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Finding of No Significant Impact Proposed Tokamak Physics Experiment; Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory
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Finding of No Significant Impact Proposed Tokamak Physics
[Federal Register: December 14, 1994]
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Finding of No Significant Impact Proposed Tokamak Physics Experiment; Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.
ACTION: Finding of no significant impact.
SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA), DOE/EA-0813, evaluating the environmental effects of using the existing Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) systems and accessory facilities in the proposed construction and operation of the Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX) at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, Princeton, New Jersey. The purpose of the TPX is to develop fusion energy to compensate for dwindling supplies of fossil fuels and the eventual depletion of fissionable uranium used in present-day nuclear reactors. Proceeding with the TPX is contingent on use of existing TFTR systems and appurtenant facilities. Decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR is an integral part of the scope of the proposed TPX; therefore, both projects are evaluated in this EA. Based on the analyses in the EA, the DOE has determined that the proposed action does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement is not required. Thus, the DOE is issuing a FONSI pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA implementing regulations (10 CFR Part 1021).
PUBLIC AVAILABILITY: Copies of this EA (DOE/EA-0813) are available from: Milton D. Johnson, Manager, Princeton Area Office, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 102, Princeton, New Jersey 08542, (609) 243-3700.
For further information regarding the DOE NEPA review process, contact: Dr. W.S. White, U.S. Department of Energy, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, Illinois 60439, (708) 252-2101.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Description of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is to use the existing TFTR systems and accessory facilities in the construction and operation of TPX, which would be primarily located inside the existing TFTR Test Cell. The TPX would require dismantlement and removal of all TFTR activated systems within the TFTR Test Cell Complex. Dismantlement and removal of nonradioactive and low activation components in areas such as the Test Cell Basement and the Hot Cell, would start immediately after the conclusion of the TFTR deuterium-tritium experiment, which is expected to conclude in Fiscal Year 1995. Cool-down of the Tokamak in the test cell will commence at that time.
The TPX is being proposed as a national facility for fusion energy research at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL). Its primary mission is to develop the scientific basis for an economical, more compact, and continuously operating tokamak in support of the design of a feasible demonstration fusion power plant. Waste from decontamination and decommissioning would include stainless steel and aluminum structures, piping, copper coils, graphite tiles, solidified radioactive liquids, anti-contamination materials, and concrete rubble. Waste would be packaged into Department of Transportation (DOT) approved containers and transported to the DOE Hanford site in Richland, Washington, as are current PPPL wastes. Approximately 950 m<SUP>3 (33,500 ft<SUP>3) of waste weighing approximately 2270 metric tonnes (2500 tons) would also be disposed. Construction of a radioactive waste storage building for temporary storage of radioactive waste and final preparation of some radioactive waste shipments would be required. The size of the facility would be approximately 560 m<SUP>2 (6000 ft<SUP>2), and would be constructed within the existing TFTR facility fence. A second storm water detention basin similar to and west of the existing detention basin would also be constructed.
Decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR Test Cell could be completed in approximately 1.5 years, after a 2-year cool-down period. TPX construction would minimally overlap decontamination and decommissioning of TFTR facilities. The TFTR Test Cell Complex would then be available for the TPX approximately 3.5 years after termination of TFTR deuterium-tritium experiments. The total cost for the decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR is estimated to be $86 million.
The construction and operation of the TPX would take place within the existing TFTR facility at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL), with construction scheduled to begin in early FY-1998. The TPX conceptual design is based on the use of deuterium fuel, but does not preclude the potential upgrade and use of tritium fuel in the final year of operation. Existing TFTR facilities would be adapted and used by the TPX, including TFTR Test Cell Complex; ventilation exhaust vent and intake shafts; mockup building; tritium cleanup/waste handling area; field coil power conversion building; neutral beam power conversion building; radioactive waste systems space; office and technical support space; and miscellaneous PPPL support facilities. In addition to providing space for the TPX, the TFTR Test Cell Complex would provide shielding (via concrete walls, roof, and floor), and provide for confinement and handling of tritium-contaminated and/or radioactive components.
