant unit.
(e) Phase of flight.
(f) Corrective action
This proposed regulation would require certificate holders to
conduct an investigation into the cause of the occurrence of any event
listed above in addition to any event described in section 135.415. The
certificate holder would have to submit findings and description of
corrective action taken to the CHDO. The FAA expects certificate
holders to investigate events above in conjunction with manufacturers.
The report must be submitted in the manner prescribed by section
135.415(e).
(c) Propulsion System Monitoring
Propulsion system monitoring is vital to ensure safe ETOPS flights.
A propulsion system-monitoring program is intended to detect adverse
trends, to identify potential problems, and to establish criteria for
when corrective action may be necessary.
Propulsion system problems and IFSD may be caused by type design
deficiencies, ineffective maintenance, or operational procedures. It is
very important to identify the root cause of events so that corrective
action may be determined.
The diverse causes of propulsion system problems require different
solutions. For example, type design problems may affect an entire fleet
of aircraft. If an individual certificate holder experiences a problem
caused by a type design issue, it may not be appropriate for the FAA to
withdraw ETOPS authority. The FAA will normally address by an
Airworthiness Directive fundamental design problems that require an
effective hardware (or software) final fix. Inspections may be
satisfactory as an interim solution but long-term design solutions are
required for terminating action. However, maintenance or operational
problems may be wholly, or partially, the responsibility of the
certificate holder. In these cases, the cause would be specific to that
certificate holder and may require changes to their operational,
dispatch or maintenance procedures.
(d) Engine Condition Monitoring
The certificate holder would have to monitor the condition of
engines on ETOPS airplanes. The monitoring program would describe the
engine performance parameters to be tracked, method of data collection,
and corrective action processes. It would detect deterioration in
engine performance by tracking parameters such as rotor speeds, exhaust
gas temperatures, and fuel flow and allow for corrective action before
safe operation is affected. The program should reflect the
manufacturer's instructions and industry practices. Engine limit
margins must be maintained so that prolonged engine inoperative
diversions may be conducted without exceeding approved engine limits at
all approved power levels and expected environmental conditions. Engine
margins are maintained through this program to account for the effects
of additional engine loading demands such as electrical and pneumatic
systems that may be required during a diversion. If oil analysis such
as Spectrographic Oil Analysis Program (SOAP) is meaningful, it should
be included.
(e) Oil Consumption Monitoring
The certificate holder would have to establish an engine oil
consumption-monitoring program to ensure that there is enough oil to
complete any ETOPS flight. The certificate holder's consumption limit
would not be allowed to exceed the manufacturer's recommendations, and
would have to be sensitive to oil consumption trends. The program would
have to track the amount of oil added at the departing ETOPS station
with reference to the running average consumption. The monitoring must
be continuous up to and including the oil added at the ETOPS departure
station. For example, after servicing, the oil consumption may be
calculated by maintenance personnel as part of the pre-departure check
or may be automatically calculated by a computer program. The amount of
oil added could also be reported to centralized maintenance control for
calculation prior to the ETOPS flight. If an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
is required for ETOPS, then its oil consumption must be included in the
program.
(f) APU In-Flight Start Program
If APU in-flight start capability is required for ETOPS, the
certificate holder would be required to establish an in flight start
and run monitoring program. The primary function of an APU is to
provide backup electrical power in the event of a main system failure
such as engine in-flight shut down or generator loss. This program
would have to ensure that the APU in-flight start capability will
continue at a level of performance and reliability established by the
manufacturer or the FAA. The program would have to be acceptable to the
Administrator and include periodic sampling of each ETOPS airplane's
APU in-flight starting

[[Page 64777]]

capabilities. Certificate holders with existing approved programs may
continue under that authority under this proposal. Sampling intervals
may be adjusted according to system performance and fleet maturity. The
Advisory Circular accompanying this proposal contains guidance for APU
reliability and performance assessment.
(g) Maintenance Training
The certificate holder would have to develop additional ETOPS
specific training that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is
required for all personnel involved in ETOPS. This training would be in
addition to the certificate holder's accepted maintenance training
program to qualify individuals for specific airplanes and engines. This
program may be incorporated into the accepted maintenance training
curricula. The certificate holder would have to review the entire
maintenance-training program with the CHDO to ensure that it adequately
supports ETOPS training requirements. The goal of this program is to
ensure that all personnel involved in ETOPS are provided the necessary
training so that the ETOPS maintenance requirements are properly
accomplished.
The program must establish a system to qualify ETOPS maintenance
personnel. ETOPS qualified maintenance personnel are those who have
successfully completed the certificate holder's ETOPS training program
and who have satisfactorily performed extended range tasks under the
direct supervision of an FAA certificated maintenance person who has
had previous experience with maintaining the particular make and model
aircraft being utilized under the certificate holder's maintenance
program. For new aircraft introduction, the previous experience for
training can be obtained from the manufacturers training program.
(h) Procedural Changes
Following approval of the maintenance and training procedures
established to qualify for ETOPS; substantial changes to those
procedures must be submitted to the CHDO and approved before they may
be adopted. The determination of what constitutes substantial changes
should be negotiated between the certificate holder and the CHDO. This
is to allow some flexibility depending on the certificate holder's
ETOPS experience and performance history. The CHDO may require
submission of all changes for a new ETOPS operator or for an operator
experiencing difficulties. However, as experience is gained the CHDO
may reevaluate what substantial changes it needs to approve.
(i) Reporting
The FAA proposes to require certificate holders to report the
operating hours and cycles for each airplane and engine authorized for
use in ETOPS on a quarterly basis to the CHDO and the respective
manufacturers. These reports would allow the FAA and manufacturers to
ensure safe operations and to anticipate potential problems.

Continuing Surveillance

International Compatibility

In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPS) that correspond to these proposed regulations. ICAO SARPS are
currently being developed for ETOPS and we expect that this proposed
rule and rules currently being developed in Europe would affect the
ICAO SARPS. We expect that there will be some differences between the
rule developed in the United States and the rules developed in Europe.

Economic Summary

Proposed changes to Federal regulations must undergo several
economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal
agency must propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities.
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. sections 2531-2533)
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
for U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Public Law 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation.).
In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this proposed
rule: (1) Would have benefits that justify its costs, would be a
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of
Executive Order 12866, and would be ``significant'' as defined in DOT's
Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (2) would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (3) would
not constitute a barrier to international trade; and (4) would not
impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or
on the private sector. The FAA has placed these analyses in the docket
and summarized them as follows.

Cost Savings

The ability to fly the most direct route between two points results
in time and fuel savings and thus reduces operating costs. The mileage
savings for a two-engine ETOPS flight can be very significant. For
example, a two-engine operator approved for 180 minutes flying the
Great Circle Route, the shortest distance between two points on the
earth, between Milan, Italy and Barbados would save over 1,300 nautical
miles compared to a routing staying within 60 minutes of an adequate
airport.
Part 121 operators of two-engine airplanes will elect to incur the
costs associated with the higher ETOPS requirements based on their
judgment of whether cost savings would exceed the cost of compliance. A
new 2-engine ETOPS operator operating a single daily roundtrip is
estimated to save 38 minutes per round trip. This timesaving is based
on the reported timesaving of a current twin-engine Part 121 ETOPS

[[Page 64778]]

operator operating a route beyond 180-minutes. The operator reported
that operating beyond 180-minutes saved 27 minutes on a westbound
trans-Pacific flight and 11 minutes on the return leg. The annual hours
saved would total approximately 231 hours based on a single daily
roundtrip. The total annual savings based on hourly operating costs of
$4,500 would be $1,040,000; the ten-year savings would be $10.4 million
or $7.3 million, discounted. The costs of the proposed rule to this
operator are estimated in the Cost section at $106,500 or $75,900,
discounted. This operator would have net cost savings of $10.3 million
or $7.2 million, discounted over a 10-year period.
Part 121 operators of three- or four-engine airplanes would be
required to make a similar judgment if they elect to fly beyond 180-
minutes ETOPS. However, the net cost savings would take longer to
achieve than if the rule had not been proposed since there are proposed
costs that are not currently required for three- or four-engine
airplanes to fly beyond 180-minutes. A part 121 operator of a three- or
four-engine fleet serving a single route beyond 180-minutes assuming
the same time savings of 38 minutes per round trip and a single daily
roundtrip would have total annual savings of $1,965,000 based on an
hourly operating costs of $8,500. The ten-year savings would be $19.7
million or $13.8 million, discounted. The costs of the proposed rule to
this operator are estimated in the Cost section at $3.7 million or $2.8
million, discounted. This operator would have net cost savings of $16
million or $11 million, discounted over a 10-year period.
Part 135 operators currently are not permitted to operate beyond
180-minutes from an airport meeting minimum requirements but the
proposed rule would allow these operators to do so. Those that elect to
incur the costs associated with the proposed rule would experience cost
savings attributable to the proposed rule. The timesaving varies by
route, airplane speed, and prevailing winds. A part 135 operator with
less fuel capacity would be able to avoid a fuel stop in each
direction, which would result in significant timesaving. The FAA
estimates that a part 135 operator would save 2 hours of flying time
per round trip by operating beyond 180-minutes. A part 135 operator
with a fleet of four airplanes, with each airplane operating 12
roundtrips beyond 180-minutes ETOPS per year would save 96 hours
annually or 960 hours over a 10-year period. The cost savings
associated with the timesaving would total $9.6 million or $6.7
million, discounted. The costs of the proposed rule to this operator
are estimated in the Cost section at $1.1 million or $777,000,
discounted. This operator would experience net cost savings of $8.5
million or $6.0 million, discounted over a 10-year period based on an
airplane operating cost of $10,000 per hour.
The net cost savings to individual operators are summarized in
Table 1.

Table 1.--Net Ten-Year Cost Savings to Individual New ETOPS Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New 2-engine 3 or 4-engine Part 135
operator operator operator
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Cost savings........................................ $10,395,000 $19,650,000 $9,600,000
Total Cost................................................ 106,500 3,676,100 1,030,400
Net Cost Savings.......................................... 10,288,500 15,973,900 8,569,600
Present Cost savings...................................... 7,300,400 13,800,200 6,742,100
Present Cost.............................................. 75,900 2,789,200 741,100
Net Present Cost Savings.................................. 7,224,500 11,011,000 6,001,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

An applicant seeking certification of a new type engine (as opposed
to an applicant seeking a type certificate through an amendment of an
existing type certificate or through supplemental type certificate
procedures) for ETOPS eligibility would realize cost savings under
proposed 33.200(f). Proposed 33.200(f) would allow the applicant to
interrupt the 3000 cycle engine test required by 33.200(c) to show
compliance with the existing initial maintenance inspection (IMI) test
and inspection required by sections 33.90(a-b). The applicant would
then resume the ETOPS test to complete the requirements of section
33.200. Thus the applicant for a new type design engine would only have
to provide one engine to complete the existing IMI test and inspection
and the 3,000-cycle test of the proposed section 33.200(f) rather than
2 engines. The 3,000-cycle test is estimated in the Cost section to
cost $6.5 million or $6.1 million, discounted. The FAA requests
comments and data addressing this issue.
Manufacturers of business airplanes do not have direct offsetting
cost savings. These manufacturers would only voluntarily incur these
costs after making a business decision that they could recoup their
costs by the sale of airplanes capable of operating beyond 180-minutes
ETOPS. The substantial net cost savings that could be achieved by a
part 135 operator operating beyond 180-minutes ETOPS would aid the
market demand for such airplanes by business airplane operators.
The total cost savings to operators are estimated at $1.09 billion
over a ten-year period or $762.3 million, discounted as shown in Table
2. These savings are based on the following assumptions:
? There are currently 3 2-engine operators flying beyond 180
minutes on an exception basis. It is assumed they will routinely fly
231 hours each beyond 180 minutes.
? There are currently 7 ``low cost'' passenger carriers
(AirTran, America West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and Spirit
as defined by the Aviation Daily). It is assumed each would operate 4
ETOPS airplanes on a single route.
? There are currently 13 U.S. operators of 3- or 4-engine
aircraft and it is assumed each would operate 1 route beyond 180
minutes.
? There are 81 Part 135 operators that both meet the proposed
aircraft and maintenance requirements and each would save 96 hours
annually.

Table 2.--Ten-Year Cost Savings to Operators
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost-savings to-- Cost savings Present value
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Existing 2-engine Operators....... $31,185,000 $21,901,225
7 New 2-engine Operators............ 72,054,500 50,596,140

[[Page 64779]]

13 3- or 4-engine Operators......... 207,660,700 143,142,935
81 Part 135 Operators............... 777,600,000 546,108,480
-------------------
Total Cost Savings.............. 1,089,210,700 762,255,500
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The net cost-savings to the industry are reduced by the costs
incurred by the operators and manufacturers. These costs are addressed
in the Cost section. These costs are estimated to be less than the
estimated savings and the net cost-savings to the industry are
estimated at $823.9 million or $530.2 million, discounted as shown in
Table 3.

Table 3.--Ten-Year Net Cost-Savings or Costs to Industry
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost savings or
Category cost Present value
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing 2-engine Operators....... $20,449,500 14,341,826
7 New 2-engine Operators.......... 72,019,500 50,571,560
13 3- or 4-engine Operators....... 159,866,200 106,879,435
81 Part 135 Operators............. 694,137,600 486,079,380
Reporting and Certification Costs
for:
3 models of 3- or 4- engine (11,875,500) (9,797,100)
airplanes....................
5 Business Aircraft (36,065,000) (33,720,900)
Manufacturers Part 25 costs..
5 Business Aircraft (50,625,000) (47,337,500)
Manufacturers Part 33 Costs..
Current Part 135 Operators:
Aircraft Replacement Costs........ (24,000,000) (22,440,000)
--------------------
Total Net Cost Savings.... 823,907,300 530,234,875
------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to cost savings to operators there are other benefits
of the proposed rule.

