UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF )
)
PAWNS PLUS, ) DOCKET NO. CAA-09-96-05
)
)
RESPONDENT )
ORDER GRANTING COMPLAINANT'S MOTION FOR
ACCELERATED DECISION AS TO LIABILITY
Introduction
On August 20, 1997, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("Complainant" or "EPA") filed a motion for partial
accelerated decision as to the liability of Pawns Plus
("Respondent") in the above cited matter. The Respondent has not
responded to the motion. The Complainant's motion is granted as
follows.
Findings and Conclusions
The Complaint in this matter is filed under the authority of
Section 113(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1).(1)
This proceeding is governed by the Consolidated Rules of Practice
Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties and the
Revocation or Suspension of Permits ("Rules of Practice"), 40 C.F.R.
§§ 22.01 et seq.
Section 609(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7671h,
directs the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate regulations
establishing standards and requirements regarding the servicing of
motor vehicle air conditioners ("MVACs"). These implementing
regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart B. Section
609(e) of the Clean Air Act and the implementing regulation at 40
C.F.R. § 82.34(b) provide that it shall be unlawful for any person
to sell or distribute, or offer for sale or distribution, to any
person who is not properly trained and certified by an EPA approved
certification program or who does not certify to the seller that
the purchase is for the purpose of resale only any class I or class
II substance that is suitable for use as a refrigerant in a MVAC
system and that is in a container which contains less that twenty
(20) pounds of such refrigerant.(2) The regulations at 40 C.F.R. §
82.42(b)(3) further provide that the seller or distributor is
required to verify that the purchaser is properly trained and
certified under 40 C.F.R. § 82.40, or, if the purchaser is
purchasing the small containers for resale only, the seller must
obtain a written statement from the purchaser that the containers
are for resale only. CF2Cl2-Dichlorodifluoromethane (CFC-12)
("Freon") is listed in Group I under Class I controlled substances.
40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart A, Appendix A.
In the Complaint, the Complainant alleges one (1) violation of
40 C.F.R. § 82.34(b), which prohibits the sale of a class I
substance in a container of less than twenty (20) pounds to a
person who is not properly trained and certified pursuant to 40
C.F.R. § 82.40 or who does not provide a written statement that the
container is for resale only pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 82.42(b)(3).
The Complainant proposes a civil administrative penalty of $2,000
for this alleged violation.
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the Respondent is a
business located in Phoenix, Arizona, that sells and buys new and
used merchandise. Complaint at ¶¶ 1,2. Count I of the Complaint
alleges that the Respondent offered for sale in twelve (12) ounce
containers Dichlorodifluoromethane (CFC-12), a class I ozone
depleting substance that is suitable for use as refrigerant in
MVACs. Complaint at ¶¶ 6,7. Count I of the Complaint further
alleges that on September 6, 1995, the Respondent sold two such
containers to an EPA investigator, Mr. Kingsley Adeduro, who was
not properly trained and certified as provided in 40 C.F.R. §
82.40 and did not represent himself to be properly trained and
certified, and who did not certify in writing that the containers
were for resale only pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 82.42(b)(3).
Complaint at ¶¶ 8-11.
As noted above, the procedures governing these proceedings are
set forth in the Rules of Practice. The regulation governing
accelerated decisions provides in pertinent part:
The Presiding Officer, upon motion of any party or
sua sponte, may at any time render an accelerated
decision in favor of the complainant or the respondent as
to all or any part of the proceeding, without further
hearing or upon such limited additional evidence, such as
affidavits, as he may require, if no genuine issue of
material fact exists and a party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, as to all or any part of the
proceeding.
Section 22.20(a) of the Rules of Practice.
On motion for partial accelerated decision on the issue of
liability of the Respondent for the violation of 40 C.F.R. §
82.34(b) as alleged in the Complaint, the Complainant contends that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The Complainant maintains that the
material facts for establishing liability are admitted or
undisputed by the Respondent and liability, therefore, should be
determined by summary adjudication. I agree.
In the Respondent's Answer and prehearing exchange, the
Respondent admits the material facts to support a finding of
liability as alleged in this matter. The Complainant has
established the essential elements to make a prima facie showing of
liability. In this regard, I find that the admissions of the
Respondent in its Answer and prehearing exchange adequately
establish that the Respondent is a "person" as that term is defined
in Section 302(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e), that
the Respondent sold or offered for sale containers of a class I
ozone depleting substance which is suitable for use as refrigerant
in MVACs, and that the container contained less than twenty (20)
pounds of such refrigerant. The Respondent's admissions also
establish that the seller did not verify that the purchaser was
properly trained and certified under an EPA approved program and
that the seller did not obtain a written statement from the
purchaser stating that the purchase was for resale only.
