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Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards

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[Federal Register: September 28, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 186)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 49703-49752]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr28se09-29]

Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards

[[Continued from page 49702]]

[[Page 49703]]
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.045
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.046

    The agency began the process of winnowing the alternatives by
determining whether any of the lower stringency alternatives should be
eliminated from consideration. To begin with, the agency needs to
ensure that its standards are high enough to enable the combined fleet
of passenger cars and light trucks to achieve at least 35 mpg not later
than MY 2020, as required by EISA. Achieving that level makes it
necessary for the chosen alternative to increase at over 3 percent annually.
    NHTSA has concluded that it must reject the 3%/y and 4%/y
alternatives. Given that CO2 and fuel savings are very
closely correlated, the above chart reveals that the 3%/y and 4%/y
alternative would not produce the reductions in fuel savings and
CO2 emissions that the Nation needs at this time. Picking
either of those alternatives would unnecessarily result in foregoing
substantial benefits, in terms of fuel

[[Page 49704]]

savings and reduced CO2 emissions, which would be achievable
at reasonable cost. Further, NHTSA has tentatively concluded that it
must reject the 3%/y and 4%/y alternatives, as neither would lead to
the regulatory harmonization that forms a vital core principle of the
National Program that EPA and NHTSA are jointly striving to implement.
In order to achieve a harmonized National Program, an average annual
increase of 4.3% is necessary.
    In contrast, at the upper end of the range of alternatives, the
agency was concerned that the increased benefits offered by those
alternatives were available only at excessive cost and might not be
practicable in all cases within the available leadtime.
    NHTSA first considered the environmentally-preferable alternative.
Based on the information provided in the DEIS, the environmentally-
preferable alternative would be that involving stringencies at which
total costs most nearly equal total benefits. NHTSA notes that NEPA
does not require that agencies choose the environmentally-preferable
alternative if doing so would be contrary to the choice that the agency
would otherwise make under its governing statute. Given the levels of
stringency required by the environmentally-preferable alternative and
the lack of lead time to achieve such levels between now and MY 2016,
NHTSA tentatively concludes that the environmentally-preferable
alternative would not be economically practicable or technologically
feasible, and thus tentatively concludes that it would result in
standards that would be beyond the level achievable for MYs 2012-2016.
    NHTSA determined that it would be inappropriate to propose any of
the other more stringent alternatives due to concerns over lead time
and economic practicability. At a time when the entire industry remains
in an economically critical state, the agencies believe that it would
be unreasonable to propose more stringent standards. Even in a case
where economic factors were not a consideration, there are real-world
time constraints which must be considered due to the short lead time
available for the early years of this program, in particular for MYs
2012 and 2013.
    As revealed by the figures shown above, the proposed standards
already require aggressive application of technologies, and more
stringent standards which would require more widespread use (including
more substantial implementation of advanced technologies such as
stoichiometric gasoline direct injection engines and strong hybrids)
raise serious issues of adequacy of lead time, not only to meet the
standards but to coordinate such significant changes with
manufacturers' redesign cycles.
    NHTSA does not believe that more stringent standards would meet
EPCA's requirement that CAFE standards be economically practicable. The
figures presented above reveal that increasing stringency beyond the
proposed standards would entail significant additional application of
technology--technology that, though perhaps feasible for individual
vehicle models, would not be economically practicable for the industry
at the scales involved. Among the more stringent alternatives, the one
closest in stringency to the standards proposed today is the
alternative under which combined CAFE stringency increases at 5%
annually. As indicated above, this alternative would yield fuel savings
and CO2 reductions about 12% and 9% higher, respectively,
than the proposed standards. However, compared to the proposed
standards, this alternative would increase outlays for new technologies
during MY 2012-2016 by about 24%, or $14b. Average MY 2016 cost
increases would, in turn, rise from $1,076 under the proposed standards
to $1,409 when stringency increases at 5% annually. This represents a
30% increase in per-vehicle cost for only a 3% increase in average
performance (on a gallon-per-mile basis to which fuel savings are
proportional). The following three tables summarize estimated
manufacturer-level average incremental costs for the 5%/y alternative
and the average of the passenger and light truck fleets:

Table IV.F.3--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under the 5%/y Alternative CAFE Standards for Passenger Cars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             474             541             667             883           1,190
Chrysler........................             726           1,464           1,832           1,928           1,913
Daimler.........................             132             209             814           1,094           1,467
Ford............................             979           1,556           1,572           1,918           2,181
General Motors..................              94             934           1,242           1,541           1,808
Honda...........................              55             263             408             451             671
Hyundai.........................             518             531             943           1,007           1,152
Kia.............................             180             344             440             612             796
Mazda...........................             603             919           1,294           1,569           1,863
Mitsubishi......................           1,106           1,141           2,594           2,962           2,913
Nissan..........................             298             587           1,344           1,402           1,517
Porsche.........................             209             240             350             465             581
Subaru..........................             353             454           1,828           2,258           2,201
Suzuki..........................             204           1,453           2,444           2,580           2,624
Tata............................             202             239             428             632           1,350
Toyota..........................             133             127             194             285             446
Volkswagen......................             231             550             688             828           1,202
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average.....................             337             664             916           1,079           1,291
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


 Table IV.F.4--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under the 5%/y Alternative CAFE Standards for Light Trucks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer               MY 2012          MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW............................             297              306             403             753             935
Chrysler.......................             113              475           1,058           1,271           1,538

[[Page 49705]]

Daimler........................             172              198             227             459             528
Ford...........................             732            1,201           1,685           2,345           2,380
General Motors.................  ...............             786           1,121           1,275           1,457
Honda..........................             646              614           1,139           1,265           1,624
Hyundai........................             990            1,009           2,106           2,206           2,148
Kia............................  ...............             309             713           1,181           1,692
Mazda..........................             434              608             612             722             953
Mitsubishi.....................              11               88           2,102           2,081           2,817
Nissan.........................             793              891           1,419           1,535           1,907
Porsche........................             (17)              55             117             962           1,009
Subaru.........................           1,398            1,370           1,501           1,441           1,486
Suzuki.........................               6            2,169           2,093           2,028           2,155
Tata...........................  ...............              77             160             242             695
Toyota.........................             113              427             906           1,065           1,291
Volkswagen.....................             (11)              55             127             209             286
                                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average....................             373              742           1,179           1,449           1,641
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


          Table IV.F.5--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under the 5%/y Alternative CAFE Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             415             469             590             848           1,123
Chrysler........................             351             888           1,392           1,632           1,747
Daimler.........................             148             205             591             884           1,167
For[caret]d.....................             872           1,401           1,623           2,110           2,269
General Motors..................              52             868           1,189           1,426           1,660
Honda...........................             272             386             638             701             955
Hyundai.........................             610             625           1,167           1,228           1,330
Kia.............................             143             337             489             707             942
Mazda...........................             571             862           1,181           1,443           1,732
Mitsubishi......................             959             975           2,525           2,854           2,902
Nissan..........................             462             683           1,367           1,441           1,627
Porsche.........................             120             172             272             623             717
Subaru..........................             743             787           1,709           1,964           1,942
Suzuki..........................             152           1,637           2,349           2,434           2,504
Tata............................              71             144             267             420           1,001
Toyota..........................             125             233             440             549             724
Volkswagen......................             182             460             586             716           1,043
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average.....................             350             692           1,010           1,207           1,409
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These cost increases derive from accelerated application of
advanced technologies as stringency increases past the levels in the
proposed standards. For example, under the proposed standards,
additional diesel application rates average 2% for the industry and
range from 0% to 7% among Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan, and
Toyota. Under standards increasing in combined stringency at 5%
annually, these rates more than double, averaging 5% for the industry
and ranging from 2% to 13% for the same six manufacturers. The agency
tentatively concludes that the levels of technology penetration
required by the proposed standards are reasonable. Increasing the
standards beyond those levels would lead to rapidly increasing
dependence on advanced technologies with higher costs, particularly in
the early years of the rulemaking time frame, according to the agency's
analysis, and potentially pose too great an economic burden given the
state of the industry.
    In contrast, through analysis of the illustrative results shown
above, as well as the more complete and detailed results presented in
the accompanying PRIA, NHTSA has concluded that the proposed standards
are technologically feasible and economically practicable. The proposed
standards will require manufacturers to apply considerable additional
technology. Although NHTSA cannot predict how manufacturers will
respond to the proposed standards, the agency's analysis indicates that
the standards could lead to significantly greater use of advanced
engine and transmission technologies. As shown above, the agency's
analysis shows considerable increases in the application of SGDI
systems and engine turbocharging and downsizing. Though not presented
above, the agency's analysis also shows similarly large increases in
the use of dual-clutch automated manual transmissions (AMTs). However,
the agency's analysis does not suggest that the additional application
of these technologies in response to the proposed standards would
extend beyond levels achievable by the industry. These technologies are
likely to be applied to at least some extent even in the absence of new
CAFE standards. In addition, the agency's analysis indicates that most
manufacturers would rely only to a limited extent on the most expensive
and advanced technologies, including diesel engines and strong HEVs.
    As shown above, NHTSA estimates that the proposed standards could
lead to average incremental costs ranging

[[Page 49706]]

from $291 per vehicle (for light trucks in MY 2011) to $1,085 per
vehicle (for passenger cars in MY 2016), increasing steadily from $421
per vehicle in for all light vehicles in MY 2011 $1,076 for all light
vehicle in MY 2016. NHTSA estimates that these costs would vary
considerably among manufacturers, but would rarely exceed $2,000 per
vehicle. The following three tables summarize estimated manufacturer-
level average incremental costs for the proposed standards and the
average of the passenger and light truck fleets:

         Table IV.F.6--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under Proposed Passenger Car CAFE Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             524             552             634             828           1,124
Chrysler........................             775           1,304           1,473           1,583           1,582
Daimler.........................             182             215             781           1,039           1,401
Ford............................           1,746           1,719           1,735           1,880           2,078
General Motors..................             143             990           1,189           1,387           1,553
Honda...........................              31             122             205             287             494
Hyundai.........................             418             452             643             726             868
Kia.............................             319             359             387             473             647
Mazda...........................             658             735             965             991            1,26
Mitsubishi......................           1,156           1,076           1,715           2,076           2,035
Nissan..........................             653             712           1,155           1,153           1,275
Porsche.........................             270             256             306             399             498
Subaru..........................             408             465           1,493           1,877           1,838
Suzuki..........................             259           1,001           1,445           1,494           1,675
Tata............................             246             244             395             577           1,284
Toyota..........................             133             127             155             257             267
Volkswagen......................             286             561             650             767           1,125
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average.....................             498             674             820             930           1,085
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


          Table IV.F.7--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under Proposed Light Truck CAFE Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             325             327             380             708             884
Chrysler........................             152             399             749             892           1,188
Daimler.........................             322             289             316             420             478
Ford............................             471             629             693           1,323           1,365
General Motors..................              33             533             752             792             962
Honda...........................             390             380             616             749           1,006
Hyundai.........................             774             744           1,301           1,322           1,292
Kia.............................             228             373             547             843           1,218
Mazda...........................             340             608             610             679             776
Mitsubishi......................              55              94           1,546           1,732           2,123
Nissan..........................             541             608             903           1,022           1,312
Porsche.........................              28              46              84             913             954
Subaru..........................           1,203           1,140           1,213           1,197           1,184
Suzuki..........................              50           1,451           1,404           1,358           1,373
Tata............................              44              83             127             193             635
Toyota..........................             172             309             665             764             877
Volkswagen......................              28              61              99             160             231
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average.....................             291             485             701             911           1,058
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                Table IV.F.8--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under Proposed CAFE Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             457             483             560             796           1,061
Chrysler........................             393             777           1,061           1,271           1,408
Daimler.........................             236             243             604             834           1,106
Ford............................           1,195           1,242           1,262           1,629           1,762
General Motors..................              94             785             997           1,131           1,304
Honda...........................             162             212             335             429             647
Hyundai.........................             488             509             769             835             944
Kia.............................             300             362             416             535             740
Mazda...........................             598             712             907             944           1,193
Mitsubishi......................           1,007             921           1,692           2,033           2,045
Nissan..........................             616             679           1,078           1,115           1,286
Porsche.........................             174             179             231             562             643
Subaru..........................             705             711           1,392           1,632           1,602
Suzuki..........................             204           1,117           1,434           1,458           1,598
Tata............................             115             150             234             368             938
Toyota..........................             147             191             331             429             468

[[Page 49707]]

Volkswagen......................             233             470             550             657             970
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average.....................             421             605             777             924           1,076
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In summary, NHTSA has considered eight regulatory alternatives,
including the proposed standards, examining technologies that could be
applied in response to each alternative, as well as corresponding
costs, effects, and benefits. The agency has concluded that
alternatives less stringent than the proposed standards would not
produce the fuel savings and CO2 reductions necessary at
this time to achieve either the overarching purpose of EPCA, i.e.,
energy conservation, or an important part of the regulatory
harmonization underpinning the National Program. Conversely, the agency
has concluded that more stringent standards would involve levels of
additional technology and cost that, considering the fragile state of
the automotive industry, would not be economically practicable.
Therefore, having considered these eight regulatory alternatives, and
the statutorily-relevant factors of technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to
conserve energy, along with other relevant factors such as the safety
impacts of the proposed standards,\580\ NHTSA tentatively concludes
that the proposed standards represent a reasonable balancing of all of
these concerns, and are the maximum feasible average fuel economy
levels that the manufacturers can achieve in MYs 2012-2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \580\ See Section IV.G.7 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Impacts of the Proposed CAFE Standards

1. How Would These Proposed Standards Improve Fuel Economy and Reduce
GHG Emissions for MY 2012-2016 Vehicles?
    As discussed above, the CAFE level required under an attribute-
based standard depends on the mix of vehicles produced for sale in the
U.S. Based on the market forecast that NHTSA and EPA have used to
develop and analyze new CAFE and CO2 emissions standards,
NHTSA estimates that the new CAFE standards will require CAFE levels to
increase by an average of 4.3 percent annually through MY 2016,
reaching a combined average fuel economy requirement of 34.1 mpg in
that model year:

                  Table IV.G.1-1--Average Required Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       2012            2013            2014            2015            2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..................            33.6            34.4            35.2            36.4            38.0
Light Trucks....................            25.0            25.6            26.2            27.1            28.3
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined....................            29.8            30.6            31.4            32.6            34.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA estimates that average achieved fuel economy levels will
correspondingly increase through MY 2016, but that manufacturers will,
on average, undercomply \581\ in some model years and overcomply \582\
in others, reaching a combined average fuel economy of 33.7 mpg in MY
2016: \583\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \581\ In NHTSA's analysis, ``undercompliance'' is mitigated
either through use of FFV credits, use of existing or ``banked''
credits, or through fine payment. Because NHTSA cannot consider
availability of credits in setting standards, the estimated achieved
CAFE levels presented here do not account for their use. In
contrast, because NHTSA is not prohibited from considering fine
payment, the estimated achieved CAFE levels presented here include
the assumption that BMW, Daimler (i.e., Mercedes), Porsche, and Tata
(i.e., Jaguar and Rover) will only apply technology up to the point
that it would be less expensive to pay civil penalties.
    \582\ In NHTSA's analysis, ``overcompliance'' occurs through
multi-year planning: Manufacturers apply some ``extra'' technology
in early model years (e.g., MY 2014) in order to carry that
technology forward and thereby facilitate compliance in later model
years (e.g., MY 2016)
    \583\ Consistent with EPCA, NHTSA has not accounted for
manufacturers' ability to earn CAFE credits for selling FFVs, carry
credits forward and back between model years, and transfer credits
between the passenger car and light truck fleets.

                  Table IV.G.1-2--Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       2012            2013            2014            2015            2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..................            32.9            34.2            35.2            36.5            37.6
Light Trucks....................            24.9            25.7            26.5            27.4            28.1
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined....................            29.3            30.5            31.5            32.7            33.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA estimates that these fuel economy increases will lead to fuel
savings totaling 61.6 billion gallons during the useful lives of
vehicles sold in MYs 2012-2016:

[[Page 49708]]

                                                      Table IV.G.1-3--Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons)
                                                               [Under proposed standards]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             2.5             5.3             7.5             9.4            11.4            36.0
Light Trucks............................................             1.8             3.7             5.4             6.8             7.8            25.6
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................             4.3             9.1            12.9            16.1            19.2            61.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency also estimates that these new CAFE standards will lead
to corresponding reductions of CO2 emissions totaling 656
million metric tons (mmt) during the useful lives of vehicles sold in
MYs 2012-2016:

                 Table IV.G.1-4--Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              2012     2013     2014     2015     2016    Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars............................................       25       56       79       99      121      381
Light Trucks..............................................       19       40       58       73       85      275
                                                           -----------------------------------------------------
    Combined..............................................       44       96      137      173      206      656
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. How Would These Proposed Standards Improve Fleet-Wide Fuel Economy
and Reduce GHG Emissions Beyond MY 2016?
    Under the assumption that CAFE standards at least as stringent as
those proposed for MY 2016 would be established for subsequent model
years, the effects of the proposed standards on fuel consumption and
GHG emissions will continue to increase for many years. This will occur
because over time, a growing fraction of the U.S. light-duty vehicle
fleet will be comprised of cars and light trucks that meet the MY 2016
standard. The impact of the proposed standards on fuel use and GHG
emissions will continue to grow through approximately 2050, when
virtually all cars and light trucks in service will have met the MY
2016 standard.
    As Table IV.G.2-1 shows, NHTSA estimates that the fuel economy
increases resulting from the proposed standards will lead to reductions
in total fuel consumption by cars and light trucks of 9 billion gallons
during 2020, increasing to 30 billion gallons by 2050. Over the period
from 2012--when the proposed standards would begin to take effect--
through 2050, cumulative fuel savings would total 693 billion gallons,
as Table IV.G.2-1 also indicates.

           Table IV.G.2-1--Reduction in Fleet-Wide Fuel Use (Billion Gallons) Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                         Total,
                      Calendar year                           2020       2030       2040       2050    2012-2050
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars...........................................          5         12         16         19        431
Light Trucks.............................................          4          7          9         11        262
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
    Combined.............................................          9         19         25         30        693
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a consequence of these reductions in fleet-wide fuel
consumption, the agency also estimates that the proposed CAFE standards
for MYs 2012-2016 will lead to corresponding reductions in
CO2 emissions from the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet.
Specifically, NHTSA estimates that total CO2 emissions
associated with passenger car and light truck use in the U.S. use will
decline by 111 million metric tons (mmt) during 2020 as a consequence
of the proposed standards, as Table IV.G.2-2 reports. The table also
shows that the this reduction is estimated to grow to 355 million
metric tons by the year 2050, and will total 8,247 million metric tons
over the period from 2012, when the proposed standards would take
effect, through 2050.

  Table IV.G.2-2--Reduction in Fleet-Wide Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) From Passenger Car and Light Truck Use
                                            Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                         Total,
                      Calendar year                           2020       2030       2040       2050    2012-2050
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars...........................................         64        144        186        222      5,117
Light Trucks.............................................         47         87        110        132      3,130
                                                          ------------------------------------------------------
    Combined.............................................        111        231        295        355      8,247
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49709]]

    These reductions in fleet-wide CO2 emissions, together
with corresponding reductions in other GHG emissions from fuel
production and use, would lead to small but significant reductions in
projected changes in the future global climate. These changes are
summarized in Table IV.G.2-3 below.

   Table IV.G.2-3--Effects of Reductions in Fleet-Wide Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) On Projected Changes in
                                                 Global Climate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Projected change in measure
                                                              --------------------------------------------------
             Measure                     Units          Date                     With proposed
                                                                  No action        standards        Difference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atmospheric CO2 Concentration...  ppm...............     2100           783.0            780.3             -2.7
Increase in Global Mean Surface   [deg]C............     2100           3.136            3.126           -0.010
 Temperature.
Sea Level Rise..................  cm................     2100           38.00            37.91            -0.09
Global Mean Precipitation.......  % change from 1980-    2090           4.59%            4.57%           -0.02%
                                   1999 avg..
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. How Would These Proposed Standards Impact Non-GHG Emissions and
Their Associated Effects?
    Under the assumption that CAFE standards at least as stringent as
those proposed for MY 2016 would be established for subsequent model
years, the effects of the proposed standards on air quality and its
associated health effects will continue to be felt over the foreseeable
future. This will occur because over time a growing fraction of the
U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet will be comprised of cars and light
trucks that meet the MY 2016 standard, and this growth will continue
until approximately 2050.
    Increases in the fuel economy of light-duty vehicles required by
the proposed CAFE standards will cause a slight increase in the number
of miles they are driven, through the fuel economy ``rebound effect.''
In turn, this increase in vehicle use will lead to increases in
emissions of criteria air pollutants and some airborne toxics, since
these are products of the number of miles vehicles are driven.
    At the same time, however, the projected reductions in fuel
production and use reported in Table IV.G.2-1 above will lead to
corresponding reductions in emissions of these pollutants that occur
during fuel production and distribution (``upstream'' emissions). For
most of these pollutants, the reduction in upstream emissions resulting
from lower fuel production and distribution will outweigh the increase
in emissions from vehicle use, resulting in a net decline in their
total emissions.
    Tables IV.G.3-1a and 3-1b report estimated reductions in emissions
of selected criteria air pollutants (or their chemical precursors) and
airborne toxics expected to result from the proposed standards during
calendar year 2030. By that date, the majority of light-duty vehicles
in use will have met the proposed MY 2016 CAFE standards, so these
reductions provide a useful index of the long-term impact of the
proposed standards on air pollution and its consequences for human health.

     Table IV.G.3-1a--Projected Changes in Emissions of Criteria Air Pollutants From Car and Light Truck Use
                                           [Calendar year 2030; tons]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Criteria air pollutant
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Source of                                                        Volatile
         Vehicle class              emissions        Nitrogen       Particulate    Sulfur oxides      organic
                                                   oxides (NOX)   matter (PM2.5)       (SOX)         compounds
                                                                                                       (VOC)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars................  Vehicle use.....           1,791             630          -2,375           2,157
                                Fuel production          -19,022          -2,539         -11,363         -75,031
                                 and
                                 distribution.
                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                All sources.....         -17,231          -1,909         -13,738         -72,874
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light Trucks..................  Vehicle use.....           1,137             257          -1,401           1,094
                                Fuel production          -11,677          -1,569          -7,031         -43,667
                                 and
                                 distribution.
                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                All sources.....         -10,540          -1,312          -8,432         -42,573
                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.....................  Vehicle use.....           2,928             887          -3,776           3,251
                                Fuel production          -30,699          -4,108         -18,394        -118,698
                                 and
                                 distribution.
                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                All sources.....         -27,771          -3,221         -22,170        -115,447
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


         Table IV.F.3-1b--Projected Changes in Emissions of Airborne Toxics From Car and Light Truck Use
                                           [Calendar year 2030; tons]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Toxic air pollutant
             Vehicle class                 Source of emissions   -----------------------------------------------
                                                                      Benzene      1,3-Butadiene   Formaldehyde
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars........................  Vehicle use.............              67              19              72

[[Page 49710]]

                                        Fuel production and                 -158              -1             -54
                                         distribution.
                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        All sources.............             -91              18              18
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light Trucks..........................  Vehicle use.............              45               9              32
                                        Fuel production and                  -93              -1             -33
                                         distribution.
                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        All sources.............             -48               8              -1
                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................  Vehicle use.............             112              28             104
                                        Fuel production and                 -251              -2             -87
                                         distribution.
                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        All sources.............            -139              26              17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Positive values indicate increases in emissions; negative values indicate reductions.

    In turn, the reductions in emissions reported in Tables IV.G.3-1a
and 3-1b are projected to result in significant declines in the health
effects that result from population exposure to these pollutants. Table
IV.G.3-2 reports the estimated reductions in selected PM2.5-
related human health impacts that are expected to result from reduced
population exposure to unhealthful atmospheric concentrations of
PM2.5. The estimates reported in Table IV.G.3-2 are derived
from PM2.5-related dollar-per-ton estimates that include
only quantifiable reductions in health impacts likely to result from
reduced population exposure to particular matter (PM). They do not
include all health impacts related to reduced exposure to PM, nor do
they include any reductions in health impacts resulting from lower
population exposure to other criteria air pollutants (particularly
ozone) and air toxics. NHTSA and EPA are using PM-related benefits-per-
ton values as an interim approach to estimating the PM-related benefits
of the proposal. To model the ozone and PM air quality benefit sof the
final rule, the analysis will utilize ambient concentration data
derived from full-scale photochemical air quality modeling.

  Table IV.G.3-2--Projected Reductions in Health Impacts of Exposure to
             Criteria Air Pollutants From Proposed Standards
                          [Calendar year 2030]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Projected
         Health impact                  Measure         reduction (2030)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mortality (ages 30 and older).  premature deaths per          217 to 554
                                 year.
Chronic Bronchitis............  cases per year........               142
Emergency Room Visits for       number per year.......               198
 Asthma.
Work Loss.....................  workdays per year.....            25,522
------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. What Are the Estimated Costs and Benefits of These Proposed
Standards?
    NHTSA estimates that the proposed standards could entail
significant additional technology beyond the levels reflected in the
baseline market forecast used by NHTSA. This additional technology will
lead to increases in costs to manufacturers and vehicle buyers, as well
as fuel savings to vehicle buyers. The following three tables summarize
the extent to which the agency estimates technologies could be added to
the passenger car, light truck, and overall fleets in each model year
in response to the proposed standards. Percentages reflect the
technology's additional application in the market, and are negative in
cases where one technology is superseded (i.e., displaced) by another.
For example, the agency estimates that many automatic transmissions
used in light trucks could be displaced by dual clutch transmissions.
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P

[[Page 49711]]
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[[Page 49712]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.048
[[Page 49713]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.049

BILLING CODE 6560-50-C
    In order to pay for this additional technology (and, for some
manufacturers, civil penalties), NHTSA estimates that average passenger
car and light truck prices will, relative to levels resulting from
compliance with baseline (MY 2011) standards, increase by $591-$1,127
and $283-$1,020, respectively, during MYs 2011-2016. The following
tables summarize the agency's estimates of average price increases for
each manufacturer's passenger car, light truck, and overall fleets
(with corresponding averages for the industry):

         Table IV.G.4-4--Average Passenger Car Incremental Price Increases ($) Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             524             552             634             828           1,124
Chrysler........................             775           1,304           1,473           1,583           1,582
Daimler.........................             182             215             781           1,039           1,401

[[Page 49714]]

Ford............................           1,746           1,719           1,735           1,880           2,078
General Motors..................             143             990           1,189           1,387           1,553
Honda...........................              31             122             205             287             494
Hyundai.........................             418             452             643             726             868
Kia.............................             319             359             387             473             647
Mazda...........................             658             735             965             991           1,263
Mitsubishi......................           1,156           1,076           1,715           2,076           2,035
Nissan..........................             653             712           1,155           1,153           1,275
Porsche.........................             270             256             306             399             498
Subaru..........................             408             465           1,493           1,877           1,838
Suzuki..........................             259           1,001           1,445           1,494           1,675
Tata............................             246             244             395             577           1,284
Toyota..........................             133             127             155             257             267
Volkswagen......................             286             561             650             767           1,125
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total/Average...............             498             674             820             930           1,085
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


          Table IV.G.4-5--Average Light Truck Incremental Price Increases ($) Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             325             327             380             708             884
Chrysler........................             152             399             749             892           1,188
Daimler.........................             322             289             316             420             478
Ford............................             471             629             693           1,323           1,365
General Motors..................              33             533             752             792             962
Honda...........................             390             380             616             749           1,006
Hyundai.........................             774             744           1,301           1,322           1,292
Kia.............................             228             373             547             843           1,218
Mazda...........................             340             608             610             679             776
Mitsubishi......................              55              94           1,546           1,732           2,123
Nissan..........................             541             608             903           1,022           1,312
Porsche.........................              28              46              84             913             954
Subaru..........................           1,203           1,140           1,213           1,197           1,184
Suzuki..........................              50           1,451           1,404           1,358           1,373
Tata............................              44              83             127             193             635
Toyota..........................             172             309             665             764             877
Volkswagen......................              28              61              99             160             231
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total/Average...............             291             485             701             911           1,058
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


        Table IV.G.4-6--Average Incremental Price Increases ($) by Manufacturer Under Proposed Standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Manufacturer                MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMW.............................             457             483             560             796           1,061
Chrysler........................             393             777           1,061           1,271           1,408
Daimler.........................             236             243             604             834           1,106
Ford............................           1,195           1,242           1,262           1,629           1,762
General Motors..................              94             785             997           1,131           1,304
Honda...........................             162             212             335             429             647
Hyundai.........................             488             509             769             835             944
Kia.............................             300             362             416             535             740
Mazda...........................             598             712             907             944           1,193
Mitsubishi......................           1,007             921           1,692           2,033           2,045
Nissan..........................             616             679           1,078           1,115           1,286
Porsche.........................             174             179             231             562             643
Subaru..........................             705             711           1,392           1,632           1,602
Suzuki..........................             204           1,117           1,434           1,458           1,598
Tata............................             115             150             234             368             938
Toyota..........................             147             191             331             429             468
Volkswagen......................             233             470             550             657             970
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total/Average...............             421             605             777             924           1,076
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49715]]

