Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.

[Federal Register: October 19, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 203)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 62811-62898]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr19oc00-23]

[[Page 62811]]

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Part II

Department of Transportation

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Federal Aviation Administration

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14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420

Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site; Rule

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420

[Docket No. FAA-1999-5833; Amendment No. 401-2, 417-1 and 420-1]
RIN 2120-AG15

Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments on handling of solid
propellants and cooperation with the National Transportation Safety
Board.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends its commercial space
transportation licensing regulations to add licensing and safety
requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date, commercial
launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges under
safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To
enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by
a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific
licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether
that site is located on or off of a federal launch range. These rules
will provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and safety
requirements to protect the public from the risks associated with
activities at a launch site.

DATES: Effective Date: December 18, 2000. An application pending at the
time of the effective date must conform to any new requirements of this
rulemaking as of the effective date. All license terms and conditions,
and all safety requirements of this rulemaking also apply as of the
effective date.
Comment Date: Comments on handling of solid propellants and
cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board must be
submitted on or before December 18, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA-
1999-5833 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two
copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that FAA
received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.
You may also submit comments through the Internet to http://
dms.dot.gov. You may review the public docket containing comments to
these regulations in person in the Dockets Office between 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets
Office is on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department
of Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review public
dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and
Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief
Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed explosive siting requirements for
facilities on a launch site that would handle solid and liquid
propellants and other explosives. The FAA did not propose rules for
solid explosives other than ``division 1.3,'' as described below.
As noted in the NPRM, the FAA is adopting the United Nations
Organization (UNO) classification system for the transport of dangerous
goods. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for
dangerous goods, of which explosives are included as UNO ``Class 1,
Explosives.'' Class 1 explosives are further subdivided into six
``divisions'' based on the character and predominance of the associated
hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or property damage.
Two explosive divisions that are likely to be present on a launch site
are division 1 and division 3, referred to as division 1.1 and 1.3,
respectively. Division 1.1 consists of explosives that have a mass
explosion hazard, and division 1.3 consists of explosives that have a
fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection
hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed criteria only for division 1.3
because the FAA believed that the only solid explosives for commercial
launches that would likely affect separation distances on a launch site
were division 1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch
vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1
explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems,
the quantity is small. The FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives
would not likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the
application of Q-D criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors
existing today are from old military missiles, which are not likely to
be used at a commercial launch site.
One government commenter, the 45th Space Wing Range Safety
Engineering Support (45SW/SESE), pointed out that this was not a
correct assumption, and the FAA agrees. As noted by the 45SW/SESE,
experience with explosive siting at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
shows that division 1.1 explosives are often significant enough to
influence explosive site plans.
Accordingly, section 420.65, Handling of Solid Propellants, now
includes requirements for division 1.1 explosives. Because this change
is being adopted without prior notice and public comment, interested
persons are also invited to submit written comments on section 420.65.
The FAA also includes a new requirement in this rulemaking
explicitly requiring a launch site operator licensee to cooperate with
the National Transportation Safety Board in section 420.59 for launch
accidents as well as for launch site accidents. The FAA will implement
this change without prior notice and comment and therefore invites
interested persons to submit written comments on section 420.59.
Pending the evaluation of the public comments, the FAA has decided to
proceed with due diligence to implement its requirements.
The FAA will consider and respond to comments on the new
provisions. The FAA will consider all comments received, and will
publish in the Federal Register a summary of the disposition of those
comments and, if appropriate, changes to the rule that may result from
consideration of those comments.
Comments must include the regulatory docket or amendment number and
must be submitted in triplicate to the address above. The FAA will
review all comments received and will file all comments in the public
docket. The docket is available for public inspection before and after
the comment closing date.
Commenters who want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their
comments submitted in response to this final rule must include a
preaddressed, stamped postcard with those comments on which the
following statement is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.''
The postcard will be date-

[[Page 62813]]

stamped by the FAA and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of Final Rules

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the
following steps:
(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/
search).
(2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket
number shown at the beginning of this rulemaking document. Click on
``search.''
(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information
for the Docket you selected, click on the final rule.
You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through
FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the
Federal Register's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/
aces140.html.
You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this final
rule.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a
question regarding this document may contact its local FAA official, or
the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find
out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/
arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us 9-AWA-
SBREFA@faa.gov.

Outline of Final Rule

I . Background
A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
C. Current Practices
II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments
A. Overview
B. Environment
C. Policy
D. Explosive Site Plan Review
E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures
F. Launch Site Location Review
G. License Conditions
H. Operational Responsibilities
III. Part Analysis
IV. Required Analyses

I. Background

The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701--Commercial Space
Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the
Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a
launch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States.
49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this
responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space
Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the
commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the
Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating
private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on
September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the
lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space
transportation activities.

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated
commercial space licensing authority to the Federal Aviation
Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the operation
of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing regulations at 14
CFR Ch. III. The first commercial launch licensing regulations were
issued in April 1988, 53 FR 11004, when no commercial launches had yet
taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing process
intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while ensuring public
safety. The Department noted that it would ``continue to evaluate and,
when necessary, reshape its program in response to growth, innovation,
and diversity in this critically important industry.'' 53 FR 11006.
Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach
to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At
the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take
place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and
flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development
of commercial launch sites. The federal launch ranges provided
commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support,
including flight safety services.
Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to
simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The
regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on
launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has
only become a reality during the past few years.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

The United States government has, since the 1950s, built, operated,
and maintained a space launch infrastructure for launching satellites
into space. Much of the demand for and use of these launch sites has
traditionally come from U.S. military and civil government agencies.
Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of the government-operated
launch sites began providing support for commercial launch activities
as well, with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
acting as the primary intermediary for providing launch services to
satellite operators. Following the Challenger accident, a White House
decision in August 1986 allowed launch customers to solicit bids
directly from the launch vehicle builders who would, in turn, lease
launch facilities from NASA or the United States Air Force (USAF). This
decision, coupled with the 1984 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act and
its 1988 amendments, did much to foster commercial launch business,
which continues to grow to this day.
The number of commercial space launches has steadily grown over the
years since the first licensed commercial launch in 1989. From March
29, 1989 to July 28, 2000, 130 licensed launches have taken place.
Launch vehicles have included traditional orbital launch vehicles such
as the Atlas, Titan and Delta, as well as suborbital vehicles such as
the Starfire. New vehicles using traditional launch techniques include
Lockheed Martin Corporation's (Lockheed Martin) Atlas III and Athena,
EER's Conestoga, Orbital Sciences Corporation's (Orbital) Taurus, and
The Boeing Company's (Boeing) Delta III. Unique vehicles such as
Orbital's Pegasus and the Zenit 3-SL of Sea Launch Limited Partnership
(Sea Launch), launched from a modified oil rig located in the Pacific
Ocean, are included in this count. New launch vehicles are proposed
every year. On the horizon are Lockheed Martin's Atlas V

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and Boeing's Delta IV. A number of companies are proposing partially
and fully reusable launch vehicles. In addition, some companies are
participating in partnership with NASA to develop X-33 and X-34 launch
vehicles incorporating reusable and single-stage-to-orbit technology, a
partnership which could result in vehicles for commercial use.
The launch site industry, the focus of this final rule, has also
made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on line
with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective
facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When
the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based
their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported
licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral
Air Force Base in Florida (CCAFB), and the Western Range located at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the
U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA;
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S.
Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy.
Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch
infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to
obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including
radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch
services.
Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal
launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites
become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first
license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to
operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB.
Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport
Florida Authority (SFA) received an FAA license to operate Launch
Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight
Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight
Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently,
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to
operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island,
Alaska. It is evident from this list that federal launch ranges still
play a role in the licensed operation of a number of launch sites.
California Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal
launch range property. Two launches each have taken place from
California Spaceport, KLC, and SFA.
Other commercial launch sites are being considered in other states.
The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization proposes to operate
Southwest Regional Spaceport adjacent to the White Sands Missile Range
as a site for reusable launch vehicles. The State of Montana is
proposing to fly reusable launch vehicles from a site near Great Falls,
Montana and Malmstrom Air Force Base. The state of Nevada is supporting
the development of a launch site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County,
Nevada. The State of New Mexico proposes to construct and operate the
Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) located in south central New Mexico
for use by private companies conducting commercial space activities and
operations. The State of Texas has enabled the development of a
commercial Spaceport for reusable launch vehicles. Lastly, in Utah, the
Wah Wah Valley Interlocal Cooperation Entity, proposes to construct and
operate a commercial launch site utilizing approximately 70,000 acres
of Utah State Trust lands located 30 miles southwest of Milford, Utah.
Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site
located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a
launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its
FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply
with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety
rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of
the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to
satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when
launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's
responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance.
In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent
upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and
flight safety to the FAA.

C. Current Practices

Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a
commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been
planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance
concerning the information that might be requested as part of an
application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to
these requests, DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(Office) published ``Site Operators License, Guidelines for
Applicants,'' on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site
operators. The guidelines described the information that DOT, and then
the FAA, expected from an applicant for a license to operate a
commercial launch site. This information included launch site location
information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations
document that governed how the facility would be operated to ensure
public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the
guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application
that are critical to assessing the suitability of the launch site
location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing
safe operations.
The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for
potential developers of launch sites pending this rulemaking, and the
guidelines describe the information that the FAA requests of an
applicant as part of its application for a license to operate a launch
site. The pace of development of the launch site industry has resulted
in the FAA describing the process and requirements for applications for
launch site operator licenses under the guidelines. As noted above, the
FAA issued its first license to operate a launch site to Spaceport
Systems International for the operation of California Spaceport. The
FAA issued this license under its general authority under 49 U.S.C.
70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch. III to license the operation of a launch
site. Because the operation of California Spaceport as a launch site
occurs at a federal launch range, the U.S. Air Force plays a
significant role in California Spaceport's safety process. In fact, the
FAA was able to review the Spaceport Systems International application
expeditiously because the applicant certified its intention to observe
the safety requirements currently applied by the Western Range and
contained in ``Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range Safety
Requirements (EWR 127-1),'' (Mar. 1995).\1\ The FAA determined that
applicant compliance with EWR 127-1, together with Air Force approval
of other important elements of the operation of a launch site protected
public health and safety and the safety of property. In general, the
FAA deems the compliance by a licensed launch site

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operator with these requirements in combination with other safety
practices imposed by a federal launch range as acceptable for purposes
of protecting the public and property from hazards associated with
launch site activities at a licensed launch site operator's facilities.
In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Department
of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration regarding
safety oversight of licensed launch site operators located on federal
launch ranges.
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\1\ EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version
of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/450SW/.
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On June 25, 1999, the FAA released a notice of proposed rulemaking,
Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site, 64 FR
34316 (Jun. 25, 1999). This will be referred to throughout this
document as the Launch Site NPRM.
Comparison of the Guidelines and the Final Rule
The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect as of the
effective date of this final rule. A comparison of some of the
similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The one
aspect of the licensing process that will not change is that the FAA
will issue a license to operate a launch site only if the operation of
the launch site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the
safety of property, or national security or foreign policy interests of
the United States. The guidelines were flexible and were intended to
identify the major elements of an application and lead the applicant
through the application process with the FAA. The final rule codifies
the requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.
The guidelines and the final rule share some common elements,
namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the
FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national
security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in
detail below, in the description of the final regulations. Under the
final regulations, the information requirements for these reviews
remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.
A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch
site is an important component of both the guidelines and the final
regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review,
the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request
an applicant to provide information regarding geographic
characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological
environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an
applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site
location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological
characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local
commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches
such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An
applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general
impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly
land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety
analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where
applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to
launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment,
the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding
temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature
inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch
site operations. Under the guidelines, an application includes the
frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in wind
or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.
In contrast to the guidelines, the final rules require an applicant
to use specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch
site location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle,
including orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed
launch point on the launch site must be evaluated for each type of
launch vehicle that the applicant wishes to have launched from the
launch point. An applicant is provided with a choice of methods to
develop a flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or
guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of
impact dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of
impact dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas,
no additional analysis is required. Otherwise, an applicant is required
to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the public
from a representative launch does not exceed a casualty expectation
(Ec) of 30 x 10-6. The FAA will review the
applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was correct, and
will approve the launch site location if the Ec risk
criteria were met.
Under either the guidelines or the final regulations, little or no
launch site location review is needed if the applicant proposes to
locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The fundamental purpose
of the FAA's proposed launch site location review--to determine whether
a launch may potentially take place safely from the proposed launch
site-- has been amply demonstrated at each of the ranges. Exceptions
may occur if a prospective launch site operator plans to use a launch
site at a federal launch range for launches markedly different from
past federal launch range launches, or if an applicant proposes a new
launch point from which no launch has taken place.
The guidelines and final regulations differ markedly in their
approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the
guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a
comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive
safety is part of the analysis and safety plan. In contrast, the final
regulations require the submission of an explosive site plan, but
impose fewer operational ground safety responsibilities on a launch
site operator. For flight safety, under the guidelines and final rules,
a launch site operator license contains minimal flight safety
responsibilities. The FAA assigns almost all responsibility for flight
safety and significant ground safety responsibility to a licensed
launch operator. Extensive ground and flight safety requirements will
accompany a launch license. This does not mean a launch site operator
cannot offer flight safety services or equipment to its customers.
However, the adequacy of such services and equipment typically will be
assessed in the FAA's review of a launch license application.

II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments

With this rulemaking, the FAA creates in 14 CFR Chapter III a new
part 420 to contain the requirements for obtaining and possessing a
license to operate a launch site. If a prospective launch site operator
proposes to offer its launch site to others, that person must obtain a
license to operate a launch site.
Part 420 does not apply in two notable situations. A launch
operator operating a private site for its own launches does not need a
license to operate a launch site because its launch license would cover
the safety issues associated with the launch site. A person wishing to
operate a site to support amateur rocket activities, as defined in 14
CFR 401.5, also does not need a license to operate a launch site
because the launches taking place from

[[Page 62816]]

the site are exempt from AST's regulations.
By means of operational, explosive safety, and site location
requirements, the FAA's regulations will address public safety issues
associated with launches that take place from a launch site whose
operation the FAA has licensed. Additionally, the FAA will address
environmental issues, and will have international obligations and
national security interests reviewed by the appropriate agencies, in
the course of a license review. Environmental review may precede or
take place concurrently with the licensing process.
The grant of a license to operate a launch site does not guarantee
that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch
proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA
review and licensing.
AST received comments from 11 members of the public and one
government organization. The one government commenter was the 45th
Space Wing Range Safety Engineering Support (45SW/SESE). The public
commenters were:

--ACTA, Inc. \2\
--New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization
--Kistler Aerospace Corporation
--Lockheed Martin Corporation
--National Fire Protection Association
--Don A. Nelson
--Nelson Engineering Co.
--Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission
--Christopher Shove, Ph.D.
--Space Access, LLC
--Texas Aerospace Commission
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\2\ ACTA, Inc. divided its comments into those from ACTA itself
and those from ACTA staff.
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A. Overview

The FAA's approach to licensing the operation of a launch site
focuses on five areas of concern critical to ensuring that operation of
a launch site will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety
of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests or
international obligations of U.S. interests. These reviews encompass
the environment, policy considerations, the siting of explosives and
other explosive safety measures, the safety of a launch site location,
and operational responsibilities.
Part 420 is divided into four subparts. Subpart A includes the
scope and applicability of the part, and definitions applicable to the
part. Subpart B includes the criteria and information requirements for
obtaining a license. Subpart C lists the terms and conditions of a
license to operate a launch site. Subpart D lists the other
responsibilities of a licensee.
Part 420 separates the requirements to obtain a license from the
responsibilities of a licensee. Much of the information required by
subpart B pertains to how the applicant will meet its responsibilities
in accordance with subpart D.
Under the regulations, an applicant is required to provide the FAA
with information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews
and determinations. An applicant is also required to submit an
explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard
facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public
areas.
The regulations provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA
that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing
public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location
approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to
operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the
applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by
the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a
different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact
that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point
at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that is
accomplished by the FAA's launch site location review: namely, a
showing that launch may occur safely from the site.
The FAA is imposing specific operational ground safety
responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and requires that
a license applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A
launch site operator licensee's responsibilities include: preventing
unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing the public
and customers to visit the site; informing customers of limitations on
use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous activities
conducted by customers; maintaining agreements with the U.S. Coast
Guard and with the FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the
airspace through which launches will take place and among other
measures, the issuance of a Notice to Mariners and Notice to Airmen,
respectively, prior to a launch from the launch site; and notifying
adjacent property owners and local jurisdictions of the pending flight
of a launch vehicle. Part 420 also contains launch site operator
responsibilities with regard to record keeping, license transfer,
compliance monitoring, accident investigation and explosives. Other
federal government agencies have jurisdiction over a number of ground
safety issues, and the FAA does not intend to duplicate their
efforts.\3\
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\3\ The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a
role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA
regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product,
help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note
is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous
chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended
to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly
hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or
explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks
associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These
requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA
regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety
from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part
68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner
or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold
quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the
owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program
to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that
occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite
consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case
releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-
case release would reach the public, the source must develop and
implement a prevention program and an emergency response program.
Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to
conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage
of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which
existing systems could fail and result in accidental releases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion of Comments Regarding Overview
A few commentors provided comments that focussed on the FAA's
regulatory approach.
Space Access believed that instead of focussing on the launch site
location, the rule should put primary interest on the activity
occurring on a site, including preparation for a launch, launch, and
any activity or process conducted on or near the site that might
endanger the public health and safety. Space Access at 1. The FAA
agrees, but believes that a launch site location analysis is necessary
in order to determine whether a launch could safely take place from the
location selected. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not plan to
license the operation of a launch site from which even a hypothetical
launch could not take place and has devised the location review to
avoid such an eventuality. The other requirements in part 420, in
conjunction with the ground and flight safety requirements of a launch
license, should address the activity occurring on a site.
Space Access also notes that the rule must achieve minimum safety
standards but not require excessive agency

[[Page 62817]]

oversight or business duplication of effort. Space Access at 2. The
desire to avoid duplication of effort was also expressed by Kistler
Aerospace Corporation and Christopher Shove, Ph.D., a Senior Consultant
for Space Data Systems, Inc. Although Kistler commends the FAA for
striving to keep the regulatory environment free from redundant
requirements levied by multiple agencies, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
at 2; Christopher Shove at 1. Kistler also states that this goal should
be expanded to include launch site operators operating out of
localities that already address similar concerns through local rules or
ordinances.
The FAA agrees that it should not impose requirements that
duplicate other federal regulations. That is why there are relatively
few operational responsibilities of a launch site licensee in part 420.
For example, OSHA and the EPA have many regulations that apply to
launch site operators, which the FAA does not duplicate. If an
applicant is required to fulfill other safety requirements because of
state or local regulations, or rules of property owners, the FAA will
work with the applicant to avoid duplication of paper work. However,
applicants must meet FAA and other federal standards.
The New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization (NMOSC) thought
that the proposed regulations should not relate only to launch
operations. NMOSC suggested that the proposed regulations be expanded
to include recovery operations. New Mexico Office for Space
Commercialization at 1. The FAA agrees that recovery operations are
important. However, recovery operations are covered in another
rulemaking. Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing, 65 FR 56617 (Sept. 19, 2000).
Because the FAA stated in the NPRM that when launching from a non-
federal launch site, a launch operator's responsibility for ground and
flight safety takes on added importance, NMOSC suggested that the FAA
is willing to accept a double standard on safety. NMOSC believes that
New Mexico will be treated differently from Florida and California
because their launch sites are federal, and New Mexico's is not. NMOSC
at 2. This is not true. The FAA did not mean to imply that a launch
operator has more responsibility for flight safety from a commercial
launch site than from a federal launch site. In both cases, the launch
operator is responsible for the safety of its flight. The FAA was only
pointing out that a launch operator at a non-federal launch site will
not be able to depend on an established flight safety infrastructure
that currently exists at federal launch ranges.
Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) recommended, in the interest of
standardization and interoperability, that a launch site operator be
required to establish and maintain at its facility a range safety/
tracking system that functions at an industry-wide standard and
demonstrate that it meets the standard. LMC at 4. A launch operator
should be required to demonstrate to the FAA that its launch vehicle
interfaces with this standardized range safety/tracking system. The FAA
agrees on the importance of range safety and tracking for most launch
operations. Because launch safety is the responsibility of the launch
operator, because interoperability and standardization are business
issues about which a launch site operator may wish to make its own
decisions, the FAA notes with interest but declines to pursue this
suggestion. Although the federal launch ranges offer a standardized
form of range safety and tracking, the FAA is reluctant to enshrine
particular standards through regulation, especially when the ranges
themselves are re-visiting how to provide tracking, transmission and
other launch safety services. Nothing precludes a launch site operator
from providing such services as well; a launch operator will continue,
of course, to remain responsible under its launch license for the
safety of the flight of its vehicle, regardless of with whom it
contracts for supporting services.

