Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards
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PDF Version (50 pp, 1533K, About PDF) [Federal Register: September 28, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 186)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 49703-49752] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr28se09-29] Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards [[Continued from page 49702]] [[Page 49703]] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.046 The agency began the process of winnowing the alternatives by determining whether any of the lower stringency alternatives should be eliminated from consideration. To begin with, the agency needs to ensure that its standards are high enough to enable the combined fleet of passenger cars and light trucks to achieve at least 35 mpg not later than MY 2020, as required by EISA. Achieving that level makes it necessary for the chosen alternative to increase at over 3 percent annually. NHTSA has concluded that it must reject the 3%/y and 4%/y alternatives. Given that CO2 and fuel savings are very closely correlated, the above chart reveals that the 3%/y and 4%/y alternative would not produce the reductions in fuel savings and CO2 emissions that the Nation needs at this time. Picking either of those alternatives would unnecessarily result in foregoing substantial benefits, in terms of fuel [[Page 49704]] savings and reduced CO2 emissions, which would be achievable at reasonable cost. Further, NHTSA has tentatively concluded that it must reject the 3%/y and 4%/y alternatives, as neither would lead to the regulatory harmonization that forms a vital core principle of the National Program that EPA and NHTSA are jointly striving to implement. In order to achieve a harmonized National Program, an average annual increase of 4.3% is necessary. In contrast, at the upper end of the range of alternatives, the agency was concerned that the increased benefits offered by those alternatives were available only at excessive cost and might not be practicable in all cases within the available leadtime. NHTSA first considered the environmentally-preferable alternative. Based on the information provided in the DEIS, the environmentally- preferable alternative would be that involving stringencies at which total costs most nearly equal total benefits. NHTSA notes that NEPA does not require that agencies choose the environmentally-preferable alternative if doing so would be contrary to the choice that the agency would otherwise make under its governing statute. Given the levels of stringency required by the environmentally-preferable alternative and the lack of lead time to achieve such levels between now and MY 2016, NHTSA tentatively concludes that the environmentally-preferable alternative would not be economically practicable or technologically feasible, and thus tentatively concludes that it would result in standards that would be beyond the level achievable for MYs 2012-2016. NHTSA determined that it would be inappropriate to propose any of the other more stringent alternatives due to concerns over lead time and economic practicability. At a time when the entire industry remains in an economically critical state, the agencies believe that it would be unreasonable to propose more stringent standards. Even in a case where economic factors were not a consideration, there are real-world time constraints which must be considered due to the short lead time available for the early years of this program, in particular for MYs 2012 and 2013. As revealed by the figures shown above, the proposed standards already require aggressive application of technologies, and more stringent standards which would require more widespread use (including more substantial implementation of advanced technologies such as stoichiometric gasoline direct injection engines and strong hybrids) raise serious issues of adequacy of lead time, not only to meet the standards but to coordinate such significant changes with manufacturers' redesign cycles. NHTSA does not believe that more stringent standards would meet EPCA's requirement that CAFE standards be economically practicable. The figures presented above reveal that increasing stringency beyond the proposed standards would entail significant additional application of technology--technology that, though perhaps feasible for individual vehicle models, would not be economically practicable for the industry at the scales involved. Among the more stringent alternatives, the one closest in stringency to the standards proposed today is the alternative under which combined CAFE stringency increases at 5% annually. As indicated above, this alternative would yield fuel savings and CO2 reductions about 12% and 9% higher, respectively, than the proposed standards. However, compared to the proposed standards, this alternative would increase outlays for new technologies during MY 2012-2016 by about 24%, or $14b. Average MY 2016 cost increases would, in turn, rise from $1,076 under the proposed standards to $1,409 when stringency increases at 5% annually. This represents a 30% increase in per-vehicle cost for only a 3% increase in average performance (on a gallon-per-mile basis to which fuel savings are proportional). The following three tables summarize estimated manufacturer-level average incremental costs for the 5%/y alternative and the average of the passenger and light truck fleets: Table IV.F.3--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under the 5%/y Alternative CAFE Standards for Passenger Cars ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 474 541 667 883 1,190 Chrysler........................ 726 1,464 1,832 1,928 1,913 Daimler......................... 132 209 814 1,094 1,467 Ford............................ 979 1,556 1,572 1,918 2,181 General Motors.................. 94 934 1,242 1,541 1,808 Honda........................... 55 263 408 451 671 Hyundai......................... 518 531 943 1,007 1,152 Kia............................. 180 344 440 612 796 Mazda........................... 603 919 1,294 1,569 1,863 Mitsubishi...................... 1,106 1,141 2,594 2,962 2,913 Nissan.......................... 298 587 1,344 1,402 1,517 Porsche......................... 209 240 350 465 581 Subaru.......................... 353 454 1,828 2,258 2,201 Suzuki.......................... 204 1,453 2,444 2,580 2,624 Tata............................ 202 239 428 632 1,350 Toyota.......................... 133 127 194 285 446 Volkswagen...................... 231 550 688 828 1,202 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Average..................... 337 664 916 1,079 1,291 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.F.4--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under the 5%/y Alternative CAFE Standards for Light Trucks ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................ 297 306 403 753 935 Chrysler....................... 113 475 1,058 1,271 1,538 [[Page 49705]] Daimler........................ 172 198 227 459 528 Ford........................... 732 1,201 1,685 2,345 2,380 General Motors................. ............... 786 1,121 1,275 1,457 Honda.......................... 646 614 1,139 1,265 1,624 Hyundai........................ 990 1,009 2,106 2,206 2,148 Kia............................ ............... 309 713 1,181 1,692 Mazda.......................... 434 608 612 722 953 Mitsubishi..................... 11 88 2,102 2,081 2,817 Nissan......................... 793 891 1,419 1,535 1,907 Porsche........................ (17) 55 117 962 1,009 Subaru......................... 1,398 1,370 1,501 1,441 1,486 Suzuki......................... 6 2,169 2,093 2,028 2,155 Tata........................... ............... 77 160 242 695 Toyota......................... 113 427 906 1,065 1,291 Volkswagen..................... (11) 55 127 209 286 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Average.................... 373 742 1,179 1,449 1,641 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.F.5--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under the 5%/y Alternative CAFE Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 415 469 590 848 1,123 Chrysler........................ 351 888 1,392 1,632 1,747 Daimler......................... 148 205 591 884 1,167 For[caret]d..................... 872 1,401 1,623 2,110 2,269 General Motors.................. 52 868 1,189 1,426 1,660 Honda........................... 272 386 638 701 955 Hyundai......................... 610 625 1,167 1,228 1,330 Kia............................. 143 337 489 707 942 Mazda........................... 571 862 1,181 1,443 1,732 Mitsubishi...................... 959 975 2,525 2,854 2,902 Nissan.......................... 462 683 1,367 1,441 1,627 Porsche......................... 120 172 272 623 717 Subaru.......................... 743 787 1,709 1,964 1,942 Suzuki.......................... 152 1,637 2,349 2,434 2,504 Tata............................ 71 144 267 420 1,001 Toyota.......................... 125 233 440 549 724 Volkswagen...................... 182 460 586 716 1,043 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Average..................... 350 692 1,010 1,207 1,409 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- These cost increases derive from accelerated application of advanced technologies as stringency increases past the levels in the proposed standards. For example, under the proposed standards, additional diesel application rates average 2% for the industry and range from 0% to 7% among Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. Under standards increasing in combined stringency at 5% annually, these rates more than double, averaging 5% for the industry and ranging from 2% to 13% for the same six manufacturers. The agency tentatively concludes that the levels of technology penetration required by the proposed standards are reasonable. Increasing the standards beyond those levels would lead to rapidly increasing dependence on advanced technologies with higher costs, particularly in the early years of the rulemaking time frame, according to the agency's analysis, and potentially pose too great an economic burden given the state of the industry. In contrast, through analysis of the illustrative results shown above, as well as the more complete and detailed results presented in the accompanying PRIA, NHTSA has concluded that the proposed standards are technologically feasible and economically practicable. The proposed standards will require manufacturers to apply considerable additional technology. Although NHTSA cannot predict how manufacturers will respond to the proposed standards, the agency's analysis indicates that the standards could lead to significantly greater use of advanced engine and transmission technologies. As shown above, the agency's analysis shows considerable increases in the application of SGDI systems and engine turbocharging and downsizing. Though not presented above, the agency's analysis also shows similarly large increases in the use of dual-clutch automated manual transmissions (AMTs). However, the agency's analysis does not suggest that the additional application of these technologies in response to the proposed standards would extend beyond levels achievable by the industry. These technologies are likely to be applied to at least some extent even in the absence of new CAFE standards. In addition, the agency's analysis indicates that most manufacturers would rely only to a limited extent on the most expensive and advanced technologies, including diesel engines and strong HEVs. As shown above, NHTSA estimates that the proposed standards could lead to average incremental costs ranging [[Page 49706]] from $291 per vehicle (for light trucks in MY 2011) to $1,085 per vehicle (for passenger cars in MY 2016), increasing steadily from $421 per vehicle in for all light vehicles in MY 2011 $1,076 for all light vehicle in MY 2016. NHTSA estimates that these costs would vary considerably among manufacturers, but would rarely exceed $2,000 per vehicle. The following three tables summarize estimated manufacturer- level average incremental costs for the proposed standards and the average of the passenger and light truck fleets: Table IV.F.6--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under Proposed Passenger Car CAFE Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 524 552 634 828 1,124 Chrysler........................ 775 1,304 1,473 1,583 1,582 Daimler......................... 182 215 781 1,039 1,401 Ford............................ 1,746 1,719 1,735 1,880 2,078 General Motors.................. 143 990 1,189 1,387 1,553 Honda........................... 31 122 205 287 494 Hyundai......................... 418 452 643 726 868 Kia............................. 319 359 387 473 647 Mazda........................... 658 735 965 991 1,26 Mitsubishi...................... 1,156 1,076 1,715 2,076 2,035 Nissan.......................... 653 712 1,155 1,153 1,275 Porsche......................... 270 256 306 399 498 Subaru.......................... 408 465 1,493 1,877 1,838 Suzuki.......................... 259 1,001 1,445 1,494 1,675 Tata............................ 246 244 395 577 1,284 Toyota.......................... 133 127 155 257 267 Volkswagen...................... 286 561 650 767 1,125 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Average..................... 498 674 820 930 1,085 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.F.7--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under Proposed Light Truck CAFE Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 325 327 380 708 884 Chrysler........................ 152 399 749 892 1,188 Daimler......................... 322 289 316 420 478 Ford............................ 471 629 693 1,323 1,365 General Motors.................. 33 533 752 792 962 Honda........................... 390 380 616 749 1,006 Hyundai......................... 774 744 1,301 1,322 1,292 Kia............................. 228 373 547 843 1,218 Mazda........................... 340 608 610 679 776 Mitsubishi...................... 55 94 1,546 1,732 2,123 Nissan.......................... 541 608 903 1,022 1,312 Porsche......................... 28 46 84 913 954 Subaru.......................... 1,203 1,140 1,213 1,197 1,184 Suzuki.......................... 50 1,451 1,404 1,358 1,373 Tata............................ 44 83 127 193 635 Toyota.......................... 172 309 665 764 877 Volkswagen...................... 28 61 99 160 231 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Average..................... 291 485 701 911 1,058 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.F.8--Average Incremental Costs ($/Vehicle) Under Proposed CAFE Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 457 483 560 796 1,061 Chrysler........................ 393 777 1,061 1,271 1,408 Daimler......................... 236 243 604 834 1,106 Ford............................ 1,195 1,242 1,262 1,629 1,762 General Motors.................. 94 785 997 1,131 1,304 Honda........................... 162 212 335 429 647 Hyundai......................... 488 509 769 835 944 Kia............................. 300 362 416 535 740 Mazda........................... 598 712 907 944 1,193 Mitsubishi...................... 1,007 921 1,692 2,033 2,045 Nissan.......................... 616 679 1,078 1,115 1,286 Porsche......................... 174 179 231 562 643 Subaru.......................... 705 711 1,392 1,632 1,602 Suzuki.......................... 204 1,117 1,434 1,458 1,598 Tata............................ 115 150 234 368 938 Toyota.......................... 147 191 331 429 468 [[Page 49707]] Volkswagen...................... 233 470 550 657 970 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Average..................... 421 605 777 924 1,076 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In summary, NHTSA has considered eight regulatory alternatives, including the proposed standards, examining technologies that could be applied in response to each alternative, as well as corresponding costs, effects, and benefits. The agency has concluded that alternatives less stringent than the proposed standards would not produce the fuel savings and CO2 reductions necessary at this time to achieve either the overarching purpose of EPCA, i.e., energy conservation, or an important part of the regulatory harmonization underpinning the National Program. Conversely, the agency has concluded that more stringent standards would involve levels of additional technology and cost that, considering the fragile state of the automotive industry, would not be economically practicable. Therefore, having considered these eight regulatory alternatives, and the statutorily-relevant factors of technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy, along with other relevant factors such as the safety impacts of the proposed standards,\580\ NHTSA tentatively concludes that the proposed standards represent a reasonable balancing of all of these concerns, and are the maximum feasible average fuel economy levels that the manufacturers can achieve in MYs 2012-2016. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \580\ See Section IV.G.7 below. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- G. Impacts of the Proposed CAFE Standards 1. How Would These Proposed Standards Improve Fuel Economy and Reduce GHG Emissions for MY 2012-2016 Vehicles? As discussed above, the CAFE level required under an attribute- based standard depends on the mix of vehicles produced for sale in the U.S. Based on the market forecast that NHTSA and EPA have used to develop and analyze new CAFE and CO2 emissions standards, NHTSA estimates that the new CAFE standards will require CAFE levels to increase by an average of 4.3 percent annually through MY 2016, reaching a combined average fuel economy requirement of 34.1 mpg in that model year: Table IV.G.1-1--Average Required Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.................. 33.6 34.4 35.2 36.4 38.0 Light Trucks.................... 25.0 25.6 26.2 27.1 28.3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined.................... 29.8 30.6 31.4 32.6 34.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA estimates that average achieved fuel economy levels will correspondingly increase through MY 2016, but that manufacturers will, on average, undercomply \581\ in some model years and overcomply \582\ in others, reaching a combined average fuel economy of 33.7 mpg in MY 2016: \583\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \581\ In NHTSA's analysis, ``undercompliance'' is mitigated either through use of FFV credits, use of existing or ``banked'' credits, or through fine payment. Because NHTSA cannot consider availability of credits in setting standards, the estimated achieved CAFE levels presented here do not account for their use. In contrast, because NHTSA is not prohibited from considering fine payment, the estimated achieved CAFE levels presented here include the assumption that BMW, Daimler (i.e., Mercedes), Porsche, and Tata (i.e., Jaguar and Rover) will only apply technology up to the point that it would be less expensive to pay civil penalties. \582\ In NHTSA's analysis, ``overcompliance'' occurs through multi-year planning: Manufacturers apply some ``extra'' technology in early model years (e.g., MY 2014) in order to carry that technology forward and thereby facilitate compliance in later model years (e.g., MY 2016) \583\ Consistent with EPCA, NHTSA has not accounted for manufacturers' ability to earn CAFE credits for selling FFVs, carry credits forward and back between model years, and transfer credits between the passenger car and light truck fleets. Table IV.G.1-2--Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.................. 32.9 34.2 35.2 36.5 37.6 Light Trucks.................... 24.9 25.7 26.5 27.4 28.1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined.................... 29.3 30.5 31.5 32.7 33.7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA estimates that these fuel economy increases will lead to fuel savings totaling 61.6 billion gallons during the useful lives of vehicles sold in MYs 2012-2016: [[Page 49708]] Table IV.G.1-3--Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) [Under proposed standards] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 2.5 5.3 7.5 9.4 11.4 36.0 Light Trucks............................................ 1.8 3.7 5.4 6.8 7.8 25.6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 4.3 9.1 12.9 16.1 19.2 61.6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The agency also estimates that these new CAFE standards will lead to corresponding reductions of CO2 emissions totaling 656 million metric tons (mmt) during the useful lives of vehicles sold in MYs 2012-2016: Table IV.G.1-4--Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars............................................ 25 56 79 99 121 381 Light Trucks.............................................. 19 40 58 73 85 275 ----------------------------------------------------- Combined.............................................. 44 96 137 173 206 656 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. How Would These Proposed Standards Improve Fleet-Wide Fuel Economy and Reduce GHG Emissions Beyond MY 2016? Under the assumption that CAFE standards at least as stringent as those proposed for MY 2016 would be established for subsequent model years, the effects of the proposed standards on fuel consumption and GHG emissions will continue to increase for many years. This will occur because over time, a growing fraction of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet will be comprised of cars and light trucks that meet the MY 2016 standard. The impact of the proposed standards on fuel use and GHG emissions will continue to grow through approximately 2050, when virtually all cars and light trucks in service will have met the MY 2016 standard. As Table IV.G.2-1 shows, NHTSA estimates that the fuel economy increases resulting from the proposed standards will lead to reductions in total fuel consumption by cars and light trucks of 9 billion gallons during 2020, increasing to 30 billion gallons by 2050. Over the period from 2012--when the proposed standards would begin to take effect-- through 2050, cumulative fuel savings would total 693 billion gallons, as Table IV.G.2-1 also indicates. Table IV.G.2-1--Reduction in Fleet-Wide Fuel Use (Billion Gallons) Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total, Calendar year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2012-2050 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars........................................... 5 12 16 19 431 Light Trucks............................................. 4 7 9 11 262 ------------------------------------------------------ Combined............................................. 9 19 25 30 693 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a consequence of these reductions in fleet-wide fuel consumption, the agency also estimates that the proposed CAFE standards for MYs 2012-2016 will lead to corresponding reductions in CO2 emissions from the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet. Specifically, NHTSA estimates that total CO2 emissions associated with passenger car and light truck use in the U.S. use will decline by 111 million metric tons (mmt) during 2020 as a consequence of the proposed standards, as Table IV.G.2-2 reports. The table also shows that the this reduction is estimated to grow to 355 million metric tons by the year 2050, and will total 8,247 million metric tons over the period from 2012, when the proposed standards would take effect, through 2050. Table IV.G.2-2--Reduction in Fleet-Wide Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) From Passenger Car and Light Truck Use Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total, Calendar year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2012-2050 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars........................................... 64 144 186 222 5,117 Light Trucks............................................. 47 87 110 132 3,130 ------------------------------------------------------ Combined............................................. 111 231 295 355 8,247 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 49709]] These reductions in fleet-wide CO2 emissions, together with corresponding reductions in other GHG emissions from fuel production and use, would lead to small but significant reductions in projected changes in the future global climate. These changes are summarized in Table IV.G.2-3 below. Table IV.G.2-3--Effects of Reductions in Fleet-Wide Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) On Projected Changes in Global Climate ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Projected change in measure -------------------------------------------------- Measure Units Date With proposed No action standards Difference ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Atmospheric CO2 Concentration... ppm............... 2100 783.0 780.3 -2.7 Increase in Global Mean Surface [deg]C............ 2100 3.136 3.126 -0.010 Temperature. Sea Level Rise.................. cm................ 2100 38.00 37.91 -0.09 Global Mean Precipitation....... % change from 1980- 2090 4.59% 4.57% -0.02% 1999 avg.. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. How Would These Proposed Standards Impact Non-GHG Emissions and Their Associated Effects? Under the assumption that CAFE standards at least as stringent as those proposed for MY 2016 would be established for subsequent model years, the effects of the proposed standards on air quality and its associated health effects will continue to be felt over the foreseeable future. This will occur because over time a growing fraction of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet will be comprised of cars and light trucks that meet the MY 2016 standard, and this growth will continue until approximately 2050. Increases in the fuel economy of light-duty vehicles required by the proposed CAFE standards will cause a slight increase in the number of miles they are driven, through the fuel economy ``rebound effect.'' In turn, this increase in vehicle use will lead to increases in emissions of criteria air pollutants and some airborne toxics, since these are products of the number of miles vehicles are driven. At the same time, however, the projected reductions in fuel production and use reported in Table IV.G.2-1 above will lead to corresponding reductions in emissions of these pollutants that occur during fuel production and distribution (``upstream'' emissions). For most of these pollutants, the reduction in upstream emissions resulting from lower fuel production and distribution will outweigh the increase in emissions from vehicle use, resulting in a net decline in their total emissions. Tables IV.G.3-1a and 3-1b report estimated reductions in emissions of selected criteria air pollutants (or their chemical precursors) and airborne toxics expected to result from the proposed standards during calendar year 2030. By that date, the majority of light-duty vehicles in use will have met the proposed MY 2016 CAFE standards, so these reductions provide a useful index of the long-term impact of the proposed standards on air pollution and its consequences for human health. Table IV.G.3-1a--Projected Changes in Emissions of Criteria Air Pollutants From Car and Light Truck Use [Calendar year 2030; tons] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Criteria air pollutant --------------------------------------------------------------- Source of Volatile Vehicle class emissions Nitrogen Particulate Sulfur oxides organic oxides (NOX) matter (PM2.5) (SOX) compounds (VOC) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars................ Vehicle use..... 1,791 630 -2,375 2,157 Fuel production -19,022 -2,539 -11,363 -75,031 and distribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- All sources..... -17,231 -1,909 -13,738 -72,874 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Light Trucks.................. Vehicle use..... 1,137 257 -1,401 1,094 Fuel production -11,677 -1,569 -7,031 -43,667 and distribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- All sources..... -10,540 -1,312 -8,432 -42,573 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total..................... Vehicle use..... 2,928 887 -3,776 3,251 Fuel production -30,699 -4,108 -18,394 -118,698 and distribution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- All sources..... -27,771 -3,221 -22,170 -115,447 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.F.3-1b--Projected Changes in Emissions of Airborne Toxics From Car and Light Truck Use [Calendar year 2030; tons] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Toxic air pollutant Vehicle class Source of emissions ----------------------------------------------- Benzene 1,3-Butadiene Formaldehyde ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars........................ Vehicle use............. 67 19 72 [[Page 49710]] Fuel production and -158 -1 -54 distribution. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- All sources............. -91 18 18 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Light Trucks.......................... Vehicle use............. 45 9 32 Fuel production and -93 -1 -33 distribution. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- All sources............. -48 8 -1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total............................. Vehicle use............. 112 28 104 Fuel production and -251 -2 -87 distribution. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- All sources............. -139 26 17 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note: Positive values indicate increases in emissions; negative values indicate reductions. In turn, the reductions in emissions reported in Tables IV.G.3-1a and 3-1b are projected to result in significant declines in the health effects that result from population exposure to these pollutants. Table IV.G.3-2 reports the estimated reductions in selected PM2.5- related human health impacts that are expected to result from reduced population exposure to unhealthful atmospheric concentrations of PM2.5. The estimates reported in Table IV.G.3-2 are derived from PM2.5-related dollar-per-ton estimates that include only quantifiable reductions in health impacts likely to result from reduced population exposure to particular matter (PM). They do not include all health impacts related to reduced exposure to PM, nor do they include any reductions in health impacts resulting from lower population exposure to other criteria air pollutants (particularly ozone) and air toxics. NHTSA and EPA are using PM-related benefits-per- ton values as an interim approach to estimating the PM-related benefits of the proposal. To model the ozone and PM air quality benefit sof the final rule, the analysis will utilize ambient concentration data derived from full-scale photochemical air quality modeling. Table IV.G.3-2--Projected Reductions in Health Impacts of Exposure to Criteria Air Pollutants From Proposed Standards [Calendar year 2030] ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Projected Health impact Measure reduction (2030) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Mortality (ages 30 and older). premature deaths per 217 to 554 year. Chronic Bronchitis............ cases per year........ 142 Emergency Room Visits for number per year....... 198 Asthma. Work Loss..................... workdays per year..... 25,522 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. What Are the Estimated Costs and Benefits of These Proposed Standards? NHTSA estimates that the proposed standards could entail significant additional technology beyond the levels reflected in the baseline market forecast used by NHTSA. This additional technology will lead to increases in costs to manufacturers and vehicle buyers, as well as fuel savings to vehicle buyers. The following three tables summarize the extent to which the agency estimates technologies could be added to the passenger car, light truck, and overall fleets in each model year in response to the proposed standards. Percentages reflect the technology's additional application in the market, and are negative in cases where one technology is superseded (i.e., displaced) by another. For example, the agency estimates that many automatic transmissions used in light trucks could be displaced by dual clutch transmissions. BILLING CODE 6560-50-P [[Page 49711]] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.047 [[Page 49712]] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.048 [[Page 49713]] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.049 BILLING CODE 6560-50-C In order to pay for this additional technology (and, for some manufacturers, civil penalties), NHTSA estimates that average passenger car and light truck prices will, relative to levels resulting from compliance with baseline (MY 2011) standards, increase by $591-$1,127 and $283-$1,020, respectively, during MYs 2011-2016. The following tables summarize the agency's estimates of average price increases for each manufacturer's passenger car, light truck, and overall fleets (with corresponding averages for the industry): Table IV.G.4-4--Average Passenger Car Incremental Price Increases ($) Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 524 552 634 828 1,124 Chrysler........................ 775 1,304 1,473 1,583 1,582 Daimler......................... 182 215 781 1,039 1,401 [[Page 49714]] Ford............................ 1,746 1,719 1,735 1,880 2,078 General Motors.................. 143 990 1,189 1,387 1,553 Honda........................... 31 122 205 287 494 Hyundai......................... 418 452 643 726 868 Kia............................. 319 359 387 473 647 Mazda........................... 658 735 965 991 1,263 Mitsubishi...................... 1,156 1,076 1,715 2,076 2,035 Nissan.......................... 653 712 1,155 1,153 1,275 Porsche......................... 270 256 306 399 498 Subaru.......................... 408 465 1,493 1,877 1,838 Suzuki.......................... 259 1,001 1,445 1,494 1,675 Tata............................ 246 244 395 577 1,284 Toyota.......................... 133 127 155 257 267 Volkswagen...................... 286 561 650 767 1,125 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total/Average............... 498 674 820 930 1,085 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.G.4-5--Average Light Truck Incremental Price Increases ($) Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 325 327 380 708 884 Chrysler........................ 152 399 749 892 1,188 Daimler......................... 322 289 316 420 478 Ford............................ 471 629 693 1,323 1,365 General Motors.................. 33 533 752 792 962 Honda........................... 390 380 616 749 1,006 Hyundai......................... 774 744 1,301 1,322 1,292 Kia............................. 228 373 547 843 1,218 Mazda........................... 340 608 610 679 776 Mitsubishi...................... 55 94 1,546 1,732 2,123 Nissan.......................... 541 608 903 1,022 1,312 Porsche......................... 28 46 84 913 954 Subaru.......................... 1,203 1,140 1,213 1,197 1,184 Suzuki.......................... 50 1,451 1,404 1,358 1,373 Tata............................ 44 83 127 193 635 Toyota.......................... 172 309 665 764 877 Volkswagen...................... 28 61 99 160 231 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total/Average............... 291 485 701 911 1,058 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.G.4-6--Average Incremental Price Increases ($) by Manufacturer Under Proposed Standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Manufacturer MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- BMW............................. 457 483 560 796 1,061 Chrysler........................ 393 777 1,061 1,271 1,408 Daimler......................... 236 243 604 834 1,106 Ford............................ 1,195 1,242 1,262 1,629 1,762 General Motors.................. 94 785 997 1,131 1,304 Honda........................... 162 212 335 429 647 Hyundai......................... 488 509 769 835 944 Kia............................. 300 362 416 535 740 Mazda........................... 598 712 907 944 1,193 Mitsubishi...................... 1,007 921 1,692 2,033 2,045 Nissan.......................... 616 679 1,078 1,115 1,286 Porsche......................... 174 179 231 562 643 Subaru.......................... 705 711 1,392 1,632 1,602 Suzuki.......................... 204 1,117 1,434 1,458 1,598 Tata............................ 115 150 234 368 938 Toyota.......................... 147 191 331 429 468 Volkswagen...................... 