Benefits

Accidents due to diversions are non-existent for twin-engine
aircraft operating under parts 121 or 135 and for more than two engine
aircraft operating under part 121. The FAA believes the proposed
weather provisions of the rule would reduce the probability of an
accident occurring and the provision requiring rescue fire fighting
services at ETOPS alternate airports would minimize the impact if an
accident were to occur. In addition, the FAA believes the proposed
requirements to require certificate holders to develop and implement
passenger recovery plans for ETOPS alternate airports would better
protect passengers and crew if a diversion is made for any reason.
Benefits cannot be assigned to specific provisions of the proposed
rule; rather, it is assumed that the proposed revisions would work
together to prevent diversions and to reduce the impact of any
diversions that do occur. Aviation routes not supported within 180-
minute diversion authority tend to be routes over remote areas of the
world that are uniquely challenging. The additional operational
challenges of these routes are equally demanding of all airplanes,
regardless of the number of engines, and require all operators to equip
their aircraft and train their personnel to prevent diversions and to
minimize the impact of diversions that do occur. All operators must
support any diversion that occurs and the subsequent recovery by
providing the added planning, training and expertise demanded by the
event. The FAA believes the requirements of the proposed rule provide
the support and procedures necessary to minimize the stress on the
airplane, crew, and passengers inherent in a diversion experience.
The FAA believes that the proposed ETOPS requirements would
increase the system reliability of an operator that decides to conduct
ETOPS operations and thus costly diversions could be reduced. One study
that only addressed the cost of an ``irregular'' operation, unrelated
to an ETOPS-type diversion, estimated the cost of a single diversion of
a wide-body international flight with passengers having an overnight
stay at another airport at between $89,400 and $181,800 \1\. The
estimate is based on 200 passengers and 400 passengers and includes
allowance for hotel, meals and telephone, aircraft operating costs,
lost opportunity cost, and revenue lost from the diverted flight to
passengers switching to another carrier. Omitting the opportunity cost
would reduce these estimates by $10,000 resulting in a minimum cost of
approximately $79,000. The cost of a diversion to a remote site would
incur significant costs since recovery times as long as 48 hours are
anticipated and per passenger costs may exceed the estimate included in
the study. A worst-case scenario presented by Airbus in a CD labeled
LROPS involves an engine loss and diversion to an airport in Siberia.
Airbus estimated the recovery costs could be as high as $1 million
including passenger accommodations, chartering an airplane to ferry the
passengers to their destination, chartering an airplane to ferry a
replacement engine, ferrying the repaired airplane to its station, and
loss of airplane use. The FAA requests comments on the number of
diversions that might be avoided on flights beyond 180-minutes as a
result of the proposed rule and seeks diversion cost data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ ``Improving Airline Profitability Through Better Estimated
Times of Arrival and Terminal Area Flight Information: a Benefit
Analysis of PASSUR'' Darryl Jenkins and Bill Cotton. Available at
http://www.passur.com/report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Costs

Compliance with the proposed rule is voluntary for all operators,
airframe-engine manufacturers. Since the decision is voluntary, the FAA
has estimated the cost to current ETOPS operators for the cost of
provisions not incurred by current practices and has estimated the cost
savings and costs to individual operators, and airframe and engine
manufacturers. The FAA has also

[[Page 64780]]

estimated the total cost to industry based on a set of assumptions as
to the number of operators and airplane manufacturers that would
voluntarily participate.
The FAA estimates that the cost of the rule to a new entrant part
121 operator of a twin-engine airplane would be approximately $106,500
over 10 years more than the operator would incur under the existing
deviation policy and procedures. This reflects the cost of preparing
and maintaining passenger recovery plans and maintenance investigation
and resolution costs for a four-airplane ETOPS operation.
A part 121 operator of a three- or four-engine fleet serving a
single route beyond 180-minutes would incur costs of approximately $3.7
million over 10 years. It is assumed that the route would require a
four-airplane fleet with 60 crewmembers, supported by 2 dispatchers and
20 mechanics.
A part 135 operator seeking authorization to conduct ETOPS
operations beyond 180-minutes would incur costs of approximately $1.0
million over 10 years. This estimate is based on a fleet of 4 airplanes
flown by a crew of 16 pilots and maintained by 2 certified mechanics,
and each aircraft conducts a monthly ETOPS operation. The fleet
excludes aircraft with a Class C cargo compartment. Aircraft with Class
C cargo compartments would add $1.5 million to the cost. All aircraft
are capable of operating between the West Coast-Hawaii. Currently 6
operators that are authorized to fly between the West Coast and Hawaii
only operate airplanes that would not be acceptable to the FAA under
the proposed rule. These operators would have to upgrade to an
acceptable aircraft at an estimated cost of $4 million per aircraft to
continue these flights.
A business aircraft manufacturer would incur reporting and
investigation costs that would be required by the proposed provisions
of part 21 estimated at $3.2 million over 10 years. This expenditure
would by incurred to fund 2 full-time staff for reporting purposes and
a full-time staff member to conduct investigations of incidents. The
manufacturer would also incur airplane ETOPS certification costs of
$7.2 million. This would consist of design costs of $6 million, and
assessment and validation costs of $1.2 million. Engine certification
costs that would be required to make an engine ETOPS eligible would
cost $10.1 million. This would consist of design costs $3.2 million,
testing costs of $6.5 million and establishing engine-monitoring
procedures at a cost of $400,000. The total cost to a business aircraft
manufacturer for reporting and investigation, and airframe and engine
certification would be $20.6 million.
The manufacturer of an existing three- or four-engine airplane
would incur additional reporting costs under part 21 of $1.9 million to
include operators that choose to fly beyond 180-minutes, supplemental
certification costs of $1.9 million to allow operators of existing
three- or four-engine airplanes to increase the capacity of the cargo
fire suppression system required for beyond 180-minute ETOPS and other
required costs of $200,000 for a total cost of $4 million.
The quantified costs to all the individual entities affected by the
proposed rule are summarized in Table 4. The FAA requests comments and
data addressing these estimates.

Table 4.--Estimated Ten Year Quantified Costs of Proposed Rule to Individual Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost area Total cost Present value
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost to a New Part 121 Twin-Engine ETOPS Operator........................... $106,500 $75,900
Cost to a 3- or 4-Engine Operator........................................... 3,676,500 2,789,500
Cost to a Part 135 Operator................................................. 1,030,400 741,100
Costs to a Business Aircraft Manufacturer for Reporting and Investigation, 20,560,000 18,474,500
and Certification of Airframe and ETOPS-Eligible Engine....................
Reporting and Certification Costs to Manufacturer of 3- or 4-engine airplane 3,958,500 3,265,700
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, the total cost of the provisions of the proposed rule
for existing two-engine ETOPS operators over a ten-year period beyond
those incurred to comply with the existing policy and guidance is
estimated at $10.7 million or $7.6 million, discounted.
The total costs to the industry are estimated at $265.3 million
over a ten-year period or $217.7 million, discounted as shown in Table
5. These costs are based on the following assumptions:
? Costs to existing 2-engine operators as shown in the
Regulatory Evaluation.
? Costs for a single operator, as shown in the Regulatory
Evaluation, are multiplied by the number in the first column for each
row to obtain the Total Cost and Present Value columns.
? There are currently 7 ``low cost'' passenger carriers
(AirTran, America West, ATA, Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest, and Spirit
as defined by the Aviation Daily). It is assumed each would operate 4
ETOPS airplanes on a single route.
? There are currently 13 U.S. operators of 3- or 4-engine
aircraft and it is assumed each would operate 1 route beyond 180
minutes.
? There are 81 Part 135 operators that both meet the proposed
aircraft and maintenance requirements.
? There are 3 ``makes'' of 3- or 4-engine airplanes (B-747,
DC-10, MD-11).
? There are 5 ``major'' business airplane manufacturers
serving this market segment. (Boeing, Cessna, Gulfstream, Raytheon, and
Sabreliner)
There are 6 current Part 135 operators using airplanes that could
not be upgraded to meet the specifications of the proposed rule. It
would cost each operator approximately $4 million to replace a single
airplane to meet the specifications.

Table 5.--Estimated Ten-Year Costs to Industry
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs incurred by-- Total cost Present value
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing 2-engine Operators............ $10,735,500 $7,559,400
7 New 2-engine Operators............... 745,500 531,300
13 3- or 4-engine Operators............ 47,794,500 36,263,500
81 Part 135 Operators.................. 83,462,400 60,029,100
Reporting and Certification Costs for:

[[Page 64781]]

3 makes of 3- or 4-engine airplanes 11,875,500 9,797,100
5 Business Aircraft Manufacturers 36,065,000 33,720,900
Part 25 Costs......................
5 Business Aircraft Manufacturers 50,625,000 47,337,500
Part 33 Costs......................
Current Part 135 Operators:
Aircraft Replacement Costs......... 24,000,000 22,440,000
-----------------
Total Costs.................... 265,303,400 217,678,800
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes,
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of small
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and
small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in
the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
This proposed rule would affect airframe and engine manufacturers
and part 121 and part 135 operators engaged in ETOPS operations. All
United States manufacturers of transport category airplanes exceed the
Small Business Administration small entity criteria of 1,500 employees
for aircraft manufacturers. Those U.S. manufacturers include: Boeing,
Cessna, Gulfstream, Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, and
Sabreliner. All United States manufacturers of ETOPS-capable engines
exceed the Small Business Administration small entity criteria of 1,000
employees for aircraft engine manufacturers. Those U.S. manufacturers
include: General Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls Royce. All United
States operators of transport category airplanes that are currently
authorized to conduct 180-minute ETOPS operations exceed the Small
Business Administration small entity criteria of 1,500 employees for
scheduled and non-scheduled air transportation firms. Those U.S.
operators include: American, American Trans Air, Continental, Delta,
United, U.S. Airways, and UPS. There are a number of small non-
scheduled part 121 operators that operate 3- or 4-engine aircraft that
have the capability to operate ETOPS flights beyond 180 minutes. Those
operators include: Atlas, Evergreen, Gemini, Kalitta, Southern Air,
Polar, and World. There are a number of small non-scheduled part 135
operators that operate 2-engine aircraft that have the capability to
operate ETOPS flights beyond 180 minutes. These non-scheduled part 121
and part 135 operators are not required to conduct beyond 180-minute
ETOPS operations. Those who voluntarily decide to equip their aircraft
and conduct the required training and planning under this proposed rule
will have made their own business decisions that the costs associated
with this NPRM are less than the cost savings of operating beyond 180-
minute ETOPS flights. The FAA therefore certifies that the proposed
rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small operators. The FAA seeks public comments regarding this
finding and requests that all comments be accompanied with detailed
supporting data.

International Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from
establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
In accordance with the above statute, the FAA has assessed the
potential effect of this proposed rule and determined that it would
impose requirements on airframe and engine manufacturers that both
domestic and foreign firms would have to comply with. U.S. operators of
3- and 4-engine aircraft that seek authority to operate beyond 180-
minutes ETOPS flight would have to comply with the same proposed
equipment and training provisions regardless of the country of origin
of the aircraft or engine manufacturer. Also the FAA does not believe
that U.S. operators of 3- and 4-engine airplanes would be placed at a
competitive disadvantage to foreign operators of 3- and 4-engine
airplanes as a result of this proposed rule. The FAA seeks public
comments regarding this finding and requests that all comments be
accompanied with detailed supporting data.
The FAA concludes that these proposed requirements would have a
neutral impact on foreign trade and, therefore, create no obstacles to
the foreign commerce of the United States.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended,
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act
requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing
the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule
that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted
annually for inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.''
This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate. The
requirements of Title II do not apply.

[[Page 64782]]

Paperwork Reduction Act

This proposal contains new information collection requirements. As
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)),
the FAA will submit the information requirements associated with this
proposal to the Office of Management and Budget for its review. A
summary of those requirements follows.
Title: Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-engine Airplanes
Summary: The regulations currently prohibit operators of two engine
airplanes from flying more than one hour from an adequate airport. The
NPRM would codify current practices that permit certificated air
carriers to obtain approval under the Administrator's deviation
authority to operate two-engine airplanes further than one hour from an
adequate airport. It would also add regulations for ETOPS for all
carriers regardless of the number of engines. ETOPS is voluntary for
operators and manufacturers.
Use of the information: This rule is necessary to support the
following elements of the FAA's strategic plan:
? Global leadership--The worldwide aviation industry is
interested in extended operations. Civil aviation authorities of other
countries and international aviation organizations are carefully
watching the FAA's efforts to develop rules to govern extended
operations. This proposed rule will enhance worldwide air travel safety
and efficiency.
? System efficiency--Allowing extended operations allows
operators to take more direct routes to long-range destinations and
improves overall system efficiency.
Safety--The proposed rule addresses the safety aspects of extended
operations.
Respondents: The likely respondents to this proposed information
requirement are airplane manufacturers and air carriers who wish to
operate on routes that go more than one hour from an adequate airport.
Frequency: Initial authorization and additional annual
requirements.
Annual Burden Estimate:
This collection of information includes four areas:
1. Operators who elect to use the ETOPS alternative would have to
prepare a passenger recovery plan applicable to each ETOPS alternate
airport listed in the carrier's operations specifications. The FAA
estimates that the initial preparation of such plans would require 100
staff hours, and to keep the plans up-to-date and viable would expend
an additional 50 hours annually.
2. Operators are required under 121.703 to file mechanical
reliability reports concerning the failure, malfunction, or defect for
17 areas. This proposal, however, would require that operators
investigate certain failures and submit findings and corrective actions
acceptable to the FAA. The FAA believes that there is a 5% probability
of such a failure that would require additional reporting, and that
such action could be resolved in two staff days.
3. Section 121.374 would require each certificate holder operating
beyond the 180-minutes to have an ETOPS maintenance program in addition
to the program currently required by 121.367. The program consists of
18 areas, including manual preparation, establishing procedures, and
conducting training. The FAA estimates that it would take 3 months to
develop.
4. Section 121.374 would require the certificate holder to develop
and write procedures for a pre-departure check. The FAA estimates that
it would take 6 weeks to develop this check. In addition, the carrier
must develop and write procedures for identifying ETOPS specific
procedures, which is estimated to take 8 hours. Carriers must also
supplement their existing reliability program; estimated time to
complete is 100 hours.
Each of these four areas is covered under three types of operators:
2-engine, 3-4 engine, and business jets. In addition, there are
reporting requirements for parts 21, and 25 certification requirements.
The burden is estimated based on the assumption that there will be 7
new 2-engine ETOPS Part 121 operators, 13 Part 121 3- or 4-engine
operators and 81 business jet operators. Since many aspects of the
proposed rule are voluntary the actual burden may vary significantly.
The hours and costs per hour break down as follows:

Two-engine operators:

Passenger recovery plans--For current operators using ETOPS,
estimate 19 plans x 100 hours x $75 = $142,500 for the initial plan.
Thereafter, operators would spend 40 hours annually reviewing and
validating the plan for a total 10-year cost of $655,000.