B. Environmental

Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action
for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental
impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to
determine whether these activities will significantly affect the
quality of the environment. Because the FAA is responsible under NEPA
regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement (EIS), part 420 requires a license applicant to
provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an analysis in
accordance with the requirements of the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of
NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering
Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. An applicant will typically
engage a contractor with specialized experience in the NEPA process to
conduct the study underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis.
The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review,
including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the
assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has
defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The
FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)
may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an
environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is
necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at
a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future
use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an
environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable
alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as
interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a
site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable
alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental
process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will
not issue a license if the FAA has not concluded an environmental
review in accordance with all applicable regulations and guidelines.

Discussion of Comments Regarding the Environmental Review

Nelson Engineering Co. stated that the X-33 EIS process included
overflight and safety issues. Nelson Engineering felt that including
overflight and safety issues for licensed activities was a duplication
of effort since these safety issues are covered in the license process
as well. It noted that the public has the right to know and comment on
overflight and safety issues, but it would be best to handle it
separate from the EIS process. Nelson Engineering at 2. The FAA agrees.
Safety issues are better addressed in the licensing process where
safety standards exist. When the question of safety comes up during the
FAA's environmental review process, the FAA notes in the environmental
documentation that safety issues are addressed in the licensing
process.
NMOSC commented on the FAA's statement that an applicant may
acquire property for future use as a launch site. NMOSC states that
according to the CEQ regulations as interpreted by the courts, an
applicant may not use the purchase of a site or construction at the
site to limit the array of reasonable alternatives. NMOSC at 2. The FAA
partially agrees with NMOSC in that purchasing a site with the intent
to

[[Page 62818]]

build a launch facility, without looking at other possible locations,
limits the launch site selection and evaluation of alternatives and is
contrary to the requirements of the National Environmental Protection
Act (NEPA). NEPA requires an applicant to show that it looked at
several feasible sites based on certain criteria and that it chose one
of those sites as the preferred or selected alternative. However, an
applicant can in fact purchase property for future use as a launch site
if the applicant can show that it looked at several sites and picked a
particular site based on certain parameters. It must also document the
evaluation of those alternative sites.

C. Policy

The FAA conducts a policy review of an application for a license to
operate a launch site to determine whether operation of the proposed
launch site would jeopardize national security, foreign policy
interests, or international obligations of the United States. The FAA
conducts the policy review in coordination with other federal agencies
that have responsibility for national and international interests. The
Department of Defense is consulted to determine whether a license
application presents any issues affecting national security. The
Department of State reviews an application for issues affecting foreign
policy or international obligations. Other agencies, such as NASA, are
consulted as appropriate. By this rulemaking, the regulations require
an applicant to supply information relevant to the FAA's policy
approval, including, for example, identification of foreign ownership
of the applicant. The FAA will obtain other information required for a
policy review from information submitted by an applicant in other parts
of the application. During a policy review, the FAA will consult with
an applicant regarding any questions or issues before making a final
determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any
questions before completion of the review.
No comments regarding policy review were received and no changes
have been made to part 420 from the Launch Site NPRM.

D. Explosive Site Plan Review

The final rules establish criteria and procedures for the siting of
facilities at a launch site where solid propellants, liquid
propellants, and other explosives are located to prepare launch
vehicles and payloads for flight. These criteria and procedures are
commonly referred to as quantity-distance (Q-D) requirements because
they provide minimum separation distances between explosive hazard
facilities, surrounding facilities and locations where the public may
be present on the basis of the type and quantity of explosive material
located within the area. Minimum prescribed separation distances are
necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards on a launch site
so that the effects of an explosion do not reach the public.
An applicant must provide the FAA with an explosive site plan that
demonstrates compliance with the Q-D requirements. Because the FAA must
approve this plan, applicants are cautioned not to begin construction
of facilities requiring an explosive site plan until obtaining FAA
approval. Note also that the Q-D requirements do not address any toxic
hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through procedural means, and
the FAA addresses toxic hazards in a separate rulemaking on licensing
and safety requirements for launch. If a toxic hazard is a controlling
factor in siting, a prudent launch site operator will address the issue
when preparing its site plan.
The quantity-distance criteria are a critical mitigation measure
required in a launch site operator application to provide the public
protection from ground operations at a launch site. The final rules
have other mitigation measures, including launch site operator
responsibilities that address accident prevention measures, and
procedural requirements to protect other launch site customers and
visitors on the launch site. Any other procedural requirements
necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards will be the
responsibility of a launch operator under a launch license.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ A launch license encompasses ground activities involved in
the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in
the United States. This may include the storage and handling of
explosives involved with the handling and assembly of launch
vehicles at a launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA has made certain changes in response to comments to part
420, from what was proposed in the Launch Site NPRM regarding the
explosive site plan requirements. A brief summary of these changes is
discussed below and is discussed in further detail in the Part
analysis.
The NPRM did not require an applicant proposing to locate
a launch site at a federal launch range to submit an explosive site
plan. In the final rule, the applicant must submit an explosive site
plan to the federal launch range operator.
Q-D requirements for hazard class 1.1 were added,
including a provision for public traffic route distance.
The assumption that solid and liquid stages on a launch
vehicle would not explode simultaneously has been removed from the Q-D
requirements for locating solid and liquid propellants together.
The explosive site plan requirements were moved from
subpart B, Application Requirements, to subpart D, Licensee
Responsibility. Although an applicant must complete an explosive site
plan to obtain a license, this section was moved because the explosive
site plan is a document with which a licensee must comply and keep up
to date at all times.
A provision was added to clarify that explosive siting
issues outside the scope of the part 420 requirements will be evaluated
by the FAA on an individual basis consistent with industry safety
standards.
A discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the reason the FAA
is adopting explosive siting criteria, current Q-D standards, the FAA's
use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other approaches to explosive
safety, and the application of ATF, DOD or NASA standards are covered
in the Launch Site NPRM. 64 FR at 34320--34322. Solid explosive
divisions, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid
and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads are discussed below.
Solid Explosive Divisions
The Launch Site NPRM proposed requirements for division 1.3 solid
explosives. As noted in the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA is adopting the
United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system, a system that
governs transport of dangerous goods. The Department of
Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration assigns
dangerous goods to the appropriate class in accordance with 49 CFR part
173. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for
dangerous goods, of which ammunition and explosives are included as the
UNO ``Class 1, Explosives.'' Class 1 explosives are further subdivided
into ``divisions'' based on the character and predominance of the
associated hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or
property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:
Division 1.1--consists of explosives that have a mass
explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the
entire load instantaneously.

[[Page 62819]]

Division 1.2--consists of explosives that have a
projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.3--consists of explosives that have a fire
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or
both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.4--consists of explosives that present a minor
explosion hazard.
Division 1.5--consists of very insensitive explosives.
Division 1.6--consists of extremely insensitive articles
which do not have a mass explosion hazard.
The FAA originally proposed criteria only for division 1.3 because
it believed that the only solid explosives for commercial launches that
would likely affect separation distances on a launch site were division
1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch vehicles frequently
have components incorporating division 1.1 explosives, such as those
used to initiate flight termination systems, the quantity is small. The
FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives will not likely be present
in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria. The
only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are from old
military missiles, which are not likely to be used at a commercial
launch site.
In response to comments from the 45th Space Wing pointing out the
errors underlying this assumption, part 420 now includes quantity-
distance requirements for explosive division 1.1 explosives. Compared
with explosive division 1.3 explosives, the distances are greater due
to their more hazardous nature.
Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements
The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) initiated a DOD Explosive
Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and established an
interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants Working Group
(LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of possible
inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the current
approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D criteria for
most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in hazard group and
compatibility group definitions, and possible inaccurate
characterization of blast overpressure hazards of liquid propellant
explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of explosive
equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance criteria, and
to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9, which addresses
liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials.
The DDESB work is almost completed, and the recommendations of the
LPWG should be incorporated in the DOD standard in the near future.
Because the DDESB is possibly the best-equipped group in the country to
address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its
recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the final rule should
not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard and
compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and the
public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible
adoption by the FAA.
Solid and Liquid Bi-Propellants at Launch Pads
In the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at
launch pads for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid
propellant components. The required separation distance would be the
greater of the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the
liquid propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant
would not have to add the separation distances of both. This proposal
rested on the conclusion that, generally, no credible scenario existed
that could produce a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid
propellant tanks and solid propellant motors. This requirement has
changed because the assumption may not always be correct.
Under the final rule, an applicant must conduct an analysis of the
maximum credible event (MCE), or the worst case explosion that is
expected to occur. If analysis shows that an explosion caused by the
liquid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of the solid
propellants, and an explosion due to the solid propellants will not
cause a simultaneous explosion of the liquid propellants, the distance
between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard
facilities and public areas should be based on the MCE.
Discussion of Comments
The 45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division
(45SW/SESE), provided a number of comments on the FAA's proposed
explosive safety requirements. First, the 45SW/SESE suggests including
alternative approaches to Q-D standards such as risk-based thresholds
and limits. 45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division
at 1. The FAA agrees that alternative approaches to Q-D may be
appropriate. However, the FAA will not formally adopt such an approach
at this time for the following reasons.
On December 9, 1999, the DDESB approved, for limited use at DOD
facilities, the use of risk-based explosives safety siting of
explosives facilities for calendar years 2000 through 2002.
Specifically, on a case-by-case basis, a risk-based explosives safety
analysis that supports an explosives facility siting may be submitted
to the DDESB Secretariat for review and approval.\5\ A risk based
analysis is used when a waiver or exemption would be required to
approve a facility. The FAA will monitor the experience of the DDESB
during those three years, and may take regulatory action at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ Memorandum from USAF Colonel Daniel T. Tompkins to the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps board members (Dec. 9, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the meantime, an applicant unable to meet the Q-D requirements
might attempt a risk-based approach if able to provide a clear and
convincing demonstration that the proposed method provides an
equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. Such a
demonstration would have to include an explosives safety analysis that
analyzes hazards associated with handling explosive materials on the
launch site. The applicant should examine the relationship between an
explosive hazard facility and an exposed facility to determine what
effect one has on the other in the event of an accidental explosion. As
discussed in the NPRM, net explosives weight is used to calculate Q-D
separations by means of the formula: D=KW 1/3, where D is
the required distance (in feet), K is the protection factor depending
on the degree of risk assumed or permitted, and W 1/3 is the
cube root of the net explosives weight (NEW) in pounds. This formula is
also used for assessing risk. Dividing the distance by the cube root of
the NEW will give the actual K factor of protection. A K factor equates
to an overpressure, as shown in table 1. Knowing the expected
overpressure can help in understanding the facility or equipment damage
and the personnel injuries expected to be sustained by a particular
blast overpressure. Hazardous fragments must also be considered when
preparing a risk assessment.
For more information on blast pressure, blast effects, and fragment
hazards, see Air Force Manual

[[Page 62820]]

(AFMAN) 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, sections 4.48 and 4.49
(Mar. 7, 2000).

Table 1.--K-Factor to PSI Relationship \6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
K-factor PSI K-factor PSI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0............................ 1000 20 3.0
1.2............................ 763 21 2.8
1.4............................ 597 22 2.6
1.6............................ 475 23 2.4
1.8............................ 384 24 2.3
2.0............................ 315 25 2.2
2.5............................ 200 26 2.1
3.0............................ 135 27 2.0
3.5............................ 95 28 1.9
4.0............................ 70 29 1.8
4.5............................ 53 30 1.7
5.0............................ 42 31 1.63
6.0............................ 28 32 1.56
7.0............................ 20 33 1.5
8.0............................ 15 34 1.4
9.0............................ 12 35 1.4
10............................. 9.6 36 1.3
11............................. 8.0 37 1.3
12............................. 6.8 38 1.25
13............................. 5.9 39 1.2
14............................. 5.2 40 1.2
15............................. 4.7 45 1.0
16............................. 4.2 50 0.9
17............................. 3.8 60 0.7
18............................. 3.5 70 0.6
19............................. 3.2 80 0.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------

45SW/SESE asks whether there is an assumption that all DOD
explosive site plan approval is current for launch sites on a federal
range? What if formal DDESB approval is not on record? 45SW/SESE at 1.
The FAA does assume that all DOD explosive site plan approval is
current for launch sites on a federal range and that formal DDESB
approval is on record. The FAA's launch site safety assessments of the
national launch ranges show that the DOD ranges enforce their
standards. However, if the FAA discovers through its safety inspection
program that a licensee is operating out of compliance with the DDESB
approved explosive site plan, it will consider this a violation of the
license and may take appropriate enforcement action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\6\ Table 4.2 in AFMAN 91-201 (Mar. 7, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to the FAA's statement that a launch site operator is
responsible for preventing unauthorized public access to the site, the
45SW/SESE commented that this should include surrounding areas
designated as posing an environmental or explosives hazard. 45SW/SESE
at 2. The FAA agrees in principle. With respect to environmental
hazards, surrounding areas posing an environmental hazard will be
addressed in the environmental review process.
With respect to explosives, to comply with these rules adopted
today, areas posing an explosive hazard during ground activities must,
by regulatory requirement, be contained within the launch site. A
launch site operator is responsible for preventing unauthorized access
to the site. It is also responsible for ensuring that hazardous areas
within the site are clear and that other users of the site are not
placed at risk during hazardous operations. In the NPRM, the FAA stated
that minimum prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect
the public from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects
of an explosion do not reach the public. 45SW/SESE notes that some
other reasons for separation distances include to prevent unnecessary
injuries or casualty to workers related to the explosive operation; to
protect property; to avoid propagation from one explosive location to
another; and remote explosives testing. 45SW/SESE at 2. The FAA agrees,
but wishes to stress that these requirements are intended to protect
public safety because public safety is the FAA's mandate. Property
belonging to members of the public also achieves some measure of
protection in accordance with these requirements. Also, propagation
from one explosive location to another is covered through part 420's
intraline distance requirements.
In the NPRM, the FAA states that it must approve the explosive site
plan that an applicant provides to the FAA. The 45SW/SESE asks whether
explosive site plans already approved by the DDESB will be granted FAA
approval. 45SW/SESE at 3. The answer is yes. A new requirement from the
NPRM is that the FAA now requires applicants for launch sites located
on a federal launch range to provide the FAA with a copy of an
explosive site plan. However, the FAA will not approve it. The FAA will
use the explosive site plan for compliance monitoring purposes only.
The 45SW/SESE notes that ``launch site'' in some contexts implies
``launch complex,'' which excludes other launch processing facilities
or areas at the launch range. 45SW/SESE at 3. The FAA does not wish to
imply that a launch site is merely a launch complex on a launch site.
To clarify, a launch site includes the entire land area operated by a
launch site operator, including all launch complexes and facilities
within.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ The Act and the regulations define launch site as the
location on Earth from which a launch takes place (as defined in a
license the Secretary issues or transfers under this chapter) and
necessary facilities. 49 USC 70102(6); 14 CFR 401.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the proposed requirements do not
account for the use of barricades and other protective measures to
mitigate the effect of an explosion on exposed areas.