233 470 550 657 970 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total/Average............... 421 605 777 924 1,076 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 49715]] Based on the agencies' estimates of manufacturers' future sales volumes, these price increases will lead to a total of $60.2 billion in incremental outlays during MYs 2012-2016 for additional technology attributable to the proposed standards: Table IV.G.4-7--Incremental Technology Outlays ($b) Under Proposed Standards -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 4.1 6.5 8.4 9.9 11.8 40.8 Light Trucks............................................ 1.5 2.8 4.0 5.2 5.9 19.4 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 5.7 9.3 12.5 15.1 17.6 60.2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA notes that these estimates of the economic costs for meeting higher CAFE standards omit certain potentially important categories of costs, and may also reflect underestimation (or possibly overestimation) of some costs that are included. For example, although the agency's analysis attempts to hold vehicle performance, capacity, and utility constant in estimating the costs of applying fuel-saving technologies to vehicles, the analysis imputes no cost to any actual reductions in vehicle performance, capacity, and utility that may result from manufacturers' efforts to comply with the proposed CAFE standards. Although these costs are difficult to estimate accurately, they nonetheless represent a potentially significant category of omitted costs. Similarly, the agency's estimates of costs for meeting higher CAFE standards does not estimate the economic value of potential increases in motor vehicle fatalities and injuries that could result from reductions in the size or weight of vehicles. While NHTSA reports worst-case estimates of these increases in fatalities and injuries, no estimate of their economic value is included in the agency's estimates of the net benefits resulting from the proposed standards due to ongoing discussion regarding these potential impacts. Finally, it is possible that the agency may have underestimated or overestimated manufacturers' direct costs for applying some fuel economy technologies, or the increases in manufacturer's indirect costs associated with higher vehicle manufacturing costs. In either case, the technology outlays reported here will not correctly represent the costs of meeting higher CAFE standards. Similarly, NHTSA's estimates of increased costs of congestion, accidents, and noise associated with added vehicle use are drawn from a 1997 study, and the correct magnitude of these values may have changed since they were developed.\584\ If this is the case, the costs of increased vehicle use associated with the fuel economy rebound effect will differ from the agency's estimates in this analysis. Thus, like the agency's estimates of economic benefits, estimates of total compliance costs reported here may underestimate or overestimate the true economic costs of the proposed standards. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \584\ The agency seeks comment above on appropriate values for these costs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, offsetting these costs, the achieved increases in fuel economy will also produce significant benefits to society. NHTSA estimates that, in present value terms (at a discount rate of 3 percent), these benefits will total $201.7 billion over the useful lives of light vehicles sold during MYs 2012-2016: Table IV.G.4-8--Present Value of Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 7.6 17.0 24.4 31.2 38.7 119.1 Light Trucks............................................ 5.5 11.6 17.3 22.2 26.0 82.6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 13.1 28.7 41.8 53.4 64.7 201.7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA attributes most of these benefits to reductions in fuel consumption, valuing fuel at future pretax prices in EIA's reference case forecast from AEO 2009. The total benefits shown in the above table also include other benefits and disbenefits, examples of which include the social values of reductions in CO2 and criteria pollutant emissions, the value of additional travel (induced by the rebound effect), and the social cost of additional congestion, accidents, and noise attributable to that additional travel. The PRIA accompanying today's proposed rule presents a detailed analysis of specific benefits of the proposed rule. For both the passenger car and light truck fleets, NHTSA estimates that the benefits of today's proposed standards will exceed the corresponding costs in every model year. Over the useful lives of the affected (MY 2012-2016) vehicles, the agency estimates that the benefits of the proposed standards will exceed the costs of the proposed standards by $141.5 billion: Table IV.G.4-9--Present Value of Net Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 3.5 10.5 16.0 21.3 26.9 78.3 Light Trucks............................................ 3.9 8.9 13.3 17.0 20.1 63.2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 49716]] Combined............................................ 7.4 19.4 29.3 38.3 47.1 141.5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA's estimates of economic benefits from establishing higher CAFE are also subject to considerable uncertainty. Most important, the agency's estimates of the fuel savings likely to result from adopting higher CAFE standards depend critically on the accuracy of the estimated fuel economy levels that will be achieved under both the baseline scenario, which assumes that manufacturers will continue to comply with the MY 2011 CAFE standards, and under alternative increases in the standards that apply to MY 2012-16 passenger cars and light trucks. Specifically, if the agency has underestimated the fuel economy levels that manufacturers will achieve under the baseline scenario, its estimates of fuel savings and the resulting economic benefits will be too large. As another example, the agency's estimate of benefits from reducing the threat of economic damages from disruptions in the supply of imported petroleum to the U.S. applies to calendar year 2015. If the magnitude of this estimate would be expected to grow after 2015 in response to increases in U.S. petroleum imports, growth in the level of U.S. economic activity, or increases in the likelihood of disruptions in the supply of imported petroleum, the agency may have underestimated the benefits from the reduction in petroleum imports expected to result from adopting higher CAFE standards. However, it is also possible that NHTSA's estimates of economic benefits from establishing higher CAFE standards underestimate the true economic benefits of the fuel savings those standards would produce. This is partly because the agency has been unable to develop monetized estimates of the economic value of certain potentially significant categories of benefits from reducing fuel consumption. Specifically, the agency's estimate of the economic value of reduced damages to human health resulting from lower exposure to criteria air pollutants includes only the effects of reducing population exposure to PM2.5 emissions. Although this is likely to be the most significant component of health benefits from reduced emissions of criteria air pollutants, it excludes the value of reduced damages to human health and other impacts resulting from lower emissions and reduced population exposure to other criteria air pollutants, including ozone and nitrous oxide (N2O), as well as airborne toxics. The agency's analysis excludes these benefits because no reliable estimates of the health impacts of criteria pollutants other than PM2.5 or of the health impacts of airborne toxics were available to use in developing estimates of these benefits. In addition, the agency's estimate of the value of reduced climate- related economic damages from lower emissions of GHGs excludes many sources of potential benefits from reducing the pace and extent of global climate change. These include reductions in the risk of catastrophic changes in the global climate, lower costs for necessary adaptations to changes in climate, reduced water supply within specific global sub-regions, reductions in damages caused by severe storms, lower population exposure to harmful air pollution levels, reductions in ecosystem impacts and risks to natural resources of global significance, and reduced threats from widespread social or political unrest. Including monetized estimates of benefits from reducing the extent of climate change and these associated impacts would increase the agency's estimates of benefits from adopting higher CAFE standards. The benefits, costs, and net benefits shown above are all based on a discount rate of 3 percent. As documented in the accompanying PRIA, the agency examined the sensitivity of results to changes in many economic inputs. With an alternative discount rate of 7 percent, incremental technology outlays were virtually identical to those estimated at a 3 percent discount rate: \585\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \585\ Because some economic inputs change the effective cost of some technologies, and NHTSA assumes some manufacturers will be willing to pay civil penalties based on economic considerations, this outcome is not assured. Table IV.G.4-10--Incremental Technology Outlays ($b) Under Proposed Standards (Using 7 Percent Discount Rate) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 4.1 6.5 8.4 9.9 11.8 40.8 Light Trucks............................................ 1.5 2.8 4.0 5.2 5.9 19.4 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 5.7 9.3 12.5 15.1 17.6 60.2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, the present value of the benefits accrued over the lifetime of the vehicles covered by the proposal is about 20 percent smaller when discounted at a 7 percent annual rate than when discounted at a 3 percent annual rate: Table IV.G.4-11--Present Value of Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (Using 7 Percent Discount Rate) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 6.0 13.6 19.5 25.0 31.1 95.3 Light Trucks............................................ 4.3 9.1 13.5 17.4 20.4 64.6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 49717]] Combined............................................ 10.3 22.6 33.1 42.4 51.5 159.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a result, net benefits are 38 percent lower when total benefits are discounted at a 7 percent annual rate: Table IV.G.4-12--Present Value of Net Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (Using 7 Percent Discount Rate) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 1.9 7.0 11.1 15.1 19.3 54.5 Light Trucks............................................ 2.7 6.3 9.5 12.2 14.5 45.2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 4.6 13.3 20.6 27.3 33.8 99.7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The following tables also present itemized costs and benefits for the combined fleet for each year of the proposed standards and for all the years combined, at 3 and 7 percent discount rates, respectively. Numbers in parentheses represent negative values. Table IV.G.4-13--Itemized Cost and Benefit Estimates for the Combined Vehicle Fleet, 3% Discount Rate -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Costs: .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. Technology Costs.................................... $5,695 $9,295 $12,454 $15,080 $17,633 $60,157 Benefits .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. Lifetime Fuel Expenditures.......................... 10,197 22,396 32,715 41,880 50,823 158,012 Consumer Surplus from Additional Driving............ 751 1,643 2,389 3,029 3,639 11,451 Refueling Time Value................................ 776 1,551 2,198 2,749 3,277 10,550 Petroleum Market Externalities...................... 559 1,194 1,700 2,129 2,538 8,121 Congestion Costs.................................... (460) (934) (1,332) (1,657) (1,991) (6,376) Noise Costs......................................... (7) (14) (21) (26) (31) (99) Crash Costs......................................... (217) (437) (625) (776) (930) (2,985) CO2................................................. 1,028 2,287 3,382 4,376 5,372 16,446 CO.................................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 VOC................................................. 41 80 108 131 156 518 NOX................................................. 82 132 155 174 200 744 PM.................................................. 220 438 621 771 904 2,956 SOX................................................. 161 345 490 613 731 2,341 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total........................................... 13,132 28,680 41,781 53,394 64,687 201,676 ======================================================================================================================================================== Net Benefits............................................ 7,044 18,759 27,090 34,710 41,386 128,992 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table IV.G.4-14--Itemized Cost and Benefit Estimates for the Combined Vehicle Fleet, 7% Discount Rate -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Costs Technology Costs.................................... $5,695 $9,295 $12,454 $15,080 $17,633 $60,157 Benefits: Lifetime Fuel Expenditures.......................... 7,991 17,671 25,900 33,264 40,478 125,305 Consumer Surplus from Additional Driving............ 590 1,301 1,896 2,412 2,904 9,102 Refueling Time Value................................ 624 1,249 1,770 2,215 2,642 8,500 Petroleum Market Externalities...................... 448 960 1,367 1,712 2,043 6,531 Congestion Costs.................................... (371) (753) (1,074) (1,335) (1,606) (5,138) Noise Costs......................................... (6) (12) (16) (21) (24) (80) Crash Costs......................................... (173) (352) (503) (626) (749) (2,403) CO2................................................. 797 1,781 2,634 3,410 4,189 12,813 CO.................................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 VOC................................................. 33 65 87 106 125 416 NOX................................................. 60 99 120 135 156 570 PM.................................................. 170 344 492 613 721 2,339 [[Page 49718]] SOX................................................. 129 278 394 493 588 1,882 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total........................................... 10,292 22,631 33,066 42,380 51,468 159,837 ======================================================================================================================================================== Net Benefits............................................ 4,281 12,832 18,818 24,414 29,293 89,638 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The above benefit and cost estimates did not reflect the availability and use of flexibility mechanisms, such as compliance credits and credit trading, because EPCA prohibits NHTSA from considering the effects of those mechanisms in setting CAFE standards. However, the agency noted that, in reality, manufacturers were likely to rely to some extent on flexibility mechanisms provided by EPCA and would thereby reduce the cost of complying with the proposed standards to a meaningful extent. As discussed in the PRIA, NHTSA has performed an analysis to estimate the costs and benefits if EPCA's provisions regarding FFVs are accounted for. The agency considered also attempting to account for other EPCA flexibility mechanisms, in particular credit transfers between the passenger and nonpassenger fleets, but has concluded that, at least within a context in which each model year is represented explicitly, technologies carry forward between model years, and multiyear planning effects are represented, there is no basis to reliably estimate how manufacturers might use these mechanisms. Accounting for the FFV provisions indicates that achieved fuel economies would be 0.6-1.1 mpg lower than when these provisions are not considered (for comparison see Table IV.G.1-2 above): Table IV.G.4-15--Average Achieved Fuel Economy (mpg) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.................. 32.5 33.4 34.3 35.3 36.5 Light Trucks.................... 24.1 24.6 25.3 26.3 27.0 Combined.................... 28.7 29.6 30.4 31.6 32.7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a result, NHTSA estimates that, when FFV credits are taken into account, fuel savings will total 58.8 billion gallons--about 4.5 percent less than the 61.6 billion gallons estimated when these credits are not considered: Table IV.G.4-16--Fuel Saved (Billion Gallons) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 2.5 5.0 6.9 8.6 10.9 33.9 Light Trucks............................................ 2.0 3.3 5.0 6.8 7.9 24.9 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 4.5 8.2 11.8 15.4 18.8 58.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The agency similarly estimates CO2 emissions reductions would total 639 million metric tons (mmt), about 2.6 percent less than the 656 mmt estimated when these credits are not considered:\586\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \586\ Differences in the application of diesel engines lead to differences in the incremental percentage changes in fuel consumption and carbon dioxide emissions. Table IV.G.4-17--Avoided Carbon Dioxide Emissions (mmt) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 27 54 75 93 118 368 Light Trucks............................................ 22 36 54 74 86 272 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 49 90 129 167 204 639 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This analysis further indicates significant reductions in outlays for additional technology when FFV provisions are taken into account-- about $45b, or about 25 percent less than the $60b estimated when excluding these provisions: [[Page 49719]] Table IV.G.4-18--Incremental Technology Outlays ($b) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 2.5 4.4 6.1 7.4 9.3 29.6 Light Trucks............................................ 1.3 2.0 3.1 4.3 5.0 15.6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 3.7 6.3 9.2 11.7 14.2 45.2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because NHTSA's analysis indicated that FFV provisions would not significantly reduce fuel savings, the agency's estimate of discounted benefits when including these provisions, $192.5b, is only about 4.5 percent lower than the $201.7b shown above for the analysis that excluded these provisions: Table IV.G.4-19--Present Value of Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 7.8 15.9 22.5 28.6 37.1 111.9 Light Trucks............................................ 6.1 10.2 15.9 22.1 26.3 80.5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 13.9 26.1 38.4 50.7 63.3 192.5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, although the agency estimates lower discounted benefits when FFV provisions are taken into account, the agency estimates that these provisions slightly increase net benefits (by about 4 percent, from $141.5b to $147.2b) because costs decrease by more than discounted benefits: Table IV.G.4-20--Present Value of Net Benefits ($Billion) Under Proposed Standards (With FFV Credits) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger Cars.......................................... 5.3 11.5 16.4 21.2 27.8 82.3 Light Trucks............................................ 4.8 8.2 12.8 17.8 21.3 64.9 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 10.2 19.7 29.2 39.0 49.1 147.2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The agency has performed several sensitivity analyses to examine important assumptions. We examine sensitivity with respect to the following five economic parameters: (1) The price of gasoline: The Reference Case uses the AEO 2009 reference case estimate for the price of gasoline. In this sensitivity analysis we examine the effect of using the AEO high or low forecast estimates instead. (2) The discount rate: The Reference Case uses a discount rate of 3 percent to discount future benefits. In the sensitivity analysis, we equally examine the effect of using a 7 percent discount rate instead. (3) The rebound effect: The Reference Case uses a rebound effect of 10 percent to project increased miles traveled as the cost per mile driven decreases. In the sensitivity analysis, we examine the effect of using a 5 percent or 15 percent rebound effect instead. (4) The values of CO2 benefits and monopsony: The Reference Case uses $20 per ton to quantify the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions and $0.178 per gallon to quantify the benefits of reducing fuel consumption. In the sensitivity analysis, we examine the effect of using values of $5, $10, $34, or $56 per ton instead to value CO2 benefits. These values can be translated into cents per gallon by multiplying by 0.0089,\587\ giving the following values: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \587\ The molecular weight of Carbon (C) is 12, the molecular weight of Oxygen (O) is 16, thus the molecular weight of CO2 is 44. One ton of C = 44/12 tons CO2 = 3.67 tons CO2. 1 gallon of gas weighs 2,819 grams, of that 2,433 grams are carbon. $1.00 CO2 = $3.67 C and $3.67/ton * ton/1000kg * kg/1000g * 2433g/gallon = (3.67 * 2433)/ 1000 * 1000 = $0.0089/gallon. ($5 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.0445 per gallon ($10 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.089 per gallon ($20 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.178 per gallon ($34 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.3026 per gallon ($56 per ton CO2) x 0.0089 = $0.4984 per gallon The $5 per ton value reflects the domestic impacts of CO2 emissions and so we use a nonzero monopsony cost, namely $0.30 cents per gallon, when valuing CO2 emissions at $5 per ton. The higher per-ton values of CO2 emissions reflect the global impacts of CO2 emissions and we so use $0 per gallon for monopsony in these cases. (5) Military security: The Reference Case uses $0 per gallon to quantify the military security benefits of reducing fuel consumption. In the sensitivity analysis, we examine the impact of using a value of 5 cents per gallon instead. Varying each of the above 5 parameters in isolation results in 10 economic scenarios, not including the Reference case. These are listed in Table IV.G.4-21 below, together with two additional scenarios that use values for these parameters that produce the lowest and highest valued benefits. [[Page 49720]] Table IV.G.4-21--Sensitivity Analyses Evaluated in NHTSA's PRIA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rebound Monopsony Military Name Fuel price Discount rate effect SCC effect security -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reference................................. Reference................... 3% 10% $20 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal High Fuel Price........................... High........................ 3% 10% $20 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal Low Fuel Price............................ Low......................... 3% 10% $20 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal 7% Discount Rate.......................... Reference................... 7% 10% $20 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal 5% Rebound Effect......................... Reference................... 3% 5% $20 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal 15% Rebound Effect........................ Reference................... 3% 15% $20 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal $56/ton CO2 Value......................... Reference................... 3% 10% $56 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal $34/ton CO2............................... Reference................... 3% 10% $34 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal $10/ton CO2............................... Reference................... 3% 10% $10 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal $5/ton CO2................................ Reference................... 3% 10% $5 30[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal 5[cent]/gal Military Security Value....... Reference................... 3% 10% $20 0[cent]/gal 5[cent]/gal Lowest Discounted Benefits................ Low......................... 7% 15% $5 0[cent]/gal 0[cent]/gal Highest Discounted Benefits............... High........................ 3% 5% $56 0[cent]/gal 5[cent]/gal -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The basic results of the sensitivity analyses were as follows: (1) The various economic assumptions have similar effects on the passenger car and light truck standards. (2) Varying the economic assumptions has virtually no impact on achieved fuel economy. (3) The economic parameter with the greatest impact is fuel price. Changing the fuel price forecast to AEO's High or Low forecasts impacts benefits by about ±37 percent. However, the impact of fuel price on other quantities, such as cost, is much smaller, resulting in increases or decreases of 3-8 percent. (4) Economic parameters other than fuel price and the rebound effect had no effect on per-vehicle cost, total cost, fuel savings, or CO2 reductions. Their impacts on benefits were 6 percent or less, with the exception of the 7 percent discount rate, which decreased benefits by 20 percent, and the $56/ton CO2 value, which raised benefits by 14 percent. (5) Changing all economic parameters simultaneously (among the considered values) changes benefits by at most about 60 percent. However impacts to other quantities, such as cost, are much smaller, resulting in increases or decreases of 6 percent or less. (6) Impacts other than those discussed in 1) through 5) were small (5 percent or less). For more detailed information regarding NHTSA's sensitivity analyses for this NPRM, please see Chapter X of NHTSA's PRIA. 5. How Would These Proposed Standards Impact Vehicle Sales? Higher fuel economy standards are expected to increase the price of passenger cars and light trucks, because manufacturers will have to add technology to vehicles to increase their fuel economy, the cost for which they will likely pass on in some fashion to consumers. NHTSA examined the potential impact of higher vehicle prices on sales on an industry-wide basis for passenger cars and light trucks separately. We note that the analysis conducted for this rule does not have the precision to examine effects on individual manufacturers or different vehicle classes. There is a broad consensus in the economic literature that the price elasticity for demand for automobiles is approximately -1.0.\588\ Thus, every one percent increase in the price of the vehicle would reduce sales by one percent. Elasticity estimates assume no perceived change in the quality of the product. However, in this case, vehicle price increases result from adding technologies that improve fuel economy. If consumers did not value improved fuel economy at all, and considered nothing but the increase in price in their purchase decisions, then the estimated impact on sales from price elasticity could be applied directly. However, NHTSA believes that consumers do value improved fuel economy, because it reduces the operating cost of the vehicles. NHTSA also believes that consumers consider other factors that affect their costs and have included these in the analysis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \588\ Kleit, A.N. (1990). ``The Effect of Annual Changes in Automobile Fuel Economy Standards,'' Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 2, pp. 151-172; Bordley, R. (1994). ``An Overlapping Choice Set Model of Automotive Price Elasticities,'' Transportation Research B, vol. 28B, no. 6, pp. 401-408; McCarthy, P.S. (1996). ``Market Price and Income Elasticities of New Vehicle Demands,'' The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. LXXVII, no. 3, pp. 543-547. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The main question, however, is how much of the retail price needed to cover the technology investments to meet higher fuel economy standards will manufacturers be able to pass on to consumers. The ability of manufacturers to pass the compliance costs on to consumers depends upon how consumers value the fuel economy improvements.\589\ Consumer valuation of fuel economy improvements often depends upon the price of gasoline, which has recently been very volatile. The estimates reported below as part of NHTSA's analysis on sales impacts assume that manufacturers will be able to pass all of their costs to improve fuel economy on to consumers. To the extent that NHTSA has accurately predicted the price of gasoline and consumers' reactions, and manufacturers can pass on all of the costs to consumers, then the sales and employment impact analyses are reasonable. On the other hand, if manufacturers only increase retail prices to the extent that consumers value these fuel economy improvements (i.e., to the extent that they value fuel savings), then there would be no impact on sales, although manufacturers' profit levels would fall. Sales losses are predicted to occur only if consumers fail to value fuel economy improvements at least as much as they pay in higher vehicle prices. Likewise, if fuel prices rise beyond levels used in this analysis, consumer valuation of improved fuel economy could increase to match or exceed their initial investment, resulting in no impact or even an increase in sales levels. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \589\ Gron, Ann and Swenson, Deborah, 2000, ``Cost Pass-Through in the U.S. Automobile Market,'' The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82: 316-324. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- To estimate the average value consumers place on fuel savings at the time of purchase, NHTSA assumes that the average purchaser considers the fuel savings they would receive over a 5-year time frame. NHTSA chose 5 years because this is the average length of time of a financing agreement.\590\ The [[Page 49721]] present values of these savings were calculated using a 3 percent discount rate. NHTSA used a fuel price forecast that included taxes, because this is what consumers must pay. Fuel savings were calculated over the first 5 years and discounted back to a present value. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \590\ National average financing terms for automobile loans are available from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System G.19 ``Consumer Finance'' release. See http:// www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/ (last accessed August 9, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA believes that consumers may consider several other factors over the 5-year horizon when contemplating the purchase of a new vehicle. NHTSA added these factors into the calculation to represent how an increase in technology costs might affect consumers' buying considerations. First, consumers might consider the sales taxes they have to pay at the time of purchasing the vehicle. NHTSA took sales taxes in 2007 by State and weighted them by population by State to determine a national weighted-average sales tax of 5.5 percent. Second, NHTSA considered insurance costs over the 5-year period. More expensive vehicles will require more expensive collision and comprehensive (e.g., theft) car insurance. The increase in insurance costs is estimated from the average value of collision plus comprehensive insurance as a proportion of average new vehicle price. Collision plus comprehensive insurance is the portion of insurance costs that depends on vehicle value. The Insurance Information Institute provides the average value of collision plus comprehensive insurance in 2006 as $448.\591\ This is compared to an average price for light vehicles of $24,033 for 2006.\592\ Average prices and estimated sales volumes are needed because price elasticity is an estimate of how a percent increase in price affects the percent decrease in sales. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \591\ Insurance Information Institute, 2008, ``Average Expenditures for Auto Insurance By State, 2005-2006.'' Available at http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/auto/(last accessed August 9, 2009). \592\ $29,678/$26,201 = 1.1327 * $22,651 = $25,657 average price for light trucks. In 2006, passenger cars were 54 percent of the on- road fleet, and light trucks were 46 percent of the on-road fleet, resulting in an average light vehicle price for 2006 of $24,033. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dividing the insurance cost by the average price of a new vehicle gives the proportion of comprehensive plus collision insurance as 1.86 percent of the price of a vehicle. If we assume that this premium is proportional to the new vehicle price, it represents about 1.86 percent of the new vehicle price, and insurance is paid each year for the five- year period we are considering for payback. Discounting that stream of insurance costs back to present value indicates that the present value of the component of insurance costs that vary with vehicle price is equal to 8.5 percent of the vehicle's price at a 3 percent discount rate. Third, NHTSA considered that 70 percent of new vehicle purchasers take out loans to finance their purchase. The average new vehicle loan is for 5 years at a 6 percent rate.\593\ At these terms, the average person taking a loan will pay 16 percent more for their vehicle over the 5 years than a consumer paying cash for the vehicle at the time of purchase.\594\ Discounting the additional 3.2 percent (16 percent/5 years) per year over the 5 years using a 3 percent mid-year discount rate \595\ results in a discounted present value of 14.87 percent higher for those taking a loan. Multiplying that by the 70 percent of consumers who take out a loan means that the average consumer would pay 10.2 percent more than the retail price for loans the consumer discounted at a 3 percent discount rate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \593\ New car loan rates in 2007 averaged about 7.8 percent at commercial banks and 4.5 percent at auto finance companies, so their average is close to 7 percent. \594\ Based on www.bankrate.com
auto loan calculator for a 5- year loan at 6 percent. \595\ For a 3 percent discount rate, the summation of 3.2 percent x 0.9853 in year one, 3.2 x 0.9566 in year two, 3.2 x 0.9288 in year three, 3.2 x 0.9017 in year 4, and 3.2 x 0.8755 in year five. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fourth, NHTSA considered the residual value (or resale value) of the vehicle after 5 years and expressed this as a percentage of the new vehicle price. In other words, if the price of the vehicle increases due to fuel economy technologies, the resale value of the vehicle will go up proportionately. The average resale price of a vehicle after 5 years is about 35 percent of the original purchase price.\596\ Discounting the residual value back 5 years using a 3 percent discount rate (35 percent * .8755) gives an effective residual value at new of 30.6 percent. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \596\ Consumer Reports, August 2008, ``What That Car Really Costs to Own.'' Available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/ cars/pricing/what-that-car-really-costs-to-own-4-08/overview/what- that-car-really-costs-to-own-ov.htm
