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Record of Decision: Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel From the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, WA
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Record of Decision: Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel From th
[Federal Register: March 15, 1996 (Volume 61, Number 52)] [Notices]
[Page 10736-10740]
>From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision: Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel From the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, WA
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
ACTION: Notice of Record of Decision (ROD).
SUMMARY: DOE has prepared and issued a final environmental impact statement (FEIS) on the ``Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel from the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington'' (DOE/EIS-0245F, January 1996). A notice of availability of the FEIS was published in the Federal Register on February 2, 1996 (61 FR 3932). The FEIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of alternatives for managing the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) located in the K-East (KE) and KWest (KW) SNF storage basins at the Hanford Site located in southeastern Washington State.
Based on the analysis in the FEIS and after careful evaluation of environmental impacts, costs, compliance requirements, engineering considerations, worker and public health and safety, and public, agency and tribal comments, DOE has decided to implement the preferred alternative evaluated in the FEIS with two modifications and is documenting that decision in this ROD. The preferred alternative consists of removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying, conditioning and sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry vault storage in a new facility, to be built at Hanford, for up to 40 years pending decisions on ultimate disposition. The K Basins will continue to be operated during the period over which the preferred alternative is implemented. The preferred alternative also includes transfer of the basin sludge to Hanford's double-shell tanks for management, disposal of non-SNF basin debris in a low-level burial ground at the Hanford Site, disposition of the basin water, and deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning. The two modifications in the ROD are with respect to management of the sludge, and the timing of placement of the SNF into the transportation casks. The modification for management of the sludge is that should it not be possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will either continue to be managed as SNF, or disposed of as solid waste. The modification regarding placement of the SNF into the transportation casks would reduce the radiation exposure to the workers by placing the multicanister overpacks (MCOs) inside the transportation casks before the SNF is loaded into the MCOs, instead of loading the SNF into the MCOs prior to placing them inside the transportation casks.ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Requests for copies of the FEIS and for further information on the FEIS or ROD should be directed to: Dr. Phillip G. Loscoe, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, M/S S7-41, Richland, Washington 99352-0550. Dr. Loscoe may be contacted by telephone at (509) 376-7434 or at (800) 321-2008.
[[Page 10737]]
For further information on the DOE NEPA process please contact: Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH- 42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, D.C. 20585-0002. Ms. Borgstrom may be reached by telephone at (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
This ROD was prepared in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). The ROD is based on the analysis of environmental impacts identified in the FEIS, consideration of project costs, compliance requirements, engineering considerations, worker and public health and safety, and public, agency and tribal comments.
This ROD covers the management of approximately 2,100 metric tons (2,300 tons) of U.S. Government-owned SNF stored in the KE and KW storage basins at DOE's Hanford Site (about 8012f DOE's total inventory). Most of the SNF is from the N Reactor at Hanford, which operated from December 1963 until January 1987 producing materials for the U.S. national defense program and also producing steam that was used for generation of electricity. This SNF consists primarily of metallic uranium, but also contains about five metric tons (six tons) of plutonium and about one metric ton (1.1 ton) of radioactive fission products within the uranium fuel elements. The KE and KW storage basins are concrete basins constructed in 1951 to temporarily store SNF from the adjacent KE and KW Reactors (nominally 0.5 to 1.5 years prior to reprocessing). The basins are located in the 100-K Area at the Hanford Site about 420 m (1,400 ft) from the Columbia River. The volume of each basin is about 4,900 m<SUP>3 (1.3 M gallons) and each basin is filled to about 9312f capacity with water. The water level in each basin is maintained at a depth of about 5 m (16 ft) to absorb heat from the radioactive decay of the fuel rods and to provide a radiation shield for protection of facility workers. SNF from the N Reactor has been stored in the KE Basin since 1975 and the KW Basin since 1981. Prior to receiving N Reactor SNF the KW Basin was drained, cleaned and refurbished. The bare concrete surfaces were given an epoxy coating which helps keep radioactive elements such as cesium-137 from being absorbed into the concrete. The KW Basin has remained relatively clean because of this refurbishment and also because only sealed canisters of SNF have been stored there. The KE Basin did not receive refurbishment prior to receiving N Reactor SNF. In addition, the SNF in the KE Basin is in open canisters which allows water to come in contact with the fuel elements inside the canisters.
