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Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards

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[Federal Register: September 28, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 186)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 49653-49702]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr28se09-28]

Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards

[[Continued from page 49652]]

[[Page 49653]]

    Industry Average.............        0.056        0.056        0.056
------------------------------------------------------------------------


   Table IV.C.1-6b--MY 2011 Final Rule Average Planned MY 2011 Vehicle
                          Power-to-Weight Ratio
                                 [hp/lb]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        PC           LT          Avg.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 1...................        0.065        0.058        0.060
Manufacturer 2...................        0.061        0.065        0.062
Manufacturer 3...................        0.053        0.059        0.056
Manufacturer 4...................        0.060        0.058        0.059
Manufacturer 5...................        0.060        0.057        0.059
Manufacturer 6...................        0.063        0.065        0.065
Manufacturer 7...................        0.053        0.055        0.053
                                  --------------------------------------
    Industry Average.............        0.060        0.059        0.060
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the agencies' market forecast for MY 2012-2016
holds the performance and other characteristics of individual vehicle
models constant, adjusting the size and composition of the fleet from
one model year to the next.
    Refresh and redesign schedules (for application in NHTSA's modeling):
    Expected model years in which each vehicle model will be redesigned
or freshened constitute another important aspect of NHTSA's market
forecast. As discussed in Section IV.C.2.c below, NHTSA's analysis
supporting the current rulemaking times the addition of nearly all
technologies to coincide with either a vehicle redesign or a vehicle
freshening. Product plans submitted to NHTSA preceding the MY 2011
final rule contained manufacturers' estimates of vehicle redesign and
freshening schedules and NHTSA's estimates of the timing of the five-
year redesign cycle and the two- to three-year refresh cycle were made
with reference to those plans. In the current baseline, in contrast,
estimates of the timing of the refresh and redesign cycles were based
on historical dates--i.e., counting forward from known redesigns
occurring in or prior to MY 2008 for each vehicle in the fleet and
assigning refresh and redesign years accordingly. After applying these
estimates, the shares of manufacturers' passenger car and light truck
estimated to be redesigned in MY 2011 were as summarized below for the
current baseline and the MY 2011 final rule. Table IV.C.1-7 below shows
the percentages of each manufacturer's fleets expected to be redesigned
in MY 2011 for the current baseline. Table IV.C.1-8 presents
corresponding estimates from the market forecast used by NHTSA in the
analysis supporting the MY 2011 final rule (again, to protect
confidential information, manufacturers are not identified by name).

 Table IV.C.1-7--Current Baseline, Share of Fleet Redesigned in MY 2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Manufacturer                 PC           LT          Avg.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW..............................          32%          40%          34%
Chrysler.........................           0%          11%           8%
Ford.............................          12%           7%          10%
Subaru...........................           0%          51%          22%
General Motors...................          20%           2%          11%
Honda............................          31%          33%          32%
Hyundai..........................          20%           0%          16%
Tata.............................          28%         100%          73%
Kia..............................          35%          87%          48%
Mazda............................           0%           0%           0%
Daimler..........................           0%           0%           0%
Mitsubishi.......................           0%          56%           7%
Nissan...........................           4%          18%           9%
Porsche..........................           0%         100%          41%
Suzuki...........................           8%          21%          11%
Toyota...........................           4%          24%          12%
Volkswagen.......................          23%           0%          18%
                                  --------------------------------------
    Industry Average.............          15%          17%          15%
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Table IV.C.1-8--MY 2011 Final Rule, Share of Fleet Redesigned in MY 2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        PC           LT          Avg.
                                    (percent)    (percent)    (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer 1...................           19            0           11

[[Page 49654]]

Manufacturer 2...................           34           27           29
Manufacturer 3...................            5            0            3
Manufacturer 4...................            7            0            5
Manufacturer 5...................           19            0           11
Manufacturer 6...................           34           28           33
Manufacturer 7...................           27           28           28
                                  --------------------------------------
    Overall......................           20            9           15
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We continue, therefore, to estimate that manufacturers' redesigns
will not be uniformly distributed across model years. This is in
keeping with standard industry practices, and reflects what
manufacturers actually do--NHTSA has observed that manufacturers in
fact do redesign more vehicles in some years than in others. NHTSA
staff have closely examined manufacturers' planned redesign schedules,
contacting some manufacturers for clarification of some plans, and
confirmed that these plans remain unevenly distributed over time. For
example, although Table 8 shows that NHTSA expects Company 2 to
redesign 34 percent of its passenger car models in MY 2011, current
information indicates that this company will then redesign only (a
different) 10 percent of its passenger cars in MY 2012. Similarly,
although Table 8 shows that NHTSA expects four of the largest seven
light truck manufacturers to redesign virtually no light truck models
in MY 2011, current information also indicates that these four
manufacturers will redesign 21-49 percent of their light trucks in MY 2012.
e. How Does Manufacturer Product Plan Data Factor Into the Baseline
Used in This Proposal?
    As discussed in Section II.B.4 above, while the agencies received
updated product plans in Spring 2009 in response to NHTSA's request,
the baseline data used in this proposal is not informed by these
product plans, because they contain confidential business information
the agencies are legally required to protect from disclosure, and
because the agencies have concluded that, for purposes of this NPRM, a
transparent baseline is preferable.
    However, as also discussed above, NHTSA has conducted a separate
analysis that does make use of these product plans, contained in
NHTSA's PRIA. NHTSA performed this separate analysis for purposes of
comparison only. NHTSA used the publicly available baseline for all
analysis related to the development and evaluation of the proposed new
CAFE standards.
2. How Were the Technology Inputs Developed?
    As discussed above in Section II.E, for developing the technology
inputs for the MY 2012-2016 CAFE and GHG standards, the agencies
primarily began with the technology inputs used in the MY 2011 CAFE
final rule and in the July 2008 EPA ANPRM, and then reviewed, as
requested by President Obama in his January 26 memorandum, the
technology assumptions that NHTSA used in setting the MY 2011 standards
and the comments that NHTSA received in response to its May 2008 Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking. In addition, the agencies supplemented their
review with updated information from more current literature, new
product plans and from EPA certification testing. More detail is
available regarding how the agencies developed the technology inputs
for this NPRM above in Section II.E, in Chapter 3 of the Draft Joint
TSD, and in Section V of NHTSA's PRIA.
a. What Technologies Does NHTSA Consider?
    Section II.E.1 above describes the fuel-saving technologies
considered by the agencies that manufacturers could use to improve the
fuel economy of their vehicles during MYs 2012-2016. The majority of
the technologies described in this section are readily available, well
known, and could be incorporated into vehicles once production
decisions are made. As discussed, the technologies considered fall into
five broad categories: Engine technologies, transmission technologies,
vehicle technologies, electrification/accessory technologies, and
hybrid technologies. Table IV.C.2-1 below lists all the technologies
considered and provides the abbreviations used for them in the Volpe
model,\464\ as well as their year of availability, which for purposes
of NHTSA's analysis means the first model year in the rulemaking period
that the Volpe model is allowed to apply a technology to a
manufacturer's fleet.\465\ Year of availability recognizes that
technologies must achieve a level of technical viability before they
can be implemented in the Volpe model, and are thus a means of
constraining technology use until such time as it is considered to be
technologically feasible. For a more detailed description of each
technology and their costs and effectiveness, we refer the reader to
Chapter 3 of the joint TSD and Section V of NHTSA's PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \464\ The abbreviations are used in this section both for
brevity and for the reader's reference if they wish to refer to the
expanded decision trees and the model input and output sheets, which
are available in Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0059 and on NHTSA's Web site.
    \465\ A date of 2011 means the technology can be applied in all
model years, while a date of 2014 means the technology can only be
applied in model years 2014 through 2016.

        Table IV.C.2-1--List of Technologies in NHTSA's Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Technology               Model abbreviation   Year available
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low Friction Lubricants...........  LUB.................            2011
Engine Friction Reduction.........  EFR.................            2011
VVT--Coupled Cam Phasing (CCP) on   CCPS................            2011
 SOHC.
Discrete Variable Valve Lift        DVVLS...............            2011
 (DVVL) on SOHC.
Cylinder Deactivation on SOHC.....  DEACS...............            2011

[[Page 49655]]

VVT--Intake Cam Phasing (ICP).....  ICP.................            2011
VVT--Dual Cam Phasing (DCP).......  DCP.................            2011
Discrete Variable Valve Lift        DVVLD...............            2011
 (DVVL) on DOHC.
Continuously Variable Valve Lift    CVVL................            2011
 (CVVL).
Cylinder Deactivation on DOHC.....  DEADD...............            2011
Cylinder Deactivation on OHV......  DEACO...............            2011
VVT--Coupled Cam Phasing (CCP) on   CCPO................            2011
 OHV.
Discrete Variable Valve Lift        DVVLO...............            2011
 (DVVL) on OHV.
Conversion to DOHC with DCP.......  CDOHC...............            2011
Stoichiometric Gasoline Direct      SGDI................            2011
 Injection (GDI).
Combustion Restart................  CBRST...............            2014
Turbocharging and Downsizing......  TRBDS...............            2011
Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR)     EGRB................            2013
 Boost.
Conversion to Diesel following      DSLC................            2011
 CBRST.
Conversion to Diesel following      DSLT................            2011
 TRBDS.
6-Speed Manual/Improved Internals.  6MAN................            2011
Improved Auto. Trans. Controls/     IATC................            2011
 Externals.
Continuously Variable Transmission  CVT.................            2011
6/7/8-Speed Auto. Trans with        NAUTO...............            2011
 Improved Internals.
Dual Clutch or Automated Manual     DCTAM...............            2011
 Transmission.
Electric Power Steering...........  EPS.................            2011
Improved Accessories..............  IACC................            2011
12V Micro-Hybrid..................  MHEV................            2011
Belt Integrated Starter Generator.  BISG................            2011
Crank Integrated Starter Generator  CISG................            2011
Power Split Hybrid................  PSHEV...............            2011
2-Mode Hybrid.....................  2MHEV...............            2011
Plug-in Hybrid....................  PHEV................            2011
Mass Reduction 1 (1.5%)...........  MS1.................            2011
Mass Reduction 2 (3.5%-8.5%)......  MS2.................            2014
Low Rolling Resistance Tires......  ROLL................            2011
Low Drag Brakes...................  LDB.................            2011
Secondary Axle Disconnect 4WD.....  SAX.................            2011
Aero Drag Reduction...............  AERO................            2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of this NPRM and as discussed in greater detail in the
joint TSD, NHTSA and EPA carefully reviewed the list of technologies
used in the agency's analysis for the MY 2011 final rule. Given the
relatively short amount of time, from a technology-development
perspective, that has elapsed since March 2009 and this NPRM, NHTSA and
EPA concluded that the considerable majority of technologies were
correctly defined and continued to be appropriate for use in the
analysis supporting the proposed standards. However, some refinements
were made as discussed below.
    Specific to its modeling, NHTSA has revised eight of the
technologies used in the current analysis from those considered in the
MY 2011 final rule. Specifically, two technologies which were
previously unavailable in the MY 2011 time frame are now available (in
the extended MY 2012-2016 period); one technology has been combined
with another; one is newly introduced; three have revised names and/or
definitions; and one has been deleted entirely. These changes are
discussed further below, and NHTSA seeks comment on both these changes
and the validation of the unchanged technology assumptions and estimates.
    Availability: In the MY 2011 final rule, two of the engine
technologies--EGR boost and combustion restart--were unavailable
because they were not considered technologically feasible until beyond
that rulemaking time frame. While both were described and discussed in
the MY 2011 final rule, neither was applied in the modeling process
that supported those standards.\466\ In this analysis, EGR boost
becomes available in MY 2013, and combustion restart in MY 2014, so
both are being applied by the Volpe model, as needed, in this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \466\ As an additional note, since combustion restart was
unavailable in the MY 2011 time frame, the technology titled diesel
following combustion restart (DSLC), which as the name indicates was
only applied after combustion restart, was also unavailable.
Accordingly, DSLC, which was described and discussed in the MY 2011
final rule, is now available in the current analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Merging of technologies: In the MY 2011 final rule, higher voltage
and improved alternator (HVIA) was used to represent changes in the
design of the alternator, effectively optimizing it for higher
efficiency (instead of for low cost as is typically done). For purposes
of this analysis, the HVIA technology is no longer represented
individually, but instead has been incorporated into a new-to-this-
analysis technology called belt integrated starter generator, or BISG,
as discussed next.
    New technology: In the MY 2011 final rule, two levels of mild
hybrid technology were defined: A 12 volt micro-hybrid (MHEV) system,
which utilized a belt-driven starter generator operating at 12 volts,
and the more capable integrated starter generator technology (ISG)
operating at higher voltages (100 volts). ISG envisioned both belt and
crank configured starter generator systems. In the current proposal,
and in an effort to offer a broader spectrum of more diversified mild
hybrid technologies for the modeling process to choose from, NHTSA has
added the BISG technology to the electrification decision tree, and
redefined the ISG technology to be a crank mounted version of ISG,
accordingly renamed to CISG.
    The BISG technology is a belt-coupled system like the 12-volt MHEV,
but it operates at a higher voltage (e.g., 42 volts) and thus can make
use of regenerative braking, as well as

[[Page 49656]]

potentially adding some limited motive power. Since BISG is a higher
voltage system, optimization of the alternator occurs as part of the
BISG technology application; hence the HVIA technology is no longer
needed as a separate technology. Additionally, the CISG technology is
now defined as a crank mounted system that operates at higher voltages
(100 volts) than BISG, yet at lower voltage than the strong hybrids
(300 volts) that make greater use of regenerative braking and provide
greater motive power capability. Thus, three levels of mild hybrid
technology exist in the current proposal, as opposed to the two levels
offered in the MY 2011 final rule.
    Revisions and Deletions: The Mass Reduction/Material Substitution
technologies have been revised for the current proposal. In the MY 2011
final rule, the Volpe model used three levels of material substitution
technologies, referred to as MS1, MS2, and MS5, which were
progressively applied to vehicles with curb weights in excess of 5,000
pounds (2,268 kg) so as to reduce weight by up to a 5 percent maximum.
In keeping with the agency's desire to limit potential negative impacts
to safety performance as a result of vehicle weight reduction, material
substitution was not applied to vehicles with curb weights below 5,000
pounds. In contrast, in the current analysis, and in keeping with some
manufacturers' stated plans to decrease overall fleet weights
regardless of subclass or curb weight, NHTSA now defines two Mass
Reduction/Material Substitution technologies as follows:
    The Mass Reduction 1.5 percent (MS1) represents a 1.5 percent
weight decrease through material substitution applicable to all vehicle
subclasses, regardless of curb weight, that can be applied throughout
the rulemaking period (and at refresh or redesign cycle times). This
technology is similar to the MS1 technology used in the prior analysis
in terms of the scale of the weight reduction (1 versus 1.5 percent),
the methods and techniques manufacturers are anticipated to use in
achieving the reductions, and when in the product cycle the model
applies it (at refresh or redesign).
    A second technology, Mass Reduction 3.5-8.5 percent (MS2), has also
been defined. The MS2 technology is unavailable until MY 2014, and can
only be applied by the Volpe model at a product redesign cycle. MS2
assumes a 3.5 to 8.5 percent weight reduction dependent on subclass
(with the smaller/lighter subclasses receiving the lowest amounts of
reduction, 3.5 percent, and the larger/heavier vehicles the 8.5
percent) via the types of more intrusive and complex mass reduction
associated with a complete vehicle redesign.\467\ MS2 is cumulative to
MS1, as it is only applied after MS1, therefore the maximum weight
reduction that can occur for smaller subclass vehicles is 5 percent,
while large cars, truck, and SUVs could experience 10 percent weight
reductions. Restricting weight reduction on smaller vehicle to lower
limits, and vice versa for larger vehicles, is intended to mitigate or
minimize the potential safety consequences from the modeled weight
reductions. Postponing the availability of the technology until MY 2014
recognizes the lead time required to implement platform redesigns that
would be necessary for these levels of weight reduction and mass
reduction. NHTSA seeks comment on the agency's use of a two-step
process, with the higher applications of MS in MYs 2014 and beyond, and
the process of applying smaller mass reductions to lighter vehicles and
higher reductions to heavier vehicles for the purpose of maintaining
safety neutrality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \467\ Examples of such weight savings associated with new
platform introductions have been provided in confidential product
plan information provided by some manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The MS5 technology used in the MY 2011 final rule is deleted.
    Additionally, for purposes of this NPRM, NHTSA has revised the
applicability of the diesel technologies to restrict it to vehicles
with engines of 6 cylinders or more. NHTSA seeks comment on its
decision not to apply diesel technologies to vehicles with 4-cylinder
engines. NHTSA also seeks comment on the revised costing methodology
for diesel technologies.
    Besides these, all other technologies considered in this analysis
were also considered in the analysis for the MY 2011 final rule, and
although the costs and effectiveness estimates may have been revised as
discussed further below, the other technologies remain otherwise
unchanged for the purposes of this analysis in terms of their
definition, functionality, and configuration. Thus, with this catalog
of technologies as a starting point, NHTSA could then review and
consider effectiveness and cost estimates for each technology, and,
through the Volpe model analysis, how a manufacturer might feasibly
apply these technologies to their MY 2012-2016 vehicles in order to
achieve compliance with the proposed standards.
b. How Did NHTSA Determine the Costs and Effectiveness of Each of These
Technologies for Use in Its Modeling Analysis?
    Building on NHTSA's estimates developed for the MY 2011 CAFE final
rule and EPA's Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which relied on
the 2008 Staff Technical Report,\468\ the agencies took a fresh look at
technology cost and effectiveness values for purposes of the joint
proposal under the National Program. This joint work is reflected in
Chapter 3 of the Draft Joint TSD and in Section II of this preamble,
which is summarized below. For more detailed information on the
effectiveness and cost of fuel-saving technologies, please refer to
Chapter 3 of the joint TSD and Section V of NHTSA's PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \468\ EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost and Effectiveness
Estimates of Technologies Used to Reduce Light-Duty Vehicle Carbon
Dioxide Emissions. EPA420-R-08-008, March 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Generally speaking, while NHTSA and EPA found that much of the cost
information used in NHTSA's MY 2011 final rule and EPA's 2008 staff
report was consistent to a great extent, the agencies, in reconsidering
information from many sources, revised several component costs of
several major technologies: turbocharging/downsizing, mild and strong
hybrids, diesels, SGDI, and Valve Train Lift Technologies. These are
discussed at length in the joint TSD and in NHTSA's PRIA. Additionally,
most effectiveness estimates used in both the MY 2011 final rule and
the 2008 EPA staff report were determined to be accurate and were
carried forward without significant change into this rulemaking. When
NHTSA and EPA's estimates for effectiveness diverged slightly due to
differences in how agencies apply technologies to vehicles in their
respective models, we report the ranges for the effectiveness values
used in each model. For much more information on the costs and
effectiveness of individual technologies, we refer the reader to
Chapter 3 of the joint TSD and Section V of NHTSA's PRIA.
    NHTSA notes that, in developing technology cost and effectiveness
estimates, the agencies have made every effort to hold constant aspects
of vehicle performance and utility typically valued by consumers, such
as horsepower, carrying capacity, and towing and hauling capacity. For
example, NHTSA includes in its analysis technology cost and
effectiveness estimates that are specific to performance passenger cars
(i.e., sports cars), as compared to non-performance passenger cars. When

[[Page 49657]]

commenting on the agencies' technology cost and effectiveness
estimates, NHTSA urges commenters either to place any related comments
within the same context, or explain any assumptions or estimates
regarding increases or decreases in vehicle performance or utility.
Additionally, NHTSA seeks comment on the extent to which commenters
believe that the agencies have been successful in holding constant
these elements of vehicle performance and utility in developing the
technology cost and effectiveness estimates.
    Additionally, NHTSA notes that the technology costs included in
this NPRM take into account only those associated with the initial
build of the vehicle. The agencies seek comments on the additional
lifetime costs, if any, associated with the implementation of advanced
technologies, including warranty, maintenance and replacement costs,
such as the replacement costs for low rolling resistance tires, low
friction lubricants, and hybrid batteries, and maintenance costs for
diesel aftertreatment components.
    While the agencies believe that the ideal estimates for the final
rule would be based on tear down studies or BOM approach and subjected
to a transparent peer-reviewed process, NHTSA and EPA are confident
that the thorough review conducted, led to the best available
conclusion regarding technology costs and effectiveness estimates for
the current rulemaking and resulted in excellent consistency between
the agencies' respective analyses for developing the CAFE and
CO2 standards.
    NHTSA seeks comment on the incremental cost and effectiveness
estimates employed by the agency in the Volpe modeling analysis for
this NPRM, examples of which are provided in table form below. These
example Tables present effectiveness and cost estimates which are
incremental in nature, according to the decision trees used in the
Volpe modeling analysis. Thus, the effectiveness and cost estimates are
not absolute to a single baseline vehicle, but are incremental to the
technology that precedes it.
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c. How Does NHTSA Use These Assumptions in Its Modeling Analysis?
    NHTSA's analysis, using the Volpe model, relies on several inputs
and data files to conduct the compliance analysis, as discussed further
below and in Section V of the PRIA. For the purposes of applying
technologies, the Volpe model primarily uses three data files, one that
contains data on the vehicles expected to be manufactured in the model
years covered by the rulemaking, one that identifies the appropriate
stage within the vehicle's life-cycle for the technology to be applied,
and one that contains data/parameters regarding the available
technologies the model can apply. These inputs are discussed below.
    As discussed above, the Volpe model begins with an initial state of
the domestic vehicle market, which in this case is the market for
passenger cars and light trucks to be sold during the period covered by
the proposed standards. The

[[Page 49660]]

vehicle market is defined on a model-by-model, engine-by-engine, and
transmission-by-transmission basis, such that each defined vehicle model
refers to a separately defined engine and a separately defined transmission.
    For the current proposal, which covers MYs 2012-2016, the light
vehicle (passenger car and light truck) market forecast was developed
jointly by NHTSA and EPA staff using MY 2008 CAFE compliance data. The
MY 2008 compliance data includes about 1,100 vehicle models, about 400
specific engines, and about 200 specific transmissions, which is a
somewhat lower level of detail in the representation of the vehicle
market than that used by NHTSA in recent CAFE analyses.\469\ However,
within the limitations of information that can be made available to the
public, it provides the foundation for a realistic analysis of
manufacturer-specific costs and the analysis of attribute-based CAFE
standards, and is much greater than the level of detail used by many
other models and analyses relevant to light vehicle fuel economy.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \469\ The market file for the MY 2011 final rule, which included
data for MYs 2011-2015, had 5500 records, or rows, about 5 times
what we are using in this analysis of the MY 2008 certification
data. However, both market files had the same number of fields, or rows.
    \470\ Because CAFE standards apply to the average performance of
each manufacturer's fleet of cars and light trucks, the impact of
potential standards on individual manufacturers cannot be credibly
estimated without analysis of fleets manufacturers can be expected
to produce in the future. Furthermore, because required CAFE levels
under an attribute-based CAFE standard depend on manufacturers'
fleet composition, the stringency of an attribute-based standard
cannot be predicted without performing analysis at this level of detail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to containing data about each vehicle, engine, and
transmission, this file contains information for each technology under
consideration as it pertains to the specific vehicle (whether the
vehicle is equipped with it or not), the model year the vehicle is
undergoing redesign, and information about the vehicle's subclass for
purposes of technology application. In essence, the model considers
whether it is appropriate to apply a technology to a vehicle.
    Is a vehicle already equipped, or can it not be equipped, with a
particular technology?
    The market forecast file provides NHTSA the ability to identify, on
a technology by technology basis, which technologies may already be
present (manufactured) on a particular vehicle, engine, or
transmission, or which technologies are not applicable (due to
technical considerations) to a particular vehicle, engine, or
transmission. These identifications are made on a model-by-model,
engine-by-engine, and transmission-by-transmission basis. For example,
if the market forecast file indicates that Manufacturer X's Vehicle Y
is manufactured with Technology Z, then for this vehicle Technology Z
will be shown as used. Additionally, NHTSA has determined that some
technologies are only suitable or unsuitable when certain vehicle,
engine, or transmission conditions exist. For example, secondary axle
disconnect is only suitable for 4WD vehicles, and cylinder deactivation
is unsuitable for any engine with fewer than 6 cylinders, while CVTs
can only be applied to unibody vehicles. Similarly, comments received
to the 2008 NPRM indicated that cylinder deactivation could not be
applied to vehicles equipped with manual transmissions, due primarily
to driveability and NVH concerns. The Volpe model employs ``engineering
constraints'' to address issues like these, which are a programmatic
method of controlling technology application that is independent of
other constraints. Thus, the market forecast file would indicate that
the technology in question should not be applied to the particular
vehicle/engine/transmission (i.e., is unavailable). Since multiple
vehicle models may be equipped with an engine or transmission, this may
affect multiple models. In using this aspect of the market forecast
file, NHTSA ensures the Volpe model only applies technologies in an
appropriate manner, since before any application of a technology can
occur, the model checks the market forecast to see if it is either
already present or unavailable.
    NHTSA seeks comment on whether this approach is reasonable and
ensures that technologies are applied in an appropriate manner.
    Is a vehicle being redesigned or refreshed?
    Manufacturers typically plan vehicle changes to coincide with
certain stages of a vehicle's life cycle that are appropriate for the
change, or in this case the technology being applied. In the automobile
industry there are two terms that describe when technology changes to
vehicles occur: redesign and refresh (i.e., freshening). Vehicle
redesign usually refers to significant changes to a vehicle's
appearance, shape, dimensions, and powertrain. Redesign is
traditionally associated with the introduction of ``new'' vehicles into
the market, often characterized as the ``next generation'' of a
vehicle, or a new platform. Vehicle refresh usually refers to less
extensive vehicle modifications, such as minor changes to a vehicle's
appearance, a moderate upgrade to a powertrain system, or small changes
to the vehicle's feature or safety equipment content. Refresh is
traditionally associated with mid-cycle cosmetic changes to a vehicle,
within its current generation, to make it appear ``fresh.'' Vehicle
refresh generally occurs no earlier than two years after a vehicle
redesign, or at least two years before a scheduled redesign. For the
majority of technologies discussed today, manufacturers will only be
able to apply them at a refresh or redesign, because their application
would be significant enough to involve some level of engineering,
testing, and calibration work.\471\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \471\ For example, applying material substitution through weight
reduction, or even something as simple as low rolling-resistance
tires, to a vehicle will likely require some level of validation and
testing to ensure that the vehicle may continue to be certified as
compliant with NHTSA's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS). Weight reduction might affect a vehicle's crashworthiness;
low rolling-resistance tires might change vehicle's braking
characteristics or how it performs in crash avoidance tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some technologies (e.g., those that require significant revision)
are nearly always applied only when the vehicle is expected to be
redesigned, like turbocharging and engine downsizing, or conversion to
diesel or hybridization. Other technologies, like cylinder
deactivation, electric power steering, and aerodynamic drag reduction
can be applied either when the vehicle is expected to be refreshed or
when it is expected to be redesigned, while a few others, like low
friction lubricants, can be applied at any time, regardless of whether
a refresh or redesign event is conducted. Accordingly, the model will
only apply a technology at the particular point deemed suitable. These
constraints are intended to produce results consistent with
manufacturers' technology application practices. For each technology
under consideration, NHTSA stipulates whether it can be applied any
time, at refresh/redesign, or only at redesign. The data forms another
input to the Volpe model. NHTSA develops redesign and refresh schedules
for each of a manufacturer's vehicles included in the analysis,
essentially based on the last known redesign year for each vehicle and
projected forward in a 5-year redesign and a 2-3 year refresh cycle,
and this data is also stored in the market forecast file. We note that
this approach is different than NHTSA has employed previously for
determining redesign and refresh schedules, where NHTSA included the
redesign and refresh dates in the market forecast file as provided by
manufacturers in confidential product plans. The new approach is necessary