Initial development = 100 hrs x 19 plans = 1900 hours
Initial cost = $142,500
Recurring hours = 40 hrs x 19 plans x 9 years = 6840 hours
Recurring cost = $513,000
Total Hours = 8,740
Total Cost = $655,500

For estimated 7 new ETOPS operators:

Initial development = 100 hrs x 7 plans = 700 hours
Initial cost = $52,500
Recurring hours = 40 hrs x 7 plans x 9 years = 2520 hours
Recurring cost = $189,000
Total Hours = 3220
Total Cost = $241,500

Reporting failures and findings

For existing operators:

Initial = 16 hrs x 1,400 incidents = 22,400 hours x $45 = $1,008,000
Total over 10 years = 224,000 hours x $45 = $10,080,000
For estimated 7 new operators:
Initial = 16 hours x 7 operators x 10 incidents per = 1,120 hours x $45
= $50,400
Total over 10 years = 11,200 hours = $504,000

3- or 4-engine airplanes

Passenger recovery plans

For estimated 13 new ETOPS operators

Initial development = 100 hrs x 13 plans = 1,300 hours
Initial cost = 1,300 hours x $75 = $97,500
Recurring hours = 40 hrs x 13 plans x 9 years = 4680 hours
Recurring cost = $351,000
Total Hours = 5,980
Total Cost = $448,500

ETOPS Maintenance Program

For estimated 13 new ETOPS operators
Program document:

One time cost of 520 hours x 13 = 6760 hours x $85 = $574,600

Pre-departure check program:

240 hours x 13 = 3,120 hours x $85 = $265,200

ETOPS specific procedures:

8 hours x 13 = 104 hours x $85 = $8,840

Reliability program:

200 hours x 13 = 2600 hours x $85 = $221,000

Pre-departure service check:

2 hours x 3 planes x 360 days x 13 = 28080 hours x $45 = $1,263,600
Total Hours = 280,800
Total Cost = $12,636,000

Reporting Failures and Findings

16 hours x 10 incidents x 13 = 2080 hours x $45 = $93,600
Total Hours = 20,800
Total Cost = $936,000

Training

Initial Training

? 44 hours x 20 mechanics x 13 = 11440 hours x $45 = $514,800

[[Page 64783]]

? 16 hours x 20 pilots x 13 = 4160 hours x $173 = $719,680
? 4 hours x 40 flight attendants x 13 = 2080 hours x $52 =
$108,160
? 12 hours x 8 dispatchers x 13 = 1248 hours x $38 = $47,424
Total Hours = 18,928
Total Cost = $1,390,064

Recurrent Training

? 1 hour x 20 mechanics x 13 x 9 = 2340 hours x $45 =
$105,300
? 1 hour x 20 pilots x 13 x 9 = 2340 hours x $173 = $404,820
? 1 hour x 40 flight attendants x 13 x 9 = 4680 hours x $52 =
$243,360
? 1 hour x 8 dispatchers x 13 x 9 = 936 hours x $38 = $35,568
Total Hours = 10,296
Total Cost = $789,048

Ten Year Training

Total Hours = 29,224
Total Cost = $2,179,112

Business Jets

For estimated 81 new ETOPS operators

Maintenance program:

50 hours x 81 = 4050 hours x $100 = $405,000

Pre-departure service check:

1 hour x 24 inspections x 81 = 1944 hours x $45 = $87,480
Total Hours = 19,440
Total Cost =$874,800

Continuing Analysis Surveillance Program (CASS)

100 hours x 81 = 8100 hours x $45 = $364,500

Monitoring programs.

1 mechanic x 81 x 2080 hours = 168480 x $45 = $7,581,600
Total Hours = 1,684,800
Total Cost = $75,816,000
Training

Initial Training

? 4 hours x 2 mechanics x 81 = 648 hours x $45 = $29,160

Recurrent Training

? 1 hour x 2 mechanics x 81 x 9 = 1458 hours x $45 = $65,610
Total Hours = 2,106
Total Cost = $94,770
Quarterly reporting:

8 hours x 81 = 648 hours x $45 = $29,160

8 hours x 81 x 10 = 6480 hours x $45 = $291,600
For operations north of latitude N78:
Recovery plan:
Initial development t = 40 hrs x 81 plans = 3240 hours
Initial cost = 3240 hours x $75 = $243,000
Recurring hours = 10 hrs x 81 plans x 9 years = 7290 hours
Recurring cost = 7290 x $75 = $546,750
Total Hours = 10,530
Total Cost = $789,750
Training

Initial Training

? 16 hours x 16 pilots x 81 = 20736 hours x $173 = $3,587,328

Recurring Training

? 1 hour x 16 pilots x 81 x 9 = 11664 hours x $173 =
$2,017,872
Total Hours = 32,400
Total Cost = $5,605,200

Part 21

Expanded ETOPS reporting:

Two engineer aides x 2080 = 4,160 hours x $45 = $187,200
Total Hours = 41,600
Total Cost = $1,872,000
New ETOPS reporting:
For estimated 5 new ETOPS manufacturers

Two engineer aides x 2080 = 4,160 hours x 5 = 20,800 hours x $45 =
$936,000
Total Hours = 208,000
Total Cost = $9,360,000

Investigation of shutdown causes:

2,000 hours x 5 = 10,000 hours x $67.50 = $675,000
Total Hours = 100,000
Total Cost = $6,750,000

Part 25

One time certification for fire suppression:

25,000 hours (for 3 type certificates) x $75 = $1,875,000 million

In summary, the FAA estimates that the one-time and first year
burden of the paperwork requirements for ETOPS operators and
manufacturers would be approximately 357,000 hours and cost $21.2
million, undiscounted. The ten-year burden is estimated at 2.7 million
hours and the undiscounted cost is estimated $132.8 million as shown in
the attached table.
In addition, there are other certification costs that are difficult
to sort by information requirements. Some of these other costs are
manufacturing costs with additional reporting requirements.
The FAA is soliciting comments to--
(1) evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency,
including whether the information will have practical utility;
(2) evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
(3) enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and
(4) minimize the burden of the collection of information on those
who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
Individuals and organizations may submit comments on the
information collection requirement by January 13, 2004, and should
direct them to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this
document. According to the 1995 amendments to the Paperwork Reduction
Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and
a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The OMB
control number for this information collection will be published in the
Federal Register, after the Office of Management and Budget approves
it.

Summary of Initial and Total Paperwork Hours and Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Ten year Ten year
Category hours Initial cost hours costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2-engine:
Recovery Plans:
Existing........................................ 1,900 $142,500 8,740 $655,500
New............................................. 700 52,500 3,320 241,500
Reporting:
Existing........................................ 22,400 1,008,000 224,000 10,080,000
New............................................. 1,120 50,400 11,200 504,000
More than 2-engine:
Recovery Plans...................................... 1,300 97,500 5,980 448,500

[[Page 64784]]

ETOPS Program document.............................. 6,760 574,600 6,760 574,600
Pre-departure Program............................... 3,120 265,200 3,120 265,200
ETOPS SpecificProcedures............................ 104 8,840 104 8,840
Reliability Program................................. 2,600 221,000 2,600 221,000
Pre-departure Service Check......................... 28,080 1,263,600 280,800 12,636,000
Reporting Failures.................................. 2080 93,600 20,800 936,000
Training............................................ 18928 1,390,064 29,224 2,179,112
Business Jets:
ETOPS Maintenance Program........................... 4050 405,000 4,050 405,000
Pre-departure Service Check......................... 1944 87,480 19,440 874,800
CASS................................................ 8100 364,500 8,100 364,500
Monitoring Programs................................. 168,480 7,581,600 1,684,800 75,816,000
Training............................................ 648 29,160 2,106 94,770
Quarterly Reporting................................. 648 29,160 6,480 291,600
Polar Recovery Plan................................. 3,240 243,000 10,530 789,750
Polar Training...................................... 20,736 3,587,328 32,400 5,605,200
Part 21:
ETOPS Reporting:
Expanded........................................ 4,160 187,200 41,600 1,872,000
New............................................. 20,800 936,000 208,000 9,360,000
Shutdown Investigations............................. 10,000 675,000 100,000 6,750,000
Part 25: Certification.................................. 25,000 1,875,000 25,000 1,875,000
---------------
Total........................................... 356,898 21,168,232 2,739,154 132,848,872
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and therefore would not have federalism implications.

Plain Language

Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993) requires each
agency to write regulations that are simple and easy to understand. We
invite your comments on how to make these proposed regulations easier
to understand, including answers to questions such as the following:
? Are the requirements in the proposed regulations clearly
stated?
? Do the proposed regulations contain unnecessary technical
language or jargon that interferes with their clarity?
? Would the regulations be easier to understand if they were
divided into more (but shorter) sections?
? Is the description in the preamble helpful in understanding
the proposed regulations?
Please send your comments to the address specified in the ADDRESSES
section.

Environmental Analysis

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental impact statement. In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D,
appendix 4, paragraph 4(j), this proposed rulemaking action qualifies
for a categorical exclusion.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the notice has been assessed in accordance
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. We have determined
that the notice is not a major regulatory action under the provisions
of the EPCA.

Executive Order 13211--Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

Executive Order 13211 requires agencies to submit a Statement of
Energy Effects to the Administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Office of Management and Budget, for matters
identified as significant energy actions. A significant energy action
is an action that (1) is significant under Executive Order 12866 and is
likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy or (2) is designated by the
administrator of the Administrator of OIRA as a significant energy
action. This proposed rule would save fuel for operators who obtain
authorization for ETOPS routes and would therefore have a significant
positive effect on energy use. We are not required to submit a
Statement of Energy Effects for this proposed rule because we do not
expect this rule to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy and the Administrator of OIRA has not
identified it as a significant energy action.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 1

Air transportation.

14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

14 CFR Part 33

Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 121

Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety,
Charter flights, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Safety, Transportation.

14 CFR Part 135

Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, Drug
abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Proposed Amendment

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend part 14 CFR parts 1, 25, 33, 121, and
135 as follows:

[[Page 64785]]

PART 1--DEFINITIONS

1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

2. Amend Sec. 1.1 by adding the definitions of ``Early ETOPS'',
``ETOPS Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures Standard (CMP)''.
``ETOPS Significant Systems'', ``Extended Operations (ETOPS)'', ``Group
1 Systems'', ``Group 2 Systems'', and ``In-flight shutdown (IFSD)'', to
read as follows:

Sec. 1.1 General Definitions.

* * * * *
Early ETOPS means obtaining ETOPS type design certification without
first gaining service experience on the airplane/engine combination to
be certified.
* * * * *
ETOPS Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures Standard (CMP)
means specific airframe and engine configuration minimum requirements,
including any special inspection, hardware life limits, Master Minimum
Equipment List (MMEL) constraints and maintenance practices found
necessary by the FAA to establish the suitability of that airframe and
engine combination for ETOPS.
* * * * *
ETOPS Significant Systems means the airplane propulsion system and
any other airplane systems whose failure could adversely affect the
safety of an ETOPS flight, or whose functioning is important to
continued safe flight and landing during an airplane diversion. Each
ETOPS significant system is either a Group 1 or Group 2 system based on
the relationship to the number of engines, or to continued safe engine
operation.
Extended Operations (ETOPS) means an airplane flight operation in
which a portion of the flight is operated beyond a predetermined time
threshold, as identified in parts 121 and 135 of this title, from an
adequate airport based on an approved one engine inoperative cruise
speed under standard conditions in still air.
* * * * *
ETOPS Group 1 Systems: Group 1 Systems include any systems that
relate to the number of engines on the airplane and are important to
the safe operation of the airplane on an ETOPS flight. The following
provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 1
Significant System:
(1) A system for which the fail-safe redundancy characteristics are
directly linked to the number of engines (for example, hydraulic
system, pneumatic system, electrical system).
(2) A system that may affect the proper functioning of the engines
to the extent that it could result in an in-flight shutdown or
uncommanded loss of thrust (for example, fuel system, thrust reverser
or engine control or indicating system, and engine fire detection
systems).
(3) A system which contributes significantly to the safety of an
engine inoperative ETOPS diversion and is intended to provide
additional redundancy to accommodate the system(s) lost by the
inoperative engine. These include back-up systems such as an emergency
generator or APU.
(4) Any system essential to prolonged operation at engine
inoperative altitudes including anti-icing systems for a twin-engine
airplane if single engine performance results in the airplane operating
in the icing envelope.
ETOPS Group 2 Systems: Group 2 Systems are systems that do not
relate to the number of engines on the airplane, but are important to
the safe operation of the airplane on an ETOPS flight. The following
provides additional discriminating definitions of an ETOPS Group 2
Significant System:
(1) A system the failure of which would reduce the capability of
the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with an ETOPS
diversion, (for example, long-range navigation or communication,
equipment cooling, or systems important to safe operation on a ETOPS
diversion after a decompression.)
(2) Time-limited systems including cargo fire suppression and
oxygen if the duration of ETOPS dependent on the availability of such
systems.
(3) Systems whose failure would result in excessive crew workload
or have operational implications or significant detrimental impact on
flight crew or passengers physiological well being for an ETOPS
diversion (for example flight control forces that would be exhausting
for a maximum ETOPS diversion, system failures that would require
continuous fuel balancing to ensure proper Center of Gravity (CG), or a
cabin environmental control failure that could cause extreme heat or
cold that it could incapacitate the crew or cause physical harm to the
passengers).
(4) Any other system specifically installed to enhance the safety
of long-range operations including an ETOPS diversion regardless of the
applicability of paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this definition (for
example SATCOM, GPS).
* * * * *
In-flight shutdown (IFSD) means when an engine ceases to function
in flight and is shutdown, whether self-induced, crew initiated or
caused by some other external influence. (The FAA considers IFSD for
all causes, for example. flameout, internal failure, crew initiated
shutoff, foreign object ingestion, icing, inability to obtain and/or
control desired thrust.)

PART 21--CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS

3. The authority citation for part 21 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113,
44701-44701, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.

4. Add Sec. 21.4 to read as follows:

Sec. 21.4 ETOPS reporting requirements.

(a) Early ETOPS problem reporting, tracking, and resolution. (1)
The holder of a type certificate of an airplane that has been approved
for ETOPS without service experience in accordance with section II,
paragraph (a), or section III, paragraph (a), of Appendix L of 14 CFR
part 25 must establish a system for reporting, tracking, and promptly
resolving problems encountered with ETOPS Significant Systems.
(2) The system must contain a means for the prompt identification
of problems with ETOPS Significant Systems, for the reporting of such
problems to the responsible FAA certification office, and for
proffering solutions to and obtaining FAA approval for the resolution
of the problems. The implementation of the problem resolution can be
accomplished by way of an FAA approved change(s) in the type design,
the manufacturing process, or an operating or maintenance procedures.
(3) The reporting system must be in place for the first 250,000
fleet engine hours. For a two-engine ETOPS airplane, the reporting
requirement remains in place until the fleet has demonstrated a stable
in-flight shutdown rate in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this
section for the maximum diversion time for which the airplane has been
certified.
(4) If the airplane or engine type certificated is a derivative of
a previously certificated airplane or engine, the type certificate
holder may, with prior authorization from the Administrator, report
only on systems that have changed from the original type certificate.
(5) For the early ETOPS service period, an applicant must define
the sources and content of in-service data that will be made available
to them in support of their problem reporting and

[[Page 64786]]

tracking system. The content of this data must be adequate to evaluate
the specific cause of all service incidents reportable under Sec.
21.3(c) of part 21, in addition to any occurrences that could affect
the safety of ETOPS operations and must be reported, including:
(i) In-flight shutdown events, and for twin-engine ETOPS airplanes,
in-flight shutdown rates;
(ii) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power;
(iii) Precautionary thrust reductions (except for normal
troubleshooting as allowed in the aircraft manual);
(iv) Degraded propulsion in-flight start capability;
(v) Inadvertent fuel loss or fuel unavailability, or uncorrectable
fuel imbalance in flight;
(vi) Technical air turn backs or diversions associated with an
ETOPS Group 1 Significant System;
(vii) Inability of an ETOPS Group 1 Significant System, designed to
provide backup capability after failure of a primary system, to provide
the required backup capability in-flight;
(viii) A complete loss of any electrical power generating system or
hydraulic power system during an operation of the aircraft;
(ix) Any event that would jeopardize the safe flight and landing of
the airplane on an ETOPS flight;
(x) Unscheduled engine removals for conditions that could result in
one of the reportable items listed above.
(b) ETOPS operational service reliability reporting for two-engine
airplanes.
(1) Two engine reliability reporting. Type Certificate Holder of
engines and airplanes used in ETOPS service must report monthly on the
reliability of their two-engine airplane fleets in service. The
Administrator may approve reporting on a quarterly basis if the
airplane and engine demonstrate sustained IFSD rates below those
identified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. This reporting may be
combined with the reporting requirements of Sec. 21.3. Causes of
propulsion system in-flight shutdown must be investigated by the
manufacturer(s), and where appropriate for the safety and airworthiness
of ETOPS operations, FAA approved corrective action must be
implemented. Reporting must include:
(i) Propulsion system in-flight shutdown events (excluding normal
training events)
(ii) In-flight shutdown rates for all causes (excluding normal
training events).
(iii) ETOPS fleet utilization, including a list of operators, their
ETOPS diversion time authority, flight hours, and cycles.
(2) ETOPS World Fleet In-Flight Shutdown Rate Requirements. Type
Certificate Holders of engines and airplanes approved for ETOPS service
must monitor and report the worldwide fleet in-flight shutdown rates by
airplane-engine type combinations to ensure appropriate rates are
maintained. ETOPS 12 month rolling average in-flight shutdown rates
must be maintained at the following levels:
(i) A threshold rate of 0.05 per 1,000 fleet engine hours for two-
engine airplanes in ETOPS for initial approval up to 120 minutes, with
continuing improvement toward a rate of 0.02 per 1,000 fleet engine
hours;
(ii) A rate of 0.02 per 1,000 fleet engine hours for two-engine
airplanes in ETOPS up to 180 minutes, and as provided for flight by
flight exception based operations up to 207 minutes maximum diversion
time in the North Pacific area of operation as defined in 14 CFR Part
121;
(iii) A rate of 0.01 per 1,000 fleet engine hours for twin-engine
airplanes in ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, except as provided for flight by
flight exception based operations up to 207 minutes maximum diversion
time in the North Pacific area of operation as defined in 14 CFR Part
121.