[[Page 62821]]

An applicant proposing to use such measures in order to deviate from
the proposed siting rules may, during the application process, provide
a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides
an equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. 45SW/SESE states
that this use of a waiver is inconsistent with the way the Air Force
uses them. A waiver is used to document a condition or requirement that
is not achieved, not one where the condition or requirement is being
met. 45SW/SESE at 4. The FAA did not mean ``waiver'' in the way the Air
Force uses it. If a launch site operator plans to use barricades or
other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an explosion on
exposed area, the applicant would have to submit a clear and convincing
demonstration of an equivalent level of safety.
In the NPRM, the FAA stated that proposed subpart B would establish
criteria and procedures for the siting of facilities at a launch site
where solid and liquid propellants are located to prepare launch
vehicles and payloads for flight. 45SW/SESE notes that propellants are
not enough. The requirements should include other explosives as well
including linear shaped charges, safe and arm devices, initiators, and
igniters. 45SW/SESE at 2, 4. The FAA agrees, and has modified the
explosive siting requirements to include those explosives, which are
division 1.1 explosives.
In the NPRM, the FAA stated that division 1.1 explosives would not
likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of
Q-D criteria. 45SW/SESE points out that this is incorrect, and the FAA
agrees. The linear shaped charge, which is an explosive division 1.1
explosive, is the driver of distance requirements because in most cases
a solid rocket booster is zero percent trinitrotoluene (TNT)
equivalency. 45SW/SESE at 5. ACTA adds that DOD 6055.9 states that the
inhabited building distance for division 1.1 solid propellants ranging
from 1-35,000 lb is 1250 ft. Proposed table E-1 only requires 800 ft.
for quantities up to 1,000,000 lb. This is true even when quantities of
1.1 explosives are present. ACTA at 5. The FAA agrees that its
assumption that division 1.1 explosives would not likely be present in
sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria was
incorrect. The FAA has added division 1.1 explosives to this final
rule.
In the NPRM, the FAA also stated that because division 1.3 solid
propellants are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not
incorporate compatibility groups for solid propellants. 45SW/SESE asks
how compatibility would be determined if there was a need to store
other explosives with the solids? 45SW/SESE at 5. Ensuring that
explosives in an explosives hazard facility are compatible is a
procedural requirement of a launch operator. Ground safety will be
covered in a separate proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety
requirements for launch.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at launch pads
for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant
components. The required separation distance would be the greater of
the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid
propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant did not
have to add the separation distances of both. The NPRM assumed that
generally, no credible scenario existed that could produce a
simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and
solid propellant motors. 45SW/SESE states that the general assumption
that a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks
and solid propellant motors is unlikely is not a prudent approach.
45SW/SESE recommends analyses be performed on a case-by-case basis to
determine a credible scenario. A number of current Q-D site plans
considered TNT equivalencies from both the solids and liquids. 45SW/
SESE at 5, 6; but see Lockheed Martin at 3 (agreeing with the NPRM
proposal as permitting greater flexibility in operations and launch
vehicle design).
The FAA agrees with 45SW/SESE, and adopts the suggestion to require
that an applicant address an explosion of both solid and liquid
propellants at the same time. Air Force standard AFMAN 91-201, section
3.8 states that the combined bulk explosive weight of explosive items
is not necessarily the weight used for Q-D calculations. Q-D is based
on the maximum credible event (MCE), namely, the worst case explosion,
that is expected to occur. Section 3.8.3 further states the basic rule
when combining mass-detonating (e.g., the explosive equivalent of
liquid propellants) and nonmass-detonating explosives (e.g., an
explosive division 1.3 solid rocket motor). Consider the distance for
the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3 first as 1.1. Then
consider the distance for the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3
as 1.3. The required distance is the greater of the two. However,
section 3.8 further states that exceptions are granted when analyses or
test results demonstrate that the explosive division 1.1 (for liquid
propellants) will not cause detonation of the explosive division 1.3
explosives.
This approach has now been incorporated into the final rule, in
section 420.69. Note that the FAA still considers a simultaneous
explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and solid propellant
motors to be unlikely. The FAA requires that this improbability be
demonstrated. Otherwise, a launch site operator will have to use the
combined explosive weight of the solids and liquids to determine
required distances.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to adopt a provision of DOD STD
6055.9 that exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a
local lightning warning system is used to terminate operations before
the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and will be
provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route distance.
The 45SW/SESE notes that this exception is not prudent in Florida where
lightning strikes can occur without warning, except possibly an
unmanned small licensed location where the value of the facility and
its content are assumable risks. 45SW/SESE at 6.
The FAA agrees that if lightning strikes can occur without warning,
then it would be prudent to have a lightning protection system. The
final rule would require a lightning protection system in that
situation. A licensee must ensure the withdrawal of the public to a
public area distance prior to an electrical storm. If this is not
possible, then a lightning protection system is required. Note also
that the objective is not to protect the licensee's property or that of
its contractors, subcontractors, or customers, but members of the
public and their property.
In the NPRM, the FAA defined intraline distance as the minimum
distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities in the
ownership, possession or control of one launch site customer. The FAA
notes that unlike distances to protect the public, intraline distance
will not protect workers with the same level or protection as the
public. If intraline distances are not maintained between two explosive
hazard facilities, then the larger area encompassing both quantities
must be used for Q-D purposes when determining prescribed distances to
the public. The 45SW/SESE questions how that could be acceptable when
worker safety is diminished, and personnel protection must be
established to be consistent with OSHA. 45SW/SESE at 7. Worker safety
comes under the jurisdiction of OSHA, and, as noted in the NPRM, the
FAA does not

[[Page 62822]]

plan to duplicate the requirements of other regulatory agencies.
45SW/SESE also notes that inhabited building distance, which the
FAA proposed as public area distance, has an assumed 20% facility
damage and some injury. 45SW/SESE states that this may be a reasonable
risk on a DOD installation, and asks whether 20% facility damage and
injury is acceptable to the general public? 45SW/SESE at 8; see also
ACTA at 3 (noting that the Q-D criterion for public buildings allows a
glass fragment serious injury probability of up to 30%). This would not
be acceptable if Q-D requirements were the only measures taken to
protect the public. The protection offered by Q-D along with the
procedural requirements covered in a proposed rulemaking governing
licensing and safety requirements for launch will be adequate to
protect the public to an acceptable level. These other safety controls
are the responsibility of a launch operator and will be covered in a
separate proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for
launch.
ACTA staff notes that the FAA uses DOD and NASA standards as the
basis for explosive safety requirements. ACTA asked that since OSHA,
EPA, and ATF have the responsibility for safety during production and
assembly of hazardous materials, why shouldn't this apply to launch
site operations as well. ACTA at 8.
OSHA and EPA regulations do apply on launch sites, but neither
agency has Q-D requirements. ATF does have Q-D requirements, but, as
noted in the NPRM, they only cover the storage of explosives at a
launch site. ATF regulations do not cover the handling of explosives,
which includes the majority of hazardous activities at launch sites.
DOD and NASA standards are currently used at every major launch site in
the United States, and the FAA requirements reflect the current
practice. Note also that the distances used in this final rule for the
``use'' of explosives are consistent with ATF regulations on the
``storage'' of explosives, and that the FAA is not duplicating the ATF
storage requirements. An ACTA staff member stated that the NPRM
provides excruciating details on how to handle explosives but does not
consider public risks associated with either toxicity or blast
overpressure focussing. These are major factors in siting decisions.
ACTA at 7. The FAA agrees that these are important issues, but are not
critical for the layout of a launch site. These issues are covered in
the proposed rulemaking governing licensing and safety requirements for
launch.
Space Access, LLC, (Space Access) also commented on the explosive
siting requirements. In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the DDESB is
likely to specify new hazard and compatibility groups, distance values,
and equivalency values, and the public may anticipate their eventual
consideration and possible adoption by the FAA. Space Access recommends
the FAA accelerate this work and provide these values as soon as
possible. These proposed changes could have a major financial impact to
both the site operators and launch vehicle operators in terms of launch
acquisition, usage, safety separation distances for storage and public
access and procedures for use in all phases of operations leading up to
the launch. Space Access was concerned that launch operators will never
achieve aircraft-like operations if they are continually evacuating
sites and areas to meet outdated policies and suggested that no
flexibility to meet safety criteria by means other than total
separation distance. Space Access at 2. The FAA would like to stress
that the work is being conducted by the DDESB, and is not in the
control of the FAA. It is, however, near completion and the FAA will
consider it once it is completed and adopted by the DDESB.
Space Access also states that there seems to be a lack of
discussion of the distances required by the Department of
Transportation (DOT). Space Access wants a single standard for
propellants. DOT uses numbers in tens of feet for public safety
distances. Other standards also exist in the National Fire Protection
Agency (NFPA) publications and in local fire codes. Space Access at 2,
3. The FAA agrees that other liquid Q-D standards are much different
than those proposed by the FAA, but the FAA selected standards
representing current procedures for the launch industry. That is why
the new liquid Q-D standards that the DDESB will likely adopt are
important since they are based on a review of all relevant government
and industry standards in this area, including those of DOT. There will
not likely be a single standard for propellants, as Space Access would
like, but the standards applicable to launch sites will be more
consistent with other commercial and government standards.
Space Access also notes that in addition to having realistic
numbers for Q-D, there needs to be procedures and policies such that
incentives are in place for actually designing and operating in a safe
manner. For example, earthen berms can be used to reduce separation
distances. This should be the same with adequate design and procedures.
According to Space Access, there is no motivation for improving the
design or procedures because all that matters is total quantity or TNT
equivalency. Space Access strongly recommends the FAA adopt a
methodology that trades design and procedures for distance. Space
Access at 3.
The FAA agrees that separation distances can be reduced if certain
features are built into a facility. The FAA has chosen not to include
design standards in the final rule at this time because of their
complexity. In recognition of the availability of such substitutes, the
final rule now provides that for explosive siting issues not otherwise
addressed by the requirements of Secs. 420.65-420.69, a launch site
operator must clearly and convincingly demonstrate a level of safety
equivalent to that otherwise required by part 420. This means that the
FAA may permit design features that provide an equivalent level of
safety to substitute for separation distances.
Lockheed Martin Corporation also commented on the Q-D requirements.
First, it believes the FAA should consider applying DOD Standard 6055.9
at non-federal launch sites instead of developing a new standard
because 6055.9 represents a well-developed and mature regime with an
impressive safety record; and because implementation of 6055.9 at non-
federal launch sites would help ensure consistent regulation of
explosives both at federal and non-federal launch ranges. Lockheed
Martin at 3. The FAA agrees that 6055.9 represents a well-developed and
mature regime with an impressive safety record. That is why the FAA's
Q-D standards are modeled after this standard. The FAA believes,
however, that codifying, instead of adopting by reference, the basic
requirements of the standard in a regulation are beneficial for a
number of reasons. First, codification permits the standard to be
tailored to the needs of commercial launch sites. DOD standard 6055.9
is applicable to all military bases, worldwide. Second, the language
within standards such as DOD regulation 6055.9 is not always stated in
a regulatory manner. Often, discretion based on military need by the
DDESB or other body is embedded in the standard. Third, changes to that
standard by the DDESB could not automatically apply to applicants for a
license. By adopting the basic requirements of that standard in the
final rule, the FAA can monitor changes in the DDESB standard, consider
the applicability and appropriateness of changes to commercial launch
sites, and go through

[[Page 62823]]

notice and comment rulemaking to adopt any change. Therefore, the FAA
retains the approach of adopting pertinent requirements of that
standard in the final rule rather than referencing the entire DOD
standard 6055.9.
Lockheed Martin agrees with the FAA's approach to addressing
hardening on a case-by-case basis, and suggests referring to National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70 and 496. Lockheed Martin at 3.
NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code (1999), includes safety
requirements for all types of electrical installations. It is useful
for work that involves electrical design, installation, identification,
or inspection. NFPA 496, Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclosure
for Electrical Equipment, 1988, specifies requirements for design and
operation of purged and pressurized electrical equipment enclosures to
reduce or eliminate the hazardous location classification within the
enclosures.
Those two standards are incorporated by reference in OSHA's
Occupational Safety and Health Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.6. Because
OSHA requires them, and because the FAA is seeking to avoid duplicating
the requirements of other civilian regulatory agencies, the standards
will not be incorporated into this final rule. In any event, the FAA
will be willing to consider those standards in the event a launch site
operator attempts to use them to demonstrate an equivalent level of
safety.

E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures.

Application of the quantity-distance rules alone will not prevent
mishaps from occurring on a launch site. The Q-D rules merely reduce
the risk to the public to an acceptable level if a mishap occurs, and
if the public is kept away from the mishap by a distance that is at
least as great as the public area distance. Safe facility design and
prudent procedural measures are critical to preventing a mishap from
occurring in the first place. Because the public at a launch site
cannot be protected by prudent site planning alone, the FAA today
adopts launch site operator responsibilities to prevent mishaps
involving propellants and other explosives.
Part 420 focuses on measures that are appropriate to be taken by a
launch site operator. For the most part, the FAA considers it prudent
to place the responsibility on a launch site operator for those
measures that must be built into facilities. Requirements of a more
operational nature will be covered in another FAA rulemaking.
Part 420 focuses on appropriate measures. These are particularly
important for electro-explosive devices. Electric hazards include
lightning, static electricity, electric supply systems, and
electromagnetic radiation. The FAA is adopting launch site operator
requirements for two of these electric hazards: lightning and electric
supply systems. A full discussion of these can be found in the Launch
Site NPRM. 64 FR at 34324-34325.
Other measures were considered but rejected because the FAA's
proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for launch
will cover other procedural measures to guard against inadvertent
initiation of propellants from electricity. Moreover, launch and launch
site operators should implement prudent design and construction
measures to comply with local, state, and other federal law, such as
OSHA requirements.
Discussion of Comments
In the NPRM, the FAA noted that the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA), Batterymarch Park, Quincy, Massachusetts, has
published NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation of Lightning
Protection Systems. The latest edition was published in 1997. NFPA 780
provides for the protection of people, buildings, special occupancies,
heavy duty stacks, structures containing flammable liquids and gases,
and other entities against lightning damage. The FAA asked for the
public's views on the use and applicability of this code.
A number of commenters supported the FAA's adoption of NFPA 780.
45SW/SESE noted that the Air Force uses NFPA 780 as a core document to
design lightning protection systems. 45SW/SESE at 6. The NFPA stated
that the FAA should adopt NFPA 780, which dates back to Benjamin
Franklin's era. NFPA at 1, 2; see also Lockheed Martin at 3. The FAA
agrees with the commentors regarding the importance of NFPA 780.
However, the FAA will not incorporate NFPA 780 by reference because it
does not always include mandatory language. Due to its importance and
utility, the FAA will undoubtedly refer to it for appropriate guidance.
Although LMC believes NFPA 780 is an appropriate and useful
standard for a lightning protection system, it states that a launch
site operator should not be required to install and maintain an
independent lightning protection system. A launch operator will likely
have one as a way to attract customers. Lockheed Martin at 3. The FAA
disagrees. The FAA has learned from experience that while most launch
site operators might be expected to adhere to commonly held standards;
this is not always the case. Without such requirements, an adequate
level of safety or risk mitigation cannot be achieved. If most would do
this anyway, then the impact is minimal. In any event, because it
involves the construction of facilities, the FAA has made the
installation of a lightning protection system a requirement for a
launch site operator license to ensure its availability.
In addition to NFPA 780, the 45SW/SESE suggested that the FAA
review DOD 6055.9, and applicable Air Force instructions to provide
full regulatory requirements. The FAA has reviewed DOD 6055.9, Air
Force Manual 91-201, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) ``Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants,
and Pyrotechnics,'' NSS 1740.12 (Aug.1993). The FAA believes that the
requirements in the final rule cover the basic safety issues that need
to be addressed for lightning protection systems. The FAA expects
applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and
NASA standard.
Another explosive mishap prevention measure is the control of
static electricity. The FAA did not propose any requirements in the
NPRM regarding the control of static electricity because the FAA
believed that the control of static electricity in launch operations is
primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by the FAA in
another proposed rulemaking governing licensing and safety requirements
for launch. The FAA asked for the public's view.
LMC agreed with the FAA and noted that new rules on control of
static electricity should reflect current procedures used by the launch
operators. Lockheed Martin at 4. The NFPA recommended NFPA 77,
Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (1993), as a reference
document. NFPA 77 provides a basic understanding of the phenomena of
static electric discharges and how they can serve as ignition sources,
and includes useful information on bonding and grounding.

F. Launch Site Location Review

The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether
the location of a proposed launch site could support launches that
would not jeopardize public health and safety, and the safety of
property. To that end, the FAA will determine whether at least one
hypothetical launch could take place safely from a launch point at the
proposed site. The FAA will not license

[[Page 62824]]

the operation of a launch site from which a launch could never safely
take place. An applicant should, however, bear in mind that an FAA
license to operate a launch site does not guarantee that a launch
license would be issued for any particular launch proposed from that
site. Accordingly, much of the decision making with respect to whether
a particular site will be economically successful will rest, as it
should, with a launch site operator, who will have to determine whether
the site possesses sufficient flight corridors for economic viability.
Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at
the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is
hypothetically possible to launch at least one type of launch vehicle
on at least one trajectory from each launch point at the proposed site
while meeting the FAA's collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to
ensure that there exists at least one flight corridor or set of impact
dispersion areas from a proposed launch site that would contain debris
away from population. Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will
allow to occur only when the risk to people is below an expected
casualty (Ec) of 30 x 10-6. In other words, if
there are too many people around a launch site or in a flight corridor
the FAA will not license the site.
All this is not to say that the FAA is requiring an applicant for a
license to operate a launch site to perform a complete flight safety
analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that an applicant
may or may not have customers or a particular launch vehicle in mind.
Accordingly, the FAA's launch site location review methods only
approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions and recognizing that
not all factors need to be taken into account, a full flight safety
analysis that would normally be performed for an actual launch. Of
course, if an applicant does have a customer who satisfies the FAA's
flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a license for launch from
the site, that showing would also demonstrate to the FAA that a launch
may occur safely from the proposed site, and the FAA could issue a
license to operate the launch site on the basis of the actual launch
proposed.
The launch site location review applies to both expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs) and reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). Detailed
methodologies for the launch site location review are only provided for
expendable launch vehicles with a flight history. The reusable launch
vehicles currently proposed by industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly,
the FAA considered it unwise to define a detailed analytical method for
determining the suitability of a launch site location for RLVs. An
applicant proposing a launch site limited to the launch of reusable
launch vehicles would still need to define a flight corridor and
conduct a risk analysis if population were present within the flight
corridor, but the FAA will review such an analysis on a case-by-case
basis, consistent with the principles discussed in this rulemaking.
Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical
method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for
unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited
to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to
the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.
A launch site location review provides an applicant with
alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site
satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must
demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas
exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to
an Ec risk of greater than 30 x 10-6. Each
proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch
vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided
sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched
from each point.
Each of the three methods for evaluating the acceptability of a
launch site's location require an applicant to identify an area,
whether a flight corridor or a set of impact dispersion areas,
emanating from a proposed launch site. That area identifies the public
that the applicant must analyze for risk of impact and harm. An
applicant who anticipates customers who use guided orbital launch
vehicles must define a flight corridor for a class of vehicles launched
from a specific point along a specified trajectory, that extends 5,000
nautical miles from the launch point or until the launch vehicle's
instantaneous impact point leaves the Earth's surface, whichever is
shorter. For guided sub-orbital launch vehicles, the flight corridor
ends at an impact dispersion area of a final stage. An applicant must
demonstrate either that there are no populated areas within the flight
corridor or that the risk to any population in the corridor does not
exceed the FAA's risk criteria. Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch
of an unguided vehicle, an applicant must analyze the risks associated
with a series of impact dispersion areas around the impact points for
spent stages. If there are people in the dispersion areas, the
applicant must demonstrate that the expected casualties from stage
impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk criteria.
Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure
of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a
launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of
casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were
thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were
added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and
the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This
Ec value defines the acceptable collective risk associated
with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and,
as prescribed by the regulations, shall not exceed an expected average
number of casualties of 0.00003 (30 x 10-6) for each
launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This Ec
value defines acceptable collective risk.
The FAA's methods for identifying a flight corridor or impact
dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital expendable launch
vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles without an FTS.\8\ For purposes of part 420,
references to a guided expendable launch vehicle, whether orbital or
sub-orbital, may be taken to mean that the vehicle has an FTS.
References to an unguided sub-orbital may be understood to mean that
the vehicle does not possess an FTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ Part 420 does not include a means for analyzing risks posed
by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch
vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have
been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a
launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles,
the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA
does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in
the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with
the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated
areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Part 420 divides guided orbital expendable launch vehicles into
four classes, with each class defined by its payload weight capability,
as shown in table 2. Sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are not
divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as either
guided or unguided. Table 3 shows the payload weight and corresponding
classes of existing orbital expendable launch vehicles. For a launch
site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant

[[Page 62825]]

defines a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the
proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated''
which the FAA anticipates will be based on expected customers.