The cost for construction of the TPX is estimated at $500M (FY-93), with the construction period 1997 to 2000. New facilities to be constructed include TFTR Test Cell building modifications, a new Cryogenic Equipment building, tank yards for water cooling and cryogenic tanks, and a new electrical substation. The Test Cell building modifications would be internal and would not increase the existing external dimensions of the building. The Cryogenic Equipment building would be constructed as a standard industrial single-story building, totaling about 1000 m<SUP>2 (10,800 ft<SUP>2). The tank yard construction would include approximately 2,130 m<SUP>2 (22,950 ft<SUP>2) of new tank yard areas for new gaseous helium tanks, liquid nitrogen storage tanks, water storage tanks, and truck-trailer access. This construction would take place on existing open space. The electrical substation construction would involve installation of a new 138 kV transmission line between the existing substation and the new substation. The new substation would be for transforming 138 kV power to 13.8 kV. A new electric power line would be constructed entirely on PPPL property.
Machine assembly would be scheduled for 1998, with the first operations during 2000. The TPX would be fueled with hydrogen and deuterium plasmas for 10 years; radiation generation would not be significant in terms of neutron activation of components or radiological doses. In deuterium operation, the peak fusion power would not exceed 140 kW. During long pulse deuterium operation, neutrons with energies of 2.45 mega electron volts (MeV) would be the primary neutrons produced, and annual production of these neutrons would be limited to 6.0 x 10<SUP>21 neutrons. A smaller number of 14.1 MeV neutrons would be produced from deuterium-tritium fusion reactions with tritium produced from the deuterium-deuterium fusion reactions. The number of 14.1 MeV neutrons produced during deuterium operations would be approximately 212f the number of 2.45 MeV neutrons produced. The TPX facility would be capable of operating with deuteriumtritium plasmas during the last year of TPX operation. During deuterium-tritium operation, a fully-formed deuterium plasma would be developed (requiring up to roughly 1,000 seconds), into which tritium would be injected. Once tritium has been injected, the device would operate for 2 seconds with a peak fusion power of 15 MW, after which the plasma would be terminated. During the 2 seconds of deuteriumtritium operation, both 2.45 MeV neutrons and 14.1 MeV neutrons would be produced, from deuterium-deuterium and deuterium-tritium fusion reactions, respectively. Production of 2.45 MeV neutrons during deuterium-tritium operation would be approximately 112f the 14.1 MeV neutron production rate. Operation of the tokamak would be controlled to limit annual neutron production so that the site boundary dose restriction adopted by the project would not be exceeded. The deuterium-tritium phase (if used) would be limited to the last year of TPX operation. Small amounts of tritium, and air activation products would be released, and minor amounts of direct radiation would result from fusion neutrons and activated structural components of TPX. Low-level solid radioactive wastes generated during TPX operations would consist of contaminated items (e.g., protective clothing) and solidified liquid wastes (tritiated water absorbed on desiccant and solidified liquid waste from the decontamination area). The volume of waste would be similar to that generated by TFTR operations, which was approximately 7.4 m<SUP>3 per year for deuterium-deuterium operations, and is projected to increase during deuterium-tritium operations to 28.3 m<SUP>3 per year (1000 ft<SUP>3 per year). Wastes generated during TPX operations would be packaged to comply with applicable DOE and DOT requirements and is expected to be shipped to the DOE Hanford Reservation in Washington for disposal, as are current PPPL wastes.Alternatives
Three alternatives were considered: (1) The proposed action, use of the TFTR facilities for the proposed construction and operation of the TPX at PPPL, (2) proposed construction and operation of the TPX at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, and (3) no action. Location of the TPX at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Knoxville, Tennessee, would require construction of new support facilities including a new test cell, hot cell, waste handling and storage areas, field coil power conversion building, and cryogenic facilities. The additional cost and time would jeopardize the U.S. fusion program and make the TPX project infeasible. Under the no action alternative, decontamination and decommission of TFTR facilities would occur under current management practices, but may involve a longer delay between safe shutdown activities and commencement of decontamination and decommissioning activities. The longer delay would not fit within the current schedule to meet the construction of the TPX. This delay may in turn be followed by a 2-3 year period of delay, during which the TFTR facility would be in a state of protective custody. The TPX would not proceed under the no action alternative.