[[Page 49661]]

given the nature of the new baseline which as a single year of data
does not contain its own refresh and redesign cycle cues for future
model years, and to ensure the complete transparency of the agency's
analysis. Vehicle redesign/refresh assumptions are discussed in more
detail in Section V of the PRIA and in Chapter 3 of the TSD. NHTSA
seeks comment on its application for this proposal of refresh and
redesign schedules to manufacturers' vehicles counting from the last
known redesign in or prior to the baseline fleet, as compared to its
approach in the MY 2011 final rule.
    Once the model has concluded that a technology should be applied to
a vehicle, the model must evaluate which technology should be applied.
This will depend on the vehicle subclass to which the vehicle is
assigned; what technologies have already been applied to the vehicle
(i.e., where in the ``decision tree'' the vehicle is); when the
technology is first available (i.e., year of availability); whether the
technology is still available (i.e., ``phase-in caps''); and the costs
and effectiveness of the technologies being considered. Technology
costs may be reduced, in turn, by learning effects, while technology
effectiveness may be increased or reduced by synergistic effects
between technologies. In the technology input file, NHTSA has developed
a separate set of technology data variables for each of the twelve
vehicle subclasses. Each set of variables is referred to as an ``input
sheet,'' so for example, the subcompact input sheet holds the
technology data that is appropriate for the subcompact subclass. Each
input sheet contains a list of technologies available for members of
the particular vehicle subclass. The following items are provided for
each technology: the name of the technology, its abbreviation, the
decision tree with which it is associated, the (first) year in which it
is available, the upper and lower cost and effectiveness (fuel
consumption reduction) estimates, the learning type and rate, the cost
basis, its applicability, and the phase-in values.
    To which vehicle subclass is the vehicle assigned?
    As part of its consideration of technological feasibility, the
agency evaluates whether each technology could be implemented on all
types and sizes of vehicles, and whether some differentiation is
necessary in applying certain technologies to certain types and sizes
of vehicles, and with respect to the cost incurred and fuel consumption
and CO2 emissions reduction achieved when doing so. The 2002
NAS Report differentiated technology application using ten vehicle
``classes'' (4 cars classes and 6 truck classes),\472\ but did not
determine how cost and effectiveness values differ from class to class.
NAS's purpose in separating vehicles into these classes was to create
groups of ``like'' vehicles, i.e., vehicles similar in size, powertrain
configuration, weight, and consumer use, and for which similar
technologies are applicable. NHTSA similarly differentiates vehicles by
``subclass'' for the purpose of applying technologies to vehicles and
assessing their incremental costs and effectiveness. NHTSA assigns each
vehicle manufactured in the rulemaking period to one of 12 subclasses:
for passenger cars, Subcompact, Subcompact Performance, Compact,
Compact Performance, Midsize, Midsize Performance, Large, and Large
Performance; and for light trucks, Small SUV/Pickup/Van, Midsize SUV/
Pickup/Van, Large SUV/Pickup/Van, and Minivan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \472\ The NAS classes included subcompact cars, compact cars,
midsize cars, large cars, small SUVs, midsize SUVs, large SUVs,
small pickups, large pickups, and minivans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For this NPRM as for the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA divides the
vehicle fleet into subclasses based on model inputs, and applies
subclass-specific estimates, also from model inputs, of the
applicability, cost, and effectiveness of each fuel-saving technology.
Therefore, the model's estimates of the cost to improve the fuel
economy of each vehicle model depend upon the subclass to which the
vehicle model is assigned.
    Each vehicle's subclass is stored in the market forecast file. When
conducting a compliance analysis, if the Volpe model seeks to apply
technology to a particular vehicle, it checks the market forecast to
see if the technology is available and if the refresh/redesign criteria
are met. If these conditions are satisfied, the model determines the
vehicle's subclass from the market data file, which it then uses to
reference another input called the technology input file. NHTSA
reviewed its methodology for dividing vehicles into subclasses for
purposes of technology application that it used in the MY 2011 final
rule, and concluded that the same methodology would be appropriate for
this NPRM for MYs 2012-2016, but the agency invites comments on the
method of assigning vehicles to subclasses for the purposes of
technology application in the CAFE model, and on the issue of
technology-application subclasses generally. The subclasses and the
methodology for dividing vehicles among them are discussed in more
detail in Section V of the PRIA and in Chapter 3 of the TSD.
    For the reader's reference, the subclasses and example vehicles
from the market forecast file are provided in the tables below.

           Passenger Car Subclasses Example (MY 2008) Vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Class                           Example vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subcompact.............................  Chevy Aveo, Honda Civic.
Subcompact Performance.................  Mazda Miata, Saturn Sky.
Compact................................  Chevy Cobalt, Nissan Sentra and
                                          Altima.
Compact Performance....................  Audi S4 Quattro, Mazda RX8.
Midsize................................  Chevy Camaro (V6), Toyota
                                          Camry, Honda Accord, Hyundai
                                          Azera.
Midsize Performance....................  Chevy Corvette, Ford Mustang
                                          (V8), Nissan G37 Coupe.
Large..................................  Audi A8, Cadillac CTS and DTS.
Large Performance......................  Bentley Arnage, Daimler CL600.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


            Light Truck Subclasses Example (MY 2008) Vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Class                           Example vehicles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minivans...............................  Dodge Caravan, Toyota Sienna.

[[Page 49662]]

Small SUV/Pickup/Van...................  Ford Escape & Ranger, Nissan
                                          Rogue.
Midsize SUV/Pickup/Van.................  Chevy Colorado, Jeep Wrangler 4-
                                          door, Volvo XC70, Toyota
                                          Tacoma.
Large SUV/Pickup/Van...................  Chevy Silverado, Ford
                                          Econoline, Toyota Sequoia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    What technologies have already been applied to the vehicle (i.e.,
where in the ``decision trees'' is it)?
    NHTSA's methodology for technology application analysis developed
out of the approach taken by NAS in the 2002 Report, and evaluates the
application of individual technologies and their incremental costs and
effectiveness. Incremental costs and effectiveness of individual
technologies are relative to the prior technology state, which means
that it is crucial to understand what technologies are already present
on a vehicle in order to determine correct incremental cost and
effectiveness values. The benefit of the incremental approach is
transparency in accounting, insofar as when individual technologies are
added incrementally to individual vehicles, it is clear and easy to
determine how costs and effectiveness adds up as technology levels increase.
    To keep track of incremental costs and effectiveness and to know
which technology to apply and in which order, the Volpe model's
architecture uses a logical sequence, which NHTSA refers to as
``decision trees,'' for applying fuel economy-improving technologies to
individual vehicles. In the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA worked with
Ricardo to modify previously-employed decision trees in order to allow
for a much more accurate application of technologies to vehicles. For
purposes of the NPRM, NHTSA reviewed the technology sequencing
architecture and updated, as appropriate, the decision trees used in
the analysis reported in the final rule for MY 2011.
    In general, and as described in great detail in the MY 2011 final
rule and in Section V of the current PRIA, each technology is assigned
to one of the five following categories based on the system it affects
or impacts: engine, transmission, electrification/accessory, hybrid or
vehicle. Each of these categories has its own decision tree that the
Volpe model uses to apply technologies sequentially during the
compliance analysis. The decision trees were designed and configured to
allow the Volpe model to apply technologies in a cost-effective,
logical order that also considers ease of implementation. For example,
software or control logic changes are implemented before replacing a
component or system with a completely redesigned one, which is
typically a much more expensive option. In some cases, and as
appropriate, the model may combine the sequential technologies shown on
a decision tree and apply them simultaneously, effectively developing
dynamic technology packages on an as-needed basis. For example, if
compliance demands indicate, the model may elect to apply LUB, EFR, and
ICP on a dual overhead cam engine, if they are not already present, in
one single step. An example simplified decision tree for engine
technologies is provided below; the other simplified decision trees may
be found in Chapter 3 of the joint TSD and in the PRIA. Expanded
decision trees are available in the docket for this NPRM.
BILLING CODE 6560-50-C

[[Page 49663]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.032

BILLING CODE 6560-50-C
    Each technology within the decision trees has an incremental cost
and an incremental effectiveness estimate associated with it, and
estimates are specific to a particular vehicle subclass (see the tables
in Section V of the PRIA). Each technology's incremental estimate takes
into account its position in the decision tree path. If a technology is
located further down the decision tree, the estimates for the costs and
effectiveness values attributed to that technology are influenced by
the incremental estimates of costs and effectiveness values for prior
technology applications. In essence, this approach accounts for ``in-
path'' effectiveness synergies, as well as cost effects that occur
between the technologies in the same path. When comparing cost and
effectiveness estimates from various sources and those provided by
commenters in the previous CAFE

[[Page 49664]]

rulemakings, it is important that the estimates evaluated are analyzed
in the proper context, especially as concerns their likely position in
the decision trees and other technologies that may be present or
missing. Not all estimates available in the public domain or offered
for the agencies' consideration during the comment period can be
evaluated in an ``apples-to-apples'' comparison with those used by the
Volpe model, since in some cases the order of application, or included
technology content, is inconsistent with that assumed in the decision tree.
    The MY 2011 final rule discussed in detail the revisions and
improvements made to the Volpe model and decision trees during that
rulemaking process, including the improved handling and accuracy of
valve train technology application and the development and
implementation of a method for accounting path-dependent correction
factors in order to ensure that technologies are evaluated within the
proper context. The reader should consult the MY 2011 final rule
documents for further information on these modeling techniques, all of
which continued to be utilized in developing this proposal.\473\ To the
extent that the decision trees have changed for purposes of this NPRM,
it was due not to revisions in the order of technology application, but
rather to redefinitions of technologies or addition or subtraction of
technologies. NHTSA seeks comment on the decision trees described here
and in the PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \473\ See, e.g., 74 FR 14238-46 (Mar. 30, 2009) for a full
discussion of the decision trees in NHTSA's MY 2011 final rule, and
Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0062-0003.1 for an expanded decision tree used
in that rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Is the next technology available in this model year?
    As discussed above, the majority of technologies considered are
available on vehicles today, and thus will be available for application
in the rulemaking time frame. Some technologies, however, will not
become available for purposes of NHTSA's analysis until later in the
rulemaking time frame. When the model is considering whether to add a
technology to a vehicle, it checks its year of availability--if the
technology is available, it may be added; if it is not available, the
model will consider whether to switch to a different decision tree to
look for another technology, or will skip to the next vehicle in a
manufacturer's fleet. The year of availability for each technology is
provided above in Table IV.C.2-1.
    Has the technology reached the phase-in cap for this model year?
    Besides the refresh/redesign cycles used in the Volpe model, which
constrain the rate of technology application at the vehicle level so as
to ensure a period of stability following any modeled technology
applications, the other constraint on technology application employed
in NHTSA's analysis is ``phase-in caps.'' Unlike vehicle-level cycle
settings, phase-in caps constrain technology application at the vehicle
manufacturer level.\474\ They are intended to reflect a manufacturer's
overall resource capacity available for implementing new technologies
(such as engineering and development personnel and financial
resources), thereby ensuring that resource capacity is accounted for in
the modeling process. At a high level, phase-in caps and refresh/
redesign cycles work in conjunction with one another to avoid the
modeling process out-pacing an OEM's limited pool of available
resources during the rulemaking time frame, especially in years where
many models may be scheduled for refresh or redesign. This helps to
ensure technological feasibility and economic practicability in
determining the stringency of the standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \474\ While phase-in caps are expressed as specific percentages
of a manufacturer's fleet to which a technology may be applied in a
given model year, phase-in caps cannot always be applied as precise
limits, and the Volpe model in fact allows ``override'' of a cap in
certain circumstances. When only a small portion of a phase-in cap
limit remains, or when the cap is set to a very low value, or when a
manufacturer has a very limited product line, the cap might prevent
the technology from being applied at all since any application would
cause the cap to be exceeded. Therefore, the Volpe model evaluates
and enforces each phase-in cap constraint after it has been exceeded
by the application of the technology (as opposed to evaluating it
before application), which can result in the described overriding of the cap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has been developing the concept of phase-in caps over the
course of the last several CAFE rulemakings, as discussed in greater
detail in the MY 2011 final rule,\475\ and in Section V of the PRIA and
Chapter 3 of the joint TSD. The MY 2011 final rule employed non-linear
phase-in caps (that is, caps that varied from year to year) that were
designed to respond to comments raising lead-time concerns in reference
to the agency's proposed MY 2011-2015 standards, but because the final
rule covered only one model year, many phase-in caps for that model
year were lower than had originally been proposed. NHTSA emphasized
that the MY 2011 phase-in caps were based on assumptions for the full
five year period of the proposal (2011-2015), and stated that it would
reconsider the phase-in settings for all years beyond 2011 in a future
rulemaking analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \475\ 74 FR 14268-14271 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of the current proposal for MYs 2012-2016, as in the
MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA combines phase-in caps for some groups of
similar technologies, such as valve phasing technologies that are
applicable to different forms of engine design (SOHC, DOHC, OHV), since
they are very similar from an engineering and implementation
standpoint. When the phase-in caps for two technologies are combined,
the maximum total application of either or both to any manufacturer's
fleet is limited to the value of the cap.\476\ In contrast to the
phase-in caps used in the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA has increased the
phase-in caps for most of the technologies, as discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \476\ See 74 FR 14270 (Mar 30, 2009) for further discussion and examples.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In developing phase-in cap values for purposes of the current
proposal, NHTSA initially considered the fact that many of the
technologies commonly applied by the model, those placed near the top
of the decision trees, such as low friction lubes, valve phasing,
electric power steering, improved automatic transmission controls, and
others, have been commonly available to manufacturers for several years
now. Many technologies, in fact, precede the 2002 NAS Report, which
estimated that such technologies would take 4 to 8 years to penetrate
the fleet. Since the current proposal would take effect in MY 2012,
nearly 10 years beyond the NAS report, and extends to MY 2016, and in
the interest of harmonization with EPA's proposal, NHTSA tentatively
determined that higher phase-in caps were likely justified.
Additionally, NHTSA considered the fact that manufacturers, as part of
the agreements supporting the National Program, appear to be
anticipating higher technology application rates than those used in the
MY 2011 final rule. This also supported higher phase-in caps for
purposes of the proposal.
    Thus, while phase-in caps for the MY 2011 final rule reached a
maximum of 50 percent for a couple of technologies and generally fell
in the range between 0 and 20 percent, phase-in caps for this NPRM for
the majority of technologies are set to reach 85 or 100 percent by MY
2016, although more advanced technologies like diesels and strong
hybrids reach only 15 percent by MY 2016.
    Theoretically, significantly higher phase-in caps, such as those
used in the current proposal as compared to those used in the MY 2011
final rule, should

[[Page 49665]]

result in higher levels of technology penetration in the modeling
results. Reviewing the modeling output does not, however, indicate
unreasonable levels of technology penetration for the proposed
standards.\477\ NHTSA believes that this is due to the interaction of
the various changes in methodology for the current proposal--changes to
phase-in caps are but one of a number of revisions to the Volpe model
and its inputs that could potentially impact the rate at which
technologies are applied in this proposal as compared to prior
rulemakings. Other revisions that could impact application rates
include the use of transparent CAFE certification data in baseline
fleet formulation and the use of other data for projecting it
forward,\478\ or the use of a multi-year planning programming technique
to apply technology retroactively to earlier-MY vehicles, both of which
may have a direct impact on the modeling process. Conversely the model
and inputs remain unchanged in other areas that also could impact
technology application, such as in the refresh/redesign cycle settings,
estimates used for the technologies, both of which remain largely
unchanged from the MY 2011 final rule. These changes together make it
difficult to predict how phase-in caps should be expected to function
in the new modeling process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \477\ The modeling output for the analysis underlying these
proposed standards is available on NHTSA's Web site.
    \478\ The baseline fleet sets the starting point, from a
technology point of view, for where the model begins the technology
application process, so changes have a direct impact on the net
application of technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, after reviewing the output files, NHTSA tentatively concludes
that the higher phase-in caps, and the resulting technology application
rates produced by the Volpe model, at both the industry and
manufacturer level, are appropriate for this proposal, achieving a
suitable level of stringency without requiring unrealistic or
unachievable penetration rates. However, the agency will consider
comments received on this approach in determining what phase-in caps to
employ in the analysis for the final rule, and may change the caps in
response to comments and/or further analysis. One additional question
the agency has, which may be primarily academic at this point, is what
impact lower phase-in caps, such as those used in earlier rulemakings,
would have on compliance costs (and whether they might counter-
intuitively increase costs by forcing more expensive technologies).
NHTSA seeks comment on the revised phase-in caps as compared to the MY
2011 final rule, and particularly on whether, combined with the refresh
and redesign assumptions, they help to ensure sufficient lead time for
manufacturers to make the technology changes required by the proposed
standards. Readers are invited to review and assess the phase-in caps
listed and described more fully in Section V of the PRIA, along with
the application and penetration rates found in the Volpe model's output
files, and after making their own assessment, provide comment and
recommendations to the agency as appropriate.
    Is the technology less expensive due to learning effects?
    Historically, NHTSA did not explicitly account for the cost
reductions a manufacturer might realize through learning achieved from
experience in actually applying a technology. Since working with EPA to
develop the 2008 NPRM for MYs 2011-2015, and with Ricardo to refine the
concept for the March 2009 MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA has accounted for
these cost reductions through two kinds of mutually exclusive learning,
``volume-based'' and ``time-based'' which it continues to use in this
proposal, as discussed below.
    In the 2008 NPRM, NHTSA applied learning factors to technology
costs for the first time. These learning factors were developed using
the parameters of learning threshold, learning rate, and the initial
cost, and were based on the ``experience curve'' concept which
describes reductions in production costs as a function of accumulated
production volume. The typical curve shows a relatively steep initial
decline in cost which flattens out to a gentle downwardly sloping line
as the volume increase to large values. In the NPRM, NHTSA applied a
learning rate discount of 20 percent for each successive doubling of
production volume (on a per manufacturer basis), and a learning
threshold of 25,000 units was assumed (thus a technology was viewed as
being fully learned out at 100,000 units). The factor was only applied
to certain technologies that were considered emerging or newly
implemented on the basis that significant cost improvements would be
achieved as economies of scale were realized (i.e., the technologies
were on the steep part of the curve).
    In the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA continued to use this learning
factor, referring to it as volume-based learning since the cost
reductions were determined by production volume increases, and again
only applied it to emerging technologies. However, and in response to
comments, NHTSA revised its assumptions on learning threshold, basing
them instead on an industry-wide production basis, and increasing the
threshold to 300,000 units annually.
    Commenters to the 2008 NPRM also described another type of learning
factor which NHTSA decided to adopt and implement in the MY 2011 final
rule. Commenters described a relatively small negotiated cost decrease
that occurred on an annual basis through contractual agreements with
first tier component and systems suppliers for readily available, high
volume technologies commonly in use by multiple OEMs. Based on the same
experience curve principal, however at production volumes that were on
the flatter part of the curve (and thus the types of volumes that
represent annual industry volumes), NHTSA adopted this type learning
and referred to it as time-based learning. An annual cost reduction of
3 percent in the second and each subsequent year, which was consistent
with estimates from commenters and supported by work Ricardo conducted
for NHTSA, was used in the final rule.
    In developing this proposal, NHTSA and EPA have reviewed both types
of learning factors, and the thresholds (300,000) and reduction rates
(20 percent for volume,\479\ 3 percent for time-based) they rely on,
and as implemented in the MY 2011 final rule, and agreed that both
factors continue to be accurate and appropriate; each agency has thus
implemented time- and volume-based learning in their analyses. Noting
that only one type of learning can be applied to any single technology,
if any learning is applied at all, the agencies reviewed each to
determine which learning factor was appropriate. Volume-based learning
is applied to the higher complexity hybrid technologies, while no
learning is applied to technologies likely to be affected by commodity
costs (LUB, ROLL) or that have loosely-defined BOMs (EFR, LDB), as was
the case in the MY 2011 final rule. Chapter 3 of the joint TSD shows
the specific learning factors that NHTSA has applied in this analysis
for each technology, and discusses learning factors and each agencies'
use of them further. NHTSA seeks comment on its use of learning
factors, including the types, the thresholds, and the reduction rates
proposed, and particularly on the revisions to the learning (time- and
volume-based) logic as compared to the MY 2011 final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \479\ NHTSA will conduct a sensitivity analysis on the volume-
based learning value of 20 percent for the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Is the technology more or less effective due to synergistic effects?
    When two or more technologies are added to a particular vehicle model to

[[Page 49666]]

improve its fuel efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions, the
resultant fuel consumption reduction may sometimes be higher or lower
than the product of the individual effectiveness values for those
items.\480\ This may occur because one or more technologies applied to
the same vehicle partially address the same source (or sources) of
engine, drivetrain or vehicle losses. Alternately, this effect may be
seen when one technology shifts the engine operating points, and
therefore increases or reduces the fuel consumption reduction achieved
by another technology or set of technologies. The difference between
the observed fuel consumption reduction associated with a set of
technologies and the product of the individual effectiveness values in
that set is referred to for purposes of this rulemaking as a
``synergy.'' Synergies may be positive (increased fuel consumption
reduction compared to the product of the individual effects) or
negative (decreased fuel consumption reduction). An example of a
positive synergy might be a vehicle technology that reduces road loads
at highway speeds (e.g., lower aerodynamic drag or low rolling
resistance tires), that could extend the vehicle operating range over
which cylinder deactivation may be employed. An example of a negative
synergy might be a variable valvetrain system technology, which reduces
pumping losses by altering the profile of the engine speed/load map,
and a six-speed automatic transmission, which shifts the engine
operating points to a portion of the engine speed/load map where
pumping losses are less significant. As the complexity of the
technology combinations is increased, and the number of interacting
technologies grows accordingly, it becomes increasingly important to
account for these synergies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \480\ More specifically, the products of the differences between
one and the technology-specific levels of effectiveness in reducing
fuel consumption. For example, not accounting for interactions, if
technologies A and B are estimated to reduce fuel consumption by 10%
(i.e., 0.1) and 20% (i.e., 0.2) respectively, the ``product of the
individual effectiveness values'' would be 1-0.1 times 1-0.2, or 0.9
times 0.8, which equals 0.72, corresponding to a combined
effectiveness of 28% rather than the 30% obtained by adding 10% to
20%. The ``synergy factors'' discussed in this section further
adjust these multiplicatively combined effectiveness values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA and EPA determined synergistic impacts for this rulemaking
using EPA's ``lumped parameter'' analysis tool, which EPA described at
length in its March 2008 Staff Technical Report.\481\ The lumped
parameter tool is a spreadsheet model that represents energy
consumption in terms of average performance over the fuel economy test
procedure, rather than explicitly analyzing specific drive cycles. The
tool begins with an apportionment of fuel consumption across several
loss mechanisms and accounts for the average extent to which different
technologies affect these loss mechanisms using estimates of engine,
drivetrain and vehicle characteristics that are averaged over the EPA
fuel economy drive cycle. Results of this analysis were generally
consistent with those of full-scale vehicle simulation modeling
performed in 2007 by Ricardo, Inc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \481\ EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost and Effectiveness
Estimates of Technologies Used to Reduce Light-duty Vehicle Carbon
Dioxide Emissions; EPA420-R-08-008, March 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the current rulemaking, NHTSA used the lumped parameter tool as
modified in the MY 2011 CAFE final rule. NHTSA modified the lumped
parameter tool from the version described in the EPA Staff Technical
Report in response to public comments received in its rulemaking. The
modifications included updating the list of technologies and their
associated effectiveness values to match the updated list of
technologies used in the final rule. NHTSA also expanded the list of
synergy pairings based on further consideration of the technologies for
which a competition for losses would be expected. These losses are
described in more detail in Section V of the PRIA.
    NHTSA and EPA incorporate synergistic impacts in their analyses in
slightly different manners. Because NHTSA applies technologies
individually in its modeling analysis, NHTSA incorporates synergistic
effects between pairings of individual technologies. The use of
discrete technology pair incremental synergies is similar to that in
DOE's National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).\482\ Inputs to the Volpe
model incorporate NEMS-identified pairs, as well as additional pairs
from the set of technologies considered in the Volpe model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \482\ U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Transportation Sector Module of the National Energy
Modeling System: Model Documentation 2007, May 2007, Washington, DC,
DOE/EIAM070(2007), at 29-30. Available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/
ftproot/modeldoc/m070(2007) (last accessed Jul. 6, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA notes that synergies that occur within a decision tree are
already addressed within the incremental values assigned and therefore
do not require a synergy pair to address. For example, all engine
technologies take into account incremental synergy factors of preceding
engine technologies, and all transmission technologies take into
account incremental synergy factors of preceding transmission
technologies. These factors are expressed in the fuel consumption
improvement factors in the input files used by the Volpe model.
    For applying incremental synergy factors in separate path
technologies, the Volpe model uses an input table (see the tables in
Chapter 3 of the TSD and in the PRIA) which lists technology pairings
and incremental synergy factors associated with those pairings, most of
which are between engine technologies and transmission/electrification/
hybrid technologies. When a technology is applied to a vehicle by the
Volpe model, all instances of that technology in the incremental
synergy table which match technologies already applied to the vehicle
(either pre-existing or previously applied by the Volpe model) are
summed and applied to the fuel consumption improvement factor of the
technology being applied. Synergies for the strong hybrid technology
fuel consumption reductions are included in the incremental value for
the specific hybrid technology block since the model applies
technologies in the order of the most effectiveness for least cost and
also applies all available electrification and transmission
technologies before applying strong hybrid technologies. NHTSA seeks
comment on whether the synergistic effects presented are accurate, and
whether there are other synergies that the agency may have overlooked.
d. Where Can Readers Find More Detailed Information About NHTSA's
Technology Analysis?
    Much more detailed information is provided in Section V of the
PRIA, and a discussion of how NHTSA and EPA jointly reviewed and
updated technology assumptions for purposes of this NPRM is available
in Chapter 3 of the TSD. Additionally, all of NHTSA's model input and
output files are now public and available for the reader's review and
consideration. The technology input files can be found in the docket
for this NPRM, Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0059, and on NHTSA's Web site. And
finally, because much of NHTSA's technology analysis for purposes of
this NPRM builds on the work that was done for the MY 2011 final rule,
we refer readers to that document as well for background information
concerning how NHTSA's methodology for technology application analysis
has evolved over the past several rulemakings, both in response to
comments and as a result of the agency's

[[Page 49667]]

growing experience with this type of analysis.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \483\ 74 FR 14233-308 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. How Did NHTSA Develop the Economic Assumption Inputs?
    NHTSA's preliminary analysis of alternative CAFE standards for the
model years covered by this proposed rulemaking relies on a range of
forecast variables, economic assumptions, and parameter values. This
section describes the proposed sources of these forecasts, the
rationale underlying each assumption, and the agency's preliminary
choices of specific parameter values. These proposed economic values
play a significant role in determining the benefits of alternative CAFE
standards, as they have for the last several CAFE rulemakings. Under
those alternatives where standards would be established by reference to
their costs and benefits, these economic values also affect the levels
of the CAFE standards themselves. Some of these variables have more
important effects on the level of CAFE standards and the benefits from
requiring alternative increases in fuel economy than do others.
    In reviewing these variables and the agency's estimates of their
values for purposes of this NPRM, NHTSA reconsidered previous comments
it had received and reviewed newly available literature. As a
consequence, the agency elected to revise some of its economic
assumptions and parameter estimates, while retaining others. Some of
the most important changes, which are discussed in greater detail
below, as well as in Chapter 4 of the joint TSD and in Chapter VIII of
the PRIA, include significant revisions to the markup factors for
technology costs; reducing the rebound effect from 15 to 10 percent;
and revising the value of reducing CO2 emissions based on
recent interagency efforts to develop estimates of this value for
government-wide use. For the reader's reference, Table IV.C.3-1 below
summarizes the values used to calculate the economic benefits from each
alternative. The agency seeks comment on the economic assumptions
presented in the table and discussed below.