Table 2.--Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight class
100 nm orbit -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Medium Medium large Large
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 degrees inclination *................ 4400 >4400 to 11100 to 18500
eq>11100 thn-eq>18500
90 degrees inclination.................. 3300 >3300 to 8400 to 15000
eq>8400 eq>15000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.

Table 3.--Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payload weight (lbs) Payload weight (lbs)
--------------------------------------------
Vehicle 100 nm Orbit 28 deg. 100 nm Orbit 90 deg. Class
inc. inc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conestoga 1229..................... 600 450 Small.
Conestoga 1620..................... 2,250 1,750 Small.
Athena-1........................... 1,755 1,140 Small.
Athena-2........................... 4,390 3,290 Small.
Pegasus............................ 700 N/A Small.
Pegasus XL......................... 1,015 769 Small.
Scout.............................. 560 460 Small.
Taurus............................. 3,100 2,340 Small.
Atlas II........................... 14,500 12,150 Medium/Large.
Atlas IIA.......................... 16,050 13,600 Medium/Large.
Atlas IIAS......................... 19,050 16,100 Large.
Atlas IIIA......................... 19,050 15,700 Large.
Atlas IIIB......................... 23,630 20,240 Large.
Atlas V 404........................ 27,550 23,700 Large.
Atlas V 552........................ 44,200 37,400 Large.
Delta 6920......................... 8,780 6,490 Medium.
Delta 7920......................... 11,330 8,590 Medium/Large.
Delta 3............................ 18,280 14,920 Medium/Large.
Delta 4 M.......................... 18,600 15,150 Large.
Delta 4 M (5,4).................... 30,000 23,000 Large.
Delta 4 Heavy...................... 56,900 46,000 Large.
Titan II........................... N/A 4,200 Medium.
Titan III.......................... 31,200 N/A Large.
Titan IV........................... 47,400 41,000 Large.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch
site for guided orbital and sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are
presented in appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions
for creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method
to appendix A. Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a
flight corridor for guided expendable launch vehicles, but provides
more detailed calculations to employ so that, although an appendix B
flight corridor is typically less conservative than that of appendix A,
it should prove more representative of actual vehicle behavior.
Appendix C contains the FAA's method for applicants to analyze the risk
posed by guided expendable launch vehicles within a flight corridor
created in accordance with appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles are presented in appendix D, which describes
how an applicant should estimate impact dispersion areas and analyze
the risk in those areas.
Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor
than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle
trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under
appendix A. Because appendix A provides a more simple methodology, an
applicant may want to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can
define a flight corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A,
that does not overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the
launch site location review requirements with the least effort. If,
however, the corridor includes populated areas, the applicant may
create an appendix B flight corridor that may be more narrow, or may
conduct a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required to
try appendix A before employing appendix B.
The FAA's location review reflects a number of assumptions designed
to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or addressing a
particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more fully below,
but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for appendices A
and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that launch failure
debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful containment
must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination system. A
perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure that any
debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a flight
corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but launch
success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still
proposes

[[Page 62826]]

a location review based on an assumption of containment.
The approaches provided in the four location review appendices are
based on some common assumptions that reflect limitations of the launch
site location review analysis. The FAA is not requiring an applicant to
analyze the risks posed to the public by toxic materials that might be
handled at the proposed site, nor the risk to ships or aircraft from
launch debris or planned jettisoning of stages. The FAA recognizes that
these assumptions represent a limitation in the launch site location
review. The FAA intends that these three risks will be dealt with
through pre-flight operational controls and flight commit criteria
which are partially addressed through part 420 coordination
requirements and which also will be identified as part of a launch
license review. All launches that take place from a U.S. launch site
whose operation is licensed will either be regulated by the FAA through
a launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the
government carries out for the government.
The two methods for creating guided expendable launch vehicle
flight corridors are intended to account for expendable launch vehicle
failure rate, malfunction turn capability, and the expendable launch
vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by the impact dispersions of these
vehicles. The premise undergirding each of these methods is that debris
would be contained within the defined flight corridor or impact
dispersion areas. Accordingly, for purposes of a launch site location
review, only the populations within the defined areas need to be
analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that were a flight termination
system to fail to destroy a vehicle as intended, a launch vehicle could
stray outside its planned flight corridor. That concern will be better
accommodated through another forum, namely, the licensing of a launch
operator and the review of that launch operator's flight safety system.
Because a containment analysis only looks at how far debris would
travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed, the containment
analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight termination
system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the acceptability of
a launch site's location for launching guided expendable launch
vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning vehicle will be
destroyed and debris will always impact within acceptable boundaries.
Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to explore, for purposes of
determining the acceptability of a launch site's location, the
possibility that a vehicle's flight termination system may fail and
that the vehicle could continue to travel toward populated areas. Any
proposed site may present such risks--indeed, any proposed launch
presents such risks--but they are best addressed in the context of
individual launch systems. This working assumption of a perfectly
reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply to the
licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider the
reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of a
launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that for
the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced
debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need
for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight
corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.
Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to
analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally
jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for
the final stage of a guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. The
FAA does not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to
assess the general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable
launch vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently
launch vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided
expendable launch vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks
from nominally jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A
launch license review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not
going to impact in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed
for launches from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low
risk posed by controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the
risk posed by wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.
Each of the FAA's approaches to defining flight corridors or impact
dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk launch event
associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is not meant to
imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily acceptable; only
that they will not be considered in the course of this review. For a
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle, that event is vehicle
failure. For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the
launch event of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted
impact of stages. For a guided expendable launch vehicle the overflight
risk, which results from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction
(assuming no FTS failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally
jettisoned debris are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For
an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the FAA proposes
that risk due to stage impact be analyzed instead of the overflight
risk. This distinction is necessitated by the fact that the failure
rate during thrust is historically significantly lower for unguided
vehicles than for guided vehicles. Current unguided expendable launch
vehicles with many years of use are highly reliable. They do not employ
an FTS; therefore, debris pieces usually consist of vehicle components
that are not broken up. Another reason for the difference between
analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact dispersions are
significantly larger than guided vehicle impact dispersions. These
differences add up to greater risk within an unguided expendable launch
vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas outside the
dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only performed on
those populations within an unguided expendable launch vehicle stage
impact dispersion area.
An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion
zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate
that the OEZ can be clear of members of the public during a flight. An
OEZ defines the area where the public risk criteria of 30
x 10-6 would be exceeded if one person were present in the
open. The overflight exclusion zone was estimated from risk
computations for each expendable launch vehicle type and class. An
applicant must define an OEZ because expendable launch vehicle range
rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle effective casualty
areas, the area within which all casualties are assumed to occur
through exposure to debris, are large, and impact dispersion areas are
dense with debris so that the presence of one person inside this
hazardous area is expected to produce Ec values exceeding
the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant must either own the
property, demonstrate to the FAA that there are times when people are
not present, or that it could clear the public from the overflight
exclusion zone prior to flight. Evacuating an overflight exclusion zone
for an inland site, might, for example, require an applicant to
demonstrate that agreements have been reached with local communities to
close any public roads during a launch.
The FAA has made a few changes to the Launch Site NPRM for this
final rule. First, the launch site location

[[Page 62827]]

review regulatory text has been expanded to better map out the launch
site location review for both ELVs and RLVs. The appendices remain
essentially the same.
Second, the size of the flight corridors that are generated in
either appendix A or B are now assumed in appendix C to reflect a
three-sigma event. The NPRM had used five-sigma. To review, for
purposes of the launch site location review, a flight corridor is an
area on the Earth's surface estimated to contain debris of a ballistic
coefficient of 3 pounds per square foot from nominal and
non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle, assuming a perfectly
functioning flight termination system. The land encompassed by the
flight corridor includes the population most at risk due to a launch.
The data used to develop a flight corridor does not directly provide
statistical significance. However, the relative risk to any specific
populated area can be assumed to vary proportionally with the populated
area's distance from the nominal trajectory ground trace. The NPRM
assumed the boundaries were five-sigma distances, which proved unwise
because the statistical probability of an event occurring between
three-sigma and five-sigma is extremely small. The launch site location
review procedures are not precise enough for the FAA to claim that a
flight corridor contains all of the population at risk at such a low
probability level. Assuming that the distance to the flight corridor
boundary is three-sigma is a more reasonable assumption.
Third, the multipliers in the launch site location review have been
taken out. In the Launch Site NPRM, to add conservatism to the launch
site location review, applicants would multiply the final Ec
value obtained through either appendix C or appendix D by a multiplier
of two and five, respectively. This final rule does not make use of
multipliers because the FAA, upon reconsideration, now believes that
the procedures for estimating risk in appendices A-D are conservative
enough to not require a multiplier at the end of the process.
Lastly, the FAA clarified in the regulatory text that orbital
expendable launch vehicles are classified by weight class, based on the
weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a 100-nm orbit, as
defined in table 2.
Discussion of Comments
The FAA received comments on the launch site location review from
ACTA, Inc; the New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization; Oklahoma
Aeronautics and Space Commission; Space Access, LLC; Christopher Shove;
and the Texas Aerospace Commission.
ACTA stated that medium to large vehicles launched from Cape
Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) do not meet the risk criteria. ACTA at 1.
The FAA disagrees. Using Appendix B, medium to large vehicles do pass
the launch site location review.
ACTA stated that unlike under EWR 127-1, the FAA has decided not to
permit any risk above 30 x 10-6. This coupled with a very
conservative approach to risk analysis could prove detrimental to the
U.S. industry. ACTA at 1. The FAA disagrees. The expected casualty
acceptable risk level, 30 x 10-6, is not new. It is a
current requirement for launches. Second, the very conservative
approach proposed is conservative because simplifying assumptions were
made. In many instances the FAA believes that such approaches
adequately demonstrate the acceptability of the site location without
the added burden of more complex analysis. It should not prove
detrimental because applicants may do a more refined, less conservative
analysis. To make this option explicit, sections 420.23 and 420.25,
covering the flight corridor and risk analysis, respectively,
explicitly state that the FAA will approve an alternate method if an
applicant provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its
proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required
in the appendices.
ACTA also states that the risk analysis methodology presented in
the document is very simplistic. There are better methods available,
albeit more complex, but the NPRM does not allow for any other
methodology. ACTA recommended that an applicant be allowed to use
equivalent approved analysis methods and processes that have been
validated by use at federal ranges involved in ELV and RLV activities.
ACTA at 2, 6 and 7. The FAA agrees and has modified the launch site
location review to allow such methods without a waiver. The analysis
methodology is intended to be simplistic and conservative. The actual
risks will be less than that estimated by the methodologies provided.
In many cases, the site applicant may not have available the inputs
necessary to provide a detailed risk analysis. In addition, many launch
sites are so remote that they do not need detailed analyses to show
that the risk levels are acceptable. New under these final rules is
that an applicant has the option of using higher fidelity
methodologies.
ACTA states that the NPRM offers no insight into the source of
numbers, such as casualty areas, that the FAA directs the license
applicant to use. The references should be identified. ACTA at 1.
Review of the Launch Site NPRM shows that the FAA provided its sources.
The NPRM stated, for example, to address the issues raised, that the
FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table C-3 from DAMP, a
series of risk estimation computer programs used at federal launch
ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in table 1, section
420.21. 64 FR at 34353.
ACTA and ACTA staff raised concerns regarding issues not addressed
in this rulemaking. ACTA stated that the NPRM did not address launch-
related risk from potential toxic releases, from far-field window
breakage, or debris risk to ships and aircraft. ACTA at 1, 2. ACTA
staff added that ignoring the existence of established major air
corridors or shipping lanes seems shortsighted. ACTA at 9. The FAA
disagrees. Air corridors and shipping lanes are not ignored. A launch
site operator must have an agreement in place with FAA Air Traffic and
the Coast Guard covering those issues before it will get a license.
The FAA agrees that the issues of toxicity and windows breaking
should not be ignored for launch safety, and launch -related risk from
potential toxic releases, from far-field window breakage, or debris
risk to ships and aircraft are covered in launch license application
reviews. Toxic and blast risks were not covered in this rulemaking
because launching only when circumstances such as wind are favorable
can minimize such risks. The FAA considers these issues better
addressed through the launch license. Second, debris risk to ships and
aircraft are addressed in these regulations. An applicant must conclude
agreements with the Coast Guard and the FAA Air Traffic in order to
address ship and aircraft risk, and a separate rulemaking addresses
these issues with additional specificity.
ACTA states that the level of analysis in the NPRM seems to assume
that the applicant will be very naive, and not have access to good
tools or consultant support. ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees. Not all
applicants are flight safety specialists. The FAA believes that
providing tools and data to conduct risk and other analyses is
beneficial to the industry. The proposed appendices take an applicant
step by step through the process.
ACTA states that the FAA's lack of methodology for risk analysis in
the back azimuth direction other than the

[[Page 62828]]

exclusion zone implies that there is no back azimuth risk. ACTA at 2.
The FAA does not wish to imply that there is no back azimuth risk.
There is. However, as noted in the NPRM, the launch site location
review assumes a perfectly functioning flight safety system. Therefore,
population behind the launch site is only addressed if it is within the
overflight exclusion zone or within the flight corridor due to wind
effects. Otherwise back azimuth population is not reviewed. A launch
license applicant will need to adequately address all flight risks in
order to receive a license.
ACTA states that the instantaneous impact point (IIP) rates are
unrealistically low, particularly late in flight. If only powered
flight is considered, the average IIP rate will increase. Using a lower
IIP rate inflates the computed risk. ACTA at 2. The FAA notes that the
IIP range rate data was intended to be conservative but, as discussed
in the NPRM, they are not unrealistically low. 64 FR at 34342.
ACTA states that the effective casualty areas seem very high. The
casualty area numbers are a prime contributor to the unrealistically
high risks computed by these methods. ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees that
the casualty area are unrealistically high if one considers, for each
piece of debris, its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact
explosions, the size of a person, and debris skip, splatter, and
bounce. They are also intended to be conservative. Higher fidelity
analyses will be necessary for the launch license application. Also,
now that the FAA will permit higher fidelity analyses that produce an
equivalent level of safety, the FAA finds that the concern is
addressed.
ACTA states that the overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) is designed to
protect an individual in the public at a risk level of
30 x 10-6 casualties. ACTA further states that this seems
rather loose, and that the Range Commanders Council Standard suggests
1 x 10-7 fatalities and the Eastern Range (ER) and Western
Range (WR) have used 1 x 10-6 casualties as an individual
risk limit for the general public. ACTA at 3. The FAA disagrees. ACTA
misunderstood what was stated in the NPRM. The NPRM actually states
that an overflight exclusion zone is the area where the collective risk
to the public would be greater than 30 x 10-6 if one person
were present in the open. 64 FR 34329. The overflight exclusion zone
does not incorporate an individual risk standard per se, but is merely
an area that must be clear of population for the collective risk
standard to be met.
ACTA states that if 30 x 10-6 was used as the basis for
developing the distance Dmax, then Dmax appears
quite conservative for that risk level. ACTA at 3. The FAA did not use
the criteria of 30 x 10-6 as the basis for developing the
distance Dmax. The basis for Dmax is the
estimated maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels
given a worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10
seconds into flight.
ACTA also opposed the FAA's use of a ballistic coefficient of
three. The NPRM stated that although the FAA proposes to assume a
ballistic coefficient of three as the smallest piece of wind sensitive
debris hazardous to the public, ballistic coefficient is not directly
related to fatality criteria based on the kinetic energy of debris. The
ballistic coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/
lbs, which represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a
standing person. ACTA states that historically, the national ranges
have used impact kinetic energy as a criterion for determining whether
an inert fragment may or may not produce a casualty. ACTA has been
performing biomechanical simulations, which are still in progress, to
investigate these criteria in support of the Air Force federal launch
ranges. However, one conclusion is that impact kinetic energy by itself
is an inadequate predictor of whether or not an inert impacting
fragment will produce a casualty. ACTA at 4, 5. The FAA notes that the
method suggested is far too complex for the scope of this final rule.
This final rule very simply assumes that a hit is a casualty. Note that
the risk criterion is based on the generation of a casualty not a
fatality.
NMOSC also disagreed with the FAA's statement that a ballistic
coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs, which
represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a standing
person. NMOSC states that 58 ft-lbs is a better number to use than 11,
but asks what is the basis for the 50% lethality claim for 58 ft-lbs
and ballistic coefficient of three. Furthermore, sheltering should also
be considered. NMOSC at 3.
The basis for the 50% lethality claim is for a standing person and
is found in the Range Commanders Council (RCC) Supplement to Standard
321-97, ``Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, Inert
Debris'', Figure 4-3, on page 4-5. However, the FAA would like to
modify its statement made in the NPRM with respect to how ballistic
coefficient relates to kinetic energy and the 50% lethality claim.
Ballistic coefficient () is very difficult to relate to
kinetic energy. () is equal to an object's weight divided by
the product of the object's drag coefficient and it's projected area
and expressed in units of lbs/ft2. Kinetic energy units are
joules or ft-lbs/sec. Various combinations of weight, drag coefficient,
and projected area can equate to the same , but each
combination would produce a different kinetic energy.
ACTA makes a number of points about launch corridors. First, ACTA
states that impulsive velocities imparted to fragments from explosives
are ignored throughout. ACTA at 6. The FAA did consider whether it was
appropriate to address explicitly impulsive velocities but decided that
the conservatism incorporated into appendix B obviates the need for
including them in the appendix B analysis. Additionally, these analyses
are not intended to be high fidelity analyses or require inputs that a
launch site applicant may not have. These analyses are believed to be
adequate for most coastal site applicants. More detailed analysis will
be required from launch operators.
Second, ACTA states that no justification is given for the use of
five-sigma for the launch corridor boundaries. ACTA at 6. The FAA does
agree that the use of five-sigma to define the flight corridor boundary
was not appropriate. As noted above, the final rule assumes the
boundaries are three-sigma.
Third, ACTA states that there does not appear to be any real
probabilistic basis for any of the dispersion analyses. ACTA at 6. ACTA
is correct. No attempt is made to determine the variations of risk
within the corridor. In the downrange direction, the chance of a
failure is considered equal at any given point on the flight
trajectory. In the crossrange direction, the chance that debris will
impact any given point within the flight corridor is based on its
distance from the trajectory ground trace. Impacting the boundary of
the flight corridor is considered a three-sigma event, and all points
in between the trajectory ground trace and the flight corridor boundary
vary linearly from zero to three-sigma.
Lastly, ACTA notes that in the risk analysis, the crossrange
standard deviations are used to compute Ec. Using downrange
risk models such as those found in appendix B, one can choose to vary
the crossrange sigma up and down and compute the Ec as a
function of sigma. Then a maximum Ec can be obtained within
reasonable limits of the possible range of the crossrange sigma. This
helps to eliminate the controversy about the determination of the width
of the corridor. ACTA at 6.