PART 25--AIRPLANE TYPE DESIGN

5. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.

6. Amend Sec. 25.857 by revising paragraph (c)(2) to read as
follows:

Sec. 25.857 Cargo compartment classification.

* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) There is an approved built-in fire extinguishing or suppression
system controllable from the cockpit. For ETOPS approval, the certified
time capability of the system must be provided as required by Sec.
25.1581(a)(2).
* * * * *
7. Add Sec. 25.1535 to read as follows:

Sec. 25.1535 ETOPS approval.

Each applicant seeking type design certification for ETOPS must:
(a) Comply with the requirements of this part considering the
maximum mission time and the longest diversion time for which approval
is being sought.
(b) Consider crew workload and operational implications and the
flight crew's and passengers' physiological needs of continued
operation with failure effects for the longest diversion time for which
approval is being sought, and
(c) Comply with the requirements of Appendix L of this part.
8. Add Appendix L to read as follows:

Appendix L to Part 25--Extended Operations (ETOPS)

This appendix defines additional airworthiness requirements for
the approval of an airplane-engine combination for Extended
Operations (ETOPS) in accordance with Sec. 25.1535. Two engine
airplanes must comply with Sections I and II of this appendix.
Airplanes with more than two engines must comply with Sections I and
III of this appendix.

Section I--Design Requirements

(a) Airplane Systems. (1) Operation in icing conditions. (i) The
airplane must be certificated for operation in icing conditions in
accordance with Sec. 25.1419.
(ii) The airframe and propulsion system ice protection must be
capable of continued safe flight and landing at engine inoperative
and decompression altitudes in icing conditions.
(iii) The applicant must show that the unprotected areas of the
airplane will not collect a load of ice that would make the airplane
uncontrollable or create too much drag to safely complete a
diversion in icing conditions.
(2) Electrical power supply. The electrical power supply system
must be designed so that--
(i) The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent
the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane on an ETOPS
flight is extremely improbable, and
(ii) The occurrence of any other failure conditions which would
reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the crew to
cope with adverse operating conditions on an ETOPS flight is
improbable.
(iii) For airplanes to be certificated for usage on routes
further than 180 minutes from a suitable airport, the airplane must
be equipped with at least three independent electrical generation
sources.
(3) Time limited systems. For each ETOPS Significant System that
is time limited, the system capability must be defined. The most
limiting ETOPS Significant System capability must be stated in the
Airplane Flight Manual per the requirements of paragraph (e)(4) of
Section I of this appendix.
(b) Propulsion systems. (1) Fuel system design. Fuel necessary
to complete an ETOPS mission, including a diversion for the longest
time for which approval is being sought, must be available to the
operating engine or engines at the pressure and flow required by
Sec. 25.955 under any airplane failure condition not shown to be
extremely improbable. Examples of the types of failures to be
considered include crossfeed valve failures, automatic fuel
management system failures, and normal electrical power generation
failures.
(i) For two engine airplanes to be certificated for usage on
routes further than 180 minutes from a suitable airport, one fuel
boost pump in each main tank and actuation

[[Page 64787]]

capability of at least one crossfeed valve must be able to be
powered by a back-up electrical generation source other than the
primary engine driven or APU driven generators, unless the required
fuel boost pressure or crossfeed valve actuation is not provided by
electrical power.
(ii) Alerts must be displayed to the flight crew when the
quantity of fuel available to the engines falls below that level
required to complete the mission. These alerts must include
provisions for abnormal fuel management or transfer between tanks,
and possible loss of fuel.
(2) APU design. If operation of the APU installation is required
to comply with this appendix, the applicant must substantiate that:
(i) The APU has adequate reliability for that operation, and;
(ii) If in-flight start and run capability is necessary, the APU
in-flight operating envelope shall extend to the maximum operating
altitude of the airplane, but need not exceed 45,000 feet.
(3) Engine oil tank design. The engine oil tank filler cap must
comply with section 33.71(c)(4).
(c) Engine condition monitoring. Procedures for an engine
condition monitoring process must be defined and validated in
accordance with Part 33 Appendix A, paragraph 33.3(c).
(d) Configuration, maintenance and procedures. If the airplane,
propulsion, and ETOPS Significant System assessments identify
configuration, maintenance or operational standards necessary to
maintain appropriate reliability for ETOPS, the applicant must
identify the appropriate standards in a Configuration, Maintenance
and Procedures (CMP) document.
(e) Airplane flight manual. The airplane flight manual must
contain the following information.
(1) Special limitations, including any limitations associated
with operation of the airplane up to the maximum diversion time
being approved.
(2) Required markings or placards.
(3) The airborne equipment, installation, and flight crew
procedures required for extended operations.
(4) The maximum diversion time capability of the airplane for
ETOPS required by paragraph (a)(3) of this appendix in accordance
with Sec. 25.1581(a)(2), ``Furnishing information.''
(5) The following statement: ``The type design reliability and
performance of this airframe-engine combination has been evaluated
in accordance with Sec. 25.1535 and found suitable for (state
maximum diversion time) extended operations (ETOPS) with the
incorporation of the approved airplane configuration CMP standard
contained in (state description or reference to a document
containing the approved CMP standard). This finding does not
constitute approval to conduct ETOPS.''

Section II--Two Engine Airplanes

An applicant for a two engine airplane must use one of the
methods described in paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of Section II of
this appendix to certify the airplane for Extended Operations.
(a) Service experience method. The applicant must demonstrate
that the airplane and engine combination for which approval is
sought has the required airplane and propulsion system capability to
safely conduct an ETOPS mission and maximum diversion and has
achieved required airframe and propulsion system reliability based
upon fleet in-service experience.
(1) Required service experience. After accumulating 250,000
worldwide fleet engine hours on the airplane and engine combination
for which approval is sought, a reliability review must be
performed. The number of hours may be reduced if adequate
compensating factors are identified which give a reasonable
equivalent database. Where experience on another airplane is
applicable, a significant portion of the 250,000 hours must be
obtained on the candidate airplane.
(2) Propulsion system assessment. (i) The applicant must conduct
a propulsion system assessment based on the following data,
collected from the entire fleet of the specific airplane and engine
combination for which approval is sought:
(A) A list of all engine shutdown events both ground and in-
flight for all causes (excluding normal training events) including
flameouts. The list should provide identification (engine and
airplane model and serial number), engine configuration and
modification history, engine position, circumstances leading up to
the event, phase of flight or ground operation, weather/
environmental conditions, and reason for shutdown. In addition,
similar information should be provided for all occurrences where
control of desired thrust level was not attained.
(B) Unscheduled engine removal rate (accumulated 6- and 12-month
rolling averages), removal summary, time history of removal rate and
primary causes for unscheduled removal.
(C) Dispatch delays, cancellations, aborted takeoffs (includes
those induced by maintenance or crew error) and en-route diversions
chargeable to the propulsion system.
(D) Total engine hours and cycles and engine hour population
(age distribution).
(E) Mean time between failure of propulsion system components
that affect reliability.
(F) IFSD rate based upon a 6- and 12-month rolling average.
(ii) All causes or potential causes of engine in-flight
shutdowns or loss of thrust control occurring in service must have
corrective actions that are shown to be effective in preventing
future occurrences.
(3) Airplane systems assessment. Airplane systems must comply
with the requirements of Sec. 25.1535(a) using available in-service
reliability data for ETOPS significant systems. All causes or
potential causes of ETOPS significant system failures occurring in
service must have corrective actions that are shown to be effective
in preventing future occurrences.
(4) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) rates. The demonstrated airplane
and engine combination world fleet propulsion system 12 month
rolling average IFSD rate must be commensurate with the level of
ETOPS approval being sought.
(i) For operations up to 120 minutes: A rate of approximately
0.05 or less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with a required list of
corrective actions in the CMP document that would result in
continuing improvement toward an IFSD rate of 0.02 per 1,000 fleet
engine hours.
(ii) For operations up to 180 minutes: A rate of approximately
0.02 or less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with an existing 120
minute CMP standard, or new or additional CMP requirements that have
been demonstrated to achieve this in-flight shutdown rate.
(iii) For operations beyond 180 minutes: A rate of approximately
0.01 or less per 1,000 fleet engine hours with an existing 120
minute or 180 minute CMP standard, or new or additional CMP
requirements that have been demonstrated to achieve this in-flight
shutdown rate.
(5) Airplane flight test requirements. A flight test must be
conducted to validate the adequacy of the airplane's flying
qualities, performance and the flight crew's ability to deal with
engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system failure
conditions expected to occur in service.
(b) Early ETOPS method.
(1) Relevant experience assessment. The applicant must identify
specific corrective actions taken on the airplane design to address
relevant design, manufacturing, operational and maintenance problems
experienced on previously certified Part 25 airplanes manufactured
by the applicant. Specific corrective actions are not required if
the nature of the problem is such that the problem would not
significantly impact the safety or reliability of the system.
Relevant problems are those problems on ETOPS Group 1 Significant
Systems that have or could have resulted in in-flight shutdowns or
diversions. To experience of supplier-provided ETOPS Group 1
Significant Systems and similar or identical equipment utilized on
aircraft built by other manufacturers must be included.
(2) Propulsion system design. (i) Engine ETOPS eligibility. The
engine must be approved for ETOPS eligibility in accordance with
Sec. 33.200.
(ii) Design to preclude in-flight shutdowns. The applicant must
design the propulsion system to preclude failures or malfunctions
that could result in an engine in-flight shutdown. The applicant
must substantiate compliance with this requirement by analysis,
test, in-service experience on other airplanes, or other means. The
analysis must show that the propulsion system design will minimize
failures and malfunctions with the objective of achieving the
following in-flight shutdown rates: 0.02 per 1,000 engine fleet
hours for ETOPS (180 minutes or less) 0.01 per 1,000 engine fleet
hours for ETOPS (beyond 180 minutes).
(3) Maintenance and operational procedures. The applicant must
validate all ETOPS significant systems maintenance and operational
procedures. Any problems found as a result of the validation must be
tracked and resolved through the Problem Tracking and Resolution
System required by Section II, paragraph (b)(8) of this appendix.
(4) Propulsion system validation test. The installed engine
configuration for which

[[Page 64788]]

approval is being sought must comply with Sec. 33.200(c). The test
engine must be configured with a complete airplane nacelle package,
including engine-mounted equipment except for any configuration
differences necessary to accommodate test stand interfaces with the
engine nacelle package. At the conclusion of the test, the
propulsion system must be:
(i) Visually inspected according to the applicant's on-wing
inspection recommendations and limits.
(ii) Completely disassembled and the propulsion system hardware
must be inspected in accordance with the service limits submitted in
compliance with Sec. 25.1529. Any potential sources of in-flight
shutdown, loss of thrust control, or other power loss encountered
during this inspection must be tracked and resolved in accordance
with Section II, paragraph (b)(8) of this appendix.
(5) New technology demonstration testing. Testing must be
conducted to substantiate the suitability of any technology new to
the applicant, including substantially new manufacturing techniques.
(6) APU validation test. If utilizing an APU in order to meet
the requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of section I of this appendix,
one APU of the type to be certificated with the airplane must
complete a test consisting of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational
cycles. Following completion of the demonstration test, the APU must
be disassembled and inspected. Any potential sources of in-flight
start problems or run problems or both must be identified, tracked
and resolved in accordance with Section II, paragraph (b)(8) of this
appendix.
(7) Airplane demonstration test. For each airplane and engine
combination to be certificated one or more airplanes must conduct
flight-testing that demonstrates that the aircraft, its components
and equipment are capable of and function properly during ETOPS and
ETOPS diversions. This flight-testing may be coordinated with, but
is not in place of flight-testing required for compliance to Sec.
21.35(b)(2).
(i) The flight test program must include:
(A) Flights simulating actual ETOPS operation including normal
cruise altitude, step climbs, and APU operations if paragraph (b)(2)
of section I of this appendix applies.
(B) Demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversion time for which eligibility is sought.
(C) Engine inoperative maximum time diversions to demonstrate
the airplane and propulsion system capability to safely conduct an
ETOPS diversion, including a repeat of a maximum continuous thrust
(MCT) diversion on the same engine.
(D) Non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplane's
capability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under worst-case
system failure conditions expected to occur in service.
(E) Diversions into representative operational diversionary
airports.
(F) Repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the
ground followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.
(ii) The flight testing must validate the adequacy of the
airplane's flying qualities, performance and flight crew's ability
to deal with the conditions of paragraphs (b)(7)(i)(C),
(b)(7)(i)(D), and (b)(7)(i)(E) of Section II of this appendix.
(iii) The engine-inoperative diversions must be evenly
distributed among the number of engines in the applicant's flight
test program except as required by paragraph (b)(7)(i)(C) of Section
II of this appendix.
(iv) The test airplane or airplanes must be operated and
maintained using the recommended operations and maintenance manual
procedures during the airplane demonstration test.
(v) At the completion of the airplane or airplanes demonstration
testing, the ETOPS significant systems must undergo an airplane
visual inspection per the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
of Sec. 25.1529. The engines must also undergo a gas path
inspection. These inspections are intended to identify any abnormal
conditions that could result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion.
Any abnormal conditions must be identified, tracked and resolved in
accordance with paragraph (b)(8) of Section II of this appendix.
(8) Problem tracking and resolution system. A problem tracking
and resolution system must be established to address problems, as
identified in Sec. 21.4(a)(5), encountered on the ETOPS significant
systems during airplane and engine testing that could affect the
safety of ETOPS operations. If the airplane or engine type
certificated is a derivative of a previously certificated airplane
or engine, the criteria of Sec. 21.4(a)(4) may apply.
(i) The system must contain a means for prompt identification of
problems that could impact the safety of ETOPS operations.
(ii) The system must contain the process for the timely
notification to the responsible FAA office of all relevant problems
encountered, and corrective actions deemed necessary, in a manner
that allows for appropriate FAA review of all planned corrective
actions.
(iii) The system must be in effect during the phases of airplane
and engine development that will be used to assess early ETOPS
eligibility.
(iv) Upon Type Certification, the certificate holder must comply
with problem tracking and resolution system requirements of Sec.
21.4.
(9) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria. For airplane,
propulsion and ETOPS significant systems, the type and frequency of
failures that occur during the airplane flight test program and the
airplane demonstration test required by paragraph (b)(7) of Section
II of this appendix must be consistent with the type and frequency
of failures or malfunctions that would be expected to occur on
presently certified ETOPS airplanes.
(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.
(1) The in-service experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1)
may be reduced to 15,000 engine hours provided compliance to
paragraphs (a)(5), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6),
(b)(8), and (b)(9) of Section II of this appendix have been met.
(2) Additionally, as allowed by Sec. 21.21(b)(1), the in-
service experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of Section II of
this appendix may be reduced to some level other than 15,000 engine
hours provided compensating factors that provide an equivalent level
of safety are provided.