    Based on the agencies' estimates of manufacturers' future sales
volumes, these price increases will lead to a total of $60.2 billion in
incremental outlays during MYs 2012-2016 for additional technology
attributable to the proposed standards:

                                      Table IV.G.4-7--Incremental Technology Outlays ($b) Under Proposed Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             4.1             6.5             8.4             9.9            11.8            40.8
Light Trucks............................................             1.5             2.8             4.0             5.2             5.9            19.4
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................             5.7             9.3            12.5            15.1            17.6            60.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA notes that these estimates of the economic costs for meeting
higher CAFE standards omit certain potentially important categories of
costs, and may also reflect underestimation (or possibly
overestimation) of some costs that are included. For example, although
the agency's analysis attempts to hold vehicle performance, capacity,
and utility constant in estimating the costs of applying fuel-saving
technologies to vehicles, the analysis imputes no cost to any actual
reductions in vehicle performance, capacity, and utility that may
result from manufacturers' efforts to comply with the proposed CAFE
standards. Although these costs are difficult to estimate accurately,
they nonetheless represent a potentially significant category of
omitted costs. Similarly, the agency's estimates of costs for meeting
higher CAFE standards does not estimate the economic value of potential
increases in motor vehicle fatalities and injuries that could result
from reductions in the size or weight of vehicles. While NHTSA reports
worst-case estimates of these increases in fatalities and injuries, no
estimate of their economic value is included in the agency's estimates
of the net benefits resulting from the proposed standards due to
ongoing discussion regarding these potential impacts.
    Finally, it is possible that the agency may have underestimated or
overestimated manufacturers' direct costs for applying some fuel
economy technologies, or the increases in manufacturer's indirect costs
associated with higher vehicle manufacturing costs. In either case, the
technology outlays reported here will not correctly represent the costs
of meeting higher CAFE standards. Similarly, NHTSA's estimates of
increased costs of congestion, accidents, and noise associated with
added vehicle use are drawn from a 1997 study, and the correct
magnitude of these values may have changed since they were
developed.\584\ If this is the case, the costs of increased vehicle use
associated with the fuel economy rebound effect will differ from the
agency's estimates in this analysis. Thus, like the agency's estimates
of economic benefits, estimates of total compliance costs reported here
may underestimate or overestimate the true economic costs of the
proposed standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \584\ The agency seeks comment above on appropriate values for
these costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, offsetting these costs, the achieved increases in fuel
economy will also produce significant benefits to society. NHTSA
estimates that, in present value terms (at a discount rate of 3
percent), these benefits will total $201.7 billion over the useful
lives of light vehicles sold during MYs 2012-2016:

                                      Table IV.G.4-8--Present Value of Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             7.6            17.0            24.4            31.2            38.7           119.1
Light Trucks............................................             5.5            11.6            17.3            22.2            26.0            82.6
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................            13.1            28.7            41.8            53.4            64.7           201.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA attributes most of these benefits to reductions in fuel
consumption, valuing fuel at future pretax prices in EIA's reference
case forecast from AEO 2009. The total benefits shown in the above
table also include other benefits and disbenefits, examples of which
include the social values of reductions in CO2 and criteria
pollutant emissions, the value of additional travel (induced by the
rebound effect), and the social cost of additional congestion,
accidents, and noise attributable to that additional travel. The PRIA
accompanying today's proposed rule presents a detailed analysis of
specific benefits of the proposed rule.
    For both the passenger car and light truck fleets, NHTSA estimates
that the benefits of today's proposed standards will exceed the
corresponding costs in every model year. Over the useful lives of the
affected (MY 2012-2016) vehicles, the agency estimates that the
benefits of the proposed standards will exceed the costs of the
proposed standards by $141.5 billion:

                                    Table IV.G.4-9--Present Value of Net Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             3.5            10.5            16.0            21.3            26.9            78.3
Light Trucks............................................             3.9             8.9            13.3            17.0            20.1            63.2
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49716]]


    Combined............................................             7.4            19.4            29.3            38.3            47.1           141.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's estimates of economic benefits from establishing higher
CAFE are also subject to considerable uncertainty. Most important, the
agency's estimates of the fuel savings likely to result from adopting
higher CAFE standards depend critically on the accuracy of the
estimated fuel economy levels that will be achieved under both the
baseline scenario, which assumes that manufacturers will continue to
comply with the MY 2011 CAFE standards, and under alternative increases
in the standards that apply to MY 2012-16 passenger cars and light
trucks. Specifically, if the agency has underestimated the fuel economy
levels that manufacturers will achieve under the baseline scenario, its
estimates of fuel savings and the resulting economic benefits will be
too large. As another example, the agency's estimate of benefits from
reducing the threat of economic damages from disruptions in the supply
of imported petroleum to the U.S. applies to calendar year 2015. If the
magnitude of this estimate would be expected to grow after 2015 in
response to increases in U.S. petroleum imports, growth in the level of
U.S. economic activity, or increases in the likelihood of disruptions
in the supply of imported petroleum, the agency may have underestimated
the benefits from the reduction in petroleum imports expected to result
from adopting higher CAFE standards.
    However, it is also possible that NHTSA's estimates of economic
benefits from establishing higher CAFE standards underestimate the true
economic benefits of the fuel savings those standards would produce.
This is partly because the agency has been unable to develop monetized
estimates of the economic value of certain potentially significant
categories of benefits from reducing fuel consumption. Specifically,
the agency's estimate of the economic value of reduced damages to human
health resulting from lower exposure to criteria air pollutants
includes only the effects of reducing population exposure to
PM2.5 emissions. Although this is likely to be the most
significant component of health benefits from reduced emissions of
criteria air pollutants, it excludes the value of reduced damages to
human health and other impacts resulting from lower emissions and
reduced population exposure to other criteria air pollutants, including
ozone and nitrous oxide (N2O), as well as airborne toxics.
The agency's analysis excludes these benefits because no reliable
estimates of the health impacts of criteria pollutants other than
PM2.5 or of the health impacts of airborne toxics were
available to use in developing estimates of these benefits.
    In addition, the agency's estimate of the value of reduced climate-
related economic damages from lower emissions of GHGs excludes many
sources of potential benefits from reducing the pace and extent of
global climate change. These include reductions in the risk of
catastrophic changes in the global climate, lower costs for necessary
adaptations to changes in climate, reduced water supply within specific
global sub-regions, reductions in damages caused by severe storms,
lower population exposure to harmful air pollution levels, reductions
in ecosystem impacts and risks to natural resources of global
significance, and reduced threats from widespread social or political
unrest. Including monetized estimates of benefits from reducing the
extent of climate change and these associated impacts would increase
the agency's estimates of benefits from adopting higher CAFE standards.
    The benefits, costs, and net benefits shown above are all based on
a discount rate of 3 percent. As documented in the accompanying PRIA,
the agency examined the sensitivity of results to changes in many
economic inputs. With an alternative discount rate of 7 percent,
incremental technology outlays were virtually identical to those
estimated at a 3 percent discount rate: \585\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \585\ Because some economic inputs change the effective cost of
some technologies, and NHTSA assumes some manufacturers will be
willing to pay civil penalties based on economic considerations,
this outcome is not assured.

                      Table IV.G.4-10--Incremental Technology Outlays ($b) Under Proposed Standards (Using 7 Percent Discount Rate)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             4.1             6.5             8.4             9.9            11.8            40.8
Light Trucks............................................             1.5             2.8             4.0             5.2             5.9            19.4
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................             5.7             9.3            12.5            15.1            17.6            60.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the present value of the benefits accrued over the
lifetime of the vehicles covered by the proposal is about 20 percent
smaller when discounted at a 7 percent annual rate than when discounted
at a 3 percent annual rate:

                     Table IV.G.4-11--Present Value of Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (Using 7 Percent Discount Rate)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             6.0            13.6            19.5            25.0            31.1            95.3
Light Trucks............................................             4.3             9.1            13.5            17.4            20.4            64.6
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 49717]]

    Combined............................................            10.3            22.6            33.1            42.4            51.5           159.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result, net benefits are 38 percent lower when total benefits
are discounted at a 7 percent annual rate:

                   Table IV.G.4-12--Present Value of Net Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (Using 7 Percent Discount Rate)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             1.9             7.0            11.1            15.1            19.3            54.5
Light Trucks............................................             2.7             6.3             9.5            12.2            14.5            45.2
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................             4.6            13.3            20.6            27.3            33.8            99.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following tables also present itemized costs and benefits for
the combined fleet for each year of the proposed standards and for all
the years combined, at 3 and 7 percent discount rates, respectively.
Numbers in parentheses represent negative values.

                          Table IV.G.4-13--Itemized Cost and Benefit Estimates for the Combined Vehicle Fleet, 3% Discount Rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016          Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs:                                                    ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............
    Technology Costs....................................          $5,695          $9,295         $12,454         $15,080         $17,633         $60,157
Benefits                                                  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............
    Lifetime Fuel Expenditures..........................          10,197          22,396          32,715          41,880          50,823         158,012
    Consumer Surplus from Additional Driving............             751           1,643           2,389           3,029           3,639          11,451
    Refueling Time Value................................             776           1,551           2,198           2,749           3,277          10,550
    Petroleum Market Externalities......................             559           1,194           1,700           2,129           2,538           8,121
    Congestion Costs....................................           (460)           (934)         (1,332)         (1,657)         (1,991)         (6,376)
    Noise Costs.........................................             (7)            (14)            (21)            (26)            (31)            (99)
    Crash Costs.........................................           (217)           (437)           (625)           (776)           (930)         (2,985)
    CO2.................................................           1,028           2,287           3,382           4,376           5,372          16,446
    CO..................................................               0               0               0               0               0               0
    VOC.................................................              41              80             108             131             156             518
    NOX.................................................              82             132             155             174             200             744
    PM..................................................             220             438             621             771             904           2,956
    SOX.................................................             161             345             490             613             731           2,341
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...........................................          13,132          28,680          41,781          53,394          64,687         201,676
========================================================================================================================================================
Net Benefits............................................           7,044          18,759          27,090          34,710          41,386         128,992
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                          Table IV.G.4-14--Itemized Cost and Benefit Estimates for the Combined Vehicle Fleet, 7% Discount Rate
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016          Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs
    Technology Costs....................................          $5,695          $9,295         $12,454         $15,080         $17,633         $60,157
Benefits:
    Lifetime Fuel Expenditures..........................           7,991          17,671          25,900          33,264          40,478         125,305
    Consumer Surplus from Additional Driving............             590           1,301           1,896           2,412           2,904           9,102
    Refueling Time Value................................             624           1,249           1,770           2,215           2,642           8,500
    Petroleum Market Externalities......................             448             960           1,367           1,712           2,043           6,531
    Congestion Costs....................................           (371)           (753)         (1,074)         (1,335)         (1,606)         (5,138)
    Noise Costs.........................................             (6)            (12)            (16)            (21)            (24)            (80)
    Crash Costs.........................................           (173)           (352)           (503)           (626)           (749)         (2,403)
    CO2.................................................             797           1,781           2,634           3,410           4,189          12,813
    CO..................................................               0               0               0               0               0               0
    VOC.................................................              33              65              87             106             125             416
    NOX.................................................              60              99             120             135             156             570
    PM..................................................             170             344             492             613             721           2,339

[[Page 49718]]

    SOX.................................................             129             278             394             493             588           1,882
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...........................................          10,292          22,631          33,066          42,380          51,468         159,837
========================================================================================================================================================
Net Benefits............................................           4,281          12,832          18,818          24,414          29,293          89,638
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The above benefit and cost estimates did not reflect the
availability and use of flexibility mechanisms, such as compliance
credits and credit trading, because EPCA prohibits NHTSA from
considering the effects of those mechanisms in setting CAFE standards.
However, the agency noted that, in reality, manufacturers were likely
to rely to some extent on flexibility mechanisms provided by EPCA and
would thereby reduce the cost of complying with the proposed standards
to a meaningful extent.
    As discussed in the PRIA, NHTSA has performed an analysis to
estimate the costs and benefits if EPCA's provisions regarding FFVs are
accounted for. The agency considered also attempting to account for
other EPCA flexibility mechanisms, in particular credit transfers
between the passenger and nonpassenger fleets, but has concluded that,
at least within a context in which each model year is represented
explicitly, technologies carry forward between model years, and
multiyear planning effects are represented, there is no basis to
reliably estimate how manufacturers might use these mechanisms.
Accounting for the FFV provisions indicates that achieved fuel
economies would be 0.6-1.1 mpg lower than when these provisions are not
considered (for comparison see Table IV.G.1-2 above):

        Table IV.G.4-15--Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       2012            2013            2014            2015            2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..................            32.5            33.4            34.3            35.3            36.5
Light Trucks....................            24.1            24.6            25.3            26.3            27.0
    Combined....................            28.7            29.6            30.4            31.6            32.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result, NHTSA estimates that, when FFV credits are taken into
account, fuel savings will total 58.8 billion gallons--about 4.5
percent less than the 61.6 billion gallons estimated when these credits
are not considered:

                                Table IV.G.4-16--Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             2.5             5.0             6.9             8.6            10.9            33.9
Light Trucks............................................             2.0             3.3             5.0             6.8             7.9            24.9
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................             4.5             8.2            11.8            15.4            18.8            58.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency similarly estimates CO2 emissions reductions
would total 639 million metric tons (mmt), about 2.6 percent less than
the 656 mmt estimated when these credits are not considered:\586\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \586\ Differences in the application of diesel engines lead to
differences in the incremental percentage changes in fuel
consumption and carbon dioxide emissions.

                           Table IV.G.4-17--Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................              27              54              75              93             118             368
Light Trucks............................................              22              36              54              74              86             272
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................              49              90             129             167             204             639
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This analysis further indicates significant reductions in outlays
for additional technology when FFV provisions are taken into account--
about $45b, or about 25 percent less than the $60b estimated when
excluding these provisions:

[[Page 49719]]

                            Table IV.G.4-18--Incremental Technology Outlays ($b) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             2.5             4.4             6.1             7.4             9.3            29.6
Light Trucks............................................             1.3             2.0             3.1             4.3             5.0            15.6
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................             3.7             6.3             9.2            11.7            14.2            45.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because NHTSA's analysis indicated that FFV provisions would not
significantly reduce fuel savings, the agency's estimate of discounted
benefits when including these provisions, $192.5b, is only about 4.5
percent lower than the $201.7b shown above for the analysis that
excluded these provisions:

                            Table IV.G.4-19--Present Value of Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             7.8            15.9            22.5            28.6            37.1           111.9
Light Trucks............................................             6.1            10.2            15.9            22.1            26.3            80.5
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................            13.9            26.1            38.4            50.7            63.3           192.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, although the agency estimates lower discounted benefits
when FFV provisions are taken into account, the agency estimates that
these provisions slightly increase net benefits (by about 4 percent,
from $141.5b to $147.2b) because costs decrease by more than discounted benefits:

                          Table IV.G.4-20--Present Value of Net Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               2012            2013            2014            2015            2016            Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars..........................................             5.3            11.5            16.4            21.2            27.8            82.3
Light Trucks............................................             4.8             8.2            12.8            17.8            21.3            64.9
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................            10.2            19.7            29.2            39.0            49.1           147.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency has performed several sensitivity analyses to examine
important assumptions. We examine sensitivity with respect to the
following five economic parameters:
    (1) The price of gasoline: The Reference Case uses the AEO 2009
reference case estimate for the price of gasoline. In this sensitivity
analysis we examine the effect of using the AEO high or low forecast
estimates instead.
    (2) The discount rate: The Reference Case uses a discount rate of 3
percent to discount future benefits. In the sensitivity analysis, we
equally examine the effect of using a 7 percent discount rate instead.
    (3) The rebound effect: The Reference Case uses a rebound effect of
10 percent to project increased miles traveled as the cost per mile
driven decreases. In the sensitivity analysis, we examine the effect of
using a 5 percent or 15 percent rebound effect instead.
    (4) The values of CO2 benefits and monopsony: The Reference Case
uses $20 per ton to quantify the benefits of reducing CO2
emissions and $0.178 per gallon to quantify the benefits of reducing
fuel consumption. In the sensitivity analysis, we examine the effect of
using values of $5, $10, $34, or $56 per ton instead to value
CO2 benefits. These values can be translated into cents per
gallon by multiplying by 0.0089,\587\ giving the following values:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \587\ The molecular weight of Carbon (C) is 12, the molecular
weight of Oxygen (O) is 16, thus the molecular weight of
CO2 is 44. One ton of C = 44/12 tons CO2 =
3.67 tons CO2. 1 gallon of gas weighs 2,819 grams, of
that 2,433 grams are carbon. $1.00 CO2 = $3.67 C and
$3.67/ton * ton/1000kg * kg/1000g * 2433g/gallon = (3.67 * 2433)/
1000 * 1000 = $0.0089/gallon.

($5 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.0445 per gallon
($10 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.089 per gallon
($20 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.178 per gallon
($34 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.3026 per gallon
($56 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.4984 per gallon

    The $5 per ton value reflects the domestic impacts of
CO2 emissions and so we use a nonzero monopsony cost, namely
$0.30 cents per gallon, when valuing CO2 emissions at $5 per
ton. The higher per-ton values of CO2 emissions reflect the
global impacts of CO2 emissions and we so use $0 per gallon
for monopsony in these cases.
    (5) Military security: The Reference Case uses $0 per gallon to
quantify the military security benefits of reducing fuel consumption.
In the sensitivity analysis, we examine the impact of using a value of
5 cents per gallon instead.
    Varying each of the above 5 parameters in isolation results in 10
economic scenarios, not including the Reference case. These are listed
in Table IV.G.4-21 below, together with two additional scenarios that
use values for these parameters that produce the lowest and highest
valued benefits.

[[Page 49720]]

                                             Table IV.G.4-21--Sensitivity Analyses Evaluated in NHTSA's PRIA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Rebound                        Monopsony       Military
                   Name                              Fuel price            Discount rate      effect            SCC           effect         security
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reference.................................  Reference...................              3%             10%             $20     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
High Fuel Price...........................  High........................              3%             10%             $20     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
Low Fuel Price............................  Low.........................              3%             10%             $20     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
7% Discount Rate..........................  Reference...................              7%             10%             $20     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
5% Rebound Effect.........................  Reference...................              3%              5%             $20     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
15% Rebound Effect........................  Reference...................              3%             15%             $20     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
$56/ton CO2 Value.........................  Reference...................              3%             10%             $56     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
$34/ton CO2...............................  Reference...................              3%             10%             $34     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
$10/ton CO2...............................  Reference...................              3%             10%             $10     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
$5/ton CO2................................  Reference...................              3%             10%              $5    30[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
5[cent]/gal Military Security Value.......  Reference...................              3%             10%             $20     0[cent]/gal     5[cent]/gal
Lowest Discounted Benefits................  Low.........................              7%             15%              $5     0[cent]/gal     0[cent]/gal
Highest Discounted Benefits...............  High........................              3%              5%             $56     0[cent]/gal     5[cent]/gal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The basic results of the sensitivity analyses were as follows:
    (1) The various economic assumptions have similar effects on the
passenger car and light truck standards.
    (2) Varying the economic assumptions has virtually no impact on
achieved fuel economy.
    (3) The economic parameter with the greatest impact is fuel price.
Changing the fuel price forecast to AEO's High or Low forecasts impacts
benefits by about ±37 percent. However, the impact of fuel
price on other quantities, such as cost, is much smaller, resulting in
increases or decreases of 3-8 percent.
    (4) Economic parameters other than fuel price and the rebound
effect had no effect on per-vehicle cost, total cost, fuel savings, or
CO2 reductions. Their impacts on benefits were 6 percent or
less, with the exception of the 7 percent discount rate, which
decreased benefits by 20 percent, and the $56/ton CO2 value,
which raised benefits by 14 percent.
    (5) Changing all economic parameters simultaneously (among the
considered values) changes benefits by at most about 60 percent.
However impacts to other quantities, such as cost, are much smaller,
resulting in increases or decreases of 6 percent or less.
    (6) Impacts other than those discussed in 1) through 5) were small
(5 percent or less).
    For more detailed information regarding NHTSA's sensitivity
analyses for this NPRM, please see Chapter X of NHTSA's PRIA.
5. How Would These Proposed Standards Impact Vehicle Sales?
    Higher fuel economy standards are expected to increase the price of
passenger cars and light trucks, because manufacturers will have to add
technology to vehicles to increase their fuel economy, the cost for
which they will likely pass on in some fashion to consumers. NHTSA
examined the potential impact of higher vehicle prices on sales on an
industry-wide basis for passenger cars and light trucks separately. We
note that the analysis conducted for this rule does not have the
precision to examine effects on individual manufacturers or different
vehicle classes.
    There is a broad consensus in the economic literature that the
price elasticity for demand for automobiles is approximately -1.0.\588\
Thus, every one percent increase in the price of the vehicle would
reduce sales by one percent. Elasticity estimates assume no perceived
change in the quality of the product. However, in this case, vehicle
price increases result from adding technologies that improve fuel
economy. If consumers did not value improved fuel economy at all, and
considered nothing but the increase in price in their purchase
decisions, then the estimated impact on sales from price elasticity
could be applied directly. However, NHTSA believes that consumers do
value improved fuel economy, because it reduces the operating cost of
the vehicles. NHTSA also believes that consumers consider other factors
that affect their costs and have included these in the analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \588\ Kleit, A.N. (1990). ``The Effect of Annual Changes in
Automobile Fuel Economy Standards,'' Journal of Regulatory
Economics, vol. 2, pp. 151-172; Bordley, R. (1994). ``An Overlapping
Choice Set Model of Automotive Price Elasticities,'' Transportation
Research B, vol. 28B, no. 6, pp. 401-408; McCarthy, P.S. (1996).
``Market Price and Income Elasticities of New Vehicle Demands,'' The
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. LXXVII, no. 3, pp. 543-547.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The main question, however, is how much of the retail price needed
to cover the technology investments to meet higher fuel economy
standards will manufacturers be able to pass on to consumers. The
ability of manufacturers to pass the compliance costs on to consumers
depends upon how consumers value the fuel economy improvements.\589\
Consumer valuation of fuel economy improvements often depends upon the
price of gasoline, which has recently been very volatile. The estimates
reported below as part of NHTSA's analysis on sales impacts assume that
manufacturers will be able to pass all of their costs to improve fuel
economy on to consumers. To the extent that NHTSA has accurately
predicted the price of gasoline and consumers' reactions, and
manufacturers can pass on all of the costs to consumers, then the sales
and employment impact analyses are reasonable. On the other hand, if
manufacturers only increase retail prices to the extent that consumers
value these fuel economy improvements (i.e., to the extent that they
value fuel savings), then there would be no impact on sales, although
manufacturers' profit levels would fall. Sales losses are predicted to
occur only if consumers fail to value fuel economy improvements at
least as much as they pay in higher vehicle prices. Likewise, if fuel
prices rise beyond levels used in this analysis, consumer valuation of
improved fuel economy could increase to match or exceed their initial
investment, resulting in no impact or even an increase in sales levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \589\ Gron, Ann and Swenson, Deborah, 2000, ``Cost Pass-Through
in the U.S. Automobile Market,'' The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 82: 316-324.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To estimate the average value consumers place on fuel savings at
the time of purchase, NHTSA assumes that the average purchaser
considers the fuel savings they would receive over a 5-year time frame.
NHTSA chose 5 years because this is the average length of time of a
financing agreement.\590\ The

[[Page 49721]]

present values of these savings were calculated using a 3 percent
discount rate. NHTSA used a fuel price forecast that included taxes,
because this is what consumers must pay. Fuel savings were calculated
over the first 5 years and discounted back to a present value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \590\ National average financing terms for automobile loans are
available from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
G.19 ``Consumer Finance'' release. See http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/ (last accessed August 9, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA believes that consumers may consider several other factors
over the 5-year horizon when contemplating the purchase of a new
vehicle. NHTSA added these factors into the calculation to represent
how an increase in technology costs might affect consumers' buying considerations.
    First, consumers might consider the sales taxes they have to pay at
the time of purchasing the vehicle. NHTSA took sales taxes in 2007 by
State and weighted them by population by State to determine a national
weighted-average sales tax of 5.5 percent.
    Second, NHTSA considered insurance costs over the 5-year period.
More expensive vehicles will require more expensive collision and
comprehensive (e.g., theft) car insurance. The increase in insurance
costs is estimated from the average value of collision plus
comprehensive insurance as a proportion of average new vehicle price.
Collision plus comprehensive insurance is the portion of insurance
costs that depends on vehicle value. The Insurance Information
Institute provides the average value of collision plus comprehensive
insurance in 2006 as $448.\591\ This is compared to an average price
for light vehicles of $24,033 for 2006.\592\ Average prices and
estimated sales volumes are needed because price elasticity is an
estimate of how a percent increase in price affects the percent
decrease in sales.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \591\ Insurance Information Institute, 2008, ``Average
Expenditures for Auto Insurance By State, 2005-2006.'' Available at
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/auto/ Exit Disclaimer (last accessed
August 9, 2009).
    \592\ $29,678/$26,201 = 1.1327 * $22,651 = $25,657 average price
for light trucks. In 2006, passenger cars were 54 percent of the on-
road fleet, and light trucks were 46 percent of the on-road fleet,
resulting in an average light vehicle price for 2006 of $24,033.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dividing the insurance cost by the average price of a new vehicle
gives the proportion of comprehensive plus collision insurance as 1.86
percent of the price of a vehicle. If we assume that this premium is
proportional to the new vehicle price, it represents about 1.86 percent
of the new vehicle price, and insurance is paid each year for the five-
year period we are considering for payback. Discounting that stream of
insurance costs back to present value indicates that the present value
of the component of insurance costs that vary with vehicle price is
equal to 8.5 percent of the vehicle's price at a 3 percent discount rate.
    Third, NHTSA considered that 70 percent of new vehicle purchasers
take out loans to finance their purchase. The average new vehicle loan
is for 5 years at a 6 percent rate.\593\ At these terms, the average
person taking a loan will pay 16 percent more for their vehicle over
the 5 years than a consumer paying cash for the vehicle at the time of
purchase.\594\ Discounting the additional 3.2 percent (16 percent/5
years) per year over the 5 years using a 3 percent mid-year discount
rate \595\ results in a discounted present value of 14.87 percent
higher for those taking a loan. Multiplying that by the 70 percent of
consumers who take out a loan means that the average consumer would pay
10.2 percent more than the retail price for loans the consumer
discounted at a 3 percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \593\ New car loan rates in 2007 averaged about 7.8 percent at
commercial banks and 4.5 percent at auto finance companies, so their
average is close to 7 percent.
    \594\ Based on www.bankrate.com Exit Disclaimer auto loan calculator for a 5-
year loan at 6 percent.
    \595\ For a 3 percent discount rate, the summation of 3.2
percent x 0.9853 in year one, 3.2 x 0.9566 in year two, 3.2 x 0.9288
in year three, 3.2 x 0.9017 in year 4, and 3.2 x 0.8755 in year five.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, NHTSA considered the residual value (or resale value) of
the vehicle after 5 years and expressed this as a percentage of the new
vehicle price. In other words, if the price of the vehicle increases
due to fuel economy technologies, the resale value of the vehicle will
go up proportionately. The average resale price of a vehicle after 5
years is about 35 percent of the original purchase price.\596\
Discounting the residual value back 5 years using a 3 percent discount
rate (35 percent * .8755) gives an effective residual value at new of
30.6 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \596\ Consumer Reports, August 2008, ``What That Car Really
Costs to Own.'' Available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/
cars/pricing/what-that-car-really-costs-to-own-4-08/overview/what-
that-car-really-costs-to-own-ov.htm Exit Disclaimer (last accessed August 9, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA then adds these four factors together. At a 3 percent
discount rate, the consumer considers she could get 30.6 percent back
upon resale in 5 years, but will pay 5.5 percent more for taxes, 8.5
percent more in insurance, and 10.2 percent more for loans, resulting
in a 6.48 percent return on the increase in price for fuel economy
technology. Thus, the increase in price per vehicle is multiplied by
0.9352 (1-0.0648) before subtracting the fuel savings to determine the
overall net consumer valuation of the increase of costs on her purchase decision.
    The following table shows the estimated impact on sales for
passenger cars and light trucks combined for the proposed alternative.
For all model years except MY 2012, NHTSA anticipates an increase in
sales, based on consumers valuing the improvement in fuel economy more
than the increase in price.