[[Page 62829]]

The FAA agrees with ACTA in that the approach would provide a more
accurate assessment of risk. If an applicant conducted such an
analysis, it might consider offering the analysis as demonstrating an
equivalent level of safety. However, the method appears to require an
applicant to make several launch corridor computations adjusting the
sigma value until an optimum value is found that produces exactly
30 x 10-6 Ec for the enclosed population. The FAA
does not believe this is necessary for assessing most launch site
locations, and has not adopted the suggested change. The analyses
provided by the FAA are presented in a fashion that produces a binary
decision. The risk computations for the populations enclosed by the
corridor will either pass or fail the Ec criteria. If the
resultant Ec is above the threshold the applicant can
quickly decide if an azimuth or launch point adjustment will resolve
the problem.
ACTA next states that the equation for casualty expectancy in
appendix C contains the ratio of the casualty area to the populated
area. This ratio should be limited to one, to avoid the possibility of
predicting more casualties, given impact, than the number of people in
the population center. ACTA at 6. The FAA agrees and the change is
reflected in the appendix.
In the NPRM's discussion of the launch site location review, the
FAA notes that for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided expendable
launch vehicle, an applicant would analyze the risks associated with a
series of impact dispersion areas around the impact points for spent
stages. ACTA staff suggests that the FAA should also be concerned about
any population centers within the three-sigma dispersions along the
entire trajectory, as is done for orbital launch vehicles. ACTA at 8.
As discussed in the NPRM, the FAA selected the event of greatest risk
for guided and unguided launch vehicles. 64 FR 34353. For proven
unguided launch vehicles, that risk stems from success. For purposes of
assessing a launch point, the FAA does not believe it is necessary to
address failures scenarios for launch points that are going to support
proven unguided suborbital launch vehicles. Malfunction scenarios are
discounted due to the very low probability of failure in proven
unguided suborbital launch vehicles. An unguided suborbital launch
vehicle will fly a wind-weighted trajectory in most cases. The impact
dispersion areas for the rocket's stages account for the impact points
within three-sigma probability of occurrence given the rocket does not
experience a malfunction. If a launch point is to be used solely for
unproven unguided suborbital launch vehicles, then an applicant must
look at failure scenarios.
ACTA staff also believes the FAA should establish criteria for
individual risk because it is a significant consideration needed to
adequately provide protection for the public. ACTA at 9. The FAA does
not disagree, and may revise its launch site regulations in the future.
At this time, however, the FAA has decided to cover individual risk
issues through a launch license, and has determined that the OEZ and
other requirements are suitable for making a decision on the
suitability of a launch site.
In the NPRM, in justifying the fact that stage impact is not
assessed during the launch site location review for orbital launch
vehicles, the FAA stated that risk calculations performed for launches
from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by
controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by
wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure. ACTA suggests
that this statement be tempered because risks posed by normally
jettisoned Delta 2 GEMS are a significant element of concern from VAFB.
ACTA at 9.
The FAA does not wish to imply that stage disposition is of no
concern. Stage disposition is a critical safety issue and will be
covered in launch license applications. However, because the location
of drop zones is different for every launch vehicle, and because the
launch site location review is not meant to assess specific launch
vehicles, the FAA has designed the launch site location so that a
launch site that does not have safe areas to dispose of stages will not
likely pass the launch site location review. Significant population
within the flight corridor, particularly near the flight trajectory
ground trace, would raise the estimated Ec above the
acceptable limit.
ACTA staff had a few comments on definitions. First, the NPRM
defined ``flight corridor'' as an area on the Earth's surface estimated
to contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-
nominal flight of an orbital or guided suborbital launch vehicle.''
ACTA staff asked what about the other potential 49% of the debris? ACTA
at 9. The FAA agrees that the definition should not have used the term
``majority'' and the word ``majority'' has been removed from the
definition.
Second, the NPRM defined ``instantaneous impact point (IIP)'' as an
impact point, following thrust termination of a launch vehicle,
calculated in the absence of atmospheric drag effects.'' The definition
should acknowledge that several forms of IIP calculations are possible.
IIPs can be calculated based on vacuum, drag or oblateness corrections
depending on the application. ACTA at 9, 10. The FAA agrees. The
definition no longer states that it must be calculated in the absence
of atmospheric drag effects. However, for purposes of part 420, IIP is
calculated in the absence of atmospheric drag.
ACTA staff next commented on proposed section 420.15(b), in which
the proposed rule stated ``For launch sites analyzed for expendable
launch vehicles, an applicant shall provide each month and any percent
wind data used in the analysis.'' ACTA at 10. For percent wind data,
ACTA suggests use of mean winds. ACTA also suggests the use of a wind
covariance matrix. Mean winds are called out in the launch site
location review. An applicant should be able to use worse winds, e.g.
three-sigma winds, if it desires. ACTA at 10. The FAA does not believe
a statistical analysis of winds such as using a wind covariance matrix
is necessary to assess a launch point. Wind covariance matrices are
also not readily available from the suggested wind data source, so
therefore the FAA will not incorporate the suggested changes.
Proposed section 420.23 stated that the FAA will evaluate the
adequacy of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles
including all new launch vehicles, whether expendable or reusable, on a
case-by-case basis. ACTA requested additional criteria. ACTA at 10. The
FAA will rely on the goal of the launch site location review--to show
that a launch vehicle can be launched safety from a given launch point.
Unproven launch vehicles must be looked at carefully due to their
inherently high probability of failure.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an overflight exclusion zone (OEZ)
that an applicant must demonstrate is either unpopulated, is
uninhabited at certain times, or from which the public can be excluded
during launch. ACTA staff notes that using this overly conservative
approach to risk analysis would likely prevent X-33 launches from the
Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). ACTA at 11. Similarly, NMOSC
states that the requirement for, and specifications of, an OEZ should
depend on the vehicle's reliability and whether it has multiple stages.
NMOSC suggests that it not be required for a highly reliable, non-
staging RLV. NMOSC at 3. The FAA agrees in part with ACTA and NMOSC.
The size or existence of an OEZ for a reliable non-staging RLV,

[[Page 62830]]

depends on whether any area exists around the launch point where the
Ec risk is equal to or greater than 30 x 10-6,
if one member of the public is inside. An overflight exclusion zone may
or may not apply to an RLV, depending on the circumstances of a
particular case analyzed. The approval of a flight corridor for an RLV,
such as the X-33, would be handled on a case-by-case basis.
ACTA staff noted that the appendix A launch area is based on a
Delta II. ACTA states that this has several shortcomings because the
families of launch vehicles based on Castor-120 SRMs, such as Athena
and Taurus, are more representative of those likely to be launched from
a non-federal launch site. ACTA at 11. The FAA notes that an appendix A
launch area is large enough to encompass launch vehicles based on
Castor-120 SRMs. Although turning rates for the Athena and Taurus may
be higher than Delta II, this is not critical for the appendix A flight
corridor lines because appendix A can accommodate the Athena and Taurus
turns.
ACTA states that in the launch area, ignoring the IIP displacement
caused by a vehicle's malfunction turn rates until 50,000 ft. seems
unwise based on the turning potential of most ELVs, especially the
Athena and Taurus. ACTA at 11. The debris dispersion radius accounts
for a number of failure scenarios, including the IIP displacement
caused by a vehicle's malfunction turn rate. The debris dispersion
radius is the estimated maximum distance from a launch point that
debris travels given a worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight
termination at 10 seconds into flight.
Other than the debris dispersion radius, ACTA is correct in that
malfunction turns and trajectory dispersions are not explicitly
accounted for in the launch area computations. The FAA does not believe
this is necessary to assess the viability of a launch point. In the
launch area, winds are the dominant dispersion effect for low-
debris pieces, accounting for up to 70% of the total launch area
dispersion effect. Conservative assumptions in the appendix B method
adequately cover the remaining percentage contributions to the overall
impact dispersion.
ACTA staff suggests that in the launch area, the FAA should better
communicate that the 10 and 100 mile limits are based on IIP and not on
present position. ACTA at 11. The FAA agrees and has modified
appendices A and B accordingly.
ACTA staff notes that for the launch and downrange areas, an
applicant is to compute Pi for each populated area using the
following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.000

ACTA suggests that this be replaced by the normal integral with a
single footnote saying that it can be approximated using Simpson's
rule. ACTA at 11. The FAA agrees that there are other ways to
approximate the normal integral that are just as accurate as Simpson's
rule. An applicant is not precluded from using other ways of computing
the normal integral.
Space Access LLC also had a number of comments on the launch site
location review. First, Space Access found the proposed rule difficult
to accept in two areas. First, flight Ec issues should be
outside the scope of site licensing and all flight-related and mission-
based calculations are the responsibility of the launch operator.
Providing several methods to simplify Ec is confusing,
conflicting with other published guidance, and could be considered
precedent setting. Space Access at 2. Much of what Space Access
suggests is already reflected in the final rule. For individual
launches, all flight-related and mission-based calculations are part of
a launch operator license. The launch site location review is intended,
however, to ensure that the FAA does not issue a license that cannot
support the launch vehicles intended for launch from the launch site.
Providing several methods to simplify Ec is meant to provide
flexibility to applicants. Lastly, review of the appendices unearthed
no conflicts with other published guidance.
Second, Space Access believes the proposed rule effectively
precludes approval of any new commercial launch sites, because under
appendix A and C, Cape Canaveral would be disapproved as a launch site
for Delta, Atlas, and Titan vehicles if it were not on federal
property. Space Access at 4. The FAA disagrees. Cape Canaveral would
fail the proposed appendix A analysis but would not fail the proposed
analysis under appendix B and C. The simplicity of appendix A is
designed for launch sites that are in remote locations. Cape Canaveral
is not a remote site.
Space Access adds that appendix B and C would not help the
shortcomings of appendix A because this method uses the same casualty
area numbers, which are the significant driver in the calculations.
Space Access also comments that the casualty area provided in Table C-3
is too large and appendix C provided data would appear to be
excessively conservative and overwhelms all other calculations. Space
Access at 4. In response, the casualty area numbers are indeed
conservative, but not excessively so. An applicant is also permitted to
utilize a more refined analysis and provide a clear and convincing
demonstration that its proposed method provides an equivalent level of
safety to that provided in the appendices.
Similarly, Space Access states that appendix C may only allow the
approval of small launch vehicles. This will encourage more launches of
small payloads and therefore increase overall risk to the public by
exposing the public to a large number of launches. A normalized risk
evaluation, such as risk per pound of payload, minimizes total risk and
should be considered in any risk methodology. Space Access at 5. The
FAA disagrees that the proposed appendix C allows only for the approval
of small launch vehicles. Space Access offers no support for this
argument.
Space Access further states that the impact of appendix C is that
potential launch site operators will fail to get sufficient local and
state support, financial and legislative inputs, to work through issues
with the FAA and potential launch operators. The enforcement of these
proposed rules at this time would negatively affect the development of
new safe launch sites for all classes of launch vehicles. Space Access
at 5. The Texas Aerospace

[[Page 62831]]

Commission stated that the proposed rules preclude approval of any new
launch sites, which are not already on federal launch ranges. These
proposed rules would stop the progress being made in Texas and other
states to secure investments and commitments for the development of
safe, efficient and modern commercial spaceports. Texas Aerospace
Commission at 1. Because Space Access and Texas Aerospace Commission do
not offer evidence in support of their concerns, the FAA will continue
to rely on the reasons it gave in the NPRM. The launch site location
review is designed to avoid licensing the operation of a launch site
that cannot safely support a launch. The launch site location review
should not preclude the licensing of any launch site that can safely
support launches.
Space Access suggests that the FAA delete all Ec
calculations from the proposed rule for site operators. It comments
that the appendix A and C methodology appears to be extremely
inaccurate, the appendix B and C methodology lacks the fidelity
required for use by launch operators for licensing, and actual vehicle
Ec data is the only valid method. Space Access at 5. The
Texas Aerospace Commission recommends the FAA consult with the RLV
developers and proposed launch site operators/developers to establish a
safe, less conservative, and simple method of calculating
Ec. Texas Aerospace at 1. The FAA disagrees, noting that the
appendices are designed to offer flexibility in ascertaining whether a
site is acceptable. The FAA has determined that a review of a launch
site location is a necessary component of any license application
process. Moreover, an applicant is not tied to the appendices. For
expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will accept other analyses that
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that an applicant's
proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that provided
by the appendices. For reusable launch vehicles, an applicant defines a
flight corridor that contains the hazardous debris from nominal and
non-nominal flight of a reusable launch vehicle. The applicant must
provide a clear and convincing demonstration of the validity of its
flight corridor.
Space Access states that the launch point, debris dispersion area,
and overflight exclusion zone definition and descriptions are of
specific concern to a site operator and should be formalized. This
guidance will directly benefit potential site operators by providing
clear planning and procedures to use for proper land acquisition and
site development work. Space Access at 5. In response, the FAA agrees
that providing clear planning and procedures to use for proper land
acquisition and site development work is important. The primary purpose
of the launch site location review is to avoid the development of
launch sites that can never support launches due to the proximity of
population. Note that the debris dispersion area and overflight
exclusion zones are only used to assess the adequacy of a launch point
to support launches. The actual hazards areas for specific launch
vehicles will be determined in the launch license process.
Space Access states that the FAA should delete the discussion of
launch area and downrange area from the proposed rule. According to
Space Access, these areas should not be of concern to a site operator
because a site operator has little or no legal control, liability or
responsibility in these areas--the launch operator does. Possible
demarcation of responsible areas for a site operator is when a launch
vehicle enters into international airspace (100 km or 300,000 feet or
the crossing of a vehicle into airspace above international waters).
Another possible definition is when takeoff or liftoff occurs. Space
Access at 6.
The FAA agrees that a launch operator is responsible for the safety
of a launch. However, the purpose of the launch site location review is
to assess the safety of the launch point, not the policies and
procedures of a specific launch operator, and these regulations place
certain responsibilities upon a launch site operator. To adequately
assess the safety of a launch point, one must look at more than just
the local population. Downrange activities must be considered in
evaluating the acceptability of the launch location, therefore launch
area and downrange area requirements remain in the final rule.
Space Access believes that current reliability data for probability
of failure (Pf) should be used for the specific vehicle or
class of launch vehicles under consideration. Space Access at 6. The
FAA would like to point out that an applicant may use probability
values that reflect the type of launch vehicle it intends on launching
from the launch point. The value must be reasonable. A good value
should have a 95% confidence that the actual Pf is equal to
or less than the value used.
Space Access believes that all commercial launches should be
treated equally from any location. The FAA should not exempt commercial
site operators from these rules at federal ranges. No benefits are
provided by a federal launch range exemption to these rules. The
perception by new commercial launch operators and new commercial site
operators is they are being held to a higher standard. Space Access at
7; see also Texas Aerospace at 1 (all commercial launches should be
treated equally from any location). In response, commercial site
applicants at federal ranges are not exempted from all requirements of
the final rule. If a launch point has already supported a launch of a
particular class of launch vehicle, there is no reason for an applicant
to repeat a demonstration already made.
Space Access recommends the FAA provide proposed universal rules
applicable to all launch sites, i.e. for RLVs and ELVs, as soon as
possible instead of making rules applicable only to ELVs. Space Access
at 7. Similarly, NMOSC believes that since the focus of the launch site
location review is expendable launch vehicles, the FAA does not see
RLVs as credible launch vehicles. NMOSC at 2. In response, the basic
public safety goals are the same for ELVs, RLVs, and reentry vehicles.
In other words, the level of safety that is required by the FAA is
universal. However, the means to achieve public safety with an RLV
mission may be different from an ELV mission. The credibility of RLV's
is not at issue here. The reason the FAA has well defined methods of
assessing a launch site for expendable launch vehicles is because 40
years of empirical data exists to define such methods.
Space Access lastly states that the unproven vehicle exclusion is
unjustified. The FAA should provide a clear definition of unproven
vehicles. Space Access at 7. The FAA has asked the RLV industry for
suggestions on what definition they might suggest. Space Access does
not provide a suggestion. There are a number of factors that the FAA
has considered in whether to provide a precise definition to the term
``unproven.'' NASA, for example, does not consider a vehicle's
demonstrated reliability adequate for placing a NASA payload on the
vehicle, unless the vehicle has flown at least 14 times. Another
approach might be to examine the flight history as an ``unproven''
vehicle and determine that statistical point in which the probability
of catastrophic failure can be shown to be equal to or less than some
number at the 95% confidence level. Historically, the flights of new
vehicles have demonstrated failure rates much higher than design
analyses indicated. The data presented for use in the final rule is
specifically based on mature vehicles. For these reasons and its
concern for