(last accessed August 9, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA then adds these four factors together. At a 3 percent discount rate, the consumer considers she could get 30.6 percent back upon resale in 5 years, but will pay 5.5 percent more for taxes, 8.5 percent more in insurance, and 10.2 percent more for loans, resulting in a 6.48 percent return on the increase in price for fuel economy technology. Thus, the increase in price per vehicle is multiplied by 0.9352 (1-0.0648) before subtracting the fuel savings to determine the overall net consumer valuation of the increase of costs on her purchase decision. The following table shows the estimated impact on sales for passenger cars and light trucks combined for the proposed alternative. For all model years except MY 2012, NHTSA anticipates an increase in sales, based on consumers valuing the improvement in fuel economy more than the increase in price. Table IV.G.5-1--Potential Impact on Sales, Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Combined ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -58,058................................................. 52,719 178,470 342,628 454,520 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. What Are the Consumer Welfare Impacts of These Proposed Standards? There are two viewpoints for evaluating the costs and benefits of the proposed increase in CAFE standards: The private perspective of vehicle buyers themselves on the higher fuel economy levels the proposed rule would require, and the economy-wide or ``social'' perspective on the costs and benefits of requiring higher fuel economy. From the perspective of vehicle buyers, raising CAFE standards would impose significant costs in the form of higher prices for new vehicles, as manufacturers attempt to recover their added costs for producing vehicles with higher fuel efficiency. If vehicle manufacturers are unable to fully recover their higher costs for producing more fuel- efficient cars and light trucks through higher sales prices, they will bear part of these costs in the form of reduced ``producer surplus'' or short-term profits. Other private costs from requiring higher fuel economy also result from changes in the welfare of potential vehicle buyers, as they respond to [[Page 49722]] higher vehicle prices by purchasing different models or postponing their purchases of new vehicles. The effects of requiring higher fuel economy on consumer welfare also depend on whether manufacturers elect to make other changes in vehicle attributes as they comply with stricter CAFE standards, such as performance, passenger- and cargo- carrying capacity, comfort, or occupant safety. Although NHTSA believes it has employed estimates of costs for improving fuel economy that include adequate allowances for any accompanying modifications necessary to maintain new vehicles' current levels of other attributes, any changes in these attributes that manufacturers elect to make will represent additional private costs to vehicle buyers from requiring increased fuel economy. At the same time, raising CAFE standards also provides important private benefits to vehicle buyers, mainly in the form of the values buyers assign to the future savings in fuel costs they believe are likely to result from purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles. Although these values are likely to vary significantly among buyers depending on their expectations about future fuel prices, how long they anticipate owning their vehicles, and how much they expect to drive, fuel savings are the primary source of private benefits from increased fuel economy. In addition, requiring new cars and light trucks to attain higher fuel economy will also provide benefits to their buyers through the increase in vehicle use associated with the fuel economy rebound effect, as well as from increases in vehicles' driving range, which allow drivers to refuel less frequently. From the social perspective, the economic benefits and costs of establishing higher CAFE standards include not only these private benefits and costs, but also changes in the value of environmental and economic externalities that result from fuel consumption and vehicle use.\597\ These include the reduction in potential climate-related economic damages resulting from lower CO2 emissions, reduced damages to human health from lower emissions of criteria air pollutants, reductions in economic externalities associated with U.S. petroleum imports, and increases in traffic congestion, vehicle noise, and accidents caused by the increased driving that results through the fuel economy rebound effect. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \597\ Vehicle buyers are likely to value fuel savings using retail fuel prices, which include taxes levied by Federal, State, and some local governments. Because the reduction in these tax payments resulting from lower fuel purchases is exactly offset by lower tax revenues to government agencies (and reduced spending on the transportation infrastructure and other investments financed by fuel taxes), it does not represent a net benefit from the perspective of the U.S. economy as a whole. Thus the social costs of requiring higher fuel efficiency also include an adjustment to reflect the reduction in fuel tax revenues that results from reduced fuel purchases by new-car buyers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA has estimated most elements of the private and social benefits and costs that will result from its proposal to establish higher CAFE standards for model years 2012 through 2016, and the agency reports detailed empirical estimates of these impacts in this document and its Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis for the proposed rule. However, the agency is unable to provide a definitive accounting of the private costs and benefits from establishing higher CAFE standards, because we are unable to estimate the losses in consumer welfare that are likely to result from the effects of higher prices for on the number of new vehicles sold or on the mix of specific vehicle models that buyers decide to purchase. Assuming that the agency has correctly estimated each of the other costs and benefits that will result from the proposed rule, its estimates of the net private and total (private plus social) benefits represent their maximum possible values, and considering the rule's impacts on consumer welfare would invariably reduce the agency's reported estimates of the proposed rule's net private and total benefits. If the agency's estimates of technology costs are indeed adequate to maintain vehicles' current levels of these other attributes constant, the only changes in vehicles' characteristics resulting from higher CAFE standards will be improvements in the fuel economy and increases in sales prices for some (or perhaps even all) models. In this case, the welfare effects of requiring higher fuel economy depend on exactly how potential vehicle buyers value the future savings in fuel costs that they anticipate will result from purchasing vehicles with higher fuel economy. If the market for new vehicles is perfectly competitive and consumers have reliable information to estimate the likely magnitude and value of future fuel savings from buying more efficient models, economic theory suggests that they will make correct trade[hyphen]offs between higher initial costs for purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles and subsequent reductions in their operating costs. These include lower fuel expenditures, savings in the time they spend refueling, and the benefits from any additional driving they do in response to its lower per-mile cost. The assumption that consumers have adequate information, foresight, and capability to make such trade-offs has been challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. If this assumption is accurate, however, no net private benefits can result from requiring higher fuel economy, since doing so will alter both the purchase prices of new cars and their lifetime streams of operating costs in ways that will inevitably reduce consumers' well-being. The essence of this view is that in the absence of the regulation, consumers fully understand their current and future costs for owning and using vehicles, and make tradeoffs between these that maximize their individual welfare. From this viewpoint, CAFE standards--or any other regulation that alters this trade[hyphen]off--will reduce their private well being. The intuition behind this conclusion is probably best captured by recognizing that automobile manufacturers currently sell a wide range of vehicle models, including many that already comply with the CAFE standards proposed in this rule. Yet sufficiently few buyers elect to purchase these vehicles that the average fuel economy of new vehicles sold today remains well below the levels this rule would require. On the other hand, a great deal of recent evidence suggests that many consumers do not accurately trade off current and future costs of owning and operating cars. For example, it appears that some buyers do not know how to estimate future savings in fuel costs from purchasing a higher-mpg vehicle, or that they incorrectly estimate the increased expense of purchasing a more fuel-efficient new car. In this situation, higher CAFE standards--which will increase purchase prices for new cars, but reduce their lifetime operating costs--can indeed improve consumers' financial well-being. If these circumstances are widespread, then it is likely that requiring manufacturers to achieve higher fuel economy can increase private well-being, and thus that potentially significant savings in private costs can result from the proposed rule. Whether these circumstances are indeed typical is largely a question of the values that consumers place on additional fuel economy. NHTSA is not currently in a position to reach a conclusive judgment on this issue, and is thus unable to determine how requiring higher fuel economy levels is likely to affect consumer welfare, even if the only impacts of the proposed rule are to change the sales prices and fuel [[Page 49723]] economy levels of new cars and light trucks, as the agency assumes. Even if these are the only changes that result from the proposed rule, however, changes in the sales prices and fuel economy levels of some new vehicle models are likely to affect some potential buyers' decisions about whether to purchase a car and what type or model to purchase. Research has demonstrated that previous CAFE rules and market[hyphen]based changes in operating costs (for example, resulting from changes in gasoline prices) lead consumers to alter the number and types of cars they purchase, and that these changes can lead to losses in consumer well[hyphen]being. However, NHTSA is not currently able to provide empirical estimates of the magnitude of potential losses in vehicle buyers' welfare resulting from postponement of their decisions to purchase new vehicles or changes in the specific models they elect to buy. For both of these reasons, the likely impacts of adopting higher CAFE standards on consumer welfare remain unknown. Because changes in consumer welfare are an important component of the total private costs and benefits resulting from higher standards, the magnitude and even the direction of the net private economic impact of adopting stricter CAFE standards also remains unknown. How Do Consumers Value Fuel Economy? For this proposed rule, NHTSA estimates several sources of private benefits to vehicle buyers, including savings in future fuel costs, the value of time saved due to less frequent refueling, and utility gained from additional travel that results from the rebound effect. In combination, the agency's estimates suggest that these private savings greatly outweigh its estimates of the costs to consumers for providing higher fuel economy, even without accounting for the additional social benefits from higher fuel economy. This is due primarily to the very large estimated value of future fuel savings from higher fuel economy, which in turn partly reflects the agency's use of modest discount rates (3 percent and 7 percent). Even without considering the unmeasured welfare losses likely to result from changes in the number of new cars sold and the specific models purchased, however, this finding presents a conundrum. On the one hand, requiring higher fuel economy levels appears likely to produce large net benefits, primarily because the increased cost of producing more fuel-efficient cars and light trucks appears to be far outweighed by the value of the future fuel savings projected to result from higher fuel economy (assuming modest discount rates). At the same time, however, vehicle manufacturers currently produce many models that would allow them to meet the proposed higher CAFE standards, yet at least on average, buyers reveal a preference for lower fuel economy than the proposed rule would require. In this situation, often referred to as the Energy Efficiency Paradox, consumers appear not to purchase products that are in their economic self[hyphen]interest. There are theoretical reasons that could explain such behavior: consumers may be myopic, and thus undervalue the long term; they might lack information or be unable to use it properly even when it is presented to them; they may be particularly averse to potential short[hyphen]term losses associated with purchasing energy- efficient products (the behavioral phenomenon of ``loss aversion''); or even if consumers have relevant knowledge, the benefits of energy efficient vehicles might not seem sufficiently important to them at the time they decide to purchase a new car. A great deal of work in behavioral economics has suggested the possibility that factors of this sort help account for the Energy Efficiency Paradox. Another possible explanation for the paradox between the apparently large private benefits to vehicle buyers from requiring higher fuel economy and the reluctance of many buyers to purchase new vehicles with higher fuel economy is that consumers may apply much higher discount rates than the agency has used when they evaluate future cost savings from purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles or other capital goods offering gains in energy efficiency. For example, the Energy Information Agency (1996) has used discount rates as high as 111 percent for water heaters and 120 percent for electric clothes dryers.\598\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \598\ Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy (1996). Issues in Midterm Analysis and Forecasting 1996, DOE/ EIA-0607(96), Washington, D.C. Available at http://www.osti.gov/ bridge/purl.cover.jsp?purl=/366567-BvCFp0/webviewable/ (last accessed Jul. 7, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some evidence also suggests directly that vehicle buyers employ high discount rates: consumers surveyed by Kubik (2006) reported that fuel savings would have to be adequate to pay back the additional purchase price of a more fuel-efficient vehicle in less than 3 years to persuade a typical buyer to purchase it. \599\ In short, there appears to be no consensus in the literature on what the private discount rate should be in the context of vehicle purchase decisions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \599\ Kubik, M. (2006). Consumer Views on Transportation and Energy. Second Edition. Technical Report: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Another possible reconciliation of the Energy Efficiency Paradox, which poses a significant complication for evaluating the private benefits resulting from higher CAFE standards, is that the values consumers place on the future savings from higher fuel economy may vary sufficiently widely that it is unclear whether on average this value exceeds the costs of providing higher fuel economy. A 1988 review of consumers' willingness to pay for improved fuel economy found estimates that varied by more than an order of magnitude: For a $1 per year reduction in vehicle operating costs, consumers would be willing to spend between $0.74 and $25.97 in increased vehicle price.\600\ (For comparison, the present value of saving $1 per year on fuel for 15 years at a 3 percent discount rate is $11.94, while a 7 percent discount rate produces a present value of $8.78.) Thus, this study finds that some consumers appear to be willing to pay far too much to obtain future fuel savings, while others may be willing to pay far too little. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \600\ Greene, David L., and Jin-Tan Liu (1988). ``Automotive Fuel Economy Improvements and Consumers' Surplus.'' Transportation Research Part A 22A(3): 203-218. The study actually calculated the willingness to pay for reduced vehicle operating costs, of which vehicle fuel economy is a major component. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although NHTSA has not found an updated survey of these values, a few examples suggest that vehicle choice models also imply wide variation in estimates of how much people are willing to pay for fuel savings. For instance, Espey and Nair (2005) and McManus (2006) find that consumers are willing to pay nearly $600 extra to purchase a vehicle that achieves one additional mile per gallon.\601\ In contrast, Gramlich (2008) finds that consumers' willingness to pay for an increase from 25 mpg to 30 mpg varies between $4,100 (for luxury cars when gasoline costs $2/gallon) to $20,560 (for SUVs when gasoline costs $3.50/gallon).\602\ Thus, some buyers appear [[Page 49724]] not to make accurate trade[hyphen]offs between higher initial purchase prices and subsequent fuel savings. At the same time, however, these results may simply reflect the fact that the expected savings from purchasing higher fuel economy vary widely among individuals, because they travel different amounts or have different driving styles. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \601\ Espey, Molly, and Santosh Nair (2005). ``Automobile Fuel Economy: What is it Worth?'' Contemporary Economic Policy 23(3): 317-323; McManus, Walter M. (2006). ``Can Proactive Fuel Economy Strategies Help Automakers Mitigate Fuel-Price Risks?'' University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. \602\ Gramlich, Jacob (2008). ``Gas Prices and Endogenous Product Selection in the U.S. Automobile Industry.'' Available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/apmicro/am08/gramlich-081216.pdf
(last accessed May 1, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, it is possible that the apparent Energy Efficiency Paradox is in fact not a paradox at all when one considers the uncertainty surrounding future fuel prices and a vehicle's expected lifetime and usage. As Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995) indicate, purchasing higher fuel economy requires buyers to weigh known, up[hyphen]front costs that are essentially irreversible (that is, they have a relatively low salvage value if the return never materializes) against an unknown future stream of fuel savings.\603\ They find some evidence that this accounts for a large portion of the seeming inconsistency between low cost opportunities to invest in energy efficiency and the current lack of investment in them. This would not imply failure on the part of consumers in making decisions, but rather that the rate of return buyers require on their vehicle purchases (or other energy efficiency investments) is much higher than that implied by a 3 percent discount rate that does not include a provision for uncertainty. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \603\ Metcalf, G., and D. Rosenthal (1995). ``The `New' View of Investment Decisions and Public Policy Analysis: An Application to Green Lights and Cold Refrigerators,'' Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14: 517-531. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Greene et al. (2009) find additional support for this conclusion in the context of fuel economy decisions: They find that the expected net present value of increasing the fuel economy of a passenger car from 28 to 35 miles per gallon falls from $405 when calculated using standard net present value calculations to nearly zero when uncertainty regarding future cost savings is taken into account.\604\ In contrast to Metcalf and Rosenthal, Greene et al. find that uncertainty regarding the future price of gasoline is less important than uncertainty surrounding the expected lifetimes of new vehicles. Supporting this hypothesis is a finding by Dasgupta et al. (2007) that consumers are more likely to lease than buy a vehicle with higher maintenance costs, because leasing provides them with the option to return it before those costs become too high.\605\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \604\ Greene, D., J. German, and M. Delucchi (2009). ``Fuel Economy: The Case for Market Failure'' in Reducing Climate Impacts in the Transportation Sector, Sperling, D., and J. Cannon, eds. Springer Science. \605\ Dasgupta, S., S. Siddarth, and J. Silva-Risso (2007). ``To Lease or to Buy? A Structural Model of a Consumer's Vehicle and Contract Choice Decisions.'' Journal of Marketing Research 44: 490-502. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In contrast, other research suggests that the Energy Efficiency Paradox is real and significant, and owes to consumers' inability to value future fuel savings appropriately. For example, Sanstad and Howarth (1994) argue that consumers optimize behavior without full information by resorting to imprecise but convenient rules of thumb. Larrick and Soll (2008) find evidence that consumers do not understand how to translate changes in miles per gallon into fuel savings.\606\ If the behavior identified in these studies is indeed widespread, then significant gains to consumers can result from requiring higher fuel economy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \606\ Sanstad, A., and R. Howarth (1994). `` `Normal' Markets, Market Imperfections, and Energy Efficiency.'' Energy Policy 22(10): 811-818; Larrick, R.P., and J.B. Soll (2008). ``The MPG illusion.'' Science 320: 1593-1594. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- How NHTSA Proposes To Treat the Issue of Welfare Losses In the course of future rulemakings, the agency intends to explore methods that would allow it to present a more comprehensive accounting of private costs and benefits from requiring higher fuel economy, including more detailed estimates of changes in the welfare of new vehicle buyers that are likely to result from higher CAFE standards. One promising approach to estimating the full welfare loss associated with CAFE's impact on vehicle purchasing decisions is using consumer vehicle choice models to evaluate the simultaneous effects of increases in sales prices, improvements in fuel economy, and changes in other attributes of specific vehicle models, rather than in the average values of these variables. NHTSA invites comments on the state of the art of consumer vehicle choice modeling, as well as on the prospects for these models to yield reliable estimates of changes in consumer welfare from requiring higher fuel economy. 7. What Are the Estimated Safety Impacts of These Proposed Standards? As discussed above, in evaluating the appropriate levels at which to establish new CAFE standards, NHTSA must assess any potential safety trade-offs. Safety trade-offs associated with fuel economy increases have occurred in the past and the possibility of future ones remains a concern. In the congressionally-mandated report entitled ``Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards,'' a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) (``2002 NAS Report'') \607\ concluded that the then-existing form of passenger car and light truck CAFE standards, together with market forces, created an incentive for vehicle manufacturers to comply in part by downweighting and even downsizing their vehicles and that these actions led to additional fatalities. Given the cost advantages of downsizing instead of substituting lighter, higher strength materials, NAS urged that the CAFE program be restructured to reduce the regulatory incentive to downsize. As NAS observed, the ability to reduce weight without reducing size does not mean they will exclusively rely on those means of weight reduction. Responding to NAS' concern, Congress mandated in EISA that CAFE standards be based on an attribute related to fuel economy, like footprint or weight. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \607\ National Research Council, ``Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards,'' National Academy Press, Washington, DC (2002). Available at http://www.nap.edu/ openbook.php?isbn=0309076013
(last accessed September 11, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Given the relative cost-effectiveness of at least some approaches to weight reduction, it is reasonable to assume that the vehicle manufacturers will choose weight reduction as one means of achieving compliance with the proposed standards. In fact, informal statements by the vehicle manufacturers themselves indicate that they intend to engage in some weight reduction, as appropriate for certain vehicle models, during the rulemaking time frame. While the manufacturers generally indicate that they plan to reduce weight without reducing size, their adherence to those plans would not remove all bases for any safety concerns. The question of the effect of changes in vehicle weight on safety in the context of fuel economy is a complex question that poses serious analytic challenges and has been a contentious issue for many years. This contentiousness arises, at least in part, from the difficulty of isolating vehicle weight from other confounding factors (e.g., driver behavior, or vehicle factors such as engine size and wheelbase). In addition, at least in the past, several vehicle factors have been closely related, such as vehicle mass, wheelbase, track width, and structural integrity. The issue has been addressed in the literature for more than two decades. For the reader's reference, much more information about safety in [[Page 49725]] the CAFE context is available in the MY 2011 final rule \608\ and in Section IX of the PRIA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \608\ 74 FR 14396-14407 (Mar. 30, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Conducting the safety assessment for this rulemaking is thus difficult since, in general, it is unclear to what extent the higher fatality risk of smaller and lighter vehicles is associated with their reduced mass as compared to their reduced physical dimensions. That is because, historically, the safest vehicles have been heavy and large, while the vehicles with the highest fatal-crash rates have been light and small, both because the crash rate is higher for small/light vehicles and because the fatality rate is higher for small/light vehicle crashes.\609\ Intuitively, a reduction in mass while maintaining physical dimensions is likely to be less harmful than a reduction in both mass and physical dimensions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \609\ Kahane, Charles J., Ph.D., ``Vehicle Weight, Fatality Risk and Crash Compatibility of Model Year 1991-99 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,'' DOT HS 809 662, October 2003, Executive Summary. Available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/ 809662.html (last accessed August 12, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As noted above, the manufacturers have generally informally stated that they plan to use weight reduction methods that do not involve size reduction. That is plausible since the selection of footprint as the attribute in setting CAFE standards helps to minimize the incentive to reduce a vehicle's physical dimensions. This is because as footprint decreases, the corresponding fuel economy target decreases.\610\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \610\ Vehicle footprint is not synonymous with vehicle size. Since the footprint is only that portion of the vehicle between the front and rear axles, footprint based standards do not discourage downsizing the portions of a vehicle in front of the front axle and to the rear of the rear axle. The crush space provided by those portions of a vehicle can make important contributions to managing crash energy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, NHTSA cautions that vehicle footprint is not synonymous with vehicle size. Since the footprint is only that portion of the vehicle bounded by the front and rear axles and by the wheels, footprint based standards do not discourage downsizing the portions of a vehicle in front of the front axle and to the rear of the rear axle (front and rear overhand). Similarly, they do not discourage downsizing the portions of a vehicle outside its wheels (side overhang). The crush space provided by those portions of a vehicle can make important contributions to managing crash energy. We note that at least one manufacturer has confidentially indicated plans to reduce overhang as a way of reducing weight on some vehicles during the rulemaking time frame. Neither the CAFE standards nor our analysis of the feasibility of fuel economy improvements mandates mass reduction or any other specific technology application. In addition, considering NHTSA's analysis of the observed relationship between vehicle mass and the prevalence of fatalities, NHTSA has, except for vehicles with baseline curb weight over 5,000 pounds, excluded weight reduction from its analysis of potential CAFE standards in past rulemakings. The agency followed this analytical approach in order to ensure that its consideration of new standards was not dependent on weight reduction that could potentially compromise highway safety, recognizing, though, that the structure of CAFE standards does not prohibit manufacturers from making such responses to new CAFE standards. The agency implemented this approach by setting the Volpe model to apply this exclusion when estimating how manufacturers could apply technology in response to new CAFE standards. In its rulemakings on MY 2008-2011 light truck CAFE standards and MY 2011 car and light truck CAFE standards, NHTSA received comments suggesting that NHTSA expand the applicability of weight reduction technologies in its modeling to vehicles under 5,000 pounds, because, according to the commenters, weight reduction can be accompanied by proper vehicle design to assure that vehicle safety is not compromised. In the final rules in those rulemakings, the agency said that there may be great possibilities in the use of material substitution and other processes to minimize the safety effects of reducing weight. The agency further noted that this should be explored as data become available. After reviewing its assumptions and methodologies per the President's January 26 memorandum and working with EPA in this rulemaking, NHTSA revised its approach to include weight reduction of up to 5-10 percent of baseline curb weight, depending on vehicle type. Recently-submitted manufacturer product plans as well as public statements from a number of the manufacturers suggest some of them expect that by MY 2016, they will be able to reduce the weight of some specific vehicle models by similar levels. However, NHTSA does not believe that, except where already planned, such significant weight reductions can be achieved in MY 2012 or MY 2013, because there is not enough lead time for the necessary design, engineering, and tooling. NHTSA estimates that weight reductions of 1.5 percent can be achieved during redesigns occurring prior to MY 2014, and that weight reductions of 5-10 percent can be achieved in redesigns occurring in MY 2014 or later. For purposes of analyzing CAFE standards, NHTSA has further assumed that weight reductions would be limited to 5 percent for small vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger cars), and that reductions of 10 percent would only be applied to the larger vehicle types (e.g., large light trucks). NHTSA's modeling approach is similar to EPA's in terms of maximum available weight reduction for any vehicle model, sensitive to vehicle safety in terms of when and to which vehicle types significant weight reduction can be achieved safely, and supported by information in some manufacturers' product plans. Some manufacturers have indicated that, in later model years, they plan to reduce significantly the weight of some specific vehicle models, and that they plan to do so without reducing vehicle size. NHTSA's analysis results in similar degrees of weight reduction, applied more widely to some manufacturers. NHTSA notes, though, that some manufacturers are also planning considerable changes in product mix, and some of these changes could mean reduced average size along with reduced average weight. In NHTSA's (and EPA's) analysis, such changes in product mix are not counted, because they are either in the baseline market forecast, or are not estimated. As stated above, neither the CAFE standards nor our analysis mandates mass reduction, or mandates that if mass reduction occurs, it be done in any specific manner. However, mass reduction is one of the technology applications available to the manufacturers and has been used by them in the past. A degree of mass reduction is used by the Volpe model in determining the capabilities of manufacturers and in predicting both cost and fuel consumption impacts of improved CAFE standards. In this section, we briefly summarize our analysis of the potential impacts of these mass reductions on vehicle safety. NHTSA's quantified analysis is based on the 2003 Kahane study,\611\ which estimates the effect of 100-pound reductions in MYs 1991-1999 heavy light trucks and vans (LTVs), light LTVs, heavy passenger cars, and light passenger cars. The study compares the fatality rates of LTVs and cars to quantify differences between vehicle [[Page 49726]] types, given drivers of the same age/gender, etc. In this analysis, the effect of ``weight reduction'' is not limited to the effect of mass per se, but includes all the factors, such as length, width, structural strength, and size of the occupant compartment, that were naturally or historically confounded with mass in MYs 1991-1999 vehicles. The rationale is that adding length, width, or strength to a vehicle will also make it heavier. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \611\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The agency utilized the relationships between weight and safety from Kahane (2003), expressed as percentage increases in fatalities per 100-pound weight reduction, and examined the weight impacts assumed in this CAFE analysis. However, there are several identifiable safety trends that are already in place or expected to occur in the foreseeable future and that are not accounted for in the study. For example, two important new safety standards that have already been issued and will be phasing in during the rulemaking time frame. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126) will require electronic stability control in all new vehicles by MY 2012, and the upgrade to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 214 (Side Impact Protection, 49 CFR 571.214) will likely result in all new vehicles being equipped with head-curtain air bags by MY 2014.\612\ Additionally, we anticipate continued improvements in driver (and passenger) behavior, such as higher safety belt use rates. All of these will tend to reduce the absolute number of fatalities resulting from weight reductions. Thus, while the percentage increases in Kahane (2003) was applied, the reduced base has resulted in smaller absolute increases than those that were predicted in the 2003 report. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \612\ We note that the Volpe model currently does not account for the weight of safety standards that will be added compared to the MY 2008 baseline, nor does it account for the societal cost of reductions in weight. However, both of these items will be added to the model for the final rule; doing so will raise the weight of every vehicle by roughly 17 pounds in MY 2016 (slightly less in earlier years), which will likely require manufacturers to add slightly more technology to reach the final standards than they were estimated to need to reach the proposed standards. However, NHTSA does not expect the impact of these roughly 17 pounds per vehicle to have a significant impact on the safety analysis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The agency examined the impacts of the identifiable safety trends over the lifetime of the vehicles produced in each model year. An estimate of these impacts was contained in a previous agency report.\613\ The impacts were estimated on a year-by-year basis, but could be examined in a combined fashion. The agency assumed that the safety trends will result in a reduction in the target population of fatalities from which the weight impacts are derived. Using this method, we found a 12.6 percent reduction in fatality levels between 2007 and 2020. The estimates derived from applying Kahane's percentages to a baseline of 2007 fatalities were thus multiplied by 0.874 to account for changes that the agency believes will take place in passenger car and light truck safety between the 2007 baseline on-road fleet used for this particular analysis and year 2020. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \613\ Blincoe, L. and Shankar, U, ``The Impact of Safety Standards and Behavioral Trends on Motor Vehicle Fatality Rates,'' DOT HS 810 777, January 2007. See Table 4 comparing 2020 to 2007 (37,906/43,363 = 12.6% reduction (1-.126 = .874). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We note that because these new analyses are based on the method shown in Kahane (2003), which predicts the safety effect of 100-pound mass reductions in MY 1991-1999 light trucks and vans (LTVs) and passenger cars, the new analyses need to be understood in the context of that study. Specifically, the numbers in the new analyses represent an upper bound (or worst case) fatality estimate--that is, the estimate would only apply if all weight reductions come from reducing both weight and footprint. Kahane's conclusions are based upon a cross- sectional analysis of the actual on-road safety experience of 1991-1999 vehicles. For those vehicles, heavier usually also meant larger- footprint. Hence, the numbers in the new analyses predict the safety- related fatalities that would occur in the unlikely event that weight reduction for MYs 2012-2016 is accomplished entirely by reducing mass and reducing footprint. Exclusive reliance on downsizing for the model years covered by this rulemaking is unlikely for the following reasons. As noted above, the manufacturers have generally indicated that they plan reduce weight without reducing size. Further, the flat CAFE standards in effect when those MY 1991-1999 vehicles were produced had no penalty for such a strategy for improving fuel economy. In contrast, as discussed above, the current attribute-based CAFE standards do not encourage vehicle downsizing by reducing footprint. This structural change to the CAFE program means that the CAFE standards now favor the use of weight reduction strategies that do not involve simply making that portion of the vehicle smaller. These other strategies include downsizing the engine and adding turbocharging, as well as materials substitution. Given this structural change to the CAFE program, it is likely that a significant portion of the weight reduction in the MY 2012-2016 vehicles will be accomplished by strategies that have a lesser safety impact than the prevalent 1990s strategy of simply making the vehicles smaller, although NHTSA is unable to predict how large a portion. For example, a manufacturer could conceivably add length, width, or strength to a vehicle by replacing existing materials with light, high- strength components. To the extent that future weight reductions could be achieved by substituting light, high-strength materials for existing materials-- without any accompanying reduction in the size or structural strength of the vehicle--then NHTSA believes that the fatality increases associated with the weight reductions anticipated by the model as a result of the proposed standards could be significantly smaller than those in the worst-case scenario. However, NHTSA does not currently have information (on-road data) to calibrate and predict how much smaller those increases would be for any given mixture of material substitution and downsizing, since the data on the safety effects of mass reduction alone is not available due to the low numbers of vehicles in the current on-road fleet that have utilized this technology extensively. Further, to the extent that weight reductions were accomplished through use of light, high-strength materials, there would be significant additional costs that would need to be determined and accounted for. Those higher costs are not reflected in NHTSA's cost-benefit analysis for this proposal. Nevertheless, even though NHTSA cannot quantify these safety effects, we can project that they could be significantly less than those that would result from simple downsizing. However, we are also convinced that the safety effects are larger than zero for the following reasons: • The effects of mass per se (laws of physics) will persist regardless whether mass is reduced by material substitution, downsizing, or any other method. There are a variety of crash types that could be impacted in various ways by changes in vehicle weight and at times by the way in which the vehicle's weight is changed. The following discussion examines weight reduction by either engine size reductions or material substitution and its impact on each of the different crash types.\614\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \614\ For a similar discussion of effect of weight reduction on different crash modes, see Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, NAS 1972, pp 74-75. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Let us assume that Car A weighs X pounds and that Car B weighs X-100 [[Page 49727]] pounds and that Cars A and B have the same footprint, overhang and structural strength. [cir] Single-vehicle crashes Hitting an immovable object (like a big tree or bridge abutment). In most cases, there would be little impact on vehicle safety if Car A and Car B each hit a different immovable object at the same speed because the change in velocity (delta-V) would be the same for both vehicles. Hitting a partially movable object (like a small tree, parked car, storefront, or dwelling). Heavier vehicles will impart more force to movable objects than lighter vehicles. This will increase the chance that the movable objects will break, crush, or otherwise give way and increase the distance over which the striking vehicle can decelerate, which will reduce the delta-V for the vehicle's occupants. Single-vehicle rollovers. Smaller vehicles end up in more rollover crashes than larger vehicles. Part of the reason for this is the static stability factor, since smaller vehicles have less track width. Part of the reason for this is the way smaller vehicles are driven. Given the same track width for Car A and Car B, the impact on rollovers is hard to determine since the weight helps build up momentum and the influence of momentum versus weight for tripped rollovers is hard to discern. • Multi-vehicle crashes Frontal impact--two light vehicles. While a collision of Car B with Car B is likely to have the same risk as a similar collision of Car A with Car A, the final answer on safety will depend upon what vehicle sizes receive overall weight reductions. As NHTSA's study shows, if weight is taken out of the larger light trucks, overall safety is improved. If weight is taken out of passenger cars or smaller light trucks, overall safety decreases. Overall, we can't determine whether there will be an overall difference in safety. Side impact--struck vehicle. As a struck vehicle, Car B is at a disadvantage because its delta V would be increased. Car B would be less safe. Side impact--striking vehicle. NHTSA analyses have shown that for a striking vehicle in a side impact, weight is not as important as striking height. Weight does have an impact, because of imparting a lower delta V on the struck vehicle. When struck by Car B, the struck vehicle would be somewhat safer. Side impact--overall. Overall, there will be a minimal difference in safety. Collision with an older light vehicle. Car B would experience a higher delta V and a higher fatality risk than Car A, if either were struck by the same pre-2012 vehicle. But the occupants of the older vehicle would experience a lower delta V and a lower risk if struck by Car B. Collision with a medium-sized truck (somewhat over 10,000 GVWR). Medium-size trucks are not affected by CAFE and do not need to decrease their weight. Car B would experience a higher delta V and a higher risk than Car A. (The risk to the occupants of the medium-size truck would be minimally higher with Car A.) Overall, Car B would be less safe. Collision with a fully-loaded tractor trailer (significantly over 10,000 GVWR). Car B would experience a higher delta V than Car A, but in this case, the difference in delta V would be minimal. Risk would be similar in both cars. • Pedestrian/bicyclist impacts In general, Car A would impose a slightly higher delta V on the pedestrian than Car B, but the difference would be so small that risk for the pedestrian would essentially be the same either way. • Our attribute-based standards have the excellent feature that they can avoid encouraging reductions in footprint. However, weight can be removed by downsizing, rather than material substitution, even while maintaining footprint: • By reducing the overhang in front of the front wheels and behind the rear wheels. These are protective structures whose removal would increase risk to occupants by reducing vehicle crush space. • By thinning or removing structures within the vehicle. • NHTSA has found that lighter vehicles are driven in a manner that results in a higher involvement rate in fatal crashes, even after controlling for the driver's age, gender, urbanization, and region of the country. However, in our response in the MY 2011 final rule to the DRI analyses, we were unable to attribute this effect to any obvious ``size'' parameter such as track width or wheelbase. In non-rollover crashes, weight continued to be the most important parameter, even when track width and wheelbase were included as independent variables. Until we understand the phenomenon better, we assume that weight reduction is likely to be associated with higher fatal-crash rates, no matter how the weight reduction is achieved. Table IV.G.7-1 below shows the results of NHTSA's worst case analysis of safety-related fatalities separately for each model year. Additionally, the societal impacts of increasing fatalities can be monetized using DOT's estimated comprehensive cost per life of $6.1 million. This consists of a value of a statistical life of $5.8 million plus external economic costs associated with fatalities such as medical care, insurance administration costs and legal costs.\615\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \615\ Blincoe et al., The Economic Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes 2000, May 2002, DOT HS 809 446. Data from this report were updated for inflation and combined with the current DOT guidance on value of a statistical life to estimate the comprehensive value of a statistical life. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA has also calculated an assumed impact on injuries and added that to the societal costs of fatalities. This assumed impact is based on past studies indicating that fatalities account for roughly 44 percent of total comprehensive costs due to injury.\616\ If weight impacts non-fatal injuries roughly proportional to its impact on fatalities, then total costs would be roughly 2.3 times those noted in Table IV.G.7-2. The potential societal costs for just fatalities are shown in Table IV.G.7-2. The combined potential social costs are shown in Table IV.G.7-4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \616\ Based on data in Blincoe et al., updated for inflation and reflecting the Department's current VSL of $5.8 million. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Looking at the results on a calendar year basis, we also note that the safety impacts of the Kahane analysis based weight reduction have a slow onset. Passenger cars typically have a 10-25 year lifetime, and light trucks somewhat longer. Thus, some of the fatalities for MY 2016 light trucks will not occur until after 2050. Moreover, the weight reductions are small in the early model years 2012 and 2013. The vehicles with reduced weight will only be a small proportion of the entire on-road fleet in the initial calendar years of these proposed CAFE standards. The influence of these factors is illustrated in Table IV.G.7-3 below. Additionally, there will be significant fuel-saving benefits from these proposed standards, up to 61.6 billion gallons during the lifetime of MYs 2012-2016 vehicles. There will also be significant reductions in CO2 emissions, up to 656 million metric tons during that same time period. Improved fuel economy will also result in a decrease in harmful criteria pollutants, which will decrease premature deaths due to a number of diseases related to environmental pollution. The literature strongly supports the causal relationship between health and exposure to criteria pollutants. However, as with vehicle safety impacts, there is much [[Page 49728]] uncertainty regarding the exact level of health impacts that might be achieved with this rule. Thus, there are potentially both positive and negative impacts that could result from this rulemaking. We have not attempted to quantify other beneficial health impacts that are expected to result from the proposed standards, including the results of a decrease in the rate of global warming, and increased energy security resulting from a lesser dependence on oil imported volatile regions of the world, but they, too, could be significant. In summary, the agency recognizes the balancing inherent in achieving higher levels of fuel economy through reduction of vehicle weight. We emphasize that these safety-related fatality estimates represent a worst case scenario for the potential effects of this rulemaking, and that actual fatalities will be less than these estimates, possibly significantly less, based on the qualitative discussion above of the various factors that could reduce the estimates. At the same time, however, the agency cannot specify a reasonable lower-bound estimate. It is possible that the impact could be fairly small, but the agency is unable to specify a lower-bound at this time due to a lack of studies that address the safety risk associated with weight reduction that is not also accompanied by size reduction. Additionally, the estimates presented here do not include estimates for injuries. Nevertheless, we believe that the balancing is reasonable. In the absence of data that permit examining the fatality impact of reductions in weight and footprint independently, we considered whether it would be appropriate to use the industry-sponsored DRI study to estimate a lower-bound value. However, as noted below, the agency's inability to reproduce DRI's results raises questions whether the DRI reports sufficiently satisfy reproducibility criteria and thus have the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity needed for information relied upon and disseminated by the Federal Government to the public. Reliance upon non-reproducible studies undermines the credibility of the Government's scientific information. Further, the DRI reports raise a significant additional data quality concern. They have not been subjected to a rigorous form of peer review. DRI produced several studies between 2000 and 2005, funded by a manufacturer of small vehicles and purporting to analyze mass, track width, and wheelbase as independent variables. DRI's 2002 paper indicated that reducing mass would be beneficial, while reducing track width and wheelbase would be harmful. If true, this meant that weight reduction would benefit safety if track width and wheelbase were maintained. However, NHTSA has concluded that the 2002 DRI study inadvertently introduced significant biases in the analysis, as a result of including 2-door cars in the analysis. Dr. Kahane's analyses have excluded 2-door passenger cars on the grounds that in the data reviewed in those analyses (and by DRI in its analysis), 2-door cars consisted in considerable part of sports and muscle cars. Including sports and muscle cars in a regression analysis of vehicle weight and safety biases the results for two primary reasons: first, because sports and muscle cars tend to have short wheelbases but be relatively heavy for their size, they function as outliers in the regression analysis and thus distort the derived relationships and second, because sports and muscle cars as a group tend to be disproportionately involved in crashes. NHTSA provided this response to DRI publicly in 2004.\617\ In response, DRI submitted a new study in 2005 with a sensitivity analysis limited to 4-door cars, excluding police cars. DRI further stated that it could mimic NHTSA's logistic regression approach for an analysis of model year 1991-98 4-door cars in calendar year 1995-1999 crashes. DRI stated that its updated 2005 analysis still showed results directionally similar to its earlier work--increased risk for lower track width and wheelbase, reduced risk for lower mass-- although DRI acknowledged that the wheelbase and mass effects were no longer statistically significant after removing the 2-door cars from the analysis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \617\ Docket No. NHTSA-2003-16318-0016. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since receiving it, NHTSA has disagreed with the results of DRI's 2005 analysis, most recently on record in the MY 2011 CAFE final rule, for two primary reasons. First, even using the same (NHTSA) data and methodology as DRI used, NHTSA has been unable to reproduce DRI's 2005 results. And second, to our knowledge, unlike Dr. Kahane's 2003 study, DRI's 2005 study has not been rigorously peer-reviewed. The following provides an example of how NHTSA has tried to reproduce DRI's results, unsuccessfully. In MY 1991-1998, the average car weighing x + 100 pounds had a track width that was 0.34 inches larger and a wheelbase that was 1.01 inches longer. Thus, one could say that a ``historical'' 100-pound weight reduction would have been accompanied by a 0.34 inch track width reduction and a 1.01 inch wheelbase reduction. However, using a reasonable check, if one dissociates weight, track width, and wheelbase and treats them as independent parameters, DRI's logistic regression of model year 1991- 1998 4-door cars excluding police cars attributes the following effects: [[Page 49729]] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.050 However, applying NHTSA's logistic regression analyses \618\ to NHTSA's database, exactly as described in the agency's response to comments on its 2003 report, except for limiting the data to model years 1991-98, instead of 1991-99, produces results that are not at all like DRI's. Mass still has the largest effect, exceeding track width, and it moves in the expected direction. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \618\ Regression analysis involves modeling and analyzing several variables, when the focus is on the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Logistic regression analysis involves three variables. [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP28SE09.051 NHTSA obtained its estimates by adding the results from 12 individual logistic regressions: Six types of crashes multiplied by two car-weight groups (less than 2,950 pounds; 2,950 pounds or more).\619\ DRI does not appear to have followed the same procedures, based on the widely differing results. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \619\ See, e.g., Kahane (2003), Table 2 on p. xi. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Based on our review, NHTSA is not persuaded by the DRI analysis. NHTSA's analyses do not corroborate the 2005 DRI study that suggested mass could be reduced without safety harm and perhaps with safety benefit. Moreover, even though NHTSA's analyses continue to attribute a much larger effect for mass than for track width or wheelbase in small cars, NHTSA has never said that mass alone is the single factor that increases or decreases fatality risk. There may not be a single factor, but rather it may be that mass and some of the other factors that are historically correlated with mass, such as wheelbase and track width, together are the factors. We note that comparatively it would seem the least harmful way to reduce mass would be from material substitution, where one replaces a heavy material with a lighter one that delivers the same performance, or other designs that reduce mass while maintaining wheelbase and track width. While this may seem intuitively to be the case, there is an absence of supporting data for the thrust of the 2005 DRI analysis, because those changes have not happened to any substantial number of vehicles in the real world. NHTSA thus has no way, yet, of proving the intuitive conclusion. We do know that mass has historically been correlated with wheelbase and track width, and that reductions in mass have also reduced those other factors. Until there is an analysis that clearly demonstrates that mass does not matter for safety, NHTSA concludes it should be guided by the decades' worth of studies suggesting [[Page 49730]] that mass is the most important of the related factors. The tables below contain NHTSA's estimates of the safety-related fatality impacts of the proposed standards, the costs associated with those impacts, and the overall change in impacts given other anticipated mitigating effects during the next several years. Again, we emphasize that the safety-related fatality impacts presented below represent a worst case scenario, and that NHTSA believes that the fatality increases associated with the anticipated weight reductions could be significantly smaller than those shown, because manufacturers are unlikely to respond to this rulemaking by decreasing the footprint or reducing the structural integrity of their vehicles. In addition, we note that the implementation of new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, combined with behavioral changes (e.g., further increases in safety belt use), will produce important reductions in the number of deaths and injuries that would otherwise occur in the vehicles subject to this rulemaking over their lifetime. NHTSA seeks comments on its analysis of the safety impacts of the proposed standards. To aid the agency in refining its analysis for the final rule, including its attempts to assess reasonable upper and lower ends of the potential range of estimated fatalities, NHTSA requests that each vehicle manufacturer provide, for inclusion in the record of this rulemaking, detailed information concerning the extent to which and manner in which it plans to reduce the weight of each of its models for the period covered by this rulemaking, and the cost of each method used. Manufacturers should include in those plans whether there will be any footprint or other size reduction, whether through reducing the size of an existing model, mix shifting or other means. Please also submit the analysis, including engineering or computer simulation analysis, performed to assess the possible safety impacts of such planned weight reduction. In addition, please submit the results of any vehicle crash or component tests that would aid in assessing those impacts. Table IV.G.7-1--Comparison of the Calculated Worst Case Weight Safety-Related Fatality Impacts of the Pending Proposed Standards Over the Lifetime of the Vehicles Produced in Each Model Year [Increase in fatalities compared to the Calendar Year 2007 fatality level] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Baseline MY 2011 standards continued for lifetime of vehicles ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger cars.................. 13 15 18 18 19 Light trucks.................... 13 15 17 17 18 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined.................... 26 30 35 35 37 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Proposed standards ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger cars.................. 42 64 165 242 379 Light trucks.................... 18 20 64 106 150 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined.................... 60 84 229 348 530 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Difference between proposed standards and baseline continued ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger cars.................. 29 49 147 224 360 Light trucks.................... 5 5 47 89 132 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined.................... 34 54 194 313 493 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less. Table IV.G.7-2--Calculated Worst Case Weight Safety-Related Fatality Impacts on Societal Costs for the Proposed Standards Over the Lifetime of the Vehicles Produced in Each Model Year [$ millions] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passenger cars.......................................... 177 299 897 1,366 2,916 4,935 Light trucks............................................ 31 31 287 543 805 1,696 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Combined............................................ 207 329 1,183 1,909 3,001 6,637 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less. Table IV.G.7-3--Estimated Worst Case Impact of Weight on Calculated Fatalities by Calendar Year [Additional fatalities by model year and calendar year] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 MY 2017 MY 2018 MY 2019 MY 2020 Totals -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2012............................ 3 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 3 2013............................ 3 5 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 8 2014............................ 3 5 19 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 27 2015............................ 3 5 19 30 .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 57 2016............................ 3 5 18 29 47 .......... .......... .......... .......... 102 [[Page 49731]] 2017............................ 3 5 17 28 46 47 .......... .......... .......... 146 2018............................ 3 5 16 27 44 46 47 .......... .......... 187 2019............................ 3 4 16 26 42 44 46 47 .......... 226 2020............................ 2 4 15 24 40 42 44 46 47 264 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less. The following table is based on the worst-case scenario estimate for fatalities. Table IV.G.7-4--Calculated Worst Case Weight Safety Impacts on Societal Costs for the Proposed Standards over the Lifetime of the Vehicles Produced in Each Model Year, Estimated Fatalities and Assumed Injuries [$ millions] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MY 2012 MY 2013 MY 2014 MY 2015 MY 2016 Total -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Undiscounted: Passenger Cars.................................. $406 $686 $2,058 $3,136 $5,040 $11,326 Light Trucks.................................... 70 70 658 1,246 1,848 3,892 Combined........................................ 476 756 2,716 4,382 6,888 15,218 Discounted 3%: Passenger Cars...................................... 337 570 1,709 2,604 4,185 9,405 Light Trucks........................................ 56 56 528 1,000 1,482 3,122 Combined............................................ 393 626 2,237 3,604 5,668 12,527 Discounted 7%: Passenger Cars...................................... 272 460 1,379 2,101 3,377 7,588 Light Trucks........................................ 44 44 415 785 1,165 2,453 Combined............................................ 316 504 1,794 2,886 4,542 10,042 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note--all estimates in this table are worst-case. Actual values could be significantly less. Discount factors: passenger cars, 3% = 0.8304, 7% = 0.67; light trucks, 3% = 0.8022, 7% = 0.6303. 8. What Other Impacts (Quantitative and Unquantifiable) Will These Proposed Standards Have? In addition to the quantified benefits and costs of fuel economy standards, the standards we are proposing will have other impacts that we have not quantified in monetary terms. The decision on whether or not to quantify a particular impact depends on several considerations: • Does the impact exist, and can the magnitude of the impact reasonably be attributed to the outcome of this rulemaking? • Would quantification help NHTSA and the public evaluate standards that may be set in rulemaking? • Is the impact readily quantifiable in monetary terms? Do we know how to quantify a particular impact? • If quantified, would the monetary impact likely be material? • Can a quantification be derived with a sufficiently narrow range of uncertainty so that the estimate is useful? NHTSA expects that this rulemaking will have a number of genuine, material impacts that have not been quantified due to one or more of the considerations listed above. In some cases, further research may yield estimates for future rulemakings. Technology Forcing The proposed rule will improve the fuel economy of the U.S. new vehicle fleet, but it will also increase the cost (and presumably, the price) of new passenger cars and light trucks built during MYs 2012- 2016. We anticipate that the cost, scope, and duration of this rule, as well as the steadily rising standards it requires, will cause automakers and suppliers to devote increased attention to methods of improving vehicle fuel economy. This increased attention will stimulate additional research and engineering, and we anticipate that, over time, innovative approaches to reducing the fuel consumption of light duty vehicles will emerge. These innovative approaches may reduce the cost of the proposed rule in its later years, and also increase the set of feasible technologies in future years. We have attempted to estimate the effect of learning on known technologies within the period of the proposed rulemaking. We have not attempted to estimate the extent to which not-yet-invented technologies will appear, either within the time period of the current rulemaking or that might be available after MY 2016. Effects on Vehicle Maintenance, Operation, and Insurance Costs Any action that increases the cost of new vehicles will subsequently make such vehicles more costly to maintain, repair, and insure. In general, this effect can be expected to be a positive linear function of vehicle costs. The proposed rulemaking, however, raises vehicle costs by only a few percent at most, and hence the change in maintenance and operation costs, distributed over the expected life of regulated vehicles and discounted back to the present, is probably de minimus in terms of the full analysis. One of the common consequences of using more complex or innovative technologies is a decline in vehicle reliability and an increase in [[Page 49732]] maintenance costs, borne, in part, by the manufacturer (through warranty costs, which are included in the indirect costs of production) and, in part by the vehicle owner. NHTSA believes that this effect is difficult to quantify, but likely to be de minimus as well. Effects on Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) While NHTSA has estimated the impact of the rebound effect on VMT, we have not estimated how a change in vehicle sales could impact VMT. Since the value of the fuel savings to consumers outweighs the technology costs, new vehicle sales are predicted to increase. A change in vehicle sales will have complicated and a hard-to-quantify effect on vehicle miles traveled given the rebound effect, the trade-in of older vehicles, etc. In general, overall VMT should not be significantly affected. Effect on Composition of Passenger Car and Light Truck Sales In addition, manufacturers, to the extent that they pass on costs to customers, may distribute these costs across their motor vehicle fleets in ways that affect the composition of sales by model. To the extent that changes in the composition of sales occur, this could affect fuel savings to some degree. However, NHTSA's view is that the scope for compositional effects is relatively small, since the total effect of the regulation itself will be to increase costs by only a few percent. Compositional effects might be important with respect to compliance costs for individual manufacturers, but are unlikely to be material for the rule as a whole. NHTSA is continuing to study methods of estimating compositional effects and may be able to develop methods for use in future rulemakings. Effects on the Used Vehicle Market The effect of this rule on the use and scrappage of older vehicles will be related to its effects on new vehicle prices, the fuel efficiency of new vehicle models, and the total sales of new vehicles. If the value of fuel savings resulting from improved fuel efficiency to the typical potential buyer of a new vehicle outweighs the average increase in new models' prices, sales of new vehicles will rise, while scrappage rates of used vehicles will increase slightly. This will cause the ``turnover'' of the vehicle fleet--that is, the retirement of used vehicles and their replacement by new models--to accelerate slightly, thus accentuating the anticipated effect of the rule on fleet-wide fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. However, if potential buyers value future fuel savings resulting from the increased fuel efficiency of new models at less than the increase in their average selling price, sales of new vehicles will decline, as will the rate at which used vehicles are retired from service. This effect will slow the replacement of used vehicles by new models, and thus partly offset the anticipated effects of the proposed rules on fuel use and emissions. Because the agencies are uncertain about how the value of projected fuel savings from the proposed rules to potential buyers will compare to their estimates of increases in new vehicle prices, we have not attempted to estimate explicitly the effects of the rule on scrappage of older vehicles and the turnover of the vehicle fleet. We seek comment on the methods that might be used to estimate the effect of the proposed rule on the scrappage and use of older vehicles as part of the analysis to be conducted for the final rule. Impacts of Changing Fuel Composition on Costs, Benefits, and Emissions EPAct, as amended by EISA, creates a Renewable Fuels Standard that sets targets for greatly increased usage of renewable fuels over the next decade. The law requires fixed volumes of renewable fuels to be used--volumes that are not linked to actual usage of transportation fuels. Ethanol and biodiesel (in the required volumes) may increase the cost of gasoline and diesel depending on crude oil prices and tax subsidies. The extra cost of renewable fuels will be borne through a cross-subsidy: The price of every gallon of gasoline will rise sufficiently to pay for the extra cost of renewable fuels. The proposed CAFE rule, by reducing total fuel consumption, would tend to increase any necessary cross-subsidy per gallon of fuel, and hence raise the market price of transportation fuels, while there would be no change in the volume or cost of renewable fuels used. Some of these effects are indirectly incorporated in NHTSA's analysis of the proposed CAFE rule because they are directly incorporated in EIA's projections of future gasoline and diesel prices in the Annual Energy Outlook, which incorporates in its baseline both a Renewable Fuel Standard and an increasing CAFE standard. The net effect of incorporating an RFS then might be to slightly reduce the benefits of the rule because affected vehicles might be driven slightly less, and because they emit slightly fewer greenhouse gas emissions per gallon. In addition there might be deadweight losses from the induced reduction in VMT. All of these effects are difficult to estimate, because of uncertainty in future crude oil prices, uncertainty in future tax policy, and uncertainty about how petroleum marketers will actually comply with the RFS, but they are likely to be small, because the cumulative deviation from baseline fuel consumption induced by the proposed rule will itself be small. Macroeconomic Impacts of This Rule The proposed rule will have a number of consequences that may have short-run and longer-run macroeconomic effects. It is important to recognize, however, that these effects do not represent benefits in addition to those resulting directly from reduced fuel consumption and emissions. Instead, they represent the economic effects that occur as these direct impacts filter through the interconnected markets comprising the U.S. economy. • Increasing the cost and quality (in the form of better fuel economy) of new light duty vehicles will have ripple effects through the rest of the economy. Depending on the assumptions made, the rule could generate very small increases or declines in output. • Reducing consumption of imported petroleum should induce an increase in long-run output. • Decreasing the world price of oil should induce an increase in long-run output. NHTSA has not studied the macroeconomic effects of the proposal, however a discussion of the economy-wide impacts of this rule conducted by EPA is included in Section III.H.5. Although economy-wide models do not capture all of the potential impacts of this rule (e.g., improvements in product quality), these models can provide valuable insights on how this proposal would impact the U.S. economy in ways that extend beyond the transportation sector. Military Expenditures This analysis contains quantified estimates for the social cost of petroleum imports based on monopsony effects and the risk of oil market disruption. We have not included estimates of the cost of military expenditures associated with petroleum imports. H. Vehicle Classification Vehicle classification, for purposes of the CAFE program, refers to whether NHTSA considers a vehicle to be a passenger automobile or a light truck, and thus subject to either the passenger automobile or the light truck standards. As NHTSA explained in the MY 2011 [[Page 49733]] rulemaking, EPCA categorizes some light 4-wheeled vehicles as passenger automobiles (cars) and the balance as non-passenger automobiles (light trucks). EPCA defines passenger automobiles as any automobile (other than an automobile capable of off-highway operation) which NHTSA decides by rule is manufactured primarily for use in the transportation of not more than 10 individuals. EPCA 501(2), 89 Stat. 901. NHTSA created regulatory definitions for passenger automobiles and light trucks, found at 49 CFR part 523, to guide the agency and manufacturers in classifying vehicles. Under EPCA, there are two general groups of automobiles that qualify as non-passenger automobiles or light trucks: (1) Those defined by NHTSA in its regulations as other than passenger automobiles due to their having design features that indicate they were not manufactured ``primarily'' for transporting up to ten individuals; and (2) those expressly excluded from the passenger category by statute due to their capability for off-highway operation, regardless of whether they might have been manufactured primarily for passenger transportation. NHTSA's classification rule directly tracks those two broad groups of non- passenger automobiles in subsections (a) and (b), respectively, of 49 CFR 523.5. For the purpose of this NPRM for the MYs 2012-2016 standards, EPA agreed to use NHTSA's regulatory definitions for determining which vehicles would be subject to which CO2 standards. In the MY 2011 rulemaking, NHTSA took a fresh look at the regulatory definitions in light of several factors and developments: its desire to ensure clarity in how vehicles are classified, the passage of EISA, and the Ninth Circuit's decision in CBD v. NHTSA.