        Table IV.C.3-1--Economic Values for Benefits Computations
                                 (2007$)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel Economy Rebound Effect.............................             10%
``Gap'' between test and on-road MPG....................             20%
Value of refueling time per ($ per vehicle-hour)........         $ 24.64
Annual growth in average vehicle use....................            1.1%
Fuel Prices (2012-50 average, $/gallon)                   ..............
    Retail gasoline price...............................           $3.77
    Pre-tax gasoline price..............................           $3.40
Economic Benefits from Reducing Oil Imports ($/gallon)    ..............
    ``Monopsony'' Component.............................          $ 0.00
    Price Shock Component...............................          $ 0.17
    Military Security Component.........................          $ 0.00
                                                         ---------------
        Total Economic Costs ($/gallon).................          $ 0.17
Emission Damage Costs (2020, $/ton or $/metric ton)       ..............
    Carbon monoxide.....................................             $ 0
    Volatile organic compounds (VOC)....................         $ 1,283
    Nitrogen oxides (NOx)--vehicle use..................         $ 5,116
    Nitrogen oxides (NOx)--fuel production and                   $ 5,339
     distribution.......................................
    Particulate matter (PM2.5)--vehicle use.............       $ 238,432
    Particulate matter (PM2.5)--fuel production and            $ 292,180
     distribution.......................................
    Sulfur dioxide (SO2)................................        $ 30,896
    Carbon dioxide (CO2)................................            $ 20
    Annual Increase in CO2 Damage Cost..................              3%
External Costs from Additional Automobile Use ($/vehicle- ..............
 mile)
    Congestion..........................................         $ 0.054
    Accidents...........................................         $ 0.023
    Noise...............................................         $ 0.001
                                                         ---------------
        Total External Costs............................         $ 0.078
External Costs from Additional Light Truck Use ($/        ..............
 vehicle-mile)
    Congestion..........................................          $0.048
    Accidents...........................................          $0.026
    Noise...............................................          $0.001
                                                         ---------------
        Total External Costs............................          $0.075
Discount Rate Applied to Future Benefits................              3%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Costs of Fuel Economy-Improving Technologies
    We developed detailed estimates of the costs of applying fuel
economy-improving technologies to vehicle models jointly with EPA for
use in analyzing the impacts of alternative standards considered in
this rulemaking. The estimates were based on those reported by the 2002
NAS Report analyzing costs for increasing fuel economy, but were
modified for purposes of this analysis as a result of extensive
consultations among engineers from NHTSA, EPA, and the Volpe Center. As
part of this process, the agency also developed varying cost estimates
for applying certain fuel economy technologies to vehicles of different
sizes and body styles. We may adjust these cost estimates based on
comments received to this NPRM.
    The technology cost estimates used in this analysis are intended to represent

[[Page 49668]]

manufacturers' direct costs for high-volume production of vehicles with
these technologies and sufficient experience with their application so
that all remaining cost reductions due to ``learning curve'' effects
have been fully realized. However, NHTSA recognizes that manufacturers'
actual costs for employing these technologies include additional
outlays for accompanying design or engineering changes to models that
use them, development and testing of prototype versions, recalibrating
engine operating parameters, and integrating the technology with other
attributes of the vehicle. Manufacturers' indirect costs for employing
these technologies also include expenses for product development and
integration, modifying assembly processes and training assembly workers
to install them, increased expenses for operation and maintaining
assembly lines, higher initial warranty costs for new technologies, any
added expenses for selling and distributing vehicles that use these
technologies, and manufacturer and dealer profit. In previous CAFE
rulemakings and in NHTSA's safety rulemakings, the agency has accounted
for these additional costs by using a Retail Price Equivalent (RPE)
multiplier of 1.5. For purposes of this rulemaking, based on recent
work by EPA, NHTSA has applied indirect cost multipliers ranging from
1.11 to 1.64 to the estimates of vehicle manufacturers' direct costs
for producing or acquiring each technology to improve fuel
economy.\484\ These multipliers vary with the complexity of each
technology and the time frame over which costs are estimated. More
complex technologies are associated with higher multipliers because of
the larger increases in manufacturers' indirect costs for developing,
producing (or procuring), and deploying these more complex
technologies. The appropriate multipliers decline over time for
technologies of all complexity levels, since increased familiarity and
experience with their application is assumed to reduce manufacturers'
indirect costs for employing them. NHTSA seeks comment regarding the
new indirect cost multiplier approach to technology costs estimates. We
note additionally that this issue will be addressed in the upcoming
revised NAS report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \484\ NHTSA notes that in addition to the technology cost
analysis employing this ``ICM'' approach, the PRIA contains a
sensitivity analysis using a technology cost multiplier of 1.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Potential Opportunity Costs of Improved Fuel Economy
    An important concern is whether achieving the fuel economy
improvements required by alternative CAFE standards would require
manufacturers to compromise the performance, carrying capacity, safety,
or comfort of their vehicle models. To the extent that it does so, the
resulting sacrifice in the value of these attributes to consumers
represents an additional cost of achieving the required improvements in
fuel economy. While exact dollar values of these attributes to
consumers are difficult to infer, differences in vehicle purchase
prices and buyers' choices among competing models that feature
different combinations of these characteristics clearly demonstrate
that changing vehicle attributes clearly affect the utility and
economic value that vehicles provide to potential buyers.\485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \485\ See, e.g., Kleit A.N., 1990. ``The Effect of Annual
Changes in Automobile Fuel Economy Standards.'' Journal of
Regulatory Economics 2: 151-172; Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and
Ariel Pakes, 1995. ``Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium,''
Econometrica 63(4): 841-940; McCarthy, Patrick S., 1996. ``Market
Price and Income Elasticities of New Vehicle Demands.'' Review of
Economics and Statistics 78: 543-547; and Goldberg, Pinelopi K.,
1998. ``The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency
Standards in the US,'' Journal of Industrial Economics 46(1): 1-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA and EPA have approached this potential problem by developing
cost estimates for fuel economy-improving technologies that include any
additional manufacturing costs that would be necessary to maintain the
originally planned levels of performance, comfort, carrying capacity,
and safety of any light-duty vehicle model to which those technologies
are applied. In doing so, the agencies followed the precedent
established by the 2002 NAS Report, which estimated ``constant
performance and utility'' costs for fuel economy technologies. NHTSA
has used these as the basis for its continuing efforts to refine the
technology costs it uses to analyze manufacturer's costs for complying
with alternative passenger car and light truck CAFE standards for MYs
2012-2016. Although the agency has revised its estimates of
manufacturers' costs for some technologies significantly for use in
this rulemaking, these revised estimates are still intended to
represent costs that would allow manufacturers to maintain the
performance, carrying capacity, and utility of vehicle models while
improving their fuel economy.
    Although we believe that our tentative cost estimates for fuel
economy-improving technologies should be generally sufficient to
prevent significant reductions in consumer welfare provided by vehicle
models to which manufacturers apply those technologies, it is possible
that they do not include adequate allowance for the necessary efforts
by manufacturers to prevent sacrifices in these attributes on all
vehicle models. If this is the case, the true economic costs of
achieving higher fuel economy should include the opportunity costs to
vehicle owners of any sacrifices in vehicles' performance, carrying
capacity, and utility and the agency's estimated technology costs would
underestimate the true economic costs of improving fuel economy.
    Recognizing this possibility, it may be preferable for NHTSA to
estimate explicitly the changes in vehicle buyers' welfare from the
combination of higher prices for new vehicle models, increases in their
fuel economy, and any accompanying changes in vehicle attributes such
as performance, passenger- and cargo-carrying capacity, or other
dimensions of utility. The net change in buyer's welfare that results
from the combination of these changes would provide a more accurate
estimate of the true economic costs for improving fuel economy. The
agency seeks comment on this or other possible ways to deal with this
extremely important issue.
c. The On-Road Fuel Economy ``Gap''
    Actual fuel economy levels achieved by light-duty vehicles in on-
road driving fall somewhat short of their levels measured under the
laboratory-like test conditions used by EPA to establish its published
fuel economy ratings for different models. In analyzing the fuel
savings from alternative CAFE standards, NHTSA has previously adjusted
the actual fuel economy performance of each light truck model downward
from its rated value to reflect the expected size of this on-road fuel
economy ``gap.'' On December 27, 2006, EPA adopted changes to its
regulations on fuel economy labeling, which were intended to bring
vehicles' rated fuel economy levels closer to their actual on-road fuel
economy levels.\486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \486\ 71 FR 77871 (Dec. 27, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its Final Rule, EPA estimated that actual on-road fuel economy
for light-duty vehicles averages 20 percent lower than published fuel
economy levels. For example, if the overall EPA fuel economy rating of
a light truck is 20 mpg, the on-road fuel economy actually achieved by
a typical driver of that vehicle is expected to be 16 mpg (20*.80).
NHTSA employed EPA's revised estimate of this on-road fuel economy gap
in its analysis of the fuel

[[Page 49669]]

savings resulting from alternative CAFE standards evaluated in the MY
2011 final rule.
    For purposes of this NPRM, NHTSA conducted additional analysis of
this issue. The agency used data on the number of passenger cars and
light trucks of each model year that were registered for use during
calendar years 2000 through 2006, average fuel economy for passenger
cars and light trucks produced during each model year, and estimates of
average miles driven per year by cars and light trucks of different
ages. These data were combined to develop estimates of the average fuel
economy that the U.S. passenger car and light truck fleets would have
achieved from 2000 through 2006 under test conditions.
    NHTSA compared these estimates to the Federal Highway
Administration's (FHWA) published values of actual on-road fuel economy
for passenger cars and light trucks during each of those years.\487\
FHWA's estimates of actual fuel economy for passenger cars averaged 22
percent lower than NHTSA's estimates of its fleet-wide average value
under test conditions over this period, while FHWA's estimates for
light trucks averaged 17 lower than NHTSA's estimates of average light
truck fuel economy under test conditions. These results appear to
confirm that the 20 percent on-road fuel economy discount or gap
represents a reasonable estimate for use in evaluating the fuel savings
likely to result from alternative CAFE standards for MY 2012-2016 vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \487\ Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, 2000
through 2006 editions, Table VM-1; see http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
policy/ohpi/hss/hsspubs.cfm (last accessed July 27, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
    Projected future fuel prices are a critical input into the
preliminary economic analysis of alternative CAFE standards, because
they determine the value of fuel savings both to new vehicle buyers and
to society. NHTSA relied on the most recent fuel price projections from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) Annual Energy
Outlook (AEO) for this analysis. Specifically, we used the AEO 2009
(April 2009 release) Reference Case forecasts of inflation-adjusted
(constant-dollar) retail gasoline and diesel fuel prices, which
represent the EIA's most up-to-date estimate of the most likely course
of future prices for petroleum products.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \488\ Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook
2009, Revised Updated Reference Case (April 2009), Table 12.
Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/stimulus/excel/
aeostimtab_12.xls(last accessed July 26, 2009). EIA's Updated
Reference Case reflects the effects of the American Reinvestment and
Recovery Act of 2009, as well as the most recent revisions to the
U.S. and global economic outlook.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While NHTSA relied on the forecasts of fuel prices presented in AEO
2008 High Price Case in the MY 2011 final rule, we noted at the time
that we were relying on that estimate primarily because volatility in
the oil market appeared to have overtaken the Reference Case, and that
we anticipated that the Reference Case forecast would be significantly
higher in the next AEO. In fact, EIA's AEO 2009 Reference Case forecast
projects higher retail fuel prices in most future years than those
forecast in the High Price Case from AEO 2008. NHTSA is thus confident
that the AEO 2009 Reference Case is an appropriate forecast for
projected future fuel prices.
    Measured in constant 2007 dollars, the Reference Case forecast of
retail gasoline prices during calendar year 2020 is $3.62 per gallon,
rising gradually to $3.82 by the year 2030 (these values include
Federal, State and local taxes). To obtain fuel price forecasts for the
years 2031 through 2050, the agency assumes that retail fuel prices
will continue to increase after 2030 at the average annual rates
projected for 2020-2030 in the AEO 2009 Revised Reference Case.\489\
This assumption results in a projected retail price of gasoline that
reaches $4.25 in 2007 dollars by the year 2050.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \489\ This projection uses the rate of increase in fuel prices
for 2020-2030 rather than that over the complete forecast period
(2009-2030) because there is extreme volatility in the forecasts for
the years 2009 through approximately 2020. Using the average rate of
change over the complete 2009-2030 forecast period would result in
projections of declining fuel prices after 2030.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The value of fuel savings resulting from improved fuel economy to
buyers of light-duty vehicles is determined by the retail price of
fuel, which includes Federal, State, and any local taxes imposed on
fuel sales. Total taxes on gasoline, including Federal, State, and
local levies averaged $0.42 per gallon during 2006, while those levied
on diesel averaged $0.50. Because fuel taxes represent transfers of
resources from fuel buyers to government agencies, however, rather than
real resources that are consumed in the process of supplying or using
fuel, their value must be deducted from retail fuel prices to determine
the value of fuel savings resulting from more stringent CAFE standards
to the U.S. economy as a whole.
    NHTSA follows the assumptions used by EIA in AEO 2009 that State
and local gasoline taxes will keep pace with inflation in nominal
terms, and thus remain constant when expressed in constant 2007
dollars. In contrast, EIA assumes that Federal gasoline taxes will
remain unchanged in nominal terms, and thus decline throughout the
forecast period when expressed in constant 2007 dollars. These
differing assumptions about the likely future behavior of Federal and
State/local fuel taxes are consistent with recent historical
experience, which reflects the fact that Federal as well as most State
motor fuel taxes are specified on a cents-per-gallon basis, and
typically require legislation to change.
    The projected value of total taxes is deducted from each future
year's forecast of retail gasoline and diesel prices reported in AEO
2009 to determine the economic value of each gallon of fuel saved
during that year as a result of improved fuel economy. Subtracting fuel
taxes results in a projected value for saving gasoline of $3.22 per
gallon during 2020, rising to $3.45 per gallon by the year 2030.
    EIA includes ``High Price Case'' and ``Low Price Case'' forecasts
in each AEO, which reflect uncertainties regarding future levels of oil
production and demand. These alternative scenarios project retail
gasoline prices that range from a low of $2.02 to a high of $5.04 per
gallon during 2020, and from $2.04 to $5.47 per gallon during 2030. In
conjunction with our assumption that fuel taxes will remain constant in
real or inflation-adjusted terms over this period, these forecasts
imply pre-tax values of saving fuel ranging from $1.63 to $4.65 per
gallon during 2020, and from $1.67 to $5.10 per gallon in 2030. In
conducting the preliminary analysis of uncertainty in benefits and
costs from alternative CAFE standards required by OMB, NHTSA evaluated
the sensitivity of its benefits estimates to these alternative
forecasts of future fuel prices. The results of this sensitivity
analysis can be found in the PRIA.
e. Consumer Valuation of Fuel Economy and Payback Period
    In estimating the value of fuel economy improvements that would
result from alternative CAFE standards to potential vehicle buyers,
NHTSA assumes, as in the MY 2011 final rule, that buyers value the
resulting fuel savings over only part of the expected lifetime of the
vehicles they purchase. Specifically, we assume that buyers value fuel
savings over the first five years of a new vehicle's lifetime, and
discount the value of these future fuel savings at a 3 percent annual
rate. The five-year figure represents

[[Page 49670]]

approximately the current average term of consumer loans to finance the
purchase of new vehicles. We recognize that the period over which
individual buyers finance new vehicle purchases may not correspond
exactly to the time horizons they apply in valuing fuel savings from
higher fuel economy.
    The agency deducts the discounted present value of fuel savings
over the first five years of a vehicle model's lifetime from the
technology costs incurred by its manufacturer to improve that model's
fuel economy to determine the increase in its ``effective price'' to
buyers. The Volpe model uses these estimates of effective costs for
increasing the fuel economy of each vehicle model to identify the order
in which manufacturers would be likely to select models for the
application of fuel economy-improving technologies in order to comply
with stricter standards. The average value of the resulting increase in
effective cost from each manufacturer's simulated compliance strategy
is also used to estimate the impact of alternative standards on its
total sales for future model years.
    However, it is important to recognize that NHTSA estimates the
aggregate value to the U.S. economy of fuel savings resulting from
alternative standards--or their ``social'' value--over the entire
expected lifetimes of vehicles manufactured under those standards,
rather than over this shorter ``payback period'' we assume for their
buyers. The procedure the agency uses for doing so is discussed in
detail in the following section.
f. Vehicle Survival and Use Assumptions
    NHTSA's first step in estimating lifetime fuel consumption by
vehicles produced during a model year is to calculate the number
expected to remain in service during each year following their
production and sale.\490\ This is calculated by multiplying the number
of vehicles originally produced during a model year by the proportion
typically expected to remain in service at their age during each later
year, often referred to as a ``survival rate.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \490\ Vehicles are defined to be of age 1 during the calendar
year corresponding to the model year in which they are produced;
thus for example, model year 2000 vehicles are considered to be of
age 1 during calendar year 2000, age 1 during calendar year 2001,
and to reach their maximum age of 26 years during calendar year
2025. NHTSA considers the maximum lifetime of vehicles to be the age
after which less than 2 percent of the vehicles originally produced
during a model year remain in service. Applying these conventions to
vehicle registration data indicates that passenger cars have a
maximum age of 26 years, while light trucks have a maximum lifetime
of 36 years. See Lu, S., NHTSA, Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation
Division, ``Vehicle Survivability and Travel Mileage Schedules,''
DOT HS 809 952, 8-11 (January 2006). Available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809952.pdf (last accessed July 27, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To estimate production volumes of passenger cars and light trucks
for individual manufacturers, NHTSA relied on a baseline market
forecast constructed by EPA staff beginning with MY 2008 CAFE
certification data. After constructing a MY 2008 baseline, EPA used
projected car and truck volumes for this period from Energy Information
Administration's (EIA's) 2009 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO).\491\
However, AEO projects sales only at the car and truck level, not at the
manufacturer and model-specific level, which are needed in order to
estimate the effects new standards will have on individual
manufacturers.\492\ Therefore, EPA purchased data from CSM-Worldwide
and used their projections of the number of vehicles of each type
predicted to be sold by manufacturers in 2011-2015.\493\ This provided
the year-by-year percentages of cars and trucks sold by each
manufacturer as well as the percentages of each vehicle segment.
Although it was thus necessary to assume the same manufacturer and
segment shares in 2016 as in 2015, 2016 estimates from CSM should be
available for the final rule. Using these percentages normalized to the
AEO projected volumes then provided the manufacturer-specific market
share and model-specific sales for model years 2011-2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \491\ Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/index.html.
NHTSA and EPA made the simplifying assumption that projected sales
of cars and light trucks during each calendar year from 2012 through
2016 represented the likely production volumes for the corresponding
model year. The agency did not attempt to establish the exact
correspondence between projected sales during individual calendar
years and production volumes for specific model years.
    \492\ Because AEO 2009's ``car'' and ``truck'' classes did not
reflect NHTSA's recent reclassification (in March 2009 for
enforcement beginning MY 2011) of many two wheel drive SUVs from the
nonpassenger (i.e., light truck) fleet to the passenger car fleet,
EPA staff made adjustments to account for such vehicles in the baseline.
    \493\ EPA also considered other sources of similar information,
such as J.D. Powers, and concluded that CSM was better able to
provide forecasts at the requisite level of detail for most of the
model years of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To estimate the number of passenger cars and light trucks
originally produced during model years 2012 through 2016 that will
remain in use during each subsequent year the agency applied age-
specific survival rates for cars and light trucks to these adjusted
forecasts of passenger car and light truck sales. In 2008, NHTSA
updated its previous estimates of car and light truck survival rates
using the most current registration data for vehicles produced during
recent model years, in order to ensure that they reflected recent
increases in the durability and expected life spans of cars and light
trucks.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \494\ Lu, S., NHTSA, Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation
Division, ``Vehicle Survivability and Travel Mileage Schedules,''
DOT HS 809 952, 8-11 (January 2006). Available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809952.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2009).
These updated survival rates suggest that the expected lifetimes of
recent-model passenger cars and light trucks are 13.8 and 14.5 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The next step in estimating fuel use is to calculate the total
number of miles that model year 2012-2016 cars and light trucks
remaining in use will be driven each year. To estimate total miles
driven, the number projected to remain in use during each future year
is multiplied by the average number of miles they are expected to be
driven at the age they will reach in that year. The agency estimated
annual usage of cars and light trucks of each age using data from the
Federal Highway Administration's 2001 National Household Transportation
Survey (NHTS).\495\ Because these estimates reflect the historically
low gasoline prices that prevailed at the time the 2001 NHTS was
conducted, however, NHTSA adjusted them to account for the effect on
vehicle use of subsequent increases in fuel prices. Details of this
adjustment are provided in Chapter VIII of the PRIA and Chapter of the
draft joint TSD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \495\ For a description of the Survey, see http://nhts.ornl.gov/
quickStart.shtml (last accessed August 9, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Increases in average annual use of cars and light trucks have been
an important source of historical growth in the total number of miles
they are driven each year. To estimate future growth in their average
annual use for purposes of this rulemaking, NHTSA calculated the rate
of growth in the adjusted mileage schedules derived from the 2001 NHTS
necessary for total car and light truck travel to increase at the rate
forecast in the AEO 2009 Reference Case.\496\ This rate was calculated
to be consistent with future changes in the overall size and age
distributions of the U.S. passenger car and light truck fleets that
result from the agency's forecasts of total car and light truck sales
and updated survival rates. The resulting growth rate in average annual
car and light truck use of approximately 1.1 percent per year was

[[Page 49671]]

applied to the mileage figures derived from the 2001 NHTS to estimate
annual mileage during each year of the expected lifetimes of MY 2012-
2016 cars and light trucks.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \496\ This approach differs from that used in the MY 2011 final
rule, where it was assumed that future growth in the total number of
cars and light trucks in use resulting from projected sales of new
vehicles was adequate by itself to account for growth in total
vehicle use, without assuming continuing growth in average vehicle use.
    \497\ While the adjustment for future fuel prices reduces
average mileage at each age from the values derived from the 2001
NHTS, the adjustment for expected future growth in average vehicle
use increases it. The net effect of these two adjustments is to
increase expected lifetime mileage by about 18 percent significantly
for both passenger cars and about 16 percent for light trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the agency estimated total fuel consumption by passenger
cars and light trucks remaining in use each year by dividing the total
number of miles surviving vehicles are driven by the fuel economy they
are expected to achieve under each alternative CAFE standard. Each
model year's total lifetime fuel consumption is the sum of fuel use by
the cars or light trucks produced during that model year during each
year of their life spans. In turn, the savings in a model year's
lifetime fuel use that will result from each alternative CAFE standard
is the difference between its lifetime fuel use at the fuel economy
level it attains under the Baseline alternative, and its lifetime fuel
use at the higher fuel economy level it is projected to achieve under
that alternative standard.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \498\ To illustrate these calculations, the agency's adjustment
of the AEO 2009 Revised Reference Case forecast indicates that 9.26
million passenger cars will be produced during 2012, and the
agency's updated survival rates show that 83 percent of these
vehicles, or 7.64 million, are projected to remain in service during
the year 2022, when they will have reached an age of 10 years. At
that age, passenger achieving the fuel economy level they are
projected to achieve under the Baseline alternative are driven an
average of about 800 miles, so surviving model year 2012 passenger
cars will be driven a total of 82.5 billion miles (= 7.64 million
surviving vehicles x 10,800 miles per vehicle) during 2022. Summing
the results of similar calculations for each year of their 26-year
maximum lifetime, model year 2012 passenger cars will be driven a
total of 1,395 billion miles under the Baseline alternative. Under
that alternative, they are projected to achieve a test fuel economy
level of 32.4 mpg, which corresponds to actual on-road fuel economy
of 25.9 mpg (= 32.4 mpg x 80 percent). Thus their lifetime fuel use
under the Baseline alternative is projected to be 53.9 billion
gallons (= 1,395 billion miles divided by 25.9 miles per gallon).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

g. Accounting for the Rebound Effect of Higher Fuel Economy
    The fuel economy rebound effect refers to the fraction of fuel
savings expected to result from an increase in vehicle fuel economy--
particularly an increase required by the adoption of higher CAFE
standards--that is offset by additional vehicle use. The increase in
vehicle use occurs because higher fuel economy reduces the fuel cost of
driving, typically the largest single component of the monetary cost of
operating a vehicle, and vehicle owners respond to this reduction in
operating costs by driving slightly more. By lowering the marginal cost
of vehicle use, improved fuel economy may lead to an increase in the
number of miles vehicles are driven each year and over their lifetimes.
Even with their higher fuel economy, this additional driving consumes
some fuel, so the rebound effect reduces the net fuel savings that
result when new CAFE standards require manufacturers to improve fuel economy.
    The magnitude of the rebound effect is an important determinant of
the actual fuel savings that are likely to result from adopting
stricter CAFE standards. Research on the magnitude of the rebound
effect in light-duty vehicle use dates to the early 1980s, and
generally concludes that a statistically significant rebound effect
occurs when vehicle fuel efficiency improves.\499\ The agency reviewed
studies of the rebound effect it had previously relied upon, considered
more recently published estimates, and developed new estimates of its
magnitude for purposes of this NPRM.\500\ Recent studies provide some
evidence that the rebound effect has been declining over time, and may
decline further over the immediate future if incomes rise faster than
gasoline prices. This result appears plausible, because the
responsiveness of vehicle use to variation in fuel costs is expected to
decline as they account for a smaller proportion of the total monetary
cost of driving, which has been the case until very recently. At the
same time, rising personal incomes would be expected to reduce the
sensitivity of vehicle use to fuel costs as the time component of
driving costs--which is likely to be related to income levels--accounts
for a larger fraction the total cost of automobile travel. NHTSA
developed new estimates of the rebound effect by using national data on
light-duty vehicle travel over the period from 1950 through 2006 to
estimate various econometric models of the relationship between vehicle
miles-traveled and factors likely to influence it, including household
income, fuel prices, vehicle fuel efficiency, road supply, the number
of vehicles in use, vehicle prices, and other factors.\501\ The results
of NHTSA's analysis are consistent with the findings from other recent
research: The average long-run rebound effect ranged from 16 percent to
30 percent over the period from 1950 through 2007, while estimates of
the rebound effect in 2007 range from 8 percent to 14 percent.
Projected values of the rebound effect for the period from 2010 through
2030, which the agency developed using forecasts of personal income,
fuel prices, and fuel efficiency from AEO 2009's Reference Case, range
from 4 percent to 16 percent, depending on the specific model used to
generate them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \499\ Some studies estimate that the long-run rebound effect is
significantly larger than the immediate response to increased fuel
efficiency. Although their estimates of the adjustment period
required for the rebound effect to reach its long-run magnitude
vary, this long-run effect is most appropriate for evaluating the
fuel savings and emissions reductions resulting from stricter
standards that would apply to future model years.
    \500\ For details of the agency's analysis, see Chapter VIII of
the PRIA and Chapter 4 of the draft joint TSD accompanying this proposed rule.
    \501\ The agency used several different model specifications and
estimation procedures to control for the effect of fuel prices on
fuel efficiency in order to obtain accurate estimates of the rebound effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of these results, the agency's judgment is that the
apparent decline over time in the magnitude of the rebound effect
justifies using a value for future analysis that is lower than
historical estimates, which average 15-25 percent. Because the
lifetimes of vehicles affected by the alternative CAFE standards
considered in this rulemaking will extend from 2012 until nearly 2050,
a value that is significantly lower than historical estimates appears
to be appropriate. Thus NHTSA has elected to use a 10 percent rebound
effect in its analysis of fuel savings and other benefits from higher
CAFE standards for this NPRM.
    NHTSA also invites comment on other alternatives for estimating the
rebound effect. As one illustration, variation in the price per gallon
of gasoline directly affects the per-mile cost of driving, and drivers
may respond just as they would to a change in the cost of driving
resulting from a change in fuel economy, by varying the number of miles
they drive. Because vehicles' fuel economy is fixed in the short run,
variation in the number of miles driven in response to changes in fuel
prices will be reflected in changes in gasoline consumption. Under the
assumption that drivers respond similarly to changes in the cost of
driving whether they are caused by variation in fuel prices or fuel
economy, the short-run price elasticity of gasoline--which measures the
sensitivity of gasoline consumption to changes in its price per
gallon--may provide some indication about the magnitude of the rebound
effect itself. NHTSA invites comment on the extent to which the short-
run elasticity of demand for gasoline with respect to its price can
provide useful information about the size of the rebound effect.
Specifically, we seek comment on whether it would be