Section III--Airplanes With More Than Two Engines

An applicant for an airplane with more than two engines must use
one of the methods described in the following paragraphs (a), (b) or
(c) of Section III of this appendix to certify the airplane for
Extended Operations.
(a) Service experience method. The applicant must demonstrate
that the airplane and engine combination for which approval is
sought has the required airplane and propulsion system capability to
safely conduct an ETOPS mission and maximum diversion and has
achieved required airplane system reliability based upon fleet in-
service experience.
(1) Required service experience. After accumulating 250,000
worldwide fleet engine hours on the airplane and engine combination
for which approval is sought, the applicant must perform a
reliability review. The number of hours may be reduced if adequate
compensating factors are identified which give a reasonable
equivalent database. Where experience on another airplane is
applicable, a significant portion of the 250,000 hours must be
obtained on the candidate airplane.
(2) Airplane systems assessment. Airplane systems must comply
with the requirements of Sec. 25.1535(a) using available in-service
reliability data for ETOPS significant systems. All causes or
potential causes of ETOPS significant system failures occurring in
service must have corrective actions that are shown to be effective
in preventing future occurrences.
(3) Airplane flight test requirements. The applicant must
conduct a flight test to validate the adequacy of the airplane's
flying qualities, performance and the flight crew's ability to deal
with engine inoperative and non-normal worst case system failure
conditions expected to occur in service.
(b) Early ETOPS method.
(1) Maintenance and operational procedures. The applicant must
validate all ETOPS Significant Systems maintenance and operational
procedures. The applicant must track and resolve any problems found
as a result of the validation through the Problem Tracking and
Resolution System required by paragraph (b)(5) of Section III of
this appendix.
(2) New technology demonstration testing. The applicant must
conduct testing to substantiate the suitability of any technology
new to the applicant, including substantially new manufacturing
techniques.
(3) APU validation test. If utilizing an APU in order to meet
the requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of section I of this appendix,
one APU of the type to certificated with the airplane must complete
a test consisting of 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles.
Following completion of the demonstration test, the APU must be
disassembled and inspected. Any potential sources of in-flight start
problems or run problems or both must be identified, tracked and
resolved in accordance with paragraph (b)(5) of Section III of this
appendix.

[[Page 64789]]

(4) Airplane demonstration test. For each airplane and engine
combination to be certificated, the applicant must conduct flight-
testing with one or more airplanes to demonstrate that the aircraft,
its components and equipment are capable of and function properly
during ETOPS and ETOPS diversions. This flight-testing may be
coordinated with, but is not in place of flight-testing required for
compliance to Sec. 21.35(b)(2).
(i) The flight test program must include:
(A) Flights simulating actual ETOPS operation including normal
cruise altitude, step climbs, and APU operations if compliance to
paragraph I (b)(2) of this appendix is necessary.
(B) Demonstration of maximum normal flight duration with maximum
diversion time for which eligibility is sought.
(C) Engine inoperative maximum time diversions to demonstrate
the airplane and propulsion system's capability to safely conduct an
ETOPS diversion, including a repeat of a maximum continuous thrust
(MCT) diversion on the same engine.
(D) Non-normal conditions to demonstrate the airplane's
capability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under worst case
system failure conditions expected to occur in service.
(E) Diversions into representative operational diversionary
airports.
(F) Repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the
ground followed by long-range operations at normal cruise altitude.
(ii) The flight testing must validate the adequacy of the
airplane's flying qualities, performance and flight crew's ability
to deal with the conditions of paragraphs (b)(4)(i)(C),
(b)(4)(i)(D), and (b)(4)(i)(E) of Section III of this appendix.
(iii) The engine-inoperative diversions must be evenly
distributed among the number of engines in the applicant's flight
test program except as required by paragraph (b)(4)(i)(C) of Section
III of this appendix.
(iv) The test airplane or airplanes must be operated and
maintained using the recommended operations and maintenance manual
procedures during the airplane demonstration test.
(v) At the completion of the airplane or airplanes demonstration
testing, the ETOPS Significant Systems must undergo an airplane
visual inspection per the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
of Sec. 25.1529. The engines must also undergo a gas path
inspection. These inspections are intended to identify any abnormal
conditions that could result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion.
The applicant must identify, track and resolve any abnormal
conditions in accordance with paragraph (b)(5) of Section III of
this appendix.
(5) Problem tracking and resolution system. The applicant must
establish a problem tracking and resolution system to address
problems, as identified in Sec. 21.4(a)(5), encountered on the
ETOPS Significant Systems during airplane and engine testing that
could affect the safety of ETOPS operations. If the airplane or
engine type certificated is a derivative of a previously
certificated airplane or engine the criteria of Sec. 21.4(a)(4) may
apply.
(i) The system must contain a means for prompt identification of
problems that could impact the safety of ETOPS operations.
(ii) The system must contain the process for the timely
notification to the responsible FAA office of all relevant problems
encountered, and corrective actions deemed necessary, in a manner
that allows for appropriate FAA review of all planned corrective
actions.
(iii) The system must be in effect during the phases of airplane
and engine development that will be used to assess early ETOPS
eligibility.
(iv) Upon type certification, the problem tracking and
resolution system will revert to the requirements of Sec. 21.4.
(6) Reliability demonstration acceptance criteria. For ETOPS
significant systems, the type and frequency of failures that occur
during the airplane flight test program and the airplane
demonstration test required by paragraph (b)(4) of this section must
be consistent with the type and frequency of failures or
malfunctions that would be expected to occur on presently certified
ETOPS airplanes, or any non-ETOPS derivative models of those
aircraft or engines.
(c) Combined service experience and early ETOPS method.
(1) The in-service experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1)
of Section III of this appendix may be reduced to 15,000 engine
hours provided compliance to paragraphs (a)(3), (b)(1), (b)(2),
(b)(3), (b)(5), and (b)(6) of Section III of this appendix have been
met.
(2) Additionally, as allowed by Sec. 21.21(b)(1), the in-
service experience requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of Section III
of this appendix may be reduced to some level other than 15,000
engine hours provided compensating factors that provide an
equivalent level of safety are provided.

PART 33--ENGINE CERTIFICATION

9. The authority citation for part 33 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702-44704.

10. Amend Sec. 33.71 by revising paragraph (c)(4) to read as
follows:

Sec. 33.71 Lubrication system.

* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) Each oil tank cap must provide an oil-tight seal. For
applicants seeking type design eligibility for engines to be installed
in an Extended Operations (ETOPS) airplane in accordance with Sec.
25.1535, the oil tank must be designed to prevent a hazardous quantity
of oil loss due to oil tank cap installation errors.
* * * * *
11. Revise Sec. 33.90 to read as follows:

Sec. 33.90 Initial maintenance inspection test.

Each engine, except engines being type certificated through
amendment of an existing type certificate or through supplemental type
certification procedures, must complete one of the following tests on
an engine that substantially conforms to the final type design to
establish when the initial maintenance inspection is required:
(a) An approved engine test that simulates the conditions in which
the engine is expected to operate in service, including typical start-
stop cycles.
(b) An approved engine test in accordance with Sec. Sec. 33.200(c)
and 33.200(f) of this part.
12. Add subpart G of part 33 to read as follows:

Subpart G--Special Requirements: Turbine Aircraft Engines

Sec. 33.200 Early extended operations (ETOPS) eligibility and test
requirements.

Each applicant seeking engine type design eligibility for an engine
to be installed in a twin-engine ETOPS airplane that does not have the
service experience required by 14 CFR part 25, Appendix L, section II,
paragraph (a) must comply with the following:
(a) The engine must be designed using a design quality process
acceptable to the Administrator, which assures that design features of
the engine minimize the occurrence of failures, malfunctions, or
maintenance errors that could result in loss of thrust control, in-
flight shutdown, or other power loss.
(b) The design features of the engine must address problems that
have been shown to result in loss of thrust control, in-flight
shutdown, or other power loss, when compared to the applicant's other
relevant type design approvals received within the past ten years,
providing that adequate service data is available within that ten year
period. Applicants without applicable engine service experience may
show equivalent experience and equivalent knowledge of problem
mitigating design practices to that gained from actual service
experience in a manner acceptable to the Administrator.
(c) The following test must be conducted on an engine that
substantially conforms to the type design and in accordance with an
approved test plan that consists of:
(1) Simulated ETOPS Mission Cyclic Endurance. The test must include
a minimum of 3,000 representative service start-stop mission cycles
(take-off, climb, cruise, descent, approach, landing and thrust
reverse), plus three simulated diversion cycles at maximum continuous
thrust for the maximum diversion time for which ETOPS eligibility is
sought. The diversions are to be approximately evenly distributed over
the cyclic duration of the test, with the last diversion to be
conducted

[[Page 64790]]

within 100 cycles of the completion of the test.
(2) Unbalance and Vibration Endurance. (i) The simulated ETOPS
mission cyclic endurance test required by Sec. 33.200(c)(1) must be
performed with the high speed and low speed main engine rotors
independently unbalanced to obtain a minimum of 90 percent of the
recommended field service maintenance vibration levels. In addition to
the specified unbalance for the low and high-speed rotors, for engines
with three main engine rotors, the intermediate speed rotor must also
be independently unbalanced to obtain a minimum of 90 percent of the
recommended production acceptance vibration level. The vibration level
must be defined as the peak level seen during a slow acceleration and
deceleration of the engine across the operating speed range.
(ii) Each 60 rpm incremental step of the typical high-speed rotor
start-stop mission cycle speed range (take-off, climb, cruise, descent,
approach, landing and thrust reverse) must be subjected to a minimum of
three million vibration cycles during the cyclic endurance test. The
test may be conducted using any rotor speed step increment up to 200
rpm provided that the typical service start-stop cycle speed range is
covered. For a 200 rpm step the corresponding vibration cycle count is
to be ten million cycles.
(iii) Each 60 rpm incremental step of the high-speed rotor approved
operational speed range between minimum flight idle and cruise power,
and not covered by Sec. 33.200(c)(2)(ii), must be subjected to a
minimum of 300,000 vibration cycles during the cyclic endurance test.
The test may be conducted using any rotor speed step increment up to
200 rpm provided that the applicable speed range is covered. For a 200
rpm step the corresponding vibration cycle count is to be 1 million
cycles.
(iv) Vibration surveys will be conducted at periodic intervals
throughout the cyclic endurance test. The equivalent value of the peak
vibration level observed during the surveys must meet the minimum
vibration requirement of Sec. 33.200(c)(2)(i).
(v) An alternate vibration test that provides an equivalent
demonstration of the unbalance and vibration endurance test specified
in paragraphs Sec. Sec. 33.200(c)(2)(i) through 33.200(c)(2)(iv) may
be approved by the Administrator.
(d) Prior to the testing required by Sec. 33.200(c), the test
engine must be subjected to a calibration run to document power and
thrust characteristics.
(e) At the conclusion of the testing required by Sec. 33.200(c),
the test engine must:
(1) Be subjected to a calibration test at sea-level conditions; and
any change in thrust characteristics must be within certified limits.
(2) Be visually inspected in accordance with the on-wing inspection
recommendations and limits contained in the Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness submitted in support of Sec. 33.4.
(3) Be completely disassembled and:
(i) The engine hardware must be inspected:
(A) In accordance with the applicable inspection recommendations
and limits contained in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
submitted in support of Sec. 33.4;
(B) With consideration of the causes of loss of thrust control, in-
flight shutdown or other power losses identified by Sec. 33.200(b);
and
(C) In a manner to identify wear or distress conditions which could
result in loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or other power
loss, and which are not specifically identified by Sec. 33.200(b) or
addressed within the current Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
(ii) The engine hardware must not show distress to the extent that
could result in loss of thrust control, in-flight shutdown, or other
power loss within a period of operation before the component, assembly
or system would likely have been inspected or functionally tested for
integrity while in service. Such hardware distress must have corrective
action implemented by way of design changes, maintenance instructions
or operational procedures before ETOPS eligibility is granted.
(iii) The type and frequency of hardware distress that occurs
during the engine test must be consistent with the type and frequency
of hardware distress that would be expected to occur on ETOPS eligible
engines, or any non-ETOPS derivative engines of this type. Additional
analysis and/or tests may be required to satisfy this requirement.
(f) The 3,000 cycle simulated ETOPS mission cyclic endurance test
required by Sec. 33.200(c) may be used to show compliance with
Sec. Sec. 33.90 and 33.90(b). After completing the full number of test
cycles required for an initial maintenance inspection test conducted in
accordance with Sec. 33.90(a), the 3,000 cycle simulated ETOPS mission
cyclic endurance test may be interrupted so that the engine may be
inspected by an on-wing or other method and criteria acceptable to the
Administrator. Following the Sec. 33.90(b) inspection, the ETOPS test
must be resumed to complete the requirements of Sec. 33.200.
13. Add paragraph A33.3(c) to Appendix A to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 33--Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

* * * * *

A33.3 Content

* * * * *
(c) Extended Operations (ETOPS) Requirements. For engines to be
installed in ETOPS airplanes, procedures for engine condition
monitoring must be included within the Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness. The engine condition monitoring procedures must be
able to determine prior to flight, whether an engine is capable of
providing, within certified engine operating limits, the maximum
power or thrust, bleed air and power extraction required for the
desired engine inoperative diversion. For engines to be installed on
twin-engine ETOPS airplanes, the engine condition monitoring
procedures must be validated before ETOPS eligibility is granted.

PART 121--AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS

14. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46105.