Further, I note that the Respondent has not responded to the
Complainant's motion for accelerated decision on the issue of
liability. Pursuant to Section 22.16(b) of the Rules of Practice,
if no timely response to a written motion is filed, the party may
be deemed to have waived any objection to the granting of the
motion.
In the Respondent's Answer and prehearing exchange, the
Respondent has set forth several defenses. Specifically, the
Respondent maintains the following defenses: The Respondent never
engaged in the sale of automotive parts and accessories; the
Respondent never received notice that selling a can of Freon
violated the law; the Respondent's former employee who sold the can
of Freon failed to follow established store policies; the
Respondent can not be held vicariously responsible for acts of its
former employee; the profit received from the sale of the
containers of Freon was less than $10; the Respondent subsequently
was advised on the EPA's stratospheric and ozone hotline that it
could give the Freon away or sell it to someone who stated they
were using it for other purposes, such as a propellant or carpet
cleaner; and the EPA's investigator should have identified himself,
explained the law, and sought the Respondent's assurances to
correct its conduct.
The Complainant argues that these defenses raised by the
Respondent do not constitute any cognizable defense to liability.
I agree.
In particular, the Complainant asserts that the Respondent
simultaneously yet inconsistently claims that it never received
notice concerning the prohibitions governing the sales of small
containers of ozone depleting substances but that the employee who
sold the containers to the EPA investigator did not follow
established store policy. The Complainant persuasively argues that
the Respondent could not have been both unaware of the sales
prohibitions and yet still have a store policy in place to comply
with the prohibition. Moreover, the Complainant correctly points
out that the lack of actual notice of the law is no defense to
liability. The Respondent is charged with constructive notice of
the law and due process does not require actual notice of changes
in the law. See North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276,
283 (1925); c.f. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985). Also,
as noted by the Complainant, the federal regulatory prohibition of
the sale of Freon in small containers found at 40 C.F.R. § 82.34
was published in the Federal Register which provided general notice
of the law, and that this prohibition has the full effect of the
law. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone; Refrigerant Recycling, 59
Fed. Reg. 42950 (1994).
The Complainant argues that the Respondent's contention that
it can not be held vicariously liable for the acts of its former
employees is without merit. The Complainant maintains that the
Respondent is liable for the violation even though its employee
processed the sale because an employer remains responsible for the
acts of its employees under the general principles of respondeat
superior when the employee is acting within the scope of his or her
employment. Here, the employee was acting within the scope of her
employment when she sold the containers of Freon displayed and
marked for sale.
Finally, the Complainant argues that the Respondent's
remaining defenses or contentions are irrelevant. Again, I agree.
The regulatory provision in question does not specify that in order
for the regulation to be applicable, the Respondent must be in the
business of selling automobile parts or accessories. In fact, the
regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 82.34 does not differentiate between any
types of business engaged in by the seller of the containers. The
amount of profit received as a result of the violation is not
germane to the issue of liability as such is not specified by the
regulation or underlying statute. There is no relevance of the
alleged information the Respondent received from the EPA's hotline
to the violation charged as the Respondent did not give the EPA
investigator free cans of Freon nor did it sell the two cans of
Freon to the investigator upon his certification that the
containers were for purposes other than as refrigerant in a MVAC.
With regard to the Respondent's assertion that it was incumbent
upon the EPA investigator to identify himself, explain the law, and
seek the Respondent's assurances of future compliance, I note that
such action is not required by the governing regulation or
underlying statute.
In conclusion, I find that in the above cited matter no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the Complainant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the issue of
liability. I find that the Respondent violated 40 C.F.R. §
82.34(b) as alleged in Count I of the Complaint. A partial
accelerated decision on the issue of liability on the violation
alleged in Count I of the Complaint is hereby rendered in favor of
the Complainant and against the Respondent.
ORDER
The Complainant's motion for partial accelerated decision as
to liability is Granted.
Inasmuch as the appropriate penalty remains in issue, as per
Section 20.22(b)(2) of the Rules of Practice, the hearing
previously scheduled for November 19-20, 1997, in Phoenix, Arizona,
will be held as scheduled for the determination of the appropriate
penalty.
original signed by undersigned
________________________________
Barbara A. Gunning
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: 10-09-97
Washington, DC
1. The Complaint was amended by order on June 2, 1997, upon
motion by the Complainant. In the First Amended Complaint, the
amount of the proposed civil administrative penalty was reduced
from $12,000 to $2,000. The term "Complaint" refers to the First
Amended Complaint.
2. The ozone depleting substances listed as class I or class
II substances are listed in 40 C.F.R. Part 82, Subpart A,
Appendices A and B.
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