[[Page 49672]]

appropriate to use the price elasticity of demand for gasoline, or
other alternative approaches, to guide the choice of a value for the
rebound effect.
    Additionally, NHTSA recognizes that as the world price of oil falls
in response to lower U.S. demand for oil, there is the potential for an
increase in oil use and, in turn, greenhouse gas emissions outside the
U.S. This so called international oil ``take back'' effect is difficult
to estimate. Given that oil consumption patterns vary across countries,
there will be different demand responses to a change in the world price
of crude oil. In addition, many countries around the world subsidize
their oil consumption. It is not clear how oil consumption would change
due to changes in the market price of oil given the current pattern of
demand and subsidies. Further, many countries, especially in the
developed countries/regions (i.e., the European Union), already have or
anticipate implementing policies to limit GHG emissions. Further out in
the future, it is anticipated that developing countries would take
actions to reduce their GHG emissions as well. Any increases in
petroleum consumption and GHG emissions in other nations that occurs in
response to a decline in world petroleum prices would be attributed to
those nations, and recorded in their respective GHG emissions
inventories. Thus, including the same increase in emissions as part of
the impact of adopting CAFE standards in the U.S. would risk double-
counting of global emissions totals. NHTSA seeks comment on how to
estimate the international ``take back'' effect and its impact on fuel
consumption and GHG emissions. See the Energy Security section of the
TSD, 4.2.8, for more discussion of the impact of the proposed vehicle
rule on oil markets.
h. Benefits From Increased Vehicle Use
    The increase in vehicle use from the rebound effect provides
additional benefits to their owners, who may make more frequent trips
or travel farther to reach more desirable destinations. This additional
travel provides benefits to drivers and their passengers by improving
their access to social and economic opportunities away from home. As
evidenced by their decisions to make more frequent or longer trips when
improved fuel economy reduces their costs for driving, the benefits
from this additional travel exceed the costs drivers and passengers
incur in making more frequent or longer trips.
    The agency's analysis estimates the economic benefits from
increased rebound-effect driving as the sum of fuel costs drivers incur
plus the consumer surplus they receive from the additional
accessibility it provides.\502\ Because the increase in travel depends
on the extent of improvement in fuel economy, the value of benefits it
provides differs among model years and alternative CAFE standards.
Under even those alternatives that would impose the highest standards,
however, the magnitude of these benefits represents a small fraction of
total benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \502\ The consumer surplus provided by added travel is estimated
as one-half of the product of the decline in fuel cost per mile and
the resulting increase in the annual number of miles driven.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. The Value of Increased Driving Range
    Improving vehicles' fuel economy may also increase their driving
range before they require refueling. By reducing the frequency with
which drivers typically refuel, and by extending the upper limit of the
range they can travel before requiring refueling, improving fuel
economy thus provides some additional benefits to their owners.\503\
NHTSA re-examined this issue for purposes of this rulemaking, and found
no information in comments or elsewhere that would cause the agency to
revise its previous approach. Since no direct estimates of the value of
extended vehicle range are available, NHTSA calculates directly the
reduction in the annual number of required refueling cycles that
results from improved fuel economy, and applies DOT-recommended values
of travel time savings to convert the resulting time savings to their
economic value.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \503\ If manufacturers respond to improved fuel economy by
reducing the size of fuel tanks to maintain a constant driving
range, the resulting cost savings will presumably be reflected in
lower vehicle sales prices.
    \504\ See Department of Transportation, Guidance Memorandum,
``The Value of Saving Travel Time: Departmental Guidance for
Conducting Economic Evaluations,'' Apr. 9, 1997. http://
ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VOT97guid.pdf (last accessed August 9,
2009); update available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/
VOTrevision1_2-11-03.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As an illustration, a typical small light truck model has an
average fuel tank size of approximately 20 gallons. Assuming that
drivers typically refuel when their tanks are 55 percent full (i.e., 11
gallons in reserve), increasing this model's actual on-road fuel
economy from 24 to 25 mpg would extend its driving range from 216 miles
(= 9 gallons x 24 mpg) to 225 miles (= 9 gallons x 25 mpg). Assuming
that it is driven 12,000 miles/year, this reduces the number of times
it needs to be refueled each year from 55.6 (= 12,000 miles per year/
216 miles per refueling) to 53.3 (= 12,000 miles per year/225 miles per
refueling), or by 2.3 refuelings per year.
    Weighted by the nationwide mix of urban and rural driving, personal
and business travel in urban and rural areas, and average vehicle
occupancy for driving trips, the DOT-recommended values of travel time
per vehicle-hour is $24.64 (in 2007 dollars).\505\ Assuming that
locating a station and filling up requires five minutes, the annual
value of time saved as a result of less frequent refueling amounts to
$4.72 (calculated as 5/60 x 2.3 x $24.64). This calculation is repeated
for each future year that model year 2012-2016 cars and light trucks
would remain in service. Like fuel savings and other benefits, the
value of this benefit declines over a model year's lifetime, because a
smaller number of vehicles originally produced during that model year remain
in service each year, and those remaining in service are driven fewer miles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \505\ The hourly wage rate during 2008 is estimated to average
$25.50 when expressed in 2007 dollars. Personal travel in urban
areas (which represents 94 percent of urban travel) is valued at 50
percent of the hourly wage rate, while business travel (the
remaining 6 percent of urban travel) is valued at 100 percent of the
hourly wage rate. For intercity travel, personal travel (87 percent
of total intercity travel) is valued at 70 percent of the wage rate,
while business travel (13 percent) is valued at 100 percent of the
wage rate. The resulting values of travel time are $12.67 for urban
travel and $17.66 for intercity travel, and must be multiplied by
vehicle occupancy (1.6) to obtain the estimated values of time per
vehicle hour in urban and rural driving. Finally, about 66% of
driving occurs in urban areas, while the remaining 34% takes place
in rural areas, and these percentages are used to calculate a
weighted average of the value of time in all driving.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA recognizes that many assumptions made in its estimate for the
value of increased driving range are subject to uncertainty. Please see
Chapter 4 of the TSD and Chapter 8 of NHTSA's PRIA for more information
about the uncertainty regarding these assumptions.
j. Added Costs From Congestion, Crashes and Noise
    Increased vehicle use associated with the rebound effect also
contributes to increased traffic congestion, motor vehicle accidents,
and highway noise. NHTSA relies on estimates of per-mile congestion,
accident, and noise costs caused by increased use of automobiles and
light trucks developed by the Federal Highway Administration to
estimate these increased costs.\506\ NHTSA employed these estimates
previously in its analysis accompanying the MY 2011 final rule, and continues

[[Page 49673]]

to find them appropriate for this NPRM after reviewing the procedures
used by FHWA to develop them and considering other available estimates
of these values. The agency multiplies FHWA's estimates of per-mile
costs by the annual increases in automobile and light truck use from
the rebound effect to yield the estimated increases in congestion,
accident, and noise externality costs during each future year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \506\ These estimates were developed by FHWA for use in its 1997
Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study; see http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
policy/hcas/final/index.htm (last accessed August 9, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

k. Petroleum Consumption and Import Externalities
    U.S. consumption and imports of petroleum products also impose
costs on the domestic economy that are not reflected in the market
price for crude petroleum, or in the prices paid by consumers of
petroleum products such as gasoline. These costs include (1) higher
prices for petroleum products resulting from the effect of U.S. oil
import demand on the world oil price; (2) the risk of disruptions to
the U.S. economy caused by sudden reductions in the supply of imported
oil to the U.S.; and (3) expenses for maintaining a U.S. military
presence to secure imported oil supplies from unstable regions, and for
maintaining the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) to cushion against
resulting price increases.\507\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \507\ See, e.g., Bohi, Douglas R. and W. David Montgomery
(1982). Oil Prices, Energy Security, and Import Policy, Washington,
DC: Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press; Bohi,
D. R., and M. A. Toman (1993). ``Energy and Security: Externalities
and Policies,'' Energy Policy 21:1093-1109; and Toman, M. A. (1993).
``The Economics of Energy Security: Theory, Evidence, Policy,'' in
A. V. Kneese and J. L. Sweeney, eds. (1993). Handbook of Natural
Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. III. Amsterdam: North-Holland,
pp. 1167-1218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Higher U.S. imports of crude oil or refined petroleum products
increase the magnitude of these external economic costs, thus
increasing the true economic cost of supplying transportation fuels
above their market prices. Conversely, lowering U.S. imports of crude
petroleum or refined fuels by reducing domestic fuel consumption can
reduce these external costs, and any reduction in their total value
that results from improved fuel economy represents an economic benefit
of more stringent CAFE standards, in addition to the value of saving
fuel itself.
    NHTSA has carefully reviewed its assumptions regarding the
appropriate value of these benefits for this proposed rule. In
analyzing benefits from its recent actions to increase light truck CAFE
standards for model years 2005-07 and 2008-11, NHTSA relied on a 1997
study by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to estimate the value of
reduced economic externalities from petroleum consumption and
imports.\508\ More recently, ORNL updated its estimates of the value of
these externalities, using the analytic framework developed in its
original 1997 study in conjunction with recent estimates of the
variables and parameters that determine their value.\509\ The updated
ORNL study was subjected to a detailed peer review by experts selected
by EPA, and its estimates of the value of oil import externalities were
subsequently revised to reflect their comments and recommendations.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \508\ Leiby, Paul N., Donald W. Jones, T. Randall Curlee, and
Russell Lee, Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, ORNL-
6851, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 1, 1997. Available at
http://pzl1.ed.ornl.gov/ORNL6851.pdf (last accessed August 9, 2009).
    \509\ Leiby, Paul N. ``Estimating the Energy Security Benefits
of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports,'' Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/
TM-2007/028, Revised July 23, 2007. Available at http://
pzl1.ed.ornl.gov/energysecurity.html (click on link below ``Oil
Imports Costs and Benefits'') (last accessed August 9, 2009).
    \510\ Peer Review Report Summary: Estimating the Energy Security
Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports, ICF, Inc., September 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the request of EPA, ORNL further revised its 2008 estimates of
external costs from U.S. oil imports to reflect recent changes in the
outlook for world petroleum prices and continuing changes in the
structure and characteristics of global petroleum supply and demand.
    These most recent revisions increase ORNL's estimates of the
``monopsony premium'' associated with U.S. oil imports, which measures
the reduced value of payments from U.S. oil purchasers to foreign oil
suppliers beyond the savings from reduced purchases of petroleum itself
that results when lower U.S. import demand reduces the world price of
petroleum.\511\ Consistency with NHTSA's use of estimates of the global
benefits from reducing emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse
gases in this analysis, however, requires the use of a global
perspective for assessing their net value. From this perspective,
reducing these payments simply results in a transfer of resources from
foreign oil suppliers to U.S. purchasers (or more properly, in a
savings in the value of resources previously transferred from U.S.
purchasers to foreign producers), and provides no real savings in
resources to the global economy. Thus NHTSA's analysis of the benefits
from adopting higher CAFE standards for MY 2012-2016 cars and light
trucks excludes the reduced value of monopsony payments by U.S. oil
consumers that might result from lower fuel consumption by these vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \511\ The reduction in payments from U.S. oil purchasers to
domestic petroleum producers is not included as a benefit, since it
represents a transfer that occurs entirely within the U.S. economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The literature on the energy security for the last two decades has
routinely combined the monopsony and the macroeconomic disruption
components when calculating the total value of the energy security
premium. However, in the context of using a global value for the Social
Cost of Carbon (SCC) the question arises: How should the energy
security premium be used when some benefits from the proposed rule,
such as the benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, are
calculated at a global level? Monopsony benefits represent avoided
payments by the U.S. to oil producers in foreign countries that result
from a decrease in the world oil price as the U.S. decreases its
consumption of imported oil. Although there is clearly a benefit to the
U.S. when considered from the domestic perspective, the decrease in
price due to decreased demand in the U.S. also represents a loss of
income to oil-producing countries. Given the redistributive nature of
this effect, do the negative effects on other countries ``net out'' the
positive impacts to the U.S.? If this is the case, then, the monopsony
portion of the energy security premium should be excluded from the net
benefits calculation for the rule.
    As the preceding discussion has indicated, the agencies omitted the
reduction in monopsony payments that occurs when U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports are reduced from their estimates of economic
benefits for the proposed rules. Since the reduction in monopsony
payments by U.S. oil consumers is exactly offset by a decline in income
to suppliers of imported oil, this omission ensures consistency of the
agencies' analysis with the inclusion of global benefits from reducing
emissions of greenhouse gas emissions. The agencies seek comment on
whether, from other perspectives, it would be reasonable to include
both the global value of reducing GHG emissions and the reduction in
monopsony payments by U.S. consumers of petroleum products in their
estimates of total economic benefits from reducing U.S. fuel consumption.
    ORNL's most recently revised estimates of the increase in the
expected costs associated with potential disruptions in U.S. petroleum
imports imply that each gallon of imported fuel or petroleum saved
reduces the expected costs of oil supply disruptions

[[Page 49674]]

to the U.S. economy by $0.16 per gallon (in 2007$). The reduction in
expected disruption costs represents a real savings in resources, and
thus contributes economic benefits in addition to the savings in fuel
production costs that result from increasing fuel economy. NHTSA
employs this value in its evaluation of the economic benefits from
adopting higher CAFE standards for MY 2012-2016 cars and light trucks.
    NHTSA's analysis does not include savings in budgetary outlays to
support U.S. military activities among the benefits of higher fuel
economy and the resulting fuel savings.\512\ NHTSA's analysis of
benefits from alternative CAFE standards for MY 2012-2016 also excludes
any cost savings from maintaining a smaller SPR from its estimates of
the external benefits of reducing gasoline consumption and petroleum
imports. This view concurs with that of the recent ORNL study of
economic costs from U.S. oil imports, which concludes that savings in
government outlays for these purposes are unlikely to result from
reductions in consumption of petroleum products and oil imports on the
scale of those resulting from higher CAFE standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \512\ However, the agency conducted a sensitivity analysis of
the potential effect of assuming that some reduction military
spending would result from fuel savings and reduced petroleum imports
in order to investigate its impacts on the standards and fuel savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on a detailed analysis of differences in fuel consumption,
petroleum imports, and imports of refined petroleum products among the
Reference Case, High Economic Growth, and Low Economic Growth Scenarios
presented in AEO 2009, NHTSA estimates that approximately 50 percent of
the reduction in fuel consumption resulting from adopting higher CAFE
standards is likely to be reflected in reduced U.S. imports of refined
fuel, while the remaining 50 percent would be reduce domestic fuel
refining.\513\ Of this latter figure, 90 percent is anticipated to
reduce U.S. imports of crude petroleum for use as a refinery feedstock,
while the remaining 10 percent is expected to reduce U.S. domestic
production of crude petroleum.\514\ Thus on balance, each 100 gallons
of fuel saved as a consequence of higher CAFE standards is anticipated
to reduce total U.S. imports of crude petroleum or refined fuel by 95
gallons.\515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \513\ Differences between forecast annual U.S. imports of crude
petroleum and refined products among these three scenarios range
from 24-89 percent of differences in projected annual gasoline and
diesel fuel consumption in the U.S. These differences average 49
percent over the forecast period spanned by AEO 2009.
    \514\ Differences between forecast annual U.S. imports of crude
petroleum among these three scenarios range from 67-97 percent of
differences in total U.S. refining of crude petroleum, and average
85 percent over the forecast period spanned by AEO 2009.
    \515\ This figure is calculated as 50 gallons + 50 gallons * 90%
= 50 gallons + 45 gallons = 95 gallons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

l. Air Pollutant Emissions
i. Impacts on Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions
    Criteria air pollutants emitted by vehicles and during fuel
production include carbon monoxide (CO), hydrocarbon compounds (usually
referred to as ``volatile organic compounds,'' or VOC), nitrogen oxides
(NOX), fine particulate matter (PM2.5), and
sulfur oxides (SOX). While reductions in domestic fuel
refining and distribution that result from lower fuel consumption will
reduce U.S. emissions of these pollutants, additional vehicle use
associated with the rebound effect from higher fuel economy will
increase their emissions. Thus the net effect of stricter CAFE
standards on emissions of each criteria pollutant depends on the
relative magnitudes of its reduced emissions in fuel refining and
distribution, and increases in its emissions from vehicle use. Because
the relationship between emissions in fuel refining and vehicle use is
different for each criteria pollutant, the net effect of fuel savings
from the proposed standards on total emissions of each pollutant is
likely to differ. We note that any benefits in terms of criteria air
pollutant reductions resulting from this rule would not be direct benefits.
    With the exception of SO2, NHTSA calculated annual
emissions of each criteria pollutant resulting from vehicle use by
multiplying its estimates of car and light truck use during each year
over their expected lifetimes by per-mile emission rates appropriate to
each vehicle type, fuel, model year, and age. These emission rates were
developed by U.S. EPA using its Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (Draft
MOVES 2009).\516\ Emission rates for SO2 were calculated by
NHTSA using average fuel sulfur content estimates supplied by EPA,
together with the assumption that the entire sulfur content of fuel is
emitted in the form of SO2.\517\ Total SO2
emissions under each alternative CAFE standard were calculated by
applying the resulting emission rates directly to estimated annual
gasoline and diesel fuel use by cars and light trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \516\ The MOVES model assumes that the per-mile rates at which
these pollutants are emitted are determined by EPA regulations and
the effectiveness of catalytic after-treatment of engine exhaust
emissions, and are thus unaffected by changes in car and light truck
fuel economy.
    \517\ These are 30 and 15 parts per million (ppm, measured on a
mass basis) for gasoline and diesel respectively, which produces
emission rates of 0.17 grams of SO2 per gallon of
gasoline and 0.10 grams per gallon of diesel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with other impacts, the changes in emissions of criteria air
pollutants resulting from alternative increases in CAFE standards for
MY 2012-2016 cars and light trucks were calculated from the differences
between emissions under each alternative that would increase CAFE
standards, and emissions under the baseline alternative.
    NHTSA estimated the reductions in criteria pollutant emissions from
producing and distributing fuel that would occur under alternative CAFE
standards using emission rates obtained by EPA from Argonne National
Laboratories' Greenhouse Gases and Regulated Emissions in
Transportation (GREET) model.\518\ The GREET model provides separate
estimates of air pollutant emissions that occur in different phases of
fuel production and distribution, including crude oil extraction,
transportation, and storage, fuel refining, and fuel distribution and
storage.\519\ EPA modified the GREET model to change certain
assumptions about emissions during crude petroleum extraction and
transportation, as well as to update its emission rates to reflect
adopted and pending EPA emission standards. NHTSA converted these
emission rates from the mass per fuel energy content basis on which
GREET reports them to mass per gallon of fuel supplied using estimates
of fuel energy content supplied by GREET.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \518\ Argonne National Laboratories, The Greenhouse Gas and
Regulated Emissions from Transportation (GREET) Model, Version 1.8,
June 2007, available at http://www.transportation.anl.gov/modeling_
simulation/GREET/index.html (last accessed August 9, 2009).
    \519\ Emissions that occur during vehicle refueling at retail
gasoline stations (primarily evaporative emissions of volatile
organic compounds, or VOCs) are already accounted for in the
``tailpipe'' emission factors used to estimate the emissions
generated by increased light truck use. GREET estimates emissions in
each phase of gasoline production and distribution in mass per unit
of gasoline energy content; these factors are then converted to mass
per gallon of gasoline using the average energy content of gasoline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The resulting emission rates were applied to the agency's estimates
of fuel consumption under each alternative CAFE standard to develop
estimates of total emissions of each criteria pollutant during fuel
production and distribution. The assumptions about the effects of
changes in fuel consumption on domestic and imported sources of fuel
supply discussed above were then employed to calculate the effects of

[[Page 49675]]

reductions in fuel use from alternative CAFE standards on changes in
imports of refined fuel and domestic refining. NHTSA's analysis assumes
that reductions in imports of refined fuel would reduce criteria
pollutant emissions during fuel storage and distribution only.
Reductions in domestic fuel refining using imported crude oil as a
feedstock are assumed to reduce emissions during fuel refining,
storage, and distribution, because each of these activities would be
reduced. Reduced domestic fuel refining using domestically-produced
crude oil is assumed to reduce emissions during all four phases of fuel
production and distribution.\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \520\ In effect, this assumes that the distances crude oil
travels to U.S. refineries are approximately the same regardless of
whether it travels from domestic oilfields or import terminals, and
that the distances that gasoline travels from refineries to retail
stations are approximately the same as those from import terminals
to gasoline stations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, NHTSA calculated the net changes in domestic emissions of
each criteria pollutant by summing the increases in emissions projected
to result from increased vehicle use, and the reductions anticipated to
result from lower domestic fuel refining and distribution.\521\ As
indicated previously, the effect of adopting higher CAFE standards on
total emissions of each criteria pollutant depends on the relative
magnitudes of the resulting reduction in emissions from fuel refining
and distribution, and the increase in emissions from additional vehicle
use. Although these net changes vary significantly among individual
criteria pollutants, the agency projects that on balance, adopting
higher CAFE standards would reduce emissions of all criteria air
pollutants except carbon monoxide (CO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \521\ All emissions from increased vehicle use are assumed to
occur within the U.S., since CAFE standards would apply only to
vehicles produced for sale in the U.S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The net changes in domestic emissions of fine particulates
(PM2.5) and its chemical precursors (such as NOX,
SOX, and VOCs) are converted to economic values using
estimates of the reductions in health damage costs per ton of emissions
of each pollutant that is avoided, which were developed and recently
revised by EPA. These savings represent the estimated reductions in the
value of damages to human health resulting from lower atmospheric
concentrations and population exposure to air pollution that occur when
emissions of each pollutant that contributes to atmospheric
PM2.5 concentrations are reduced. The value of reductions in
the risk of premature death due to exposure to fine particulate
pollution (PM2.5) account for a majority of EPA's estimated
values of reducing criteria pollutant emissions, although the value of
avoiding other health impacts is also included in these estimates.
These values do not include a number of unquantified benefits, such as
reduction in the welfare and environmental impacts of PM2.5
pollution, or reductions in health and welfare impacts related to other
criteria pollutants (ozone, NO2, and SO2) and air
toxics. EPA estimates different PM-related per-ton values for reducing
emissions from vehicle use than for reductions in emissions of that
occur during fuel production and distribution.\522\ NHTSA applies these
separate values to its estimates of changes in emissions from vehicle
use and fuel production and distribution to determine the net change in
total economic damages from emissions of these pollutants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \522\ These reflect differences in the typical geographic
distributions of emissions of each pollutant, their contributions to
ambient PM2.5 concentrations, pollution levels
(predominantly those of PM2.5), and resulting changes in
population exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA projects that the per-ton values for reducing emissions of
criteria pollutants from both mobile sources (including motor vehicles)
and stationary sources such as fuel refineries and storage facilities
will increase over time. These projected increases reflect rising
income levels, which are assumed to increase affected individuals'
willingness to pay for reduced exposure to health threats from air
pollution, as well as future population growth, which increases
population exposure to future levels of air pollution.
ii. Reductions in CO2 Emissions
    Emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) occur
throughout the process of producing and distributing transportation
fuels, as well as from fuel combustion itself. By reducing the volume
of fuel consumed by passenger cars and light trucks, higher CAFE
standards will reduce GHG emissions generated by fuel use, as well as
throughout the fuel supply cycle. Lowering these emissions is likely to
slow the projected pace and reduce the ultimate extent of future
changes in the global climate, thus reducing future economic damages
that changes in the global climate are expected to cause. By reducing
the probability that climate changes with potentially catastrophic
economic or environmental impacts will occur, lowering GHG emissions
may also result in economic benefits that exceed the resulting
reduction in the expected future economic costs caused by gradual
changes in the earth's climatic systems.
    Quantifying and monetizing benefits from reducing GHG emissions is
thus an important step in estimating the total economic benefits likely
to result from establishing higher CAFE standards. The agency estimated
emissions of CO2 from passenger car and light truck use by
multiplying the number of gallons of each type of fuel (gasoline and
diesel) they are projected to consume under alternative CAFE standards
by the quantity or mass of CO2 emissions released per gallon
of fuel consumed. This calculation assumes that the entire carbon
content of each fuel is converted to CO2 emissions during
the combustion process. Carbon dioxide emissions account for nearly 95
percent of total GHG emissions that result from fuel combustion during
vehicle use.
iii. Economic Value of Reductions in CO2 Emissions
    NHTSA has taken the economic benefits of reducing CO2
emission into account in this rulemaking, both in developing proposed
CAFE standards and in assessing the economic benefits of each
alternative that was considered. Since direct estimates of the economic
benefits from reducing GHG emissions are generally not reported in
published literature on the impacts of climate change, these benefits
are typically assumed to be the ``mirror image'' of the estimated
incremental costs resulting from an increase in those emissions. That
is, the benefits from reducing emissions are usually measured by the
savings in estimated economic damages that an equivalent increase in
emissions would otherwise have caused.
    The ``social cost of carbon'' (SCC) is intended to be a monetary
measure of the incremental damage resulting from carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions, including (but not limited to) net
agricultural productivity loss, human health effects, property damages
from sea level rise, and changes in ecosystem services. Any effort to
quantify and to monetize the consequences associated with climate
change will raise serious questions of science, economics, and ethics.
But with full regard for the limits of both quantification and
monetization, the SCC can be used to provide an estimate of the social
benefits of reductions in GHG emissions.
    For at least four reasons, any particular figure will be
contestable. First, scientific and economic knowledge about the impacts
of climate change continues to grow. With new and better information
about relevant questions, including the cost, burdens, and possibility
of adaptation, current