15. Add Sec. 121.7 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.7 Definitions and designations.

The following definitions apply to those sections of part 121 that
apply to ETOPS:
Adequate airport means an airport that:
(1) The Administrator determines satisfies safety requirements of
part 139, subpart D, excluding aircraft rescue and fire fighting
service, or
(2) Meets the landing performance requirements of Sec. 121.197, or
(3) Is a military airport that is active and operational, and meets
the landing performance requirements of Sec. 121.197.
ETOPS alternate means an adequate airport listed in the certificate
holder's operations specifications that meets the requirements of Sec.
121.624 and the Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF) requirements of Sec.
121.106 designated in a dispatch/flight release. This definition
applies to flight planning and does not in any way limit the discretion
of the pilot in command during flight.
ETOPS area of operation. (1) ETOPS area of operation means for
turbine engine powered airplanes with two engines, an area beyond 60
minutes from an adequate airport, or with more than two engines, an
area beyond 180 minutes from an adequate airport, and

[[Page 64791]]

within the authorized ETOPS maximum diversion time approved for the
operation being conducted or an area designated by the Administrator as
an area of ETOPS applicability. An ETOPS area of operation is
calculated at a one-engine inoperative cruise speed (approved) under
standard conditions in still air.
(2) The Administrator designates the following areas as ETOPS areas
in which the planning, operational, and equipage requirements for ETOPS
apply:
(i) NOPAC: The North Pacific Air Traffic Service routes and
adjacent airspace between Anchorage and Tokyo Flight Information
Region.
(ii) North Pacific: Pacific Ocean areas north of 40[deg]
N
latitudes including NOPAC ATS routes, and published PACOTS (Pacific
organized track system) tracks between Japan and North America.
(iii) Polar areas--North Pole: The entire area north of 78[deg]
N
latitude.
(iv) Polar areas--South Pole: The entire area south of 60[deg]
S
latitude.
ETOPS dual maintenance means maintenance actions performed on the
same element of identical, but separate ETOPS maintenance significant
systems, during the same routine or non-routine visit. This is to
recognize and preclude common cause human failure modes without proper
verification process or operation test prior to ETOPS.
(1) For turbine engine powered airplanes with two engines--A
maintenance action performed on the same element of identical but
separate ETOPS significant systems during the same routine or non-
routine visit.
(2) For turbine engine powered airplanes with more than two
engines--A maintenance action performed on the same element of
identical but separate ETOPS significant systems on 2 engines of a 3
engine aircraft, or more than 1 engine per side of a 4 engine aircraft
during the same routine or non-routine visit.
ETOPS entry point means, for turbine engine powered airplanes, the
first point on the route of an authorized flight which is more than 60
minutes from an adequate airport for airplanes with two engines, or 180
minutes from an adequate airport for airplanes with more than two
engines, or a point designated as an entry point in an area designated
by the Administrator as an area of ETOPS applicability. The ETOPS entry
point is calculated at a one-engine inoperative cruise speed (approved)
under standard conditions in still air.
ETOPS maintenance significant system means:
(1) A system for which the redundancy characteristics are directly
linked to the number of engines; or
(2) A system that may affect the proper functioning of the engines
to the extent that it could result in an in-flight shutdown or
uncommanded loss of thrust; or
(3) A system that contributes significantly to the safety of a
diversion.
ETOPS qualified personnel means maintenance personnel that have
completed the certificate holder's ETOPS training program.
Maximum diversion time means for the purposes of ETOPS in part 121
the diversion time, under standard conditions in still air at the One
Engine Inoperative Cruise Speed (Approved).
One engine inoperative cruise speed means, for the purposes of
those sections of part 121 applicable to ETOPS, a speed within the
certified operating limits of the airplane, selected by the certificate
holder and approved by the FAA, that is used for calculating fuel
reserve requirements and the still air distance associated with the
maximum approved one engine inoperative diversion distance for the
flight.
16. Amend Sec. 121.97 by revising paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to read as
follows:

Sec. 121. 97 Airports: Required data.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) Public protection including the availability of facilities at
each airport or in the immediate area sufficient to protect the
passengers and crew from the elements and to see to their welfare.
* * * * *
17. Amend Sec. 121.99 by adding paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as
follows:

Sec. 121.99 Communications facilities.

* * * * *
(c) For ETOPS where voice communication facilities are available,
voice communications must be provided. The certificate holder must
consider potential routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to
ETOPS alternates in determining whether voice communication facilities
are available. Where voice communication facilities are not available
or is of poor quality, and voice communication is not possible,
communications using alternative systems must be substituted.
(d) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes the certificate holder must have
an additional communication system that is capable of providing
immediate satellite based voice communications of landline telephone-
fidelity. The system must provide communication capability between the
flight crew and air traffic services and the flight crew and the
certificate holder. The certificate holder must consider potential
routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to ETOPS alternates in
determining whether immediate, satellite based voice communications are
available. Where immediate, satellite based voice communications are
not available, or are of poor quality, communications using alternative
systems must be substituted.
18. Add Sec. 121.106 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.106 ETOPS alternate: Rescue fire fighting service (RFFS).

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the
following rescue fire fighting service must be available at each
airport designated as an ETOPS alternate listed in a dispatch or flight
release.
(1) For ETOPS up to 180-minute diversion length, the designated
ETOPS alternates must have rescue fire fighting capability equivalent
to that specified by ICAO Category 4.
(2) For Two-Engine 207-Minute operations the designated ETOPS
Alternates must have rescue fire fighting capability equivalent to that
specified by ICAO Category 4. In addition, at least one adequate
airport within the 207-minute diversion time must have rescue fire
fighting capability equivalent to that specified by ICAO Category 7.
(3) For all other ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes, the
designated ETOPS alternates must have rescue fire fighting capability
equivalent to that specified by ICAO Category 7.
(b) If the equipment and personnel required in paragraph (a) are
not immediately available at the airport, the airport may still be
listed on the dispatch or flight release if the required RFFS
capability can be augmented from the local fire fighting assets. Such
equipment and personnel must be available on arrival of the diverting
airplane and must remain as long as the diverting airplane requires the
services. A 30-minute response time for augmentation by the local fire
department is adequate if the initial notification to respond can be
initiated while the diverting airplane is enroute.
19. Add Sec. 121.122 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.122 Communications facilities.

(a) Each certificate holder conducting supplemental operations must
show that a two-way radio communication system or other means of
communication approved by the Administrator is available at points that
will ensure reliable and rapid communications, under normal operating
conditions over the entire

[[Page 64792]]

route, (either direct or via approved point-to-point circuits) between
each airplane and the certificate holder, and between each airplane and
the appropriate air traffic services, except as specified in Sec.
121.351(c).
(b) For ETOPS where voice communication facilities are available,
voice communications must be provided. The certificate holder must
consider potential routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to
ETOPS alternates in determining whether voice communication facilities
are available. Where voice communication facilities are not available
or is of poor quality, and voice communication is not possible,
communications using alternative systems must be substituted.
(c) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes the certificate holder must have
an additional communication system that is capable of providing
immediate satellite based voice communications of landline telephone-
fidelity. The system must provide communication capability between the
flight crew and air traffic services and the flight crew and the
certificate holder. The certificate holder must consider potential
routes and altitudes necessary for diversion to ETOPS alternates in
determining whether immediate, satellite based voice communications are
available. Where immediate, satellite based voice communications are
not available, or are of poor quality, communications using alternative
systems must be substituted.
20. Amend Sec. 121.135(b) by:
a. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(10) through (b)(22) as paragraphs
(b)(11) through (b)(23);
b. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(23) and (b)(24) as paragraphs
(b)(25) and (b)(26); and
c. Adding paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(24) as follows:

Sec. 121.135 Contents.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(10) For ETOPS, airplane performance data to support all phases of
these operations.
* * * * *
(24) For flag and supplemental operations, a passenger recovery
plan applicable to each approved en route alternate airport listed in
the air carrier's operations specifications.
* * * * *
21. Amend Sec. 121.161 by revising paragraph (a) and adding
paragraph (d) to read as follows:

Sec. 121.161 Airplane limitations: Type of route.

(a) No certificate holder may operate a turbine engine powered
airplane over a route that contains a point farther than 60 minutes
flying time from an adequate airport for airplanes with two engines, or
180 minutes flying time from an adequate airport for airplanes with
more than two engines, (in still air at normal cruising speed with one
engine inoperative) or within an area designated by the Administrator
as an Area of ETOPS Applicability unless approved by the Administrator
in accordance with Appendix O of this part. The polar areas are
designated as areas of ETOPS applicability. ETOPS must be authorized in
the certificate holder's operations specifications.
* * * * *
(d) Unless authorized by the Administrator, based on the character
of the terrain, the kind of operation or the performance of the
airplane to be used, no certificate holder may operate a reciprocating
engine powered airplane over a route that contains a point farther than
60 minutes flying time (in still air at normal cruising speed with one
engine inoperative) from an adequate airport.
22. Add Sec. 121.374 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.374 ETOPS maintenance elements.

Each certificate holder authorized to conduct ETOPS under Appendix
O must have a maintenance program that includes the following:
(a) Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) compliance. A
system to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements set forth in
the Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) for each airframe
and engine combination, or the Type Design document for each airframe
and engine combination. Any CMP changes necessary for continued safe
ETOPS flights will be mandated through the Airworthiness Directive
procedures pursuant to part 39 of this chapter.
(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP). Develop
and follow a continuous airworthiness maintenance program based on the
manufacturers maintenance program or one currently approved for the
operator and supplemented for ETOPS for each airframe and engine
combination. The program must include the following:
(1) ETOPS pre-departure service check. A check that must be
accomplished immediately prior to an ETOPS flight and certified
complete by an ETOPS qualified maintenance person.
(2) Dual maintenance. (i) Procedures to preclude ETOPS dual
maintenance.
(ii) Procedures to use if ETOPS dual maintenance cannot be avoided.
(3) Verification program. Procedures for corrective action to an
ETOPS maintenance significant system.
(4) Task identification. Identify ETOPS specific procedures or
tasks that must be accomplished or verified by ETOPS qualified
personnel.
(5) Centralized maintenance control procedures. Establish and
document procedures for centralized Maintenance Control related to
ETOPS.
(6) ETOPS program document. Develop a document for use by personnel
involved in ETOPS. All ETOPS requirements, including supportive
programs, procedures, duties and responsibilities, must be identified
in this document and submitted for approval to the CHDO. This document
is not required to be inclusive but must at least reference the
maintenance programs and clearly define where they are located in the
certificate holder's document system. Changes to the ETOPS document
must be submitted to the CHDO and approved before such changes may be
adopted.
(7) ETOPS parts control. Develop an ETOPS parts control program to
ensure the proper identification of parts to maintain the ETOPS
configuration.
(8) Reliability program. Develop an ETOPS reliability program, or
supplement the existing reliability program. The program must be event-
oriented and incorporate reporting procedures for significant events
detrimental to ETOPS flights.
(i) In addition to the reporting requirements in Sec. 121.703, the
following items must be reported within 72 hours to the CHDO:
(A) In-flight shutdowns.
(B) Diversions or turnback.
(C) Uncommanded power changes or surges.
(D) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.
(E) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.
(F) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.
(ii) The certificate holder must conduct an investigation into the
cause of the occurrence of any event listed in Sec. 121.703 and
paragraph (b)(8)(i) of this section in conjunction with manufacturers
and submit findings and description of corrective action to the CHDO.
The report must be submitted in the manner prescribed by Sec.
121.703(e). The corrective action must be acceptable to the CHDO.
(c) Propulsion system monitoring. (1) If the IFSD rate computed on
a 12-month rolling average exceeds the following values, the
certificate holder, in conjunction with the CHDO, must

[[Page 64793]]

investigate common cause effects or systemic errors.
(i) Two engine airplanes:
(A) 0.05/1,000 engine hours for ETOPS up to and including 120
minutes;
(B) 0.03/1,000 engine hours for ETOPS beyond 120 minutes up to and
including 180 minutes, and 207 minutes in North Pacific; and
(C) 0.02/1,000 engine hours for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, except
for 207 minutes in North Pacific.
(ii) For airplanes with more than two engines:
(A) 0.2/1,000 engine hours for 3-engine ETOPS; and
(B) 0.1/1,000 engine hours for 4-engine ETOPS.
(2) The report of investigation and, if necessary, corrective
action taken, must be submitted within 30 days through the CHDO to the
Director of the Flight Standards Service for approval.
(d) Engine condition monitoring. The certificate holder must
establish and conduct an Engine Condition Monitoring program to detect
deterioration, at an early stage, and to allow for corrective action
before safe operation is affected.
(1) This program must describe the parameters to be monitored,
method of data collection, analysis, and corrective action process.
(2) The program must ensure that engine limit margins are
maintained so that a prolonged engine inoperative diversion may be
conducted without exceeding approved engine limits (for example, rotor
speeds, exhaust gas temperatures) at all approved power levels and
expected environmental conditions.
(e) Oil consumption monitoring. The certificate holder must
establish and conduct an engine oil consumption monitoring program to
ensure that there is enough oil to complete any ETOPS flight. The
operator's consumption limit must not exceed the manufacturer's
recommendations. The program must consider the amount of oil added at
the departing ETOPS stations with reference to the running average
consumption. The monitoring must be continuous up to and including oil
added at the ETOPS departure station. The APU must be included if an
APU is required for ETOPS.
(f) APU in-flight start program. If APU in-flight start capability
is required for ETOPS, the certificate holder must have a cold soak in-
flight APU start and run reliability program acceptable to the
Administrator.
(g) Maintenance training. The certificate holder must review the
airplane and engine combination maintenance training program with the
CHDO to ensure that it adequately supports ETOPS training requirements.
The certificate holder must develop additional ETOPS specific training
that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is required for all
personnel involved in ETOPS. This training is in addition to the
operator's accepted maintenance training program to qualify individuals
for specific airplanes and engines.
(h) Procedural changes. Any substantial changes to the maintenance
or training procedures established to qualify for ETOPS must be
submitted to the CHDO and approved before they may be adopted.
23. Amend Sec. 121.415 by adding paragraph (a)(4) to read as
follows:

Sec. 121.415 Crewmember and dispatcher training requirements.

(a) * * *
(4) Training for crewmembers and dispatchers in their roles and
responsibilities in the certificate holder's passenger recovery plan.
* * * * *
24. Amend Sec. 121.565 by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:

Sec. 121.565 Engine inoperative: Landing; reporting.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever
an engine of an airplane fails or whenever an engine is shutdown to
prevent possible damage, the pilot in command shall land the airplane
at the nearest suitable airport in point of time at which a safe
landing can be made.
* * * * *
25. Add Sec. 121.624 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.624 ETOPS alternates.

(a) No person may dispatch an airplane for ETOPS unless the ETOPS
Alternates listed in the dispatch or flight release are located such
that the airplane remains within the authorized ETOPS maximum diversion
time under which the flight is to be dispatched. The certificate holder
must consider all adequate airports within the diversion limits of the
operation that meet the standards of this part. Each required ETOPS
Alternate must be listed in the dispatch or flight release.
(b) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate in the
dispatch or flight release unless the appropriate weather reports or
forecasts or any combination thereof indicating that weather conditions
are at or above ETOPS Alternate minima specified in the certificate
holder's operations specifications and with field condition reports
indicating that a safe landing can be accomplished at the time of the
intended operation (from the earliest to the latest time of landing at
that airport). Once a flight is enroute, the ETOPS Alternates must meet
the requirements of Sec. 121.631(c).
(c) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate in the
dispatch or flight release unless that airport meets the requirements
of this part.
(d) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate in the
dispatch or flight release unless that airport meets the public
protection requirements of Sec. 121.97(b)(1)(ii).
26. Revise Sec. 121.625 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.625 Alternate airport weather minimums.