The principal environmental and safety concerns are associated with the KE Basin and arise from the presence of broken and corroding SNF, buildup of radioactive sludge on the bottom of the basin, deteriorating concrete with vulnerability to earthquake damage, leakage of contaminated water to the soil below the basin, and the presence of cesium-137 contamination of the concrete at the water line which, unshielded, can contribute to worker exposure to radiation. Conditions in KW Basin are not as serious because the SNF stored there is in sealed canisters.
In a November 1993 report entitled ``Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventory and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and their Environmental, Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities,'' DOE identified K Basins storage problems as requiring priority attention. Similarly, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in its recommendation 94-1 to the Secretary of Energy dated May 26, 1994, recommended ``That the [DOE's] program be accelerated to place the deteriorating reactor fuel in the KE Basin at Hanford in a stable configuration for interim storage until an option for ultimate disposition is chosen. This program needs to be directed toward storage methods that will minimize further deterioration.''Purpose and Need
The purpose of and need for DOE's action to which this ROD applies is to reduce risks to human health and the environment, specifically (1) to prevent the release of radioactive materials into the air or the soil surrounding the K Basins and the potential migration of radionuclides through the soil column to the nearby Columbia River, (2) to reduce occupational radiation exposure, and (3) to eliminate the risks to the public and to workers from the deterioration of SNF in the K Basins.
Alternatives Considered
Preferred Alternative
The preferred alternative is referred to in the FEIS as ``drying/ passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage''. In addition to construction of a staging/storage building at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) site, the proposed series of operations to achieve the preferred alternative is presented below. The details of the processes and perhaps their order are expected to change somewhat as the designs evolve and as the results of ongoing testing become available. However, the impacts of the following steps bound those necessary to place the K Basins SNF in safe dry storage:
[[Page 10738]]
for disposal at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site.
Other Alternatives Considered
The FEIS analyzed six other alternatives for the management of SNF
from the K Basins at the Hanford Site. The other alternatives examined
in detail were:
The principal advantage of the no action alternative is that it would require no movement of SNF and no construction of new facilities. Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the K Basins were not designed for an 80-year life (40 years to date and up to an additional 40 years) and would require increasing maintenance of aging facilities with associated potential for increased radiological impacts on workers, would not place the SNF in a safer storage configuration, would not preclude leakage of radionuclides to the soil beneath the basins and near the Columbia River, and would fail to alleviate concerns expressed by regulatory agencies, advisory bodies and the public relative to environmental impacts induced by seismic events.
Principal advantages of the enhanced K Basins storage alternative are that it would remove degrading SNF from the KE Basin, permit deactivation of the KE Basin, and would require no construction of new facilities.
Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the KW Basin was not designed for an 80-year life and would require increasing maintenance of the aging facility. Despite completion of practical upgrades, this alternative would not arrest continued fuel degradation, might result in conditions favorable to the production of reactive uranium hydrides in the repackaged KE Basin SNF transferred to the KW Basin, and would fail to alleviate concerns expressed by regulatory agencies, advisory bodies and the public relative to environmental impacts potentially induced by seismic events.
Principal advantages of the new wet storage alternative are that it would accelerate removal of SNF from aging facilities in the proximity to the Columbia River, would make use of a proven storage technology (at least for commercial fuel) coupled with design to modern seismic criteria, and would maintain flexibility for preparing SNF for ultimate disposition.
Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that it would require construction expense and continued maintenance, would not prevent the continuation of SNF degradation, and would not eliminate the potential for further hydriding of the SNF.
The principal disadvantage of this alternative is the need to construct and operate a relatively expensive calcining facility.
Principal advantages of the onsite processing alternative are that it would remove the SNF from aging facilities near the Columbia River, convert uranium (the major constituent of SNF) into uranium trioxide that is readily storable in dry form and for which future use (constituent of power reactor fuel) might be found, convert plutonium to a stable oxide for which a future use (constituent of power reactor fuel) might be found or for which storage in a geologic repository may be suitable without further processing, and convert fission products into a form suitable for storage in a geologic repository. Principal disadvantages of this alternative are the need to construct and operate a relatively expensive separations facility, the plutonium dioxide product would no longer be self-protecting and would require special storage and accountability that in turn may require construction of additional storage capacity, and no immediate need exists for either the separated uranium or plutonium.