[[Page 62832]]

public safety, the FAA will address unproven vehicles on a case-by-case
basis based on the facts available.
NMOSC also had many comments on the launch site location review.
First, for the most part, NMOSC states that the draft requirements do
not adequately address the launch of RLVs or unproven vehicles, and is
concerned that an operator could spend a lot of money and time
preparing an application, only to find that the application is
incomplete or the site unacceptable. The FAA should provide more in the
way of guidelines for RLV-only sites. NMOSC at 1.
The FAA disagrees that an RLV operator has to guess what the FAA
will look for in a license application. The FAA's flight safety goals
are clear--the risk to the public must be at an acceptable level, that
is, an expected casualty of less than or equal to 30 x
10-6. What is acceptable for RLVs is described in the rule
concerning reentry. 65 FR 56617.
The flight safety approach for RLVs and ELVs are different, so
naturally a launch point suitable for a RLV may not be suitable for an
ELV. The reason the FAA has articulated clear methods of assessing a
launch site for ELVs is because 40 years of empirical data exists to
promulgate such methods.
In the NPRM, the FAA stated that references to a guided launch
vehicle, whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be taken to mean that the
vehicle has an FTS. References to an unguided sub-orbital could be
understood to mean that the vehicle does not possess an FTS. NMOSC
believes that this does not accommodate RLVs very well. NMOSC at 2. In
response, the FAA did not mean to imply that RLV's would have to have
an FTS. This applies only to guided ELV's. The final rule has been
modified to clarify this point.
In the NPRM, the FAA stated, as an example, that because a launch
licensee will need to assure the adequacy of ground tracking, approval
of ground tracking systems will be handled in the launch license
process even if a launch site operator provides the service. NMOSC asks
what about tracking from space? NMOSC at 2. Tracking systems were not a
subject of the NPRM. The FAA was only pointing out that flight safety
services such as tracking will be assessed for a launch license, not
for a launch site operator license. No implication was intended about
how tracking is accomplished.
In the NPRM, the FAA states that for the ``semi-automated method''
of plotting on maps, the ``Mercator'' and ``Oblique Mercator'' are
adequate cylindrical projections, the ``Lambert-Conformal'' and
``Albers Equal-Area'' are adequate conic projections, and the ``Lambert
Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and ``Azimuthal Equidistant'' are adequate plane
projections. An applicant may use other maps, but the applicant would
be required to demonstrate an equivalent level of accuracy over the
required distances. NMOSC suggest the FAA provide clarification on
``equivalent level of accuracy over the required distances.'' NMOSC at
2.
As noted in the NPRM, all map projections have inherent
distortions. The distortions are virtually unavoidable and are directly
related to the techniques for displaying latitude and longitude lines
on a flat surface area. The flight corridor methods are primarily
sensitive to azimuthal direction and geodetic length of the flight
corridor line segments. The launch site location review methods require
an applicant to use cylindrical, conic, and plane map projections
because they produce only small error with straight-line measurements.
Therefore, ``equivalency'' would be based on how well the applicant-
proposed map projection preserves the accuracy of scale and direction.
NMOSC suggests the FAA provide corridor standards for vehicles that
do not employ destructive termination. NMOSC at 3. The FAA disagrees. A
flight corridor is a means of defining the population that is at risk
due to a launch. Destructive flight termination is not specifically
ingrained in the standard provided. The appendices provided corridor
standards for ELV's because reliable flight termination systems allow
one to determine the worse-case reach of debris due to a failure.
Corridors for RLV's are not as straightforward, and are dependent on
the technology involved. That is why the FAA has opted for a case-by-
case approach. What is of interest are all failures that could lead to
exposure of the uninvolved public. Note that a final rule has been
published with standards for the operation of RLVs and reentry
vehicles. 65 FR 56617.
NMOSC notes that failure probability is a big issue for both this
and the RLV NPRM, suggesting that ninety percent (90%) reliability is
way too low for an RLV. For purposes of site licensing, NMOSC suggests
no lower than ninety nine percent (99%) reliability be assumed for the
analyses; this is the proven reliability of the Space Shuttle. NMOSC at
3. The FAA disagrees. There are accepted ways to estimating the design
reliability of a vehicle and for proving what the reliability is.
Unfortunately, historically, design reliability has never been achieved
during the first flights of any new vehicle. Proof comes only through
verification and validation with empirical flight data. There is no
basis for the statement that 90% is too low for an RLV. This number may
be well below intended design reliability, but 99% reliability has
never been shown for any new RLV. The Shuttle's historic data does not
support a value of 99% at any reasonable confidence level. At a 95%
confidence level, the shuttle's demonstrated reliability is only about
97%. In any case, RLV flight safety standards are covered in the final
rule for RLVs and reentry operations. 65 FR 56617.
Christopher Shove, Ph.D., Senior Consultant, Space Data Systems,
Inc, states that for some launch vehicles, the proposed failure rate of
10% is five times greater than those vehicles' historical failure rate.
The FAA should use actual failure rates and double them for
conservatism. The proposed constant failure rate creates an unfair
playing field among different vehicle types by lumping them into one
category. Shove at 2. The FAA disagrees that for some launch vehicles,
the proposed failure rate of 10% is five times greater than those
vehicles' historical failure rate. No vehicle has a failure rate of 2%
at any reasonable confidence level. The failure rate of 10% was chosen
to find an acceptably conservative value while not overly penalizing
seasoned launch vehicles. The seasoned launch vehicles currently have
failure rates ranging from 2.5% for Ariane to 6.4% for Proton. Doubling
any failure rate exceeding 5% would burden the industry by adding
unnecessary conservatism at a 95% confidence level.
In the NPRM, after an applicant has computed casualty expectancy
for a flight corridor, the proposed regulations required that it be
multiplied by a safety factor of two. NMOSC suggested that the FAA
eliminate the safety factor and set the standard at 15 x
10-\6\. NMOSC at 3. As noted above in the summary section,
the multiplier has been taken out in the final rule.
NMOSC states that appendix C seems to favor coastal sites because
appendix C provides the option for an applicant to further simplify the
estimation of casualty expectancy by making worst-case assumptions that
would produce a higher value of the corridor EC compared
with the analysis defined in appendix C, subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8).
NMOSC at 3. The FAA disagrees. The simplifying options in the
appendices were directed at launch sites that are remote enough that
they pass a test that is simple but extremely conservative. This does
not preclude other launch

[[Page 62833]]

sites. The FAA's concern is that it be demonstrated that operations can
be conducted safely from the site. If circumstances are such that it is
easier for one site to make this demonstration than another, so be it.
Lastly, NMOSC commented on the proposed requirement that at least
two days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, the licensee shall notify
local officials and all owners of land adjacent to the launch site of
the flight schedule. This should not be required for highly reliable,
non-staging RLVs. If it is, what methods of notification are
acceptable? NMOSC at 3. In response, when RLV's begin to have routine
operations that make this requirement unworkable, the FAA will
reevaluate the requirement. The intent will remain unchanged, however,
which is to ensure that the local community has reasonable notice of
upcoming launch activity to make any necessary preparations.
Mr. Shove noted that the FAA states that the proposed rule would
allow the FAA to disapprove any launch site request because the
applicant could not prove it is safe, which proof, according to
scientific method, is impossible. Shove at 1. The FAA disagrees. Launch
activities take place today from sites that clearly meet these
standards. The final rule articulates an objective standard that is
quite possible to demonstrate. The FAA is not free to arbitrarily turn
down a launch site application. The potential operators of a launch
site must demonstrate that operations can be safely conducted from the
site. It the applicant can not, then the FAA will not issue a license.
He also questioned whether the FAA definition of sub-orbital launch
vehicle would include the vehicles used in programs such as ``Rockets
for Schools,'' and thus require those states, schools, and launch areas
to apply for a launch site operator license. Shove at 2. Such sites
would not. If a launch meets the definition of amateur rocket activity,
no launch license is required. Similarly, launch sites that support
such vehicles do not require a license.
Mr. Shove also states that the U.S. Census Bureau's TIGER files
provide the data to create census block polygons. The FAA should allow
the use of such data to calculate populated areas, so that greater
accuracy can be obtained. Calculating populated areas by block groups
may give an inaccurately high population estimate to the detriment of
what could be a safe launch area and flight trajectory. Shove at 2.
The FAA would like to stress that an applicant is always free to
use a more accurate method. The method in the NPRM requires that
population be at least at a census block group level. It does not
preclude more accurate data. The launch site location review is written
so that census block groups are the largest size populated area
allowed. An applicant may certainly use census block polygons, which
are smaller and therefore allow for a higher fidelity analysis.
Lastly, Mr. Shove commented on the appendix B requirement that an
applicant obtain the launch point geodetic latitude on the WGS-84
ellipsoidal Earth model. An applicant may do this using the Global
Positioning System. His question is whether this means the single
receiver accuracy of 100 meters, differential GPS with two
receiver accuracy of less than a meter, or differential GPS using a
base station and a receiver accuracy of 10 cm? Shove at 2.
The launch site location review requires the launch area map scale
to be ``not less than 1:250,000 inches per inch.'' An applicant is
required to show that the measurement instruments provide the required
accuracy. Latitude and longitude can be mechanically measured to four
decimal point accuracy on that scale map. Four decimal point accuracy
in degrees latitude/longitude at the equator is approximately 36 feet
[11 meters].
The Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission (OASC) had one
comment on the launch site location review. It requests clarification
on what constitutes sounding rockets. There is great variance in the
capability of sounding rockets and the altitudes they reach. OASC
recommends classification based on altitude and propellant utilized.
Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission at 1.
A sounding rocket is a common term for suborbital launch vehicles.
These final rules adopted today do not use that term. However,
suborbital launch vehicles are defined, and mean exactly what their
name implies--launch vehicles that do not obtain orbital velocity. The
FAA used altitude in the NPRM to classify sounding rockets, but not
propellant. The type of propellant used by a sounding rocket was not
used as a factor because it is not an important consideration for
purposes of the launch site location review.
Don A. Nelson commented that the proposed rules do not specifically
address the flight testing of launch vehicles from a proposed launch
site. He believed that the FAA must establish an experimental flight-
testing category for flights from launch sites under FAA jurisdiction.
Anything less would subject the public to very high risks. This is
because, historically, all launch vehicles during the flight test
period have experienced catastrophic in-flight failures. This
unacceptable failure rate requires that all population, including
ground and air traffic, be removed from the areas defined by the
instantaneous impact points of the nominal and worst-case dispersed
trajectories of the flight test vehicle. The flight test corridor must
be free of all-high value property and hazardous storage areas. White
Sands Missile Range (WSMR) has set the standard for testing
experimental launch vehicles within the continental United States. WSMR
requires population be removed from the test range, and all ground and
air traffic in the test range is prohibited during the flight test. Don
A. Nelson at 1.
The FAA agrees that the flight safety issues of an unproven vehicle
are valid concerns and addresses the issue in the rulemaking governing
reentry. 65 FR 56617. Note that the FAA's intent is to ensure that all
operations conducted on a launch site are done so in a manner that
protects public health and safety and safety of property. The FAA does
not intend to allow experimental flight testing under any circumstance
which places the public at greater risk. This may mean that the
proposed operations are restricted or limited in scope in order to
ensure public safety is achieved. These issues will be covered in a
launch license application review process.
Kistler Aerospace Corporation commented that treating RLV's on a
case-by-case manner is the proper approach and fully justified in light
of the new capabilities and operational concepts that will be brought
to the industry by reusable launch systems. Kistler at 1.

G. License Conditions

Subpart C contains standard terms and conditions of a license. It
covers such items as the need for a licensee to operate a launch site
in accordance with the representations contained in its license
application, the duration of a license, transfer of a license, license
modification, and compliance monitoring.
A license may also contain conditions flowing from the various
reviews conducted during the application process. For example, a
license granted following approval of a launch site location is limited
to the launch points analyzed, and the type and class of launch vehicle
used in the demonstration of site location safety. An applicant may
choose to analyze all three types of launch vehicles in its
application. An FAA launch site operator license authorizing the

[[Page 62834]]

operation of a launch site for launch of an orbital expendable launch
vehicle allows the launch of vehicles from the site that were less than
or equal to the class of launch vehicle, based on payload weight, used
to demonstrate the safety of the site location. If a licensee later
wanted to offer the launch site for the launch of a larger class of
vehicles or a different type of launch vehicle, such as an unguided
sub-orbital launch vehicle, the licensee would be required to request a
license modification and demonstrate that the larger vehicle or
different type of vehicle could be safely launched from the launch
site. Likewise, the addition of a new launch point would require a
license modification. The demonstration would be based on the same
kinds of analyses used for the original license. In some cases, a
licensee might be able to use the safety analyses performed by a launch
operator to meet location review requirements.
Discussion of Comments
The agency did not receive any specific comments on the conditions
of a license but one change was made in this area between the final
rule and the Launch Site NPRM. The section on license modifications has
been changed to clarify that changes in operations require prior
approval of the FAA

H. Operational Responsibilities

The FAA is imposing certain operational responsibilities on an
operator of a launch site. In addition, the FAA distinguishes between
activities covered by a license to operate a launch site and those
covered by a launch license. Any activity that will be approved as part
of a launch license will not be covered in a launch site operator
license even if the launch site operator provides the service. For
example, because a launch licensee will need to ensure the adequacy of
ground tracking, approval of ground tracking systems will be handled in
the launch license process even if a launch site operator provides the
service. Similarly, in the case of ground safety, a launch site
operator may provide fueling for a launch licensee, but safe procedures
for fueling will be addressed in the launch license.
The operational requirements being adopted for the operator of a
launch site addresses control of public access, scheduling of
operations at the site, notifications, recordkeeping, launch site
accident response and investigation, and explosive safety. A launch
site operator licensee is required to control access to the site.
Security guards, fences, or other physical barriers may be used. Anyone
entering the site must, on first entry, be informed of the site's
safety and emergency response procedures. Alarms or other warning
signals are required to alert persons on the launch site of any
emergency that might occur when they are on site. If a launch site
licensee has multiple launch customers on site at one time, the
licensee must have procedures for scheduling their operations so that
the activities of one customer do not create hazards for others.
An operator of a launch site has responsibilities regarding
explosives, specifically, those dealing with lightning and electric
power lines.
The launch site operator is responsible for all initial
coordination with the appropriate FAA regional office having
jurisdiction over the airspace where launches will take place as well
as the U.S. Coast Guard. The FAA's Air Traffic Service and, if
applicable the Coast Guard, issues Notices to Airmen and Mariners,
respectively, to ensure that they avoid hazardous areas. An FAA Air
Route Traffic Control Center also closes airways during a launch
window, if necessary. A launch site operator is required to obtain an
agreement regarding procedures for coordinating contacts with these
agencies for launches from the site. The requirement for coordinating
with the Coast Guard might not, of course, always be applicable, for
example, for an inland launch site.
The regulatory text has been changed from the Launch Site NPRM to
clarify that the Coast Guard and FAA agreements must be completed
during the application process, and must be complied with during the
term of the license.
A launch site operator licensee must also notify local officials
with an interest in the launch. These include officials with
responsibilities that might be called into play by a launch mishap,
such as fire and emergency response personnel.
A launch site operator is required to develop and implement a
launch site accident investigation plan containing procedures for
investigating and reporting a launch site accident. This extends
similar reporting, investigation and response procedures currently
applicable to launch related accidents and incidents to accidents
occurring during ground activities at a launch site.
The FAA did not propose the definition of mishap in the Launch Site
NPRM. The definition that currently exists in section 401.5 was
modified to include launch site accidents.
Of more significance, the accident investigation plan section has
been modified to require a licensee to participate in an investigation
of a launch accident for launches launched from the launch site, and to
cooperate with FAA or National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
investigations of a launch accident for launches launched from the
launch site. This was added because launch mishaps may have a
connection with the launch site.
Discussion of Comments
In the NPRM, the FAA stated that a launch site operator is
responsible for ground and flight safety under its FAA license, and
that the FAA would revisit ground safety issues in its development of
rules for launches from non-federal launch sites. ACTA staff noted that
ground safety issues are equally critical to this rule because it
requires an explosive site plan. ACTA at 8. The New Mexico Office for
Space Commercialization (NMOSC) suggested that it should be a site
operator's responsibility to ensure that procedures are in place to
preclude human error accidents involving explosive materials and static
discharge events. NMOSC at 1.
The FAA disagrees. Most ground safety issues are directly related
to operations of a launch operator, not those of a launch site
operator. Requirements addressing ground safety procedures are more
appropriate requirements for launch operators, since launch operators
conduct these types of hazardous operations. Most other risks and
phenomena associated with pre-flight operations are typically mitigated
by restrictions on the operations. That said, however, nothing
precludes a launch site operator from imposing additional requirements
on customers on the facility as long as those requirements do not
violate FAA requirements or other laws.
NMOSC made the point that ground safety issues would be better left
to other agencies such as OSHA, ATF, and state licensing organizations.
Vast quantities of liquid oxygen (LO2), liquid hydrogen
(LH2), and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4),
and other materials are shipped and used in interstate commerce. Why
single out the launch industry for special regulations? NMOSC at 1. The
FAA agrees in principal, and has attempted to only add requirements
where those other agency regulations do not apply.
LMC had comments concerning whether the proposed requirements might
affect launch operators performing services at commercial launch sites,
and whether the

