UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF )
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PETRO WEST, INC. ) Docket No. II-RCRA-95-0306
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Respondent )
ORDER DENYING COMPLAINANT'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT ON
LIABILITY AND GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO ACCEPT
LATE-FILED PREHEARING EXCHANGE
On November 4, 1997, Complainant filed a Motion for Entry of
a Default Order On Liability against the Respondent, Petro West,
Inc., in this proceeding under Section 3008 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6928). The Motion was filed
pursuant to Section 22.17 of the Rules of Practice and related to
the failure of the Respondent to file a prehearing exchange
pursuant to the undersigned ALJ's prehearing Order of July 23,
1997. The prehearing order had set an October 24, 1997, deadline
for the filing of either Respondent's prehearing exchange or a
statement that it intended to forgo the presentation answering
evidence.
In response, Respondent, on November 10, 1997, filed a
Motion Requesting an Extension of Time to comply with the
prehearing order. On November 13, 1997, the undersigned issued an
Order granting Respondent's request for an extension and holding
Complainant's Motion For Default On Liability in abeyance.
Respondent was given to December 15, 1997, to file its prehearing
exchange.
On December 19, 1997, Complainant moved that its underlying
Motion For Default on Liability be granted as Respondent had once
again failed to comply with the prehearing order of the ALJ by
failing to file its prehearing exchange. Thereafter, on December
29, 1997, Respondent filed its prehearing exchange requesting
that it be accepted as late-filed for good cause shown.
As a result of the above chronology, the parties requested a
teleconference with the undersigned ALJ, which was conducted on
January 7, 1998. During this teleconference, the parties were
asked to make arguments in support of their outstanding motions.
Although Complainant had sought an order on its Motion For
Default under Part 22.17(b) of the Rules of Practice, it intended
that such order only address the liability phase of the
proceeding and agreed to conduct an evidentiary hearing in the
penalty phase of the litigation in April, 1998.(1) Moreover,
Complainant's initial Motion For Default was based exclusively on
Respondent's failure to comply with the prehearing order of the
ALJ.
As the issue of liability became the theme of the
teleconference, the discussion focused on Respondent's defenses
to liability, i.e., lack of knowledge of applicable regulations;
history of compliance; and good faith efforts to comply once it
became aware of RCRA requirements for used oil transporting and
processing. Complainant sought to rebut these arguments citing
inter alia, the strict liability component of the RCRA statute.
As a result of these arguments, the undersigned made a
preliminary ruling granting Complainant's Motion For Default.
On January 8, 1998, Respondent faxed the undersigned a
request that no order on default be entered, and raised alleged
meritorious defenses to the issue of liability. On January 9,
1998, Complainant faxed a Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondent's Motion Requesting That the Court Not Enter Its
Default Order. Complainant again provided argument in support of
a default order, but only as to Respondent's liability.
Upon further consideration, and in the name of fundamental
fairness to the Respondent, the undersigned declines to grant
Complainant's Motion For Default, either as presented, or sua
sponte. Section 22.17(c) mandates that any order granting default
include findings and conclusions on all material issues,
including penalty. Complainant's good faith attempt to secure
judgment on liability only is properly the subject of a Motion
for Accelerated Decision, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Section 22.20(a),
which authorizes the ALJ to render an accelerated decision as to
all or any part of the proceeding.
Respondent's failure to comply with numerous prehearing
orders and the resulting confusion generated in this proceeding,
has not only tested the patience of the court, but in other
circumstances, might well have resulted in the granting of a
motion favorable to EPA. However, despite Respondent's dilatory
conduct, no showing of prejudice against the Complainant has been
made as a result of Respondent's late-filed prehearing exchange.
ORDER
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Section 22.17(d) of the Rules of
Practice, the undersigned sets aside his preliminary default
ruling, and DENIES Complainant's Motion For Default based on
Respondent's late-filed prehearing exchange. Concomitantly,
Respondent's Motion To Accept Its Prehearing Exchange is GRANTED.
An evidentiary hearing on both liability and the penalty
phase of this litigation will be set for April of 1998. As
instructed in the January 7, 1998, teleconference, the parties
are to notify the undersigned of the exact date and location of
such hearing. As further instructed, the parties will reduce to
writing any understandings or agreements regarding the
presentation or admission of any evidence, or any stipulations
appropriate for the conduct of this proceeding.
Stephen J. McGuire
Administrative Law Judge
Date: January 9, 1998
Washington, D.C.
1. In support of its initial Motion For Entry of Default
Order On Liability, dated November 4, 1997, Complainant had
attached a draft Order for the ALJ's signature which on p. 10
likewise indicates EPA's intention that a "hearing on penalties"
be held.
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