With the exception that foreign processing would obviate the need for construction of additional processing facilities at Hanford, the principal advantages of the foreign processing alternative are essentially the same as those for onsite processing. Principal disadvantages of the foreign processing alternative are the need to transport the K Basins SNF to a U.S. shipping/receiving port, transload the SNF to ocean vessels, ship the SNF to a foreign port, transport the SNF to an operating reprocessing plant, and ship the uranium and plutonium products and vitrified high-level waste back to Hanford or elsewhere, as appropriate. Additional disadvantages include issues associated with the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, unfavorable agency and public opinion regarding
[[Page 10739]]
shipping the degraded fuel off the Hanford Site, costs of new shipping
casks, and construction of a new head-end facility at the processing
plant. The need for special storage for plutonium product would be the
same as in the onsite processing alternative.
In all but the no action alternative, sludge, debris, and
contaminated water would be removed from the basins and managed
appropriately.
DOE considered, but did not analyze in detail, four additional
alternatives identified during the public scoping process. DOE
determined that these alternatives were not reasonable in the sense of
satisfying the purpose and need for this action. These alternatives,
which involved relocation of the K Basins SNF to existing facilities
that were in most cases adjacent to the Columbia River, would not meet
the Department's objectives of expeditious removal of K Basins SNF and
management of the SNF at a location away from the Columbia river.
Comments Received
DOE received comments on the draft EIS from six individuals and
representatives of BNFL, Inc., the State of Washington Department of
Fish and Wildlife, the State of Washington Department of Ecology, the
Oregon Department of Energy, the Nez Perce Tribe, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of the
Interior (DOI).
Responses to individual comments are provided in the FEIS (which
consists of the draft EIS and an Addendum to the draft EIS).
Reproductions of the as-received comment letters and the transcript of
oral comments received are presented in Appendix A to the FEIS.
Comments from EPA and DOI were received after the close of the public
comment period and publication of the FEIS; these comments and DOE's
responses will be made available in the public reading rooms listed in
the FEIS.
Several representative comments and DOE's responses are paraphrased
below.
Comment. Some commentors voiced concern about the pyrophoricity of
the SNF, the potential for ignition and sustained combustion, and the
potential for releases of radionuclides to the atmosphere.
Response. The concern for uncertainties in the potential for
ignition of SNF is one of the principal drivers for both the DOE's
defense-in-depth approach, which includes conditioning of the SNF
followed by dry vault storage in sealed, inert-gas filled canisters,
and the SNF characterization effort which is currently underway. The
characterization work is intended to confirm the efficacy of planned
process steps to assure safe SNF management via laboratory analyses of
samples of the K Basins SNF.
Comment. Some commentors contended that SNF as packaged would not
meet geologic repository requirements, hence the SNF should be
processed so that the SNF and high-activity fission products could be
put in a form acceptable to repository disposal.
Response. Acceptance criteria for the proposed geologic repository
have not yet been determined. In the absence of the criteria for
accepting defense SNF or high-level waste into the repository, it is
not prudent to base currently needed SNF management decisions too
heavily on the criterion of suitability for ultimate geologic
disposition.
Comment. The EPA expressed concern that estimates of some accident
probabilities were given without describing how the probabilities were
derived.
Response. Except in a few instances, such as crane drops, there is
no actual experience on which to base estimates of the probability of
occurrence of accidents in SNF management as presented in the EIS. As a
consequence, engineering judgement is used to qualitatively assess the
likelihood of a postulated accident occurring. These qualitative
judgments are then expressed as a numerical range of annual frequency
of occurrence to permit development of some quantitative estimate of
accident impacts that may be compared among the alternatives. While
imprecise, these estimates represent the best information available to
DOE at this time.
Comment. DOI acknowledged that radiological and nonradiological
exposure risks to humans and consideration for special habitats
occurring on the Hanford Site were addressed, but expressed concern
that environmental impacts in terms of other biota were not addressed
in the EIS and thus comparison among alternatives was not complete.
Response. As may be noted in the EIS, impacts on humans (including
onsite noninvolved workers, which may be taken as representative of
other onsite biota) from normal operations associated with any
alternative were estimated to be very small. As a consequence,
exposures to other biota and the consequences therefrom are also
believed to be trivial to very small. Thus, while zero impact to other
onsite biota cannot be claimed, scrutiny of environmental impacts to
levels expressed by DOI is believed to be of minimal value in forming a
basis for making decisions among the alternatives.