[[Page 62835]]

requirements are consistent with ground and flight safety requirements
imposed on launch operators by DOD and NASA at federal launch ranges.
The Air Force tailors the standards set forth in EWR 127-1 to each
operator prior to such operator entering the federal range for the
purposes of conducting launch activities. LMC strongly recommends that
the FAA, like the Air Force, employ a case-by-case tailoring of the
standards. NMOSC at 2.
In response, the FAA has two comments. First, requirements for
launch operators are covered in a separate proposal on licensing and
safety requirements for launch. Second, for launch site operators, the
rules that the FAA is adopting today should be general enough to fit
most launch site scenarios. The FAA recognizes, however, that there may
be more than one way of meeting a requirement. That is why a
prospective applicant is required to consult with the FAA, in
accordance with 14 CFR 413.5, before submitting an application. Early
consultation enables an applicant to identify unique approaches to
meeting regulatory requirements. The FAA and an applicant can then work
together to resolve such issues.
The 45SW/SESE commented on the Accident Investigation Plan
requirements. It asks what agency or agencies will have responsibility
to maintain accident investigation reports and why? 45SW/SESE at 2. If
a launch site accident occurs, the NTSB or FAA will investigate, and
will maintain an investigation record. A launch site operator may also
conduct an investigation of its own, and will be responsible for
maintaining the investigation record in accordance with section 420.61.
ACTA also had comments on the Accident Investigation Plan
requirements and suggests that the definition of ``launch site
accident'' be clarified by either deleting ``ground'' or changing the
definition of ``launch site accident'' to read ``ground or launch
activity.'' The NPRM defined ``launch site accident'' as ``an unplanned
event occurring during a ground activity at a launch site resulting in
a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person
who is not associated with the activity, or any damage estimated to
exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the activity.'' ACTA at
10. The FAA does not agree with ACTA suggestion. A launch site accident
is strictly one that occurs during a ground activity. An accident
caused by the flight of a launch vehicle is a launch accident, as
defined in 14 CFR 401.5.
LMC commented on the Accident Investigation Plan requirements,
requesting clarification of whether the launch site operator or the
launch operator accident investigation plans have priority if there
were conflicts between plans. LMC at 4.
The FAA offers the following guidance. Although no accident
investigation plan has priority per se, the applicability of an
accident investigation plan depends on the nature of a mishap. Compared
to the NPRM, the definition of mishap has been changed in this final
rule to accord with another rule governing reentry. 65 FR 56617. A
mishap is now defined in section 401.5 as a launch or reentry accident,
launch or reentry incident, launch site accident, failure to complete a
launch or reentry as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events
resulting in a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2),
or resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to property. The
purpose of this definition is to encompass all incidents that must be
reported, responded to, or investigated in some manner by a launch
operator, a reentry operator, or launch site operator.
At a launch site operated under an FAA license, the launch site
operator would have a launch site accident investigation plan and each
launch operator on the launch site would have an individual launch
accident investigation plan. Each plan would cover different mishaps,
although there is some overlap, as discussed below. Table 4 is also
provided as a guide.
A launch site operator's launch site accident investigation plan
covers launch site accidents only. A launch site accident is an
unplanned event occurring during a ground activity at a launch site
resulting in a fatality or serious injury to any person who is not
associated with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000
to property not associated with the activity. In other words, if a
member of the public is injured or property belonging to a member of
the public over $25,000 is damaged due to a ground activity on the
launch site, a launch site operator must report, respond to, and
investigate the mishap. The FAA considers any licensee or its
employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or subcontractor or
the employees of any of these persons to be associated with a ground
activity. Property not associated with the activity will typically
include any property belonging to members of the public. Property
associated with the activity includes the property of a launch site
operator or launch licensee, or either licensee's customers,
contractors or subcontractors.
A launch operator's launch accident investigation plan, on the
other hand, covers launch accidents, launch incidents, and other
mishaps. Launch accidents and launch incidents are strictly related to
the flight of a launch vehicle, not ground activities. So, for launch
accidents and launch incidents, there is no overlap with launch site
operator reporting requirements.
Where there is overlap in launch operator and launch site operator
accident investigation plans is when a mishap occurs on the ground. A
launch operator must notify the FAA immediately in the event of a
mishap that involves a fatality or serious injury, and within 24 hours
in the event of a mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious
injury. The person injured does not have to be a member of the public.
Also, a launch operator must notify AST or the Washington Operations
Center within 24 hours in the event damage is estimated to exceed
$25,000 to property not associated with the activity.
In summary, both a launch site operator and a launch operator must
report, respond to, and investigate a mishap occurring during a ground
activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious injury to
any person who is not associated with the activity, or any damage
estimated to exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the
activity. The reason this type of mishap is covered by both plans is
that both a launch site operator and launch operator have a
responsibility to protect the public from hazardous ground activities.
Note, however, that either the launch site or launch operator may agree
to lead one investigation for both.

[[Page 62836]]

Table 4.--Mishap Investigations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Launch operator reporting Launch site operator reporting
Event requirement (14 CFR 415.41(b)) requirement (14 CFR 420.59(b))
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Launch accident--an unplanned event Immediate notification to the None.
occurring during the flight of a Federal Aviation Administration
launch vehicle resulting in the (FAA) Washington Operations Center
known impact of a launch vehicle,
its payload or any component
thereof outside designated impact
limit lines; or a fatality or
serious injury (as defined in 49
CFR 830.2) to any person who is not
associated with the flight; or any
damage estimated to exceed $25,000
to property not associated with the
flight that is not located at the
launch site or designated recovery
area.
Launch incident--an unplanned event Immediate notification to the None.
occurring during the flight of a Federal Aviation Administration
launch vehicle, other than a launch (FAA) Washington Operations Center
accident, involving a malfunction
of a flight safety system or
failure of the licensee's safety
organization, design or operations.
Launch site accident--an unplanned Immediate notification to the Immediate notification to the
event occurring during a ground Federal Aviation Administration Federal Aviation Administration
activity at a launch site resulting (FAA) Washington Operations Center (FAA) Washington Operations Center.
in a fatality or serious injury (as in the event of a fatality or
defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any serious injury.
person who is not associated with Notification within 24 hours to AST
the activity, or any damage or the Washington Operations Center
estimated to exceed $25,000 to in the event of damage estimated to
property not associated with the exceed $25,000 to property not
activity. associated with the activity
Other Mishap*: Immediate notification to the None.
Failure to complete a to Federal Aviation Administration
launch as planned. (FAA) Washington Operations Center
An unplanned event or in the event of a fatality or
series of events resulting in a serious injury
fatality or serious injury to any Notification within 24 hours to AST
person who is associated with the or the Washington Operations Center
activity. in the event of failure to complete
An unplanned event or a launch as planned, or greater
series of events resulting in than $25,000 worth of damage to a
greater than $25,000 worth of payload, a launch vehicle, a launch
damage to a payload, a launch support facility or government
vehicle, a launch support facility property located on the launch
or government property located on site.
the launch site.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Mishap means a launch or reentry accident, launch or reentry incident, launch site accident, failure to
complete a launch or reentry as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events resulting in a fatality or
serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to property.

IV. Part Analysis

Part 401--Organization and Definitions

Section 401.5 contains definitions of significant terms used in all
of Chapter III. The term ``mishap'' has been revised to include launch
site accidents as part of the definition of mishap. The term ``mishap''
is a general term for all unplanned events at a launch site or that
occur during a launch or reentry resulting in injury, or damage to or
loss of equipment or property. Mishaps include but are not limited to
launch or reentry accidents, launch or reentry incidents, and launch
site accidents. Mishaps also include failure to complete a launch or
reentry as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events resulting
in a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or
resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to property.

Part 417--License to Operate a Launch Site

The FAA removes and reserves part 417 and creates part 420 to
address licensing and safety requirements for operation of a launch
site.

Part 420--License to Operate a Launch Site

Section 420.1 describes the scope of part 420. Part 420 encompasses
the information and demonstrations that must be submitted as part of a
license application, the bases for license approval, license terms and
conditions, and post-licensing requirements with which a licensee must
comply to remain licensed.
Section 420.3 specifies the person who must apply for a license to
operate a launch site, and the person who must comply with regulations
that apply to a licensed launch site operator. Because a launch site
operator is someone who offers a launch site to others for launch, only
someone proposing such an offer need obtain a license to operate a
launch site. A launch operator proposing to launch from its own launch
site need only obtain a launch license because a launch license will
address safety issues related to a specific launch and because a launch
license will encompass ground operations. In response to comments, as
discussed earlier, a person operating a launch site that only supports
amateur rocket activities does not need a license under part 420.
Section 420.5 adds terms that have not been previously defined by
the FAA. These definitions apply in the context of part 420, which
governs the licensing and safety requirements for operation of a launch
site. These terms do not apply outside part 420. Specifically, the
following terms are defined. Unless otherwise noted, they remain
unchanged from the definitions proposed in the Launch Site NPRM.
Ballistic Coefficient () means the weight (W) of an object
divided by the

[[Page 62837]]

quantity product of the coefficient of drag (Cd) of the
object and the area (A) of the object.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.001

A ballistic coefficient is a parameter used to describe flight
characteristics of an object.
Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be
located together without adverse reaction. Compatibility in storage
exists when storing materials together does not increase the
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of
the effects of such an accident. Compatibility determines whether
materials require segregation.
Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination early in flight. For
an expendable launch vehicle, flight termination is assumed to occur at
10 seconds into flight. No assumptions are made for reusable launch
vehicles. If an expendable launch vehicle failure occurs shortly after
ignition, and a flight termination system is employed, the FAA expects
the debris to be contained within an area described by Dmax.
Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch
point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is
at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive
directed though 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis
is positive directed north. The EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed
away from the Earth.
Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty,
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to
be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris
piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact
explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. An effective
casualty area also accounts for the size of a person.
Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that,
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or
deflagrate.
Explosive division has also been added since the Launch Site NPRM
and means the hazard class 1 division of an explosive as defined by the
United Nations Organization classification system for transport of
dangerous goods, and as determined in accordance with 49 CFR part 173,
subpart C. The term ``division 1.3 explosive'' was proposed but not
adopted because the general terms for hazard class and explosive
division have been added instead.
Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast
effects when detonated.
Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where
solid propellant, liquid propellant, or other explosives are stored or
handled. This term has been slightly modified from the Launch Site NPRM
to include other explosives other than propellants.
Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees. For example, due east is 90 degrees.
Flight corridor means an area on the Earth's surface estimated to
contain the hazardous debris from nominal flight of a launch vehicle,
and non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle assuming a perfectly
functioning flight termination system or other flight safety system.
This has been changed from the Launch Site NPRM in two respects. The
proposed definition included the phrase ``contain the majority of
hazardous debris'' which, as discussed in the comment section, is
incorrect. The new definition also makes clear that the flight corridor
is based on a perfectly functioning flight termination system.
Guided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that
employs an active guidance system.
Hazard class has been added since the NPRM and means the class of
dangerous good defined by the United Nations Organization
classification system for transport of dangerous goods, and as
determined in accordance with 49 CFR part 173, subpart C.
Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated
three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an
intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle.
Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a
stage apogee, a three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch
vehicle. Intermediate stages include all stages up to the final stage.
Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a radius that
defines an impact dispersion area. It applies to all launch vehicle
stages.
Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the
impact point of a sub-orbital launch vehicle stage.
Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, when
multiplied by a stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following
thrust termination of a launch vehicle. IIP may be calculated with or
without atmospheric drag effects. This is a change from the Launch Site
NPRM. The NPRM limited the definition to a vacuum IIP. Note that the
analyses of part 420 use vacuum IIP.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface. It is
typically abbreviated as R, or R-dot.
Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control
of one launch site customer. Intraline distance prevents the
propagation of an explosion. In other words, with an appropriate
intraline distance, an explosive mishap at one explosive hazard
facility would not cause an explosive event at another explosive hazard
facility. The FAA anticipates that worker safety requirements will
dictate protection of employees and anticipates that all licensees will
familiarize themselves with those

[[Page 62838]]

requirements and conform to them in accordance with the law. Unlike
distances used to protect the public, intraline distance will not offer
workers the same level of protection as the public.
Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined in accordance with
appendix A, the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to a
point 100 nm in the direction of the flight azimuth. For a flight
corridor defined in accordance with appendix B, a launch area is the
portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to the enveloping
line enclosing the outer boundary of the last debris dispersion circle.
Launch point means a point on the Earth from which the flight of a
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by the point's geodetic latitude,
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to
property not associated with the activity. The FAA considers any
licensee or its employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or
subcontractor or the employees of any of these persons to be associated
with a ground activity. Property not associated with the activity will
typically include any property belonging to members of the public or
personal property of employees. Property associated with the activity
includes the property of a launch site operator or launch licensee, or
either licensee's customers, contractors or subcontractors.
Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an
item. This term is used for applying Q-D criteria to solid propellants
and other explosives, and for liquid propellants when explosive
equivalency applies. Explosive equivalency applies to liquid
propellants when a liquid fuel and a liquid oxidizer are close enough
together that their explosive potential combined must be used when
determining prescribed distances to the public.
Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance,
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle
internal and external systems perform as planned, and there are no
external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric
drag and gravity.
Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measured
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor,
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch
vehicle.
Populated area means a land area with population. For a part 420
site location risk analysis of a populated area within the first 100 nm
of a launch point, a populated area is no greater than a census block
group in the United States, and an equivalent size outside the United
States. For analysis of a part 420 flight corridor more than 100 nm
downrange from the launch point, a populated area is no greater than a
1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude grid, whether the populated area is
in the United States or not.
Population density means the number of people per unit area in a
populated area.
Position data means data referring to the current position of a
launch vehicle with respect to time using the x, y, z coordinate
system.
Public means people or property that are not involved in supporting
a licensed launch, and includes those people and property that may be
located within the boundary of a launch site, such as visitors, any
individual providing goods or services not related to launch processing
or flight, and any other launch operator and its personnel. This is a
new definition and was added to clarify how the FAA defines the public.
Public area means any area outside a hazard area, and is an area
that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of a launch
site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns or
otherwise controls that hazard area. For purposes of Q-D criteria, the
final rules treat any location outside a launch site boundary as a
public area for any activity at a launch site. Certain areas within a
launch site are also considered public areas for purposes of applying
Q-D criteria. For any given launch operator, areas where other launch
operators are located are public areas.
Public area distance means the minimum separation distance
permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility.
Public traffic route distance means the minimum distance permitted
between a public highway or railroad line and an explosive hazard
facility. This is a new definition. It was necessary to add the
definition because explosive division 1.1 explosives were added to the
explosive safety requirements. The distance requirements for explosive
division 1.1 explosives differentiate between public traffic routes and
inhabited buildings, a differentiation not made for explosive division
1.3 explosives.
Trajectory means the position and velocity components as a function
of time of a launch vehicle relative to an x, y, z coordinate system,
expressed in x, y, z, x, y, z. The x, y, z coordinates describe the
position of the vehicle both for projecting the proposed flight path
and during actual flight. The x, y, z variables describe the velocity
of the vehicle.
Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that
does not have a guidance system.
X,Y,Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The X-axis coincides with the initial launch
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The Y-axis is
positive to the left looking downrange. The XY-plane is tangent to the
ellipsoidal Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to
the geodetic vertical. The Z-axis is normal to the XY-plane and
positive directed away from the Earth.
o,o,om
eans a latitude, longitude, height system where o
is the geodetic latitude of a launch point, o is
the east longitude of the launch point, and o is
the height of the launch point above a reference ellipsoid.
o and o are expressed in
degrees-decimal-degrees, which is abbreviated as DDD.
Subpart B contains the criteria and information requirements for
obtaining a license to operate a launch site. Section 420.15 specifies
the information that an applicant for a launch site operator license
must submit as part of its license application. The FAA requires this
information to evaluate issues affecting national security and foreign
policy, environmental impacts, whether the launch site location could
safely be used to conduct launches, explosive site safety, and whether
the applicant will operate the launch site safely.

[[Page 62839]]

Section 420.15 has been modified slightly from the NPRM. The first
and only substantive change is section 420.15(a). It states that an
applicant shall identify the name and address of the applicant, and the
name, address, and telephone number of any person to whom inquiries and
correspondence should be directed. It also requires the applicant to
provide the name and location of the proposed launch site, including
downrange equipment; and describe the layout of the launch site,
including launch points; the types of launch vehicles to be supported
at each launch point; the range of launch azimuths planned from each
launch point; and the scheduled operational date. The FAA determined
that it was necessary to obtain this basic general information from an
applicant in order to conduct the licensing process and to review
compliance with the requirements of this part. Section 420.15(a) also
requires foreign ownership information, as did the Launch Site NPRM's
section 420.15(b).
The other changes to section 420.15 are organizational only.
Section 420.15(b) contains the environmental review requirements, which
replace requirements currently located at sections 417.105-107.
Section 420.15(c) states that an applicant must provide the
information necessary for the review of the launch site location. An
applicant who is proposing to locate a launch site at an existing
launch point at a federal launch range is not required to submit a
launch site location review analysis if a launch vehicle of the same
type and class as proposed for the launch point has been safely
launched from the launch point.
Section 420.15(d) states that an applicant must provide the
information necessary for the review of the explosive site plan. If an
applicant plans to operate a launch site located on a federal launch
range, and if the applicant is required by the federal launch range to
comply with the federal launch range's explosive safety requirements,
the applicant shall submit the explosive site plan submitted to the
federal launch range. The requirement to submit the federal launch
range approved explosive site plan is new. The FAA proposed in the
Launch Site NPRM that no explosive site plan would have to be
submitted. The FAA will not approve the explosive site plan. Rather,
the FAA will use it to assess the adequacy of other aspects of an
applicant's application, such as the applicant's coordination
procedures under section 420.55(a).
Section 420.15(e) requires an applicant to demonstrate how it will
satisfy the launch site operation requirements of sections 420.53
through 420.61, and section 420.71. Specifically, a license applicant
must show how the applicant proposes to control public access pursuant
to section 420.53, how it proposes to comply with the scheduling
requirements of section 420.55, and how it proposes to satisfy the
notification obligations of section 420.57. The FAA requires this
information to ascertain whether an applicant will be able to satisfy
the launch site operation performance requirements and for compliance
monitoring purposes. With regard to the notification obligations of
section 420.57, an applicant must submit its agreements with the U.S.
Coast Guard district and the FAA regional air traffic control facility
having jurisdiction over the affected airspace to demonstrate
satisfaction of the requirements of 420.57(b) and (c). A license
applicant must also show how it proposes to comply with the accident
investigation requirements of section 420.59, the record requirements
of section 420.61, and the requirements governing lightning protection
of section 420.71.
Section 420.17 establishes the bases upon which the FAA will make
its license determination. This includes the FAA's determination of the
adequacy of information provided by the applicant, the conclusions of
the environmental and policy reviews, the adequacy of the explosive
site plan, and satisfaction of site location requirements. The FAA will
notify the applicant of, and allow the applicant to address any
deficiencies in the application.
A few changes were made from the NPRM. All were structural, except
for section 420.17(a)(2) which now states that one basis for the
issuance of a license is that the FAA has completed an analysis of the
environmental impacts associated with the proposed operation of the
launch site, in accordance with NEPA, 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and FAA
Order 1050.1D. The NPRM had only stated that the National Environmental
Policy Act review must be completed, but the FAA decided that it would
be more informative to advise of the full extent of the FAA's review.
Sections 420.19 through 420.29 require an applicant to demonstrate
that its proposed launch site location will allow for the safe launch
of at least one type of launch vehicle by defining flight corridors or
impact dispersion areas and estimating casualty expectancy. The launch
site location review remains largely unchanged from the Launch Site
NPRM, with a few exceptions, which will be discussed below. The
treatment of the launch site location review in this final rule has
been enhanced for two reasons. The FAA decided to outline the process
more distinctly. Additionally, the FAA decided to clarify what parts of
the launch site location review apply to reusable launch vehicles and
which do not.
Section 420.19 provides general requirements. To gain approval for
a launch site location, an applicant must demonstrate that for each
launch point proposed for the launch site, at least one type of
expendable or reusable launch vehicle can be flown from the launch
point safely. For purposes of the launch site location review, a safe
launch must possess a risk level estimated not to exceed an expected
average number of 0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the collective
member of the public exposed to hazards from the flight (Ec
30 x 10--6).
Types of launch vehicles include orbital expendable launch
vehicles, guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, unguided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles.
Orbital expendable launch vehicles are further classified by weight
class, based on the weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a
100-nm orbit. If an applicant proposes to have more than one type of
launch vehicle flown from a launch point, the applicant must
demonstrate that each type of expendable or reusable launch vehicle
planned to be flown from the launch point can be flown from the launch
point safely. If an applicant proposes to have more than one weight
class of orbital expendable launch vehicles flown from a launch point,
the applicant must demonstrate that the heaviest weight class planned
to be flown from the launch point can be flown from the launch point
safely.
The three types of expendable launch vehicles account for the
significant distinctions between launch vehicles designed for orbital
or sub-orbital flight, and between those with and without guidance
systems. Guided orbital expendable launch vehicles typically require an
FTS, which means that the greatest risk to the public stems from debris
caused by destruction of a vehicle. Guided sub-orbital launch vehicles
will be treated similarly to orbital launch vehicles, except for the
nominal impact of the final stage. In contrast, current unguided sub-
orbital launch vehicles generally have high reliability levels, and
therefore create the greatest public risk through nominal stage impact.
The launch site location review is designed to account for these
differences in public risk.