[[Page 49676]]

estimates will inevitably change over time. Second, some of the likely
and potential damages from climate change--for example, the loss of
endangered species--are generally not included in current SCC
estimates. These omissions may turn out to be significant; in the sense
that they may mean that the best current estimates are too low. As
noted by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, ``It is very likely that
globally aggregated figures underestimate the damage costs because they
cannot include many non-quantifiable impacts.'' Third, it is unlikely
that the damage estimates account for the directed technological change
that will lead to innovations that reduce the costs of responding to
climate change--for example, it is likely that scientists will develop
crops that are better able to withstand high temperatures. In this
respect, the current estimates may overstate the likely damages.
Fourth, controversial ethical judgments, including those involving the
treatment of future generations, play a role in judgments about the SCC
(see in particular the discussion of the discount rate, below).
    To date, SCC estimates presented in recent regulatory documents
have varied within and among agencies, including DOT, DOE, and EPA. For
example, a regulation proposed by DOT in 2008 assumed a value of $7 per
ton CO2 \523\ (2006$) for 2011 emission reductions (with a
range of $0-14 for sensitivity analysis). A regulation finalized by DOE
used a range of $0-$20 (2007$). Both of these ranges were designed to
reflect the value of damages to the United States resulting from carbon
emissions, or the ``domestic'' SCC. In the final MY 2011 CAFE EIS, DOT
used both a domestic SCC value of $2/tCO2 and a global SCC
value of $33/tCO2 (with sensitivity analysis at $80/
tCO2), increasing at 2.4 percent per year thereafter. The
final MY 2011 CAFE rule also presented a range from $2 to $80/
tCO2. EPA's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
Greenhouse Gases discussed the benefits of reducing GHG emissions and
identified what it described as ``very preliminary'' SCC estimates
``subject to revision'' that spanned three orders of magnitude. EPA's
global mean values were $68 and $40/tCO2 for discount rates
of 2 percent and 3 percent respectively (in 2006 real dollars for 2007
emissions).\524\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \523\ For the purposes of this discussion, we present all values
of the SCC as the cost per ton of CO2 emissions. Some
discussions of the SCC in the literature use an alternative
presentation of a dollar per ton of Carbon. The standard adjustment
factor is 3.67, which means, for example, that a SCC of $10 per ton
of CO2 would be equivalent to a cost of $36.70 for a ton
of carbon emitted.
    \524\ 73 FR 44416 (July 30, 2008). EPA, ``Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act,
Technical Support Document on Benefits of Reducing GHG Emissions,''
June 2008. www.regulations.gov. Search for ID ``EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-
0318-0078.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current Administration has worked to develop a transparent
methodology for selecting a set of interim SCC estimates to use in
regulatory analyses until a more comprehensive characterization of the
distribution of SCC is developed. This discussion proposes a set of
values for the interim social cost of carbon. It should be emphasized
that the analysis here is preliminary. Today's proposed joint
rulemaking presents SCC estimates that reflect the Administration's
current understanding of the relevant literature. These interim
estimates are being used for the short-term while an interagency group
develops a more comprehensive characterization of the distribution of
SCC values for future economic and regulatory analyses. The interim
values should not be viewed as a statement about the results of the
longer-term process. The Administration will be evaluating and seeking
comment in the preamble to today's proposed rule on all of the
scientific, economic, and ethical issues before establishing final
estimates for use in future rulemakings.
    The outcomes of the Administration's process to develop interim
values are judgments in favor of (a) global rather than domestic
values, (b) an annual growth rate of 3%, and (c) interim global SCC
estimates for 2007 (in 2006 dollars) of $55, $33, $19, $10, and $5 per
ton of CO2. Notably, we have centered our current attention
on a SCC of $19. The proposed figures are based on the following judgments.
    1. Global and domestic measures. Because of the distinctive nature
of the climate change problem, we present both a global SCC and a
fraction of that value that represents impacts that may occur within
the borders of the U.S. alone, or a ``domestic'' SCC, but center our
current attention on the global measure. This approach represents a
departure from past practices, which relied, for the most part, on
domestic measures. As a matter of law, both global and domestic values
are permissible; the relevant statutory provisions are ambiguous and
allow selection of either measure.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \525\ It is true that Federal statutes are presumed not to have
extraterritorial effect, in part to ensure that the laws of the
United States respect the interests of foreign sovereigns. But use
of a global measure for the SCC does not give extraterritorial
effect to Federal law and hence does not intrude on such interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is true that under OMB guidance, analysis from the domestic
perspective is required, while analysis from the international
perspective is optional. The domestic decisions of one nation are not
typically based on a judgment about the effects of those decisions on
other nations. But the climate change problem is highly unusual in the
sense that it involves (a) a global public good in which (b) the
emissions of one nation may inflict significant damages on other
nations and (c) the United States is actively engaged in promoting an
international agreement to reduce worldwide emissions.
    In these circumstances, we believe the global measure is preferred.
Use of a global measure reflects the reality of the problem and is
expected to contribute to the continuing efforts of the United States
to ensure that emissions reductions occur in many nations.
    Domestic SCC values are also presented. The development of a
domestic SCC is greatly complicated by the relatively few region- or
country-specific estimates of the SCC in the literature. One potential
source of estimates comes from a recent unpublished EPA modeling effort
using the FUND model. The resulting estimates suggest that the ratio of
domestic to global benefits varies with key parameter assumptions. With
a 3 percent discount rate, for example, the U.S. benefit is about 6
percent of the global benefit for the ``central'' (mean) FUND results,
while, for the corresponding ``high'' estimates associated with a
higher climate sensitivity and lower global economic growth, the U.S.
benefit is less than 4 percent of the global benefit. With a 2 percent
discount rate, the U.S. share is about 2-5 percent of the global estimate.
    Based on this available evidence, an interim domestic SCC value
equal to 6 percent of the global damages is proposed. This figure is in
the middle of the range of available estimates from the literature. It
is recognized that the 6 percent figure is approximate and highly
speculative and alternative approaches will be explored before
establishing final values for future rulemakings.
    2. Filtering existing analyses. There are numerous SCC estimates in
the existing literature, and it is reasonable to make use of those
estimates in order to produce a figure for current use. A starting
point is provided by the meta-analysis in Richard Tol, 2008.\526\ With

[[Page 49677]]

that starting point, the Administration proposes to ``filter'' existing
SCC estimates by using those that (1) are derived from peer-reviewed
studies; (2) do not weight the monetized damages to one country more
than those in other countries; (3) use a ``business as usual'' climate
scenario; and (4) are based on the most recent published version of
each of the three major integrated assessment models (IAMs): FUND,
PAGE, and DICE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \526\ Richard Tol, The Social Cost of Carbon: Trends, Outliers,
and Catastrophes, Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-
Journal, Vol. 2, 2008-25. http://www.economics-ejournal.org/
economics/journalarticles/2008-25 Exit Disclaimer (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposal (1) is based on the view that those studies that have been
subject to peer review are more likely to be reliable than those that
have not been. Proposal (2) is based on a principle of neutrality and
simplicity; it does not treat the citizens of one nation (or different
citizens within the U.S.) differently on the basis of speculative or
controversial considerations. Further, it is consistent with the
potential compensation tests of Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1940), which
use unweighted sums of willingness to pay. Finally, this is the
approach used in rulemakings across a variety of settings and
consequently keeps U.S. government policy consistent across contexts.
    Proposal (3) stems from the judgment that as a general rule, the
proper way to assess a policy decision is by comparing the
implementation of the policy against a counterfactual state where the
policy is not implemented. In addition, our expectation is that most
policies to be evaluated using these interim SCC estimates will
constitute small enough changes to the larger economy to safely assume
that the marginal benefits of emissions reductions will not change
between the baseline and policy scenarios. A departure from this
approach would be to consider a more dynamic setting in which other
countries might implement policies to reduce GHG emissions at an
unknown future date and the U.S. could choose to implement such a
policy now or at a future date.
    Proposal (4) is based on four complementary judgments. First, the
FUND, PAGE, and DICE models now stand as the most comprehensive and
reliable efforts to measure the economic damages from climate change.
Second, the latest versions of the three IAMs are likely to reflect the
most recent evidence and learning, and hence they are presumed to be
superior to those that preceded them. Third, any effort to choose among
them, or to reject one in favor of the others, would be difficult to
defend at the present time. In the absence of a clear reason to choose
among them, it is reasonable to base the SCC on all of them. Fourth, in
light of the uncertainties associated with the SCC, the additional
information offered by different models is important.
    3. Use a model-weighted average of the estimates at each discount
rate. At this time, a scientifically valid reason to prefer any of the
three major IAMs (FUND, PAGE, and DICE) has not been identified.
Accordingly, to address the concern that certain models not be given
unequal weight relative to the other models, the estimates are based on
an equal weighting of the means of the estimates from each of the
models. Among estimates that remain after applying the filter, we begin
by taking the average of all estimates within a model. The estimated
SCC is then calculated as the average of the three model-specific
averages. This approach is used to ensure that models with a greater
number of published results do not exert unequal weight on the interim
SCC estimates.
    4. Apply a 3 percent annual growth rate to the chosen SCC values.
SCC is assumed to increase over time, because future emissions are
expected to produce larger incremental damages as physical and economic
systems become more stressed as the magnitude of climate change
increases. Indeed, an implied growth rate in the SCC can be produced by
most of the models that estimate economic damages caused by increased
GHG emissions in future years. But neither the rate itself nor the
information necessary to derive its implied value is commonly reported.
In light of the limited amount of debate thus far about the appropriate
growth rate of the SCC, applying a rate of 3 percent per year seems
appropriate at this stage. This value is consistent with the range
recommended by IPCC (2007) and close to the latest published estimate
(Hope 2008).
(1) Discount Rates
    For estimation of the benefits associated with the mitigation of
climate change, one of the most complex issues involves the appropriate
discount rate. OMB's current guidance offers a detailed discussion of
the relevant issues and calls for discount rates of 3 percent and 7
percent. It also permits a sensitivity analysis with low rates (1-3
percent) for intergenerational problems: ``If your rule will have
important intergenerational benefits or costs you might consider a
further sensitivity analysis using a lower but positive discount rate
in addition to calculating net benefits using discount rates of 3 and 7
percent.'' \527\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \527\ See OMB Circular A-4, pp. 35-36, citing Portney and
Weyant, eds. (1999), Discounting and Intergenerational Equity,
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The choice of a discount rate, especially over long periods of
time, raises highly contested and exceedingly difficult questions of
science, economics, philosophy, and law. See, e.g., William Nordhaus,
The Challenge of Global Warming (2008); Nicholas Stern, The Economics
of Climate Change (2007); Discounting and Intergenerational Equity
(Paul Portney and John Weyant eds. 1999). It is not clear that future
generations would be willing to trade environmental quality for
consumption at the same rate as the current generations. Under
imaginable assumptions, decisions based on cost-benefit analysis with
high discount rates might harm future generations--at least if
investments are not made for the benefit of those generations. See
Robert Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Discounting, id. at 173,
176-177. It is also possible that the use of low discount rates for
particular projects might itself harm future generations, by ensuring
that resources are not used in a way that would greatly benefit them.
In the context of climate change, questions of intergenerational equity
are especially important.
    Reasonable arguments support the use of a 3 percent discount rate.
First, that rate is among the two figures suggested by OMB guidance,
and hence it fits with existing national policy. Second, it is standard
to base the discount rate on the compensation that people receive for
delaying consumption, and the 3 percent is close to the risk-free rate
of return, proxied by the return on long term inflation-adjusted U.S.
Treasury Bonds, as of this writing. Although these rates are currently
closer to 2.5 percent, the use of 3 percent provides an adjustment for
the liquidity premium that is reflected in these bonds' returns.
    At the same time, others would argue that a 5 percent discount rate
can be supported. The argument relies on several assumptions. First,
that rate can also be justified by reference to the level of
compensation for delaying consumption, because it fits with market
behavior with respect to individuals' willingness to trade-off
consumption across periods as measured by the estimated post-tax
average real returns to risky private investments (e.g., the S&P 500).
In the climate setting, the 5 percent discount rate may be preferable
to the riskless rate because it is based on risky investments and the
return to projects to mitigate climate change is also risky. In
contrast, the 3 percent riskless rate may be a more appropriate
discount rate for

[[Page 49678]]

projects where the return is known with a high degree of confidence
(e.g., highway guardrails). In principal, the correct discount rate
would reflect the variance in payoff from climate mitigation policy and
the correlation between the payoffs of the policy and the broader
economy.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \528\ Specifically, if the benefits of the policy are highly
correlated with the returns from broader economy, then the market
rate should be used to discount the benefits. If the benefits are
uncorrelated with the broader economy the long term government bond
rate should be applied. Furthermore, if the benefits are negatively
correlated with the broader economy a rate less than that on long
term government bonds should be used (Lind, 1982 pp. 89-90).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, 5 percent, and not 3 percent, is roughly consistent with
estimates implied by reasonable inputs to the theoretically derived
Ramsey equation, which specifies the optimal time path for consumption.
That equation specifies the optimal discount rate as the sum of two
components. The first term (the product of the elasticity of the
marginal utility of consumption and the growth rate of consumption)
reflects the fact that consumption in the future is likely to be higher
than consumption today, so diminishing marginal utility implies that
the same monetary damage will cause a smaller reduction of utility in
the future. Standard estimates of this term from the economics
literature are in the range of 3 percent-5 percent. The second
component reflects the possibility that a lower weight should be placed
on utility in the future, to account for social impatience or
extinction risk, which is specified by a pure rate of time preference
(PRTP). A common estimate of the PRTP is 2 percent, though some
observers believe that a principle of intergenerational equity suggests
that the PRTP should be close to zero. It follows that discount rate of
5 percent is near the middle of the range of values that are able to be
derived from the Ramsey equation.
    It is recognized that the arguments above--for use of market
behavior and the Ramsey equation--face objections in the context of
climate change, and of course there are alternative approaches. In
light of climate change, it is possible that consumption in the future
will not be higher than consumption today, and if so, the Ramsey
equation will suggest a lower figure. However, the historical evidence
is consistent with rising consumption over time.
    Some critics note that using observed interest rates for inter-
generational decisions imposes current preferences on future
generations, which some economists say may not be appropriate. For
generational equity, they argue that the discount rate should be below
market rates to correct for market distortions and inefficiencies in
inter-generational transfers of wealth (which are presumed to
compensate future generations for damage), and to treat generations
equitably based on ethical principles (see Broome 2008).\529\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \529\ See Arrow, K.J., W.R. Cline, K-G Maler, M. Munasinghe, R.
Squiteri, J.E. Stiglitz, 1996. ``Intertemporal equity, discounting
and economic efficiency,'' in Climate Change 1995: Economic and
Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group
III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change. See also Weitzman, M.L., 1999. In Portney, P.R.
and Weyant J.P. (eds.), Discounting and Intergenerational Equity,
Resources for the Future, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, some analyses attempt to deal with uncertainty with
respect to interest rates over time. We explore below how this might be
done.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \530\ Richard Newell and William Pizer, Discounting the distant
future: how much do uncertain rates increase valuations? J. Environ.
Econ. Manage. 46 (2003) 52-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Proposed Interim Estimates
    The application of the methodology outlined above yields interim
estimates of the SCC that are reported in Table IV.C.3-2. These
estimates are reported separately using 3 percent and 5 percent
discount rates. The cells are empty in rows 10 and 11, because these
studies did not report estimates of the SCC at a 3 percent discount
rate. The model-weighted means are reported in the final or summary
row; they are $33 per tCO2 at a 3 percent discount rate and
$5 per tCO2 with a 5 percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \531\ Most of the estimates in Table 1 rely on climate scenarios
developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The IPCC published a new set of scenarios in 2000 for use in the
Third Assessment Report (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios--
SRES). The SRES scenarios define four narrative storylines: A1, A2,
B1 and B2, describing the relationships between the forces driving
greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions and their evolution during the
21st century for large world regions and globally. Each storyline
represents different demographic, social, economic, technological,
and environmental developments that diverge in increasingly
irreversible ways. The storylines are summarized in Nakicenovic et
al., 2000 (see also http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/ddc/sres/ Exit Disclaimer).
Because the B1 and B2 storylines represent policy cases rather than
business-as-usual projections, estimates derived from these
scenarios to be less appropriate for use in benefit-cost analysis.
They are therefore excluded.
    \532\ Guo et al. (2006) report estimates based on two Gollier
discounting schemes. The Gollier discounting assumes complex
specifications about individual utility functions and risk
preferences. After various conditions are satisfied, declining
social discount rates emerge. Gollier Discounting Scheme 1 employs a
certainty-equivalent social rate of time preference (SRTP) derived
by assuming the regional growth rate is equally likely to be 1%
above or below the original forecast growth rate. Gollier
Discounting Scheme 2 calculates a certainty-equivalent social rate
of time preference (SRTP) using five possible growth rates, and
applies the new SRTP instead of the original. Hope (2008) conducts
Monte Carlo analysis on the PRTP component of the discount rate. The
PRTP is modeled as a triangular distribution with a min value of 1%/
yr, a most likely value of 2%/yr, and a max value of 3%/yr.

    Table IV.C.3-2--Global Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) Estimates ($/tCO2 in 2007 (2006$)), Based on 3% and 5%
                                                 Discount Rates*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Model                              Study                 Climate scenario         3%      5%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 FUND..................................  Anthoff et al. 2009.......  FUND default..............       6      -1
2 FUND..................................  Anthoff et al. 2009.......  SRES A1b..................       1      -1
3 FUND..................................  Anthoff et al. 2009.......  SRES A2...................       9      -1
4 FUND..................................  Link and Tol 2004.........  No THC....................      12       3
5 FUND..................................  Link and Tol 2004.........  THC continues.............      12       2
6 FUND..................................  Guo et al. 2006...........  Constant PRTP.............       5      -1
7 FUND..................................  Guo et al. 2006...........  Gollier discount 1........      14       0
8 FUND..................................  Guo et al. 2006...........  Gollier discount 2........       7      -1
                                                                      FUND Mean.................    8.25       0
9 PAGE..................................  Wahba & Hope 2006.........  A2-scen...................      57       7
10 PAGE.................................  Hope 2006.................  ..........................  ......       7
11 DICE.................................  Nordhaus 2008.............  ..........................  ......       8

[[Page 49679]]

Summary.................................  ..........................  Model-weighted Mean.......      33       5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The sample includes all peer reviewed, non-equity-weighted estimates included in Tol (2008), Nordhaus (2008),
  Hope (2008), and Anthoff et al. (2009), that are based on the most recent published version of FUND, PAGE, or
  DICE and use business-as-usual climate scenarios.531 532 All values are based on the best available
  information from the underlying studies about the base year and year dollars, rather than the Tol (2008)
  assumption that all estimates included in his review are 1995 values in 1995$. All values were updated to 2007
  using a 3 percent annual growth rate in the SCC, and adjusted for inflation using GDP deflator.

    Analyses have been conducted at $33 and $5 as these represent the
estimates associated with the 3 percent and 5 percent discount rates,
respectively.\533\ The 3 percent and 5 percent estimates have
independent appeal, and at this time a clear preference for one over
the other is not warranted. Thus, we have also included--and centered
our current attention on--the average of the estimates associated with
these discount rates, which is $19. (Based on the $19 global value, the
approximate domestic fraction of these benefits would be $1.14 per ton
of CO2 assuming that domestic benefits are 6 percent of the
global benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \533\ It should be noted that reported discount rates may not be
consistently derived across models or specific applications of
models: While the discount rate may be identical, it may reflect
different assumptions about the individual components of the Ramsey
equation identified earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is true that there is uncertainty about interest rates over long
time horizons. Recognizing that point, Newell and Pizer (2003) have
made a careful effort to adjust for that uncertainty. The Newell-Pizer
approach models discount rate uncertainty as something that evolves
over time.\534\ This is a relatively recent contribution to the
literature, and estimates based on this method are included with the
aim of soliciting comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \534\ In contrast, an alternative approach based on Weitzman
(2001) would assume that there is a constant discount rate that is
uncertain and represented by a probability distribution. The Newell
and Pizer, and Weitzman approaches are relatively recent
contributions, and we invite comment on the advantages and
disadvantages of each.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are several concerns with using this approach in this
context. First, it would be a departure from current OMB guidance.
Second, an approach that would average what emerges from discount rates
of 3 percent and 5 percent reflects uncertainty about the discount
rate, but based on a different model of uncertainty. The Newell-Pizer
approach models discount rate uncertainty as something that evolves
over time; in contrast, the preferred approach (outlined above) assumes
that there is a single discount rate with equal probability of 3
percent and 5 percent.
    Table IV.C.3-3 reports on the application of the Newell-Pizer
adjustments. The precise numbers depend on the assumptions about the
data generating process that governs interest rates. Columns (1a) and
(1b) assume that ``random walk'' model best describes the data and uses
3 percent and 5 percent discount rates, respectively. Columns (2a) and
(2b) repeat this, except that it assumes a ``mean-reverting'' process.
While the empirical evidence does not rule out a mean-reverting model,
Newell and Pizer find stronger empirical support for the random walk model.

  Table IV.C.3-3--Global Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) Estimates ($/tCO2 in 2007 (2006$))*, Using Newell & Pizer
                            (2003) Adjustment for Future Discount Rate Uncertainty**
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Random-walk        Mean-
                                                                                       model         reverting
                                                                                 ----------------      model
               Model                        Study             Climate scenario                   ---------------
                                                                                    3%      5%      3%      5%
                                                                                   (1a)    (1b)    (2a)    (2b)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 FUND............................  Anthoff et al. 2009..  FUND default.........      10       0       7      -1
2 FUND............................  Anthoff et al. 2009..  SRES A1b.............       2       0       1      -1
3 FUND............................  Anthoff et al. 2009..  SRES A2..............      15       0      10      -1
4 FUND............................  Link and Tol 2004....  No THC...............      20       6      13       4
5 FUND............................  Link and Tol 2004....  THC continues........      20       4      13       2
6 FUND............................  Guo et al. 2006......  Constant PRTP........       9       0       6      -1
7 FUND............................  Guo et al. 2006......  Gollier discount 1...      14       0      14       0
8 FUND............................  Guo et al. 2006......  Gollier discount 2...       7      -1       7      -1
                                                           FUND Mean............      12       1       9       0
9 PAGE............................  Wahba & Hope 2006....  A2-scen..............      97      13      63       8
10 PAGE...........................  Hope 2006............  .....................  ......      13  ......       8
11 DICE...........................  Nordhaus 2008........  .....................  ......      15  ......       9
Summary...........................  .....................  Model-weighted Mean..      55      10      36       6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The sample includes all peer reviewed, non-equity-weighted estimates included in Tol (2008), Nordhaus (2008),
  Hope (2008), and Anthoff et al. (2009), that are based on the most recent published version of FUND, PAGE, or
  DICE and use business-as-usual climate scenarios. All values are based on the best available information from
  the underlying studies about the base year and year dollars, rather than the Tol (2008) assumption that all
  estimates included in his review are 1995 values in 1995$. All values were updated to 2007 using a 3 percent
  annual growth rate in the SCC, and adjusted for inflation using GDP deflator. See the Notes to Table 1 for
  further details.
** Assumes a starting discount rate of 3 percent or 5 percent. Newell and Pizer (2003) based adjustment factors
  are not applied to estimates from Guo et al. (2006) that use a different approach to account for discount rate
  uncertainty (rows 7-8).
Note that the correction factor from Newell and Pizer is based on the DICE model. The proper adjustment may
  differ for other integrated assessment models that produce different time schedules of marginal damages. We
  would expect this difference to be minor.