Comment. EPA noted that contrary to Section 6.10 of the draft EIS,
DOE must apply for permission to construct any facility, regardless of
emission projections expressed in Appendix D of the regulation.
Response. It is DOE's intent to comply with the letter and spirit
of all applicable environmental requirements, and DOE will file for
permission to construct the facilities associated with the preferred
alternative. Although, as indicated by EPA, the requirement was
misstated in Section 6.10, the requirement and intent to comply was
correctly stated elsewhere in the EIS.
Comment. DOI commented that DOE should provide compensatory
mitigation for habitat lost in the initial development of the canister
storage building site.
Response. DOE does not plan to provide mitigation for the CSB site
per se. However, DOE is committed to implementing the Hanford
Biological Resources Management Plan (BRMP) when it is completed. This
plan is intended to provide for responsible management of the Hanford
ecosystem.
Environmentally Preferred Alternative
CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require identification of the environmentally preferred alternative(s). Overall environmental impacts under normal operating conditions were found to be neither large nor to vary markedly among the alternatives. Since the no action alternative would involve the least handling of SNF and require no new facilities, under normal operating conditions it would have the lowest overall impacts. Hence, the no action alternative is the environmentally preferred alternative under normal operating conditions. However, over the long term, implementation of the no action alternative is not prudent because it does not address the continuing degradation of the SNF, the increasing accumulation of radioactive sludge, the further contamination of the basin water and the unlikely, but not impossible, occurrence of an earthquake releasing substantial quantities of radionuclides to the air, ground and possibly the Columbia River.
Decision
Based on consideration of environmental impacts, costs, compliance requirements, engineering practicability, worker and public health and safety, and on comments received on the draft EIS, DOE will implement the preferred alternative, as described
[[Page 10740]]
above, with two modifications. The preferred alternative will involve
removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying, conditioning and
sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry vault storage for
up to 40 years pending decisions on its ultimate disposition. The
preferred alternative also calls for transfer of the basin sludge to
Hanford's double-shell tanks for management, disposal of non-SNF basin
debris in a low-level burial ground at Hanford, disposition of the
basin water at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site (SALDS),
and deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning.
The first modification is with respect to sludge management. In the
preferred alternative, sludge is to be dispositioned as waste in
Hanford's double-shell tanks. However, while in the basins, the sludge
will continue to be managed as spent nuclear fuel. Should it not be
possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will
either continue to be managed and treated as SNF, or grouted and
packaged to meet the Solid Waste Burial Ground waste acceptance
criteria. The impacts of alternate sludge management were analyzed in
the FEIS and are small. By mass the sludge is about 0.512f the SNF and
impacts of continuing to manage the sludge as SNF would be negligible
by comparison.
The second modification is with respect to the timing of the
placement of the MCOs into the transportation casks. In the preferred
alternative, the fuel baskets would be loaded into the MCO's, then
drained and vacuum dried prior to placement in the transportation
casks. However, placing the MCOs in the transportation casks prior to
loading the fuel baskets into the MCOs will reduce the exposure of the
workers to radiation during draining and vacuum drying.
The DOE selected the preferred alternative principally because it
will alleviate concerns for protection of workers, public health and
safety, and the environment (by expeditious removal of the SNF from the
vicinity of the Columbia River), will utilize a partially completed
existing facility (the CSB), will have few, if any, impacts on the
physical environment (minimal new construction) and will be implemented
at a cost on par with or substantially less than that of the other
alternatives.
Mitigation
Implementation of the preferred alternative, which is drying/ passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage at the CSB site, is not expected to result in adverse impacts. As a consequence, preparation of a Mitigation Action Plan (10 CFR 1021.331) in the event of adverse impacts is not planned. Nevertheless, DOE is responding to Executive Order 12856 (58 FR 41981) and associated DOE Orders and guidelines by reducing the use of toxic chemicals, improving emergency planning, response and accident notification, and encouraging the development of clean technologies and the testing of innovative pollution prevention technologies. The pollution prevention program at the Hanford Site is formalized in a Hanford Site Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention Awareness Program Plan. Moreover, DOE aggressively applies the principle of reducing exposure to both radioactive and toxic chemicals to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) throughout its operations.
Issued
This Record of Decision for the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel
from the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington is issued
by the Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland,
Washington on March 4, 1996.
John D. Wagoner,
Manager, DOE Richland Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 96-6291 Filed 3-14-96; 8:45 am]
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