Except as required by Sec. 121.624, no person may list an airport
as an alternate in the dispatch or flight release unless the
appropriate weather reports or forecasts or any combination thereof
indicate that the weather conditions will be at or above the alternate
weather minimums specified in the certificate holder's operations
specifications for that airport when the flight arrives.
27. Amend Sec. 121.631 by redesignating paragraphs (c) and (d) as
paragraphs (e) and (f), respectively, and adding new paragraphs (c) and
(d) to read as follows:

Sec. 121.631 Original dispatch or flight release, redispatch or
amendment of dispatch or flight release.

* * * * *
(c) For ETOPS, in addition to paragraph (b) of this section, no
person may allow a flight to continue beyond the ETOPS Entry Point
unless the weather conditions at required ETOPS Alternates specified in
the dispatch or flight release are reviewed and forecast to be at or
above the operating minimums specified in the operations specifications
for that airport during the period in which that airport may be
expected to be used (from the earliest to the latest time of landing at
that airport). Such a review must include all ETOPS Alternates within
the dispatch diversion time of the planned routing and advice to the
flight crew of any changes that have occurred since dispatch. However,
the dispatch or flight release may be amended en route to add any ETOPS
Alternate with weather above operating minima and that is within the
maximum ETOPS diversion time that could be authorized for that flight.
(d) The pilot in command for supplemental operators, or a
dispatcher for flag operators must, prior to the ETOPS Entry Point, use
company communications to update any revised flight plan if required as
a result of

[[Page 64794]]

re-evaluation of aircraft system capabilities.
28. Add Sec. 121.633 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.633 ETOPS: Time limited system planning.

(a) For ETOPS up to and including 180 minutes, the time required to
fly the distance to the planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, in still air and standard
day temperature, may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane
Flight Manual for the airplanes most time limited system time minus 15
minutes.
(b) Except as provided in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section,
for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the time required to fly the distance to
the planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at the all engines operating
cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature, may not exceed the
time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane's cargo
fire suppression system time minus 15 minutes.
(c) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section,
for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the time required to fly the distance to
the planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at the approved one engine
inoperative cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature, may not
exceed the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the
airplanes most time limited system time (except for cargo fire
suppression) minus 15 minutes.
(d) Three and four-engine turbine powered airplanes not meeting the
requirements of paragraph (b) of this section as of the effective date
of this regulation may continue ETOPS operations for a period not to
exceed 6 years from the effective date of this regulation.
29. Add Sec. 121.646 to read as follows:

Sec. 121.646 En route fuel supply: flag and supplemental operations.

(a) No person may dispatch or release for flight or takeoff a
turbine engine powered airplane with more than two engines more than 90
minutes (with all engines operating at cruising power) and less than
180 minutes (at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed) from
an adequate airport unless, considering wind and other weather
conditions (including icing), it has enough fuel, assuming a rapid
decompression at the most critical point followed by descent to a safe
altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply requirements of Sec.
121.333, to fly to an adequate airport and conduct a normal approach
and landing with enough fuel remaining to hold for 15 minutes at 1500
feet above field elevation.
(b) No person may dispatch or release for flight or takeoff a
turbine powered airplane in ETOPS unless, considering wind and other
weather conditions expected, it has enough fuel to satisfy the
following requirements (b)(1) through (b)(4) of this section:
(1) Greater of:
(i) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate assuming a rapid
decompression at the most critical point followed by descent to a safe
altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply requirements of Sec.
121.333, or
(ii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate at the approved
one engine inoperative cruise speed assuming a rapid decompression and
a simultaneous engine failure at the most critical point followed by
descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply
requirements of Sec. 121.333, or
(iii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate at the approved
one engine inoperative cruise speed assuming an engine failure at the
most critical point followed by descent to the one engine inoperative
cruise altitude.
(2) Upon reaching the alternate hold at 1500 feet above field
elevation for 15 minutes and then conduct an instrument approach and
land.
(3) Add a 5% wind speed factor (i.e., an increment to headwind or a
decrement to tailwind) on the actual forecast wind used to calculate
fuel in paragraph (b)(1)(i) above to account for any potential errors
in wind forecasting. If a certificate holder is not using the actual
forecast wind based on wind model acceptable to the FAA, allow 5% of
the fuel required for paragraph (b)(1)(i) above, as reserve fuel to
allow for errors in wind data.
(4) Compensate in paragraph (b)(1)(i) above for the greater of:
(A) The effect of airframe icing during 10 percent of the time
during which icing is forecast (including the fuel used by engine and
wing anti-ice during this period), or
(B) Fuel for engine anti-ice, and if appropriate wing anti-ice for
the entire time during which icing is forecast.
(C) Unless the certificate holder has a program established to
monitor airplane in-service deterioration in cruise fuel burn
performance and includes in fuel supply calculations fuel sufficient to
compensate for any such deterioration, increase the fuel supply by 5%
to account for deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance.
(D) If an APU is a required power source, then its fuel consumption
must be accounted for during the appropriate phases of flight.
30. Amend Sec. 121.687 by adding paragraph (a)(6) to read as
follows:

Sec. 121.687 Dispatch release: Flag and domestic operations.

(a) * * *
(6) For each flight dispatched as an ETOPS flight, the ETOPS time
basis (if any) under which the flight is dispatched.
* * * * *
31. Amend Sec. 121.689 by adding paragraph (a)(8) to read as
follows:

Sec. 121.689 Flight release form: Supplemental operations.

(a) * * *
(8) For each flight released as an ETOPS flight, the ETOPS time
basis (if any) under which the flight is released.
* * * * *
32. Add appendix O to read as follows:

Appendix O to Part 121--Requirements for ETOPS

The Administrator may approve ETOPS for various areas of
operation in accordance with the requirements and limitations
specified in this appendix.

A. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes with Two engines

(a) 75 Minutes ETOPS-- (1) Caribbean/Western Atlantic Area.
Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion
times up to 75 minutes on Western Atlantic/Caribbean area routes.
The airframe and engine combination shall be reviewed by the
Administrator to ensure the absence of factors that could prevent
safe operations. The airframe and engine combination need not be
approved for ETOPS; however, it must have sufficient favorable
experience to demonstrate a level of reliability appropriate for 75-
minute ETOPS. These operations must comply with the requirements of
section 121.633. The certificate holder must employ an FAA approved
maintenance program that specifically addresses factors significant
to 75-minute ETOPS operations except that a service check before
departure of the return flight may not be required.
(2) Other Areas. Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS
operations with maximum diversion times up to 75 minutes on other
than Western Atlantic/Caribbean area routes. The airframe and engine
combination shall be reviewed by the Administrator to ensure the
absence of factors that could prevent safe operations. The airframe
and engine combination need not be approved for ETOPS; however it
must have sufficient favorable experience to demonstrate a level of
reliability appropriate for 75-minute ETOPS. These operations must
comply with the requirements of section 121.633. The certificate
holder must employ an FAA approved operations and maintenance
program that specifically addresses factors significant to 75-minute
ETOPS operations.
(b) 90-minutes ETOPS (Micronesia). Approvals may be granted to
conduct ETOPS

[[Page 64795]]

with maximum diversion times up to 90 minutes on Micronesian area
routes. For such operations the airframe and engine combination must
be type design approved for a minimum of 120 minute ETOPS. The
certificate holder must employ an FAA approved operations and
maintenance program that specifically addresses factors significant
to 120 minute ETOPS, except that a service check before departure of
the return flight may not be required. Minimum equipment list
requirements for 120 minute extended range (``ER'') operations apply
to such operations.
(c) 120 minutes. Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS with
maximum diversion times up to 120 minutes. For such operations the
airframe/engine combination must be type design approved for a
minimum of 120 minute ETOPS. The certificate holder must employ an
FAA approved operations and maintenance program that specifically
addresses factors significant to 120 minute ETOPS. Minimum equipment
list requirements for 120 minute extended range (``ER'') operations
apply to such operations.
(d) 138 Minutes. 138-minute ETOPS must be operated under one of
the following:
(1) Extension of 120-minute ETOPS authority. Approvals may be
granted to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 138
minutes. This authority is deemed to be an extension of already
existing 120-minute ETOPS authority, and may only be exercised on a
flight-by-flight exception basis. For such operations the airframe-
engine combination must be type design approved for a minimum of 120
minute ETOPS. In addition, airplane time-limited system capability
may not be less than the authorized 138-minute diversion time in
still air conditions at the approved one engine inoperative cruise
speed plus a 15-minute allowance for holding, approach and landing.
The certificate holder must employ an FAA approved operations and
maintenance program that specifically addresses factors significant
to 138-minute ETOPS. Operators with 120-minute ETOPS authority but
no 180-minute authority may apply to AFS-200 through their
certificate holding district office (CHDO) for a modified MEL which
satisfies the MMEL policy for system/component relief in ETOPS
beyond 120 minutes. The certificate holder shall submit for FAA
approval a summary of revisions to training curricula for
maintenance, dispatch and flight crew personnel which identifies
differences between 138-minute ETOPS diversion authority and its
previously approved 120-minute ETOPS diversion authority.
(2) Use of existing 180-minute ETOPS approval. Approvals may be
granted to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 138
minutes to certificate holders with existing 180 minute ETOPS
approval. This authority may be exercised on an unlimited basis. For
such operations the airframe/engine combination must be type design
approved for a minimum of 180-minute ETOPS. The certificate holder
must employ an FAA approved operations and maintenance program that
specifically addresses factors significant to 138-minute ETOPS.
Approved minimum equipment list provisions for ``beyond 120 minutes
ETOPS'' apply to these operations. The certificate holder shall
submit for FAA approval a summary of revisions to training curricula
for maintenance, dispatch and flight crew personnel which identifies
differences between 138-minute ETOPS diversion authority and its
previously approved 180-minute ETOPS diversion authority.
(e) 180 minutes. Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS with
maximum diversion times up to 180 minutes. For such operations the
airframe and engine combination must be type design approved for a
minimum of 180-minute ETOPS. The certificate holder must employ an
FAA approved operations and maintenance program that specifically
addresses factors significant to 180-minute ETOPS operations.
Minimum equipment list provisions for ``beyond 120 minutes ETOPS''
apply to these operations.
(f) Greater than 180 minutes.
Approvals may be granted to certificate holders with previous
ETOPS experience to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times
exceeding 180 minutes as specified in paragraphs (g) through (j) of
this appendix. Approvals may be granted only to certificate holders
with existing 180 minutes ETOPS approval on the airframe/engine
combination listed in their application. In conducting all such
operations, operators must make every attempt to minimize diversion
time along the preferred track and plan ETOPS at maximum diversion
distances of 180 minutes or less. If conditions prevent the use of
adequate airports within 180 minutes as ETOPS Alternates, the route
may be flown beyond 180 minutes authority subject to the
requirements provided for the specific area of operations. In
addition to the MEL limitations for 180 minute ETOPS, the following
systems must be operational for dispatch:
(1) Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS),
(2) APU (including electrical and pneumatic supply to its
designed capability),
(3) auto throttle system,
(4) the communication system required by section 121.99(d) or
121.122(c), as applicable, and
(5) one engine inoperative auto land capability, if flight
planning is predicated on its use.
Operators must inform the flight crew any time an aircraft is
proposed for dispatch under this authority and make available the
dispatch considerations requiring such operations.
(g) North Pacific.
On flight by flight exception basis, tracked by the certificate
holder, when an ETOPS Alternate is not available within 180 minutes
in the North Pacific area of operation, the nearest available ETOPS
Alternate must be specified within 207 minutes maximum diversion
time. In conducting such operations the operator must give Air
Traffic Services preferred track, if available, the first
consideration. Application of this exception must be limited to
circumstances such as political or military concern, volcanic
activity, airport weather below dispatch requirements, temporary
airport conditions and other weather related events. For such
operations, the airframe and engine combination must be type design
approved for a minimum of 180-minute ETOPS. The time required to fly
the distance to the planned ETOPS Alternate or alternates, at the
approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, in still air and
standard day temperature, may not exceed the time specified in the
Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane's most time limited system
time minus 15 minutes.
(h) Polar Area (North Pole) and North of NOPAC.
On a flight by flight exception basis, tracked by the
certificate holder, when an ETOPS alternate is not available within
180 minutes in the Polar Area (North Pole) or north of the North
Pacific Area of Operations, the nearest available ETOPS Alternate
must be specified within 240 minutes maximum diversion time.
Application of this exception shall be limited to circumstances
related to the weather extremes particular to this area of the world
such as volcanic activity, extreme cold weather at en route
airports, airport weather below dispatch requirements, temporary
airport conditions and other weather related events. The criteria
used by the certificate holder to make determinations that extreme
weather precludes the use of an airport must be established by the
certificate holder and accepted by the FAA and published in the
certificate holder's manual for the use of dispatchers and pilots.
For such operations, the airframe/engine combination must be type
design approved for a minimum of 240-minute ETOPS as specified in
the Configuration Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) Standard for such
operations. For such operations, the requirements in paragraph C,
Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS beyond 180 minutes North
of the NOPAC area, of this appendix apply.
(i) 240 minutes Area of Operations.
Approvals may be granted to certificate holders with previous
ETOPS experience and existing 180-minute ETOPS approval for the
airframe engine combination listed in their application to conduct
ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 240 minutes on routes in
the Pacific oceanic areas between the U.S. west coast and Australia,
New Zealand and Polynesia; south Atlantic oceanic areas; Indian
Oceanic areas; oceanic areas between Australia and South America.
The operator must designate the nearest available ETOPS Alternate or
Alternates along the planned route of flight. For such operations,
the airframe and engine combination must be type design approved for
a minimum of 240 minute ETOPS. All requirements specified in the
Configuration Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) Standard for 240
minute ETOPS are applicable to such operations.
(j) Beyond 240 minutes Area of Operations.
Approvals may be granted, to certificate holders who have been
operating in accordance with 180 minute or greater ETOPS for 24
consecutive months, of which at least 12 consecutive months shall be
at 240 minute ETOPS on the airframe/engine combination for which the
authority is requested, to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion
times beyond 240 minutes between city pairs on routes in the Pacific
oceanic areas between the U.S. west coast and

[[Page 64796]]

Australia, New Zealand and Polynesia; south Atlantic oceanic areas;
Indian Oceanic areas; oceanic areas between Australia and South
America, and South Pole area. The operator must designate the
nearest available ETOPS alternate(s) along the planned route of
flight. For such operations, the airframe and engine combination
must be type design approved for at least the maximum authorized
ETOPS diversion time necessary for that operation. All requirements
specified in the Configuration Maintenance and Procedures (CMP)
Standard for beyond 240 minute ETOPS are applicable to such
operations.