\620\ NHTSA explained the origin of the current definitions of passenger automobiles and light trucks by tracing them back through the history of the CAFE program, and did not propose to change the definitions themselves at that time, because the agency concluded that the definitions were largely consistent with Congress' intent in separating passenger automobiles and light trucks, but also in part because the agency tentatively concluded that doing so would not lead to increased fuel savings. However, the agency tightened the definitions in Sec. 523.5 to ensure that only vehicles that actually have 4WD will be classified as off-highway vehicles by reason of having 4WD (to prevent 2WD SUVs that also come in a 4WD ``version'' from qualifying automatically as ``off-road capable'' simply by reason of the existence of the 4WD version). It also took this action to ensure that manufacturers may only use the ``greater cargo-carrying capacity'' criterion of 523.5(a)(4) for cargo van-type vehicles, rather than for SUVs with removable second-row seats unless they truly have greater cargo-carrying than passenger-carrying capacity ``as sold'' to the first retail purchaser. NHTSA concluded that these changes increased clarity, were consistent with EPCA and EISA, and responded to the Ninth Circuit's decision with regard to vehicle classification. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \620\ 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, manufacturers currently have an incentive to classify vehicles as light trucks because, generally speaking, the fuel economy target for light trucks with a given footprint is less stringent than the target for passenger cars with the same footprint. This is due to the fact that the curves are based on actual fuel economy capabilities of the vehicles to which they apply. Because of characteristics like 4WD, towing and hauling capacity, and heavy weight, the vehicles in the current light truck fleet are generally less capable of achieving higher fuel economy levels as compared to the vehicles in the passenger car fleet. 2WD SUVs are the vehicles that could be most readily redesigned so that they can be ``moved'' from the passenger car to the light truck fleet. A manufacturer could do this by adding a third row of seats, for example, or boosting GVWR over 6,000 lbs for a 2WD SUV that already meets the ground clearance requirements for ``off-road capability.'' A change like this may only be possible during a vehicle redesign, but since vehicles are redesigned, on average, every 5 years, at least some manufacturers may make such changes before or during the model years covered by this rulemaking. In looking forward to model years beyond 2011 and considering how CAFE should operate in the context of the National Program and previously-received comments as requested by President Obama, NHTSA seeks comment on the following potential changes to NHTSA's vehicle classification system. We request comment also on whether, if any of the changes were to be adopted, they should be applied to any of the model years covered by this rulemaking or whether, due to lead time concerns, they should apply only to MY 2017 and thereafter. Reclassifying Minivans and other ``3-row'' light trucks as passenger cars (i.e., removing 49 CFR 523.5(a)(5)): NHTSA has received repeated comments over the course of the last several rulemakings from environmental and consumer groups regarding the classification of minivans as light trucks instead of as passenger cars. Commenters have argued that because minivans generally have three rows of seats, are built on unibody chassis, and are used primarily for transporting passengers, they should be classified as passenger cars. NHTSA did not accept these arguments in the MY 2011 final rule, due to concerns that moving minivans to the passenger car fleet would lower the fuel economy targets for those passenger cars having essentially the same footprint as the minivans, and thus lower the overall fuel average fuel economy level that the manufacturers would need to meet. However, due to the new methodology for setting standards, the as-yet- unknown fuel-economy capabilities of future minivans and 3-row 2WD SUVs, and the unknown state of the vehicle market (particularly for MYs 2017 and beyond), NHTSA can no longer say with certainty that moving these vehicles could negatively affect potential stringency levels for either passenger cars or light trucks. Although such a change would not be made applicable during the MY 2012-2016 time frame, we seek comment on why NHTSA should or should not consider, as part of this rulemaking, reclassifying minivans (and other current light trucks that qualify as such because they have three rows of designated seating positions as standard equipment) for MYs 2017 and after. Classifying ``like'' vehicles together: Many commenters objected in the rulemaking for the MY 2011 standards to NHTSA's regulatory separation of ``like'' vehicles. Industry commenters argued that it was technologically inappropriate for NHTSA to place 4WD and 2WD versions of the same SUV in separate classes. They argued that the vehicles are the same, except for their drivetrain features, thus giving them similar fuel economy improvement potential. They further argued that all SUVs should be classified as light trucks. Environmental and consumer group commenters, on the other hand, argued that 4WD SUVs and 2WD SUVs that are ``off-highway capable'' by virtue of a GVWR above 6,000 pounds should be classified as passenger cars, since they are primarily used to transport passengers. In the MY 2011 rulemaking, NHTSA rejected both of these sets of arguments. NHTSA concluded that 2WD SUVs that were neither ``off-highway capable'' nor possessed ``truck-like'' functional characteristics were appropriately classified as passenger cars. At the same time, NHTSA also [[Page 49734]] concluded that because Congress explicitly designated vehicles with GVWRs over 6,000 pounds as ``off-highway capable'' (if they meet the ground clearance requirements established by the agency), NHTSA did not have authority to move these vehicles to the passenger car fleet. With regard to the first argument, that ``like'' vehicles should be classified similarly (i.e., that 2WD SUVs should be classified as light trucks because, besides their drivetrain, they are ``like'' the 4WD version that qualifies as a light truck), NHTSA continues to believe that 2WD SUVs that do not meet any part of the existing regulatory definition for light trucks should be classified as passenger cars. However, NHTSA recognizes the additional point raised by industry commenters in the MY 2011 rulemaking that manufacturers may respond to this tighter classification by ceasing to build 2WD versions of SUVs, which could reduce fuel savings. In response to that point, NHTSA stated in the MY 2011 final rule that it expects that manufacturer decisions about whether to continue building 2WD SUVs will be driven in much greater measure by consumer demand than by NHTSA's regulatory definitions. If it appears, in the course of the next several model years, that manufacturers are indeed responding to the CAFE regulatory definitions in a way that reduces overall fuel savings from expected levels, it may be appropriate for NHTSA to review this question again. NHTSA seeks comment on how the agency might go about reviewing this question as more information about manufacturer behavior is accumulated. With regard to the second argument, that NHTSA should move vehicles that qualify as ``off-highway capable'' from the light truck to the passenger car fleet because they are primarily used to transport passengers, NHTSA reiterates that EPCA is clear that certain vehicles are non-passenger automobiles (i.e., light trucks) because of their off-highway capabilities, regardless of how they may be used day-to-day. However, NHTSA could explore additional approaches, although not all could be pursued on current law. Possible alternative legal regimes might include: (a) classifying vehicles as passenger cars or light trucks based on use alone (rather than characteristics); (b) removing the regulatory distinction altogether and setting standards for the entire fleet of vehicles instead of for separate passenger car and light truck fleets; or (c) dividing the fleet into multiple categories more consistent with current vehicle fleets (i.e., sedans, minivans, SUVs, pickup trucks, etc.). NHTSA seeks comment on whether and why it should pursue any of these courses of action. I. Compliance and Enforcement 1. Overview NHTSA's CAFE enforcement program and the compliance flexibilities available to manufacturers are largely established by statute--unlike the CAA, EPCA and EISA are very prescriptive and leave the agency limited authority to increase the flexibilities available to manufacturers. This was intentional, however. Congress balanced the energy saving purposes of the statute against the benefits of the various flexibilities and incentives it provided and placed precise limits on those flexibilities and incentives. For example, while the Department sought authority for unlimited transfer of credits between a manufacturer's car and light truck fleets, Congress limited the extent to which a manufacturer could raise its average fuel economy for one of its classes of vehicles through credit transfer in lieu of adding more fuel saving technologies. It did not want these provisions to slow progress toward achieving greater energy conservation or other policy goals. In keeping with EPCA's focus on energy conservation, NHTSA has done its best, for example, in crafting the credit transfer and trading regulations authorized by EISA, to ensure that total fuel savings are preserved when manufacturers exercise their compliance flexibilities. The following sections explain how NHTSA determines whether manufacturers are in compliance with the CAFE standards for each model year, and how manufacturers may address potential non-compliance situations through the use of compliance flexibilities or fine payment. 2. How Does NHTSA Determine Compliance? a. Manufacturer Submission of Data and CAFE Testing by EPA NHTSA begins to determine CAFE compliance by considering pre- and mid-model year reports submitted by manufacturers pursuant to 49 CFR part 537, Automotive Fuel Economy Reports.\621\ The reports for the current model year are submitted to NHTSA every December and July. As of the time of this NPRM, NHTSA has received mid-model year reports from manufacturers for MY 2009, and anticipates receiving pre-model year reports for MY 2010 at the end of this year. Although the reports are used for NHTSA's reference only, they help the agency, and the manufacturers who prepare them, anticipate potential compliance issues as early as possible, and help manufacturers plan compliance strategies. Currently, NHTSA receives these reports in paper form. In order to facilitate submission by manufacturers and consistent with the President's electronic government initiatives, NHTSA proposes to amend Part 537 to allow for electronic submission of the pre- and mid-model year CAFE reports. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \621\ 49 CFR Part 537 is authorized by 49 U.S.C. 32907. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA makes its ultimate determination of manufacturers' CAFE compliance upon receiving EPA's official certified and reported CAFE data. The EPA certified data is based on vehicle testing and on final model year data submitted by manufacturers to EPA pursuant to 40 CFR 600.512, Model Year Report, no later than 90 days after the end of the calendar year. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32904(e), EPA is responsible for calculating automobile manufacturers' CAFE values so that NHTSA can determine compliance with the CAFE standards. In measuring the fuel economy of passenger cars, EPA is required by EPCA \622\ to use the EPA test procedures in place as of 1975 (or procedures that give comparable results), which are the city and highway tests of today, with adjustments for procedural changes that have occurred since 1975. EPA uses similar procedures for light trucks, although, as noted above, EPCA does not require it to do so. One notable shortcoming of the 1975 test procedure is that it does not include a provision for air conditioner usage during the test cycle. As discussed in Section III above of the preamble, air conditioner usage increases the load on a vehicle's engine, reducing fuel efficiency and increasing CO2 emissions. Since the air conditioner is not turned on during testing, equipping a vehicle model with a relatively inefficient air conditioner will not adversely affect that model's measured fuel economy, while quipping a vehicle model with a relatively efficient air conditioner will not raise that model's measured fuel economy. The fuel economy test procedures for light trucks could be amended through rulemaking to provide for air conditioner operation during testing and to take other steps for improving the accuracy and representativeness of fuel economy measurements. Comment is sought in section I.D.2 regarding implementing such amendments beginning in MY 2017 and also on the more immediate [[Page 49735]] interim step of providing credits under 49 U.S.C. 32904(c) for light trucks equipped with relatively efficient air conditioners for MYs 2012-2016. Modernizing the passenger car test procedures as well would not be possible under EPCA as currently written. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \622\ 49 U.S.C. 32904(c). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. NHTSA Then Analyzes EPA-Certified CAFE Values for Compliance Determining CAFE compliance is fairly straightforward. After testing, EPA verifies the data submitted by manufacturers and issues final CAFE reports to manufacturers and to NHTSA between April and October of each year (for the previous model year). NHTSA then identifies the manufacturers' compliance categories (fleets) that do not meet the applicable CAFE fleet standards. To determine if manufacturers have earned credits that would offset those shortfalls, NHTSA calculates a cumulative credit status for each of a manufacturer's vehicle compliance categories according to 49 U.S.C. 32903. If a manufacturer's compliance category exceeds the applicable fuel economy standard, NHTSA adds credits to the account for that compliance category. If a manufacturer's vehicles in a particular compliance category fall below the standard fuel economy value, NHTSA will provide written notification to the manufacturer that it has not met a particular fleet standard. The manufacturer will be required to confirm the shortfall and must either: Submit a plan indicating it will allocate existing credits, and/or for MY 2011 and later, how it will earn, transfer and/or acquire credits; or pay the appropriate civil penalty. The manufacturer must submit a plan or payment within 60 days of receiving agency notification. The amount of credits are determined by multiplying the number of tenths of a mpg by which a manufacturer exceeds, or falls short of, a standard for a particular category of automobiles by the total volume of automobiles of that category manufactured by the manufacturer for a given model year. Credits used to offset shortfalls are subject to the three and five year limitations as described in 49 U.S.C. 32903(a). Transferred credits are subject to the limitations specified by 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(3). The value of each credit, when used for compliance, received via trade or transfer is adjusted, using the adjustment factor described in 49 CFR part 536.4, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32903(f)(1). Credit allocation plans received from the manufacturer will be reviewed and approved by NHTSA. NHTSA will approve a credit allocation plan unless it finds the proposed credits are unavailable or that it is unlikely that the plan will result in the manufacturer earning sufficient credits to offset the subject credit shortfall. If a plan is approved, NHTSA will revise the respective manufacturer's credit account accordingly. If a plan is rejected, NHTSA will notify the respective manufacturer and request a revised plan or payment of the appropriate fine. In the event that a manufacturer does not comply with a CAFE standard, even after the consideration of credits, EPCA provides for the assessing of civil penalties. The Act specifies a precise formula for determining the amount of civil penalties for such a noncompliance. The penalty, as adjusted for inflation by law, is $5.50 for each tenth of a mpg that a manufacturer's average fuel economy falls short of the standard for a given model year multiplied by the total volume of those vehicles in the affected fleet (i.e., import or domestic passenger car, or light truck), manufactured for that model year. The amount of the penalty may not be reduced except under the unusual or extreme circumstances specified in the statute. All penalties are paid to the U.S. Treasury and not to NHTSA itself. Unlike the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, EPCA does not provide for recall and remedy in the event of a noncompliance. The presence of recall and remedy provisions \623\ in the Safety Act and their absence in EPCA is believed to arise from the difference in the application of the safety standards and CAFE standards. A safety standard applies to individual vehicles; that is, each vehicle must possess the requisite equipment or feature which must provide the requisite type and level of performance. If a vehicle does not, it is noncompliant. Typically, a vehicle does not entirely lack an item or equipment or feature. Instead, the equipment or features fails to perform adequately. Recalling the vehicle to repair or replace the noncompliant equipment or feature can usually be readily accomplished. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \623\ 49 U.S.C. 30120, Remedies for defects and noncompliance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In contrast, a CAFE standard applies to a manufacturer's entire fleet for a model year. It does not require that a particular individual vehicle be equipped with any particular equipment or feature or meet a particular level of fuel economy. It does require that the manufacturer's fleet, as a whole, comply. Further, although under the attribute-based approach to setting CAFE standards fuel economy targets are established for individual vehicles based on their footprints, the vehicles are not required to comply with those targets on a model-by- model or vehicle-by-vehicle basis. However, as a practical matter, if a manufacturer chooses to design some vehicles so they fall below their target levels of fuel economy, it will need to design other vehicles so they exceed their targets if the manufacturer's overall fleet average is to meet the applicable standard. Thus, under EPCA, there is no such thing as a noncompliant vehicle, only a noncompliant fleet. No particular vehicle in a noncompliant fleet is any more, or less, noncompliant than any other vehicle in the fleet. After enforcement letters are sent, NHTSA continues to monitor receipt of credit allocation plans or civil penalty payments that are due within 60 days from the date of receipt of the letter by the vehicle manufacturer, and takes further action if the manufacturer is delinquent in responding. 3. What Compliance Flexibilities Are Available Under the CAFE Program and How Do Manufacturers Use Them? There are three basic flexibilities permitted by EPCA/EISA that manufacturers can use to achieve compliance with CAFE standards beyond applying fuel economy-improving technologies: (1) Building dual- and alternative-fueled vehicles; (2) banking, trading, and transferring credits earned for exceeding fuel economy standards; and (3) paying fines. We note again that while these flexibility mechanisms will reduce compliance costs to some degree for most manufacturers, 49 U.S.C. 32902(h) expressly prohibits NHTSA from considering the availability of credits (either for building dual- or alternative- fueled vehicles or from accumulated transfers or trades) in determining the level of the standards. Thus, NHTSA may not raise CAFE standards because manufacturers have enough credits to meet higher standards. This is an important difference from EPA's authority under the CAA, which does not contain such a restriction, and which allows EPA to set higher standards as a result. a. Dual- and Alternative-Fueled Vehicles As discussed at length in prior rulemakings, EPCA encourages manufacturers to build alternative-fueled and dual- (or flexible-) fueled vehicles by providing special fuel economy calculations for ``dedicated'' (that is, 100 percent) alternative fueled vehicles and ``dual-fueled'' (that is, [[Page 49736]] capable of running on either the alternative fuel or gasoline) vehicles. The fuel economy of a dedicated alternative fuel vehicle is determined by dividing its fuel economy in equivalent miles per gallon of gasoline or diesel fuel by 0.15.\624\ Thus, a 15 mpg dedicated alternative fuel vehicle would be rated as 100 mpg. For dual-fueled vehicles, the rating is the average of the fuel economy on gasoline or diesel and the fuel economy on the alternative fuel vehicle divided by 0.15.\625\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \624\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(a). \625\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(b) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For example, this calculation procedure turns a dual-fueled vehicle that averages 25 mpg on gasoline or diesel into a 40 mpg vehicle for CAFE purposes. This assumes that (1) the vehicle operates on gasoline or diesel 50 percent of the time and on alternative fuel 50 percent of the time; (2) fuel economy while operating on alternative fuel is 15 mpg (15/.15 = 100 mpg); and (3) fuel economy while operating on gas or diesel is 25 mpg. Thus: CAFE FE = 1/{0.5/(mpg gas) + 0.5/(mpg alt fuel){time} = 1/{0.5/25 + 0.5/100) = 40 mpg In the case of natural gas, the calculation is performed in a similar manner. The fuel economy is the weighted average while operating on natural gas and operating on gas or diesel. The statute specifies that 100 cubic feet (ft\3\) of natural gas is equivalent to 0.823 gallons of gasoline. The gallon equivalency of natural gas is equal to 0.15 (as for other alternative fuels).\626\ Thus, if a vehicle averages 25 miles per 100 ft\3\ of natural gas, then: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \626\ 49 U.S.C. 32905(c). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CAFE FE = (25/100) * (100/.823)* (1/0.15) = 203 mpg Congress extended the incentive in EISA for dual-fueled automobiles through MY 2019, but provided for its phase out between MYs 2015 and 2019.\627\ The maximum fuel economy increase which may be attributed to the incentive is thus as follows: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \627\ 49 U.S.C. 32906(a). NHTSA notes that the incentive for dedicated alternative-fuel automobiles, automobiles that run exclusively on an alternative fuel, at 49 U.S.C. 32905(a), was not phased-out by EISA. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Model year mpg increase ------------------------------------------------------------------------ MYs 1993-2014............................................. 1.2 MY 2015................................................... 1.0 MY 2016................................................... 0.8 MY 2017................................................... 0.6 MY 2018................................................... 0.4 MY 2019................................................... 0.2 After MY 2019............................................. 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 49 CFR part 538 implements the statutory alternative-fueled and dual-fueled automobile manufacturing incentive. NHTSA is proposing to update Part 538 as part of this NPRM to reflect the EISA changes, but to the extent that 49 U.S.C. 32906(a) differs from the current version of 49 CFR 538.9, the statute supersedes the regulation, and regulated parties may rely on the text of the statute. A major difference between EPA's statutory authority and NHTSA's statutory authority is that the CAA contains no specific prescriptions with regard to credits for dual- and alternative-fueled vehicles comparable to those found in EPCA/EISA. As an exercise of that authority, and as discussed in Section III above, EPA is offering similar credits for dual- and alternative-fueled vehicles through MY 2015 for compliance with its CO2 standards, but for MY 2016 and beyond EPA will establish CO2 emission levels for alternative fuel vehicles based on measurement of actual CO2 emissions during testing, plus a manufacturer demonstration that the vehicles are actually being run on the alternative fuel. NHTSA has no such authority under EPCA/EISA to require that vehicles manufactured for the purpose of obtaining the credit actually be run on the alternative fuel, but requests comment on whether it should seek legislative changes to revise its authority to address this issue. b. Credit Trading and Transfer In the MY 2011 final rule, NHTSA established Part 536 for credit trading and transfer. Part 536 implements the provisions in EISA authorizing NHTSA to establish by regulation a credit trading program and directing it to establish by regulation a credit transfer program.\628\ Since its enactment, EPCA has permitted manufacturers to earn credits for exceeding the standards and to carry those credits backward or forward. EISA extended the ``carry-forward'' period from three to five model years, and left the ``carry-back'' period at three model years. Under Part 536, credit holders (including, but not limited to, manufacturers) will have credit accounts with NHTSA, and will be able to hold credits, use them to achieve compliance with CAFE standards, transfer them between compliance categories, or trade them. A credit may also be cancelled before its expiry date, if the credit holder so chooses. Traded and transferred credits are subject to an ``adjustment factor'' to ensure total oil savings are preserved, as required by EISA. EISA also prohibits credits earned before MY 2011 from being transferred, so NHTSA has developed several regulatory restrictions on trading and transferring to facilitate Congress' intent in this regard. EISA also establishes a ``cap'' for the maximum increase in any compliance category attributable to transferred credits: for MYs 2011-2013, transferred credits can only be used to increase a manufacturer's CAFE level in a given compliance category by 1.0 mpg; for MYs 2014-2017, by 1.5 mpg; and for MYs 2018 and beyond, by 2.0 mpg. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \628\ Congress required that DOT establish a credit ``transferring'' regulation, to allow individual manufacturers to move credits from one of their fleets to another (e.g., using a credit earned for exceeding the light truck standard for compliance with the domestic passenger car standard). Congress allowed DOT to establish a credit ``trading'' regulation, so that credits may be bought and sold between manufacturers and other parties. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA recognizes that some manufacturers may have to rely on credit transferring for compliance in MYs 2012-2017.\629\ As a way to improve the transferring flexibility mechanism for manufacturers, NHTSA interprets EISA not to prohibit the banking of transferred credits for use in later model years. Thus, NHTSA believes that the language of EISA may be read to allow manufacturers to transfer credits from one fleet that has an excess number of credits, within the limits specified, to another fleet that may also have excess credits instead of transferring only to a fleet that has a credit shortfall. This would mean that a manufacturer could transfer a certain number of credits each year and bank them, and then the credits could be carried forward or back ``without limit'' later if and when a shortfall ever occurred in that same fleet. NHTSA bases this interpretation on 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(2), which states that transferred credits ``are available to be used in the same model years that the manufacturer could have applied such credits under subsections (a), (b), (d), and (e), as well as for the model year in which the manufacturer earned such credits.'' The EISA limitation applies only to the application of such credits for compliance in particular model years, and not their transfer per se. If transferred credits have the same lifespan and may be used in carry- back and carry-forward plans, it seems reasonable that they should be allowed to be stored in any fleet, rather than only in the fleet in which they were [[Page 49737]] earned. Of course, manufacturers could not transfer and bank credits for purposes of achieving the minimum standard for domestically- manufactured passenger cars, as prohibited by 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(4). Transferred and banked credits would additionally still be subject to the adjustment factor when actually used, which would help to ensure that total oil savings are preserved while still offering greater flexibility to manufacturers. This interpretation of EISA also helps NHTSA, to some extent, to harmonize better with EPA's CO2 program, which allows unlimited banking and transfer of credits. NHTSA seeks comment on this interpretation of EISA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \629\ In contrast, manufacturers stated in comments in NHTSA's MY 2011 rulemaking that they did not anticipate a robust market for credit trading, due to competitive concerns. NHTSA does not yet know whether those concerns will continue to deter manufacturers from exercising the trading flexibility during MYs 2012-2016. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. Payment of Fines If a manufacturer's average miles per gallon for a given compliance category (domestic passenger car, imported passenger car, light truck) falls below the applicable standard, and the manufacturer cannot make up the difference by using credits earned or acquired, the manufacturer is subject to penalties. The penalty, as mentioned, is $5.50 for each tenth of a mpg that a manufacturer's average fuel economy falls short of the standard for a given model year, multiplied by the total volume of those vehicles in the affected fleet, manufactured for that model year. NHTSA has collected $772,850,459.00 to date in CAFE penalties, the largest ever being paid by DaimlerChrysler for its MY 2006 import passenger car fleet, $30,257,920.00. For their MY 2007 fleets, five manufacturers paid CAFE fines for not meeting an applicable standard-- Ferrari, Maserati, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, and Volkswagen--for a total of $37,385,941.00 NHTSA recognizes that some manufacturers may use the option to pay fines as a CAFE compliance flexibility--presumably, when paying fines is deemed more cost-effective than applying additional fuel economy- improving technology, or when adding fuel economy-improving technology would fundamentally change the characteristics of the vehicle in ways that the manufacturer believes its target consumers would not accept. NHTSA has no authority under EPCA/EISA to prevent manufacturers from turning to fine-payment if they choose to do so. This is another important difference from EPA's authority under the CAA, which allows EPA to revoke a manufacturer's certificate of compliance that permits it to sell vehicles if EPA determines that the manufacturer is in non- compliance, and does not permit manufacturers to pay fines in lieu of compliance with applicable standards. NHTSA has grappled repeatedly with the issue of whether fines are motivational for manufacturers, and whether raising fines would increase manufacturers' compliance with the standards. EPCA authorizes increasing the civil penalty very slightly up to $10.00, exclusive of inflationary adjustments, if NHTSA decides that the increase in the penalty ``will result in, or substantially further, substantial energy conservation for automobiles in the model years in which the increased penalty may be imposed; and will not have a substantial deleterious impact on the economy of the United States, a State, or a region of a State.'' 49 U.S.C. 32912(c). To support a decision that increasing the penalty would result in ``substantial energy conservation'' without having ``a substantial deleterious impact on the economy,'' NHTSA would likely need to provide some reasonably certain quantitative estimates of the fuel that would be saved, and the impact on the economy, if the penalty were raised. Comments received on this issue in the past have not explained in clear quantitative terms what the benefits and drawbacks to raising the penalty might be. Additionally, it may be that the range of possible increase that the statute provides, i.e., up to $10 per tenth of a mpg, is insufficient to result in substantial energy conservation, although changing this would require an amendment to the statute by Congress. While NHTSA continues to seek to gain information on this issue to inform a future rulemaking decision, we request that commenters wishing to address this issue please provide, as specifically as possible, estimates of how raising or not raising the penalty amount will or will not substantially raise energy conservation and impact the economy. 4. Other CAFE Enforcement Issues--Variations in Footprint NHTSA has a standardized test procedure for determining vehicle footprint,\630\ which is defined by regulation as follows: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \630\ NHTSA TP-537-01, March 30, 2009. Available at http:// www.nhtsa.gov/portal/site/nhtsa/ menuitem.b166d5602714f9a73baf3210dba046a0/, scroll down to ``537'' (last accessed July 18, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Footprint is defined as the product of track width (measured in inches, calculated as the average of front and rear track widths, and rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch) times wheelbase (measured in inches and rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch), divided by 144 and then rounded to the nearest tenth of a square foot.