               Table IV.G.5-1--Potential Impact on Sales, Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Combined
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         MY 2012                             MY 2013       MY 2014       MY 2015       MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-58,058.................................................       52,719       178,470       342,628       454,520
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. What Are the Consumer Welfare Impacts of These Proposed Standards?
    There are two viewpoints for evaluating the costs and benefits of
the proposed increase in CAFE standards: The private perspective of
vehicle buyers themselves on the higher fuel economy levels the
proposed rule would require, and the economy-wide or ``social''
perspective on the costs and benefits of requiring higher fuel economy.
From the perspective of vehicle buyers, raising CAFE standards would
impose significant costs in the form of higher prices for new vehicles,
as manufacturers attempt to recover their added costs for producing
vehicles with higher fuel efficiency. If vehicle manufacturers are
unable to fully recover their higher costs for producing more fuel-
efficient cars and light trucks through higher sales prices, they will
bear part of these costs in the form of reduced ``producer surplus'' or
short-term profits.
    Other private costs from requiring higher fuel economy also result
from changes in the welfare of potential vehicle buyers, as they respond to

[[Page 49722]]

higher vehicle prices by purchasing different models or postponing
their purchases of new vehicles. The effects of requiring higher fuel
economy on consumer welfare also depend on whether manufacturers elect
to make other changes in vehicle attributes as they comply with
stricter CAFE standards, such as performance, passenger- and cargo-
carrying capacity, comfort, or occupant safety. Although NHTSA believes
it has employed estimates of costs for improving fuel economy that
include adequate allowances for any accompanying modifications
necessary to maintain new vehicles' current levels of other attributes,
any changes in these attributes that manufacturers elect to make will
represent additional private costs to vehicle buyers from requiring
increased fuel economy.
    At the same time, raising CAFE standards also provides important
private benefits to vehicle buyers, mainly in the form of the values
buyers assign to the future savings in fuel costs they believe are
likely to result from purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles. Although
these values are likely to vary significantly among buyers depending on
their expectations about future fuel prices, how long they anticipate
owning their vehicles, and how much they expect to drive, fuel savings
are the primary source of private benefits from increased fuel economy.
In addition, requiring new cars and light trucks to attain higher fuel
economy will also provide benefits to their buyers through the increase
in vehicle use associated with the fuel economy rebound effect, as well
as from increases in vehicles' driving range, which allow drivers to
refuel less frequently.
    From the social perspective, the economic benefits and costs of
establishing higher CAFE standards include not only these private
benefits and costs, but also changes in the value of environmental and
economic externalities that result from fuel consumption and vehicle
use.\597\ These include the reduction in potential climate-related
economic damages resulting from lower CO2 emissions, reduced
damages to human health from lower emissions of criteria air
pollutants, reductions in economic externalities associated with U.S.
petroleum imports, and increases in traffic congestion, vehicle noise,
and accidents caused by the increased driving that results through the
fuel economy rebound effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \597\ Vehicle buyers are likely to value fuel savings using
retail fuel prices, which include taxes levied by Federal, State,
and some local governments. Because the reduction in these tax
payments resulting from lower fuel purchases is exactly offset by
lower tax revenues to government agencies (and reduced spending on
the transportation infrastructure and other investments financed by
fuel taxes), it does not represent a net benefit from the
perspective of the U.S. economy as a whole. Thus the social costs of
requiring higher fuel efficiency also include an adjustment to
reflect the reduction in fuel tax revenues that results from reduced
fuel purchases by new-car buyers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has estimated most elements of the private and social
benefits and costs that will result from its proposal to establish
higher CAFE standards for model years 2012 through 2016, and the agency
reports detailed empirical estimates of these impacts in this document
and its Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis for the proposed rule.
However, the agency is unable to provide a definitive accounting of the
private costs and benefits from establishing higher CAFE standards,
because we are unable to estimate the losses in consumer welfare that
are likely to result from the effects of higher prices for on the
number of new vehicles sold or on the mix of specific vehicle models
that buyers decide to purchase. Assuming that the agency has correctly
estimated each of the other costs and benefits that will result from
the proposed rule, its estimates of the net private and total (private
plus social) benefits represent their maximum possible values, and
considering the rule's impacts on consumer welfare would invariably
reduce the agency's reported estimates of the proposed rule's net
private and total benefits.
    If the agency's estimates of technology costs are indeed adequate
to maintain vehicles' current levels of these other attributes
constant, the only changes in vehicles' characteristics resulting from
higher CAFE standards will be improvements in the fuel economy and
increases in sales prices for some (or perhaps even all) models. In
this case, the welfare effects of requiring higher fuel economy depend
on exactly how potential vehicle buyers value the future savings in
fuel costs that they anticipate will result from purchasing vehicles
with higher fuel economy.
    If the market for new vehicles is perfectly competitive and
consumers have reliable information to estimate the likely magnitude
and value of future fuel savings from buying more efficient models,
economic theory suggests that they will make correct trade[hyphen]offs
between higher initial costs for purchasing more fuel-efficient
vehicles and subsequent reductions in their operating costs. These
include lower fuel expenditures, savings in the time they spend
refueling, and the benefits from any additional driving they do in
response to its lower per-mile cost. The assumption that consumers have
adequate information, foresight, and capability to make such trade-offs
has been challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. If this
assumption is accurate, however, no net private benefits can result
from requiring higher fuel economy, since doing so will alter both the
purchase prices of new cars and their lifetime streams of operating
costs in ways that will inevitably reduce consumers' well-being.
    The essence of this view is that in the absence of the regulation,
consumers fully understand their current and future costs for owning
and using vehicles, and make tradeoffs between these that maximize
their individual welfare. From this viewpoint, CAFE standards--or any
other regulation that alters this trade[hyphen]off--will reduce their
private well being. The intuition behind this conclusion is probably
best captured by recognizing that automobile manufacturers currently
sell a wide range of vehicle models, including many that already comply
with the CAFE standards proposed in this rule. Yet sufficiently few
buyers elect to purchase these vehicles that the average fuel economy
of new vehicles sold today remains well below the levels this rule
would require.
    On the other hand, a great deal of recent evidence suggests that
many consumers do not accurately trade off current and future costs of
owning and operating cars. For example, it appears that some buyers do
not know how to estimate future savings in fuel costs from purchasing a
higher-mpg vehicle, or that they incorrectly estimate the increased
expense of purchasing a more fuel-efficient new car. In this situation,
higher CAFE standards--which will increase purchase prices for new
cars, but reduce their lifetime operating costs--can indeed improve
consumers' financial well-being. If these circumstances are widespread,
then it is likely that requiring manufacturers to achieve higher fuel
economy can increase private well-being, and thus that potentially
significant savings in private costs can result from the proposed rule.
    Whether these circumstances are indeed typical is largely a
question of the values that consumers place on additional fuel economy.
NHTSA is not currently in a position to reach a conclusive judgment on
this issue, and is thus unable to determine how requiring higher fuel
economy levels is likely to affect consumer welfare, even if the only
impacts of the proposed rule are to change the sales prices and fuel

[[Page 49723]]

economy levels of new cars and light trucks, as the agency assumes.
    Even if these are the only changes that result from the proposed
rule, however, changes in the sales prices and fuel economy levels of
some new vehicle models are likely to affect some potential buyers'
decisions about whether to purchase a car and what type or model to
purchase. Research has demonstrated that previous CAFE rules and
market[hyphen]based changes in operating costs (for example, resulting
from changes in gasoline prices) lead consumers to alter the number and
types of cars they purchase, and that these changes can lead to losses
in consumer well[hyphen]being. However, NHTSA is not currently able to
provide empirical estimates of the magnitude of potential losses in
vehicle buyers' welfare resulting from postponement of their decisions
to purchase new vehicles or changes in the specific models they elect to buy.
    For both of these reasons, the likely impacts of adopting higher
CAFE standards on consumer welfare remain unknown. Because changes in
consumer welfare are an important component of the total private costs
and benefits resulting from higher standards, the magnitude and even
the direction of the net private economic impact of adopting stricter
CAFE standards also remains unknown.
How Do Consumers Value Fuel Economy?
    For this proposed rule, NHTSA estimates several sources of private
benefits to vehicle buyers, including savings in future fuel costs, the
value of time saved due to less frequent refueling, and utility gained
from additional travel that results from the rebound effect. In
combination, the agency's estimates suggest that these private savings
greatly outweigh its estimates of the costs to consumers for providing
higher fuel economy, even without accounting for the additional social
benefits from higher fuel economy. This is due primarily to the very
large estimated value of future fuel savings from higher fuel economy,
which in turn partly reflects the agency's use of modest discount rates
(3 percent and 7 percent).
    Even without considering the unmeasured welfare losses likely to
result from changes in the number of new cars sold and the specific
models purchased, however, this finding presents a conundrum. On the
one hand, requiring higher fuel economy levels appears likely to
produce large net benefits, primarily because the increased cost of
producing more fuel-efficient cars and light trucks appears to be far
outweighed by the value of the future fuel savings projected to result
from higher fuel economy (assuming modest discount rates). At the same
time, however, vehicle manufacturers currently produce many models that
would allow them to meet the proposed higher CAFE standards, yet at
least on average, buyers reveal a preference for lower fuel economy
than the proposed rule would require.
    In this situation, often referred to as the Energy Efficiency
Paradox, consumers appear not to purchase products that are in their
economic self[hyphen]interest. There are theoretical reasons that could
explain such behavior: consumers may be myopic, and thus undervalue the
long term; they might lack information or be unable to use it properly
even when it is presented to them; they may be particularly averse to
potential short[hyphen]term losses associated with purchasing energy-
efficient products (the behavioral phenomenon of ``loss aversion''); or
even if consumers have relevant knowledge, the benefits of energy
efficient vehicles might not seem sufficiently important to them at the
time they decide to purchase a new car. A great deal of work in
behavioral economics has suggested the possibility that factors of this
sort help account for the Energy Efficiency Paradox.
    Another possible explanation for the paradox between the apparently
large private benefits to vehicle buyers from requiring higher fuel
economy and the reluctance of many buyers to purchase new vehicles with
higher fuel economy is that consumers may apply much higher discount
rates than the agency has used when they evaluate future cost savings
from purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles or other capital goods
offering gains in energy efficiency. For example, the Energy
Information Agency (1996) has used discount rates as high as 111
percent for water heaters and 120 percent for electric clothes dryers.\598\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \598\ Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of
Energy (1996). Issues in Midterm Analysis and Forecasting 1996, DOE/
EIA-0607(96), Washington, D.C. Available at http://www.osti.gov/
bridge/purl.cover.jsp?purl=/366567-BvCFp0/webviewable/ (last
accessed Jul. 7, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some evidence also suggests directly that vehicle buyers employ
high discount rates: consumers surveyed by Kubik (2006) reported that
fuel savings would have to be adequate to pay back the additional
purchase price of a more fuel-efficient vehicle in less than 3 years to
persuade a typical buyer to purchase it. \599\ In short, there appears
to be no consensus in the literature on what the private discount rate
should be in the context of vehicle purchase decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \599\ Kubik, M. (2006). Consumer Views on Transportation and
Energy. Second Edition. Technical Report: National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another possible reconciliation of the Energy Efficiency Paradox,
which poses a significant complication for evaluating the private
benefits resulting from higher CAFE standards, is that the values
consumers place on the future savings from higher fuel economy may vary
sufficiently widely that it is unclear whether on average this value
exceeds the costs of providing higher fuel economy. A 1988 review of
consumers' willingness to pay for improved fuel economy found estimates
that varied by more than an order of magnitude: For a $1 per year
reduction in vehicle operating costs, consumers would be willing to
spend between $0.74 and $25.97 in increased vehicle price.\600\ (For
comparison, the present value of saving $1 per year on fuel for 15
years at a 3 percent discount rate is $11.94, while a 7 percent
discount rate produces a present value of $8.78.) Thus, this study
finds that some consumers appear to be willing to pay far too much to
obtain future fuel savings, while others may be willing to pay far too little.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \600\ Greene, David L., and Jin-Tan Liu (1988). ``Automotive
Fuel Economy Improvements and Consumers' Surplus.'' Transportation
Research Part A 22A(3): 203-218. The study actually calculated the
willingness to pay for reduced vehicle operating costs, of which
vehicle fuel economy is a major component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although NHTSA has not found an updated survey of these values, a
few examples suggest that vehicle choice models also imply wide
variation in estimates of how much people are willing to pay for fuel
savings. For instance, Espey and Nair (2005) and McManus (2006) find
that consumers are willing to pay nearly $600 extra to purchase a
vehicle that achieves one additional mile per gallon.\601\ In contrast,
Gramlich (2008) finds that consumers' willingness to pay for an
increase from 25 mpg to 30 mpg varies between $4,100 (for luxury cars
when gasoline costs $2/gallon) to $20,560 (for SUVs when gasoline costs
$3.50/gallon).\602\ Thus, some buyers appear

[[Page 49724]]

not to make accurate trade[hyphen]offs between higher initial purchase
prices and subsequent fuel savings. At the same time, however, these
results may simply reflect the fact that the expected savings from
purchasing higher fuel economy vary widely among individuals, because
they travel different amounts or have different driving styles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \601\ Espey, Molly, and Santosh Nair (2005). ``Automobile Fuel
Economy: What is it Worth?'' Contemporary Economic Policy 23(3):
317-323; McManus, Walter M. (2006). ``Can Proactive Fuel Economy
Strategies Help Automakers Mitigate Fuel-Price Risks?'' University
of Michigan Transportation Research Institute.
    \602\ Gramlich, Jacob (2008). ``Gas Prices and Endogenous
Product Selection in the U.S. Automobile Industry.'' Available at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/apmicro/am08/gramlich-081216.pdf Exit Disclaimer
(last accessed May 1, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, it is possible that the apparent Energy Efficiency Paradox
is in fact not a paradox at all when one considers the uncertainty
surrounding future fuel prices and a vehicle's expected lifetime and
usage. As Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995) indicate, purchasing higher fuel
economy requires buyers to weigh known, up[hyphen]front costs that are
essentially irreversible (that is, they have a relatively low salvage
value if the return never materializes) against an unknown future
stream of fuel savings.\603\ They find some evidence that this accounts
for a large portion of the seeming inconsistency between low cost
opportunities to invest in energy efficiency and the current lack of
investment in them. This would not imply failure on the part of
consumers in making decisions, but rather that the rate of return
buyers require on their vehicle purchases (or other energy efficiency
investments) is much higher than that implied by a 3 percent discount
rate that does not include a provision for uncertainty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \603\ Metcalf, G., and D. Rosenthal (1995). ``The `New' View of
Investment Decisions and Public Policy Analysis: An Application to
Green Lights and Cold Refrigerators,'' Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 14: 517-531.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Greene et al. (2009) find additional support for this conclusion in
the context of fuel economy decisions: They find that the expected net
present value of increasing the fuel economy of a passenger car from 28
to 35 miles per gallon falls from $405 when calculated using standard
net present value calculations to nearly zero when uncertainty
regarding future cost savings is taken into account.\604\ In contrast
to Metcalf and Rosenthal, Greene et al. find that uncertainty regarding
the future price of gasoline is less important than uncertainty
surrounding the expected lifetimes of new vehicles. Supporting this
hypothesis is a finding by Dasgupta et al. (2007) that consumers are
more likely to lease than buy a vehicle with higher maintenance costs,
because leasing provides them with the option to return it before those
costs become too high.\605\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \604\ Greene, D., J. German, and M. Delucchi (2009). ``Fuel
Economy: The Case for Market Failure'' in Reducing Climate Impacts
in the Transportation Sector, Sperling, D., and J. Cannon, eds.
Springer Science.
    \605\ Dasgupta, S., S. Siddarth, and J. Silva-Risso (2007). ``To
Lease or to Buy? A Structural Model of a Consumer's Vehicle and
Contract Choice Decisions.'' Journal of Marketing Research 44: 490-502.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast, other research suggests that the Energy Efficiency
Paradox is real and significant, and owes to consumers' inability to
value future fuel savings appropriately. For example, Sanstad and
Howarth (1994) argue that consumers optimize behavior without full
information by resorting to imprecise but convenient rules of thumb.
Larrick and Soll (2008) find evidence that consumers do not understand
how to translate changes in miles per gallon into fuel savings.\606\ If
the behavior identified in these studies is indeed widespread, then
significant gains to consumers can result from requiring higher fuel economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \606\ Sanstad, A., and R. Howarth (1994). `` `Normal' Markets,
Market Imperfections, and Energy Efficiency.'' Energy Policy 22(10):
811-818; Larrick, R.P., and J.B. Soll (2008). ``The MPG illusion.''
Science 320: 1593-1594.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

How NHTSA Proposes To Treat the Issue of Welfare Losses
    In the course of future rulemakings, the agency intends to explore
methods that would allow it to present a more comprehensive accounting
of private costs and benefits from requiring higher fuel economy,
including more detailed estimates of changes in the welfare of new
vehicle buyers that are likely to result from higher CAFE standards.
One promising approach to estimating the full welfare loss associated
with CAFE's impact on vehicle purchasing decisions is using consumer
vehicle choice models to evaluate the simultaneous effects of increases
in sales prices, improvements in fuel economy, and changes in other
attributes of specific vehicle models, rather than in the average
values of these variables. NHTSA invites comments on the state of the
art of consumer vehicle choice modeling, as well as on the prospects
for these models to yield reliable estimates of changes in consumer
welfare from requiring higher fuel economy.
7. What Are the Estimated Safety Impacts of These Proposed Standards?
    As discussed above, in evaluating the appropriate levels at which
to establish new CAFE standards, NHTSA must assess any potential safety
trade-offs. Safety trade-offs associated with fuel economy increases
have occurred in the past and the possibility of future ones remains a
concern. In the congressionally-mandated report entitled
``Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards,'' a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
(``2002 NAS Report'') \607\ concluded that the then-existing form of
passenger car and light truck CAFE standards, together with market
forces, created an incentive for vehicle manufacturers to comply in
part by downweighting and even downsizing their vehicles and that these
actions led to additional fatalities. Given the cost advantages of
downsizing instead of substituting lighter, higher strength materials,
NAS urged that the CAFE program be restructured to reduce the
regulatory incentive to downsize. As NAS observed, the ability to
reduce weight without reducing size does not mean they will exclusively
rely on those means of weight reduction. Responding to NAS' concern,
Congress mandated in EISA that CAFE standards be based on an attribute
related to fuel economy, like footprint or weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \607\ National Research Council, ``Effectiveness and Impact of
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards,'' National Academy
Press, Washington, DC (2002). Available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?isbn=0309076013 Exit Disclaimer (last accessed September 11, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the relative cost-effectiveness of at least some approaches
to weight reduction, it is reasonable to assume that the vehicle
manufacturers will choose weight reduction as one means of achieving
compliance with the proposed standards. In fact, informal statements by
the vehicle manufacturers themselves indicate that they intend to
engage in some weight reduction, as appropriate for certain vehicle
models, during the rulemaking time frame. While the manufacturers
generally indicate that they plan to reduce weight without reducing
size, their adherence to those plans would not remove all bases for any
safety concerns.
    The question of the effect of changes in vehicle weight on safety
in the context of fuel economy is a complex question that poses serious
analytic challenges and has been a contentious issue for many years.
This contentiousness arises, at least in part, from the difficulty of
isolating vehicle weight from other confounding factors (e.g., driver
behavior, or vehicle factors such as engine size and wheelbase). In
addition, at least in the past, several vehicle factors have been
closely related, such as vehicle mass, wheelbase, track width, and
structural integrity. The issue has been addressed in the literature
for more than two decades. For the reader's reference, much more
information about safety in

[[Page 49725]]

the CAFE context is available in the MY 2011 final rule \608\ and in
Section IX of the PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \608\ 74 FR 14396-14407 (Mar. 30, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Conducting the safety assessment for this rulemaking is thus
difficult since, in general, it is unclear to what extent the higher
fatality risk of smaller and lighter vehicles is associated with their
reduced mass as compared to their reduced physical dimensions. That is
because, historically, the safest vehicles have been heavy and large,
while the vehicles with the highest fatal-crash rates have been light
and small, both because the crash rate is higher for small/light
vehicles and because the fatality rate is higher for small/light
vehicle crashes.\609\ Intuitively, a reduction in mass while
maintaining physical dimensions is likely to be less harmful than a
reduction in both mass and physical dimensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \609\ Kahane, Charles J., Ph.D., ``Vehicle Weight, Fatality Risk
and Crash Compatibility of Model Year 1991-99 Passenger Cars and
Light Trucks,'' DOT HS 809 662, October 2003, Executive Summary.
Available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/
809662.html (last accessed August 12, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, the manufacturers have generally informally stated
that they plan to use weight reduction methods that do not involve size
reduction. That is plausible since the selection of footprint as the
attribute in setting CAFE standards helps to minimize the incentive to
reduce a vehicle's physical dimensions. This is because as footprint
decreases, the corresponding fuel economy target decreases.\610\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \610\ Vehicle footprint is not synonymous with vehicle size.
Since the footprint is only that portion of the vehicle between the
front and rear axles, footprint based standards do not discourage
downsizing the portions of a vehicle in front of the front axle and
to the rear of the rear axle. The crush space provided by those
portions of a vehicle can make important contributions to managing
crash energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, NHTSA cautions that vehicle footprint is not synonymous
with vehicle size. Since the footprint is only that portion of the
vehicle bounded by the front and rear axles and by the wheels,
footprint based standards do not discourage downsizing the portions of
a vehicle in front of the front axle and to the rear of the rear axle
(front and rear overhand). Similarly, they do not discourage downsizing
the portions of a vehicle outside its wheels (side overhang). The crush
space provided by those portions of a vehicle can make important
contributions to managing crash energy. We note that at least one
manufacturer has confidentially indicated plans to reduce overhang as a
way of reducing weight on some vehicles during the rulemaking time frame.
    Neither the CAFE standards nor our analysis of the feasibility of
fuel economy improvements mandates mass reduction or any other specific
technology application. In addition, considering NHTSA's analysis of
the observed relationship between vehicle mass and the prevalence of
fatalities, NHTSA has, except for vehicles with baseline curb weight
over 5,000 pounds, excluded weight reduction from its analysis of
potential CAFE standards in past rulemakings. The agency followed this
analytical approach in order to ensure that its consideration of new
standards was not dependent on weight reduction that could potentially
compromise highway safety, recognizing, though, that the structure of
CAFE standards does not prohibit manufacturers from making such
responses to new CAFE standards. The agency implemented this approach
by setting the Volpe model to apply this exclusion when estimating how
manufacturers could apply technology in response to new CAFE standards.
    In its rulemakings on MY 2008-2011 light truck CAFE standards and
MY 2011 car and light truck CAFE standards, NHTSA received comments
suggesting that NHTSA expand the applicability of weight reduction
technologies in its modeling to vehicles under 5,000 pounds, because,
according to the commenters, weight reduction can be accompanied by
proper vehicle design to assure that vehicle safety is not compromised.
In the final rules in those rulemakings, the agency said that there may
be great possibilities in the use of material substitution and other
processes to minimize the safety effects of reducing weight. The agency
further noted that this should be explored as data become available.
    After reviewing its assumptions and methodologies per the
President's January 26 memorandum and working with EPA in this
rulemaking, NHTSA revised its approach to include weight reduction of
up to 5-10 percent of baseline curb weight, depending on vehicle type.
Recently-submitted manufacturer product plans as well as public
statements from a number of the manufacturers suggest some of them
expect that by MY 2016, they will be able to reduce the weight of some
specific vehicle models by similar levels. However, NHTSA does not
believe that, except where already planned, such significant weight
reductions can be achieved in MY 2012 or MY 2013, because there is not
enough lead time for the necessary design, engineering, and tooling.
NHTSA estimates that weight reductions of 1.5 percent can be achieved
during redesigns occurring prior to MY 2014, and that weight reductions
of 5-10 percent can be achieved in redesigns occurring in MY 2014 or
later. For purposes of analyzing CAFE standards, NHTSA has further
assumed that weight reductions would be limited to 5 percent for small
vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger cars), and that reductions of 10
percent would only be applied to the larger vehicle types (e.g., large
light trucks).
    NHTSA's modeling approach is similar to EPA's in terms of maximum
available weight reduction for any vehicle model, sensitive to vehicle
safety in terms of when and to which vehicle types significant weight
reduction can be achieved safely, and supported by information in some
manufacturers' product plans. Some manufacturers have indicated that,
in later model years, they plan to reduce significantly the weight of
some specific vehicle models, and that they plan to do so without
reducing vehicle size. NHTSA's analysis results in similar degrees of
weight reduction, applied more widely to some manufacturers. NHTSA
notes, though, that some manufacturers are also planning considerable
changes in product mix, and some of these changes could mean reduced
average size along with reduced average weight. In NHTSA's (and EPA's)
analysis, such changes in product mix are not counted, because they are
either in the baseline market forecast, or are not estimated.
    As stated above, neither the CAFE standards nor our analysis
mandates mass reduction, or mandates that if mass reduction occurs, it
be done in any specific manner. However, mass reduction is one of the
technology applications available to the manufacturers and has been
used by them in the past. A degree of mass reduction is used by the
Volpe model in determining the capabilities of manufacturers and in
predicting both cost and fuel consumption impacts of improved CAFE standards.
    In this section, we briefly summarize our analysis of the potential
impacts of these mass reductions on vehicle safety. NHTSA's quantified
analysis is based on the 2003 Kahane study,\611\ which estimates the
effect of 100-pound reductions in MYs 1991-1999 heavy light trucks and
vans (LTVs), light LTVs, heavy passenger cars, and light passenger
cars. The study compares the fatality rates of LTVs and cars to
quantify differences between vehicle

[[Page 49726]]

types, given drivers of the same age/gender, etc. In this analysis, the
effect of ``weight reduction'' is not limited to the effect of mass per
se, but includes all the factors, such as length, width, structural
strength, and size of the occupant compartment, that were naturally or
historically confounded with mass in MYs 1991-1999 vehicles. The
rationale is that adding length, width, or strength to a vehicle will
also make it heavier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \611\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency utilized the relationships between weight and safety
from Kahane (2003), expressed as percentage increases in fatalities per
100-pound weight reduction, and examined the weight impacts assumed in
this CAFE analysis. However, there are several identifiable safety
trends that are already in place or expected to occur in the
foreseeable future and that are not accounted for in the study. For
example, two important new safety standards that have already been
issued and will be phasing in during the rulemaking time frame. Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126) will require
electronic stability control in all new vehicles by MY 2012, and the
upgrade to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 214 (Side Impact
Protection, 49 CFR 571.214) will likely result in all new vehicles
being equipped with head-curtain air bags by MY 2014.\612\
Additionally, we anticipate continued improvements in driver (and
passenger) behavior, such as higher safety belt use rates. All of these
will tend to reduce the absolute number of fatalities resulting from
weight reductions. Thus, while the percentage increases in Kahane
(2003) was applied, the reduced base has resulted in smaller absolute
increases than those that were predicted in the 2003 report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \612\ We note that the Volpe model currently does not account
for the weight of safety standards that will be added compared to
the MY 2008 baseline, nor does it account for the societal cost of
reductions in weight. However, both of these items will be added to
the model for the final rule; doing so will raise the weight of
every vehicle by roughly 17 pounds in MY 2016 (slightly less in
earlier years), which will likely require manufacturers to add
slightly more technology to reach the final standards than they were
estimated to need to reach the proposed standards. However, NHTSA
does not expect the impact of these roughly 17 pounds per vehicle to
have a significant impact on the safety analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The agency examined the impacts of the identifiable safety trends
over the lifetime of the vehicles produced in each model year. An
estimate of these impacts was contained in a previous agency
report.\613\ The impacts were estimated on a year-by-year basis, but
could be examined in a combined fashion. The agency assumed that the
safety trends will result in a reduction in the target population of
fatalities from which the weight impacts are derived. Using this
method, we found a 12.6 percent reduction in fatality levels between
2007 and 2020. The estimates derived from applying Kahane's percentages
to a baseline of 2007 fatalities were thus multiplied by 0.874 to
account for changes that the agency believes will take place in
passenger car and light truck safety between the 2007 baseline on-road
fleet used for this particular analysis and year 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \613\ Blincoe, L. and Shankar, U, ``The Impact of Safety
Standards and Behavioral Trends on Motor Vehicle Fatality Rates,''
DOT HS 810 777, January 2007. See Table 4 comparing 2020 to 2007
(37,906/43,363 = 12.6% reduction (1-.126 = .874).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We note that because these new analyses are based on the method
shown in Kahane (2003), which predicts the safety effect of 100-pound
mass reductions in MY 1991-1999 light trucks and vans (LTVs) and
passenger cars, the new analyses need to be understood in the context
of that study. Specifically, the numbers in the new analyses represent
an upper bound (or worst case) fatality estimate--that is, the estimate
would only apply if all weight reductions come from reducing both
weight and footprint. Kahane's conclusions are based upon a cross-
sectional analysis of the actual on-road safety experience of 1991-1999
vehicles. For those vehicles, heavier usually also meant larger-
footprint. Hence, the numbers in the new analyses predict the safety-
related fatalities that would occur in the unlikely event that weight
reduction for MYs 2012-2016 is accomplished entirely by reducing mass
and reducing footprint.
    Exclusive reliance on downsizing for the model years covered by
this rulemaking is unlikely for the following reasons. As noted above,
the manufacturers have generally indicated that they plan reduce weight
without reducing size. Further, the flat CAFE standards in effect when
those MY 1991-1999 vehicles were produced had no penalty for such a
strategy for improving fuel economy. In contrast, as discussed above,
the current attribute-based CAFE standards do not encourage vehicle
downsizing by reducing footprint. This structural change to the CAFE
program means that the CAFE standards now favor the use of weight
reduction strategies that do not involve simply making that portion of
the vehicle smaller. These other strategies include downsizing the
engine and adding turbocharging, as well as materials substitution.
    Given this structural change to the CAFE program, it is likely that
a significant portion of the weight reduction in the MY 2012-2016
vehicles will be accomplished by strategies that have a lesser safety
impact than the prevalent 1990s strategy of simply making the vehicles
smaller, although NHTSA is unable to predict how large a portion. For
example, a manufacturer could conceivably add length, width, or
strength to a vehicle by replacing existing materials with light, high-
strength components.
    To the extent that future weight reductions could be achieved by
substituting light, high-strength materials for existing materials--
without any accompanying reduction in the size or structural strength
of the vehicle--then NHTSA believes that the fatality increases
associated with the weight reductions anticipated by the model as a
result of the proposed standards could be significantly smaller than
those in the worst-case scenario. However, NHTSA does not currently
have information (on-road data) to calibrate and predict how much
smaller those increases would be for any given mixture of material
substitution and downsizing, since the data on the safety effects of
mass reduction alone is not available due to the low numbers of
vehicles in the current on-road fleet that have utilized this
technology extensively. Further, to the extent that weight reductions
were accomplished through use of light, high-strength materials, there
would be significant additional costs that would need to be determined
and accounted for. Those higher costs are not reflected in NHTSA's
cost-benefit analysis for this proposal.
    Nevertheless, even though NHTSA cannot quantify these safety
effects, we can project that they could be significantly less than
those that would result from simple downsizing. However, we are also
convinced that the safety effects are larger than zero for the
following reasons:
    • The effects of mass per se (laws of physics) will persist
regardless whether mass is reduced by material substitution,
downsizing, or any other method. There are a variety of crash types
that could be impacted in various ways by changes in vehicle weight and
at times by the way in which the vehicle's weight is changed. The
following discussion examines weight reduction by either engine size
reductions or material substitution and its impact on each of the
different crash types.\614\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \614\ For a similar discussion of effect of weight reduction on
different crash modes, see Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, NAS 1972, pp 74-75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Let us assume that Car A weighs X pounds and that Car B weighs X-100