Environmental Impacts
The impacts of the TFTR decontamination and decommissioning and TPX construction and operation on the environment and on the health and safety of workers and the public were analyzed in the Environmental Assessment. Both routine operations and off-normal or accident scenarios were assessed. The Environmental Assessment considered impacts to air quality, noise, water quality and quantity, aquatic and terrestrial ecology, threatened and endangered species, the visual environment, land use, historical and archaeological resources, socioeconomic environment, radiological conditions, and impacts of potential accidents. No significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed action are anticipated. Activities associated with decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR would not present any long-term or adverse nonradiological impacts to the public or the environment. It would result in minor impacts, consisting primarily of commitment of a small area of onsite land for the radioactive waste storage building and the second storm water detention basin. Construction of the radioactive waste storage building and storm water detention basin may result in a temporary small increase of effluent to Bee Brook, but would not exceed PPPL New Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit or other State or federal regulatory requirements.
Potential radiological impacts of TFTR decontamination and decommissioning would not represent potential impacts greater than those from current PPPL operations, which have had no significant consequences. Decontamination and decommissioning activities would result in a dose of less than the adopted design objective of 10 mrem per year to any member of the public from all project sources. It would result in minor releases of activated metal and tritium to the atmosphere and sewer system. The maximum calculated individual public dose would be 2.3 mrem per year, and the increased probability of incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure from this dose would be 1.1 chances in 1,000,000. This very low calculated effect means insignificant risk to the public. Occupational doses would not exceed the PPPL administrative limit of 1 rem per year, which is less than the DOE limit of 5 rem per year.
Operational occurrences during decontamination and decommissioning that could result in the accidental release of tritium, activated gases, or solids consist primarily of component failures and human error, and any releases would be limited by inventories within the components. The largest calculated dose to the public from decontamination and decommissioning accident scenarios, including beyond design basis accidents, is 390 mrem to a maximally exposed member of the public. The increased probability of incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure from this dose would be 195 chances in 1,000,000.
The TPX would not present long-term or adverse nonradiological impacts to the public or the environment at the PPPL site. Other TPX nonradiological impacts would be temporary, except for the commitment of a small parcel of land for construction of new TPX facilities. Construction impacts due to test cell modifications and construction of the cryogenic equipment building, tank yards, and electric substation would be minor. All construction would be built on land already committed to DOE operations. This construction would all be within the current land use restrictions governing PPPL site agreements with the DOE. For a construction project of this scope, the potential exists for 2.5 lost workday cases (work related injuries that require time-off from work) over the construction period. Also there would be a 10 increase in the current amount of site traffic, which would increase the potential for on-site vehicular accidents slightly. Radiological impacts from the TPX would not exceed current impacts from PPPL operations, which has not been shown to cause incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure. Potential environmental, safety, and health radiological impacts were evaluated for both deuterium and possible future tritium operations. Atmospheric releases of tritium and activation products constitute the potential sources of radiological exposure to members of the public. Maximum projected atmospheric releases would result in annual effective dose equivalents of 1.2 mrem and 4.6 mrem to a hypothetical maximally-exposed individual at the site boundary during deuterium and tritium operations, respectively, with a maximum increased probability of incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure of 2.3 chances in 1,000,000. These conservatively-calculated effective dose equivalents are less than the most restrictive limit for public doses caused by airborne releases (the EPA limit of 10 mrem per year). Direct radiation from the TPX would be mitigated with shielding to keep the total effective dose equivalent from all sources at the site boundary within the project design objective of less than or equal to 10 mrem per year. This design objective effective dose equivalent is well below the DOE limit of 100 mrem per year to members of the public from routine DOE operations.