[[Page 49680]]

    The resulting estimates of the social cost of carbon are
necessarily greater. When the adjustments from the random walk model
are applied, the estimates of the social cost of carbon are $10 and $55
per ton of CO2, with the 5 percent and 3 percent discount
rates, respectively. The application of the mean-reverting adjustment
yields estimates of $6 and $36. Relying on the random walk model,
analyses are also conducted with the value of the SCC set at $10 and $55.
(3) Caveats
    There are at least four caveats to the approach outlined above.
    First, the impacts of climate change are expected to be widespread,
diverse, and heterogeneous. In addition, the exact magnitude of these
impacts is uncertain, because of the inherent randomness in the Earth's
atmospheric processes, the U.S. and global economies, and the behaviors
of current and future populations. Current IAM do not currently
individually account for and assign value to all of the important
physical and other impacts of climate change that are recognized in the
climate change literature. Although it is likely that our capability to
quantify and monetize impacts will improve with time, it is also likely
that even in future applications, there are a number of potentially
significant benefits categories that will remain unmonetized.
    Second, in the opposite direction, it is unlikely that the damage
estimates adequately account for the directed technological change that
climate change will cause. In particular, climate change will increase
the return on investment to develop technologies that allow individuals
to better cope with climate change. For example, it is likely that
scientists will develop crops that are better able to withstand high
temperatures. In this respect, the current estimates may overstate the
likely damages.
    Third, there has been considerable recent discussion of the risk of
catastrophic impacts and of how best to account for worst-case
scenarios. Recent research by Weitzman (2009) specifies some conditions
under which the possibility of catastrophe would undermine the use of
IAMs and conventional cost-benefit analysis. This research requires
further exploration before its generality is known and the optimal way
to incorporate it into regulatory reviews is understood.
    Fourth, it is also worth noting that the SCC estimates are only
relevant for incremental policies relative to the projected baselines,
which capture business-as-usual scenarios. To evaluate non-marginal
changes, such as might occur if the U.S. acts in tandem with other
nations, then it might be necessary to go beyond the simple expedient
of using the SCC along the BAU path. In particular, it would be correct
to calculate the aggregate WTP to move from the BAU scenario to the
policy scenario, without imposing the restriction that the marginal
benefit remains constant over this range.
    All of the values derived from this process are expressed in 2006
dollars. NHTSA has adjusted them to their equivalent values in 2007
dollars for consistency with other values used in its analysis of
benefits from adopting higher CAFE standards for MY 2012-2016 passenger
cars and light trucks. The resulting value upon which we have centered
our analysis, which is derived from the figures reported in the tables
above, is equivalent to $20 per metric ton of CO2 emissions
avoided when expressed in 2007$, and the agency has relied on this
value in its analysis. NHTSA has also analyzed the sensitivity of its
benefit estimates to alternative values of $5, $10, $34, and $56 per
metric ton of CO2 emissions avoided, with all figures again
in 2007$. Each of these values applies to emissions during 2007, and
are assumed to grow in real terms by 3 percent annually beginning in
2007. NHTSA seeks comments on these values and the approach used to
derive them.
m. Discounting Future Benefits and Costs
    Discounting future fuel savings and other benefits is intended to
account for the reduction in their value to society when they are
deferred until some future date, rather than received immediately. The
discount rate expresses the percent decline in the value of these
benefits--as viewed from today's perspective--for each year they are
deferred into the future. In evaluating the benefits from alternative
increases in CAFE standards for MY 2012-2016 passenger cars and light
trucks, NHTSA has employed a discount rate of 3 percent per year. The
agency has also tested the sensitivity of these benefit and cost
estimates to the use of a 7 percent discount rate. Although these are
the same discount rates analyzed in the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA has
chosen to use 3 percent as the basis for the Reference Case in this
proposed rule rather than the 7 percent rate it employed previously,
for the reasons discussed below.
    The primary reason that NHTSA has selected 3 percent as the
appropriate rate for discounting future benefits from increased CAFE
standards is that most or all of vehicle manufacturers' costs for
complying with higher CAFE standards are likely to be reflected in
higher sales prices for their new vehicle models. By increasing sales
prices for new cars and light trucks, CAFE regulation will thus
primarily affect vehicle purchases and other private consumption
decisions. Both economic theory and OMB guidance on discounting
indicate that the future benefits and costs of regulations that mainly
affect private consumption should be discounted at the social rate of
time preference.\535\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \535\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OMB guidance also indicates that savers appear to discount future
consumption at an average real (that is, adjusted to remove the effect
of inflation) rate of about 3 percent when they face little risk about
its likely level. Since the real rate that savers use to discount
future consumption represents a reasonable estimate of the social rate
of time preference, NHTSA has employed the 3 percent rate to discount
projected future benefits and costs resulting from higher CAFE
standards for MY 2012-2016 passenger cars and light trucks.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \536\ Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4,
``Regulatory Analysis,'' September 17, 2003, 33. Available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (last accessed August
9, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because there is some uncertainty about the extent to which vehicle
manufacturers will be able to recover their costs for complying with
higher CAFE standards by increasing vehicle sales prices, however,
NHTSA has also tested the sensitivity of these benefit and cost
estimates to the use of a higher percent discount rate. OMB guidance
indicates that the real economy-wide opportunity cost of capital is the
appropriate discount rate to apply to future benefits and costs when
the primary effect of a regulation is ``* * * to displace or alter the
use of capital in the private sector,'' and estimates that this rate
currently averages about 7 percent.\537\ Thus the agency has also
tested the sensitivity of its benefit and cost estimates for
alternative MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards to the use of a 7 percent real
discount rate. NHTSA seeks comment on whether it should evaluate CAFE
standards using a discount rate of 3 percent, 7 percent, or an
alternative value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \537\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

n. Accounting for Uncertainty in Benefits and Costs
    In analyzing the uncertainty surrounding its estimates of benefits
and costs from alternative CAFE standards,

[[Page 49681]]

NHTSA has considered alternative estimates of those assumptions and
parameters likely to have the largest effect. These include the
projected costs of fuel economy-improving technologies and their
expected effectiveness in reducing vehicle fuel consumption, forecasts
of future fuel prices, the magnitude of the rebound effect, the
reduction in external economic costs resulting from lower U.S. oil
imports, the value to the U.S. economy of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions, and the discount rate applied to future benefits and costs.
The range for each of these variables employed in the uncertainty
analysis is presented in the section of this notice discussing each variable.
    The uncertainty analysis was conducted by assuming independent
normal probability distributions for each of these variables, using the
low and high estimates for each variable as the values below which 5
percent and 95 percent of observed values are believed to fall. Each
trial of the uncertainty analysis employed a set of values randomly
drawn from each of these probability distributions, assuming that the
value of each variable is independent of the others. Benefits and costs
of each alternative standard were estimated using each combination of
variables. A total of 1,000 trials were used to establish the likely
probability distributions of estimated benefits and costs for each
alternative standard.
o. Where Can Readers Find More Information About the Economic Assumptions?
    Much more detailed information is provided in Chapter VIII of the
PRIA, and a discussion of how NHTSA and EPA jointly reviewed and
updated economic assumptions for purposes of this NPRM is available in
Chapter 4 of the TSD. In addition, all of NHTSA's model input and
output files are now public and available for the reader's review and
consideration. The economic input files can be found in the docket for
this NPRM, NHTSA-2009-0059, and on NHTSA's Web site. Finally, because
much of NHTSA's economic analysis for purposes of this NPRM builds on
the work that was done for the MY 2011 final rule, we refer readers to
that document as well for background information concerning how NHTSA's
assumptions regarding economic inputs for CAFE analysis have evolved
over the past several rulemakings, both in response to comments and as
a result of the agency's growing experience with this type of analysis.\538\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \538\ 74 FR 14308-14358 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. How Does NHTSA Use the Assumptions in Its Modeling Analysis?
    In developing today's proposed CAFE standards, NHTSA has made
significant use of results produced by the CAFE Compliance and Effects
Model (commonly referred to as ``the CAFE model'' or ``the Volpe
model''), which DOT's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center
developed specifically to support NHTSA's CAFE rulemakings. The model,
which has been constructed specifically for the purpose of analyzing
potential CAFE standards, integrates the following core capabilities:
    (1) Estimating how manufacturers could apply technologies in
response to new fuel economy standards,
    (2) Estimating the costs that would be incurred in applying these
technologies,
    (3) Estimating the physical effects resulting from the application
of these technologies, such as changes in travel demand, fuel
consumption, and emissions of carbon dioxide and criteria pollutants,
and
    (4) Estimating the monetized societal benefits of these physical effects.
    An overview of the model follows below. Separate model
documentation provides a detailed explanation of the functions the
model performs, the calculations it performs in doing so, and how to
install the model, construct inputs to the model, and interpret the
model's outputs. Documentation of the model, along with model
installation files, source code, and sample inputs are available at
NHTSA's web site. The model documentation is also available in the
docket for today's proposed rule, as are inputs for and outputs from
analysis of today's proposed CAFE standards.
a. How Does the Model Operate?
    As discussed above, the agency uses the Volpe model to estimate the
extent to which manufacturers could attempt to comply with a given CAFE
standard by adding technology to fleets that the agency anticipates
they will produce in future model years. This exercise constitutes a
simulation of manufacturers' decisions regarding compliance with CAFE standards.
    This compliance simulation begins with the following inputs: (a)
The baseline market forecast discussed above in Section IV.C.1, (b)
technology-related estimates discussed above in Section IV.C.2, (c)
economic inputs discussed above in Section IV.C.3, and (d) inputs
defining the characteristics of potential new CAFE standards. For each
manufacturer, the model applies technologies in a sequence that follows
a defined engineering logic (``decision trees'' discussed in the MY
2011 final rule and in the model documentation) and a cost-minimizing
strategy in order to identify a set of technologies the manufacturer
could apply in response to new CAFE standards. The model applies
technologies to each of the projected individual vehicles in a
manufacturer's fleet, until one of three things occurs:
    (1) The manufacturer's fleet achieves compliance with the
applicable standard;
    (2) The manufacturer ``exhausts'' \539\ available technologies; or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \539\ In a given model year, the model makes additional
technologies available to each vehicle model within several
constraints, including (a) whether or not the technology is
applicable to the vehicle model's technology class, (b) whether the
vehicle is undergoing a redesign or freshening in the given model
year, (c) whether engineering aspects of the vehicle make the
technology unavailable (e.g., secondary axle disconnect cannot be
applied to two-wheel drive vehicles), and (d) whether technology
application remains within ``phase in caps'' constraining the
overall share of a manufacturer's fleet to which the technology can
be added in a given model year. Once enough technology is added to a
given manufacturer's fleet in a given model year that these
constraints make further technology application unavailable,
technologies are exhausted for that manufacturer in that model year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (3) For manufacturers estimated to be willing to pay civil
penalties, the manufacturer reaches the point at which doing so would
be more cost-effective (from the manufacturer's perspective) than
adding further technology.\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \540\ This possibility was added to the model to account for the
fact that under EPCA/EISA, manufacturers must pay fines if they do
not achieve compliance with applicable CAFE standards. 49 U.S.C.
32912(b). NHTSA recognizes that some manufacturers will find it more
cost-effective to pay fines than to achieve compliance, and believes
that to assume these manufacturers would exhaust available
technologies before paying fines would cause unrealistically high
estimates of market penetration of expensive technologies such as
diesel engines and strong hybrid electric vehicles, as well as
correspondingly inflated estimates of both the costs and benefits of
any potential CAFE standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed below, the model has also been modified in order to
apply additional technology in early model years if doing so will
facilitate compliance in later model years.
    The model accounts explicitly for each model year, applying most
technologies when vehicles are scheduled to be redesigned or freshened,
and carrying forward technologies between model years. The CAFE model
accounts explicitly for each model year because EPCA requires that
NHTSA make a year-by-year determination of the appropriate level of

[[Page 49682]]

stringency and then set the standard at that level, while ensuring
ratable increases in average fuel economy.\541\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \541\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a) states that at least 18 months before
the beginning of each model year, the Secretary of Transportation
shall prescribe by regulation average fuel economy standards for
automobiles manufactured by a manufacturer in that model year, and
that each standard shall be the maximum feasible average fuel
economy level that the Secretary decides the manufacturers can
achieve in that year. NHTSA has long interpreted this statutory
language to require year-by-year assessment of manufacturer
capabilities. 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(C) also requires that standards
increase ratably between MY 2011 and MY 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The model also calculates the costs, effects, and benefits of
technologies that it estimates could be added in response to a given
CAFE standard.\542\ It calculates costs by applying the cost estimation
techniques discussed above in Section IV.C.2, and by accounting for the
number of affected vehicles. It accounts for effects such as changes in
vehicle travel, changes in fuel consumption, and changes in greenhouse
gas and criteria pollutant emissions. It does so by applying the fuel
consumption estimation techniques also discussed in Section IV.C.2, and
the vehicle survival and mileage accumulation forecasts, the rebound
effect estimate and the fuel properties and emission factors discussed
in Section IV.C.3. Considering changes in travel demand and fuel
consumption, the model estimates the monetized value of accompanying
benefits to society, as discussed in Section IV.C.3. The model
calculates both the undiscounted and discounted value of benefits that
accrue over time in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \542\ As for all of its other rulemakings, NHTSA is required by
Executive Order 12866 and DOT regulations to analyze the costs and
benefits of CAFE standards. Executive Order 12866, 58 FR 51735 (Oct.
4, 1993); DOT Order 2100.5, ``Regulatory Policies and Procedures,''
1979, available at http://regs.dot.gov/rulemakingrequirements.htm
(last accessed August 21, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Volpe model has other capabilities that facilitate the
development of a CAFE standard. It can be used to fit a mathematical
function forming the basis for an attribute-based CAFE standard,
following the steps described below. It can also be used to evaluate
many (e.g., 200 per model year) potential levels of stringency
sequentially, and identify the stringency at which specific criteria
are met. For example, it can identify the stringency at which net
benefits to society are maximized, the stringency at which a specified
total cost is reached, or the stringency at which a given average
required fuel economy level is attained. This allows the agency to
compare more easily the impacts in terms of fuel savings, emissions
reductions, and costs and benefits of achieving different levels of
stringency according to different criteria. The model can also be used
to perform uncertainty analysis (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation), in
which input estimates are varied randomly according to specified
probability distributions, such that the uncertainty of key measures
(e.g., fuel consumption, costs, benefits) can be evaluated.
b. Has NHTSA Considered Other Models?
    Nothing in EPCA requires NHTSA to use the Volpe model. In
principle, NHTSA could perform all of these tasks through other means.
For example, in developing the standards proposed today, the agency did
not use the Volpe model's curve fitting routines, because they could
not be modified in time to reflect the change in the mathematical
function defining the proposed CAFE standards. The Volpe model may be
modified to do so for the final rule, although the agency can also
continue to fit the mathematical function outside the model. In
general, though, these model capabilities have greatly increased the
agency's ability to rapidly, systematically, and reproducibly conduct
key analyses relevant to the formulation and evaluation of new CAFE standards.
    During its previous rulemaking, which led to the final MY 2011
standards promulgated earlier this year, NHTSA received comments from
the Alliance and CARB encouraging NHTSA to examine the usefulness of
other models. As discussed in that final rule, NHTSA, having undertaken
such consideration, concluded that the Volpe model is a sound and
reliable tool for the development and evaluation of potential CAFE
standards.\543\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \543\ 74 FR 14372 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In reconsidering and reaffirming this conclusion for purposes of
this NPRM, NHTSA notes that the Volpe model not only has been formally
peer-reviewed and tested through three rulemakings, but also has some
features especially important for the analysis of CAFE standards under
EPCA/EISA. Among these are the ability to perform year-by-year
analysis, and the ability to account for engineering differences
between specific vehicle models.
    EPCA requires that NHTSA set CAFE standards for each model year at
the level appropriate for that year.\544\ Doing so requires the ability
to analyze each model year and, when developing regulations covering
multiple model years, to account for the interdependency of model years
in terms of the appropriate levels of stringency for each one. Also, as
part of the evaluation of the economic practicability of the standards,
as required by EPCA, NHTSA has traditionally assessed the annual costs
and benefits of the standards as it is permitted to do so. The first
(2002) version of DOT's model treated each model year separately, and
did not perform this type of explicit accounting. Manufacturers took
strong exception to these shortcomings. For example, GM commented in
2002 that ``although the table suggests that the proposed standard for
MY 2007, considered in isolation, promises benefits exceeding costs,
that anomalous outcome is merely an artifact of the peculiar Volpe
methodology, which treats each year independently of any other * * *.''
In 2002, GM also criticized DOT's analysis for, in some cases, adding a
technology in MY 2006 and then replacing it with another technology in
MY 2007. GM (and other manufacturers) argued that this completely
failed to represent true manufacturer product-development cycles, and
therefore could not be technologically feasible or economically practicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \544\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to these concerns, and related concerns expressed by
other manufacturers, DOT modified the CAFE model in order to account
for dependencies between model years and to better represent
manufacturers' planning cycles, in a way that still allowed NHTSA to
comply with the statutory requirement to determine the appropriate
level of the standards for each model year. This was accomplished by
limiting the application of many technologies to model years in which
vehicle models are scheduled to be redesigned (or, for some
technologies, ``freshened''), and by causing the model to ``carry
forward'' applied technologies from one model year to the next.
    During the recent rulemaking for MY 2011 passenger cars and light
trucks, DOT further modified the CAFE model to account for cost
reductions attributable to ``learning effects'' related to volume
(i.e., economies of scale) and the passage of time (i.e., time-based
learning), both of which evolve on year-by-year basis. These changes
were implemented in response to comments by environmental groups and
other stakeholders.
    The Volpe model is also able to account for important engineering
differences between specific vehicle models, and to thereby reduce the risk
of applying technologies that may be incompatible with or already present on

[[Page 49683]]

a given vehicle model. Some commenters have previously suggested that
manufacturers are most likely to broadly apply generic technology
``packages,'' and the Volpe model does tend to form ``packages''
dynamically, based on vehicle characteristics, redesign schedules, and
schedules for increases in CAFE standards. For example, under the
proposed CAFE standards for passenger cars, the CAFE model estimated
that manufacturers could apply turbocharged SGDI engines mated with
dual-clutch AMTs to 1.8 million passenger cars in MY 2016, about 16
percent of the MY 2016 passenger car fleet. Recent modifications to the
model, discussed below, to represent multi-year planning, increase the
model's tendency to add relatively cost-effective technologies when
vehicles are estimated to be redesigned, and thereby increase the
model's tendency to form such packages.
    On the other hand, some manufacturers have indicated that
especially when faced with significant progressive increases in the
stringency of new CAFE standards, they are likely to also look for
narrower opportunities to apply specific technologies. By progressively
applying specific technologies to specific vehicle models, the CAFE
model also produces such outcomes. For example, under the proposed CAFE
standards for passenger cars, the CAFE model estimated that in MY 2012,
some manufacturers could find it advantageous to apply SIDI to some
vehicle models without also adding turbochargers.
    By following this approach of combining technologies incrementally
and on a model-by-model basis, the CAFE model is able to account for
important engineering differences between vehicle models and avoid
unlikely technology combinations. For example, the model does not apply
dual-clutch AMTs (or strong hybrid systems) to vehicle models with 6-
speed manual transmissions. Some vehicle buyers prefer a manual
transmission; this preference cannot be assumed away. The model's
accounting for manual transmissions is also important for vehicles with
larger engines: For example, cylinder deactivation cannot be applied to
vehicles with manual transmissions, because there is no reliable means
of predicting when the driver will change gears. By retaining cylinder
deactivation as a specific technology rather than part of a pre-
determined package and by retaining differentiation between vehicles
with different transmissions, DOT's model is able to target cylinder
deactivation only to vehicle models for which it is technologically feasible.
    The Volpe model also produces a single vehicle-level output file
that, for each vehicle model, shows which technologies were present at
the outset of modeling, which technologies were superseded by other
technologies, and which technologies were ultimately present at the
conclusion of modeling. For each vehicle, the same file shows resultant
changes in vehicle weight, fuel economy, and cost. This provides for
efficient identification, analysis, and correction of errors, a task
with which the public can now assist the agency, since all inputs and
outputs are public.
    Such considerations, as well as those related to the efficiency
with which the Volpe model is able to analyze attribute-based CAFE
standards and changes in vehicle classification, and to perform higher-
level analysis such as stringency estimation (to meet predetermined
criteria), sensitivity analysis, and uncertainty analysis, lead the
agency to conclude that the model remains the best available to the
agency for the purposes of analyzing potential new CAFE standards.
c. What Changes Has DOT Made to the Model?
    Prior to being used for analysis supporting today's proposal, the
Volpe model was revised to make some minor improvements, and to add one
significant new capability: the ability to simulate manufacturers'
ability to engage in ``multi-year planning.'' Multi-year planning
refers to the fact that when redesigning or freshening vehicles,
manufacturers can anticipate future fuel economy or CO2
standards, and add technologies accounting for these standards. For
example, a manufacturer might choose to over-comply in a given model
year when many vehicle models are scheduled for redesign, in order to
facilitate compliance in a later model year when standards will be more
stringent yet few vehicle models are scheduled for redesign.\545\ Prior
comments have indicated that the Volpe model, by not representing such
manufacturer choices, tended to overestimate compliance costs. However,
because of the technical complexity involved in representing these
choices when, as in the Volpe model, each model year is accounted for
separately and explicitly, the model could not be modified to add this
capability prior to the statutory deadline for the MY 2011 final standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \545\ Although a manufacturer may, in addition, generate CAFE
credits in early model years for use in later model years (or, less
likely, in later years for use in early years), EPCA does not allow
NHTSA, when setting CAFE standards, to account for manufacturers'
use of CAFE credits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The model now includes this capability, and NHTSA has applied it in
analyzing the standards proposed today. Consequently, this often
produces results indicating that manufacturers could over-comply in
some model years (with corresponding increases in costs and benefits in
those model years) and thereby ``carry forward'' technology into later
model years in order to reduce compliance costs in those later model
years. NHTSA believes this better represents how manufacturers would
actually respond to new CAFE standards, and thereby produces more
realistic estimates of the costs and benefits of such standards.
    The Volpe model has also been modified to accommodate inputs
specifying the amount of CAFE credit to be applied to each
manufacturer's fleet. Although the model is not currently capable of
estimating manufacturers' decisions regarding the generation and use of
CAFE credits, and EPCA does not allow NHTSA, in setting CAFE standards,
to take into account manufacturers' potential use of credits, this
additional capability in the Volpe model provides a basis for more
accurately estimating costs, effects, and benefits that may actually
result from new CAFE standards. Insofar as some manufacturers actually
do earn and use CAFE credits, this provides NHTSA with some ability to
examine outcomes more realistically than EPCA allows for purposes of
setting new CAFE standards.
    In comments on recent NHTSA rulemakings, some reviewers have
suggested that the Volpe model should be modified to estimate the
extent to which new CAFE standards would induce changes in the mix of
vehicles in the new vehicle fleet. NHTSA, like EPA, agrees that a
``market shift'' model, also called a consumer vehicle choice model,
could provide useful information regarding the possible effects of
potential new CAFE standards. An earlier experimental version of the
Volpe model included a multinomial logit model that estimated changes
in sales resulting from CAFE-induced increases in new vehicle fuel
economy and prices. A fuller description of this attempt can be found
in Section V of the PRIA. However, NHTSA has thus far been unable to
develop credible coefficients specifying such a model. In addition, as
discussed in Section II.H.4, such a model is sensitive to the
coefficients used in it, and there is great variation over some key
values of these coefficients in published studies. NHTSA seeks comment
on ways to

[[Page 49684]]

improve on this earlier work and develop this capability effectively.
If the agency is able to do so prior to conducting analysis supporting
decisions regarding final CAFE standards, it will attempt to
reintegrate this capability in the Volpe model and include these
effects in its analysis of final standards. If not, NHTSA will continue
efforts to develop and make use of this capability in future rulemakings.
d. Does the Model Set the Standards?
    Although NHTSA currently uses the Volpe model as a tool to inform
its consideration of potential CAFE standards, the Volpe model does not
determine the CAFE standards that NHTSA proposes or promulgates as
final regulations. The results it produces are completely dependent on
inputs selected by NHTSA, based on the best available information and
data available in the agency's estimation at the time standards are
set. Although the model has been programmed in previous rulemakings to
estimate at what stringency net benefits are maximized, NHTSA has not
done so here and has instead used the Volpe model to estimate
stringency levels that produce roughly constant rates of increase in
the combined average required fuel economy. Ultimately, NHTSA's
selection of a CAFE standard is governed and guided by the statutory
requirements of EPCA, as amended by EISA: NHTSA sets the standard at
the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it determines is
achievable during a particular model year, considering technological
feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other standards of
the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the nation to conserve energy.
    NHTSA considers the results of analyses conducted by the Volpe
model and analyses conducted outside of the Volpe model, including
analysis of the impacts of carbon dioxide and criteria pollutant
emissions, analysis of technologies that may be available in the long
term and whether NHTSA could expedite their entry into the market
through these standards, and analysis of the extent to which changes in
vehicle prices and fuel economy might affect vehicle production and
sales. Using all of this information--not solely that from the Volpe
model--the agency considers the governing statutory factors, along with
environmental issues and other relevant societal issues such as safety,
and promulgates the standards based on its best judgment on how to
balance these factors.
    This is why the agency considered eight regulatory alternatives,
only one of which reflects the agency's proposed standards, based on
the agency's determinations and assumptions. Others assess alternative
standards, some of which exceed the proposed standards and/or the point
at which net benefits are maximized. These comprehensive analyses,
which also included scenarios with different economic input assumptions
as presented in the FEIS and FRIA, are intended to inform and
contribute to the agency's consideration of the ``need of the United
States to conserve energy,'' as well as the other statutory factors. 49
U.S.C. 32902(f). Additionally, the agency's analysis considers the need
of the nation to conserve energy by accounting for economic
externalities of petroleum consumption and monetizing the economic
costs of incremental CO2 emissions in the social cost of
carbon. NHTSA uses information from the model when considering what
standards to propose and finalize, but the model does not determine the
standards.
e. How Does NHTSA Make the Model Available and Transparent?
    Model documentation, which is publicly available in the rulemaking
docket and on NHTSA's web site, explains how the model is installed,
how the model inputs (all of which are available to the public) \546\
and outputs are structured, and how the model is used. The model can be
used on any Windows-based personal computer with Microsoft Office 2003
and the Microsoft .NET framework installed (the latter available
without charge from Microsoft). The executable version of the model and
the underlying source code are also available at NHTSA's Web site. The
input files used to conduct the core analysis documented in this
proposed rule are available in the public docket. With the model and
these input files, anyone is capable of independently running the model
to repeat, evaluate, and/or modify the agency's analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \546\ We note, however, that files from any supplemental
analysis conducted that relied in part on confidential manufacturer
product plans cannot be made public, as prohibited under 49 CFR part 512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. How Did NHTSA Develop the Shape of the Target Curves for the
Proposed Standards?
    In developing the shape of the target curves for today's proposed
standards, NHTSA took a new approach, primarily in response to comments
received in the MY 2011 rulemaking. NHTSA's authority under EISA allows
consideration of any ``attribute related to fuel economy'' and any
``mathematical function.'' While the attribute, footprint, is the same
for these proposed standards as the attribute used for the MY 2011
standards, the mathematical function is new.
    Both vehicle manufacturers and public interest groups expressed
concern in the MY 2011 rulemaking process that the constrained logistic
function, particularly the function for the passenger car standards,
was overly steep and could lead, on the one hand, to fuel economy
targets that were overly stringent for small footprint vehicles, and on
the other hand, to a greater incentive for manufacturers to upsize
vehicles in order to reduce their compliance obligation (because
larger-footprint vehicles have less stringent targets) in ways that
could compromise energy and environmental benefits. We tentatively
believe that the constrained linear function developed here
significantly mitigates steepness concerns, but we seek comment on
whether readers agree, and whether there are any other issues relating
to the new approach that NHTSA should consider in developing the curves
for the final rule.
a. Standards Are Attribute-Based and Defined by a Mathematical Function
    EPCA, as amended by EISA, expressly requires that CAFE standards
for passenger cars and light trucks be based on one or more vehicle
attributes related to fuel economy, and be expressed in the form of a
mathematical function.\547\ Like the MY 2011 standards, the MY 2012-
2016 passenger car and light truck standards are attribute-based and
defined by a mathematical function.\548\ Also like the MY 2011
standards, the MY 2012-2016 standards are based on the footprint
attribute. However, unlike the MY 2011 standards, the MY 2012-2016
standards are defined by a constrained linear rather than a constrained
logistic function. The reasons for these similarities and differences
are explained below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \547\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a)(3)(A).
    \548\ As discussed in Chapter 2 of the TSD, EPA is also
proposing to set attribute-based CO2 standards that are
defined by a mathematical function, given the advantages of using
attribute-based standards and given the goal of coordinating and
harmonizing the CAFE and CO2 standards as expressed by
President Obama in his announcement of the new National Program and
in the joint NOI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above in Section II, under attribute-based standards,
the fleet-wide average fuel economy that a particular manufacturer must
achieve in a given model year depends on the mix of vehicles that it
produces for sale.