[[Page 49727]]

pounds and that Cars A and B have the same footprint, overhang and
structural strength.
    [cir] Single-vehicle crashes
    Hitting an immovable object (like a big tree or bridge abutment).
    In most cases, there would be little impact on vehicle safety if
Car A and Car B each hit a different immovable object at the same speed
because the change in velocity (delta-V) would be the same for both vehicles.
    Hitting a partially movable object (like a small tree, parked car,
storefront, or dwelling).
    Heavier vehicles will impart more force to movable objects than
lighter vehicles. This will increase the chance that the movable
objects will break, crush, or otherwise give way and increase the
distance over which the striking vehicle can decelerate, which will
reduce the delta-V for the vehicle's occupants.
    Single-vehicle rollovers.
    Smaller vehicles end up in more rollover crashes than larger
vehicles. Part of the reason for this is the static stability factor,
since smaller vehicles have less track width. Part of the reason for
this is the way smaller vehicles are driven. Given the same track width
for Car A and Car B, the impact on rollovers is hard to determine since
the weight helps build up momentum and the influence of momentum versus
weight for tripped rollovers is hard to discern.
    • Multi-vehicle crashes
    Frontal impact--two light vehicles.
    While a collision of Car B with Car B is likely to have the same
risk as a similar collision of Car A with Car A, the final answer on
safety will depend upon what vehicle sizes receive overall weight
reductions. As NHTSA's study shows, if weight is taken out of the
larger light trucks, overall safety is improved. If weight is taken out
of passenger cars or smaller light trucks, overall safety decreases.
Overall, we can't determine whether there will be an overall difference
in safety.
    Side impact--struck vehicle.
    As a struck vehicle, Car B is at a disadvantage because its delta V
would be increased. Car B would be less safe.
    Side impact--striking vehicle.
    NHTSA analyses have shown that for a striking vehicle in a side
impact, weight is not as important as striking height. Weight does have
an impact, because of imparting a lower delta V on the struck vehicle.
When struck by Car B, the struck vehicle would be somewhat safer.
    Side impact--overall.
    Overall, there will be a minimal difference in safety.
    Collision with an older light vehicle.
    Car B would experience a higher delta V and a higher fatality risk
than Car A, if either were struck by the same pre-2012 vehicle. But the
occupants of the older vehicle would experience a lower delta V and a
lower risk if struck by Car B.
    Collision with a medium-sized truck (somewhat over 10,000 GVWR).
    Medium-size trucks are not affected by CAFE and do not need to
decrease their weight. Car B would experience a higher delta V and a
higher risk than Car A. (The risk to the occupants of the medium-size
truck would be minimally higher with Car A.) Overall, Car B would be less safe.
    Collision with a fully-loaded tractor trailer (significantly over
10,000 GVWR).
    Car B would experience a higher delta V than Car A, but in this
case, the difference in delta V would be minimal. Risk would be similar
in both cars.
    • Pedestrian/bicyclist impacts
    In general, Car A would impose a slightly higher delta V on the
pedestrian than Car B, but the difference would be so small that risk
for the pedestrian would essentially be the same either way.
    • Our attribute-based standards have the excellent feature
that they can avoid encouraging reductions in footprint. However,
weight can be removed by downsizing, rather than material substitution,
even while maintaining footprint:
     • By reducing the overhang in front of the front wheels and
behind the rear wheels. These are protective structures whose removal
would increase risk to occupants by reducing vehicle crush space.
     • By thinning or removing structures within the vehicle.
    • NHTSA has found that lighter vehicles are driven in a
manner that results in a higher involvement rate in fatal crashes, even
after controlling for the driver's age, gender, urbanization, and
region of the country. However, in our response in the MY 2011 final
rule to the DRI analyses, we were unable to attribute this effect to
any obvious ``size'' parameter such as track width or wheelbase. In
non-rollover crashes, weight continued to be the most important
parameter, even when track width and wheelbase were included as
independent variables. Until we understand the phenomenon better, we
assume that weight reduction is likely to be associated with higher
fatal-crash rates, no matter how the weight reduction is achieved.
    Table IV.G.7-1 below shows the results of NHTSA's worst case
analysis of safety-related fatalities separately for each model year.
Additionally, the societal impacts of increasing fatalities can be
monetized using DOT's estimated comprehensive cost per life of $6.1
million. This consists of a value of a statistical life of $5.8 million
plus external economic costs associated with fatalities such as medical
care, insurance administration costs and legal costs.\615\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \615\ Blincoe et al., The Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle
Crashes 2000, May 2002, DOT HS 809 446. Data from this report were
updated for inflation and combined with the current DOT guidance on
value of a statistical life to estimate the comprehensive value of a
statistical life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA has also calculated an assumed impact on injuries and added
that to the societal costs of fatalities. This assumed impact is based
on past studies indicating that fatalities account for roughly 44
percent of total comprehensive costs due to injury.\616\ If weight
impacts non-fatal injuries roughly proportional to its impact on
fatalities, then total costs would be roughly 2.3 times those noted in
Table IV.G.7-2. The potential societal costs for just fatalities are
shown in Table IV.G.7-2. The combined potential social costs are shown
in Table IV.G.7-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \616\ Based on data in Blincoe et al., updated for inflation and
reflecting the Department's current VSL of $5.8 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Looking at the results on a calendar year basis, we also note that
the safety impacts of the Kahane analysis based weight reduction have a
slow onset. Passenger cars typically have a 10-25 year lifetime, and
light trucks somewhat longer. Thus, some of the fatalities for MY 2016
light trucks will not occur until after 2050. Moreover, the weight
reductions are small in the early model years 2012 and 2013. The
vehicles with reduced weight will only be a small proportion of the
entire on-road fleet in the initial calendar years of these proposed
CAFE standards. The influence of these factors is illustrated in Table
IV.G.7-3 below.
    Additionally, there will be significant fuel-saving benefits from
these proposed standards, up to 61.6 billion gallons during the
lifetime of MYs 2012-2016 vehicles. There will also be significant
reductions in CO2 emissions, up to 656 million metric tons
during that same time period.
    Improved fuel economy will also result in a decrease in harmful
criteria pollutants, which will decrease premature deaths due to a
number of diseases related to environmental pollution. The literature
strongly supports the causal relationship between health and exposure
to criteria pollutants. However, as with vehicle safety impacts, there
is much

[[Page 49728]]

uncertainty regarding the exact level of health impacts that might be
achieved with this rule. Thus, there are potentially both positive and
negative impacts that could result from this rulemaking. We have not
attempted to quantify other beneficial health impacts that are expected
to result from the proposed standards, including the results of a
decrease in the rate of global warming, and increased energy security
resulting from a lesser dependence on oil imported volatile regions of
the world, but they, too, could be significant.
    In summary, the agency recognizes the balancing inherent in
achieving higher levels of fuel economy through reduction of vehicle
weight. We emphasize that these safety-related fatality estimates
represent a worst case scenario for the potential effects of this
rulemaking, and that actual fatalities will be less than these
estimates, possibly significantly less, based on the qualitative
discussion above of the various factors that could reduce the
estimates. At the same time, however, the agency cannot specify a
reasonable lower-bound estimate. It is possible that the impact could
be fairly small, but the agency is unable to specify a lower-bound at
this time due to a lack of studies that address the safety risk
associated with weight reduction that is not also accompanied by size
reduction. Additionally, the estimates presented here do not include
estimates for injuries. Nevertheless, we believe that the balancing is reasonable.
    In the absence of data that permit examining the fatality impact of
reductions in weight and footprint independently, we considered whether
it would be appropriate to use the industry-sponsored DRI study to
estimate a lower-bound value. However, as noted below, the agency's
inability to reproduce DRI's results raises questions whether the DRI
reports sufficiently satisfy reproducibility criteria and thus have the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity needed for information
relied upon and disseminated by the Federal Government to the public.
Reliance upon non-reproducible studies undermines the credibility of
the Government's scientific information. Further, the DRI reports raise
a significant additional data quality concern. They have not been
subjected to a rigorous form of peer review.
    DRI produced several studies between 2000 and 2005, funded by a
manufacturer of small vehicles and purporting to analyze mass, track
width, and wheelbase as independent variables. DRI's 2002 paper
indicated that reducing mass would be beneficial, while reducing track
width and wheelbase would be harmful. If true, this meant that weight
reduction would benefit safety if track width and wheelbase were
maintained. However, NHTSA has concluded that the 2002 DRI study
inadvertently introduced significant biases in the analysis, as a
result of including 2-door cars in the analysis. Dr. Kahane's analyses
have excluded 2-door passenger cars on the grounds that in the data
reviewed in those analyses (and by DRI in its analysis), 2-door cars
consisted in considerable part of sports and muscle cars. Including
sports and muscle cars in a regression analysis of vehicle weight and
safety biases the results for two primary reasons: first, because
sports and muscle cars tend to have short wheelbases but be relatively
heavy for their size, they function as outliers in the regression
analysis and thus distort the derived relationships and second, because
sports and muscle cars as a group tend to be disproportionately
involved in crashes. NHTSA provided this response to DRI publicly in
2004.\617\ In response, DRI submitted a new study in 2005 with a
sensitivity analysis limited to 4-door cars, excluding police cars. DRI
further stated that it could mimic NHTSA's logistic regression approach
for an analysis of model year 1991-98 4-door cars in calendar year
1995-1999 crashes. DRI stated that its updated 2005 analysis still
showed results directionally similar to its earlier work--increased
risk for lower track width and wheelbase, reduced risk for lower mass--
although DRI acknowledged that the wheelbase and mass effects were no
longer statistically significant after removing the 2-door cars from
the analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \617\ Docket No. NHTSA-2003-16318-0016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since receiving it, NHTSA has disagreed with the results of DRI's
2005 analysis, most recently on record in the MY 2011 CAFE final rule,
for two primary reasons. First, even using the same (NHTSA) data and
methodology as DRI used, NHTSA has been unable to reproduce DRI's 2005
results. And second, to our knowledge, unlike Dr. Kahane's 2003 study,
DRI's 2005 study has not been rigorously peer-reviewed.
    The following provides an example of how NHTSA has tried to
reproduce DRI's results, unsuccessfully. In MY 1991-1998, the average
car weighing x + 100 pounds had a track width that was 0.34 inches
larger and a wheelbase that was 1.01 inches longer. Thus, one could say
that a ``historical'' 100-pound weight reduction would have been
accompanied by a 0.34 inch track width reduction and a 1.01 inch
wheelbase reduction. However, using a reasonable check, if one
dissociates weight, track width, and wheelbase and treats them as
independent parameters, DRI's logistic regression of model year 1991-
1998 4-door cars excluding police cars attributes the following effects:

[[Page 49729]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.050

    However, applying NHTSA's logistic regression analyses \618\ to
NHTSA's database, exactly as described in the agency's response to
comments on its 2003 report, except for limiting the data to model
years 1991-98, instead of 1991-99, produces results that are not at all
like DRI's. Mass still has the largest effect, exceeding track width,
and it moves in the expected direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \618\ Regression analysis involves modeling and analyzing
several variables, when the focus is on the relationship between a
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Logistic
regression analysis involves three variables.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.051

    NHTSA obtained its estimates by adding the results from 12
individual logistic regressions: Six types of crashes multiplied by two
car-weight groups (less than 2,950 pounds; 2,950 pounds or more).\619\
DRI does not appear to have followed the same procedures, based on the
widely differing results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \619\ See, e.g., Kahane (2003), Table 2 on p. xi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on our review, NHTSA is not persuaded by the DRI analysis.
NHTSA's analyses do not corroborate the 2005 DRI study that suggested
mass could be reduced without safety harm and perhaps with safety
benefit. Moreover, even though NHTSA's analyses continue to attribute a
much larger effect for mass than for track width or wheelbase in small
cars, NHTSA has never said that mass alone is the single factor that
increases or decreases fatality risk. There may not be a single factor,
but rather it may be that mass and some of the other factors that are
historically correlated with mass, such as wheelbase and track width,
together are the factors.
    We note that comparatively it would seem the least harmful way to
reduce mass would be from material substitution, where one replaces a
heavy material with a lighter one that delivers the same performance,
or other designs that reduce mass while maintaining wheelbase and track
width. While this may seem intuitively to be the case, there is an
absence of supporting data for the thrust of the 2005 DRI analysis,
because those changes have not happened to any substantial number of
vehicles in the real world. NHTSA thus has no way, yet, of proving the
intuitive conclusion. We do know that mass has historically been
correlated with wheelbase and track width, and that reductions in mass
have also reduced those other factors. Until there is an analysis that
clearly demonstrates that mass does not matter for safety, NHTSA
concludes it should be guided by the decades' worth of studies suggesting

[[Page 49730]]

that mass is the most important of the related factors.
    The tables below contain NHTSA's estimates of the safety-related
fatality impacts of the proposed standards, the costs associated with
those impacts, and the overall change in impacts given other
anticipated mitigating effects during the next several years. Again, we
emphasize that the safety-related fatality impacts presented below
represent a worst case scenario, and that NHTSA believes that the
fatality increases associated with the anticipated weight reductions
could be significantly smaller than those shown, because manufacturers
are unlikely to respond to this rulemaking by decreasing the footprint
or reducing the structural integrity of their vehicles.
    In addition, we note that the implementation of new Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards, combined with behavioral changes (e.g.,
further increases in safety belt use), will produce important
reductions in the number of deaths and injuries that would otherwise
occur in the vehicles subject to this rulemaking over their lifetime.
    NHTSA seeks comments on its analysis of the safety impacts of the
proposed standards. To aid the agency in refining its analysis for the
final rule, including its attempts to assess reasonable upper and lower
ends of the potential range of estimated fatalities, NHTSA requests
that each vehicle manufacturer provide, for inclusion in the record of
this rulemaking, detailed information concerning the extent to which
and manner in which it plans to reduce the weight of each of its models
for the period covered by this rulemaking, and the cost of each method
used. Manufacturers should include in those plans whether there will be
any footprint or other size reduction, whether through reducing the
size of an existing model, mix shifting or other means. Please also
submit the analysis, including engineering or computer simulation
analysis, performed to assess the possible safety impacts of such
planned weight reduction. In addition, please submit the results of any
vehicle crash or component tests that would aid in assessing those impacts.

  Table IV.G.7-1--Comparison of the Calculated Worst Case Weight Safety-Related Fatality Impacts of the Pending
                Proposed Standards Over the Lifetime of the Vehicles Produced in Each Model Year
                   [Increase in fatalities compared to the Calendar Year 2007 fatality level]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Baseline MY 2011 standards continued for lifetime of vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars..................              13              15              18              18              19
Light trucks....................              13              15              17              17              18
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined....................              26              30              35              35              37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Proposed standards
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars..................              42              64             165             242             379
Light trucks....................              18              20              64             106             150
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined....................              60              84             229             348             530
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Difference between proposed standards and baseline continued
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars..................              29              49             147             224             360
Light trucks....................               5               5              47              89             132
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined....................              34              54             194             313             493
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less.


   Table IV.G.7-2--Calculated Worst Case Weight Safety-Related Fatality Impacts on Societal Costs for the Proposed Standards Over the Lifetime of the
                                                          Vehicles Produced in Each Model Year
                                                                      [$ millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016          Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger cars..........................................             177             299             897           1,366           2,916           4,935
Light trucks............................................              31              31             287             543             805           1,696
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Combined............................................             207             329           1,183           1,909           3,001           6,637
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less.


                             Table IV.G.7-3--Estimated Worst Case Impact of Weight on Calculated Fatalities by Calendar Year
                                                 [Additional fatalities by model year and calendar year]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    MY 2012     MY 2013     MY 2014     MY 2015     MY 2016     MY 2017     MY 2018     MY 2019     MY 2020     Totals
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012............................           3  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........           3
2013............................           3           5  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........           8
2014............................           3           5          19  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........          27
2015............................           3           5          19          30  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........          57
2016............................           3           5          18          29          47  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..........         102

[[Page 49731]]

2017............................           3           5          17          28          46          47  ..........  ..........  ..........         146
2018............................           3           5          16          27          44          46          47  ..........  ..........         187
2019............................           3           4          16          26          42          44          46          47  ..........         226
2020............................           2           4          15          24          40          42          44          46          47         264
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less.

    The following table is based on the worst-case scenario estimate for fatalities.

 Table IV.G.7-4--Calculated Worst Case Weight Safety Impacts on Societal Costs for the Proposed Standards over the Lifetime of the Vehicles Produced in
                                               Each Model Year, Estimated Fatalities and Assumed Injuries
                                                                      [$ millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              MY 2012         MY 2013         MY 2014         MY 2015         MY 2016          Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undiscounted:
        Passenger Cars..................................            $406            $686          $2,058          $3,136          $5,040         $11,326
        Light Trucks....................................              70              70             658           1,246           1,848           3,892
        Combined........................................             476             756           2,716           4,382           6,888          15,218
Discounted 3%:
    Passenger Cars......................................             337             570           1,709           2,604           4,185           9,405
    Light Trucks........................................              56              56             528           1,000           1,482           3,122
    Combined............................................             393             626           2,237           3,604           5,668          12,527
Discounted 7%:
    Passenger Cars......................................             272             460           1,379           2,101           3,377           7,588
    Light Trucks........................................              44              44             415             785           1,165           2,453
    Combined............................................             316             504           1,794           2,886           4,542          10,042
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less.
Discount factors: passenger cars, 3% = 0.8304, 7% = 0.67; light trucks, 3% = 0.8022, 7% = 0.6303.

8. What Other Impacts (Quantitative and Unquantifiable) Will These
Proposed Standards Have?
    In addition to the quantified benefits and costs of fuel economy
standards, the standards we are proposing will have other impacts that
we have not quantified in monetary terms. The decision on whether or
not to quantify a particular impact depends on several considerations:
    • Does the impact exist, and can the magnitude of the impact
reasonably be attributed to the outcome of this rulemaking?
    • Would quantification help NHTSA and the public evaluate
standards that may be set in rulemaking?
    • Is the impact readily quantifiable in monetary terms? Do
we know how to quantify a particular impact?
    • If quantified, would the monetary impact likely be material?
    • Can a quantification be derived with a sufficiently narrow
range of uncertainty so that the estimate is useful?
    NHTSA expects that this rulemaking will have a number of genuine,
material impacts that have not been quantified due to one or more of
the considerations listed above. In some cases, further research may
yield estimates for future rulemakings.
Technology Forcing
    The proposed rule will improve the fuel economy of the U.S. new
vehicle fleet, but it will also increase the cost (and presumably, the
price) of new passenger cars and light trucks built during MYs 2012-
2016. We anticipate that the cost, scope, and duration of this rule, as
well as the steadily rising standards it requires, will cause
automakers and suppliers to devote increased attention to methods of
improving vehicle fuel economy.
    This increased attention will stimulate additional research and
engineering, and we anticipate that, over time, innovative approaches
to reducing the fuel consumption of light duty vehicles will emerge.
These innovative approaches may reduce the cost of the proposed rule in
its later years, and also increase the set of feasible technologies in
future years.
    We have attempted to estimate the effect of learning on known
technologies within the period of the proposed rulemaking. We have not
attempted to estimate the extent to which not-yet-invented technologies
will appear, either within the time period of the current rulemaking or
that might be available after MY 2016.
Effects on Vehicle Maintenance, Operation, and Insurance Costs
    Any action that increases the cost of new vehicles will
subsequently make such vehicles more costly to maintain, repair, and
insure. In general, this effect can be expected to be a positive linear
function of vehicle costs. The proposed rulemaking, however, raises
vehicle costs by only a few percent at most, and hence the change in
maintenance and operation costs, distributed over the expected life of
regulated vehicles and discounted back to the present, is probably de
minimus in terms of the full analysis.
    One of the common consequences of using more complex or innovative
technologies is a decline in vehicle reliability and an increase in

[[Page 49732]]

maintenance costs, borne, in part, by the manufacturer (through
warranty costs, which are included in the indirect costs of production)
and, in part by the vehicle owner. NHTSA believes that this effect is
difficult to quantify, but likely to be de minimus as well.
Effects on Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT)
    While NHTSA has estimated the impact of the rebound effect on VMT,
we have not estimated how a change in vehicle sales could impact VMT.
Since the value of the fuel savings to consumers outweighs the
technology costs, new vehicle sales are predicted to increase. A change
in vehicle sales will have complicated and a hard-to-quantify effect on
vehicle miles traveled given the rebound effect, the trade-in of older
vehicles, etc. In general, overall VMT should not be significantly affected.
Effect on Composition of Passenger Car and Light Truck Sales
    In addition, manufacturers, to the extent that they pass on costs
to customers, may distribute these costs across their motor vehicle
fleets in ways that affect the composition of sales by model. To the
extent that changes in the composition of sales occur, this could
affect fuel savings to some degree. However, NHTSA's view is that the
scope for compositional effects is relatively small, since the total
effect of the regulation itself will be to increase costs by only a few
percent. Compositional effects might be important with respect to
compliance costs for individual manufacturers, but are unlikely to be
material for the rule as a whole.
    NHTSA is continuing to study methods of estimating compositional
effects and may be able to develop methods for use in future rulemakings.
Effects on the Used Vehicle Market
    The effect of this rule on the use and scrappage of older vehicles
will be related to its effects on new vehicle prices, the fuel
efficiency of new vehicle models, and the total sales of new vehicles.
If the value of fuel savings resulting from improved fuel efficiency to
the typical potential buyer of a new vehicle outweighs the average
increase in new models' prices, sales of new vehicles will rise, while
scrappage rates of used vehicles will increase slightly. This will
cause the ``turnover'' of the vehicle fleet--that is, the retirement of
used vehicles and their replacement by new models--to accelerate
slightly, thus accentuating the anticipated effect of the rule on
fleet-wide fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. However, if
potential buyers value future fuel savings resulting from the increased
fuel efficiency of new models at less than the increase in their
average selling price, sales of new vehicles will decline, as will the
rate at which used vehicles are retired from service. This effect will
slow the replacement of used vehicles by new models, and thus partly
offset the anticipated effects of the proposed rules on fuel use and emissions.
    Because the agencies are uncertain about how the value of projected
fuel savings from the proposed rules to potential buyers will compare
to their estimates of increases in new vehicle prices, we have not
attempted to estimate explicitly the effects of the rule on scrappage
of older vehicles and the turnover of the vehicle fleet. We seek
comment on the methods that might be used to estimate the effect of the
proposed rule on the scrappage and use of older vehicles as part of the
analysis to be conducted for the final rule.
Impacts of Changing Fuel Composition on Costs, Benefits, and Emissions
    EPAct, as amended by EISA, creates a Renewable Fuels Standard that
sets targets for greatly increased usage of renewable fuels over the
next decade. The law requires fixed volumes of renewable fuels to be
used--volumes that are not linked to actual usage of transportation fuels.
    Ethanol and biodiesel (in the required volumes) may increase the
cost of gasoline and diesel depending on crude oil prices and tax
subsidies. The extra cost of renewable fuels will be borne through a
cross-subsidy: The price of every gallon of gasoline will rise
sufficiently to pay for the extra cost of renewable fuels. The proposed
CAFE rule, by reducing total fuel consumption, would tend to increase
any necessary cross-subsidy per gallon of fuel, and hence raise the
market price of transportation fuels, while there would be no change in
the volume or cost of renewable fuels used.
    Some of these effects are indirectly incorporated in NHTSA's
analysis of the proposed CAFE rule because they are directly
incorporated in EIA's projections of future gasoline and diesel prices
in the Annual Energy Outlook, which incorporates in its baseline both a
Renewable Fuel Standard and an increasing CAFE standard.
    The net effect of incorporating an RFS then might be to slightly
reduce the benefits of the rule because affected vehicles might be
driven slightly less, and because they emit slightly fewer greenhouse
gas emissions per gallon. In addition there might be deadweight losses
from the induced reduction in VMT. All of these effects are difficult
to estimate, because of uncertainty in future crude oil prices,
uncertainty in future tax policy, and uncertainty about how petroleum
marketers will actually comply with the RFS, but they are likely to be
small, because the cumulative deviation from baseline fuel consumption
induced by the proposed rule will itself be small.
Macroeconomic Impacts of This Rule
    The proposed rule will have a number of consequences that may have
short-run and longer-run macroeconomic effects. It is important to
recognize, however, that these effects do not represent benefits in
addition to those resulting directly from reduced fuel consumption and
emissions. Instead, they represent the economic effects that occur as
these direct impacts filter through the interconnected markets
comprising the U.S. economy.
    • Increasing the cost and quality (in the form of better
fuel economy) of new light duty vehicles will have ripple effects
through the rest of the economy. Depending on the assumptions made, the
rule could generate very small increases or declines in output.
    • Reducing consumption of imported petroleum should induce
an increase in long-run output.
    • Decreasing the world price of oil should induce an
increase in long-run output.
    NHTSA has not studied the macroeconomic effects of the proposal,
however a discussion of the economy-wide impacts of this rule conducted
by EPA is included in Section III.H.5. Although economy-wide models do
not capture all of the potential impacts of this rule (e.g.,
improvements in product quality), these models can provide valuable
insights on how this proposal would impact the U.S. economy in ways
that extend beyond the transportation sector.
Military Expenditures
    This analysis contains quantified estimates for the social cost of
petroleum imports based on monopsony effects and the risk of oil market
disruption. We have not included estimates of the cost of military
expenditures associated with petroleum imports.