\631\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \631\ 49 CFR 523.2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``Track width,'' in turn, is defined as ``the lateral distance between the centerlines of the base tires at ground, including the camber angle.'' \632\ ``Wheelbase'' is defined as ``the longitudinal distance between front and rear wheel centerlines.'' \633\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \632\ Id. \633\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA began requiring manufacturers to submit this information as part of their pre-model year reports in MY 2008 for light trucks, and will require manufacturers to submit this information for passenger cars as well beginning in MY 2011. Manufacturers have submitted the required information for their light trucks, but NHTSA has identified several issues with regard to footprint measurement, that could affect how required fuel economy levels are calculated for a manufacturer. The paragraphs that follow explain NHTSA's views regarding these issues, and solicit public input on what NHTSA should do to address them in the future. a. Variations in Track Width By definition, wheelbase measurement should be very consistent from one vehicle to another of the same model. Track width, in contrast, may vary in two respects: Wheel offset,\634\ and camber. Most current vehicles have wheels with positive offset, with technical specifications for offset typically expressed in millimeters. Additionally, for most vehicles, the camber angle of each of a vehicle's wheels is specified as a range, i.e., front axle, left and right within minus 0.9 to plus 0.3 degree and rear axle, left and right within minus 0.9 to plus 0.1 degree. Given the small variations in offset and camber angle dimensions, the potential effects of components (wheels) and vehicle specifications (camber) within existing designs on vehicle footprints are considered insignificant. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \634\ Offset of a wheel is the distance from its hub mounting surface to the centerline of the wheel, i.e., measured laterally inboard or outboard. Zero offset--the hub mounting surface is even with the centerline of the wheel. Positive offset--the hub mounting surface is outboard of the centerline of the wheel (toward street side). Negative offset--the hub mounting surface is inboard of the centerline of the wheel (away from street side). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, NHTSA recognizes that manufacturers may change the specifications of and the equipment on vehicles, even those that are not redesigned or refreshed, during a model year and from year to year. There may be opportunity for manufacturers to change specifications for wheel offset and camber to increase a vehicle's track [[Page 49738]] width and footprint, and thus decrease their required fuel economy level. NHTSA believes that this is likely easiest on vehicles that already have sufficient space to accommodate changes without accompanying changes to the body profile and/or suspension component locations. There may be drawbacks to such a decision, however. Changing from positive offset wheels to wheels with zero or negative offset will move tires and wheels outward toward the fenders. Increasing the negative upper limit of camber will tilt the top of the tire and wheel inward and move the bottom outward, placing the upper portion of the rotating tires and wheels in closer proximity to suspension components. In addition, higher negative camber can adversely affect tire life and the on-road fuel economy of the vehicle. Furthermore, it is likely that most vehicle designs have already used the available space in wheel areas since, by doing so, the vehicle's handling performance is improved. Therefore, it seems unlikely that manufacturers will make significant changes to wheel offset and camber. b. How Manufacturers Designate ``Base Tires'' and Wheels According to the definition of ``track width'' in 49 CFR 523.2, manufacturers must determine track width when the vehicle is equipped with ``base tires.'' Section 523.2 defines ``base tire,'' in turn, as ``the tire specified as standard equipment by a manufacturer on each configuration of a model type.'' NHTSA did not define ``standard equipment.'' In their pre-model year reports required by 49 CFR part 537, manufacturers have the option of either (A) reporting a base tire for each model type, or (B) reporting a base tire for each vehicle configuration within a model type, which represents an additional level of specificity. If different vehicle configurations have different footprint values, then reporting the number of vehicles for each footprint will improve the accuracy of the required fuel economy level for the fleet, since the pre-model year report data is part of what manufacturers use to determine their CAFE obligations. For example, assume a manufacturer's pre-model year report listed five vehicle configurations that comprise one model type. If the manufacturer provides only one vehicle configuration's front and rear track widths, wheelbase, footprint and base tire size to represent the model type, and the other vehicle configurations all have a different tire size specified as standard equipment, the footprint value represented by the manufacturer may not capture the full spectrum of footprint values for that model type. Similarly, the base tires of a model type may be mounted on two or more wheels with different offset dimensions for different vehicle configurations. Of course, if the footprint value for all vehicle configurations is essentially the same, there would be no need to report by vehicle configuration. However, if footprints are different--larger or smaller--reporting for each group with similar footprints or for each vehicle configuration would produce a more accurate result. c. Vehicle ``Design'' Values Reported by Manufacturers NHTSA understands that the track widths and wheelbase values and the calculated footprint calculated values, as provided in pre-model year reports, are based on vehicle designs. This can lead to inaccurate calculations of required fuel economy level. For example, if the values reported by manufacturers are within an expected range of values, but are skewed to the higher end of the ranges, the required fuel economy level for the fleet will be artificially lower, an inaccurate attribute based value. Likewise, it would be inaccurate for manufacturers to submit values on the lower end of the ranges, but would decrease the likelihood that measured values would be less than the values reported and reduce the likelihood of an agency inquiry. Since not every vehicle is identical, it is also probable that variations between vehicles exist that can affect track width, wheelbase and footprint. As with other self-certifications, each manufacturer must decide how it will report, by model type, vehicle configuration, or a combination, and whether the reported values have sufficient margin to account for variations. To address this, the agency will be monitoring the track widths, wheelbases and footprints reported by manufacturers, and anticipates measuring vehicles to determine if the reported and measured values are consistent. We will look for year-to-year changes in the reported values. We can compare MY 2008 light truck information and MY 2010 passenger car information to the information reported in subsequent model years. Moreover, under 49 CFR 537.8, manufacturers may make separate reports to explain why changes have occurred or they may be contacted by the agency to explain them. d. How Manufacturers Report This Information in their Pre-Model Year Reports 49 CFR 537.7(c) requires that manufacturers' pre-model year reports include ``model type and configuration fuel economy and technical information.'' The fuel economy of a ``model type'' is, for many manufacturers, comprised of a number of vehicle configurations. 49 CFR 537.4 states that ``model type'' and ``vehicle configuration'' are defined in 40 CFR part 600. Under that Part, ``model type'' includes engine, transmission, and drive configuration (2WD, 4WD, or all-wheel drive), while ``vehicle configuration'' includes those parameters plus test weight. Model type is important for calculating fuel economy in the new attribute-based system--the required fuel economy level for each of a manufacturer's fleets is calculated using the number of vehicles within each model type and the applicable fuel economy target for each model type. In MY 2008 and 2009 pre-model year reports for light trucks, manufacturers have expressed information in different ways. Some manufacturers that have many vehicle configurations within a model type have included information for each vehicle configuration's track width, wheelbase and footprint. Other manufacturers reported vehicle configuration information per Sec. 537.7(c)(4), but provided only model type track width, wheelbase and footprint information for subsections 537.7(c)(4)(xvi)(B)(3), (4) and (5). NHTSA believes that these manufacturers may have reported the information this way because the track widths, wheelbase and footprint are essentially the same for each vehicle configuration within each model type. A third group of manufacturers submitted model type information only, presumably because each model type contains only one vehicle configuration. NHTSA does not believe that this variation in reporting methodology presents an inherent problem, as long as manufacturers follow the specifications in Part 537 for reporting format, and as long as pre- model year reports provide information that is accurate and represents each vehicle configuration within a model type. The report may, but need not, be similar to what manufacturers submit to EPA as their end- of-model year report. However, NHTSA seeks comment on any potential benefits or drawbacks to requiring a more standardized reporting methodology. If commenters recommend increasing standardization, NHTSA requests that they provide [[Page 49739]] specific examples of what information should be required and how NHTSA should require it to be provided. J. Other Near-Term Rulemakings Mandated by EISA 1. Commercial Medium- and Heavy-Duty On-Highway Vehicles and Work Trucks EISA added a new provision to 49 U.S.C. 32902 requiring DOT, in consultation with DOE and EPA, to examine the fuel efficiency of commercial medium- and heavy-duty on-highway vehicles \635\ and work trucks \636\ and determine the appropriate test procedures and methodologies for measuring their fuel efficiency, as well as the appropriate metric for measuring and expressing their fuel efficiency performance and the range of factors that affect their fuel efficiency. Work on developing these standards is on-going. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \635\ Defined as an on-highway vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or more. \636\ Defined as a vehicle that is both rated at between 8,500 and 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight; and also is not a medium- duty passenger vehicle (as defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01, as in effect on the date of EISA's enactment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Consumer Information EISA also added a new provision to 49 U.S.C. 32908 requiring DOT, in consultation with DOE and EPA, to develop and implement by rule a program to require manufacturers to label new automobiles sold in the United States with: (1) Information reflecting an automobile's performance on the basis of criteria that EPA shall develop, not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of EISA, to reflect fuel economy and greenhouse gas and other emissions over the useful life of the automobile; and (2) A rating system that would make it easy for consumers to compare the fuel economy and greenhouse gas and other emissions of automobiles at the point of purchase, including a designation of automobiles with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions over the useful life of the vehicles; and with the highest fuel economy. DOT must also develop and implement by rule a program to require manufacturers to include in the owner's manual for vehicles capable of operating on alternative fuels information that describes that capability and the benefits of using alternative fuels, including the renewable nature and environmental benefits of using alternative fuels. EISA further requires DOT, in consultation with DOE and EPA, to • Develop and implement by rule a consumer education program to improve consumer understanding of automobile performance described [by the label to be developed] and to inform consumers of the benefits of using alternative fuel in automobiles and the location of stations with alternative fuel capacity; • Establish a consumer education campaign on the fuel savings that would be recognized from the purchase of vehicles equipped with thermal management technologies, including energy efficient air conditioning systems and glass; and • By rule require a label to be attached to the fuel compartment of vehicles capable of operating on alternative fuels, with the form of alternative fuel stated on the label. 49 U.S.C. 32908(g)(2) and (3). DOT has 42 months from the date of EISA's enactment (by the end of 2011) to issue final rules under this subsection. Work on developing these standards is also on-going. Additionally, in preparation for this future rulemaking, NHTSA will consider appropriate metrics for presenting fuel economy-related information on labels. Based on the non-linear relationship between mpg and fuel costs as well as emissions, inclusion of the ``gallons per 100 miles'' metric on fuel economy labels may be appropriate going forward, although the mpg information is currently required by law. A cost/ distance metric may also be useful, as could a CO2e grams per mile metric to facilitate comparisons between conventional vehicles and alternative fuel vehicles and to incorporate information about air conditioning-related emissions. NHTSA seeks comment on these options. K. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 1. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), provides for making determinations whether a regulatory action is ``significant'' and therefore subject to OMB review and to the requirements of the Executive Order. The Order defines a ``significant regulatory action'' as one that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local or Tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive Order. The rulemaking proposed in this NPRM will be economically significant if adopted. Accordingly, OMB reviewed it under Executive Order 12866. The rule, if adopted, would also be significant within the meaning of the Department of Transportation's Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The benefits and costs of this proposal are described above. Because the proposed rule would, if adopted, be economically significant under both the Department of Transportation's procedures and OMB guidelines, the agency has prepared a Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) and placed it in the docket and on the agency's Web site. Further, pursuant to OMB Circular A-4, we have prepared a formal probabilistic uncertainty analysis for this proposal. The circular requires such an analysis for complex rules where there are large, multiple uncertainties whose analysis raises technical challenges or where effects cascade and where the impacts of the rule exceed $1 billion. This proposal meets these criteria on all counts. 2. National Environmental Policy Act NHTSA has initiated the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, and implementing regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 40 CFR part 1500, and NHTSA, 49 CFR part 520. On April 1, 2009, NHTSA published a notice of intent to prepare an EIS for this rulemaking and requested scoping comments. (74 FR 14857) The notice invites Federal, State, and local agencies, Indian tribes, and the public to participate in the scoping process and to help identify the environmental issues and reasonable alternatives to be examined in the EIS. The scoping notice also provides information about the proposed standards, the alternatives NHTSA expects to consider in its NEPA analysis, and the scoping process. Concurrently with this NPRM, NHTSA is releasing a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). NHTSA prepared the DEIS to analyze and disclose the potential [[Page 49740]] environmental impacts of the proposed MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards for the total fleet of passenger cars and light trucks and reasonable alternative standards for the NHTSA CAFE Program pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA, DOT Order 5610.1C, and NHTSA regulations.\637\ The DEIS compares the potential environmental impacts of alternative mile per gallon (mpg) levels that will be considered by NHTSA for the final rule. It also analyzes direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts and analyzes impacts in proportion to their significance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \637\ NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. CEQ NEPA implementing regulations are codified at 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 1500-1508. NHTSA NEPA implementing regulations are codified at 49 CFR Part 520. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The DEIS also describes potential environmental impacts to a variety of resources. Resources that may be affected by the proposed action and alternatives include water resources, biological resources, land use and development, safety, hazardous materials and regulated wastes, noise, socioeconomics, and environmental justice. These resource areas were assessed qualitatively in the DEIS. Throughout the DEIS, NHTSA has relied extensively on findings of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), and EPA. Our discussion relies heavily on the most recent, thoroughly peer-reviewed, and credible assessments of global and U.S. climate change: the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Climate Change 2007), EPA's proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act and the accompanying Technical Support Document (TSD), and CCSP and National Science and Technology Council reports that include the Scientific Assessment of the Effects of Global Change on the United States and Synthesis and Assessment Products. The DEIS cites these sources and the studies they review frequently. Because of the link between the transportation sector and GHG emissions, NHTSA recognizes the need to consider the possible impacts on climate and global climate change in the analysis of the effects of these fuel economy standards. NHTSA also recognizes the difficulties and uncertainties involved in such an impact analysis. Accordingly, consistent with CEQ regulations on addressing incomplete or unavailable information in environmental impact analyses, NHTSA has reviewed existing credible scientific evidence that is relevant to this analysis and summarized it in the DEIS. NHTSA has also employed and summarized the results of research models generally accepted in the scientific community. Although the alternatives have the potential to decrease GHG emissions substantially, they do not prevent climate change, but only result in reductions in the anticipated increases in CO2 concentrations, temperature, precipitation, and sea level. They would also, to a small degree, delay the point at which certain temperature increases and other physical effects stemming from increased GHG emissions would occur. As discussed below, NHTSA presumes that these reductions in climate effects will be reflected in reduced impacts on affected resources. NHTSA consulted with various Federal agencies in the development of the DEIS, including EPA, Bureau of Land Management, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Minerals Management Service, National Park Service, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Forest Service, and Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. NHTSA is also exploring its obligations under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service. The main direct and indirect effects resulting from the different alternatives analyzed in the DEIS are as follows: Fuel consumption: For passenger cars, fuel consumption under the No Action Alternative is 171 billion gallons in 2060. Fuel consumption ranges from 156.1 billion gallons under Alternative 2 (3-Percent Alternative) to 133.7 billion gallons under Alternative 9 (TCTB). Fuel consumption is 149.3 billion gallons under the Preferred Alternative. For light trucks, fuel consumption under the No Action Alternative is 105.4 billion gallons in 2060. Fuel consumption ranges from 97.1 billion gallons under Alternative 2 (3-Percent Alternative) to 83.8 billion gallons under Alternative 9 (TCTB). Fuel consumption is 92.2 billion gallons under the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4). Air quality: Emissions of criteria pollutants change very little between the No Action Alternative and Alternatives 2 through 4. In the case of particulate matter (PM2.5), sulfur oxides (SOX), nitrogen oxides (NOX), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), the No Action Alternative results in the highest emissions, and emissions generally decline as fuel economy standards increase across alternatives. There are some increases from Alternative 6 through Alternative 9, but emissions remain below the levels under the No Action Alternative. In the case of carbon monoxide (CO), emissions under Alternatives 2 through 4 are slightly higher than under the No Action Alternative. Emissions of CO decline as fuel economy standards increase across Alternatives 5 through 9. The trend for toxic air pollutant emissions across the alternatives is mixed. Emissions of nearly all toxic air pollutants are highest under the No Action Alternative, except for those of acrolein, which increases with each successive alternative and are highest under Alternative 9. The acrolein emissions are an upper-bound estimate and actual emissions might be less. Emissions of acetaldehyde, benzene, and DPM in 2030 decrease with successive alternatives from Alternative 1 to Alternative 9. Emissions of 1,3-butadiene increase slightly from Alternative 3 (4-Percent Alternative) to Alternative 4 (Preferred), and emissions of formaldehyde increase slightly from Alternative 8 (7- Percent Alternative) to Alternative 9 (TCTB) in 2030. The reductions in emissions are expected to lead to reductions in adverse health effects. There would be reductions in adverse health effects nationwide under Alternatives 2 (3-Percent Alternative) through 9 (TCTB) compared to the No Action Alternative. These reductions primarily reflect the projected PM2.5 reductions, and secondarily the reductions in SO2. The economic value of health impacts would vary proportionally with changes in health outcomes. Climate: The DEIS uses a climate model to estimate the changes in CO2 concentrations, global mean surface temperature, and changes in sea level for each alternative CAFE standard. NHTSA used the publicly available modeling software, Model for Assessment of Greenhouse Gas-induced Climate Change (MAGICC) version 5.3.v2 to estimate changes in key direct and indirect effects. The application of MAGICC version 5.3.v2 uses the emissions estimates for CO2, CH4, N2O, CO, NOX, SO2, and VOCs from the Volpe model. A sensitivity analysis was completed to examine the relationship among selected CAFE alternatives and likely climate sensitivities, and the associated direct and indirect effects for each combination. These relationships can be used to infer the effect of emissions associated with the regulatory alternatives on direct and indirect climate effects. [[Page 49741]] For the analysis using MAGICC, NHTSA has assumed that global emissions consistent with the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) follow the trajectory provided by the Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 MiniCAM (Mini Climate Assessment Model) reference scenario.\638\ The SAP 2.1 global emissions scenarios were created as part of CCSP's effort to develop a set of long-term (2000 to 2100) global emissions scenarios that incorporate an update of economic and technology data and utilize improved scenario development tools compared to the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) developed more than a decade ago. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \638\ The reference scenario for global emissions assumes the absence of significant global GHG control policies. It is based on the Climate Change Science Program's (CCSP) Synthesis and Assessment Product (SAP) 2.1 MiniCAM reference scenario, and has been revised by the Joint Global Change Research Institute to update emission estimates of non-CO2 gases. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The results rely primarily on the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference scenario to represent an emissions scenario, that is, future global emissions assuming no additional climate policy. Each alternative was simulated by calculating the difference in annual GHG emissions in relation to the No Action Alternative and subtracting this change from the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference scenario to generate modified global- scale emissions scenarios, which each show the effect of the various regulatory alternatives on the global emissions path. To estimate changes in global precipitation, this EIS uses increases in global mean surface temperature combined with a scaling approach and coefficients from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. For all of the climate change analysis, the approaches focus on marginal changes in emissions that affect climate. Thus, the approaches result in a reasonable characterization of climate change for a given set of emissions reductions, regardless of the underlying details associated with those emissions reductions. The climate sensitivity analysis provides a basis for determining climate responses to varying climate sensitivities under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) and the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4). Some responses of the climate system are believed to be non-linear; by using a range of emissions cases and climate sensitivities, the effects of the alternatives in relation to different scenarios and sensitivities can be estimated. GHG emissions: Although GHG emissions from new passenger cars and light trucks will continue to rise over 2012 through 2100 (absent other reduction efforts), the effect of the alternatives is to slow this increase by varying amounts. Emissions for the period range from 196,341 million metric tons of CO2 (MMTCO2) for the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9) to 244,821 MMTCO2 for the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1). Compared to the No Action Alternative, projections of emissions reductions over the period 2012 to 2100 due to the MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards range from 19,169 to 48,480 MMTCO2. Compared to cumulative global emissions of 5,293,896 MMTCO2 over this period (projected by the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference scenario), this rulemaking is expected to reduce global CO2 emissions by about 0.4 to 0.9 percent. To get a sense of the relative impact of these reductions, it can be helpful to consider the relative importance of emissions from passenger cars and light trucks as a whole and to compare them against emissions projections from the transportation sector. As mentioned earlier, U.S. passenger cars and light trucks currently account for significant CO2 emissions in the United States. With the action alternatives reducing U.S. passenger car and light truck CO2 emissions by 7.8 to 19.8 percent, the CAFE alternatives would have a noticeable impact on total U.S. CO2 emissions. Compared to total U.S. CO2 emissions in 2100 projected by the MiniCAM reference scenario of 7,886 MMTCO2, the action alternatives would reduce annual U.S. CO2 emissions by 3.5 to 8.9 percent in 2100. CO2 concentration, global mean surface temperature, sea-level rise, and precipitation: Estimated CO2 concentrations for 2100 range from 778.4 ppm under the most stringent alternative (TCTB) to 783.0 ppm under the No Action Alternative. For 2030 and 2050, the range is even smaller. Because CO2 concentration is the key driver of other climate effects (which in turn act as drivers on resource impacts), this leads to small differences in these effects. For the No Action alternative, the temperature increase from 1990 is 0.92 [deg]C for 2030, 1.56 [deg]C for 2050, and 3.14 [deg]C for 2100. The differences among alternatives are small. For 2100, the reduction in temperature increase, in relation to the No Action Alternative, ranges from 0.007 [deg]C to 0.018 [deg]C. Given that all the action alternatives reduce temperature increases slightly in relation to the No Action Alternative, they also slightly reduce predicted increases in precipitation. In summary, the impacts of the proposed action and alternatives on global mean surface temperature, precipitation, or sea-level rise are small in absolute terms. This is because the action alternatives have a small proportional change in the emissions trajectories in the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference scenario.\639\ This is due primarily to the global and multi-sectoral nature of the climate change issues. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \639\ These conclusions are not meant to be interpreted as expressing NHTSA's views that impacts on global mean surface temperature, precipitation, or sea-level rise are not areas of concern for policymakers. Under NEPA, the agency is obligated to discuss the environmental impact[s] of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(i) (emphasis added). This analysis fulfills NHTSA's obligations in this regard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Under CEQ regulations, NHTSA must also analyze cumulative impacts, defined as ``the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency or person undertakes such other actions.'' 40 CFR 1508.7. Following is a description of the cumulative effects of the proposed action and alternatives on energy, air quality, and climate. The methodology for evaluating cumulative effects includes the reasonably foreseeable future actions of projected average annual passenger-car and light-truck mpg estimates from 2016 through 2030 that differ from mpg estimates reflected in the analysis of the direct and indirect impacts of MY 2012 through MY 2016 fuel economy requirements under each of the action alternatives, assuming no further increases in average new passenger-car or light-truck mpg after 2016. The evaluation of cumulative effects projects ongoing gains in average new passenger- car and light-truck mpg consistent with further increases in CAFE standards to an EISA-mandated minimum level of 35 mpg combined for passenger cars and light trucks by the year 2020, along with AEO April 2009 (updated) Reference Case projections of annual percentage gains of 0.51 percent in passenger-car mpg and 0.86 percent in light-truck mpg through 2030.\640\ AEO Reference Case [[Page 49742]] projections are regarded as the official U.S. government energy projections by both the public and private sector. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \640\ NHTSA considers these AEO projected mpg increases to be reasonably foreseeable future actions under NEPA because the AEO projections reflect future consumer and industry actions that result in ongoing mpg gains through 2030. The AEO projections of fuel economy gains beyond the EISA requirement of combined achieved 35 mpg by 2020 result from a future forecasted increase in consumer demand for fuel economy resulting from projected fuel price increases. Since the AEO forecasts do not extend beyond the year 2030, the mpg estimates for MY 2030 through MY 2060 remain constant. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The assumption that all action alternatives reach the EISA 35 mpg target by 2020, with mpg growth at the AEO forecast rate from 2020 to 2030, results in estimated cumulative impacts for Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 that are substantially equivalent, with any minor variation in cumulative impacts across these Alternatives due to the specific modeling assumptions used to ensure that each Alternative achieves at least 35 mpg by 2020. Therefore, the cumulative impacts analysis adds substantively to the analysis of direct and indirect impacts when comparing cumulative impacts between Alternatives 4 through 9, but not when comparing cumulative impacts between Alternatives 2 through 4. Another important difference in the methodology for evaluating cumulative effects is that the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) also reflects the AEO Reference Case projected annual percentage gains of 0.51 percent in car mpg and 0.86 percent in light truck mpg for the period 2016 through 2030, whereas the direct and indirect impacts analysis assumed no increases in average new passenger-car or light- truck mpg after 2016 under any alternative, including the No Action Alternative. NHTSA also considered other reasonably foreseeable actions that would affect greenhouse gas emissions, such as regional, national, and international initiatives and programs to reduce GHG emissions. Fuel consumption: The nine alternatives examined in the DEIS will result in different future levels of fuel use, total energy, and petroleum consumption, which will in turn have an impact on emissions of GHG and criteria air pollutants. For passenger cars, by 2060, fuel consumption reaches 160.4 billion gallons under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1). Consumption falls across the alternatives, from 139.4 billion gallons under the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4) to 125.7 billion gallons under the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9) representing a fuel savings of 21.0 to 34.7 billion gallons in 2060, as compared to fuel consumption projected under the No Action Alternative. For light trucks, fuel consumption by 2060 reaches 94.8 billion gallons under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1). Consumption declines across the alternatives, from 83.3 billion gallons under the 3-Percent Alternative (Alternative 2) to 75.7 billion gallons under the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9). This represents a fuel savings of 11.5 to 19.1 billion gallons in 2060, as compared to fuel consumption projected under the No Action Alternative. Air quality: In the case of PM2.5, SOX, NOX, and VOCs, the No Action Alternative results in the highest emissions, and emissions generally decline as fuel economy standards increase across alternatives. Exceptions to this declining trend are NOX under the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4); PM2.5 under Alternatives 3 and 4, and Alternatives 8 and 9; SOX under Alternatives 3 (4-Percent Alternative) and 4 (Preferred Alternative); and VOCs under Alternative 4. Despite these individual increases, emissions of PM2.5, SOX, NOX, and VOCs remain below the levels under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1). In the case of CO, emissions under Alternatives 2 through 4 are slightly higher than under the No Action Alternative. Emissions of CO decline as fuel economy standards increase across Alternatives 5 through 9. As with criteria pollutants, emissions of most toxic air pollutants would decrease from one alternative to the next more stringent alternative. The exceptions are acetaldehyde emissions, which would increase under Alternative 4; acrolein emissions, which increase under each of the alternatives; benzene emissions, which would increase under Alternative 4; 1,3-butadiene, which would increase under Alternatives 2 and 4; diesel particulate matter (DPM), which would increase under Alternatives 3 and 4; and formaldehyde, which would increase under Alternatives 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9. The changes in toxic air pollutant emissions, whether positive or negative, generally would be small relative to Alternative 1 emissions levels.\641\ The exceptions are acetaldehyde emissions, which would decrease by more than 10 percent under Alternative 9; acrolein emissions, which would increase across successive alternatives (as noted above, the acrolein emissions are an upper-bound estimate and actual emissions might be less); benzene emissions, which would decrease by more than 10 percent under Alternatives 8 and 9; and DPM emissions, which would decrease by more than 10 percent under all action alternatives. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \641\ These conclusions are not meant to be interpreted as expressing NHTSA's views that impacts on air quality is not an area of concern for policymakers. Under NEPA, the agency is obligated to discuss the environmental impact[s] of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(i) (emphasis added). This analysis fulfills NHTSA's obligations in this regard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cumulative emissions generally would be less than noncumulative emissions for the same combination of pollutant, year, and alternative because of differing changes in VMT and fuel consumption under the cumulative case compared to the noncumulative case. The exceptions are acrolein for all alternatives except Alternative 9, and 1,3-butadiene for all alternatives except Alternative 2 (3-Percent Alternative). The reductions in emissions are expected to lead to reductions in cumulative adverse health effects. There would be reductions in adverse health effects nationwide under Alternatives 2 (3-Percent Alternative) through 9 (TCTB) compared to the No Action Alternative. Reductions in adverse health effects decrease from Alternative 2 (3-Percent Alternative) through Alternative 4 (Preferred Alternative), and then increase under Alternatives 5 (5-Percent Alternative through Alternative 9 (TCTB). These reductions primarily reflect the projected PM2.5 reductions, and secondarily the reductions in SO2. The economic value of health impacts would vary proportionally with changes in health outcomes. Climate change: As with the analysis of the direct and indirect effects of the proposed action and alternatives on climate change, for the cumulative impacts analysis this EIS uses MAGICC version 5.3.v2 to estimate the changes in CO2 concentrations, global mean surface temperature, and changes in sea level for each alternative CAFE standard. To estimate changes in global precipitation, NHTSA uses increases in global mean surface temperature combined with a scaling approach and coefficients from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. A sensitivity analysis was completed to examine the relationship among the alternatives and likely climate sensitivities, and the associated direct and indirect effects for each combination. These relationships can be used to infer the effect of emissions associated with the regulatory alternatives on direct and indirect climate effects. One of the key categories of inputs to MAGICC is a time series of global GHG emissions. In assessing the cumulative effects on climate, NHTSA used the CCSP SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 scenario to represent a Reference Case global emission scenario, that is, future global emissions assuming significant global actions to address climate change. This Reference Case global emission scenario serves as a baseline against which the climate benefits of the various alternatives can be measured. The Reference Case global emissions scenario used in the cumulative impacts analysis (and described in Chapter 4 of this EIS) differs from the global emissions scenario used for the climate [[Page 49743]] change modeling presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the Reference Case global emission scenario reflects reasonably foreseeable actions in global climate change policy; in Chapter 3, the global emissions scenario used for the analysis assumes that there are no significant global controls. Given that the climate system is non-linear, the choice of a global emissions scenario could produce different estimates of the benefits of the proposed action and alternatives, if the emission reductions of the alternatives were held constant. The SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 scenario assumes a moderate level of global GHG reductions, resulting in a global atmospheric CO2 concentration of roughly 650 parts per million by volume (ppmv) as of 2100. The following regional, national, and international initiatives and programs are reasonably foreseeable actions to reduce GHG emissions: Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI); Western Climate Initiative (WCI); Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord; EPA's Proposed GHG Emissions Standards; H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act (``Waxman-Markey Bill''); Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2); Program Activities of DOE's Office of Fossil Energy; Program Activities of DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy; United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)--The Kyoto Protocol and upcoming Conference of the Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark; G8 Declaration--Summit 2009; and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.\642\ The SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 scenario provides a global context for emissions of a full suite of GHGs and ozone precursors for a Reference Case harmonious with implementation of the above policies and initiatives. Each of the action alternatives was simulated by calculating the difference in annual GHG emissions in relation to the No Action Alternative, and subtracting this change in the MiniCAM Level 3 scenario to generate modified global-scale emissions scenarios, which each show the effect of the various regulatory alternatives on the global emissions path. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \642\ The regional, national, and international initiatives and programs discussed above are those which NHTSA has tentatively concluded are reasonably foreseeable past, current, or future actions to reduce GHG emissions. Although some of the actions, policies, or programs listed are not associated with precise GHG reduction commitments, collectively they illustrate a current and continuing trend of U.S. and global awareness, emphasis, and efforts towards significant GHG reductions. Together they imply that future commitments for reductions are probable and, therefore, reasonably foreseeable under NEPA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA used the MiniCAM Level 3 scenario as the primary global emissions scenario for evaluating climate effects, and used the MiniCAM Level 2 scenario and the RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference emissions scenario to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to alternative emission scenarios. The sensitivity analysis provides a basis for determining climate responses to varying levels of climate sensitivities and global emissions and under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) and the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4). Some responses of the climate system are believed to be non-linear; by using a range of emissions cases and climate sensitivities, it is possible to estimate the effects of the alternatives in relation to different reference cases. Cumulative GHG emissions: Projections of GHG emissions reductions over the 2012 to 2100 period due to the MY 2012-2016 CAFE standards and other reasonably foreseeable future actions ranged from 27,164 to 44,626 MMTCO2. Compared to global emissions of 3,919,462 MMTCO2 over this period (projected by the SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 scenario), the incremental impact of this rulemaking is expected to reduce global CO2 emissions by about 0.7 to 1.1 percent from their projected levels under the No Action Alternative. CO2 concentration, global mean surface temperature, sea- level rise, and precipitation: For the mid-range results of MAGICC model simulations for the No Action Alternative and the eight action alternatives in terms of CO2 concentrations and increase in global mean surface temperature in 2030, 2050, and 2100, the impact on the growth in CO2 concentrations and temperature is just a fraction of the total growth in CO2 concentrations and global mean surface temperature. However, the relative impact of the action alternatives is illustrated by the reduction in growth of both CO2 concentrations and temperature in the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9). There is a fairly narrow band of estimated CO2 concentrations as of 2100, from 653.5 ppm for the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9) to 657.5 ppm for the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1). For 2030 and 2050, the range is even smaller. Because CO2 concentrations are the key driver of all other climate effects, this leads to small differences in these effects. The MAGICC simulations of mean global surface air temperature increases are also shown in Table S-18. For all alternatives, the cumulative global mean surface temperature increase is about 0.80 [deg]C to 0.81 [deg]C as of 2030; 1.32 to 1.33 [deg]C as of 2050; and 2.59 to 2.61 [deg]C as of 2100.\643\ The differences among alternatives are small. For 2100, the reduction in temperature increase for the action alternatives in relation to the No Action Alternative is about 0.01 to 0.02 [deg]C. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \643\ Because the actual increase in global mean surface temperature lags the commitment to warming, the impact on global mean surface temperature increase is less than the long-term commitment to warming. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The impact on sea-level rise in 2100 ranges from 32.84 centimeters under the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) to 32.68 centimeters under the TCTB Alternative (Alternative 9), for a maximum reduction of 0.16 centimeter by 2100 from the action alternatives. Given that the action alternatives would reduce temperature increases slightly in relation to the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1), they also would reduce predicted increases in precipitation slightly. In summary, the impacts of the proposed action and alternatives and other reasonably foreseeable future actions on global mean surface temperature, sea-level rise, and precipitation are relatively small in the context of the expected changes associated with the emissions trajectories in the SRES scenarios.\644\ This is due primarily to the global and multi-sectoral nature of the climate problem. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \644\ These conclusions are not meant to be interpreted as expressing NHTSA's views that impacts on global mean surface temperature, precipitation, or sea-level rise are not areas of concern for policymakers. Under NEPA, the agency is obligated to discuss the environmental impact[s] of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)(i) (emphasis added). This analysis fulfills NHTSA's obligations in this regard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA examined the sensitivity of climate effects on key assumptions used in the analysis. The two variables for which assumptions were varied were climate sensitivity and global emissions. Climate sensitivities used included 2.0, 3.0, and 4.5 [deg]C for a doubling of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. Global emissions scenarios used included the SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 3 (650 ppm as of 2100), the SAP 2.1 MiniCAM Level 2 (550 ppm as of 2100), and RCP 4.5 MiniCAM reference scenario (783 ppm as of 2100). The sensitivity analysis is based on the results provided for two alternatives--the No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) and the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4). The sensitivity analysis was conducted only for two alternatives, as this was deemed sufficient to assess the effect of various climate sensitivities on the results. [[Page 49744]] The results of these simulations illustrate the uncertainty due to factors influencing future global emissions of GHGs (factors other than the CAFE rulemaking). The use of different climate sensitivities \645\ (the equilibrium warming that occurs at a doubling of CO2 from pre-industrial levels) can affect not only warming but also indirectly affect sea-level rise and CO2 concentration. The use of alternative global emissions scenarios can influence the results in several ways. Emissions reductions can lead to larger reductions in the CO2 concentrations in later years because more anthropogenic emissions can be expected to stay in the atmosphere. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \645\ Equilibrium climate sensitivity (or climate sensitivity) is the projected responsiveness of Earth's global climate system to forcing from GHG drivers, and is often expressed in terms of changes to global surface temperature resulting from a doubling of CO2 in relation to pre-industrial atmospheric concentrations. According to IPCC, using a likely emissions scenario that results in a doubling of the concentration of atmospheric CO2, there is a 66- to 90-percent probability of an increase in surface warming of 2.5 to 4.0 [deg]C by the end of the century (relative to 1990 average global temperatures), with 3 [deg]C as the single most likely surface temperature increase. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA's analysis indicates that the sensitivity of the simulated CO2 emissions in 2030, 2050, and 2100 to assumptions of global emissions and climate sensitivity is low; stated simply, CO2 emissions do not change much with changes in global emissions and climate sensitivity. For 2030 and 2050, the choice of global emissions scenario has little impact on the results. By 2100, the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 4) has the greatest impact in the global emissions scenario with the highest CO2 emissions (MiniCAM Reference) and the least impact in the scenario with the lowest CO2 emissions (MiniCAM Level 2). The total range of the impact of the Preferred Alternative on CO2 concentrations in 2100 is from 2.2 to 2.6 ppm. The Reference Case using the MiniCAM Level 3 scenario and a 3.0 [deg]C climate sensitivity has an impact of 2.4 ppm. The sensitivity of the simulated global mean surface temperatures for 2030 is also low due primarily to the slow rate at which the global mean surface temperature increases in response to increases in radiative forcing. The relatively slow response in the climate system explains the observation that even by 2100, when CO2 concentrations more than double in comparison to pre-industrial levels, the temperature increase is below the equilibrium sensitivity levels, i.e., the climate system has not had enough time to equilibrate to the new CO2 concentrations. Nonetheless, as of 2100 there is a larger range in temperatures across the different values of climate sensitivity: The reduction in global mean surface temperature from the No Action Alternative to the Preferred Alternative ranges from 0.008 [deg]C for the 2.0 [deg]C climate sensitivity to 0.012 [deg]C for the 4.5 [deg]C climate sensitivity, for the MiniCAM Level 3 emissions scenario. The impact on global mean surface temperature due to assumptions concerning global emissions of GHGs is also important. The scenario with the higher global emissions of GHGs (viz., the MiniCAM Reference) has a slightly lower reduction in global mean surface temperature, and the scenario with lower global emissions (viz., the MiniCAM Level 2) has a slightly higher reduction. This is in large part due to the non- linear and near-logarithmic relationship between radiative forcing and CO2 concentrations. At high emissions levels, CO2 concentrations are higher and, as a result, a fixed reduction in emissions yields a lower reduction in radiative forcing and global mean surface temperature. The sensitivity of the simulated sea-level rise to changes in climate sensitivity and global GHG emissions mirrors that of global temperature. Scenarios with lower climate sensitivities have lower increases in sea-level rise. The greater the climate sensitivity, the greater the decrement in sea-level rise for the Preferred Alternative as compared to the No Action Alternative. Resource impacts of climate change: The effects of the alternatives on climate--CO2 concentrations, temperature, precipitation, and sea-level rise--can translate into impacts on key resources including terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems; marine, coastal systems, and low-lying areas; food, fiber, and forest products; industries, settlements, and society; and human health. Although the alternatives have the potential to substantially decrease GHG emissions, they would not alone prevent climate change from occurring. The magnitude of the changes in climate effects that the alternatives would produce--two to five parts per million of CO2, a few hundredths of a degree Celsius difference in temperature, a small percentage change in the rate of precipitation increase, and 1 or 2 millimeters of sea-level rise--are too small to address quantitatively in terms of their impacts on resources. Given the enormous resource values at stake, these distinctions could be important--very small percentages of huge numbers can still yield substantial results--but they are too small for current quantitative techniques to resolve. Consequently, the discussion of resource impacts does not distinguish among the CAFE alternatives; rather, it provides a qualitative review of the benefits of reducing GHG emissions and the magnitude of the risks involved in climate change.\646\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \646\ See 42 U.S.C. 4332 (requiring Federal agencies to ``identify and develop methods and procedures * * * which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration''); 40 CFR 1502.23 (requiring an EIS to discuss the relationship between a cost-benefit analysis and any analyses of unquantified environmental impacts, values, and amenities); CEQ, Considering Cumulative Effects Under the National Environmental Policy Act (1984), available at http:// ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepa/ccenepa.htm (recognizing that agencies are sometimes ``limited to qualitative evaluations of effects because cause-and-effect relationships are poorly understood'' or cannot be quantified). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NHTSA examined the impacts resulting from global climate change due to all global emissions on the U.S. and global scale. Impacts to freshwater resources could include changes in precipitation patterns, decreasing aquifer recharge in some locations, changes in snowpack and timing of snowmelt, salt-water intrusion from sea-level changes, changes in weather patterns resulting in flooding or drought in certain regions, increased water temperature, and numerous other changes to freshwater systems that disrupt human use and natural aquatic habitats. Impacts to terrestrial ecosystems could include shifts in species range and migration patterns, potential extinctions of sensitive species unable to adapt to changing conditions, increases in the occurrence of forest fires and pest infestation, and changes in habitat productivity because of increased atmospheric CO2. Impacts to coastal ecosystems, primarily from predicted sea-level rise, could include the loss of coastal areas due to submersion and erosion, additional impacts from severe weather and storm surges, and increased salinization of estuaries and freshwater aquifers (for example, one impact could be reductions in manatee habitat in the Florida coastal areas). Impacts to land use and several key economic sectors could include flooding and severe-weather impacts to coastal, floodplain, and island settlements; extreme heat and cold waves; increases in drought in some locations; and weather- or sea-level related disruptions of the service, agricultural, and transportation sectors. Impacts to human health could include increased mortality and morbidity due to excessive heat, increases in respiratory conditions due to poor air quality, increases in water and food- [[Page 49745]] borne diseases, changes to the seasonal patterns of vector-borne diseases, and increases in malnutrition. Non-climate cumulative impacts of CO2 emissions: In addition to its role as a GHG in the atmosphere, CO2 is transferred from the atmosphere to water, plants, and soil. In water, CO2 combines with water molecules to form carbonic acid. When CO2 dissolves in seawater, a series of well-known chemical reactions begin that increase the concentration of hydrogen ions and make seawater more acidic, which has adverse effects on corals and some other marine life. Increased concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere can also stimulate plant growth to some degree, a phenomenon known as the CO2 fertilization effect. This effect could have positive ramifications for agricultural productivity and forest growth. The available evidence indicates that different plants respond in different ways to enhanced CO2 concentrations. As with the climate effects of CO2, the changes in non- climate impacts associated with the alternatives are difficult to assess quantitatively. Whether the distinction in concentrations is substantial across alternatives is not clear because the damage functions and potential existence of thresholds for CO2 concentration are not known. However, what is clear is that a reduction in the rate of increase in atmospheric CO2, which all the action alternatives would provide to some extent, would reduce the ocean acidification effect and the CO2 fertilization effect. For much more information on NHTSA's NEPA analysis, please see the DEIS. 3. Regulatory Flexibility Act Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency is required to publish a notice of rulemaking for any proposed or final rule, it must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities (i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions). The Small Business Administration's regulations at 13 CFR part 121 define a small business, in part, as a business entity ``which operates primarily within the United States.'' 13 CFR 121.105(a). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required if the head of an agency certifies the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I certify that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The following is NHTSA's statement providing the factual basis for the certification (5 U.S.C. 605(b)). If adopted, the proposal would directly affect twenty-one large single stage motor vehicle manufacturers.\647\ The proposal would also affect two small domestic single stage motor vehicle manufacturers, Saleen and Tesla.\648\ According to the Small Business Administration's small business size standards (see 13 CFR 121.201), a single stage automobile or light truck manufacturer (NAICS code 336111, Automobile Manufacturing; 336112, Light Truck and Utility Vehicle Manufacturing) must have 1,000 or fewer employees to qualify as a small business. Both Saleen and Tesla have less than 1,000 employees and make less than 1,000 vehicles per year. We believe that the rulemaking would not have a significant economic impact on these small vehicle manufacturers because under Part 525, passenger car manufacturers making less than 10,000 vehicles per year can petition NHTSA to have alternative standards set for those manufacturers. Tesla produces only electric vehicles with fuel economy values far beyond those proposed today, so we would not expect them to need to petition for relief. Saleen modifies a very small number of vehicles produced by one of the 21 large single-stage manufacturers, and currently does not meet the 27.5 mpg passenger car standard, nor is it anticipated to be able to meet the standards proposed today. However, Saleen already petitions the agency for relief. If the standard is raised, it has no meaningful impact on Saleen, because it must still go through the same process to petition for relief. Given that there already is a mechanism for handling small businesses, which is the purpose of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, a regulatory flexibility analysis was not prepared. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \647\ BMW, Daimler (Mercedes), Chrysler, Ferrari, Ford, Subaru, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Lotus, Maserati, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Suzuki, Tata, Toyota, and Volkswagen. \648\ The Regulatory Flexibility Act only requires analysis of small domestic manufacturers. There are two passenger car manufacturers that we know of, Saleen and Tesla, and no light truck manufacturers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism) Executive Order 13132 requires NHTSA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' The Order defines the term ``Policies that have federalism implications'' to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.'' Under the Order, NHTSA may not issue a regulation that has federalism implications, that imposes substantial direct compliance costs, and that is not required by statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local governments, or NHTSA consults with State and local officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation. NHTSA solicits comment on this proposed action from State and local officials. In his January 26 memorandum, the President requested NHTSA to ``consider whether any provisions regarding preemption are consistent with the EISA, the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and other relevant provisions of law and the policies underlying them.'' NHTSA is deferring consideration of the preemption issue. The agency believes that it is unnecessary to address the issue further at this time because of the consistent and coordinated Federal standards that would apply nationally under the proposed National Program. 5. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform) Pursuant to Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice Reform,'' \649\ NHTSA has considered whether this rulemaking would have any retroactive effect. This proposed rule does not have any retroactive effect. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \649\ 61 FR 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) requires Federal agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of a proposed or final rule that includes a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of more than $100 million in any one year (adjusted for inflation with base year of 1995). Adjusting this amount by the implicit gross domestic product price deflator for 2006 results in $126 million (116.043/ 92.106=1.26). Before promulgating a rule for which a written statement is needed, section 205 of [[Page 49746]] UMRA generally requires NHTSA to identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule. The provisions of section 205 do not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover, section 205 allows NHTSA to adopt an alternative other than the least costly, most cost- effective, or least burdensome alternative if the agency publishes with the final rule an explanation why that alternative was not adopted. This proposed rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, of more than $126 million annually, but it will result in the expenditure of that magnitude by vehicle manufacturers and/or their suppliers. In promulgating this proposal, NHTSA considered a variety of alternative average fuel economy standards lower and higher than those proposed. NHTSA is statutorily required to set standards at the maximum feasible level achievable by manufacturers based on its consideration and balancing of relevant factors and has tentatively concluded that the proposed fuel economy standards are the maximum feasible standards for the passenger car and light truck fleets for MYs 2012-2016 in light of the statutory considerations. 7. Paperwork Reduction Act Under the procedures established by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, a person is not required to respond to a collection of information by a Federal agency unless the collection displays a valid OMB control number. This section describes a request for clearance for a collection of information associated with product plan information to assist the agency in developing final corporate average fuel economy standards for MY 2012 through 2016 passenger cars and light trucks. The establishment of those standards is required by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140. In compliance with the PRA, this notice requests comment on the Information Collection Request (ICR) abstracted below. The ICR describes the nature of the information collection and its expected burden. This is a request for an extension of an existing collection. Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Title: 49 CFR parts 531 and 533 Passenger Car Average Fuel Economy Standards--Model Years 2008-2020; Light Truck Average Fuel Economy Standards--Model Years 2008-2020; Production Plan Data Type of Request: Extension of existing collection. OMB Clearance Number: 2127-0655. Form Number: This collection of information will not use any standard forms. Summary of the Collection of Information In this collection of information, NHTSA is requesting any updates to previously-submitted future product plans from vehicle manufacturers, as well as production data through the recent past, including data about engines and transmissions for model year (MY) 2008 through MY 2020 passenger cars and light trucks and the assumptions underlying those plans. If manufacturers have not previously submitted product plan information to NHTSA and wish to do so, NHTSA also requests such information from them. NHTSA requests information for MYs 2008-2020 to supplement other information used by NHTSA in developing a realistic forecast of the MY 2012-2016 vehicle market, and in evaluating what technologies may feasibly be applied by manufacturers to achieve compliance with the MY 2012-2016 standards. Information regarding earlier model years may help the agency to better account for cumulative effects such as volume- and time-based reductions in costs, and also may help to reveal product mix and technology application trends during model years for which the agency is currently receiving actual corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) compliance data. Information regarding later model years may help the agency gain a better understanding of how manufacturers' plans through MY 2016 relate to their longer-term expectations regarding Energy Independence and Security Act requirements, market trends, and prospects for more advanced technologies. NHTSA will also consider information from model years before and after MYs 2012-2016 when reviewing manufacturers' planned schedules for redesigning and freshening their products, in order to examine how manufacturers anticipate tying technology introduction to product design schedules and to consider how the agency should account for those schedules in its analysis for the final rule. In addition, the agency is requesting information regarding manufacturers' estimates of the future vehicle population, and fuel economy improvements and incremental costs attributed to this notice. Description of the Need for the Information and Use of the Information NHTSA needs the information described above to aid in assessing what CAFE standards should be established for MY 2012 through 2016 passenger cars and light trucks. Description of the Likely Respondents (Including Estimated Number, and Proposed Frequency of Response to the Collection of Information) It is estimated that this collection affects approximately 22 motor vehicle manufacturers. The information that is the subject of this collection of information is collected whenever NHTSA publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking for the purpose of setting CAFE standards. Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden Resulting From the Collection of Information It is estimated that this collection affects approximately 22 vehicle manufacturers. One major manufacturer (General Motors) estimated their burden to be approximately 4,300 hours. The burden to other manufacturers was estimated using sales weights relative to General Motor's total sales (e.g., if a manufacturer produces 50 percent as many vehicles as General Motors, their burden is estimated to be 4,300 * 0.5 = 2,150 hours). Therefore the burden to each manufacturer depends on the number of vehicles that manufacturer produces. The total estimated burden is 16,000 hours annually. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Number of Affected Vehicle Manufacturers.. 22 Annual Labor Hours for Each Manufacturer Variable To Prepare and Submit Required Information. ----------------------------- Total Annual Information Collection 16,000 Hours Burden. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The monetized cost associated with this information collection is determined by multiplying the total labor hours by an appropriate labor rate. For this information collection, we believe vehicle manufacturers will use mechanical engineers to prepare and submit the data. Therefore, we are applying a labor rate of $36.02 per hour which is the median national wage for mechanical engineers.\650\ Thus, the [[Page 49747]] estimated monetized annual cost is 16,000 hours x $36.02 per hour = $576,320. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \650\ The national median hourly rate for mechanical engineers, May 2008, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is $36.02. See http://www.bls.gov/oes/2008/may/oes_nat.htm#b17-0000 (last accessed August 26, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comments are specifically sought on the following issues: • Whether the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Department, including whether the information will have practical utility. • Whether the Department's estimate for the burden of the information collection is accurate. • Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology. Please send comments to the docket number cited in the heading of this notice. PRA comments are due within 60 days following publication of this document in the Federal Register. The agency recognizes that the amendment to the existing collection of information may be subject to revision in response to public comments and the OMB review. For further information on this proposal to extend the collection of information, please contact Ken Katz, Fuel Economy Division, Office of International Policy, Fuel Economy, and Consumer Programs, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. You may also contact him by phone at (202) 366- 0846 or by fax at (202) 493-2290. 8. Regulation Identifier Number The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda. 9. Executive Order 13045 Executive Order 13045 \651\ applies to any rule that: (1) Is determined to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866, and (2) concerns an environmental, health, or safety risk that NHTSA has reason to believe may have a disproportionate effect on children. If the regulatory action meets both criteria, we must evaluate the environmental health or safety effects of the proposed rule on children, and explain why the proposed regulation is preferable to other potentially effective and reasonably foreseeable alternatives considered by us. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \651\ 62 FR 19885 (Apr. 23, 1997). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4 of NHTSA's DEIS notes that breathing PM can cause respiratory ailments, heart attack, and arrhythmias (Dockery et al. 1993, Samet et al. 2000, Pope et al. 1995, 2002, 2004, Pope and Dockery 2006, Dominici et al. 2006, Laden et al. 2006, all in Ebi et al. 2008). Populations at greatest risk could include children, the elderly, and those with heart and lung disease, diabetes (Ebi et al. 2008), and high blood pressure (K[uuml]nzli et al. 2005, in Ebi et al. 2008). Chronic exposure to PM could decrease lifespan by 1 to 3 years (Pope 2000, in American Lung Association 2008). Increasing PM concentrations are expected to have a measurable adverse impact on human health (Confalonieri et al. 2007). Additionally, the DEIS notes that substantial morbidity and childhood mortality has been linked to water- and food-borne diseases. Climate change is projected to alter temperature and the hydrologic cycle through changes in precipitation, evaporation, transpiration, and water storage. These changes, in turn, potentially affect water-borne and food-borne diseases, such as salmonellosis, campylobacter, leptospirosis, and pathogenic species of vibrio. They also have a direct impact on surface water availability and water quality. It has been estimated that more than 1 billion people in 2002 did not have access to adequate clean water (McMichael et al. 2003, in Epstein et al. 2006). Increased temperatures, greater evaporation, and heavy rain events have been associated with adverse impacts on drinking water through increased waterborne diseases, algal blooms, and toxins (Chorus and Bartram 1999, Levin et al. 2002, Johnson and Murphy 2004, all in Epstein et al. 2006). A seasonal signature has been associated with waterborne disease outbreaks (EPA 2009b). In the United States, 68 percent of all waterborne diseases between 1948 and 1994 were observed after heavy rainfall events (Curriero et al. 2001a, in Epstein et al. 2006). Climate change could further impact a pathogen by directly affecting its life cycle (Ebi et al. 2008). The global increase in the frequency, intensity, and duration of red tides could be linked to local impacts already associated with climate change (Harvell et al. 1999, in Epstein et al. 2006); toxins associated with red tide directly affect the nervous system (Epstein et al. 2006). Many people do not report or seek medical attention for their ailments of water-borne or food-borne diseases; hence, the number of actual cases with these diseases is greater than clinical records demonstrate (Mead et al. 1999, in Ebi et al. 2008). Many of the gastrointestinal diseases associated with water-borne and food-borne diseases can be self-limiting; however, vulnerable populations include young children, those with a compromised immune system, and the elderly. Thus, as detailed in the DEIS, NHTSA has evaluated the environmental health and safety effects of the proposed rule on children. The DEIS also explains why the proposed regulation is preferable to other potentially effective and reasonably foreseeable alternatives considered by the agency. 10. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act Section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA) requires NHTA to evaluate and use existing voluntary consensus standards in its regulatory activities unless doing so would be inconsistent with applicable law (e.g., the statutory provisions regarding NHTSA's vehicle safety authority) or otherwise impractical. Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies. Technical standards are defined by the NTTAA as ``performance-base or design-specific technical specification and related management systems practices.'' They pertain to ``products and processes, such as size, strength, or technical performance of a product, process or material.'' Examples of organizations generally regarded as voluntary consensus standards bodies include the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). If NHTSA does not use available and potentially applicable voluntary consensus standards, we are required by the Act to provide Congress, through OMB, an explanation of the reasons for not using such standards. There are currently no voluntary consensus standards relevant to today's proposed CAFE standards. 11. Executive Order 13211 Executive Order 13211 \652\ applies to any rule that: (1) Is determined to be economically significant as defined under E.O. 12866, and is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the Administrator of the Office of [[Page 49748]] Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action. If the regulatory action meets either criterion, we must evaluate the adverse energy effects of the proposed rule and explain why the proposed regulation is preferable to other potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives considered by us. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \652\ 66 FR 28355 (May 18, 2001). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The proposed rule seeks to establish passenger car and light truck fuel economy standards that will reduce the consumption of petroleum and will not have any adverse energy effects. Accordingly, this proposed rulemaking action is not designated as a significant energy action. 12. Department of Energy Review In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32902(j)(1), we submitted this proposed rule to the Department of Energy for review. That Department did not make any comments that we have not addressed. 13. Plain Language Executive Order 12866 requires each agency to write all rules in plain language. Application of the principles of plain language includes consideration of the following questions: • Have we organized the material to suit the public's needs? • Are the requirements in the rule clearly stated? • Does the rule contain technical language or jargon that isn't clear? • Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, use of headings, paragraphing) make the rule easier to understand? • Would more (but shorter) sections be better? • Could we improve clarity by adding tables, lists, or diagrams? • What else could we do to make the rule easier to understand? If you have any responses to these questions, please include them in your comments on this proposal. 14. Privacy Act Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an organization, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register (65 FR 19477-78, April 11, 2000) or you may visit http://www.dot.gov/privacy.html. List of Subjects 40 CFR Part 86 Administrative practice and procedure, Confidential business information, Labeling, Motor vehicle pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 40 CFR Part 600 Administrative practice and procedure, Electric power, Fuel economy, Incorporation by reference, Labeling, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 49 CFR Part 531 and 533 Fuel economy. 49 CFR Part 537 Fuel economy, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 49 CFR Part 538 Administrative practice and procedure, Fuel economy, Motor vehicles, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Environmental Protection Agency 40 CFR Chapter I For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Environmental Protection Agency proposes to amend parts 86 and 600 of title 40, Chapter I of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows: PART 86--CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NEW AND IN-USE HIGHWAY VEHICLES AND ENGINES 1. The authority citation for part 86 continues to read as follows: Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q. 2. Section 86.1 is amended by adding paragraphs (b)(2)(xxxix) through (xxxxi) to read as follows: Sec. 86.1 Reference materials. * * * * * (b) * * * (2) * * * (xxxix) SAE J2064, December 2005, R134a Refrigerant Automotive Air- Conditioned Hose, IBR approved for Sec. 86.166-12. (xxxx) SAE J2727, revised August 2008, HFC-134a Mobile Air Conditioning System Refrigerant Emission Chart, IBR approved for Sec. 86.166-12. (xxxxi) SAE J2765, October, 2008, Procedure for Measuring System COP [Coefficient of Performance] of a Mobile Air Conditioning System on a Test Bench, IBR approved for Sec. 86.1866-12. * * * * * Subpart B--[Amended] 3. Section 86.111-94 is amended by revising paragraph (b) introductory text to read as follows: Sec. 86.111-94 Exhaust gas analytical system. * * * * * (b) Major component description. The exhaust gas analytical system, Figure B94-7, consists of a flame ionization detector (FID) (heated, 235 [deg] ± 15 [deg]F (113 [deg] ± 8 [deg]C) for methanol-fueled vehicles) for the determination of THC, a methane analyzer (consisting of a gas chromatograph combined with a FID) for the determination of CH4, non-dispersive infrared analyzers (NDIR) for the determination of CO and CO2, a chemiluminescence analyzer (CL) for the determination of NOX, and an analyzer meeting the requirements specified in Sec. 86.167-12 for the determination of N2O for 2012 and later model year vehicles. A heated flame ionization detector (HFID) is used for the continuous determination of THC from petroleum-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles (may also be used with methanol-fueled diesel- cycle vehicles), Figure B94-5 (or B94-6). The analytical system for methanol consists of a gas chromatograph (GC) equipped with a flame ionization detector. The analysis for formaldehyde is performed using high-pressure liquid chromatography (HPLC) of 2,4- dinitrophenylhydrazine (DNPH) derivatives using ultraviolet (UV) detection. The exhaust gas analytical system shall conform to the following requirements: * * * * * 4. Section 86.127-00 is amended as follows: a. By revising the introductory text. b. By revising paragraph (a) introductory text. c. By revising paragraph (a)(1), d. By revising paragraph (b). e. By revising paragraph (c). f. By revising paragraphs (d) and (e). Sec. 86.127-00 Test procedures; overview. Applicability. The procedures described in this subpart are used to determine the conformity of vehicles with the standards set forth in subpart A or S of this part (as applicable) for light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles. Except where noted, the procedures of paragraphs (a) through (b) of this section, Sec. 86.127-96 (c) and (d), and the contents of Sec. Sec. 86.135-94, 86.136-90, 86.137-96, 86.140-94, 86.142-90, and 86.144-94 are applicable for determining emission results for vehicle exhaust emission systems designed to comply with the FTP emission standards, or the FTP emission element required for determining compliance with composite SFTP standards. Paragraphs (f) and (g) of this section discuss the additional test elements of [[Page 49749]] aggressive driving (US06) and air conditioning (SC03) that comprise the exhaust emission components of the SFTP. Section 86.127-96(e) discusses fuel spitback emissions and paragraphs (h) and (i) of this section are applicable to all vehicle emission test procedures. Section 86.127-00 includes text that specifies requirements that differ from Sec. 86.127-96. Where a paragraph in Sec. 86.127-96 is identical and applicable to Sec. 86.127-00, this may be indicated by specifying the corresponding paragraph and the statement ``[Reserved]. For guidance see Sec. 86.127-96.'' (a) The overall test consists of prescribed sequences of fueling, parking, and operating test conditions. Vehicles are tested for any or all of the following emissions, depending upon the specific test requirements and the vehicle fuel type: (1) Gaseous exhaust THC, NMHC, CO, NOX, CO2, N2O, CH4, CH3OH, C2H5OH, C2H4O, and HCHO. * * * * * (b) The FTP Otto-cycle exhaust emission test is designed to determine gaseous THC, CO, CO2, CH4, NOX, N2O, and particulate mass emissions from gasoline-fueled, methanol-fueled and gaseous-fueled Otto-cycle vehicles as well as methanol and formaldehyde from methanol-fueled Otto-cycle vehicles, as well as methanol, ethanol, acetaldehyde, and formaldehyde from ethanol-fueled vehicles while simulating an average trip in an urban area of 11 miles (18 kilometers). The test consists of engine start-ups and vehicle operation on a chassis dynamometer through a specified driving schedule (see paragraph (a) of appendix I to this part for the Urban Dynamometer Driving Schedule). A proportional part of the diluted exhaust is collected continuously for subsequent analysis, using a constant volume (variable dilution) sampler or critical flow venturi sampler. (c) The diesel-cycle exhaust emission test is designed to determine particulate and gaseous mass emissions during a test similar to the test in Sec. 86.127(b). For petroleum-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles, diluted exhaust is continuously analyzed for THC using a heated sample line and analyzer; the other gaseous emissions (CH4, CO, CO2, N2O, and NOX) are collected continuously for analysis as in Sec. 86.127(b). For methanol- and ethanol-fueled vehicles, THC, methanol, formaldehyde, CO, CO2, CH4, N2O, and NOX are collected continuously for analysis as in Sec. 86.127(b). Additionally, for ethanol-fueled vehicles, ethanol and acetaldehyde are collected continuously for analysis as in Sec. 86.127(b). THC, methanol, ethanol, acetaldehyde, and formaldehyde are collected using heated sample lines, and a heated FID is used for THC analyses. Simultaneous with the gaseous exhaust collection and analysis, particulates from a proportional part of the diluted exhaust are collected continuously on a filter. The mass of particulate is determined by the procedure described in Sec. 86.139. This testing requires a dilution tunnel as well as the constant volume sampler. (d)-(e) [Reserved]. For guidance see Sec. 86.127-96. * * * * * 5. Section 86.135-00 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows: Sec. 86.135-12 Dynamometer procedure. * * * * * (a) Overview. The dynamometer run consists of two tests, a ``cold'' start test, after a minimum 12-hour and a maximum 36-hour soak according to the provisions of Sec. Sec. 86.132 and 86.133, and a ``hot'' start test following the ``cold'' start by 10 minutes. Engine startup (with all accessories turned off), operation over the UDDS and engine shutdown make a complete cold start test. Engine startup and operation over the first 505 seconds of the driving schedule complete the hot start test. The exhaust emissions are diluted with ambient air in the dilution tunnel as shown in Figure B94-5 and Figure B94-6. A dilution tunnel is not required for testing vehicles waived from the requirement to measure particulates. Six particulate samples are collected on filters for weighing; the first sample plus backup is collected during the first 505 seconds of the cold start test; the second sample plus backup is collected during the remainder of the cold start test (including shutdown); the third sample plus backup is collected during the hot start test. Continuous proportional samples of gaseous emissions are collected for analysis during each test phase. For gasoline-fueled, natural gas-fueled and liquefied petroleum gas- fueled Otto-cycle vehicles, the composite samples collected in bags are analyzed for THC, CO, CO2, CH4, NOX, and, for 2012 and later model year vehicles, N2O. For petroleum-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles (optional for natural gas- fueled, liquefied petroleum gas-fueled and methanol-fueled diesel-cycle vehicles), THC is sampled and analyzed continuously according to the provisions of Sec. 86.110. Parallel samples of the dilution air are similarly analyzed for THC, CO, CO2, CH4, NOX, and, for 2012 and later model year vehicles, N2O. For natural gas-fueled, liquefied petroleum gas-fueled and methanol-fueled vehicles, bag samples are collected and analyzed for THC (if not sampled continuously), CO, CO2, CH4, NOX, and, for 2012 and later model year vehicles, N2O. For methanol-fueled vehicles, methanol and formaldehyde samples are taken for both exhaust emissions and dilution air (a single dilution air formaldehyde sample, covering the total test period may be collected). For ethanol-fueled vehicles, methanol, ethanol, acetaldehyde, and formaldehyde samples are taken for both exhaust emissions and dilution air (a single dilution air formaldehyde sample, covering the total test period may be collected). Parallel bag samples of dilution air are analyzed for THC, CO, CO2, CH4, NOX, and, for 2012 and later model year vehicles, N2O. Methanol and formaldehyde samples may be omitted for 1990 through 1994 model years when a FID calibrated on methanol is used. * * * * * 6. A new Sec. 86.165-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows: Sec. 86.165-12 Air conditioning idle test procedure. (a) Applicability. This section describes procedures for determining air conditioning-related CO2 emissions from 2014 and later model year light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles. The results of this test are used to qualify for air conditioning efficiency CO2 credits according to Sec. 86.1866-12(c). (b) Overview. The test consists of a brief period to stabilize the vehicle at idle, followed by a ten-minute period at idle when CO2 emissions are measured without any air conditioning systems operating, followed by a ten-minute period at idle when CO2 emissions are measured with the air conditioning system operating. This test is designed to determine the air conditioning- related CO2 emission value, in grams per minute. If engine stalling occurs during cycle operation, follow the provisions of Sec. 86.136-90 to restart the test. Measurement instruments must meet the specifications described in this subpart. (c) Test cell ambient conditions. (1) Ambient humidity within the test cell during all phases of the test sequence shall be controlled to an average of 50 ± 5 grains of water/pound of dry air. (2) Ambient air temperature within the test cell during all phases of the test sequence shall be controlled to 75 ± 2 [deg]F on average and 75 ± 5 [deg]F as an instantaneous measurement. Air temperature shall be recorded [[Page 49750]] continuously at a minimum of 30 second intervals. (d) Test sequence. (1) Connect the vehicle exhaust system to the raw sampling location or dilution stage according to the provisions of this subpart. For dilution systems, dilute the exhaust as described in this subpart. Continuous sampling systems must meet the specifications provided in this subpart. (2) Test the vehicle in a fully warmed-up condition. If the vehicle has soaked for two hours or less since the last exhaust test element, preconditioning may consist of a 505 Cycle, 866 Cycle, US06, or SC03, as these terms are defined in Sec. 86.1803-01, or a highway fuel economy test procedure, as defined in Sec. 600.002-08 of this chapter. For longer soak periods, precondition the vehicle using one full Urban Dynamometer Driving Schedule. Ensure that the vehicle has stabilized at test cell ambient conditions such that the vehicle interior temperature is not substantially different from the external test cell temperature. Windows may be opened during preconditioning to achieve this stabilization. (3) Immediately after the preconditioning, turn off any cooling fans, if present, close the vehicle's hood, fully close all the vehicle's windows, ensure that all the vehicle's air conditioning systems are set to full off, start the CO2 sampling system, and then idle the vehicle for not less than 1 minute and not more than 5 minutes to achieve normal and stable idle operation. (4) Measure and record the continuous CO2 concentration for 600 seconds. Measure the CO2 concentration continuously using raw or dilute sampling procedures. Multiply this concentration by the continuous (raw or dilute) flow rate at the emission sampling location to determine the CO2 flow rate. Calculate the CO2 cumulative flow rate continuously over the test interval. This cumulative value is the total mass of the emitted CO2. (5) Within 60 seconds after completing the measurement described in paragraph (d)(4) of this section, turn on the vehicle's air conditioning system. Set automatic air conditioning systems to a temperature 9 [deg]F (5 [deg]C) below the ambient temperature of the test cell. Set manual air conditioning systems to maximum cooling with recirculation turned off, except that recirculation shall be enabled if the air conditioning system automatically defaults to a recirculation mode when set to maximum cooling. Continue idling the vehicle while measuring and recording the continuous CO2 concentration for 600 seconds as described in paragraph (d)(4) of this section. Air conditioning systems with automatic temperature controls are finished with the test. Manually controlled air conditioning systems must complete one additional idle period described in paragraph (d)(6) of this section. (6) This paragraph (d)(6) applies only to manually controlled air conditioning systems. Within 60 seconds after completing the measurement described in paragraph (d)(5) of this section, leave the vehicle's air conditioning system on and set as described in paragraph (d)(5) of this section but set the fan speed to the lowest setting that continues to provide air flow. Recirculation shall be turned off except that if the system defaults to a recirculation mode when set to maximum cooling and maintains recirculation with the low fan speed, then recirculation shall continue to be enabled. After the fan speed has been set, continue idling the vehicle while measuring and recording the continuous CO2 concentration for a total of 600 seconds as described in paragraph (d)(4) of this section. (e) Calculations. (1) For the measurement with no air conditioning, calculate the CO2 emissions (in grams per minute) by dividing the total mass of CO2 from paragraph (d)(4) of this section by 10.0 (the duration in minutes for which CO2 is measured). Round this result to the nearest whole gram per minute. (2)(i) For the measurement with air conditioning in operation for automatic air conditioning systems, calculate the CO2 emissions (in grams per minute) by dividing the total mass of CO2 from paragraph (d)(5) of this section by 10.0. Round this result to the nearest whole gram per minute. (ii) For the measurement with air conditioning in operation for manually controlled air conditioning systems, calculate the CO2 emissions (in grams per minute) by summing the total mass of CO2 from paragraphs (d)(5) and (d)(6) of this section and dividing by 20.0. Round this result to the nearest whole gram per minute. (3) Calculate the increased CO2 emissions due to air conditioning (in grams per minute) by subtracting the results of paragraph (e)(1) of this section from the results of paragraph (e)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section, whichever is applicable. 7. A new Sec. 86.166-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows: Sec. 86.166-12 Method for calculating emissions due to air conditioning leakage. This section describes procedures used to determine a refrigerant leakage rate from vehicle-based air conditioning units. The results of this test are used to determine air conditioning leakage credits according to Sec. 86.1866-12(b). (a) Emission totals. Calculate an annual rate of refrigerant leakage from an air conditioning system using the following equation: Grams/YRTOT = Grams/YRRP + Grams/ YRSP + Grams/YRFH + Grams/YRMC + Grams/YRC - Grams/YRCREDIT Where: Grams/YRTOT = Total air conditioning system emission rate in grams per year and rounded to the nearest tenth of a gram per year. Grams/YRRP = Emission rate for rigid pipe connections as described in paragraph (b) of this section. Grams/YRSP = Emission rate for service ports and refrigerant control devices as described in paragraph (c) of this section. Grams/YRFH = Emission rate for flexible hoses as described in paragraph (d) of this section. Grams/YRMC = Emission rate for heat exchangers, mufflers, receiver/driers, and accumulators as described in paragraph (e) of this section. Grams/YRC = Emission rate for compressors as described in paragraph (f) of this section. Grams/YRCREDIT = Leakage monitoring credit, as applicable, from paragraph (g) of this section. (b) Fittings. Determine the grams per year emission rate for rigid pipe connections using the following equation: Grams/YRRP = 0.00522 [middot] [(125 [middot] SO) + (75 [middot] SCO) + (50 [middot] MO) + (10 [middot] SW) + (5 [middot] SWO) + (MG)] Where: Grams/YRRP = Total emission rate for rigid pipe connections in grams per year. SO = The number of single O-ring connections. SCO = The number of single captured O-ring connections. MO = The number of multiple O-ring connections. SW = The number of seal washer connections. SWO = The number of seal washer with O-ring connections. MG = The number of metal gasket connections. (c) Service ports and refrigerant control devices. Determine the grams per year emission rate for service ports and refrigerant control devices using the following equation: Grams/YRSP = (0.3 [middot] HSSP [middot] 0.522) + (0.2 [middot] LSSP [middot] 0.522) + (0.2 [middot] STV [middot] 0.522) + (0.2 [middot] TXV [middot] 0.522) Where: Grams/YRSP = The emission rate for service ports and refrigerant control devices, in grams per year. HSSP = The number of high side service ports. [[Page 49751]] LSSP = The number of low side service ports. STV = The total number of switches, transducers, and pressure relief valves. TXV = The number of TXV refrigerant control devices. (d) Flexible hoses. Determine the permeation emission rate in grams per year for each segment of flexible hose using the following equation, and then sum the values for each hose in the system to calculate a total emission rate for the system: Grams/YRFH = 0.00522 [middot] (3.14159 [middot] ID [middot] L [middot] ER) Where: Grams/YRFH = Emission rate for a segment of flexible hose in grams per year. ID = Inner diameter of hose, in millimeters. L = Length of hose, in millimeters. ER = Emission rate per unit internal surface area of the hose, in g/ mm\2\. Select the appropriate value from the following table: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ER Material/configuration ----------------------------------------- High-pressure side Low-pressure side ------------------------------------------------------------------------ All rubber hose............... 0.0216 0.0144 Standard barrier or veneer 0.0054 0.0036 hose......................... Ultra-low permeation barrier 0.00225 0.00167 or veneer hose............... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (e) Heat exchangers, mufflers, receiver/driers, and accumulators. Use an emission rate of 0.261 grams per year as a combined value for all heat exchangers, mufflers, receiver/driers, and accumulators (Grams/YRMC). (f) Compressors. Determine the emission rate for compressors using the following equation, except that the final term in the equation (``1500/SSL'') is not applicable to electric (or semi-hermetic) compressors: Grams/YRC = 0.00522 [middot] [(300 [middot] OHS) + (200 [middot] MHS) + (150 [middot] FAP) + (100 [middot] GHS) + (1500/SSL)] Where: Grams/YRC = The emission rate for the compressors in the air conditioning system, in grams per year. OHS = The number of O-ring housing seals. MHS = The number of molded housing seals. FAP = The number of fitting adapter plates. GHS = The number of gasket housing seals. SSL = The number of lips on shaft seal (for belt-driven compressors only). (g) Leakage monitoring credits. Electronic monitoring systems that provide indication of a refrigerant loss to the operator through an interior driver information display or an air conditioning-specific malfunction indicator when the air conditioning system has lost 40 percent of its charge capacity shall use a credit of 1 g/yr. (h) Definitions. The following definitions apply to this section: (1) All rubber hose means a Type A or Type B hose as defined by SAE J2064 with a permeation rate not greater than 15 kg/m\2\/year when tested according to SAE J2064. SAE J2064 is incorporated by reference; see Sec. 86.1. (2) Standard barrier or veneer hose means a Type C, D, E, or F hose as defined by SAE J2064 with a permeation rate not greater than 5 kg/ m\2\/year when tested according to SAE J2064. SAE J2064 is incorporated by reference; see Sec. 86.1. (3) Ultra-low permeation barrier or veneer hose means a hose with a permeation rate not greater than 1.5 kg/m\2\/year when tested according to SAE J2064. SAE J2064 is incorporated by reference; see Sec. 86.1. 8. A new Sec. 86.167-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows: Sec. 86.167-12 N2O measurement devices. (a) General component requirements. We recommend that you use an analyzer that meets the specifications in Table 1 of 40 CFR 1065.205. Note that your system must meet the linearity verification in 40 CFR 1065.307. (b) Instrument types. You may use any of the following analyzers to measure N2O: (1) Nondispersive infra-red (NDIR) analyzer. You may use an NDIR analyzer that has compensation algorithms that are functions of other gaseous measurements and the engine's known or assumed fuel properties. The target value for any compensation algorithm is 0.0% (that is, no bias high and no bias low), regardless of the uncompensated signal's bias. (2) Fourier transform infra-red (FTIR) analyzer. You may use an FTIR analyzer that has compensation algorithms that are functions of other gaseous measurements and the engine's known or assumed fuel properties. The target value for any compensation algorithm is 0.0% (that is, no bias high and no bias low), regardless of the uncompensated signal's bias. Use EPA Test Method 320 ``Measurement of Vapor Phase Organic and Inorganic Emissions by Extractive Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) Spectroscopy'' for spectral interpretation (see 40 CFR part 63 appendix A). (3) Photoacoustic analyzer. You may use a photoacoustic analyzer that has compensation algorithms that are functions of other gaseous measurements. The target value for any compensation algorithm is 0.0% (that is, no bias high and no bias low), regardless of the uncompensated signal's bias. Use an optical wheel configuration that gives analytical priority to measurement of the least stable components in the sample. Select a sample integration time of at least 5 seconds. Take into account sample chamber and sample line volumes when determining flush times for your instrument. (4) Gas chromatograph (GC) analyzer. You may use a gas chromatograph with Electron Capture Detector (ECD) to measure N2O concentrations of diluted exhaust for batch sampling. You may use a packed or porous layer open tubular (PLOT) column phase of suitable polarity and length to achieve adequate resolution of the N2O peak for analysis. Examples of acceptable columns are a PLOT column consisting of bonded polystyrene-divinylbenzene or a Porapack Q packed column. Take the column temperature profile and carrier gas selection into consideration when setting up your method to achieve adequate N2O peak resolution. (c) Interference validation. Perform interference validation for NDIR, FTIR, and Photoacoustic analyzers using the procedures of Sec. 86.168-12 as follows: (1) Certain interference gases can positively interfere with these analyzers by causing a response similar to N2O as follows: (i) The interference gases for NDIR analyzers are CO, CO2, H2O, CH4 and SO2. Note that interference species, with the exception of H2O, are dependent on the N2O infrared absorption band chosen by the instrument manufacturer and should be determined independently for each analyzer. (ii) Use good engineering judgment to determine interference gases for FTIR. Note that interference species, with the exception of H2O, are dependent on the N2O infrared absorption band chosen by the instrument manufacturer and should be determined independently for each analyzer. (iii) The interference gases for photoacoustic analyzers are CO, CO2, and H2O. [[Page 49752]] (2) Analyzers must have combined interference that is within (0.0 ± 1.0) mol/mol. We strongly recommend a lower interference that is within (0.0 ± 0.5) mol/. 9. A new Sec. 86.168-12 is added to subpart B to read as follows: Sec. 86.168-12 Interference verification for N2O analyzers. (a) Scope and frequency. See 40 CFR 1065.275 to determine whether you need to verify the amount of interference after initial analyzer installation and after major maintenance. (b) Measurement principles. Interference gasses can positively interfere with certain analyzers by causing a response similar to N2O. If the analyzer uses compensation algorithms that utilize measurements of other gases to meet this interference verification, simultaneously conduct these other measurements to test the compensation algorithms during the analyzer interference verification. (c) System requirements. See 40 CFR 1065.275 for system requirements related to allowable interference levels. (d) Procedure. Perform the interference verification as follows: (1) Start, operate, zero, and span the N2O FTIR analyzer as you would before an emission test. If the sample is passed through a dryer during emission testing, you may run this verification test with the dryer if it meets the requirements of 40 CFR 1065.342. Operate the dryer at the same conditions as you will for an emission test. You may also run this verification test without the sample dryer. (2) Create a humidified test gas by bubbling a multi component span gas that incorporates the target interference species and meets the specifications in 40 CFR 1065.750 through distilled water in a sealed vessel. If the sample is not passed through a dryer during emission testing, control the vessel temperature to generate an H2O level at least as high as the maximum expected during emission testing. If the sample is passed through a dryer during emission testing, control the vessel temperature to generate an H2O level at least as high as the level determined in 40 CFR 1065.145(e)(2) for that dryer. Use interference span gas concentrations that are at least as high as the maximum expected during testing. (3) Introduce the humidified interference test gas into the sample system. You may introduce it downstream of any sample dryer, if one is used during testing. (4) If the sample is not passed through a dryer during this verification test, measure the water mole fraction, xH2O, of the humidified interference test gas as close as possible to the inlet of the analyzer. For example, measure dewpoint, Tdew, and absolute pressure, ptotal, to calculate xH2O. Verify that the water content meets the requirement in paragraph (d)(2) of this section. If the sample is passed through a dryer during this verification test, you must verify that the water content of the humidified test gas downstream of the vessel meets the requirement in paragraph (d)(2) of this section based on either direct measurement of the water content (e.g., dewpoint and pressure) or an estimate based on the vessel pressure and temperature. Use good engineering judgment to estimate the water content. For example, you may use previous direct measurements of water content to verify the vessel's level of saturation. (5) If a sample dryer is not used in this verification test, use good engineering judgment to prevent condensation in the transfer lines, fittings, or valves from the point where xH2O is measured to the analyzer. We recommend that you design your system so that the wall temperatures in the transfer lines, fittings, and valves from the point where xH2O is measured to the analyzer are at least 5 [deg]C above the local sample gas dewpoint. (6) Allow time for the analyzer response to stabilize. Stabilization time may include time to purge the transfer line and to account for analyzer response. (7) While the analyzer measures the sample's concentration, record its output for 30 seconds. Calculate the arithmetic mean of this data. (8) The analyzer meets the interference verification if the result of paragraph (d)(7) of this section meets the tolerance in 40 CFR 1065.275. (9) You may also run interference procedures separately for individual interference gases. If the interference gas levels used are higher than the maximum levels expected during testing, you may scale down each observed interference value by multiplying the observed interference by the ratio of the maximum expected concentration value to the actual value used during this procedure. You may run separate interference concentrations of H2O (down to 0.025 mol/mol H2O content) that are lower than the maximum levels expected during testing, but you must scale up the observed H2O interference by multiplying the observed interference by the ratio of the maximum expected H2O concentration value to the actual value used during this procedure. The sum of the scaled interference values must meet the tolerance specified in 40 CFR 1065.275. Subpart S--[Amended] 10. A new Sec. 86.1801-12 is added to read as follows: Sec. 86.1801-12 Applicability. (a) Applicability. Except as otherwise indicated, the provisions of this subpart apply to new light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, medium-duty passenger vehicles, and Otto-cycle complete heavy-duty vehicles, including multi-fueled, alternative fueled, hybrid electric, plug-in hybrid electric, and electric vehicles. These provisions also apply to new incomplete light-duty trucks below 8,500 Gross Vehicle Weight Rating. In cases where a provision applies only to a certain vehicle group based on its model year, vehicle class, motor fuel, engine type, or other distinguishing characteristics, the limited applicability is cited in the appropriate section of this subpart. (b) Aftermarket conversions. The provisions of this subpart apply to aftermarket conversion systems, aftermarket conversion installers, and aftermarket conversion certifiers, as those terms are defined in 40 CFR 85.502, of all model year light-duty vehicles, light-duty trucks, medium-duty passenger vehicles, and complete Otto-cycle heavy-duty vehicles. (c) Optional applicability. (1) [Reserved] (2) A manufacturer may request to certify any incomplete Otto-cycle heavy-duty vehicle of 14,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating or less in accordance with the provisions for complete heavy-duty vehicles. Heavy-duty engine or heavy-duty vehicle provisions of subpart A of this part do not apply to such a vehicle. (3) [Reserved] (4) Upon preapproval by the Administrator, a manufacturer may optionally certify an aftermarket conversion of a complete heavy-duty vehicle greater than 10,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating and of 14,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating or less under the heavy-duty engine or heavy-duty vehicle provisions of subpart A of this part. Such preapproval will be granted only upon demonstration that chassis-based certification would be infeasible or unreasonable for the manufacturer to perform. (5) A manufacturer may optionally certify an aftermarket conversion of a complete heavy-duty vehicle greater than 10,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating and of 14,000 pounds [[Continued on page 49753]]
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