[[Page 49685]]

Until NHTSA began to set ``Reformed'' attribute-based standards for
light trucks in MYs 2008-2011, and until EISA gave NHTSA authority to
set attribute-based standards for passenger cars beginning in MY 2011,
NHTSA set ``universal'' or ``flat'' industry-wide average CAFE
standards. Attribute-based standards are preferable to universal
industry-wide average standards for several reasons. First, attribute-
based standards increase fuel savings and reduce emissions when
compared to an equivalent universal industry-wide standard under which
each manufacturer is subject to the same numerical requirement. Absent
a policy to require all full-line manufacturers to produce and sell
essentially the same mix of vehicles, the stringency of the universal
industry-wide standards is constrained by the capability of those full-
line manufacturers whose product mix includes a relatively high
proportion of larger and heavier vehicles. In effect, the standards are
based on the mix of those manufacturers. As a result, the standards are
generally set below the capabilities of full-line and limited-line
manufacturers that sell predominantly lighter and smaller vehicles.
    Under an attribute-based system, in contrast, every manufacturer is
more likely to be required to continue adding more fuel-saving
technology each year because the level of the compliance obligation of
each manufacturer is based on its own particular product mix. Thus, the
compliance obligation of a manufacturer with a higher percentage of
lighter and smaller vehicles will have a higher compliance obligation
than a manufacturer with a lower percentage of such vehicles. As a
result, all manufacturers must use technologies to enhance the fuel
economy levels of the vehicles they sell. Therefore, fuel savings and
CO2 emissions reductions should be higher under an
attribute-based system than under a comparable industry-wide standard.
    Second, attribute-based standards minimize the incentive for
manufacturers to respond to CAFE in ways harmful to safety.\549\
Because each vehicle model has its own target (based on the attribute
chosen), attribute-based standards provide no incentive to build
smaller vehicles simply to meet a fleet-wide average. Since smaller
vehicles are subject to more stringent fuel economy targets, a
manufacturer's increasing its proportion of smaller vehicles would
simply cause its compliance obligation to increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \549\ The 2002 NAS Report described at length and quantified the
potential safety problem with average fuel economy standards that
specify a single numerical requirement for the entire industry. See
NAS Report at 5, finding 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, attribute-based standards provide a more equitable
regulatory framework for different vehicle manufacturers.\550\ A
universal industry-wide average standard imposes disproportionate cost
burdens and compliance difficulties on the manufacturers that need to
change their product plans and no obligation on those manufacturers
that have no need to change their plans. Attribute-based standards
spread the regulatory cost burden for fuel economy more broadly across
all of the vehicle manufacturers within the industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \550\ Id. at 4-5, finding 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    And fourth, attribute-based standards respect economic conditions
and consumer choice, instead of having the government mandate a certain
fleet mix. Manufacturers are required to invest in technologies that
improve the fuel economy of their fleets, regardless of vehicle mix.
Additionally, attribute-based standards help to avoid the need to
conduct rulemakings to amend standards if economic conditions change,
causing a shift in the mix of vehicles demanded by the public. NHTSA
conducted three rulemakings during the 1980s to amend passenger car
standards for MYs 1986-1989 in response to unexpected drops in fuel
prices and resulting shifts in consumer demand that made the passenger
car standard of 27.5 mpg infeasible for several years following the
change in fuel prices.
    As discussed above in Section II, for purposes of the CAFE
standards proposed in this NPRM, NHTSA recognizes that the risk, even
if small, does exist that low fuel prices in MYs 2012-2016 might lead
indirectly to less than currently anticipated fuel savings and
emissions reductions. Thus, we seek comment on whether backstop
standards, or any other method within the agencies' statutory
authority, should and can be implemented for the import and light truck
fleets in order to achieve the fuel savings that attribute-based
standards might not absolutely guarantee. Commenters are encouraged,
but not required, to review and respond to NHTSA's discussion of this
issue in the MY 2011 final rule as a starting point.\551\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \551\ 74 FR 14409-14412 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. What Attribute Does NHTSA Use, and Why?
    Consistent with the MY 2011 CAFE standards, NHTSA is proposing to
use footprint as the attribute for the MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards.
There are several policy reasons why NHTSA and EPA both believe that
footprint is the most appropriate attribute on which to base the
standards, as discussed below.
    As discussed in the PRIA, in NHTSA's judgment, from the standpoint
of vehicle safety, it is important that the CAFE standards be set in a
way that does not encourage manufacturers to respond by selling
vehicles that are in any way less safe. While NHTSA's research also
indicates that reductions in vehicle mass tend to compromise vehicle
safety, footprint-based standards provide an incentive to use advanced
lightweight materials and structures that would be discouraged by
weight-based standards, because manufacturers can use them to improve a
vehicle's fuel economy without their use necessarily resulting in a
change in the vehicle's target level of fuel economy.
    Further, although we recognize that weight is better correlated
with fuel economy than is footprint, we continue to believe that there
is less risk of ``gaming'' (artificial manipulation of the attribute(s)
to achieve a more favorable target) by increasing footprint under
footprint-based standards than by increasing vehicle mass under weight-
based standards--it is relatively easy for a manufacturer to add enough
weight to a vehicle to decrease its applicable fuel economy target a
significant amount, as compared to increasing vehicle footprint. We
also agree with concerns raised in 2008 by some commenters in the MY
2011 CAFE rulemaking that there would be greater potential for gaming
under multi-attribute standards, such as standards under which targets
would also depend on attributes such as weight, torque, power, towing
capability, and/or off-road capability. Standards that incorporate such
attributes in conjunction with footprint would not only be
significantly more complex, but by providing degrees of freedom with
respect to more easily-adjusted attributes, they would make it less
certain that the future fleet would actually achieve the projected
average fuel economy and CO2 reduction levels.
    However, while NHTSA tentatively concludes that footprint is the
most appropriate attribute upon which to base the proposed standards,
recognizing strong public interest in this issue, we seek comment on
whether the agency should consider setting standards for the final rule
based on another attribute or another combination of attributes. If
commenters suggest that the agency should consider another attribute or
another combination of attributes, the agency specifically requests
that the commenters address the concerns raised

[[Page 49686]]

in the paragraphs above regarding the use of other attributes, and
explain how standards should be developed using the other attribute(s)
in a way that contributes more to fuel savings and CO2
reductions than the footprint-based standards, without compromising safety.
c. What Mathematical Function Did NHTSA Use for the Recently-
Promulgated MY 2011 CAFE Standards?
    The MY 2011 CAFE standards are defined by a continuous, constrained
logistic function, which takes the form of an S-curve, and is defined
according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.052

    Here, TARGET is the fuel economy target (in mpg) applicable to
vehicles of a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in square feet), b and a
are the function's lower and upper asymptotes (also in mpg), e is
approximately equal to 2.718,\552\ c is the footprint (in square
feet) at which the inverse of the fuel economy target falls halfway
between the inverses of the lower and upper asymptotes, and d is a
parameter (in square feet) that determines how gradually the fuel
economy target transitions from the upper toward the lower asymptote
as the footprint increases.

    \552\ e is the irrational number for which the slope of the
function y = number\x\ is equal to 1 when x is equal to zero. The
first 8 digits of e are 2.7182818.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After fitting this mathematical form (separately) to the passenger
car and light truck fleets and determining the stringency of the
standards (i.e., the vertical positions of the curves), NHTSA arrived
at the following curves to define the MY 2011 standards:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.031

d. What Mathematical Function is NHTSA Proposing to Use for New CAFE
Standards, and Why?
    In finalizing the MY 2011 standards, NHTSA noted that the agency is
not required to use a constrained logistic function and indicated that
the agency may consider defining future CAFE standards in terms of a
different mathematical function. NHTSA has done so in preparation for
the proposed CAFE standards.
    In revisiting this question, NHTSA found that the final MY 2011
CAFE standard for passenger cars, though less

[[Page 49687]]

steep than the MY 2011 standard NHTSA proposed in 2008, continues to
concentrate the sloped portion of the curve (from a compliance
perspective, the area in which upsizing results in a slightly lower
applicable target) within a relatively narrow footprint range
(approximately 47-55 square feet). Further, most passenger car models
have footprints smaller than the curve's 51.4 square foot inflection
point, and many passenger car models have footprints at which the curve
is relatively flat.
    For both passenger cars and light trucks, a mathematical function
that has some slope at most footprints where vehicles are produced is
advantageous in terms of fairly balancing regulatory burdens among
manufacturers, and in terms of providing a disincentive to respond to
new standards by downsizing vehicles in ways that compromise vehicle
safety. For example, a flat standard may be very difficult for a full-
line manufacturer to meet, while requiring very little of a
manufacturer concentrating on small vehicles, and a flat standard may
provide an incentive to manufacturers to downsize certain vehicles, in
order to ``balance out'' other vehicles subject to the same standard.
    As a potential alternative to the constrained logistic function,
NHTSA had, in proposing MY 2011 standards, presented information
regarding a constrained linear function. As shown in the 2008 NPRM, a
constrained linear function has the potential to avoid creating a
localized region (in terms of vehicle footprint) over which the slope
of the function is relatively steep. Although NHTSA did not receive
public comments on this option, the agency indicated that it still
believed a linear function constrained by upper (on a gpm basis) and
possibly lower limits could merit reconsideration in future CAFE rulemakings.
    Having re-examined a constrained linear function for purposes of
the proposed standards, NHTSA tentatively concludes that for both
passenger cars and light trucks, it remains meaningfully sloped over a
wide footprint range, thereby providing a well-distributed disincentive
to downsize vehicles in ways that could compromise highway safety.
Further, the constrained linear function proposed today is not so
steeply sloped that it would provide a strong incentive to increase
vehicle size in order to obtain a lower CAFE requirement and higher
CO2 limit, thereby compromising energy and environmental
benefits. Therefore, the CAFE standards proposed today are defined by
constrained linear functions.
    The constrained linear function is defined according to the
following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.053

    Here, TARGET is the fuel economy target (in mpg) applicable to
vehicles of a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in square feet), b and a
are the function's lower and upper asymptotes (also in mpg),
respectively, c is the slope (in gpm per square foot) of the sloped
portion of the function, and d is the intercept (in gpm) of the
sloped portion of the function (that is, the value the sloped
portion would take if extended to a footprint of 0 square feet. The
MIN and MAX functions take the minimum and maximum, respectively of
the included values; for example, MIN(1,2) = 1, MAX(1,2) = 2, and
MIN[MAX(1,2),3)]=2. The following chart shows an example of a linear
target function, where a = 0.0241 gpm (41.6 mpg), b = 0.032 gpm
(31.2 mpg), c = 0.000531 gpm per square foot, and d = 0.002292 gpm
(436 mpg). Because the function is linear on a gpm basis, not an mpg
basis, it is plotted on this basis.
e. How Did NHTSA Fit the Coefficients That Determine the Shape of the
Proposed Curves?
    For purposes of this NPRM, and for EPA's use in developing new
CO2 emissions standards, the basic curve shapes were
developed using methods similar to those applied by NHTSA in fitting
the curves defining the MY 2011 standards. We began with the market
inputs discussed above, but because the baseline fleet is
technologically heterogeneous, NHTSA used the CAFE model to develop a
fleet to which nearly all the technologies discussed in Section V of
the PRIA and Chapter 3 of the joint TSD \553\ were applied, by taking
the following steps: (1) Treating all manufacturers as unwilling to pay
civil penalties rather than applying technology, (2) applying any
technology at any time, irrespective of scheduled vehicle redesigns or
freshening, and (3) ignoring ``phase-in caps'' that constrain the
overall amount of technology that can be applied by the model to a
given manufacturer's fleet. These steps helped to increase
technological parity among vehicle models, thereby providing a better
basis (than the baseline fleet) for estimating the statistical
relationship between vehicle size and fuel economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \553\ The agencies excluded diesel engines and strong hybrid
vehicle technologies from this exercise (and only this exercise)
because the agencies expect that manufacturers would not need to
rely heavily on these technologies in order to comply with the
proposed standards. NHTSA and EPA did include diesel engines and
strong hybrid vehicle technologies in all other portions of their analyses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More information on the process for fitting the passenger car and
light truck curves for MYs 2012-2016 is available above in Section
II.C, and NHTSA refers the reader to that section and to Chapter 2 of
the joint TSD. NHTSA seeks comment on this approach to fitting the
curves. We note that final decisions on this issue will play an
important role in determining the form and stringency of the final CAFE
and CO2 standards, the incentives those standards will
provide (e.g., with respect to downsizing small vehicles), and the
relative compliance burden faced by each manufacturer.

D. Statutory Requirements

1. EPCA, as Amended by EISA
a. Standard Setting
    NHTSA must establish separate standards for MY 2011-2020 passenger
cars and light trucks, subject to two principal requirements.\554\
First, the standards are subject to a minimum requirement regarding
stringency: They must be set at levels high enough to ensure that the
combined U.S. passenger car and light truck fleet achieves an average
fuel economy level of not less than 35 mpg not later than MY 2020.\555\
Second, as discussed above and at length in the March 2009 final rule
establishing the MY 2011 CAFE standards, EPCA requires that the

[[Page 49688]]

agency establish standards for all new passenger cars and light trucks
at the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that the Secretary
decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year.\556\ The
implication of this second requirement is that it calls for exceeding
the minimum requirement if the agency determines that the manufacturers
can achieve a higher level. When determining the level achievable by
the manufacturers, EPCA requires that the agency consider the four
statutory factors of technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to
conserve energy. In addition, the agency has the authority to and
traditionally does consider other relevant factors, such as the effect
of the CAFE standards on motor vehicle safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \554\ EISA added the following additional requirements.
Standards must be attribute-based and expressed in the form of a
mathematical function. 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3)(A). Standards for MYs
2011-2020 must ``increase ratably'' in each model year. 49 U.S.C.
32902(b)(2)(C). NHTSA interprets this requirement, in combination
with the requirement to set the standards for each model year at the
level determined to be the maximum feasible level for that model
year, to mean that the annual increases should not be
disproportionately large or small in relation to each other.
    \555\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(A).
    \556\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Statutory Factors Considered in Determining the Achievable Level of
Average Fuel Economy
    As none of the four factors is defined in EPCA and each remains
interpreted only to a limited degree by case law, NHTSA has
considerable latitude in interpreting them. NHTSA interprets the four
statutory factors as set forth below.
(1) Technological Feasibility
    ``Technological feasibility'' refers to whether a particular
technology for improving fuel economy is available or can become
available for commercial application in the model year for which a
standard is being established. Thus, the agency is not limited in
determining the level of new standards to technology that is already
being commercially applied at the time of the rulemaking. It can,
instead, set technology-forcing standards, i.e., ones that make it
necessary for manufacturers to engage in research and development in
order to bring a new technology to market.
(2) Economic Practicability
    ``Economic practicability'' refers to whether a standard is one
``within the financial capability of the industry, but not so stringent
as to'' lead to ``adverse economic consequences, such as a significant
loss of jobs or the unreasonable elimination of consumer choice.''
\557\ In an attempt to ensure the economic practicability, the agency
considers a variety of factors, including the annual rate at which
manufacturers can increase the percentage of its fleet that has a
particular type of fuel saving technology, and cost to consumers.
Consumer acceptability is also an element of economic practicability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \557\ 67 FR 77015, 77021 (Dec. 16, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the same time, the law does not preclude a CAFE standard that
poses considerable challenges to any individual manufacturer. The
Conference Report for EPCA, as enacted in 1975, makes clear, and the
case law affirms, ``(A) determination of maximum feasible average fuel
economy should not be keyed to the single manufacturer which might have
the most difficulty achieving a given level of average fuel economy.''
\558\ Instead, the agency is compelled ``to weigh the benefits to the
nation of a higher fuel economy standard against the difficulties of
individual automobile manufacturers.'' Id. The law permits CAFE
standards exceeding the projected capability of any particular
manufacturer as long as the standard is economically practicable for
the industry as a whole. Thus, while a particular CAFE standard may
pose difficulties for one manufacturer, it may also present
opportunities for another. The CAFE program is not necessarily intended
to maintain the competitive positioning of each particular company.
Rather, it is intended to enhance fuel economy of the vehicle fleet on
American roads, while protecting motor vehicle safety and being mindful
of the risk of harm to the overall United States economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \558\ CEI-I, 793 F.2d 1322, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, NHTSA believes that this term must be applied in the context
of the competing concerns associated with different levels of
standards. Prior to switching to attribute-based standards in the MY
2008-2011 rulemaking, the agency sought to ensure the economy
practicability of standards in part by setting them at or near the
capability of the ``least capable manufacturer'' with a significant
share of the market, i.e., typically the manufacturer whose vehicles
are, on average, the heaviest and largest. In the first several
rulemakings to establish attribute based standards, the agency applied
marginal cost benefit analysis. This ensured that the agency's
application of technologies was limited to those that would pay for
themselves and thus would have significant appeal to consumers.
However, the agency can and has limited its application of technologies
to those technologies, with or without the use of such analysis.
(3) The Effect of Other Motor Vehicle Standards of the Government on
Fuel Economy
    ``The effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on
fuel economy,'' involves an analysis of the effects of compliance with
emission,\559\ safety, noise, or damageability standards on fuel
economy capability and thus on average fuel economy. In previous CAFE
rulemakings, the agency has said that pursuant to this provision, it
considers the adverse effects of other motor vehicle standards on fuel
economy. It said so because, from the CAFE program's earliest years
\560\ until present, the effects of such compliance on fuel economy
capability over the history of the CAFE program have been negative
ones. In those instances in which the effects are negative, NHTSA is
called upon to ``mak[e] a straightforward adjustment to the fuel
economy improvement projections to account for the impacts of other
Federal standards, principally those in the areas of emission control,
occupant safety, vehicle damageability, and vehicle noise. However,
only the unavoidable consequences should be accounted for. The
automobile manufacturers must be expected to adopt those feasible
methods of achieving compliance with other Federal standards which
minimize any adverse fuel economy effects of those standards.'' \561\
For example, safety standards that have the effect of increasing
vehicle weight lower vehicle fuel economy capability and thus decrease
the level of average fuel economy that the agency can determine to be feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \559\ In the case of emission standards, this includes standards
adopted by the Federal Government and can include standards adopted
by the States as well, since in certain circumstances the Clean Air
Act allows States to adopt and enforce State standards different
from the Federal ones.
    \560\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (Dec. 15, 1977). See also 42 FR 33534,
33537 (Jun. 30, 1977).
    \561\ 42 FR 33534, 33537 (Jun. 30, 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ``other motor vehicle standards'' consideration has thus in
practice functioned in a fashion similar to the provision in EPCA, as
originally enacted, for adjusting the statutorily-specified CAFE
standards for MY 1978-1980 passengers cars.\562\ EPCA did not permit
NHTSA to amend those standards based on a finding that the maximum
feasible level of average fuel economy for any of those three years was
greater or less than the standard specified for that year. Instead, it
provided that the agency could only reduce the standards and only on
one basis: if the agency found that there had been a Federal standards
fuel economy reduction, i.e., a reduction in fuel economy due to
changes in the Federal vehicle standards, e.g., emissions and safety,
relative to the year of enactment, 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \562\ That provision was deleted as obsolete when EPCA was codified in 1994.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49689]]

    The ``other motor vehicle standards'' provision is broader than the
Federal standards fuel economy reduction provision. Although the
effects analyzed to date under the ``other motor vehicle standards''
provision have been negative, there could be circumstances in which the
effects are positive. In the event that the agency encountered such
circumstances, it would be required to consider those positive effects.
For example, if changes in vehicle safety technology led to NHTSA's
amending a safety standard in a way that permits manufacturers to
reduce the weight added in complying with that standard, that weight
reduction would increase vehicle fuel economy capability and thus
increase the level of average fuel economy that could be determined to
be feasible.
    In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA and of EPA's proposed
endangerment finding, granting of a waiver to California for its motor
vehicle GHG standards, and its own proposal of GHG standards, the
agency is confronted with the issue of how to treat those standards
under the ``other motor vehicle standards'' provision. To the extent
the GHG standards result in increases in fuel economy, they would do so
almost exclusively as a result of inducing manufacturers to install the
same types of technologies used by manufacturers in complying with the
CAFE standards. The primary exception would involve increases in the
efficiency of air conditioners.
    Thus, NHTSA tentatively concludes that the effects of the EPA and
California standards are neither positive nor negative because the
proposed rule results in consistent standards among all components of
the National Program. Comment is requested on whether and in what way
the effects of the California and EPA standards should be considered
under the ``other motor vehicle standards'' provision or other
provisions of EPCA in 49 U.S.C. 32902, consistent with NHTSA's
independent obligation under EPCA/EISA to issue CAFE standards? The
agency has already considered EPA's proposal and the harmonization
benefits of the National Program in developing its own proposal.
(4) The Need of the United States To Conserve Energy
    ``The need of the United States to conserve energy'' means ``the
consumer cost, national balance of payments, environmental, and foreign
policy implications of our need for large quantities of petroleum,
especially imported petroleum.'' \563\ Environmental implications
principally include those associated with reductions in emissions of
criteria pollutants and CO2. A prime example of foreign
policy implications are energy independence and security concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \563\ 42 FR 63184, 63188 (1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Other Factors Considered by NHTSA
    The agency historically has considered the potential for adverse
safety consequences in setting CAFE standards. This practice is
recognized approvingly in case law. As the courts have recognized,
``NHTSA has always examined the safety consequences of the CAFE
standards in its overall consideration of relevant factors since its
earliest rulemaking under the CAFE program.'' Competitive Enterprise
Institute v. NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 120 n. 11 (DC Cir. 1990) (``CEI I'')
(citing 42 Fed. Reg. 33534, 33551 (June 30, 1977)). The courts have
consistently upheld NHTSA's implementation of EPCA in this manner. See,
e.g., Competitive Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321, 322
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (``CEI II'') (in determining the maximum feasible fuel
economy standard, ``NHTSA has always taken passenger safety into
account.'') (citing CEI I, 901 F.2d at 120 n. 11); Competitive
Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 45 F.3d 481, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(``CEI III'') (same); Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538
F.3d 1172, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding NHTSA's analysis of
vehicle safety issues associated with weight in connection with the MY
2008-11 light truck CAFE rule). Thus, in evaluating what levels of
stringency would result in maximum feasible standards, NHTSA assesses
the potential safety impacts and considers them in balancing the
statutory considerations and to determine the appropriate level of the standards.
    Under the universal or ``flat'' CAFE standards that NHTSA was
previously authorized to establish, the primary risk to safety came
from the possibility that manufacturers would respond to higher
standards by building smaller, less safe vehicles in order to ``balance
out'' the larger, safer vehicles that the public generally preferred to
buy. Under the attribute-based standards being proposed today, that
risk is reduced because building smaller vehicles would tend to raise a
manufacturer's overall CAFE obligation, rather than only raising its
fleet average CAFE. However, even if the manufacturers did not engage
in any downsizing under attribute-based standards, there is still the
possibility that manufacturers would rely on downweighting to improve
their fuel economy (for a given vehicle at a given footprint target) in
ways that may reduce safety to a greater or lesser extent. While NHTSA
recognizes that manufacturers may nonetheless choose this option for
raising their CAFE levels, in prior rulemakings we have limited the
application of downweighting/material substitution in our modeling
analysis to vehicles over 5,000 lbs GVWR.\564\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \564\ See 74 FR 14396-14407 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For purposes of today's proposed standards, however, NHTSA has
revised its modeling analysis to allow some application of
downweighting/material substitution for all vehicles, including those
under 5,000 lbs GVWR, because we believe that this is more consistent
with how manufacturers will actually respond to the standards. However,
as discussed above, NHTSA does not mandate the use of any particular
technology by manufacturers in meeting the standards. More information
on the new approach to modeling manufacturer use of downweighting/
material substitution is available in Chapter 3 of the draft joint TSD
and in Section V of the PRIA; and the estimated safety impacts that may
be due to the proposed standards are described below.
iii. Factors That NHTSA Is Prohibited From Considering
    EPCA also provides that in determining the level at which it should
set CAFE standards for a particular model year, NHTSA may not consider
the ability of manufacturers to take advantage of several EPCA
provisions that facilitate compliance with the CAFE standards and
thereby reduce the costs of compliance.\565\ As discussed further
below, manufacturers can earn compliance credits by exceeding the CAFE
standards and then use those credits to achieve compliance in years in
which their measured average fuel economy falls below the standards.
Manufacturers can also increase their CAFE levels through MY 2019 by
producing alternative fuel vehicles. EPCA provides an incentive for
producing these vehicles by specifying that their fuel economy is to be
determined using a special calculation procedure that results in those
vehicles being assigned a high fuel economy level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \565\ 49 U.S.C. 32902(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The effect of the prohibitions against considering these
flexibilities in setting the CAFE standards is that the flexibilities
remain voluntarily-employed measures. If the agency were

[[Page 49690]]

instead to assume manufacturer use of those flexibilities in setting
new standards, that assumption would result in higher standards and
thus tend to require manufacturers to use those flexibilities.
iv. Determining the Level of the Standards by Balancing the Factors
    NHTSA has broad discretion in balancing the above factors in
determining the appropriate levels of average fuel economy at which to
set the CAFE standards for each model year. Congress ``specifically
delegated the process of setting * * * fuel economy standards with
broad guidelines concerning the factors that the agency must
consider.'' \566\ The breadth of those guidelines, the absence of any
statutorily prescribed formula for balancing the factors, the fact that
the relative weight to be given to the various factors may change from
rulemaking to rulemaking as the underlying facts change, and the fact
that the factors may often be conflicting with respect to whether they
militate toward higher or lower standards give NHTSA discretion to
decide what weight to give each of the competing policies and concerns
and then determine how to balance them. The exercise of that discretion
is subject to the necessity of ensuring that NHTSA's balancing does not
undermine the fundamental purpose of the EPCA: Energy
conservation,\567\ and as long as that balancing reasonably
accommodates ``conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's
care by the statute.'' \568\ The balancing of the factors in any given
rulemaking is highly dependent on the factual and policy context of
that rulemaking. Given the changes over time in facts bearing on
assessment of the various factors, such as those relating to the
economic conditions, fuel prices and the state of climate change
science, the agency recognizes that what was a reasonable balancing of
competing statutory priorities in one rulemaking may not be a
reasonable balancing of those priorities in another rulemaking.\569\
Nevertheless, the agency retains substantial discretion under EPCA to
choose among reasonable alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \566\ Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1341
(C.A.D.C. 1986).
    \567\ Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172,
1195 (9th Cir. 2008).
    \568\ CAS, 1338 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845).
    \569\ CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPCA neither requires nor precludes the use of any type of cost-
benefit analysis as a tool to help inform the balancing process. While
NHTSA used marginal cost-benefit analysis in the first two rulemakings
to establish attribute-based CAFE standards, it was not required to do
so and is not required to continue to do so. Regardless of what type of
analysis is or is not used, considerations relating to costs and
benefits remain an important part of CAFE standard setting.
    Because the relevant considerations and factors can reasonably be
balanced in a variety of ways under EPCA, and because of uncertainties
associated with the many technological and cost inputs, NHTSA considers
a wide variety of alternative sets of standards, each reflecting
different balancing of those policies and concerns, to aid it in
discerning reasonable outcomes. Among the alternatives providing for an
increase in the standards in this rulemaking, the alternatives range in
stringency from a set of standards that increase, on average, 3 percent
annually to a set of standards that increase, on average, 7 percent annually.
2. Administrative Procedure Act
    To be upheld under the ``arbitrary and capricious'' standard of
judicial review in the APA, an agency rule must be rational, based on
consideration of the relevant factors, and within the scope of the
authority delegated to the agency by the statute. The agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for
its action including a ``rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.'' Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
    Statutory interpretations included in an agency's rule are
subjected to the two-step analysis of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984). Under step one, where a statute ``has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue,'' id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, the court and
the agency ``must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress,'' id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If the statute is silent or
ambiguous regarding the specific question, the court proceeds to step
two and asks ``whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.'' Id.
    If an agency's interpretation differs from the one that it has
previously adopted, the agency need not demonstrate that the prior
position was wrong or even less desirable. Rather, the agency would
need only to demonstrate that its new position is consistent with the
statute and supported by the record, and acknowledge that this is a
departure from past positions. The Supreme Court emphasized this
recently in FCC v. Fox Television, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009). When an
agency changes course from earlier regulations, ``the requirement that
an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily
demand that it display awareness that it is changing position,'' but
``need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for
the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices
that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better,
which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.'' \570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \570\ Ibid., 1181.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. National Environmental Policy Act
    As discussed above, EPCA requires the agency to determine what
level at which to set the CAFE standards for each model year by
considering the four factors of technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to
conserve energy. NEPA directs that environmental considerations be
integrated into that process. To accomplish that purpose, NEPA requires
an agency to compare the potential environmental impacts of its
proposed action to those of a reasonable range of alternatives.
    To explore the environmental consequences in depth, NHTSA has
prepared a draft environmental impact statement. The purpose of an EIS
is to ``provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental
impacts and [to] inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable
alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance
the quality of the human environment.'' 40 CFR 1502.1.
    NEPA is ``a procedural statute that mandates a process rather than
a particular result.'' Stewart Park & Reserve Coal., Inc. v. Slater,
352 F.3d at 557. The agency's overall EIS-related obligation is to
``take a `hard look' at the environmental consequences before taking a
major action.'' Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983).
Significantly, ``[i]f the adverse environmental effects of the proposed
action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the
environmental costs.'' Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989).