H. Vehicle Classification

    Vehicle classification, for purposes of the CAFE program, refers to
whether NHTSA considers a vehicle to be a passenger automobile or a
light truck, and thus subject to either the passenger automobile or the
light truck standards. As NHTSA explained in the MY 2011

[[Page 49733]]

rulemaking, EPCA categorizes some light 4-wheeled vehicles as passenger
automobiles (cars) and the balance as non-passenger automobiles (light
trucks). EPCA defines passenger automobiles as any automobile (other
than an automobile capable of off-highway operation) which NHTSA
decides by rule is manufactured primarily for use in the transportation
of not more than 10 individuals. EPCA 501(2), 89 Stat. 901. NHTSA
created regulatory definitions for passenger automobiles and light
trucks, found at 49 CFR part 523, to guide the agency and manufacturers
in classifying vehicles.
    Under EPCA, there are two general groups of automobiles that
qualify as non-passenger automobiles or light trucks: (1) Those defined
by NHTSA in its regulations as other than passenger automobiles due to
their having design features that indicate they were not manufactured
``primarily'' for transporting up to ten individuals; and (2) those
expressly excluded from the passenger category by statute due to their
capability for off-highway operation, regardless of whether they might
have been manufactured primarily for passenger transportation. NHTSA's
classification rule directly tracks those two broad groups of non-
passenger automobiles in subsections (a) and (b), respectively, of 49
CFR 523.5.
    For the purpose of this NPRM for the MYs 2012-2016 standards, EPA
agreed to use NHTSA's regulatory definitions for determining which
vehicles would be subject to which CO2 standards.
    In the MY 2011 rulemaking, NHTSA took a fresh look at the
regulatory definitions in light of several factors and developments:
its desire to ensure clarity in how vehicles are classified, the
passage of EISA, and the Ninth Circuit's decision in CBD v. NHTSA.\620\
NHTSA explained the origin of the current definitions of passenger
automobiles and light trucks by tracing them back through the history
of the CAFE program, and did not propose to change the definitions
themselves at that time, because the agency concluded that the
definitions were largely consistent with Congress' intent in separating
passenger automobiles and light trucks, but also in part because the
agency tentatively concluded that doing so would not lead to increased
fuel savings. However, the agency tightened the definitions in Sec. 
523.5 to ensure that only vehicles that actually have 4WD will be
classified as off-highway vehicles by reason of having 4WD (to prevent
2WD SUVs that also come in a 4WD ``version'' from qualifying
automatically as ``off-road capable'' simply by reason of the existence
of the 4WD version). It also took this action to ensure that
manufacturers may only use the ``greater cargo-carrying capacity''
criterion of 523.5(a)(4) for cargo van-type vehicles, rather than for
SUVs with removable second-row seats unless they truly have greater
cargo-carrying than passenger-carrying capacity ``as sold'' to the
first retail purchaser. NHTSA concluded that these changes increased
clarity, were consistent with EPCA and EISA, and responded to the Ninth
Circuit's decision with regard to vehicle classification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \620\ 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, manufacturers currently have an incentive to classify
vehicles as light trucks because, generally speaking, the fuel economy
target for light trucks with a given footprint is less stringent than
the target for passenger cars with the same footprint. This is due to
the fact that the curves are based on actual fuel economy capabilities
of the vehicles to which they apply. Because of characteristics like
4WD, towing and hauling capacity, and heavy weight, the vehicles in the
current light truck fleet are generally less capable of achieving
higher fuel economy levels as compared to the vehicles in the passenger
car fleet. 2WD SUVs are the vehicles that could be most readily
redesigned so that they can be ``moved'' from the passenger car to the
light truck fleet. A manufacturer could do this by adding a third row
of seats, for example, or boosting GVWR over 6,000 lbs for a 2WD SUV
that already meets the ground clearance requirements for ``off-road
capability.'' A change like this may only be possible during a vehicle
redesign, but since vehicles are redesigned, on average, every 5 years,
at least some manufacturers may make such changes before or during the
model years covered by this rulemaking.
    In looking forward to model years beyond 2011 and considering how
CAFE should operate in the context of the National Program and
previously-received comments as requested by President Obama, NHTSA
seeks comment on the following potential changes to NHTSA's vehicle
classification system. We request comment also on whether, if any of
the changes were to be adopted, they should be applied to any of the
model years covered by this rulemaking or whether, due to lead time
concerns, they should apply only to MY 2017 and thereafter.
    Reclassifying Minivans and other ``3-row'' light trucks as
passenger cars (i.e., removing 49 CFR 523.5(a)(5)):
    NHTSA has received repeated comments over the course of the last
several rulemakings from environmental and consumer groups regarding
the classification of minivans as light trucks instead of as passenger
cars. Commenters have argued that because minivans generally have three
rows of seats, are built on unibody chassis, and are used primarily for
transporting passengers, they should be classified as passenger cars.
NHTSA did not accept these arguments in the MY 2011 final rule, due to
concerns that moving minivans to the passenger car fleet would lower
the fuel economy targets for those passenger cars having essentially
the same footprint as the minivans, and thus lower the overall fuel
average fuel economy level that the manufacturers would need to meet.
However, due to the new methodology for setting standards, the as-yet-
unknown fuel-economy capabilities of future minivans and 3-row 2WD
SUVs, and the unknown state of the vehicle market (particularly for MYs
2017 and beyond), NHTSA can no longer say with certainty that moving
these vehicles could negatively affect potential stringency levels for
either passenger cars or light trucks.
    Although such a change would not be made applicable during the MY
2012-2016 time frame, we seek comment on why NHTSA should or should not
consider, as part of this rulemaking, reclassifying minivans (and other
current light trucks that qualify as such because they have three rows
of designated seating positions as standard equipment) for MYs 2017 and after.
    Classifying ``like'' vehicles together:
    Many commenters objected in the rulemaking for the MY 2011
standards to NHTSA's regulatory separation of ``like'' vehicles.
Industry commenters argued that it was technologically inappropriate
for NHTSA to place 4WD and 2WD versions of the same SUV in separate
classes. They argued that the vehicles are the same, except for their
drivetrain features, thus giving them similar fuel economy improvement
potential. They further argued that all SUVs should be classified as
light trucks. Environmental and consumer group commenters, on the other
hand, argued that 4WD SUVs and 2WD SUVs that are ``off-highway
capable'' by virtue of a GVWR above 6,000 pounds should be classified
as passenger cars, since they are primarily used to transport
passengers. In the MY 2011 rulemaking, NHTSA rejected both of these
sets of arguments. NHTSA concluded that 2WD SUVs that were neither
``off-highway capable'' nor possessed ``truck-like'' functional
characteristics were appropriately classified as passenger cars. At the
same time, NHTSA also

[[Page 49734]]

concluded that because Congress explicitly designated vehicles with
GVWRs over 6,000 pounds as ``off-highway capable'' (if they meet the
ground clearance requirements established by the agency), NHTSA did not
have authority to move these vehicles to the passenger car fleet.
    With regard to the first argument, that ``like'' vehicles should be
classified similarly (i.e., that 2WD SUVs should be classified as light
trucks because, besides their drivetrain, they are ``like'' the 4WD
version that qualifies as a light truck), NHTSA continues to believe
that 2WD SUVs that do not meet any part of the existing regulatory
definition for light trucks should be classified as passenger cars.
However, NHTSA recognizes the additional point raised by industry
commenters in the MY 2011 rulemaking that manufacturers may respond to
this tighter classification by ceasing to build 2WD versions of SUVs,
which could reduce fuel savings. In response to that point, NHTSA
stated in the MY 2011 final rule that it expects that manufacturer
decisions about whether to continue building 2WD SUVs will be driven in
much greater measure by consumer demand than by NHTSA's regulatory
definitions. If it appears, in the course of the next several model
years, that manufacturers are indeed responding to the CAFE regulatory
definitions in a way that reduces overall fuel savings from expected
levels, it may be appropriate for NHTSA to review this question again.
NHTSA seeks comment on how the agency might go about reviewing this
question as more information about manufacturer behavior is accumulated.
    With regard to the second argument, that NHTSA should move vehicles
that qualify as ``off-highway capable'' from the light truck to the
passenger car fleet because they are primarily used to transport
passengers, NHTSA reiterates that EPCA is clear that certain vehicles
are non-passenger automobiles (i.e., light trucks) because of their
off-highway capabilities, regardless of how they may be used day-to-day.
    However, NHTSA could explore additional approaches, although not
all could be pursued on current law. Possible alternative legal regimes
might include: (a) classifying vehicles as passenger cars or light
trucks based on use alone (rather than characteristics); (b) removing
the regulatory distinction altogether and setting standards for the
entire fleet of vehicles instead of for separate passenger car and
light truck fleets; or (c) dividing the fleet into multiple categories
more consistent with current vehicle fleets (i.e., sedans, minivans,
SUVs, pickup trucks, etc.). NHTSA seeks comment on whether and why it
should pursue any of these courses of action.

I. Compliance and Enforcement

1. Overview
    NHTSA's CAFE enforcement program and the compliance flexibilities
available to manufacturers are largely established by statute--unlike
the CAA, EPCA and EISA are very prescriptive and leave the agency
limited authority to increase the flexibilities available to
manufacturers. This was intentional, however. Congress balanced the
energy saving purposes of the statute against the benefits of the
various flexibilities and incentives it provided and placed precise
limits on those flexibilities and incentives. For example, while the
Department sought authority for unlimited transfer of credits between a
manufacturer's car and light truck fleets, Congress limited the extent
to which a manufacturer could raise its average fuel economy for one of
its classes of vehicles through credit transfer in lieu of adding more
fuel saving technologies. It did not want these provisions to slow
progress toward achieving greater energy conservation or other policy
goals. In keeping with EPCA's focus on energy conservation, NHTSA has
done its best, for example, in crafting the credit transfer and trading
regulations authorized by EISA, to ensure that total fuel savings are
preserved when manufacturers exercise their compliance flexibilities.
    The following sections explain how NHTSA determines whether
manufacturers are in compliance with the CAFE standards for each model
year, and how manufacturers may address potential non-compliance
situations through the use of compliance flexibilities or fine payment.
2. How Does NHTSA Determine Compliance?
a. Manufacturer Submission of Data and CAFE Testing by EPA
    NHTSA begins to determine CAFE compliance by considering pre- and
mid-model year reports submitted by manufacturers pursuant to 49 CFR
part 537, Automotive Fuel Economy Reports.\621\ The reports for the
current model year are submitted to NHTSA every December and July. As
of the time of this NPRM, NHTSA has received mid-model year reports
from manufacturers for MY 2009, and anticipates receiving pre-model
year reports for MY 2010 at the end of this year. Although the reports
are used for NHTSA's reference only, they help the agency, and the
manufacturers who prepare them, anticipate potential compliance issues
as early as possible, and help manufacturers plan compliance
strategies. Currently, NHTSA receives these reports in paper form. In
order to facilitate submission by manufacturers and consistent with the
President's electronic government initiatives, NHTSA proposes to amend
Part 537 to allow for electronic submission of the pre- and mid-model
year CAFE reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \621\ 49 CFR Part 537 is authorized by 49 U.S.C. 32907.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA makes its ultimate determination of manufacturers' CAFE
compliance upon receiving EPA's official certified and reported CAFE
data. The EPA certified data is based on vehicle testing and on final
model year data submitted by manufacturers to EPA pursuant to 40 CFR
600.512, Model Year Report, no later than 90 days after the end of the
calendar year. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32904(e), EPA is responsible for
calculating automobile manufacturers' CAFE values so that NHTSA can
determine compliance with the CAFE standards. In measuring the fuel
economy of passenger cars, EPA is required by EPCA \622\ to use the EPA
test procedures in place as of 1975 (or procedures that give comparable
results), which are the city and highway tests of today, with
adjustments for procedural changes that have occurred since 1975. EPA
uses similar procedures for light trucks, although, as noted above,
EPCA does not require it to do so. One notable shortcoming of the 1975
test procedure is that it does not include a provision for air
conditioner usage during the test cycle. As discussed in Section III
above of the preamble, air conditioner usage increases the load on a
vehicle's engine, reducing fuel efficiency and increasing
CO2 emissions. Since the air conditioner is not turned on
during testing, equipping a vehicle model with a relatively inefficient
air conditioner will not adversely affect that model's measured fuel
economy, while quipping a vehicle model with a relatively efficient air
conditioner will not raise that model's measured fuel economy. The fuel
economy test procedures for light trucks could be amended through
rulemaking to provide for air conditioner operation during testing and
to take other steps for improving the accuracy and representativeness
of fuel economy measurements. Comment is sought in section I.D.2
regarding implementing such amendments beginning in MY 2017 and also on
the more immediate

[[Page 49735]]

interim step of providing credits under 49 U.S.C. 32904(c) for light
trucks equipped with relatively efficient air conditioners for MYs
2012-2016. Modernizing the passenger car test procedures as well would
not be possible under EPCA as currently written.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \622\ 49 U.S.C. 32904(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. NHTSA Then Analyzes EPA-Certified CAFE Values for Compliance
    Determining CAFE compliance is fairly straightforward. After
testing, EPA verifies the data submitted by manufacturers and issues
final CAFE reports to manufacturers and to NHTSA between April and
October of each year (for the previous model year). NHTSA then
identifies the manufacturers' compliance categories (fleets) that do
not meet the applicable CAFE fleet standards.
    To determine if manufacturers have earned credits that would offset
those shortfalls, NHTSA calculates a cumulative credit status for each
of a manufacturer's vehicle compliance categories according to 49
U.S.C. 32903. If a manufacturer's compliance category exceeds the
applicable fuel economy standard, NHTSA adds credits to the account for
that compliance category. If a manufacturer's vehicles in a particular
compliance category fall below the standard fuel economy value, NHTSA
will provide written notification to the manufacturer that it has not
met a particular fleet standard. The manufacturer will be required to
confirm the shortfall and must either: Submit a plan indicating it will
allocate existing credits, and/or for MY 2011 and later, how it will
earn, transfer and/or acquire credits; or pay the appropriate civil
penalty. The manufacturer must submit a plan or payment within 60 days
of receiving agency notification. The amount of credits are determined
by multiplying the number of tenths of a mpg by which a manufacturer
exceeds, or falls short of, a standard for a particular category of
automobiles by the total volume of automobiles of that category
manufactured by the manufacturer for a given model year. Credits used
to offset shortfalls are subject to the three and five year limitations
as described in 49 U.S.C. 32903(a). Transferred credits are subject to
the limitations specified by 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(3). The value of each
credit, when used for compliance, received via trade or transfer is
adjusted, using the adjustment factor described in 49 CFR part 536.4,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32903(f)(1). Credit allocation plans received
from the manufacturer will be reviewed and approved by NHTSA. NHTSA
will approve a credit allocation plan unless it finds the proposed
credits are unavailable or that it is unlikely that the plan will
result in the manufacturer earning sufficient credits to offset the
subject credit shortfall. If a plan is approved, NHTSA will revise the
respective manufacturer's credit account accordingly. If a plan is
rejected, NHTSA will notify the respective manufacturer and request a
revised plan or payment of the appropriate fine.
    In the event that a manufacturer does not comply with a CAFE
standard, even after the consideration of credits, EPCA provides for
the assessing of civil penalties. The Act specifies a precise formula
for determining the amount of civil penalties for such a noncompliance.
The penalty, as adjusted for inflation by law, is $5.50 for each tenth
of a mpg that a manufacturer's average fuel economy falls short of the
standard for a given model year multiplied by the total volume of those
vehicles in the affected fleet (i.e., import or domestic passenger car,
or light truck), manufactured for that model year. The amount of the
penalty may not be reduced except under the unusual or extreme
circumstances specified in the statute. All penalties are paid to the
U.S. Treasury and not to NHTSA itself.
    Unlike the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, EPCA does
not provide for recall and remedy in the event of a noncompliance. The
presence of recall and remedy provisions \623\ in the Safety Act and
their absence in EPCA is believed to arise from the difference in the
application of the safety standards and CAFE standards. A safety
standard applies to individual vehicles; that is, each vehicle must
possess the requisite equipment or feature which must provide the
requisite type and level of performance. If a vehicle does not, it is
noncompliant. Typically, a vehicle does not entirely lack an item or
equipment or feature. Instead, the equipment or features fails to
perform adequately. Recalling the vehicle to repair or replace the
noncompliant equipment or feature can usually be readily accomplished.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \623\ 49 U.S.C. 30120, Remedies for defects and noncompliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast, a CAFE standard applies to a manufacturer's entire
fleet for a model year. It does not require that a particular
individual vehicle be equipped with any particular equipment or feature
or meet a particular level of fuel economy. It does require that the
manufacturer's fleet, as a whole, comply. Further, although under the
attribute-based approach to setting CAFE standards fuel economy targets
are established for individual vehicles based on their footprints, the
vehicles are not required to comply with those targets on a model-by-
model or vehicle-by-vehicle basis. However, as a practical matter, if a
manufacturer chooses to design some vehicles so they fall below their
target levels of fuel economy, it will need to design other vehicles so
they exceed their targets if the manufacturer's overall fleet average
is to meet the applicable standard.
    Thus, under EPCA, there is no such thing as a noncompliant vehicle,
only a noncompliant fleet. No particular vehicle in a noncompliant
fleet is any more, or less, noncompliant than any other vehicle in the fleet.
    After enforcement letters are sent, NHTSA continues to monitor
receipt of credit allocation plans or civil penalty payments that are
due within 60 days from the date of receipt of the letter by the
vehicle manufacturer, and takes further action if the manufacturer is
delinquent in responding.
3. What Compliance Flexibilities Are Available Under the CAFE Program
and How Do Manufacturers Use Them?
    There are three basic flexibilities permitted by EPCA/EISA that
manufacturers can use to achieve compliance with CAFE standards beyond
applying fuel economy-improving technologies: (1) Building dual- and
alternative-fueled vehicles; (2) banking, trading, and transferring
credits earned for exceeding fuel economy standards; and (3) paying
fines. We note again that while these flexibility mechanisms will
reduce compliance costs to some degree for most manufacturers, 49
U.S.C. 32902(h) expressly prohibits NHTSA from considering the
availability of credits (either for building dual- or alternative-
fueled vehicles or from accumulated transfers or trades) in determining
the level of the standards. Thus, NHTSA may not raise CAFE standards
because manufacturers have enough credits to meet higher standards.
This is an important difference from EPA's authority under the CAA,
which does not contain such a restriction, and which allows EPA to set
higher standards as a result.
a. Dual- and Alternative-Fueled Vehicles
    As discussed at length in prior rulemakings, EPCA encourages
manufacturers to build alternative-fueled and dual- (or flexible-)
fueled vehicles by providing special fuel economy calculations for
``dedicated'' (that is, 100 percent) alternative fueled vehicles and
``dual-fueled'' (that is,

[[Page 49736]]

capable of running on either the alternative fuel or gasoline)
vehicles. The fuel economy of a dedicated alternative fuel vehicle is
determined by dividing its fuel economy in equivalent miles per gallon
of gasoline or diesel fuel by 0.15.\624\ Thus, a 15 mpg dedicated
alternative fuel vehicle would be rated as 100 mpg. For dual-fueled
vehicles, the rating is the average of the fuel economy on gasoline or
diesel and the fuel economy on the alternative fuel vehicle divided by
0.15.\625\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \624\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(a).
    \625\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(b)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, this calculation procedure turns a dual-fueled vehicle
that averages 25 mpg on gasoline or diesel into a 40 mpg vehicle for
CAFE purposes. This assumes that (1) the vehicle operates on gasoline
or diesel 50 percent of the time and on alternative fuel 50 percent of
the time; (2) fuel economy while operating on alternative fuel is 15
mpg (15/.15 = 100 mpg); and (3) fuel economy while operating on gas or
diesel is 25 mpg. Thus:

CAFE FE = 1/{0.5/(mpg gas) + 0.5/(mpg alt fuel){time}  = 1/{0.5/25 +
0.5/100) = 40 mpg

    In the case of natural gas, the calculation is performed in a
similar manner. The fuel economy is the weighted average while
operating on natural gas and operating on gas or diesel. The statute
specifies that 100 cubic feet (ft\3\) of natural gas is equivalent to
0.823 gallons of gasoline. The gallon equivalency of natural gas is
equal to 0.15 (as for other alternative fuels).\626\ Thus, if a vehicle
averages 25 miles per 100 ft\3\ of natural gas, then:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \626\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(c).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAFE FE = (25/100) * (100/.823)* (1/0.15) = 203 mpg

    Congress extended the incentive in EISA for dual-fueled automobiles
through MY 2019, but provided for its phase out between MYs 2015 and
2019.\627\ The maximum fuel economy increase which may be attributed to
the incentive is thus as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \627\ 49 U.S.C. 32906(a). NHTSA notes that the incentive for
dedicated alternative-fuel automobiles, automobiles that run
exclusively on an alternative fuel, at 49 U.S.C. 32905(a), was not
phased-out by EISA.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Model year                          mpg increase
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MYs 1993-2014.............................................           1.2
MY 2015...................................................           1.0
MY 2016...................................................           0.8
MY 2017...................................................           0.6
MY 2018...................................................           0.4
MY 2019...................................................           0.2
After MY 2019.............................................           0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    49 CFR part 538 implements the statutory alternative-fueled and
dual-fueled automobile manufacturing incentive. NHTSA is proposing to
update Part 538 as part of this NPRM to reflect the EISA changes, but
to the extent that 49 U.S.C. 32906(a) differs from the current version
of 49 CFR 538.9, the statute supersedes the regulation, and regulated
parties may rely on the text of the statute.
    A major difference between EPA's statutory authority and NHTSA's
statutory authority is that the CAA contains no specific prescriptions
with regard to credits for dual- and alternative-fueled vehicles
comparable to those found in EPCA/EISA. As an exercise of that
authority, and as discussed in Section III above, EPA is offering
similar credits for dual- and alternative-fueled vehicles through MY
2015 for compliance with its CO2 standards, but for MY 2016
and beyond EPA will establish CO2 emission levels for
alternative fuel vehicles based on measurement of actual CO2
emissions during testing, plus a manufacturer demonstration that the
vehicles are actually being run on the alternative fuel. NHTSA has no
such authority under EPCA/EISA to require that vehicles manufactured
for the purpose of obtaining the credit actually be run on the
alternative fuel, but requests comment on whether it should seek
legislative changes to revise its authority to address this issue.
b. Credit Trading and Transfer
    In the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA established Part 536 for credit
trading and transfer. Part 536 implements the provisions in EISA
authorizing NHTSA to establish by regulation a credit trading program
and directing it to establish by regulation a credit transfer
program.\628\ Since its enactment, EPCA has permitted manufacturers to
earn credits for exceeding the standards and to carry those credits
backward or forward. EISA extended the ``carry-forward'' period from
three to five model years, and left the ``carry-back'' period at three
model years. Under Part 536, credit holders (including, but not limited
to, manufacturers) will have credit accounts with NHTSA, and will be
able to hold credits, use them to achieve compliance with CAFE
standards, transfer them between compliance categories, or trade them.
A credit may also be cancelled before its expiry date, if the credit
holder so chooses. Traded and transferred credits are subject to an
``adjustment factor'' to ensure total oil savings are preserved, as
required by EISA. EISA also prohibits credits earned before MY 2011
from being transferred, so NHTSA has developed several regulatory
restrictions on trading and transferring to facilitate Congress' intent
in this regard. EISA also establishes a ``cap'' for the maximum
increase in any compliance category attributable to transferred
credits: for MYs 2011-2013, transferred credits can only be used to
increase a manufacturer's CAFE level in a given compliance category by
1.0 mpg; for MYs 2014-2017, by 1.5 mpg; and for MYs 2018 and beyond, by 2.0 mpg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \628\ Congress required that DOT establish a credit
``transferring'' regulation, to allow individual manufacturers to
move credits from one of their fleets to another (e.g., using a
credit earned for exceeding the light truck standard for compliance
with the domestic passenger car standard). Congress allowed DOT to
establish a credit ``trading'' regulation, so that credits may be
bought and sold between manufacturers and other parties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA recognizes that some manufacturers may have to rely on credit
transferring for compliance in MYs 2012-2017.\629\ As a way to improve
the transferring flexibility mechanism for manufacturers, NHTSA
interprets EISA not to prohibit the banking of transferred credits for
use in later model years. Thus, NHTSA believes that the language of
EISA may be read to allow manufacturers to transfer credits from one
fleet that has an excess number of credits, within the limits
specified, to another fleet that may also have excess credits instead
of transferring only to a fleet that has a credit shortfall. This would
mean that a manufacturer could transfer a certain number of credits
each year and bank them, and then the credits could be carried forward
or back ``without limit'' later if and when a shortfall ever occurred
in that same fleet. NHTSA bases this interpretation on 49 U.S.C.
32903(g)(2), which states that transferred credits ``are available to
be used in the same model years that the manufacturer could have
applied such credits under subsections (a), (b), (d), and (e), as well
as for the model year in which the manufacturer earned such credits.''
The EISA limitation applies only to the application of such credits for
compliance in particular model years, and not their transfer per se. If
transferred credits have the same lifespan and may be used in carry-
back and carry-forward plans, it seems reasonable that they should be
allowed to be stored in any fleet, rather than only in the fleet in
which they were

[[Page 49737]]

earned. Of course, manufacturers could not transfer and bank credits
for purposes of achieving the minimum standard for domestically-
manufactured passenger cars, as prohibited by 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(4).
Transferred and banked credits would additionally still be subject to
the adjustment factor when actually used, which would help to ensure
that total oil savings are preserved while still offering greater
flexibility to manufacturers. This interpretation of EISA also helps
NHTSA, to some extent, to harmonize better with EPA's CO2
program, which allows unlimited banking and transfer of credits. NHTSA
seeks comment on this interpretation of EISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \629\ In contrast, manufacturers stated in comments in NHTSA's
MY 2011 rulemaking that they did not anticipate a robust market for
credit trading, due to competitive concerns. NHTSA does not yet know
whether those concerns will continue to deter manufacturers from
exercising the trading flexibility during MYs 2012-2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Payment of Fines
    If a manufacturer's average miles per gallon for a given compliance
category (domestic passenger car, imported passenger car, light truck)
falls below the applicable standard, and the manufacturer cannot make
up the difference by using credits earned or acquired, the manufacturer
is subject to penalties. The penalty, as mentioned, is $5.50 for each
tenth of a mpg that a manufacturer's average fuel economy falls short
of the standard for a given model year, multiplied by the total volume
of those vehicles in the affected fleet, manufactured for that model
year. NHTSA has collected $772,850,459.00 to date in CAFE penalties,
the largest ever being paid by DaimlerChrysler for its MY 2006 import
passenger car fleet, $30,257,920.00. For their MY 2007 fleets, five
manufacturers paid CAFE fines for not meeting an applicable standard--
Ferrari, Maserati, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, and Volkswagen--for a total
of $37,385,941.00
    NHTSA recognizes that some manufacturers may use the option to pay
fines as a CAFE compliance flexibility--presumably, when paying fines
is deemed more cost-effective than applying additional fuel economy-
improving technology, or when adding fuel economy-improving technology
would fundamentally change the characteristics of the vehicle in ways
that the manufacturer believes its target consumers would not accept.
NHTSA has no authority under EPCA/EISA to prevent manufacturers from
turning to fine-payment if they choose to do so. This is another
important difference from EPA's authority under the CAA, which allows
EPA to revoke a manufacturer's certificate of compliance that permits
it to sell vehicles if EPA determines that the manufacturer is in non-
compliance, and does not permit manufacturers to pay fines in lieu of
compliance with applicable standards.
    NHTSA has grappled repeatedly with the issue of whether fines are
motivational for manufacturers, and whether raising fines would
increase manufacturers' compliance with the standards. EPCA authorizes
increasing the civil penalty very slightly up to $10.00, exclusive of
inflationary adjustments, if NHTSA decides that the increase in the
penalty ``will result in, or substantially further, substantial energy
conservation for automobiles in the model years in which the increased
penalty may be imposed; and will not have a substantial deleterious
impact on the economy of the United States, a State, or a region of a
State.'' 49 U.S.C. 32912(c).
    To support a decision that increasing the penalty would result in
``substantial energy conservation'' without having ``a substantial
deleterious impact on the economy,'' NHTSA would likely need to provide
some reasonably certain quantitative estimates of the fuel that would
be saved, and the impact on the economy, if the penalty were raised.
Comments received on this issue in the past have not explained in clear
quantitative terms what the benefits and drawbacks to raising the
penalty might be. Additionally, it may be that the range of possible
increase that the statute provides, i.e., up to $10 per tenth of a mpg,
is insufficient to result in substantial energy conservation, although
changing this would require an amendment to the statute by Congress.
While NHTSA continues to seek to gain information on this issue to
inform a future rulemaking decision, we request that commenters wishing
to address this issue please provide, as specifically as possible,
estimates of how raising or not raising the penalty amount will or will
not substantially raise energy conservation and impact the economy.
4. Other CAFE Enforcement Issues--Variations in Footprint
    NHTSA has a standardized test procedure for determining vehicle
footprint,\630\ which is defined by regulation as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \630\ NHTSA TP-537-01, March 30, 2009. Available at http://
www.nhtsa.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/
menuitem.b166d5602714f9a73baf3210dba046a0/, scroll down to ``537''
(last accessed July 18, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Footprint is defined as the product of track width (measured in
inches, calculated as the average of front and rear track widths, and
rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch) times wheelbase (measured in
inches and rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch), divided by 144 and
then rounded to the nearest tenth of a square foot.\631\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \631\ 49 CFR 523.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``Track width,'' in turn, is defined as ``the lateral distance
between the centerlines of the base tires at ground, including the
camber angle.'' \632\ ``Wheelbase'' is defined as ``the longitudinal
distance between front and rear wheel centerlines.'' \633\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \632\ Id.
    \633\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA began requiring manufacturers to submit this information as
part of their pre-model year reports in MY 2008 for light trucks, and
will require manufacturers to submit this information for passenger
cars as well beginning in MY 2011. Manufacturers have submitted the
required information for their light trucks, but NHTSA has identified
several issues with regard to footprint measurement, that could affect
how required fuel economy levels are calculated for a manufacturer. The
paragraphs that follow explain NHTSA's views regarding these issues, and
solicit public input on what NHTSA should do to address them in the future.
a. Variations in Track Width
    By definition, wheelbase measurement should be very consistent from
one vehicle to another of the same model. Track width, in contrast, may
vary in two respects: Wheel offset,\634\ and camber. Most current
vehicles have wheels with positive offset, with technical
specifications for offset typically expressed in millimeters.
Additionally, for most vehicles, the camber angle of each of a
vehicle's wheels is specified as a range, i.e., front axle, left and
right within minus 0.9 to plus 0.3 degree and rear axle, left and right
within minus 0.9 to plus 0.1 degree. Given the small variations in
offset and camber angle dimensions, the potential effects of components
(wheels) and vehicle specifications (camber) within existing designs on
vehicle footprints are considered insignificant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \634\ Offset of a wheel is the distance from its hub mounting
surface to the centerline of the wheel, i.e., measured laterally
inboard or outboard.
    Zero offset--the hub mounting surface is even with the
centerline of the wheel.
    Positive offset--the hub mounting surface is outboard of the
centerline of the wheel (toward street side).
    Negative offset--the hub mounting surface is inboard of the
centerline of the wheel (away from street side).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, NHTSA recognizes that manufacturers may change the
specifications of and the equipment on vehicles, even those that are
not redesigned or refreshed, during a model year and from year to year.
There may be opportunity for manufacturers to change specifications for
wheel offset and camber to increase a vehicle's track