B. ETOPS Authorizations: Airplanes with more than two engines

Approvals may be granted to conduct ETOPS on a routine basis
with maximum diversion times up to 240 minutes in any area of
operations. For all such operations, the nearest available ETOPS
Alternate within 240 minutes diversion time (in still air at one
engine inoperative speed) must be specified. If an ETOPS Alternate
is not available within 240 minutes, the nearest alternate ETOPS
alternate must be specified. In either case the operator must
designate the nearest available ETOPS Alternate(s) along the planned
route of flight. On all such operations, MEL limitations for ETOPS
apply and in addition, the Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS)
and the communications requirements of Sec. 121.99(d) or Sec.
121.122(c) must be operational. For company communications on such
operations, operators must use the system required by Sec.
121.99(d). For such operations, the airframe and engine combination
must be type design approved for the maximum authorized ETOPS
diversion time.

C. Polar Area (North & South Pole) and ETOPS Beyond 180 Minutes
North of the NOPAC Area

Approvals may be granted to conduct any operations within these
areas. To obtain such approvals, in addition to the requirements in
paragraphs (A) and (B) of this appendix, the operator must consider
airport requirements for ETOPS Alternates, airline recovery plan for
passengers at diversion alternates, fuel freeze strategy and
monitoring, communication capability, Minimum Equipment List
considerations, airline training issues specific to polar
operations, long range crew requirements, dispatch and crew
considerations during solar flare activity, special equipment
requirements, and validation requirements for area approval in a
manner acceptable to the Administrator.

PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS; COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATION
AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT

33. The authority citation for part 135 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 41706, 44113, 44701-44702, 44705,
44709, 44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722.

34. Add Sec. 135.98 to read as follows:

Sec. 135.98 Polar operations.

Except for intrastate operations within the State of Alaska, no
person may operate an aircraft in the region north of N 78[deg]
00',
designated as Polar, unless authorized by the Administrator and unless
the certificate holder's operation specifications address the following
items:
(a) Designation and requirements for airports that may be used for
enroute diversions.
(b) Recovery plan for passengers at diversion alternates.
(c) Fuel freeze strategy and monitoring requirements for Polar
operations.
(d) Communication capability for Polar operations.
(e) MEL considerations for Polar operations.
(f) Training issues for Polar operations.
(g) Crew considerations during solar flare activity.
(h) Special equipment for Polar operations
35. Amend Sec. 135.345 by removing the word ``and'' from the end
of (a)(7), redesignating paragraph (a)(8) as (a)(10), and by adding new
paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9) to read as follows:

Sec. 135.345 Pilots: Initial, transition, and upgrade ground
training.

* * * * *
(a) * * *
(8) ETOPS, if applicable;
(9) Passenger Recovery for ETOPS, if applicable; and
* * * * *
36. Add Sec. 135.364 to read as follows:

Sec. 135.364 Multi-engine airplane limitations: Maximum distance from
an airport.

Unless approved by the Administrator in accordance with Appendix H
of this part (Extended Operations (ETOPS)), no certificate holder may
operate an airplane outside the continental U.S. unless the planned
route for that airplane remains within 180 minutes flying time (in
still air at normal cruise speed with one engine inoperative) from an
airport meeting the requirements of Sec. Sec. 135.385, 135.387,
135.393 or 135.395, as applicable, and Sec. Sec. 135.219 or 135.221 as
applicable.
37. Amend Sec. 135.411 by adding paragraph (d) to read as follows:

Sec. 135.411 Applicability.

* * * * *
(d) A certificate holder performing Extended Operations must comply
with paragraph (a)(2) of this section and the additional requirements
of Appendix H of this part.
38. Add appendix H to read as follows:

Appendix H to Part 135--Extended Operations (ETOPS)

The Administrator may approve ETOPS for various areas of
operation in accordance with the requirements and limitations
specified in this appendix

(A) Definitions

(1) ETOPS: Extended operations.
ETOPS is an operation authorized under part 135 for flights
beyond 180 minutes flying time (in still air at normal cruise speed
with one engine inoperative) from an airport meeting the
requirements of Sec. Sec. 135.385, 135.387, 135.393 or 135.395, as
applicable, and Sec. Sec. 135.219 or 135.221 as applicable.
However, ETOPS flights must be planned so as to remain within 240
minutes flying time (in still air with one engine inoperative) from
an airport meeting the requirements of Sec. Sec. 135.385, 135.387,
135.393 or 135.395, as applicable, and Sec. Sec. 135.219 or 135.221
as applicable.
(2) ETOPS dual maintenance.
Maintenance actions performed on the same element of identical,
but separate ETOPS maintenance significant systems, during the same
routine or non-routine visit. This is to recognize and preclude
common cause human failure modes without proper verification process
or operation test prior to ETOPS.

(B) Certificate Holder Experience Prior to Conducting ETOPS

(1) Prior to applying for authorization to conduct ETOPS, the
certificate holder must have at least 12 months operating experience
with a type of transport category turbine-engine powered airplane
conducting international operations (excluding Canada and Mexico).
For the purpose of this subparagraph, operations to or from the
State of Hawaii may be considered as experience in international
operations.
(2) Certificate holders granted authority to operate under part
135 or part 121 before [insert date final rule is effective]
may
credit up to 6 months of domestic operating experience (including
Canada and Mexico) in a transport category turbojet airplane as part
of the required 12 months of international experience.
(3) A certificate holder's previous ETOPS experience with other
aircraft types may be considered by the Administrator as meeting the
requirements of paragraph (B)(1) in whole or in part.

(1) No person may conduct ETOPS in a multi-engine airplane that
was added to the certificate holder's U.S. operations specifications
after [insert date that is eight years after the effective date of
this final rule]
unless the airplane is certificated to Sec.
25.1535.
(2) No person may conduct ETOPS in a multi-engine airplane that
was added to the certificate holder's U.S. operations specifications
on or before [insert date that is eight years after the effective
date of this final rule]
unless the airplane has the following
systems capability acceptable to the Administrator:
(a) Electrical System. Three or more independent electrical
power sources must

[[Page 64797]]

be available, each of which must be capable of providing power for
all of the equipment required by this part for the duration of any
diversion.
(b) Fuel System. The fuel supply system must be able to provide
sufficient fuel for the duration of any diversion following any
single failure of fuel system components.

(D) Certificate Holder Requirements

(1) No certificate holder may operate an airplane in accordance
with ETOPS unless the planned route for that airplane remains within
240 minutes flying time (in still air and one engine inoperative)
from an airport meeting the requirements of Sec. 135.385, Sec.
135.387, Sec. 135.393 or Sec. 135.395, as applicable, and Sec.
135.219 or Sec. 135.221 as applicable.
(2) In addition to the requirements of Sec. 135.83, Sec.
135.225 and Sec. 135.229 the certificate holder will ensure flight
crews have in-flight access to current weather and operational
information on all enroute alternate, destination and destination
alternate airports proposed for each ETOPS flight.

(E) Operational Requirements

(1) No pilot in command may allow a flight to continue beyond
the ETOPS entry point unless the weather and operating conditions at
the required enroute alternate airports are reviewed and expected to
be at or above the operating minimums specified in the operations
specifications during the period in which that airport may be
expected to be used based on expected estimated times of arrival at
that airport. The planned route of flight may be amended while en
route to allow use of additional enroute alternate airports provided
weather is forecast to be at or above operating minima and the
airport is within the maximum ETOPS diversion time.
(2) Pilots shall plan and conduct ETOPS under instrument flight
rules.
(3) Time Limited Systems.
(a) For ETOPS, the time required to fly the distance to the
planned ETOPS alternate or alternates, at the all engines operating
cruise speed, correcting for wind and temperature, may not exceed
the time specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane's
cargo fire suppression system time (if installed), minus 15 minutes.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a) above, the time required
to fly the distance to the planned ETOPS Alternate or Alternates, at
the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed, correcting for
wind and temperature, may not exceed the time specified in the
Airplane Flight Manual for the airplanes most time limited system
time (except for cargo fire suppression) minus 15 minutes.
(c) Certificate holders operating turbine-engine powered
airplanes that, on the effective date of this regulation, lack the
airplane flight manual information required by paragraphs a and b
above, may continue ETOPS operations for a period not to exceed the
date that occurs eight years following the effective date of this
rule.

(F) Communications Requirements

(1) No person may conduct an ETOPS flight unless the following
communications equipment, appropriate to the route to be flown, is
installed and operational:
(a) Two independent communication transmitters (at least one
must allow voice communication).
(b) Two independent communication receivers (at least one must
allow voice communication).
(c) Two headsets, or one headset and one speaker.
(2) In areas where voice communication facilities are not
available, or voice communication is not possible or is of poor
quality, communications using alternative systems may be
substituted.

(G) Fuel Planning Requirements

1. No person may take off a flight for operations in ETOPS
unless the fuel carried on board is the greater of:
a. Fuel required under Sec. 135.223, or
b. Considering forecast wind and other weather conditions, the
airplane carries sufficient fuel to complete the flight under the
following conditions:
(i) Greater of:
(a) Fuel sufficient to fly to a ETOPS enroute alternate airport
assuming a rapid decompression at the most critical point followed
by descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply
requirements of Sec. 135.157; or
(b) Fuel sufficient to fly to a ETOPS enroute alternate airport
at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed assuming a rapid
decompression and a simultaneous engine failure at the most critical
point followed by descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the
oxygen supply requirements of Sec. 135.157; or
(c) Fuel sufficient to fly to a ETOPS enroute alternate airport
at the approved one engine inoperative cruise speed assuming an
engine failure at the most critical point followed by descent to the
one engine inoperative cruise altitude.
(ii) Upon reaching the enroute alternate airport, hold at 1500
ft. above field elevation for 15 minutes and then conduct an
instrument approach and land.
(iii) Add a 5% wind speed factor (i.e., an increment to headwind
or a decrement to tailwind) on the actual forecast wind used to
calculate fuel in paragragh b.(i) of this appendix to account for
any potential errors in wind forecasting. If a certificate holder is
not using the actual forecast wind based on wind model acceptable to
the FAA, allow 5% of the fuel required for a above, as reserve fuel
to allow for errors in wind data.
(iv) Compensate in paragraph b.(i) above for the greater of:
(A) The effect of airframe icing during 10 percent of the time
during which icing is forecast, or
(B) Fuel for engine anti-ice, and if appropriate wing anti-ice
for the time during which icing is forecast,
2. Unless the certificate holder has a program established to
monitor airplane in-service deterioration of cruise fuel burn
performance and includes in fuel supply calculations fuel sufficient
to compensate for any such deterioration, increase the fuel supply
by 5 percent to account for deterioration in cruise fuel burn
performance.
3. If the APU is a power source required by this appendix, then
its fuel consumption must be accounted for.

(H) Maintenance Program Requirements

Each certificate holder authorized to conduct ETOPS under
section 135.364 must have a maintenance program that includes the
following:
(a) Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) compliance.
A system to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements set
forth in the Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) for
each airframe and engine combination, or the Type Design document
for each airframe and engine combination.
(b) Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP).
Develop and follow a continuous airworthiness maintenance
program based on the manufacturers maintenance program or one
currently approved for the operator and supplemented for ETOPS for
each airframe and engine combination. The program must include the
following:
(1) ETOPS pre-departure service check. A check that must be
accomplished immediately prior to an ETOPS flight and certified
complete by an ETOPS qualified maintenance person
(2) Dual maintenance.
(a) Procedures to preclude ETOPS dual maintenance.
(b) Procedures to use if ETOPS dual maintenance cannot be
avoided.
(3) Verification program. Procedures for corrective action to an
ETOPS maintenance significant system.
(4) Task identification. Identify ETOPS specific procedures or
tasks that must be accomplished or verified by ETOPS qualified
personnel.
(5) Centralized maintenance control procedures. Establish and
document procedures for centralized Maintenance Control related to
ETOPS.
(6) ETOPS program document. Develop a document for use by
personnel involved in ETOPS. All ETOPS requirements, including
supportive programs, procedures, duties and responsibilities, must
be identified in this document and submitted for approval to the
CHDO. This document is not required to be inclusive but must at
least reference the maintenance programs and clearly define where
they are located in the certificate holder's document system.
Changes to the ETOPS document must be submitted to the CHDO and
approved before such changes may be adopted.
(7) ETOPS parts control. Develop an ETOPS parts control program
to ensure the proper identification of parts to maintain the ETOPS
configuration.
(8) Enhanced Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS)
program. The certificate holder must include the ETOPS program
elements in the certificate holder's CASS program. The program must
incorporate reporting procedures for significant events detrimental
to ETOPS flights.
(a) In addition to the reporting requirements in Sec. 135.415
and Sec. 135.417, the following items must be reported within 72
hours to the CHDO.

[[Page 64798]]

(1) In-flight shutdowns.
(2) Uncommanded power changes or surges.
(3) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power.
(4) Problems with systems critical to ETOPS.
(5) Any other event detrimental to ETOPS.
(b) The certificate holder must conduct an investigation into
the cause of the occurrence of any event listed in Sec. 135.415,
Sec. 135.417, or paragraph (8)(a) above in conjunction with
manufacturers and submit findings and corrective action to the CHDO.
The report must be submitted in the manner prescribed by section
135.415(e). If the CHDO determines that additional corrective action
is necessary, the certificate holder must implement the corrective
action.
(c) Propulsion system monitoring.
The certificate holder, in conjunction with the CHDO, must
(1) establish criteria as to what action is to be taken when
adverse trends in propulsion system conditions are detected and
(2) investigate common cause effects or systemic errors and
submit the findings to the CHDO within 30 days.
(d) Engine condition monitoring.
The certificate holder must establish an Engine Condition
Monitoring program to detect deterioration at an early stage to
allow for corrective action before safe operation is affected.
(1) This program must describe the parameters to be monitored,
method of data collection and corrective action process.
(2) The program must ensure that engine limit margins are
maintained so that a prolonged engine inoperative diversion may be
conducted without exceeding approved engine limits (for example,
rotor speeds, exhaust gas temperatures) at all approved power levels
and expected environmental conditions.
(e) Oil consumption monitoring.
The certificate holder must establish an engine oil consumption
monitoring program to ensure that there is enough oil to complete
any ETOPS flight. The operator's consumption limit must not exceed
the manufacturer's recommendations. The program must consider the
amount of oil added at the departing ETOPS stations with reference
to the running average consumption. The monitoring must be
continuous up to and including oil added at the ETOPS departure
station. The APU must be included if an APU is required for ETOPS.
(f) APU in-flight start program.
If APU in-flight start capability is required for ETOPS, the
certificate holder must have a cold soak in-flight APU start and run
reliability program acceptable to the Administrator.
(g) Maintenance training.
The certificate holder must review the airplane and engine
combination maintenance training program with the CHDO to ensure
that it adequately supports ETOPS training requirements. The
certificate holder must develop additional ETOPS specific training
that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS and is required for all
personnel involved in ETOPS. This training is in addition to the
operator's accepted maintenance training program to qualify
individuals for specific airplanes and engines.
(h) Procedural changes.
Any substantial changes to the maintenance or training
procedures established to qualify for ETOPS must be submitted to the
CHDO and approved before they may be adopted.
(i) Reporting.
For each airplane authorized to conduct ETOPS, the certificate
holder shall report on a quarterly basis operating hours and cycles
for each engine and airframe to the CHDO and to the airplane and
engine manufacturer.

Issued in Washington, DC, on November 7, 2003.
James Ballough,
Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. 03-28407 Filed 11-10-03; 2:26 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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