[[Page 49691]]

    The agency must identify the ``environmentally preferable''
alternative, but need not adopt it. ``Congress in enacting NEPA * * *
did not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other
appropriate considerations.'' Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Instead, NEPA
requires an agency to develop alternatives to the proposed action in
preparing an EIS. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(iii). The statute does not
command the agency to favor an environmentally preferable course of
action, only that it make its decision to proceed with the action after
taking a hard look at environmental consequences.

E. What Are the Proposed CAFE Standards?

1. Form of the Standards
    Each of the CAFE standards that NHTSA is proposing today for
passenger cars and light trucks is expressed as a mathematical function
that defines a fuel economy target applicable to each vehicle model
and, for each fleet, establishes a required CAFE level determined by
computing the sales-weighted harmonic average of those targets.\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \571\ Required CAFE levels shown here are estimated required
levels based on NHTSA's current projection of manufacturers' vehicle
fleets in MYs 2012-2016. Actual required levels are not determined
until the end of each model year, when all of the vehicles produced
by a manufacturer in that model year are known and their compliance
obligation can be determined with certainty. The target curves, as
defined by the constrained linear function, and as embedded in the
function for the sales-weighted harmonic average, are the real
``standards'' being proposed today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above in Section II.C, NHTSA is proposing to determine
fuel economy targets using a constrained linear function defined
according to the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.054

    Here, TARGET is the fuel economy target (in mpg) applicable to
vehicles of a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in square feet), b and a
are the function's lower and upper asymptotes (also in mpg),
respectively, c is the slope (in gpm per square foot) of the sloped
portion of the function, and d is the intercept (in gpm) of the
sloped portion of the function (that is, the value the sloped
portion would take if extended to a footprint of 0 square feet). The
MIN and MAX functions take the minimum and maximum, respectively of
the included values.

    As also discussed in Section II.C, under the proposed standards (as
under the recently-promulgated MY 2011 standards), the CAFE level
required of any given manufacturer will be determined by calculating
the production-weighted harmonic average of the fuel economy targets
applicable to each vehicle model:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.055

    Here, CAFErequired is the required level for a given fleet,
SALESi is the number of units of model i produced for
sale in the United States, TARGETi is the fuel economy target
applicable to model i (according to the equation shown in Chapter II
and based on the footprint of model i), and the summations in the
numerator and denominator are both performed over all models in the
fleet in question.

    The proposed standards are, therefore, specified by the four
coefficients defining fuel economy targets:

a = upper limit (mpg)
b = lower limit (mpg)
c = slope (gpm per square foot)
d = intercept (gpm)

    The values of the coefficients are different for the passenger car
standards and the light truck standards.
2. Passenger Car Standards for MYs 2012-2016
    For passenger cars, NHTSA is proposing CAFE standards defined by
the following coefficients during MY 2012-2016:

       Table IV.E.2-1--Coefficients Defining Proposed MY 2012-2016 Fuel Economy Targets for Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Coefficient                 2012            2013            2014            2015            2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a (mpg).........................      36.23           37.15           38.08           39.55           41.38
b (mpg).........................      28.12           28.67           29.22           30.08           31.12
c (gpm/sf)......................       0.0005308       0.0005308       0.0005308       0.0005308       0.0005308
d (gpm).........................       0.005842        0.005153        0.004498        0.003520        0.002406
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These coefficients result in footprint-dependent target curves
shown graphically below. The MY 2011 final standard, which is specified
by a constrained logistic function rather than a constrained linear
function, is shown for comparison.

[[Page 49692]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.033

    As discussed, the CAFE levels required of individual manufacturers
will depend on the mix of vehicles they produce for sale in the United
States. Based on the market forecast of future sales that NHTSA has
used to examine today's proposed CAFE standards, the agency estimates
that the targets shown above will result in the following average
required fuel economy levels for individual manufacturers during MYs
2012-2016 (an updated estimate of the average required fuel economy
level under the final MY 2011 standard is shown for comparison): \572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \572\ In the March 2009 final rule establishing MY 2011
standards for passenger cars and light trucks, NHTSA estimated that
the required fuel economy levels for passenger cars would average
30.2 mpg under the MY 2011 passenger car standard. Based on the
agency's current forecast of the MY 2011 passenger car market, which
anticipates greater numbers of passenger cars than the forecast used
in the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA now estimates that the average
required fuel economy level for passenger cars will be 30.5 mpg in MY 2011.

         Table IV.E.2-2--Estimated Average Fuel Economy Required Under Final MY 2011 and Proposed MY 2012-2016 CAFE Standards for Passenger Cars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Manufacturer                            MY 2011         MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.....................................................            30.2            33.2            34.0            34.8            36.0            37.5
Chrysler................................................            29.6            33.0            33.7            34.5            35.3            36.8
Daimler.................................................            29.4            32.6            33.1            33.8            35.0            36.4
Ford....................................................            29.8            33.0            33.7            34.5            35.8            37.3
General Motors..........................................            30.3            33.0            33.8            34.6            35.8            37.3
Honda...................................................            30.8            33.9            34.7            35.5            36.8            38.4
Hyundai.................................................            30.8            33.8            34.6            35.5            36.8            38.3
Kia.....................................................            30.6            33.6            34.4            35.2            36.5            38.0
Mazda...................................................            30.7            34.1            34.8            35.7            37.0            38.6
Mitsubishi..............................................            31.0            34.4            35.3            36.1            37.4            39.2
Nissan..................................................            30.7            33.5            34.2            35.0            36.2            37.8
Porsche.................................................            31.2            36.2            37.2            38.1            39.6            41.4
Subaru..................................................            31.0            34.8            35.7            36.5            37.9            39.6
Suzuki..................................................            31.2            35.9            36.8            37.7            39.2            41.0
Tata....................................................            27.8            30.7            31.4            32.1            33.1            34.4
Toyota..................................................            30.8            34.1            34.9            35.7            37.0            38.6
Volkswagen..............................................            30.8            34.6            35.4            36.2            37.5            39.1
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average.............................................            30.5            33.6            34.4            35.2            36.4            38.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49693]]

    We note that a manufacturer's required average fuel economy level
for a model year under the proposed standards would be based on its
actual production numbers in that model year. Therefore, its official
required fuel economy level would not be known until the end of that
model year. However, because the targets for each vehicle footprint
would be established in advance of the model year, a manufacturer
should be able to estimate its required level accurately.
3. Minimum Domestic Passenger Car Standards
    EISA expressly requires each manufacturer to meet a minimum fuel
economy standard for domestically manufactured passenger cars in
addition to meeting the standards set by NHTSA. According to the
statute (49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(4)) the minimum standard shall be the
greater of (A) 27.5 miles per gallon; or (B) 92 percent of the average
fuel economy projected by the Secretary for the combined domestic and
non-domestic passenger automobile fleets manufactured for sale in the
United States by all manufacturers in the model year. The agency must
publish the projected minimum standards in the Federal Register when
the passenger car standards for the model year in question are promulgated.
    Based on NHTSA's current market forecast, the agency's estimates of
these minimum standards under the proposed MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards
(and, for comparison, the final MY 2011 standard) are summarized below
in Table IV.E.2-1.\573\ For eventual compliance calculations, the final
calculated minimum standards will be updated to reflect any changes in
the average fuel economy level required under the final standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \573\ In the March 2009 final rule establishing MY 2011
standards for passenger cars and light trucks, NHTSA estimated that
the minimum required CAFE standard for domestically manufactured
passenger cars would be 27.8 mpg under the MY 2011 passenger car
standard. Based on the agency's current forecast of the MY 2011
passenger car market, NHTSA now estimates that the minimum required
CAFE standard will be 28.0 mpg in MY 2011.

 Table IV.E.3-1--Estimated Minimum Standard for Domestically Manufactured Passenger Cars Under Final MY 2011 and
                             Proposed MY 2012-2016 CAFE Standards for Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       2011               2012               2013               2014               2015               2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           28.0               30.9               31.6               32.4               33.5               34.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Light Truck Standards
    For light trucks, NHTSA is proposing CAFE standards defined by the
following coefficients during MYs 2012-2016:

        Table IV.E.4-1--Coefficients Defining Proposed MY 2012-2016 Fuel Economy Targets for Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Coefficient                 2012            2013            2014            2015            2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a (mpg).........................      29.44           30.32           31.30           32.70           34.38
b (mpg).........................      22.06           22.55           23.09           23.84           24.72
c (gpm/sf)......................       0.0004546       0.0004546       0.0004546       0.0004546       0.0004546
d (gpm).........................       0.01533         0.01434         0.01331         0.01194         0.01045
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These coefficients result in footprint-dependent targets shown
graphically below. The MY 2011 final standard, which is specified by a
constrained logistic function rather than a constrained linear
function, is shown for comparison.

[[Page 49694]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.034

    Given these targets, the CAFE levels required of individual
manufacturers will depend on the mix of vehicles they produce for sale
in the United States. Based on the market forecast NHTSA has used to
examine today's proposed CAFE standards, the agency estimates that the
targets shown above will result in the following average required fuel
economy levels for individual manufacturers during MYs 2012-2016 (an
updated estimate of the average required fuel economy level under the
final MY 2011 standard is shown for comparison): \574\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \574\ In the March 2009 final rule establishing MY 2011
standards for passenger cars and light trucks, NHTSA estimated that
the required fuel economy levels for light trucks would average 24.1
mpg under the MY 2011 light truck standard. Based on the agency's
current forecast of the MY 2011 light truck market, NHTSA now
estimates that the required fuel economy levels will average 24.2
mpg in MY 2011. The increase in the estimate reflects a slight
decrease in the size of the average light truck.

          Table IV.E.4-2--Estimated Average Fuel Economy Required Under Final MY 2011 and Proposed MY 2012-2016 CAFE Standards for Light Trucks
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Manufacturer                            MY 2011         MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.....................................................            25.7            26.3            27.0            27.7            28.8            30.1
Chrysler................................................            24.2            25.2            25.8            26.4            27.3            28.5
Daimler.................................................            24.7            25.4            26.1            26.9            27.9            29.1
Ford....................................................            23.3            24.3            24.9            25.3            26.2            27.3
General Motors..........................................            22.9            23.6            24.2            24.8            25.6            26.6
Honda...................................................            25.6            26.4            27.1            27.9            29.0            30.4
Hyundai.................................................            25.9            26.6            27.3            28.1            29.3            30.6
Kia.....................................................            25.1            25.8            26.4            27.2            28.3            29.6
Mazda...................................................            26.3            27.4            28.1            28.8            29.9            31.4
Mitsubishi..............................................            26.4            27.4            28.1            28.9            30.1            31.6
Nissan..................................................            24.1            25.0            25.6            26.1            27.0            28.2
Porsche.................................................            25.5            26.0            26.7            27.4            28.5            29.8
Subaru..................................................            26.5            27.5            28.3            29.2            30.4            31.8
Suzuki..................................................            26.3            27.2            27.9            28.7            29.9            31.3
Tata....................................................            26.1            26.9            27.6            28.4            29.6            31.0
Toyota..................................................            25.2            25.7            26.3            27.1            28.1            29.3
Volkswagen..............................................            25.0            25.6            26.2            26.9            27.9            29.2
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average.............................................            24.2            25.0            25.6            26.2            27.1            28.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49695]]

    As discussed above with respect to the proposed passenger cars
standards, we note that a manufacturer's required fuel economy level
for a model year under the proposed standards would be based on its
actual production numbers in that model year.

F. How Do the Proposed Standards Fulfill NHTSA's Statutory Obligations?

    In developing the proposed MY 2012-16 standards, the agency
developed and considered a wide variety of alternatives. NHTSA took a
new approach to defining alternatives as compared to the most recent
prior CAFE rulemaking. In response to comments received in the last
round of rulemaking, in our March 2009 notice of intent to prepare an
environmental impact statement, the agency selected a range of
candidate stringencies that increased annually, on average, 3% to
7%.\575\ That same approach has been carried over to this NPRM and to
the accompanying DEIS and PRIA. The majority of the alternatives
considered in this rulemaking are defined as average percentage
increases in stringency--3 percent per year, 4 percent per year, 5
percent per year, and so on. NHTSA believes that this approach more
clearly communicates the level of stringency of each alternative and is
more intuitive than alternatives defined in terms of different cost-
benefit ratios, and still allows us to identify alternatives that
represent different ways to balance NHTSA's statutory requirements
under EPCA/EISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \575\ Notice of intent to prepare an EIS, 74 FR 14857, 14859-60,
April 1, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the notice of intent, we noted that each of the listed
alternatives represents, in part, a different way in which NHTSA could
conceivably balance conflicting policies and considerations in setting
the standards. We were mindful that the agency would need to weigh and
balance many factors, such as the technological feasibility, economic
practicability, including leadtime considerations for the introduction
of technologies and impacts on the auto industry, the impacts of the
standards on fuel savings and CO2 emissions, fuel savings by
consumers; as well as other relevant factors such as safety. For
example, the 7% Alternative, the most stringent alternative, weighs
energy conservation and climate change considerations more heavily and
technological feasibility and economic practicability less heavily. In
contrast, the 3% Alternative, the least stringent alternative, places
more weight on technological feasibility and economic practicability.
We recognized that the ``feasibility'' of the alternatives also may
reflect differences and uncertainties in the way in which key economic
(e.g., the price of fuel and the social cost of carbon) and
technological inputs could be assessed and estimated or valued.
    In subsequently developing the NPRM and the associated analytical
documents, the agency expanded the list of alternatives to provide a
degree of analytical continuity between the old and new approach to
defining alternatives in an effort help the agency and the public
understand the similarities and dissimilarities between the two
approaches and to make the transition to the new approach. To that end,
we included and analyzed two additional alternatives, one that sets
standards at the point where net benefits are maximized, and another
that sets standards at the point at which total costs are equal to
total benefits.\576\ With respect to the first of those alternatives,
we note that Executive Order 12866 focuses attention on an approach
that maximizes net benefits. Further, since NHTSA has thus far set
attribute-based CAFE standards at the point at which net benefits are
maximized, we believed it would be useful and informative to consider
the potential impacts of that approach as compared to the new approach
for MYs 2012-2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \576\ The stringency indicated by each of these alternatives
depends on the value of inputs to NHTSA's analysis. Results
presented here for these two alternatives are based on NHTSA's
reference case inputs, which underlie the central analysis of the
proposed standards. In the accompanying PRIA, the agency presents
the results of that analysis to explore the sensitivity of results
to changes in key economic inputs. Because of numerous changes in
model inputs (e.g., discount rate, rebound effect, CO2
value, technology cost estimates), our analysis often exhausts all
available technologies before reaching the point at which total
costs equal total benefits. In these cases, the stringency that
exhausts all available technologies is considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After working with EPA in thoroughly reviewing and in some cases
reassessing the effectiveness and costs of technologies, most of which
are already being incorporated in at least some vehicles, market
forecasts and economic assumptions, we used the Volpe model extensively
to assess the technologies that the manufacturers could apply in order
to comply with each of the alternatives. This permitted us to assess
the variety, amount and cost of the technologies that could be needed
to enable the manufacturers to comply with each of the alternatives.
NHTSA estimated how the application of these and other technologies
could increase vehicle costs. The following five figures show industry-
wide average incremental (i.e., relative to the reference fleet) per-
vehicle costs, for each model year, each fleet, and the combined fleet.
Estimates specific to each manufacturer are shown in the accompanying PRIA.

[[Page 49696]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.036
[[Page 49697]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.038
[[Page 49698]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.039

    Corresponding to these per-vehicle cost increases, NHTSA estimated
total incremental outlays for additional technology in each model year.
The following figure shows cumulative results for MY 2012-2016 for
industry and Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota.
This figure focuses on these manufacturers as they currently (in MY
2008) represent three large U.S.-headquartered and three large foreign-
headquartered full-line manufacturers.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.040

[[Page 49699]]

    For each alternative, NHTSA has also estimated all corresponding
effects for each model year, including fuel savings, CO2
reductions, and other effects, as well as the estimated societal
benefits of these effects.

          Table IV.F.1--Fuel Savings, CO2 Reductions, and Technology Costs for Regulatory Alternatives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Fuel savings   CO2 reductions
                     Regulatory alternative                          (b. gal)          (mmt)        Cost  ($b)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% per Year.....................................................              37             404              29
4% per Year.....................................................              54             582              46
5% per Year.....................................................              69             718              74
6% per Year.....................................................              83             846             103
Maximum Net Benefit.............................................              90             923             111
7% per Year.....................................................              91             934             116
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total Cost = Total Benefit..................................              95             977             122
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The accompanying PRIA presents a detailed analysis of these results.
Relevant to EPCA's requirement that NHTSA consider, among other
factors, economic practicability and the need of the nation to conserve
energy, the following figure compares the incremental technology
outlays presented above to the corresponding cumulative fuel savings.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.041

The agency then assessed which alternative would represent a reasonable
balancing of the statutory criteria, given the difficulties confronting
the industry and the economy, and the priorities and policy goals of
the President. Those priorities and goals include achieving nationally
harmonized and coordinated program for regulating fuel economy and GHG
emissions.
    Part of that assessment entailed an evaluation of the stringencies
necessary to achieve both Federal and State GHG emission reduction
goals, especially those of California and the States that have adopted
its GHG emission standard for motor vehicles. Given that EPCA requires
attribute-based standards, NHTSA and EPA determined the level at which
an attribute-based GHG emissions standard would need to be set to
achieve the goals of California. This was done by evaluating a
nationwide CAA standard for MY 2016 that would require the levels of
technology upgrade, across the country, which California standards
would require for the subset of vehicles sold in California under the
California standards for MY 2009-2016 (known as ``Pavley 1''). In
essence, the stringency of the California Pavley 1 program was
evaluated, but for a national standard. For a number of reasons
discussed in section III.D, an assessment was developed of an
equivalent national new vehicle fleet-wide CO2 performance
standards for model year 2016 which would result in the new vehicle
fleet in the State of California having CO2 performance
equal to the performance from the California Pavley 1 standards. That
level, 250 g/mi, is equivalent to 35.5 mpg if the GHG standard is met

[[Page 49700]]

exclusively by fuel economy improvements.
    To obtain the counterpart CAFE standard, we then adjusted that
level downward to account for differences between the more prescriptive
EPCA and the more flexible CAA. These differences give EPA greater
ability under the CAA to provide compliance flexibilities that would
enable manufacturers to achieve compliance with a given level of
requirement under the CAA at less cost than with the same level of
requirement under EPCA. Principal among those greater flexibilities are
the credits that EPA can provide for improving the efficiency of air
conditioners and reducing the leakage of refrigerants from them. The
adjustments result in a figure of 34.1 mpg as the appropriate
counterpart CAFE standard. This differential gives manufacturers the
opportunity to reach 35.5 mpg under the CAA in ways that would
significantly reduce their costs. Were NHTSA instead to establish its
standard at the same level, manufacturers would need to make
substantially greater expenditures on fuel-saving technologies to reach
35.5 mpg under EPCA.
    Given the importance to this rulemaking of achieving a harmonized
National Program, we created a new alternative whose annual percentage
increases would achieve 34.1 mpg by MY 2016. That alternative is one
which increases on average at 4.3% annually.
    This new alternative, like the seven alternative presented above,
represents a unique balancing of the statutory factors and other
relevant considerations. We have added that alternative to the table below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Fuel
                                            savings      CO2       Cost
          Regulatory  alternative              (b.   reductions    ($b)
                                              gal)      (mmt)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3% per Year...............................       37        404        29
4% per Year...............................       54        582        46
Proposed (4.3% per Year)..................       62        656        60
5% per Year...............................       69        718        74
6% per Year...............................       83        846       103
Maximum Net Benefit.......................       90        923       111
7% per Year...............................       91        934       116
                                           -----------------------------
    Total Cost = Total Benefit............       95        977       122
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, NHTSA has used the Volpe model to analyze each of
these alternatives based on analytical inputs determined jointly with
EPA. For a given regulatory alternative, the Volpe model estimates how
each manufacturer could apply technology in response to the MY 2012
standard (separately for cars and trucks), carries technologies applied
in MY 2012 forward to MY 2013, and then estimates how each manufacturer
could apply technology in response to the MY 2013 standard. When
analyzing MY 2013, the model considers the potential to add ``extra''
technology in MY 2012 in order to carry that technology into MY 2013,
thereby avoiding the use of more expensive technologies in MY 2013. The
model continues in this fashion through MY 2016, and then performs
calculations to estimate the costs, effects, and benefits of the
applied technologies, and to estimate any civil penalties owed based on
projected noncompliance. For each regulatory alternative, the model
calculates incremental costs, effects, and benefits relative to the
regulatory baseline (i.e., the no-action alternative), under which the
MY 2011 CAFE standards continue through MY 2016. The model calculates
results for each model year, because EPCA requires that NHTSA set its
standards for each model year at the ``maximum feasible average fuel
economy level that the Secretary decides the manufacturers can achieve
in that model year'' considering four statutory factors. Pursuant to
EPCA's directive notice not to consider statutory credits in
establishing CAFE standards, NHTSA did not FFV credits, credits carried
forward and backward, and transferred credit.577 578 In
addition, the analysis reflects the ability of manufacturers to pay
fines in lieu of compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \577\ Separately, NHTSA has conducted analysis that accounts for
EPCA's provisions regarding FFVs.
    \578\ Because NHTSA's modeling represents every model year
explicitly, accounts for estimates of when vehicle model redesigns
will occur, and sets aside these compliance flexibilities, the
agency's modeling produces results that differ varyingly from EPA's
for specific manufacturers, fleets, and model years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because it entails year-by-year examination of eight regulatory
alternatives for, separately, passenger cars and light trucks, NHTSA's
analysis involves a large amount of information. Detailed results of
this analysis are presented separately in the PRIA accompanying today's
notice. The remainder of this section discusses a combination of
aggregated and illustrative results of this analysis.
    The following figure compares average fuel economy levels required
of manufacturers under the eight regulatory alternatives in MYs 2012,
2014, and 2016. Required levels for MY 2013 and MY 2015 fall between
those for MYs 2012 and 2014 and MYs 2014 and 2016, respectively.
Although required levels for these interim years are not presented in
the following figure to limit the complexity of the figure, they do
appear in the accompanying PRIA.\579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \579\ Also, the ``Max NB'' and the ``TC = TB'' alternatives
depend on the inputs to the agencies' analysis. The sensitivity
analysis presented in the PRIA documents the response of these
alternatives to changes in key economic inputs. For example, the
combined average required fuel economy under the ``Max NB''
alternative is 36.8 mpg under the reference case economic inputs
presented here, and ranges from 32.8 mpg to 37.2 mpg under the
alternative economic inputs presented in the PRIA.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49701]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.042

    As this figure illustrates, the proposed standards involve a
``faster start'' toward increased stringency than do any of the
alternatives that increase steadily (i.e., the 3%/y, 4%/y, 5%/y, 6%/y,
and 7%/y alternatives). However, by MY 2016, the stringency of the
proposed standards reflects an average annual increase of 4.3%/y. The
proposed standards, therefore, represent an alternative that could be
referred to as ``4.3% per year with a fast start'' or a ``front-loaded
4.3% average annual increase.''
    In NHTSA's analysis, these achieved average fuel economy levels
result from the application of technology rather than changes in the
mix of vehicles produced for sale in the U.S. The accompanying PRIA
presents detailed estimates of additional technology penetration into
the NHTSA reference fleet associated with each regulatory alternative.
The following four charts illustrate the results of this analysis,
considering the application of four technologies by six manufacturers
and the industry as a whole. Technologies include gasoline direct
injection (GDI), engine turbocharging and downsizing, diesel engines,
and strong HEV systems (including CISG systems). GDI and turbocharging
are among the technologies that play an important role in achieving the
fuel economy improvements shown in NHTSA's analysis, and diesels and
strong HEVs represent technologies involving significant challenges for
widespread use through MY 2016. These figures focus on Chrysler, Ford,
General Motors, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota, as these manufacturers
currently (in MY 2008) represent three large U.S.-headquartered and
three large foreign-headquartered full-line manufacturers. For each
alternative, the figures show additional application of technology by
MY 2016. The PRIA presents results for all model years, technologies,
and manufacturers, and NHTSA has considered these broader results when
considering the eight regulatory alternatives.

[[Page 49702]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.044

[[Continued on page 49703]]

 
 


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