[[Page 49738]]

width and footprint, and thus decrease their required fuel economy
level. NHTSA believes that this is likely easiest on vehicles that
already have sufficient space to accommodate changes without
accompanying changes to the body profile and/or suspension component locations.
    There may be drawbacks to such a decision, however. Changing from
positive offset wheels to wheels with zero or negative offset will move
tires and wheels outward toward the fenders. Increasing the negative
upper limit of camber will tilt the top of the tire and wheel inward
and move the bottom outward, placing the upper portion of the rotating
tires and wheels in closer proximity to suspension components. In
addition, higher negative camber can adversely affect tire life and the
on-road fuel economy of the vehicle. Furthermore, it is likely that
most vehicle designs have already used the available space in wheel
areas since, by doing so, the vehicle's handling performance is
improved. Therefore, it seems unlikely that manufacturers will make
significant changes to wheel offset and camber.
b. How Manufacturers Designate ``Base Tires'' and Wheels
    According to the definition of ``track width'' in 49 CFR 523.2,
manufacturers must determine track width when the vehicle is equipped
with ``base tires.'' Section 523.2 defines ``base tire,'' in turn, as
``the tire specified as standard equipment by a manufacturer on each
configuration of a model type.'' NHTSA did not define ``standard equipment.''
    In their pre-model year reports required by 49 CFR part 537,
manufacturers have the option of either (A) reporting a base tire for
each model type, or (B) reporting a base tire for each vehicle
configuration within a model type, which represents an additional level
of specificity. If different vehicle configurations have different
footprint values, then reporting the number of vehicles for each
footprint will improve the accuracy of the required fuel economy level
for the fleet, since the pre-model year report data is part of what
manufacturers use to determine their CAFE obligations.
    For example, assume a manufacturer's pre-model year report listed
five vehicle configurations that comprise one model type. If the
manufacturer provides only one vehicle configuration's front and rear
track widths, wheelbase, footprint and base tire size to represent the
model type, and the other vehicle configurations all have a different
tire size specified as standard equipment, the footprint value
represented by the manufacturer may not capture the full spectrum of
footprint values for that model type. Similarly, the base tires of a
model type may be mounted on two or more wheels with different offset
dimensions for different vehicle configurations. Of course, if the
footprint value for all vehicle configurations is essentially the same,
there would be no need to report by vehicle configuration. However, if
footprints are different--larger or smaller--reporting for each group
with similar footprints or for each vehicle configuration would produce
a more accurate result.
c. Vehicle ``Design'' Values Reported by Manufacturers
    NHTSA understands that the track widths and wheelbase values and
the calculated footprint calculated values, as provided in pre-model
year reports, are based on vehicle designs. This can lead to inaccurate
calculations of required fuel economy level. For example, if the values
reported by manufacturers are within an expected range of values, but
are skewed to the higher end of the ranges, the required fuel economy
level for the fleet will be artificially lower, an inaccurate attribute
based value. Likewise, it would be inaccurate for manufacturers to
submit values on the lower end of the ranges, but would decrease the
likelihood that measured values would be less than the values reported
and reduce the likelihood of an agency inquiry. Since not every vehicle
is identical, it is also probable that variations between vehicles
exist that can affect track width, wheelbase and footprint. As with
other self-certifications, each manufacturer must decide how it will
report, by model type, vehicle configuration, or a combination, and
whether the reported values have sufficient margin to account for variations.
    To address this, the agency will be monitoring the track widths,
wheelbases and footprints reported by manufacturers, and anticipates
measuring vehicles to determine if the reported and measured values are
consistent. We will look for year-to-year changes in the reported
values. We can compare MY 2008 light truck information and MY 2010
passenger car information to the information reported in subsequent
model years. Moreover, under 49 CFR 537.8, manufacturers may make
separate reports to explain why changes have occurred or they may be
contacted by the agency to explain them.
d. How Manufacturers Report This Information in their Pre-Model Year Reports
    49 CFR 537.7(c) requires that manufacturers' pre-model year reports
include ``model type and configuration fuel economy and technical
information.'' The fuel economy of a ``model type'' is, for many
manufacturers, comprised of a number of vehicle configurations. 49 CFR
537.4 states that ``model type'' and ``vehicle configuration'' are
defined in 40 CFR part 600. Under that Part, ``model type'' includes
engine, transmission, and drive configuration (2WD, 4WD, or all-wheel
drive), while ``vehicle configuration'' includes those parameters plus
test weight. Model type is important for calculating fuel economy in
the new attribute-based system--the required fuel economy level for
each of a manufacturer's fleets is calculated using the number of
vehicles within each model type and the applicable fuel economy target
for each model type.
    In MY 2008 and 2009 pre-model year reports for light trucks,
manufacturers have expressed information in different ways. Some
manufacturers that have many vehicle configurations within a model type
have included information for each vehicle configuration's track width,
wheelbase and footprint. Other manufacturers reported vehicle
configuration information per Sec.  537.7(c)(4), but provided only
model type track width, wheelbase and footprint information for
subsections 537.7(c)(4)(xvi)(B)(3), (4) and (5). NHTSA believes that
these manufacturers may have reported the information this way because
the track widths, wheelbase and footprint are essentially the same for
each vehicle configuration within each model type. A third group of
manufacturers submitted model type information only, presumably because
each model type contains only one vehicle configuration.
    NHTSA does not believe that this variation in reporting methodology
presents an inherent problem, as long as manufacturers follow the
specifications in Part 537 for reporting format, and as long as pre-
model year reports provide information that is accurate and represents
each vehicle configuration within a model type. The report may, but
need not, be similar to what manufacturers submit to EPA as their end-
of-model year report. However, NHTSA seeks comment on any potential
benefits or drawbacks to requiring a more standardized reporting
methodology. If commenters recommend increasing standardization, NHTSA
requests that they provide

[[Page 49739]]

specific examples of what information should be required and how NHTSA
should require it to be provided.

J. Other Near-Term Rulemakings Mandated by EISA

1. Commercial Medium- and Heavy-Duty On-Highway Vehicles and Work Trucks
    EISA added a new provision to 49 U.S.C. 32902 requiring DOT, in
consultation with DOE and EPA, to examine the fuel efficiency of
commercial medium- and heavy-duty on-highway vehicles \635\ and work
trucks \636\ and determine the appropriate test procedures and
methodologies for measuring their fuel efficiency, as well as the
appropriate metric for measuring and expressing their fuel efficiency
performance and the range of factors that affect their fuel efficiency.
Work on developing these standards is on-going.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \635\ Defined as an on-highway vehicle with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or more.
    \636\ Defined as a vehicle that is both rated at between 8,500
and 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight; and also is not a medium-
duty passenger vehicle (as defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01, as in
effect on the date of EISA's enactment.
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2. Consumer Information
    EISA also added a new provision to 49 U.S.C. 32908 requiring DOT,
in consultation with DOE and EPA, to develop and implement by rule a
program to require manufacturers to label new automobiles sold in the
United States with:
    (1) Information reflecting an automobile's performance on the basis
of criteria that EPA shall develop, not later than 18 months after the
date of the enactment of EISA, to reflect fuel economy and greenhouse
gas and other emissions over the useful life of the automobile; and
    (2) A rating system that would make it easy for consumers to
compare the fuel economy and greenhouse gas and other emissions of
automobiles at the point of purchase, including a designation of
automobiles with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions over the useful
life of the vehicles; and with the highest fuel economy.
    DOT must also develop and implement by rule a program to require
manufacturers to include in the owner's manual for vehicles capable of
operating on alternative fuels information that describes that
capability and the benefits of using alternative fuels, including the
renewable nature and environmental benefits of using alternative fuels.
    EISA further requires DOT, in consultation with DOE and EPA, to
    • Develop and implement by rule a consumer education program
to improve consumer understanding of automobile performance described
[by the label to be developed] and to inform consumers of the benefits
of using alternative fuel in automobiles and the location of stations
with alternative fuel capacity;
    • Establish a consumer education campaign on the fuel
savings that would be recognized from the purchase of vehicles equipped
with thermal management technologies, including energy efficient air
conditioning systems and glass; and
    • By rule require a label to be attached to the fuel
compartment of vehicles capable of operating on alternative fuels, with
the form of alternative fuel stated on the label.

49 U.S.C. 32908(g)(2) and (3). DOT has 42 months from the date of
EISA's enactment (by the end of 2011) to issue final rules under this
subsection. Work on developing these standards is also on-going.

    Additionally, in preparation for this future rulemaking, NHTSA will
consider appropriate metrics for presenting fuel economy-related
information on labels. Based on the non-linear relationship between mpg
and fuel costs as well as emissions, inclusion of the ``gallons per 100
miles'' metric on fuel economy labels may be appropriate going forward,
although the mpg information is currently required by law. A cost/
distance metric may also be useful, as could a CO2e grams
per mile metric to facilitate comparisons between conventional vehicles
and alternative fuel vehicles and to incorporate information about air
conditioning-related emissions. NHTSA seeks comment on these options.

K. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

1. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
    Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR
51735, Oct. 4, 1993), provides for making determinations whether a
regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore subject to OMB
review and to the requirements of the Executive Order. The Order
defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as one that is likely to
result in a rule that may:
    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local or Tribal governments or communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
the Executive Order.
    The rulemaking proposed in this NPRM will be economically
significant if adopted. Accordingly, OMB reviewed it under Executive
Order 12866. The rule, if adopted, would also be significant within the
meaning of the Department of Transportation's Regulatory Policies and
Procedures.
    The benefits and costs of this proposal are described above.
Because the proposed rule would, if adopted, be economically
significant under both the Department of Transportation's procedures
and OMB guidelines, the agency has prepared a Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis (PRIA) and placed it in the docket and on the agency's
Web site. Further, pursuant to OMB Circular A-4, we have prepared a
formal probabilistic uncertainty analysis for this proposal. The
circular requires such an analysis for complex rules where there are
large, multiple uncertainties whose analysis raises technical
challenges or where effects cascade and where the impacts of the rule
exceed $1 billion. This proposal meets these criteria on all counts.
2. National Environmental Policy Act
    NHTSA has initiated the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
4321-4347, and implementing regulations issued by the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), 40 CFR part 1500, and NHTSA, 49 CFR part
520. On April 1, 2009, NHTSA published a notice of intent to prepare an
EIS for this rulemaking and requested scoping comments. (74 FR 14857)
The notice invites Federal, State, and local agencies, Indian tribes,
and the public to participate in the scoping process and to help
identify the environmental issues and reasonable alternatives to be
examined in the EIS. The scoping notice also provides information about
the proposed standards, the alternatives NHTSA expects to consider in
its NEPA analysis, and the scoping process.
    Concurrently with this NPRM, NHTSA is releasing a Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). NHTSA prepared the DEIS to
analyze and disclose the potential

[[Page 49740]]

environmental impacts of the proposed MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards for
the total fleet of passenger cars and light trucks and reasonable
alternative standards for the NHTSA CAFE Program pursuant to the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA,
DOT Order 5610.1C, and NHTSA regulations.\637\ The DEIS compares the
potential environmental impacts of alternative mile per gallon (mpg)
levels that will be considered by NHTSA for the final rule. It also
analyzes direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts and analyzes impacts
in proportion to their significance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \637\ NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. CEQ NEPA
implementing regulations are codified at 40 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Parts 1500-1508. NHTSA NEPA implementing
regulations are codified at 49 CFR Part 520.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The DEIS also describes potential environmental impacts to a
variety of resources. Resources that may be affected by the proposed
action and alternatives include water resources, biological resources,
land use and development, safety, hazardous materials and regulated
wastes, noise, socioeconomics, and environmental justice. These
resource areas were assessed qualitatively in the DEIS.
    Throughout the DEIS, NHTSA has relied extensively on findings of
the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), and EPA. Our discussion
relies heavily on the most recent, thoroughly peer-reviewed, and
credible assessments of global and U.S. climate change: the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report (Climate Change 2007), EPA's proposed Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act and the accompanying Technical Support
Document (TSD), and CCSP and National Science and Technology Council
reports that include the Scientific Assessment of the Effects of Global
Change on the United States and Synthesis and Assessment Products. The
DEIS cites these sources and the studies they review frequently.
    Because of the link between the transportation sector and GHG
emissions, NHTSA recognizes the need to consider the possible impacts
on climate and global climate change in the analysis of the effects of
these fuel economy standards. NHTSA also recognizes the difficulties
and uncertainties involved in such an impact analysis. Accordingly,
consistent with CEQ regulations on addressing incomplete or unavailable
information in environmental impact analyses, NHTSA has reviewed
existing credible scientific evidence that is relevant to this analysis
and summarized it in the DEIS. NHTSA has also employed and summarized
the results of research models generally accepted in the scientific community.
    Although the alternatives have the potential to decrease GHG
emissions substantially, they do not prevent climate change, but only
result in reductions in the anticipated increases in CO2
concentrations, temperature, precipitation, and sea level. They would
also, to a small degree, delay the point at which certain temperature
increases and other physical effects stemming from increased GHG
emissions would occur. As discussed below, NHTSA presumes that these
reductions in climate effects will be reflected in reduced impacts on
affected resources.
    NHTSA consulted with various Federal agencies in the development of
the DEIS, including EPA, Bureau of Land Management, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Minerals Management Service, National Park
Service, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Forest Service, and
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. NHTSA is also exploring its
obligations under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act with the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration Fisheries Service.
    The main direct and indirect effects resulting from the different
alternatives analyzed in the DEIS are as follows:
    Fuel consumption: For passenger cars, fuel consumption under the No
Action Alternative is 171 billion gallons in 2060. Fuel consumption
ranges from 156.1 billion gallons under Alternative 2 (3-Percent
Alternative) to 133.7 billion gallons under Alternative 9 (TCTB). Fuel
consumption is 149.3 billion gallons under the Preferred Alternative.
For light trucks, fuel consumption under the No Action Alternative is
105.4 billion gallons in 2060. Fuel consumption ranges from 97.1
billion gallons under Alternative 2 (3-Percent Alternative) to 83.8
billion gallons under Alternative 9 (TCTB). Fuel consumption is 92.2
billion gallons under the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4).
    Air quality: Emissions of criteria pollutants change very little
between the No Action Alternative and Alternatives 2 through 4. In the
case of particulate matter (PM2.5), sulfur oxides
(SOX), nitrogen oxides (NOX), and volatile
organic compounds (VOCs), the No Action Alternative results in the
highest emissions, and emissions generally decline as fuel economy
standards increase across alternatives. There are some increases from
Alternative 6 through Alternative 9, but emissions remain below the
levels under the No Action Alternative. In the case of carbon monoxide
(CO), emissions under Alternatives 2 through 4 are slightly higher than
under the No Action Alternative. Emissions of CO decline as fuel
economy standards increase across Alternatives 5 through 9.
    The trend for toxic air pollutant emissions across the alternatives
is mixed. Emissions of nearly all toxic air pollutants are highest
under the No Action Alternative, except for those of acrolein, which
increases with each successive alternative and are highest under
Alternative 9. The acrolein emissions are an upper-bound estimate and
actual emissions might be less. Emissions of acetaldehyde, benzene, and
DPM in 2030 decrease with successive alternatives from Alternative 1 to
Alternative 9. Emissions of 1,3-butadiene increase slightly from
Alternative 3 (4-Percent Alternative) to Alternative 4 (Preferred), and
emissions of formaldehyde increase slightly from Alternative 8 (7-
Percent Alternative) to Alternative 9 (TCTB) in 2030.
    The reductions in emissions are expected to lead to reductions in
adverse health effects. There would be reductions in adverse health
effects nationwide under Alternatives 2 (3-Percent Alternative) through
9 (TCTB) compared to the No Action Alternative. These reductions
primarily reflect the projected PM2.5 reductions, and
secondarily the reductions in SO2. The economic value of
health impacts would vary proportionally with changes in health outcomes.
    Climate: The DEIS uses a climate model to estimate the changes in
CO2 concentrations, global mean surface temperature, and
changes in sea level for each alternative CAFE standard. NHTSA used the
publicly available modeling software, Model for Assessment of
Greenhouse Gas-induced Climate Change (MAGICC) version 5.3.v2 to
estimate changes in key direct and indirect effects. The application of
MAGICC version 5.3.v2 uses the emissions estimates for CO2,
CH4, N2O, CO, NOX, SO2, and
VOCs from the Volpe model. A sensitivity analysis was completed to
examine the relationship among selected CAFE alternatives and likely
climate sensitivities, and the associated direct and indirect effects
for each combination. These relationships can be used to infer the
effect of emissions associated with the regulatory alternatives on
direct and indirect climate effects.

[[Page 49741]]

    For the analysis using MAGICC, NHTSA has assumed that global
emissions consistent with the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1)
follow the trajectory provided by the Representative Concentration
Pathway (RCP) 4.5 MiniCAM (Mini Climate Assessment Model) reference
scenario.\638\ The SAP 2.1 global emissions scenarios were created as
part of CCSP's effort to develop a set of long-term (2000 to 2100)
global emissions scenarios that incorporate an update of economic and
technology data and utilize improved scenario development tools
compared to the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)
developed more than a decade ago.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \638\ The reference scenario for global emissions assumes the
absence of significant global GHG control policies. It is based on
the Climate Change Science Program's (CCSP) Synthesis and Assessment
Product (SAP) 2.1 MiniCAM reference scenario, and has been revised
by the Joint Global Change Research Institute to update emission
estimates of non-CO2 gases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The results rely primarily on the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference
scenario to represent an emissions scenario, that is, future global
emissions assuming no additional climate policy. Each alternative was
simulated by calculating the difference in annual GHG emissions in
relation to the No Action Alternative and subtracting this change from
the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference scenario to generate modified global-
scale emissions scenarios, which each show the effect of the various
regulatory alternatives on the global emissions path.
    To estimate changes in global precipitation, this EIS uses
increases in global mean surface temperature combined with a scaling
approach and coefficients from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.
    For all of the climate change analysis, the approaches focus on
marginal changes in emissions that affect climate. Thus, the approaches
result in a reasonable characterization of climate change for a given
set of emissions reductions, regardless of the underlying details
associated with those emissions reductions. The climate sensitivity
analysis provides a basis for determining climate responses to varying
climate sensitivities under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1)
and the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4). Some responses of the
climate system are believed to be non-linear; by using a range of
emissions cases and climate sensitivities, the effects of the
alternatives in relation to different scenarios and sensitivities can
be estimated.
    GHG emissions: Although GHG emissions from new passenger cars and
light trucks will continue to rise over 2012 through 2100 (absent other
reduction efforts), the effect of the alternatives is to slow this
increase by varying amounts. Emissions for the period range from
196,341 million metric tons of CO2 (MMTCO2) for
the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9) to 244,821 MMTCO2 for
the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1). Compared to the No Action
Alternative, projections of emissions reductions over the period 2012
to 2100 due to the MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards range from 19,169 to
48,480 MMTCO2. Compared to cumulative global emissions of
5,293,896 MMTCO2 over this period (projected by the RCP 4.5
MiniCAM reference scenario), this rulemaking is expected to reduce
global CO2 emissions by about 0.4 to 0.9 percent.
    To get a sense of the relative impact of these reductions, it can
be helpful to consider the relative importance of emissions from
passenger cars and light trucks as a whole and to compare them against
emissions projections from the transportation sector. As mentioned
earlier, U.S. passenger cars and light trucks currently account for
significant CO2 emissions in the United States. With the
action alternatives reducing U.S. passenger car and light truck
CO2 emissions by 7.8 to 19.8 percent, the CAFE alternatives
would have a noticeable impact on total U.S. CO2 emissions.
Compared to total U.S. CO2 emissions in 2100 projected by
the MiniCAM reference scenario of 7,886 MMTCO2, the action
alternatives would reduce annual U.S. CO2 emissions by 3.5
to 8.9 percent in 2100.
    CO2 concentration, global mean surface temperature, sea-level rise,
and precipitation: Estimated CO2 concentrations for 2100
range from 778.4 ppm under the most stringent alternative (TCTB) to
783.0 ppm under the No Action Alternative. For 2030 and 2050, the range
is even smaller. Because CO2 concentration is the key driver
of other climate effects (which in turn act as drivers on resource
impacts), this leads to small differences in these effects. For the No
Action alternative, the temperature increase from 1990 is 0.92 [deg]C
for 2030, 1.56 [deg]C for 2050, and 3.14 [deg]C for 2100. The
differences among alternatives are small. For 2100, the reduction in
temperature increase, in relation to the No Action Alternative, ranges
from 0.007 [deg]C to 0.018 [deg]C. Given that all the action
alternatives reduce temperature increases slightly in relation to the
No Action Alternative, they also slightly reduce predicted increases in
precipitation.
    In summary, the impacts of the proposed action and alternatives on
global mean surface temperature, precipitation, or sea-level rise are
small in absolute terms. This is because the action alternatives have a
small proportional change in the emissions trajectories in the RCP 4.5
MiniCAM reference scenario.\639\ This is due primarily to the global
and multi-sectoral nature of the climate change issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \639\ These conclusions are not meant to be interpreted as
expressing NHTSA's views that impacts on global mean surface
temperature, precipitation, or sea-level rise are not areas of
concern for policymakers. Under NEPA, the agency is obligated to
discuss the environmental impact[s] of the proposed action. 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(i) (emphasis added). This analysis fulfills
NHTSA's obligations in this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under CEQ regulations, NHTSA must also analyze cumulative impacts,
defined as ``the impact on the environment which results from the
incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency or
person undertakes such other actions.'' 40 CFR 1508.7. Following is a
description of the cumulative effects of the proposed action and
alternatives on energy, air quality, and climate.
    The methodology for evaluating cumulative effects includes the
reasonably foreseeable future actions of projected average annual
passenger-car and light-truck mpg estimates from 2016 through 2030 that
differ from mpg estimates reflected in the analysis of the direct and
indirect impacts of MY 2012 through MY 2016 fuel economy requirements
under each of the action alternatives, assuming no further increases in
average new passenger-car or light-truck mpg after 2016. The evaluation
of cumulative effects projects ongoing gains in average new passenger-
car and light-truck mpg consistent with further increases in CAFE
standards to an EISA-mandated minimum level of 35 mpg combined for
passenger cars and light trucks by the year 2020, along with AEO April
2009 (updated) Reference Case projections of annual percentage gains of
0.51 percent in passenger-car mpg and 0.86 percent in light-truck mpg
through 2030.\640\ AEO Reference Case

[[Page 49742]]

projections are regarded as the official U.S. government energy
projections by both the public and private sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \640\ NHTSA considers these AEO projected mpg increases to be
reasonably foreseeable future actions under NEPA because the AEO
projections reflect future consumer and industry actions that result
in ongoing mpg gains through 2030. The AEO projections of fuel
economy gains beyond the EISA requirement of combined achieved 35
mpg by 2020 result from a future forecasted increase in consumer
demand for fuel economy resulting from projected fuel price
increases. Since the AEO forecasts do not extend beyond the year
2030, the mpg estimates for MY 2030 through MY 2060 remain constant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The assumption that all action alternatives reach the EISA 35 mpg
target by 2020, with mpg growth at the AEO forecast rate from 2020 to
2030, results in estimated cumulative impacts for Alternatives 2, 3,
and 4 that are substantially equivalent, with any minor variation in
cumulative impacts across these Alternatives due to the specific
modeling assumptions used to ensure that each Alternative achieves at
least 35 mpg by 2020. Therefore, the cumulative impacts analysis adds
substantively to the analysis of direct and indirect impacts when
comparing cumulative impacts between Alternatives 4 through 9, but not
when comparing cumulative impacts between Alternatives 2 through 4.
Another important difference in the methodology for evaluating
cumulative effects is that the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1)
also reflects the AEO Reference Case projected annual percentage gains
of 0.51 percent in car mpg and 0.86 percent in light truck mpg for the
period 2016 through 2030, whereas the direct and indirect impacts
analysis assumed no increases in average new passenger-car or light-
truck mpg after 2016 under any alternative, including the No Action
Alternative. NHTSA also considered other reasonably foreseeable actions
that would affect greenhouse gas emissions, such as regional, national,
and international initiatives and programs to reduce GHG emissions.
    Fuel consumption: The nine alternatives examined in the DEIS will
result in different future levels of fuel use, total energy, and
petroleum consumption, which will in turn have an impact on emissions
of GHG and criteria air pollutants. For passenger cars, by 2060, fuel
consumption reaches 160.4 billion gallons under the No Action
Alternative (Alternative 1). Consumption falls across the alternatives,
from 139.4 billion gallons under the Preferred Alternative (Alternative
4) to 125.7 billion gallons under the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9)
representing a fuel savings of 21.0 to 34.7 billion gallons in 2060, as
compared to fuel consumption projected under the No Action Alternative.
For light trucks, fuel consumption by 2060 reaches 94.8 billion gallons
under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1). Consumption declines
across the alternatives, from 83.3 billion gallons under the 3-Percent
Alternative (Alternative 2) to 75.7 billion gallons under the TCTB
Alternative (Alternative 9). This represents a fuel savings of 11.5 to
19.1 billion gallons in 2060, as compared to fuel consumption projected
under the No Action Alternative.
    Air quality: In the case of PM2.5, SOX,
NOX, and VOCs, the No Action Alternative results in the
highest emissions, and emissions generally decline as fuel economy
standards increase across alternatives. Exceptions to this declining
trend are NOX under the Preferred Alternative (Alternative
4); PM2.5 under Alternatives 3 and 4, and Alternatives 8 and
9; SOX under Alternatives 3 (4-Percent Alternative) and 4
(Preferred Alternative); and VOCs under Alternative 4. Despite these
individual increases, emissions of PM2.5, SOX,
NOX, and VOCs remain below the levels under the No Action
Alternative (Alternative 1). In the case of CO, emissions under
Alternatives 2 through 4 are slightly higher than under the No Action
Alternative. Emissions of CO decline as fuel economy standards increase
across Alternatives 5 through 9.
    As with criteria pollutants, emissions of most toxic air pollutants
would decrease from one alternative to the next more stringent
alternative. The exceptions are acetaldehyde emissions, which would
increase under Alternative 4; acrolein emissions, which increase under
each of the alternatives; benzene emissions, which would increase under
Alternative 4; 1,3-butadiene, which would increase under Alternatives 2
and 4; diesel particulate matter (DPM), which would increase under
Alternatives 3 and 4; and formaldehyde, which would increase under
Alternatives 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9. The changes in toxic air pollutant
emissions, whether positive or negative, generally would be small
relative to Alternative 1 emissions levels.\641\ The exceptions are
acetaldehyde emissions, which would decrease by more than 10 percent
under Alternative 9; acrolein emissions, which would increase across
successive alternatives (as noted above, the acrolein emissions are an
upper-bound estimate and actual emissions might be less); benzene
emissions, which would decrease by more than 10 percent under
Alternatives 8 and 9; and DPM emissions, which would decrease by more
than 10 percent under all action alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \641\ These conclusions are not meant to be interpreted as
expressing NHTSA's views that impacts on air quality is not an area
of concern for policymakers. Under NEPA, the agency is obligated to
discuss the environmental impact[s] of the proposed action. 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(i) (emphasis added). This analysis fulfills
NHTSA's obligations in this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Cumulative emissions generally would be less than noncumulative
emissions for the same combination of pollutant, year, and alternative
because of differing changes in VMT and fuel consumption under the
cumulative case compared to the noncumulative case. The exceptions are
acrolein for all alternatives except Alternative 9, and 1,3-butadiene
for all alternatives except Alternative 2 (3-Percent Alternative).
    The reductions in emissions are expected to lead to reductions in
cumulative adverse health effects. There would be reductions in adverse
health effects nationwide under Alternatives 2 (3-Percent Alternative)
through 9 (TCTB) compared to the No Action Alternative. Reductions in
adverse health effects decrease from Alternative 2 (3-Percent
Alternative) through Alternative 4 (Preferred Alternative), and then
increase under Alternatives 5 (5-Percent Alternative through
Alternative 9 (TCTB). These reductions primarily reflect the projected
PM2.5 reductions, and secondarily the reductions in
SO2. The economic value of health impacts would vary
proportionally with changes in health outcomes.
    Climate change: As with the analysis of the direct and indirect
effects of the proposed action and alternatives on climate change, for
the cumulative impacts analysis this EIS uses MAGICC version 5.3.v2 to
estimate the changes in CO2 concentrations, global mean
surface temperature, and changes in sea level for each alternative CAFE
standard. To estimate changes in global precipitation, NHTSA uses
increases in global mean surface temperature combined with a scaling
approach and coefficients from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. A
sensitivity analysis was completed to examine the relationship among
the alternatives and likely climate sensitivities, and the associated
direct and indirect effects for each combination. These relationships
can be used to infer the effect of emissions associated with the
regulatory alternatives on direct and indirect climate effects.
    One of the key categories of inputs to MAGICC is a time series of
global GHG emissions. In assessing the cumulative effects on climate,
NHTSA used the CCSP SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 scenario to represent a
Reference Case global emission scenario, that is, future global
emissions assuming significant global actions to address climate
change. This Reference Case global emission scenario serves as a
baseline against which the climate benefits of the various alternatives
can be measured.
    The Reference Case global emissions scenario used in the cumulative
impacts analysis (and described in Chapter 4 of this EIS) differs from
the global emissions scenario used for the climate