Normal TPX deuterium-tritium operations would result in total estimated collective effective dose equivalents of 7.5 person-rem per year and 24 person-rem per year to the projected population within the 80 km (50 mi) radius area surrounding PPPL during deuterium and tritium operations, respectively. These doses amount to an average effective dose equivalent of less than 0.002 mrem per year to each individual in the assessment area and would result in less than 1 health effect in the exposed population. On the basis of the collective effective dose equivalent, incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure attributable to TPX operations are not expected to occur. A collective effective dose equivalent of 24 person-rem per year represents approximately .00212f the collective effective dose equivalent from natural background radiation in the area (exclusive of radon). Occupational doses to workers during TPX operations would result from direct radiation and small releases of tritium and activated gases. Operational procedures, administrative controls and monitoring would ensure that occupational doses are kept below regulatory limits and as low as reasonably achievable.
Accidental releases of radioactive material could hypothetically result from (a) natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes), (b) accidents with external origin (e.g., airplane crashes), (c) shipping accidents (i.e., accidents involving the transportation of radioactive material), and (d) operational occurrences (e.g., tritium leaks). All TPX confinement boundaries would be capable of maintaining integrity for design basis natural phenomenon, and therefore a release due to a natural phenomena event is extremely unlikely. Accidents with external origins and transportation accidents involving small quantities of radioactive material would present little risk to the public and the environment. Transportation accidents involving larger quantities of radioactive material, for example tritium, could occur; however, the accidental release of significant quantities of radionuclides has a very low probability because of the demonstrated integrity of the approved containers that would be used. TPX operational occurrences that could result in the accidental release of tritium, activated gases, or solids consist primarily of component failures and human error. Releases associated with these occurrences would be limited by component inventories. The maximum calculated individual dose from accident scenarios is 390 mrem, which is well below the DOE siting guideline limit of 25 rem. Incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure resulting from the collective doses would represent a negligible increase in the total number of such health effects in the exposed population from all natural background radiation doses. The largest potential radiological impacts to the public from TPX accidents, including beyond design basis accidents, are below regulatory limits. After TPX operation has ended, a proper NEPA review would be conducted for the decontamination and decommissioning of the facility. It is expected that the waste material resulting from decontamination and decommissioning activities would qualify as low-level radioactive waste and would be disposed of at an appropriate DOE waste disposal facility.
TFTR operations would be discontinued prior to TFTR decontamination and decommissioning. Cumulative effects would be minor and would represent a continuation of, rather than a change in, any impacts (negative and positive) associated with TFTR operations. Commitment of 560 m\2\ (6,000 ft\2\) of land for the construction of the radioactive waste storage building and 1,300 m\2\ (14,000 ft\2\) for construction of a second storm water detention basin would represent a long-term commitment of land use. Environmental releases of small amounts of residual tritium during decontamination and decommissioning would not add measurably to current low levels.Cumulative and Long Term Impacts
There are currently no measurable cumulative impacts occurring between PPPL and other facilities in the region, and none would be expected for the proposed TPX. Releases of radionuclides to the atmosphere by commercial operations (such as hospitals and research laboratories) near PPPL are not detectable in environmental samples collected around PPPL; analyses show no radionuclide concentrations above background levels. No adverse long-term environmental effects are expected from normal operations of the TPX. Tritium releases during normal operations would not constitute a measurable contribution to background radiation levels, because of the small amount of tritium to be released, its relatively short half-life (12.3 years), and rapid dispersion in the environment.
Determination
Based on the analyses in the Environmental Assessment, the DOE has determined that the proposed action at the PPPL is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the NEPA, consequently, an environmental impact statement is not required.
Issued in Argonne, Illinois, this 5th day of December, 1994. Cherri J. Langenfeld,
Manager, Chicago Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 94-30744 Filed 12-13-94; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P