[[Page 49743]]

change modeling presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the Reference
Case global emission scenario reflects reasonably foreseeable actions
in global climate change policy; in Chapter 3, the global emissions
scenario used for the analysis assumes that there are no significant
global controls. Given that the climate system is non-linear, the
choice of a global emissions scenario could produce different estimates
of the benefits of the proposed action and alternatives, if the
emission reductions of the alternatives were held constant.
    The SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 scenario assumes a moderate level of
global GHG reductions, resulting in a global atmospheric CO2
concentration of roughly 650 parts per million by volume (ppmv) as of
2100. The following regional, national, and international initiatives
and programs are reasonably foreseeable actions to reduce GHG
emissions: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI); Western Climate
Initiative (WCI); Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord; EPA's
Proposed GHG Emissions Standards; H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and
Security Act (``Waxman-Markey Bill''); Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2);
Program Activities of DOE's Office of Fossil Energy; Program Activities
of DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy; United Nation's Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)--The Kyoto Protocol and upcoming Conference
of the Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark; G8 Declaration--Summit
2009; and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate.\642\ The SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 scenario provides a global
context for emissions of a full suite of GHGs and ozone precursors for
a Reference Case harmonious with implementation of the above policies
and initiatives. Each of the action alternatives was simulated by
calculating the difference in annual GHG emissions in relation to the
No Action Alternative, and subtracting this change in the MiniCAM Level
3 scenario to generate modified global-scale emissions scenarios, which
each show the effect of the various regulatory alternatives on the
global emissions path.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \642\ The regional, national, and international initiatives and
programs discussed above are those which NHTSA has tentatively
concluded are reasonably foreseeable past, current, or future
actions to reduce GHG emissions. Although some of the actions,
policies, or programs listed are not associated with precise GHG
reduction commitments, collectively they illustrate a current and
continuing trend of U.S. and global awareness, emphasis, and efforts
towards significant GHG reductions. Together they imply that future
commitments for reductions are probable and, therefore, reasonably
foreseeable under NEPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA used the MiniCAM Level 3 scenario as the primary global
emissions scenario for evaluating climate effects, and used the MiniCAM
Level 2 scenario and the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference emissions scenario
to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to alternative emission
scenarios. The sensitivity analysis provides a basis for determining
climate responses to varying levels of climate sensitivities and global
emissions and under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) and the
Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4). Some responses of the climate
system are believed to be non-linear; by using a range of emissions
cases and climate sensitivities, it is possible to estimate the effects
of the alternatives in relation to different reference cases.
    Cumulative GHG emissions: Projections of GHG emissions reductions
over the 2012 to 2100 period due to the MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards and
other reasonably foreseeable future actions ranged from 27,164 to
44,626 MMTCO2. Compared to global emissions of 3,919,462
MMTCO2 over this period (projected by the SAP 2.1 MiniCAM
Level 3 scenario), the incremental impact of this rulemaking is
expected to reduce global CO2 emissions by about 0.7 to 1.1
percent from their projected levels under the No Action Alternative.
    CO2 concentration, global mean surface temperature, sea-
level rise, and precipitation: For the mid-range results of MAGICC
model simulations for the No Action Alternative and the eight action
alternatives in terms of CO2 concentrations and increase in
global mean surface temperature in 2030, 2050, and 2100, the impact on
the growth in CO2 concentrations and temperature is just a
fraction of the total growth in CO2 concentrations and
global mean surface temperature. However, the relative impact of the
action alternatives is illustrated by the reduction in growth of both
CO2 concentrations and temperature in the TCTB Alternative
(Alternative 9).
    There is a fairly narrow band of estimated CO2
concentrations as of 2100, from 653.5 ppm for the TCTB Alternative
(Alternative 9) to 657.5 ppm for the No Action Alternative (Alternative
1). For 2030 and 2050, the range is even smaller. Because
CO2 concentrations are the key driver of all other climate
effects, this leads to small differences in these effects.
    The MAGICC simulations of mean global surface air temperature
increases are also shown in Table S-18. For all alternatives, the
cumulative global mean surface temperature increase is about 0.80
[deg]C to 0.81 [deg]C as of 2030; 1.32 to 1.33 [deg]C as of 2050; and
2.59 to 2.61 [deg]C as of 2100.\643\ The differences among alternatives
are small. For 2100, the reduction in temperature increase for the
action alternatives in relation to the No Action Alternative is about
0.01 to 0.02 [deg]C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \643\ Because the actual increase in global mean surface
temperature lags the commitment to warming, the impact on global
mean surface temperature increase is less than the long-term
commitment to warming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The impact on sea-level rise in 2100 ranges from 32.84 centimeters
under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) to 32.68 centimeters
under the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9), for a maximum reduction of
0.16 centimeter by 2100 from the action alternatives.
    Given that the action alternatives would reduce temperature
increases slightly in relation to the No Action Alternative
(Alternative 1), they also would reduce predicted increases in
precipitation slightly. In summary, the impacts of the proposed action
and alternatives and other reasonably foreseeable future actions on
global mean surface temperature, sea-level rise, and precipitation are
relatively small in the context of the expected changes associated with
the emissions trajectories in the SRES scenarios.\644\ This is due
primarily to the global and multi-sectoral nature of the climate problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \644\ These conclusions are not meant to be interpreted as
expressing NHTSA's views that impacts on global mean surface
temperature, precipitation, or sea-level rise are not areas of
concern for policymakers. Under NEPA, the agency is obligated to
discuss the environmental impact[s] of the proposed action. 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(i) (emphasis added). This analysis fulfills
NHTSA's obligations in this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA examined the sensitivity of climate effects on key
assumptions used in the analysis. The two variables for which
assumptions were varied were climate sensitivity and global emissions.
    Climate sensitivities used included 2.0, 3.0, and 4.5 [deg]C for a
doubling of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. Global
emissions scenarios used included the SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 (650 ppm
as of 2100), the SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 2 (550 ppm as of 2100), and RCP
4.5 MiniCAM reference scenario (783 ppm as of 2100). The sensitivity
analysis is based on the results provided for two alternatives--the No
Action Alternative (Alternative 1) and the Preferred Alternative
(Alternative 4). The sensitivity analysis was conducted only for two
alternatives, as this was deemed sufficient to assess the effect of
various climate sensitivities on the results.

[[Page 49744]]

    The results of these simulations illustrate the uncertainty due to
factors influencing future global emissions of GHGs (factors other than
the CAFE rulemaking). The use of different climate sensitivities \645\
(the equilibrium warming that occurs at a doubling of CO2
from pre-industrial levels) can affect not only warming but also
indirectly affect sea-level rise and CO2 concentration. The
use of alternative global emissions scenarios can influence the results
in several ways. Emissions reductions can lead to larger reductions in
the CO2 concentrations in later years because more
anthropogenic emissions can be expected to stay in the atmosphere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \645\ Equilibrium climate sensitivity (or climate sensitivity)
is the projected responsiveness of Earth's global climate system to
forcing from GHG drivers, and is often expressed in terms of changes
to global surface temperature resulting from a doubling of
CO2 in relation to pre-industrial atmospheric
concentrations. According to IPCC, using a likely emissions scenario
that results in a doubling of the concentration of atmospheric
CO2, there is a 66- to 90-percent probability of an
increase in surface warming of 2.5 to 4.0 [deg]C by the end of the
century (relative to 1990 average global temperatures), with 3
[deg]C as the single most likely surface temperature increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA's analysis indicates that the sensitivity of the simulated
CO2 emissions in 2030, 2050, and 2100 to assumptions of
global emissions and climate sensitivity is low; stated simply,
CO2 emissions do not change much with changes in global
emissions and climate sensitivity. For 2030 and 2050, the choice of
global emissions scenario has little impact on the results. By 2100,
the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4) has the greatest impact in
the global emissions scenario with the highest CO2 emissions
(MiniCAM Reference) and the least impact in the scenario with the
lowest CO2 emissions (MiniCAM Level 2). The total range of
the impact of the Preferred Alternative on CO2
concentrations in 2100 is from 2.2 to 2.6 ppm. The Reference Case using
the MiniCAM Level 3 scenario and a 3.0 [deg]C climate sensitivity has
an impact of 2.4 ppm.
    The sensitivity of the simulated global mean surface temperatures
for 2030 is also low due primarily to the slow rate at which the global
mean surface temperature increases in response to increases in
radiative forcing. The relatively slow response in the climate system
explains the observation that even by 2100, when CO2
concentrations more than double in comparison to pre-industrial levels,
the temperature increase is below the equilibrium sensitivity levels,
i.e., the climate system has not had enough time to equilibrate to the
new CO2 concentrations. Nonetheless, as of 2100 there is a
larger range in temperatures across the different values of climate
sensitivity: The reduction in global mean surface temperature from the
No Action Alternative to the Preferred Alternative ranges from 0.008
[deg]C for the 2.0 [deg]C climate sensitivity to 0.012 [deg]C for the
4.5 [deg]C climate sensitivity, for the MiniCAM Level 3 emissions scenario.
    The impact on global mean surface temperature due to assumptions
concerning global emissions of GHGs is also important. The scenario
with the higher global emissions of GHGs (viz., the MiniCAM Reference)
has a slightly lower reduction in global mean surface temperature, and
the scenario with lower global emissions (viz., the MiniCAM Level 2)
has a slightly higher reduction. This is in large part due to the non-
linear and near-logarithmic relationship between radiative forcing and
CO2 concentrations. At high emissions levels, CO2
concentrations are higher and, as a result, a fixed reduction in
emissions yields a lower reduction in radiative forcing and global mean
surface temperature.
    The sensitivity of the simulated sea-level rise to changes in
climate sensitivity and global GHG emissions mirrors that of global
temperature. Scenarios with lower climate sensitivities have lower
increases in sea-level rise. The greater the climate sensitivity, the
greater the decrement in sea-level rise for the Preferred Alternative
as compared to the No Action Alternative.
    Resource impacts of climate change: The effects of the alternatives
on climate--CO2 concentrations, temperature, precipitation,
and sea-level rise--can translate into impacts on key resources
including terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems; marine, coastal
systems, and low-lying areas; food, fiber, and forest products;
industries, settlements, and society; and human health. Although the
alternatives have the potential to substantially decrease GHG
emissions, they would not alone prevent climate change from occurring.
The magnitude of the changes in climate effects that the alternatives
would produce--two to five parts per million of CO2, a few
hundredths of a degree Celsius difference in temperature, a small
percentage change in the rate of precipitation increase, and 1 or 2
millimeters of sea-level rise--are too small to address quantitatively
in terms of their impacts on resources. Given the enormous resource
values at stake, these distinctions could be important--very small
percentages of huge numbers can still yield substantial results--but
they are too small for current quantitative techniques to resolve.
Consequently, the discussion of resource impacts does not distinguish
among the CAFE alternatives; rather, it provides a qualitative review
of the benefits of reducing GHG emissions and the magnitude of the
risks involved in climate change.\646\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \646\ See 42 U.S.C. 4332 (requiring Federal agencies to
``identify and develop methods and procedures * * * which will
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration''); 40 CFR 1502.23
(requiring an EIS to discuss the relationship between a cost-benefit
analysis and any analyses of unquantified environmental impacts,
values, and amenities); CEQ, Considering Cumulative Effects Under
the National Environmental Policy Act (1984), available at http://
ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepa/ccenepa.htm (recognizing that agencies
are sometimes ``limited to qualitative evaluations of effects
because cause-and-effect relationships are poorly understood'' or
cannot be quantified).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA examined the impacts resulting from global climate change due
to all global emissions on the U.S. and global scale. Impacts to
freshwater resources could include changes in precipitation patterns,
decreasing aquifer recharge in some locations, changes in snowpack and
timing of snowmelt, salt-water intrusion from sea-level changes,
changes in weather patterns resulting in flooding or drought in certain
regions, increased water temperature, and numerous other changes to
freshwater systems that disrupt human use and natural aquatic habitats.
Impacts to terrestrial ecosystems could include shifts in species range
and migration patterns, potential extinctions of sensitive species
unable to adapt to changing conditions, increases in the occurrence of
forest fires and pest infestation, and changes in habitat productivity
because of increased atmospheric CO2. Impacts to coastal
ecosystems, primarily from predicted sea-level rise, could include the
loss of coastal areas due to submersion and erosion, additional impacts
from severe weather and storm surges, and increased salinization of
estuaries and freshwater aquifers (for example, one impact could be
reductions in manatee habitat in the Florida coastal areas). Impacts to
land use and several key economic sectors could include flooding and
severe-weather impacts to coastal, floodplain, and island settlements;
extreme heat and cold waves; increases in drought in some locations;
and weather- or sea-level related disruptions of the service,
agricultural, and transportation sectors. Impacts to human health could
include increased mortality and morbidity due to excessive heat,
increases in respiratory conditions due to poor air quality, increases
in water and food-

[[Page 49745]]

borne diseases, changes to the seasonal patterns of vector-borne
diseases, and increases in malnutrition.
    Non-climate cumulative impacts of CO2 emissions: In
addition to its role as a GHG in the atmosphere, CO2 is
transferred from the atmosphere to water, plants, and soil. In water,
CO2 combines with water molecules to form carbonic acid.
When CO2 dissolves in seawater, a series of well-known
chemical reactions begin that increase the concentration of hydrogen
ions and make seawater more acidic, which has adverse effects on corals
and some other marine life.
    Increased concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere can
also stimulate plant growth to some degree, a phenomenon known as the
CO2 fertilization effect. This effect could have positive
ramifications for agricultural productivity and forest growth. The
available evidence indicates that different plants respond in different
ways to enhanced CO2 concentrations.
    As with the climate effects of CO2, the changes in non-
climate impacts associated with the alternatives are difficult to
assess quantitatively. Whether the distinction in concentrations is
substantial across alternatives is not clear because the damage
functions and potential existence of thresholds for CO2
concentration are not known. However, what is clear is that a reduction
in the rate of increase in atmospheric CO2, which all the
action alternatives would provide to some extent, would reduce the
ocean acidification effect and the CO2 fertilization effect.
    For much more information on NHTSA's NEPA analysis, please see the DEIS.
3. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,
as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice
of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make
available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that
describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions).
The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121
define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates
primarily within the United States.'' 13 CFR 121.105(a). No regulatory
flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency certifies the
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
    I certify that the proposed rule would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The
following is NHTSA's statement providing the factual basis for the
certification (5 U.S.C. 605(b)).
    If adopted, the proposal would directly affect twenty-one large
single stage motor vehicle manufacturers.\647\ The proposal would also
affect two small domestic single stage motor vehicle manufacturers,
Saleen and Tesla.\648\ According to the Small Business Administration's
small business size standards (see 13 CFR 121.201), a single stage
automobile or light truck manufacturer (NAICS code 336111, Automobile
Manufacturing; 336112, Light Truck and Utility Vehicle Manufacturing)
must have 1,000 or fewer employees to qualify as a small business. Both
Saleen and Tesla have less than 1,000 employees and make less than
1,000 vehicles per year. We believe that the rulemaking would not have
a significant economic impact on these small vehicle manufacturers
because under Part 525, passenger car manufacturers making less than
10,000 vehicles per year can petition NHTSA to have alternative
standards set for those manufacturers. Tesla produces only electric
vehicles with fuel economy values far beyond those proposed today, so
we would not expect them to need to petition for relief. Saleen
modifies a very small number of vehicles produced by one of the 21
large single-stage manufacturers, and currently does not meet the 27.5
mpg passenger car standard, nor is it anticipated to be able to meet
the standards proposed today. However, Saleen already petitions the
agency for relief. If the standard is raised, it has no meaningful
impact on Saleen, because it must still go through the same process to
petition for relief. Given that there already is a mechanism for
handling small businesses, which is the purpose of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, a regulatory flexibility analysis was not prepared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \647\ BMW, Daimler (Mercedes), Chrysler, Ferrari, Ford, Subaru,
General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Lotus, Maserati, Mazda,
Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Suzuki, Tata, Toyota, and Volkswagen.
    \648\ The Regulatory Flexibility Act only requires analysis of
small domestic manufacturers. There are two passenger car manufacturers
that we know of, Saleen and Tesla, and no light truck manufacturers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
    Executive Order 13132 requires NHTSA to develop an accountable
process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State and local
officials in the development of regulatory policies that have
federalism implications.'' The Order defines the term ``Policies that
have federalism implications'' to include regulations that have
``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.'' Under
the Order, NHTSA may not issue a regulation that has federalism
implications, that imposes substantial direct compliance costs, and
that is not required by statute, unless the Federal government provides
the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance costs incurred by
State and local governments, or NHTSA consults with State and local
officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation.
    NHTSA solicits comment on this proposed action from State and local
officials. In his January 26 memorandum, the President requested NHTSA
to ``consider whether any provisions regarding preemption are
consistent with the EISA, the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA and other relevant provisions of law and the policies underlying
them.'' NHTSA is deferring consideration of the preemption issue. The
agency believes that it is unnecessary to address the issue further at
this time because of the consistent and coordinated Federal standards
that would apply nationally under the proposed National Program.
5. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
    Pursuant to Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform,'' \649\
NHTSA has considered whether this rulemaking would have any retroactive
effect. This proposed rule does not have any retroactive effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \649\ 61 FR 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of a proposed or final rule that includes a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more
than $100 million in any one year (adjusted for inflation with base
year of 1995). Adjusting this amount by the implicit gross domestic
product price deflator for 2006 results in $126 million (116.043/
92.106=1.26). Before promulgating a rule for which a written statement
is needed, section 205 of

[[Page 49746]]

UMRA generally requires NHTSA to identify and consider a reasonable
number of regulatory alternatives and adopt the least costly, most
cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the
objectives of the rule. The provisions of section 205 do not apply when
they are inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover, section 205 allows
NHTSA to adopt an alternative other than the least costly, most cost-
effective, or least burdensome alternative if the agency publishes with
the final rule an explanation why that alternative was not adopted.
    This proposed rule will not result in the expenditure by State,
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, of more than $126
million annually, but it will result in the expenditure of that
magnitude by vehicle manufacturers and/or their suppliers. In
promulgating this proposal, NHTSA considered a variety of alternative
average fuel economy standards lower and higher than those proposed.
NHTSA is statutorily required to set standards at the maximum feasible
level achievable by manufacturers based on its consideration and
balancing of relevant factors and has tentatively concluded that the
proposed fuel economy standards are the maximum feasible standards for
the passenger car and light truck fleets for MYs 2012-2016 in light of
the statutory considerations.
7. Paperwork Reduction Act
    Under the procedures established by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, a person is not required to respond to a collection of
information by a Federal agency unless the collection displays a valid
OMB control number. This section describes a request for clearance for
a collection of information associated with product plan information to
assist the agency in developing final corporate average fuel economy
standards for MY 2012 through 2016 passenger cars and light trucks. The
establishment of those standards is required by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, as amended by the Energy Independence and Security
Act (EISA) of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140. In compliance with the PRA, this
notice requests comment on the Information Collection Request (ICR)
abstracted below. The ICR describes the nature of the information
collection and its expected burden. This is a request for an extension
of an existing collection.
    Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
    Title: 49 CFR parts 531 and 533 Passenger Car Average Fuel Economy
Standards--Model Years 2008-2020; Light Truck Average Fuel Economy
Standards--Model Years 2008-2020; Production Plan Data
    Type of Request: Extension of existing collection.
    OMB Clearance Number: 2127-0655.
    Form Number: This collection of information will not use any standard forms.
Summary of the Collection of Information
    In this collection of information, NHTSA is requesting any updates
to previously-submitted future product plans from vehicle
manufacturers, as well as production data through the recent past,
including data about engines and transmissions for model year (MY) 2008
through MY 2020 passenger cars and light trucks and the assumptions
underlying those plans. If manufacturers have not previously submitted
product plan information to NHTSA and wish to do so, NHTSA also
requests such information from them.
    NHTSA requests information for MYs 2008-2020 to supplement other
information used by NHTSA in developing a realistic forecast of the MY
2012-2016 vehicle market, and in evaluating what technologies may
feasibly be applied by manufacturers to achieve compliance with the MY
2012-2016 standards. Information regarding earlier model years may help
the agency to better account for cumulative effects such as volume- and
time-based reductions in costs, and also may help to reveal product mix
and technology application trends during model years for which the
agency is currently receiving actual corporate average fuel economy
(CAFE) compliance data. Information regarding later model years may
help the agency gain a better understanding of how manufacturers' plans
through MY 2016 relate to their longer-term expectations regarding
Energy Independence and Security Act requirements, market trends, and
prospects for more advanced technologies.
    NHTSA will also consider information from model years before and
after MYs 2012-2016 when reviewing manufacturers' planned schedules for
redesigning and freshening their products, in order to examine how
manufacturers anticipate tying technology introduction to product
design schedules and to consider how the agency should account for
those schedules in its analysis for the final rule. In addition, the
agency is requesting information regarding manufacturers' estimates of
the future vehicle population, and fuel economy improvements and
incremental costs attributed to this notice.
Description of the Need for the Information and Use of the Information
    NHTSA needs the information described above to aid in assessing
what CAFE standards should be established for MY 2012 through 2016
passenger cars and light trucks.
Description of the Likely Respondents (Including Estimated Number, and
Proposed Frequency of Response to the Collection of Information)
    It is estimated that this collection affects approximately 22 motor
vehicle manufacturers. The information that is the subject of this
collection of information is collected whenever NHTSA publishes a
notice of proposed rulemaking for the purpose of setting CAFE standards.
Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
Resulting From the Collection of Information
    It is estimated that this collection affects approximately 22
vehicle manufacturers. One major manufacturer (General Motors)
estimated their burden to be approximately 4,300 hours. The burden to
other manufacturers was estimated using sales weights relative to
General Motor's total sales (e.g., if a manufacturer produces 50
percent as many vehicles as General Motors, their burden is estimated
to be 4,300 * 0.5 = 2,150 hours). Therefore the burden to each
manufacturer depends on the number of vehicles that manufacturer
produces. The total estimated burden is 16,000 hours annually.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Affected Vehicle Manufacturers..  22
Annual Labor Hours for Each Manufacturer    Variable
 To Prepare and Submit Required
 Information.
                                           -----------------------------
    Total Annual Information Collection     16,000 Hours
     Burden.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The monetized cost associated with this information collection is
determined by multiplying the total labor hours by an appropriate labor
rate. For this information collection, we believe vehicle manufacturers
will use mechanical engineers to prepare and submit the data.
Therefore, we are applying a labor rate of $36.02 per hour which is the
median national wage for mechanical engineers.\650\ Thus, the

[[Page 49747]]

estimated monetized annual cost is 16,000 hours x $36.02 per hour = $576,320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \650\ The national median hourly rate for mechanical engineers,
May 2008, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is $36.02.
See http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes_nat.htm#b17-0000 (last
accessed August 26, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comments are specifically sought on the following issues:
    • Whether the collection of information is necessary for the
proper performance of the functions of the Department, including
whether the information will have practical utility.
    • Whether the Department's estimate for the burden of the
information collection is accurate.
    • Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of
information on respondents, including the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology.
    Please send comments to the docket number cited in the heading of
this notice. PRA comments are due within 60 days following publication
of this document in the Federal Register. The agency recognizes that
the amendment to the existing collection of information may be subject
to revision in response to public comments and the OMB review.
    For further information on this proposal to extend the collection
of information, please contact Ken Katz, Fuel Economy Division, Office
of International Policy, Fuel Economy, and Consumer Programs, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. You may also contact him by phone at (202) 366-
0846 or by fax at (202) 493-2290.
8. Regulation Identifier Number
    The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier
number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of
Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center
publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may
use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document
to find this action in the Unified Agenda.
9. Executive Order 13045
    Executive Order 13045 \651\ applies to any rule that: (1) Is
determined to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866,
and (2) concerns an environmental, health, or safety risk that NHTSA
has reason to believe may have a disproportionate effect on children.
If the regulatory action meets both criteria, we must evaluate the
environmental health or safety effects of the proposed rule on
children, and explain why the proposed regulation is preferable to
other potentially effective and reasonably foreseeable alternatives
considered by us.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \651\ 62 FR 19885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Chapter 4 of NHTSA's DEIS notes that breathing PM can cause
respiratory ailments, heart attack, and arrhythmias (Dockery et al.
1993, Samet et al. 2000, Pope et al. 1995, 2002, 2004, Pope and Dockery
2006, Dominici et al. 2006, Laden et al. 2006, all in Ebi et al. 2008).
Populations at greatest risk could include children, the elderly, and
those with heart and lung disease, diabetes (Ebi et al. 2008), and high
blood pressure (K[uuml]nzli et al. 2005, in Ebi et al. 2008). Chronic
exposure to PM could decrease lifespan by 1 to 3 years (Pope 2000, in
American Lung Association 2008). Increasing PM concentrations are
expected to have a measurable adverse impact on human health
(Confalonieri et al. 2007).
    Additionally, the DEIS notes that substantial morbidity and
childhood mortality has been linked to water- and food-borne diseases.
Climate change is projected to alter temperature and the hydrologic
cycle through changes in precipitation, evaporation, transpiration, and
water storage. These changes, in turn, potentially affect water-borne
and food-borne diseases, such as salmonellosis, campylobacter,
leptospirosis, and pathogenic species of vibrio. They also have a
direct impact on surface water availability and water quality. It has
been estimated that more than 1 billion people in 2002 did not have
access to adequate clean water (McMichael et al. 2003, in Epstein et
al. 2006). Increased temperatures, greater evaporation, and heavy rain
events have been associated with adverse impacts on drinking water
through increased waterborne diseases, algal blooms, and toxins (Chorus
and Bartram 1999, Levin et al. 2002, Johnson and Murphy 2004, all in
Epstein et al. 2006). A seasonal signature has been associated with
waterborne disease outbreaks (EPA 2009b). In the United States, 68
percent of all waterborne diseases between 1948 and 1994 were observed
after heavy rainfall events (Curriero et al. 2001a, in Epstein et al. 2006).
    Climate change could further impact a pathogen by directly
affecting its life cycle (Ebi et al. 2008). The global increase in the
frequency, intensity, and duration of red tides could be linked to
local impacts already associated with climate change (Harvell et al.
1999, in Epstein et al. 2006); toxins associated with red tide directly
affect the nervous system (Epstein et al. 2006).
    Many people do not report or seek medical attention for their
ailments of water-borne or food-borne diseases; hence, the number of
actual cases with these diseases is greater than clinical records
demonstrate (Mead et al. 1999, in Ebi et al. 2008). Many of the
gastrointestinal diseases associated with water-borne and food-borne
diseases can be self-limiting; however, vulnerable populations include
young children, those with a compromised immune system, and the elderly.
    Thus, as detailed in the DEIS, NHTSA has evaluated the
environmental health and safety effects of the proposed rule on
children. The DEIS also explains why the proposed regulation is
preferable to other potentially effective and reasonably foreseeable
alternatives considered by the agency.
10. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
    Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act (NTTAA) requires NHTA to evaluate and use existing voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory activities unless doing so would
be inconsistent with applicable law (e.g., the statutory provisions
regarding NHTSA's vehicle safety authority) or otherwise impractical.
    Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies. Technical standards
are defined by the NTTAA as ``performance-base or design-specific
technical specification and related management systems practices.''
They pertain to ``products and processes, such as size, strength, or
technical performance of a product, process or material.''
    Examples of organizations generally regarded as voluntary consensus
standards bodies include the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), and the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI). If NHTSA does not use available
and potentially applicable voluntary consensus standards, we are
required by the Act to provide Congress, through OMB, an explanation of
the reasons for not using such standards.
    There are currently no voluntary consensus standards relevant to
today's proposed CAFE standards.
11. Executive Order 13211
    Executive Order 13211 \652\ applies to any rule that: (1) Is
determined to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866,
and is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the
Administrator of the Office of

[[Page 49748]]

Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action. If
the regulatory action meets either criterion, we must evaluate the
adverse energy effects of the proposed rule and explain why the
proposed regulation is preferable to other potentially effective and
reasonably feasible alternatives considered by us.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \652\ 66 FR 28355 (May 18, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule seeks to establish passenger car and light truck
fuel economy standards that will reduce the consumption of petroleum
and will not have any adverse energy effects. Accordingly, this
proposed rulemaking action is not designated as a significant energy action.
12. Department of Energy Review
    In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32902(j)(1), we submitted this
proposed rule to the Department of Energy for review. That Department
did not make any comments that we have not addressed.
13. Plain Language
    Executive Order 12866 requires each agency to write all rules in
plain language. Application of the principles of plain language
includes consideration of the following questions:
    • Have we organized the material to suit the public's needs?
    • Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated?
    • Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that isn't clear?
    • Would a different format (grouping and order of sections,
use of headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand?
    • Would more (but shorter) sections be better?
    • Could we improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or diagrams?
    • What else could we do to make the rule easier to understand?
    If you have any responses to these questions, please include them
in your comments on this proposal.
14. Privacy Act
    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
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complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register (65 FR 19477-78,
April 11, 2000) or you may visit http://www.dot.gov/privacy.html.

List of Subjects

40 CFR Part 86

    Administrative practice and procedure, Confidential business
information, Labeling, Motor vehicle pollution, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

40 CFR Part 600

    Administrative practice and procedure, Electric power, Fuel
economy, Incorporation by reference, Labeling, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 531 and 533

    Fuel economy.

49 CFR Part 537

    Fuel economy, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 538

    Administrative practice and procedure, Fuel economy, Motor
vehicles, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Environmental Protection Agency

40 CFR Chapter I

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Environmental
Protection Agency proposes to amend parts 86 and 600 of title 40,
Chapter I of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 86--CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NEW AND IN-USE HIGHWAY VEHICLES AND ENGINES

    1. The authority citation for part 86 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q.

    2. Section 86.1 is amended by adding paragraphs (b)(2)(xxxix)
through (xxxxi) to read as follows:

Sec.  86.1  Reference materials.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (xxxix) SAE J2064, December 2005, R134a Refrigerant Automotive Air-
Conditioned Hose, IBR approved for Sec.  86.166-12.
    (xxxx) SAE J2727, revised August 2008, HFC-134a Mobile Air
Conditioning System Refrigerant Emission Chart, IBR approved for Sec.  86.166-12.
    (xxxxi) SAE J2765, October, 2008, Procedure for Measuring System
COP [Coefficient of Performance] of a Mobile Air Conditioning System on
a Test Bench, IBR approved for Sec.  86.1866-12.
* * * * *

Subpart B--[Amended]

    3. Section 86.111-94 is amended by revising paragraph (b)
introductory text to read as follows:

Sec.  86.111-94  Exhaust gas analytical system.

* * * * *
    (b) Major component description. The exhaust gas analytical system,
Figure B94-7, consists of a flame ionization detector (FID) (heated,
235 [deg] ± 15 [deg]F (113 [deg] ± 8 [deg]C) for
methanol-fueled vehicles) for the determination of THC, a methane
analyzer (consisting of a gas chromatograph combined with a FID) for
the determination of CH4, non-dispersive infrared analyzers
(NDIR) for the determination of CO and CO2, a
chemiluminescence analyzer (CL) for the determination of
NOX, and an analyzer meeting the requirements specified in
Sec.  86.167-12 for the determination of N2O for 2012 and
later model year vehicles. A heated flame ionization detector (HFID) is
used for the continuous determination of THC from petroleum-fueled
diesel-cycle vehicles (may also be used with methanol-fueled diesel-
cycle vehicles), Figure B94-5 (or B94-6). The analytical system for
methanol consists of a gas chromatograph (GC) equipped with a flame
ionization detector. The analysis for formaldehyde is performed using
high-pressure liquid chromatography (HPLC) of 2,4-
dinitrophenylhydrazine (DNPH) derivatives using ultraviolet (UV)
detection. The exhaust gas analytical system shall conform to the
following requirements:
* * * * *
    4. Section 86.127-00 is amended as follows:
    a. By revising the introductory text.
    b. By revising paragraph (a) introductory text.
    c. By revising paragraph (a)(1),
    d. By revising paragraph (b).
    e. By revising paragraph (c).
    f. By revising paragraphs (d) and (e).

Sec.  86.127-00  Test procedures; overview.

    Applicability. The procedures described in this subpart are used to
determine the conformity of vehicles with the standards set forth in
subpart A or S of this part (as applicable) for light-duty vehicles,
light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles. Except where
noted, the procedures of paragraphs (a) through (b) of this section,
Sec.  86.127-96 (c) and (d), and the contents of Sec. Sec.  86.135-94,
86.136-90, 86.137-96, 86.140-94, 86.142-90, and 86.144-94 are
applicable for determining emission results for vehicle exhaust
emission systems designed to comply with the FTP emission standards, or
the FTP emission element required for determining compliance with
composite SFTP standards. Paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section
discuss the additional test elements of

[[Page 49749]]

aggressive driving (US06) and air conditioning (SC03) that comprise the
exhaust emission components of the SFTP. Section 86.127-96(e) discusses
fuel spitback emissions and paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section are
applicable to all vehicle emission test procedures. Section 86.127-00
includes text that specifies requirements that differ from Sec. 
86.127-96. Where a paragraph in Sec.  86.127-96 is identical and
applicable to Sec.  86.127-00, this may be indicated by specifying the
corresponding paragraph and the statement ``[Reserved]. For guidance
see Sec.  86.127-96.''
    (a) The overall test consists of prescribed sequences of fueling,
parking, and operating test conditions. Vehicles are tested for any or
all of the following emissions, depending upon the specific test
requirements and the vehicle fuel type:
    (1) Gaseous exhaust THC, NMHC, CO, NOX, CO2,
N2O, CH4, CH3OH,
C2H5OH, C2H4O, and HCHO.
* * * * *
    (b) The FTP Otto-cycle exhaust emission test is designed to
determine gaseous THC, CO, CO2, CH4,
NOX, N2O, and particulate mass emissions from
gasoline-fueled, methanol-fueled and gaseous-fueled Otto-cycle vehicles
as well as methanol and formaldehyde from methanol-fueled Otto-cycle
vehicles, as well as methanol, ethanol, acetaldehyde, and formaldehyde
from ethanol-fueled vehicles while simulating an average trip in an
urban area of 11 miles (18 kilometers). The test consists of engine
start-ups and vehicle operation on a chassis dynamometer through a
specified driving schedule (see paragraph (a) of appendix I to this
part for the Urban Dynamometer Driving Schedule). A proportional part
of the diluted exhaust is collected continuously for subsequent
analysis, using a constant volume (variable dilution) sampler or
critical flow venturi sampler.
    (c) The diesel-cycle exhaust emission test is designed to determine
particulate and gaseous mass emissions during a test similar to the
test in Sec.  86.127(b). For petroleum-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles,
diluted exhaust is continuously analyzed for THC using a heated sample
line and analyzer; the other gaseous emissions (CH4, CO,
CO2, N2O, and NOX) are collected
continuously for analysis as in Sec.  86.127(b). For methanol- and
ethanol-fueled vehicles, THC, methanol, formaldehyde, CO,
CO2, CH4, N2O, and NOX are
collected continuously for analysis as in Sec.  86.127(b).
Additionally, for ethanol-fueled vehicles, ethanol and acetaldehyde are
collected continuously for analysis as in Sec.  86.127(b). THC,
methanol, ethanol, acetaldehyde, and formaldehyde are collected using
heated sample lines, and a heated FID is used for THC analyses.
Simultaneous with the gaseous exhaust collection and analysis,
particulates from a proportional part of the diluted exhaust are
collected continuously on a filter. The mass of particulate is
determined by the procedure described in Sec.  86.139. This testing
requires a dilution tunnel as well as the constant volume sampler.
    (d)-(e) [Reserved]. For guidance see Sec.  86.127-96.
* * * * *
    5. Section 86.135-00 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:

Sec.  86.135-12  Dynamometer procedure.

* * * * *
    (a) Overview. The dynamometer run consists of two tests, a ``cold''
start test, after a minimum 12-hour and a maximum 36-hour soak
according to the provisions of Sec. Sec.  86.132 and 86.133, and a
``hot'' start test following the ``cold'' start by 10 minutes. Engine
startup (with all accessories turned off), operation over the UDDS and
engine shutdown make a complete cold start test. Engine startup and
operation over the first 505 seconds of the driving schedule complete
the hot start test. The exhaust emissions are diluted with ambient air
in the dilution tunnel as shown in Figure B94-5 and Figure B94-6. A
dilution tunnel is not required for testing vehicles waived from the
requirement to measure particulates. Six particulate samples are
collected on filters for weighing; the first sample plus backup is
collected during the first 505 seconds of the cold start test; the
second sample plus backup is collected during the remainder of the cold
start test (including shutdown); the third sample plus backup is
collected during the hot start test. Continuous proportional samples of
gaseous emissions are collected for analysis during each test phase.
For gasoline-fueled, natural gas-fueled and liquefied petroleum gas-
fueled Otto-cycle vehicles, the composite samples collected in bags are
analyzed for THC, CO, CO2, CH4, NOX,
and, for 2012 and later model year vehicles, N2O. For
petroleum-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles (optional for natural gas-
fueled, liquefied petroleum gas-fueled and methanol-fueled diesel-cycle
vehicles), THC is sampled and analyzed continuously according to the
provisions of Sec.  86.110. Parallel samples of the dilution air are
similarly analyzed for THC, CO, CO2, CH4,
NOX, and, for 2012 and later model year vehicles,
N2O. For natural gas-fueled, liquefied petroleum gas-fueled
and methanol-fueled vehicles, bag samples are collected and analyzed
for THC (if not sampled continuously), CO, CO2,
CH4, NOX, and, for 2012 and later model year
vehicles, N2O. For methanol-fueled vehicles, methanol and
formaldehyde samples are taken for both exhaust emissions and dilution
air (a single dilution air formaldehyde sample, covering the total test
period may be collected). For ethanol-fueled vehicles, methanol,
ethanol, acetaldehyde, and formaldehyde samples are taken for both
exhaust emissions and dilution air (a single dilution air formaldehyde
sample, covering the total test period may be collected). Parallel bag
samples of dilution air are analyzed for THC, CO, CO2,
CH4, NOX, and, for 2012 and later model year
vehicles, N2O. Methanol and formaldehyde samples may be
omitted for 1990 through 1994 model years when a FID calibrated on
methanol is used.
* * * * *
    6. A new Sec.  86.165-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows:

Sec.  86.165-12  Air conditioning idle test procedure.

    (a) Applicability. This section describes procedures for
determining air conditioning-related CO2 emissions from 2014
and later model year light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, and
medium-duty passenger vehicles. The results of this test are used to
qualify for air conditioning efficiency CO2 credits
according to Sec.  86.1866-12(c).
    (b) Overview. The test consists of a brief period to stabilize the
vehicle at idle, followed by a ten-minute period at idle when
CO2 emissions are measured without any air conditioning
systems operating, followed by a ten-minute period at idle when
CO2 emissions are measured with the air conditioning system
operating. This test is designed to determine the air conditioning-
related CO2 emission value, in grams per minute. If engine
stalling occurs during cycle operation, follow the provisions of Sec. 
86.136-90 to restart the test. Measurement instruments must meet the
specifications described in this subpart.
    (c) Test cell ambient conditions.
    (1) Ambient humidity within the test cell during all phases of the
test sequence shall be controlled to an average of 50 ± 5
grains of water/pound of dry air.
    (2) Ambient air temperature within the test cell during all phases
of the test sequence shall be controlled to 75 ± 2 [deg]F on
average and 75 ± 5 [deg]F as an instantaneous measurement.
Air temperature shall be recorded

[[Page 49750]]

continuously at a minimum of 30 second intervals.
    (d) Test sequence.
    (1) Connect the vehicle exhaust system to the raw sampling location
or dilution stage according to the provisions of this subpart. For
dilution systems, dilute the exhaust as described in this subpart.
Continuous sampling systems must meet the specifications provided in
this subpart.
    (2) Test the vehicle in a fully warmed-up condition. If the vehicle
has soaked for two hours or less since the last exhaust test element,
preconditioning may consist of a 505 Cycle, 866 Cycle, US06, or SC03,
as these terms are defined in Sec.  86.1803-01, or a highway fuel
economy test procedure, as defined in Sec.  600.002-08 of this chapter.
For longer soak periods, precondition the vehicle using one full Urban
Dynamometer Driving Schedule. Ensure that the vehicle has stabilized at
test cell ambient conditions such that the vehicle interior temperature
is not substantially different from the external test cell temperature.
Windows may be opened during preconditioning to achieve this stabilization.
    (3) Immediately after the preconditioning, turn off any cooling
fans, if present, close the vehicle's hood, fully close all the
vehicle's windows, ensure that all the vehicle's air conditioning
systems are set to full off, start the CO2 sampling system,
and then idle the vehicle for not less than 1 minute and not more than
5 minutes to achieve normal and stable idle operation.
    (4) Measure and record the continuous CO2 concentration
for 600 seconds. Measure the CO2 concentration continuously
using raw or dilute sampling procedures. Multiply this concentration by
the continuous (raw or dilute) flow rate at the emission sampling
location to determine the CO2 flow rate. Calculate the
CO2 cumulative flow rate continuously over the test
interval. This cumulative value is the total mass of the emitted CO2.
    (5) Within 60 seconds after completing the measurement described in
paragraph (d)(4) of this section, turn on the vehicle's air
conditioning system. Set automatic air conditioning systems to a
temperature 9 [deg]F (5 [deg]C) below the ambient temperature of the
test cell. Set manual air conditioning systems to maximum cooling with
recirculation turned off, except that recirculation shall be enabled if
the air conditioning system automatically defaults to a recirculation
mode when set to maximum cooling. Continue idling the vehicle while
measuring and recording the continuous CO2 concentration for
600 seconds as described in paragraph (d)(4) of this section. Air
conditioning systems with automatic temperature controls are finished
with the test. Manually controlled air conditioning systems must
complete one additional idle period described in paragraph (d)(6) of
this section.
    (6) This paragraph (d)(6) applies only to manually controlled air
conditioning systems. Within 60 seconds after completing the
measurement described in paragraph (d)(5) of this section, leave the
vehicle's air conditioning system on and set as described in paragraph
(d)(5) of this section but set the fan speed to the lowest setting that
continues to provide air flow. Recirculation shall be turned off except
that if the system defaults to a recirculation mode when set to maximum
cooling and maintains recirculation with the low fan speed, then
recirculation shall continue to be enabled. After the fan speed has
been set, continue idling the vehicle while measuring and recording the
continuous CO2 concentration for a total of 600 seconds as
described in paragraph (d)(4) of this section.
    (e) Calculations. (1) For the measurement with no air conditioning,
calculate the CO2 emissions (in grams per minute) by
dividing the total mass of CO2 from paragraph (d)(4) of this
section by 10.0 (the duration in minutes for which CO2 is measured).
Round this result to the nearest whole gram per minute.
    (2)(i) For the measurement with air conditioning in operation for
automatic air conditioning systems, calculate the CO2
emissions (in grams per minute) by dividing the total mass of
CO2 from paragraph (d)(5) of this section by 10.0. Round
this result to the nearest whole gram per minute.
    (ii) For the measurement with air conditioning in operation for
manually controlled air conditioning systems, calculate the
CO2 emissions (in grams per minute) by summing the total
mass of CO2 from paragraphs (d)(5) and (d)(6) of this
section and dividing by 20.0. Round this result to the nearest whole
gram per minute.
    (3) Calculate the increased CO2 emissions due to air
conditioning (in grams per minute) by subtracting the results of
paragraph (e)(1) of this section from the results of paragraph
(e)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section, whichever is applicable.
    7. A new Sec.  86.166-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows:

Sec.  86.166-12  Method for calculating emissions due to air
conditioning leakage.

    This section describes procedures used to determine a refrigerant
leakage rate from vehicle-based air conditioning units. The results of
this test are used to determine air conditioning leakage credits
according to Sec.  86.1866-12(b).
    (a) Emission totals. Calculate an annual rate of refrigerant
leakage from an air conditioning system using the following equation:

    Grams/YRTOT = Grams/YRRP + Grams/
YRSP + Grams/YRFH + Grams/YRMC +
Grams/YRC - Grams/YRCREDIT

Where:

Grams/YRTOT = Total air conditioning system emission rate
in grams per year and rounded to the nearest tenth of a gram per year.
Grams/YRRP = Emission rate for rigid pipe connections as
described in paragraph (b) of this section.
Grams/YRSP = Emission rate for service ports and
refrigerant control devices as described in paragraph (c) of this section.
Grams/YRFH = Emission rate for flexible hoses as
described in paragraph (d) of this section.
Grams/YRMC = Emission rate for heat exchangers, mufflers,
receiver/driers, and accumulators as described in paragraph (e) of this section.
Grams/YRC = Emission rate for compressors as described in
paragraph (f) of this section.
Grams/YRCREDIT = Leakage monitoring credit, as
applicable, from paragraph (g) of this section.

    (b) Fittings. Determine the grams per year emission rate for rigid
pipe connections using the following equation:

Grams/YRRP = 0.00522 [middot] [(125 [middot] SO) + (75
[middot] SCO) + (50 [middot] MO) + (10 [middot] SW) + (5 [middot] SWO) + (MG)]

Where:

Grams/YRRP = Total emission rate for rigid pipe
connections in grams per year.
SO = The number of single O-ring connections.
SCO = The number of single captured O-ring connections.
MO = The number of multiple O-ring connections.
SW = The number of seal washer connections.
SWO = The number of seal washer with O-ring connections.
MG = The number of metal gasket connections.

    (c) Service ports and refrigerant control devices. Determine the
grams per year emission rate for service ports and refrigerant control
devices using the following equation:

Grams/YRSP = (0.3 [middot] HSSP [middot] 0.522) + (0.2
[middot] LSSP [middot] 0.522) + (0.2 [middot] STV [middot] 0.522) +
(0.2 [middot] TXV [middot] 0.522)

Where:

Grams/YRSP = The emission rate for service ports and
refrigerant control devices, in grams per year.
HSSP = The number of high side service ports.

[[Page 49751]]

LSSP = The number of low side service ports.
STV = The total number of switches, transducers, and pressure relief valves.
TXV = The number of TXV refrigerant control devices.

    (d) Flexible hoses. Determine the permeation emission rate in grams
per year for each segment of flexible hose using the following
equation, and then sum the values for each hose in the system to
calculate a total emission rate for the system:

Grams/YRFH = 0.00522 [middot] (3.14159 [middot] ID [middot]
L [middot] ER)

Where:

Grams/YRFH = Emission rate for a segment of flexible hose
in grams per year.
ID = Inner diameter of hose, in millimeters.
L = Length of hose, in millimeters.
ER = Emission rate per unit internal surface area of the hose, in g/
mm\2\. Select the appropriate value from the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   ER
    Material/configuration     -----------------------------------------
                                 High-pressure side   Low-pressure side
------------------------------------------------------------------------
All rubber hose...............              0.0216               0.0144
Standard barrier or veneer                  0.0054               0.0036
 hose.........................
Ultra-low permeation barrier                0.00225              0.00167
 or veneer hose...............
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (e) Heat exchangers, mufflers, receiver/driers, and accumulators.
Use an emission rate of 0.261 grams per year as a combined value for
all heat exchangers, mufflers, receiver/driers, and accumulators
(Grams/YRMC).
    (f) Compressors. Determine the emission rate for compressors using
the following equation, except that the final term in the equation
(``1500/SSL'') is not applicable to electric (or semi-hermetic) compressors:

Grams/YRC = 0.00522 [middot] [(300 [middot] OHS) + (200
[middot] MHS) + (150 [middot] FAP) + (100 [middot] GHS) + (1500/SSL)]

Where:

Grams/YRC = The emission rate for the compressors in the
air conditioning system, in grams per year.
OHS = The number of O-ring housing seals.
MHS = The number of molded housing seals.
FAP = The number of fitting adapter plates.
GHS = The number of gasket housing seals.
SSL = The number of lips on shaft seal (for belt-driven compressors only).

    (g) Leakage monitoring credits. Electronic monitoring systems that
provide indication of a refrigerant loss to the operator through an
interior driver information display or an air conditioning-specific
malfunction indicator when the air conditioning system has lost 40
percent of its charge capacity shall use a credit of 1 g/yr.
    (h) Definitions. The following definitions apply to this section:
    (1) All rubber hose means a Type A or Type B hose as defined by SAE
J2064 with a permeation rate not greater than 15 kg/m\2\/year when
tested according to SAE J2064. SAE J2064 is incorporated by reference;
see Sec.  86.1.
    (2) Standard barrier or veneer hose means a Type C, D, E, or F hose
as defined by SAE J2064 with a permeation rate not greater than 5 kg/
m\2\/year when tested according to SAE J2064. SAE J2064 is incorporated
by reference; see Sec.  86.1.
    (3) Ultra-low permeation barrier or veneer hose means a hose with a
permeation rate not greater than 1.5 kg/m\2\/year when tested according
to SAE J2064. SAE J2064 is incorporated by reference; see Sec.  86.1.
    8. A new Sec.  86.167-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows:

Sec.  86.167-12  N2O measurement devices.

    (a) General component requirements. We recommend that you use an
analyzer that meets the specifications in Table 1 of 40 CFR 1065.205.
Note that your system must meet the linearity verification in 40 CFR 1065.307.
    (b) Instrument types. You may use any of the following analyzers to
measure N2O:
    (1) Nondispersive infra-red (NDIR) analyzer. You may use an NDIR
analyzer that has compensation algorithms that are functions of other
gaseous measurements and the engine's known or assumed fuel properties.
The target value for any compensation algorithm is 0.0% (that is, no
bias high and no bias low), regardless of the uncompensated signal's bias.
    (2) Fourier transform infra-red (FTIR) analyzer. You may use an
FTIR analyzer that has compensation algorithms that are functions of
other gaseous measurements and the engine's known or assumed fuel
properties. The target value for any compensation algorithm is 0.0%
(that is, no bias high and no bias low), regardless of the
uncompensated signal's bias. Use EPA Test Method 320 ``Measurement of
Vapor Phase Organic and Inorganic Emissions by Extractive Fourier
Transform Infrared (FTIR) Spectroscopy'' for spectral interpretation
(see 40 CFR part 63 appendix A).
    (3) Photoacoustic analyzer. You may use a photoacoustic analyzer
that has compensation algorithms that are functions of other gaseous
measurements. The target value for any compensation algorithm is 0.0%
(that is, no bias high and no bias low), regardless of the
uncompensated signal's bias. Use an optical wheel configuration that
gives analytical priority to measurement of the least stable components
in the sample. Select a sample integration time of at least 5 seconds.
Take into account sample chamber and sample line volumes when
determining flush times for your instrument.
    (4) Gas chromatograph (GC) analyzer. You may use a gas
chromatograph with Electron Capture Detector (ECD) to measure
N2O concentrations of diluted exhaust for batch sampling.
You may use a packed or porous layer open tubular (PLOT) column phase
of suitable polarity and length to achieve adequate resolution of the
N2O peak for analysis. Examples of acceptable columns are a
PLOT column consisting of bonded polystyrene-divinylbenzene or a
Porapack Q packed column. Take the column temperature profile and
carrier gas selection into consideration when setting up your method to
achieve adequate N2O peak resolution.
    (c) Interference validation. Perform interference validation for
NDIR, FTIR, and Photoacoustic analyzers using the procedures of Sec. 
86.168-12 as follows:
    (1) Certain interference gases can positively interfere with these
analyzers by causing a response similar to N2O as follows:
    (i) The interference gases for NDIR analyzers are CO,
CO2, H2O, CH4 and SO2. Note
that interference species, with the exception of H2O, are
dependent on the N2O infrared absorption band chosen by the
instrument manufacturer and should be determined independently for each
analyzer.
    (ii) Use good engineering judgment to determine interference gases
for FTIR. Note that interference species, with the exception of
H2O, are dependent on the N2O infrared absorption
band chosen by the instrument manufacturer and should be determined
independently for each analyzer.
    (iii) The interference gases for photoacoustic analyzers are CO,
CO2, and H2O.

[[Page 49752]]

    (2) Analyzers must have combined interference that is within (0.0
± 1.0) mol/mol. We strongly recommend a lower interference
that is within (0.0 ± 0.5) mol/.
    9. A new Sec.  86.168-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows:

Sec.  86.168-12  Interference verification for N2O analyzers.

    (a) Scope and frequency. See 40 CFR 1065.275 to determine whether
you need to verify the amount of interference after initial analyzer
installation and after major maintenance.
    (b) Measurement principles. Interference gasses can positively
interfere with certain analyzers by causing a response similar to
N2O. If the analyzer uses compensation algorithms that
utilize measurements of other gases to meet this interference
verification, simultaneously conduct these other measurements to test
the compensation algorithms during the analyzer interference verification.
    (c) System requirements. See 40 CFR 1065.275 for system
requirements related to allowable interference levels.
    (d) Procedure. Perform the interference verification as follows:
    (1) Start, operate, zero, and span the N2O FTIR analyzer
as you would before an emission test. If the sample is passed through a
dryer during emission testing, you may run this verification test with
the dryer if it meets the requirements of 40 CFR 1065.342. Operate the
dryer at the same conditions as you will for an emission test. You may
also run this verification test without the sample dryer.
    (2) Create a humidified test gas by bubbling a multi component span
gas that incorporates the target interference species and meets the
specifications in 40 CFR 1065.750 through distilled water in a sealed
vessel. If the sample is not passed through a dryer during emission
testing, control the vessel temperature to generate an H2O
level at least as high as the maximum expected during emission testing.
If the sample is passed through a dryer during emission testing,
control the vessel temperature to generate an H2O level at
least as high as the level determined in 40 CFR 1065.145(e)(2) for that
dryer. Use interference span gas concentrations that are at least as
high as the maximum expected during testing.
    (3) Introduce the humidified interference test gas into the sample
system. You may introduce it downstream of any sample dryer, if one is
used during testing.
    (4) If the sample is not passed through a dryer during this
verification test, measure the water mole fraction, xH2O, of
the humidified interference test gas as close as possible to the inlet
of the analyzer. For example, measure dewpoint, Tdew, and
absolute pressure, ptotal, to calculate xH2O.
Verify that the water content meets the requirement in paragraph (d)(2)
of this section. If the sample is passed through a dryer during this
verification test, you must verify that the water content of the
humidified test gas downstream of the vessel meets the requirement in
paragraph (d)(2) of this section based on either direct measurement of
the water content (e.g., dewpoint and pressure) or an estimate based on
the vessel pressure and temperature. Use good engineering judgment to
estimate the water content. For example, you may use previous direct
measurements of water content to verify the vessel's level of saturation.
    (5) If a sample dryer is not used in this verification test, use
good engineering judgment to prevent condensation in the transfer
lines, fittings, or valves from the point where xH2O is
measured to the analyzer. We recommend that you design your system so
that the wall temperatures in the transfer lines, fittings, and valves
from the point where xH2O is measured to the analyzer are at
least 5 [deg]C above the local sample gas dewpoint.
    (6) Allow time for the analyzer response to stabilize.
Stabilization time may include time to purge the transfer line and to
account for analyzer response.
    (7) While the analyzer measures the sample's concentration, record
its output for 30 seconds. Calculate the arithmetic mean of this data.
    (8) The analyzer meets the interference verification if the result
of paragraph (d)(7) of this section meets the tolerance in 40 CFR 1065.275.
    (9) You may also run interference procedures separately for
individual interference gases. If the interference gas levels used are
higher than the maximum levels expected during testing, you may scale
down each observed interference value by multiplying the observed
interference by the ratio of the maximum expected concentration value
to the actual value used during this procedure. You may run separate
interference concentrations of H2O (down to 0.025 mol/mol
H2O content) that are lower than the maximum levels expected
during testing, but you must scale up the observed H2O
interference by multiplying the observed interference by the ratio of
the maximum expected H2O concentration value to the actual
value used during this procedure. The sum of the scaled interference
values must meet the tolerance specified in 40 CFR 1065.275.

Subpart S--[Amended]

    10. A new Sec.  86.1801-12 is added to read as follows:

Sec.  86.1801-12  Applicability.

    (a) Applicability. Except as otherwise indicated, the provisions of
this subpart apply to new light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks,
medium-duty passenger vehicles, and Otto-cycle complete heavy-duty
vehicles, including multi-fueled, alternative fueled, hybrid electric,
plug-in hybrid electric, and electric vehicles. These provisions also
apply to new incomplete light-duty trucks below 8,500 Gross Vehicle
Weight Rating. In cases where a provision applies only to a certain
vehicle group based on its model year, vehicle class, motor fuel,
engine type, or other distinguishing characteristics, the limited
applicability is cited in the appropriate section of this subpart.
    (b) Aftermarket conversions. The provisions of this subpart apply
to aftermarket conversion systems, aftermarket conversion installers,
and aftermarket conversion certifiers, as those terms are defined in 40
CFR 85.502, of all model year light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks,
medium-duty passenger vehicles, and complete Otto-cycle heavy-duty vehicles.
    (c) Optional applicability.
    (1) [Reserved]
    (2) A manufacturer may request to certify any incomplete Otto-cycle
heavy-duty vehicle of 14,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating or less
in accordance with the provisions for complete heavy-duty vehicles.
Heavy-duty engine or heavy-duty vehicle provisions of subpart A of this
part do not apply to such a vehicle.
    (3) [Reserved]
    (4) Upon preapproval by the Administrator, a manufacturer may
optionally certify an aftermarket conversion of a complete heavy-duty
vehicle greater than 10,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating and of
14,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating or less under the heavy-duty
engine or heavy-duty vehicle provisions of subpart A of this part. Such
preapproval will be granted only upon demonstration that chassis-based
certification would be infeasible or unreasonable for the manufacturer to perform.
    (5) A manufacturer may optionally certify an aftermarket conversion
of a complete heavy-duty vehicle greater than 10,000 pounds Gross
Vehicle Weight Rating and of 14,000 pounds

[[Continued on page 49753]]

 
 


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