[[Page 62840]]

Section 420.21 provides minimum distance requirements governing the
separation of a launch point from a launch site boundary. The distance
from any proposed launch point to the closest launch site boundary must
be at least as great as the debris dispersion radius of the largest
launch vehicle type and weight class proposed for the launch point. For
launch sites supporting expendable launch vehicles, an applicant may
use the largest distance listed in table 2 for the type and weight
class of launch vehicles proposed for the launch point. For launch
sites supporting reusable launch vehicles, an applicant must determine
the debris dispersion radius that represents the maximum distance from
a launch point that debris travels given a worst-case launch vehicle
failure in the launch area. An applicant shall clearly and convincingly
demonstrate the validity of its proposed radius.
Section 420.23 provides the requirement for applicants to define a
flight corridor. The section is divided up into flight corridor
requirements for guided orbital expendable launch vehicles, guided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicles, unguided sub-orbital expendable
launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. For guided orbital
expendable launch vehicles, an applicant must define a flight corridor
that encompasses an area that is estimated, in accordance with the
requirements of this part, to contain debris with a ballistic
coefficient of 3 pounds per square foot, from any non-
nominal flight of a guided orbital expendable launch vehicle from the
launch point to a point 5000 nm downrange, or where the IIP leaves the
surface of the Earth, whichever is shorter. The IIP for most orbital
expendable launch vehicles goes well beyond 5000 nm. The requirement is
the same for guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, except that
the flight corridor ends with an impact dispersion area for the launch
vehicle's last stage where it impacts the Earth's surface. For either
type of launch vehicle, the flight corridor includes an overflight
exclusion zone where the public risk criteria of
30 x 10-6 would be exceeded if one person were
present in the open. An applicant must use one of the methodologies
provided in appendix A or B to define a flight corridor. These are
discussed below.
Because the FAA realizes that applicants may have other methods to
determine a flight corridor, the FAA will approve an alternate method
if an applicant provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its
proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required
by appendix A or B.
Section 420.23(c) addresses unguided sub-orbital expendable launch
vehicles. For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, an
applicant must define impact dispersion areas that are estimated, in
accordance with the requirements of this part, to contain the impact of
launch vehicle stages from nominal flight of an unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicle from the launch point to impact with the
Earth's surface, and an overflight exclusion zone where the public risk
criteria of 30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were
present in the open. An applicant must follow the methodology provided
in appendix D. The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix D.
An important point to note about the launch site location review
for unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles is that it is based on the
apogee of the unguided suborbital launch vehicle used in the analysis.
The apogee used in the analysis must represent the maximum apogee
intended to be reached by a launch vehicle launched from the launch
point.
Section 420.23(d) addresses reusable launch vehicles. For a
reusable launch vehicle, an applicant must define a flight corridor
that contains the hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal flight
of a reusable launch vehicle. The applicant must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate the validity of the flight corridor.
Section 420.25 provides the requirement for applicants to conduct a
risk analysis. If a flight corridor or impact dispersion area contains
a populated area, the applicant must estimate the casualty expectation
associated with the flight corridor or impact dispersion area. An
applicant must use the methodology provided in appendix C to this part
for guided orbital or suborbital expendable launch vehicles and
appendix D for unguided suborbital launch vehicles. For reusable launch
vehicles, the FAA will evaluate the adequacy of an applicant's casualty
expectancy analysis on a case-by-case basis. If the estimated expected
casualty exceeds 30 x 10-\6\, the FAA will not approve the
location of the proposed launch point.
Section 420.27 contains the information that an applicant must
submit in its application for a launch site location review. The FAA
recognizes that not all information is applicable to all analyses.
Section 420.29 contains an important caveat to the launch site
location review as discussed so far. The FAA must evaluate the adequacy
of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles on a case-by-
case basis. An applicant for a license to operate a launch site for an
unproven launch vehicle must provide a clear and convincing
demonstration that its proposed launch site location provides an
equivalent level of safety to that required by this part. A launch site
that is safe for proven launch vehicles may not be safe for new
vehicles. The probability of failure is likely to be higher, and the
risk to populated areas may increase significantly.
Section 420.31 requires an applicant to complete two agreements
necessary for the safety of aircraft and ships during a launch. An
applicant must complete an agreement with the local U.S. Coast Guard
district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to
Mariners prior to a launch and other such measures as the Coast Guard
deems necessary to protect public health and safety. An applicant must
also complete an agreement with the FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC)
office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches
will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice
to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air routes during the
launch window and other such measures as the FAA ATC office deems
necessary to protect public health and safety.
If an applicant plans to operate a launch site located on a federal
launch range and is using existing federal launch range agreements; the
applicant does not have to comply with section 420.31. These agreements
are with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA ATC office having
jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches will take place.

Appendix A

Of the two methods allowing an applicant to demonstrate the
existence of a guided expendable launch vehicle flight corridor that
satisfies the FAA's risk criteria, appendix A is the simplest of the
methods. Appendix A typically offers the more conservative approach in
that it produces a larger area for guided orbital and suborbital
expendable launch vehicles. In order to achieve the simplicity this
approach offers, the FAA based certain decisions regarding the
methodology on a series of what it intends as conservative assumptions
and on hazard areas previously developed by the federal

[[Page 62841]]

launch ranges for the guided expendable launch vehicles listed in table
1 of section 420.19.
The greater simplicity of the approach derives from the fact that,
unlike the method of appendix B, an applicant need obtain no
meteorological data and need not plot the trajectory of a particular
launch vehicle. Instead, recognizing that a typical flight corridor
consists of a series of fans of decreasing angle extending out from a
launch point, appendix A employs a variation on that typical corridor.
The appendix A flight corridor estimation contains a number of
elements, each of which an applicant must define for each of its
proposed launch points. An appendix A flight corridor consists of a
circular area around a selected launch point, an overflight exclusion
zone, a launch area and a downrange area. A flight corridor for a
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from
the launch point, and, for a guided suborbital expendable launch
vehicle, the flight corridor ends with the impact dispersion area of
the launch vehicle's final stage.
Once an applicant has produced an appendix A flight corridor, the
applicant must ascertain whether the flight corridor contains
population, and, if so, whether the use of the corridor would present
unacceptable risk to that population. If no members of the public
reside within the corridor, the FAA will approve the proposed location
of the site.\9\ If the flight corridor is populated, the FAA will
require an applicant to perform a risk analysis in accordance with
appendix C. If the proposed corridor satisfies the FAA's risk criteria,
the FAA will approve the location of the site. If, however, the
proposed corridor fails to satisfy the FAA's risk criteria, an
applicant has certain options. The applicant may attempt another
appendix A flight corridor by selecting a different flight azimuth or
by selecting a different launch point at the proposed launch site, or
by selecting a different launch vehicle type or class. Or, the
applicant may, using the more accurate but more complicated
calculations of appendix B, narrow its flight corridor and determine
whether that flight corridor satisfies the FAA's risk criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ An applicant must still obtain written agreements with the
FAA Air Traffic Control office having jurisdiction over the airspace
where launches will take place and, if appropriate, with the U.S.
Coast Guard regarding procedures for coordinating launches with the
launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To create a hypothetical flight corridor under appendix A an
applicant must first determine from where on the launch site a guided
expendable launch vehicle would take flight. That position is defined
as a launch point. An applicant must determine the geodetic latitude
and longitude of each launch point that it proposes to offer for
launch, and select a flight azimuth for each launch point. An applicant
should know whether it plans to offer the site for the launch of guided
orbital or sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles. If planning for the
launch of guided orbital expendable launch vehicles, the applicant must
decide what expendable launch vehicle class, as described by payload
weight in section 420.19, table 1, best represents the largest
expendable launch vehicle class the launch site would support.
Once an applicant has made the necessary decisions regarding
location and vehicle class, the next step in creating an appendix A
flight corridor is to look up the maximum distance (Dmax)
that debris is expected to travel from a launch point if a worst-case
expendable launch vehicle failure were to occur and flight termination
action destroyed the expendable launch vehicle at 10 seconds into
flight. Dmax serves as a radius that defines a circular area
around the launch point. The FAA has estimated, on the basis of federal
launch range experience, the Dmax for a guided suborbital
expendable launch vehicle and for each guided orbital expendable launch
vehicle class and provided the results that an applicant should employ
in table A-1, appendix A.
The circular area, defined by Dmax, is part of an
overflight exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion zone in an appendix
A flight corridor consists of a rectangular area of the length
prescribed by table A-2, capped up-range by a semi-circle with radius
Dmax centered on the launch point. Its downrange boundary is
defined by an identical semi-circular arc with a radius Dmax
centered on the endpoint prescribed by table A-2. The crossrange
boundaries consist of two lines parallel to and to either side of the
flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the uprange and downrange
Dmax circles as shown in appendix A, figure A-1.
An appendix A flight corridor also contains a launch area. The
launch area extends from the uprange boundary, which is coextensive
with the circle created by the radius Dmax, to a line drawn
perpendicular to the flight azimuth one hundred nautical miles down
range of the launch point. The launch area's crossrange boundaries are
a function of the lengths of two lines perpendicular to the flight
azimuth: one drawn ten nautical miles down range from the launch point
and the other line drawn one hundred nautical miles down range from the
launch point. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
Adjacent to the launch area is the downrange area. For purposes of
appendix A, a corridor's downrange area extends from the one hundred
nautical miles line to a line, perpendicular to the flight azimuth,
that is 5,000 nautical miles downrange from the launch point for the
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle classes, and to an impact
dispersion area for a guided suborbital expendable launch vehicle
corridor. The down range area's crossrange boundaries connect the
prescribed endpoints of the perpendicular lines at one hundred nautical
miles and 5,000 nautical miles. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the
line segments.
An applicant must determine whether the public resides within this
flight corridor. If no populated areas exist, an applicant may submit
its analysis for the FAA's launch site location review. If there is
population located within the flight corridor, the applicant must
calculate the risk to the public in accordance with the requirements of
appendix C. The expected casualty (Ec) result for the flight
corridor must not exceed 30 x 10-6 for the applicant to
satisfy the location requirements.

Map Requirements and Plotting Methods

To describe a flight corridor and any populated areas within that
corridor, an applicant must observe data and methodology requirements
for mapping a flight corridor and analyzing populations. These
requirements apply to all appendices.
The FAA requires certain geographical data for use in describing
flight corridors for each appendix. The geographical data must include
the latitude and longitude of each proposed launch point at a launch
site, and all populated areas in a flight corridor. The accuracy
requirement for the launch area portion of the analyses calls for map
scales of no smaller than 1:250,000 inches per inch. The actual map
scale will depend on the smallest census block group size in a launch
area. The FAA bases its scale requirement on average range rates in the
launch area, because range rates have a direct impact on dwell times
over populated areas. While in the launch area of a flight corridor,
the instantaneous impact point (IIP) ground trace tends to linger over
any populated areas, which increases the Ec for an
individual populated area. The map scale required by the FAA is large
enough to allow an applicant to

[[Page 62842]]

determine the dwell time and size for each applicable populated area.
Using a similar approach, the FAA establishes an accuracy
requirement for the downrange area of a flight corridor. A map scale
may be no smaller than 1:20,000,000 inches per inch. The scale is to be
smaller than that required for the launch area because the dwell times
over downrange populated areas are small and the map scale must only be
large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell time and the
size of each populated area downrange. Maps satisfying these accuracy
requirements are readily available. For example, civil aeronautical
charts are published and distributed by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and
are also published by the Defense Mapping Agency and distributed by
NOAA.
Besides scale, appendices A, B, C and D require an applicant to use
cylindrical, conic, and plane map projections. The FAA uses these map
projections for the analyses because they produce only small error with
straight line measurements.
Scale requirements, geographic location of the launch site, and
plotting method are the main considerations for choosing a map
projection. Of these considerations, the plotting method selected for
development and depiction of the flight corridor line segments is the
most important. Three plotting methods are provided by appendix A.
The ``mechanical method'' is the least complex, least costly, but
also the least accurate of the methods suggested here. The ``semi-
automated method'' provides more accurate techniques for determining
the endpoint coordinates of each flight corridor line segment. The
fully automated method makes use of geographic information system (GIS)
software with global mapping data.
Appendix A provides an applicant with equations to perform range
and bearing computations for the purpose of plotting a flight corridor
on a map. The range and bearing from a launch point are used to
determine the latitude and longitude coordinates of a point on the
flight corridor. Range and bearing equations are standard geodesic
computations, which can be found in most geodesy textbooks.
An applicant may create line segments to describe a flight corridor
by using range and bearings from the launch point along various
azimuths. Appendix A provides equations to calculate geodetic latitude
(+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch point geodetic latitude (+N),
longitude (+E), range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise
from North). The same equations may also be used to calculate an impact
dispersion area by substituting a final stage impact point for the
launch point. Appendix A also provides equations to calculate the
distance of a geodesic between two points.
As noted above, an alternative to range and bearing computations is
to use geographic information system (GIS) software with global mapping
data. GIS software is an effective tool for constructing and evaluating
a flight corridor, and has the advantage of allowing an applicant to
create maps of varying scales in the launch and downrange areas.
Commercially available GIS products are acceptable to the FAA for use
in appendices A, B, C and D if they meet the map and plotting method
requirements of paragraph (b) of appendix A. An applicant should note,
however, that maps of different scales in GIS software may not match
each other. For instance, the coastline of Florida on a U.S. map may
not match the coastline on a world map. Applicants shall resolve such
contradictions by referring to more accurate maps such as NOAA maps.
Once an applicant has selected a map for displaying a flight
corridor's launch area, the line segment lengths may be scaled to the
chosen map. Map scale units are actual distance units measured along
the Earth's surface per unit of map distance. Most map scale units are
given in terms of inches per inch (in/in). An applicant converts
appendix A flight corridor line segment distances to the map scale
distance by dividing the launch area flight corridor line segment
length (inches) by the map scale (in/in). If, for example, an applicant
selected a map scale of 250,000 in/in and the line segment for the
launch area flight corridor was 1677008 inches, the equivalent scaled
length of the line segment for constructing an appendix A launch area
is (1677008/250,000) = 6.7 inches of map distance. An applicant would
then plot the line segment on the map for display purposes using the
scaled line segment length of 6.7 inches. If an applicant were to
choose a map with scale units other than inches per inch, the FAA
requires a description of the conversion algorithm to inches per inch
and sample computations. Also note that the FAA will accept straight
lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale on
map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per inch; or
straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less than
1:1,000,000 in/in.

Weight Classes for Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles

Appendix A distinguishes between the guided orbital expendable
launch vehicles represented in the appendix on the basis of four
separate weight class. These are used to determine the size of the
debris dispersion radius around a launch point, and the size of an
appendix A flight corridor. The FAA selected the four expendable launch
vehicle classes based on the size and characteristics of expendable
launch vehicles that currently exist in the U.S. commercial inventory
and that should approximate any proposed new expendable launch vehicle
as well. An applicant planning to support the launch of guided orbital
expendable launch vehicles must choose the largest expendable launch
vehicle class anticipated for launch from the chosen launch point. This
maximizes the area of the flight corridor. Also, selection of the
largest class anticipated lessens the possibility of having to obtain a
license modification to accommodate a larger customer than an
application may have originally encompassed.
A 100-nm orbit is the standard for inter-class launch vehicle
comparison purposes. It is a standard reference orbit used by launch
vehicle manufacturers for descriptive purposes and allows the uniform
comparison of launch vehicle throw weight capability. The FAA obtained
the payload weights for the 28 deg. and 90 deg. orbital inclinations
from the ``International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems,'' S.
J. Isakowitz, 2d ed. (1995). They represent capabilities from CCAS and
VAFB, respectively.

Dmax Circle

A radius, maximum distance (Dmax), is employed to define
a circular area about a launch point. The circular area indicates the
limits for both flight control and explosive containment following a
worst-case expendable launch vehicle failure and flight termination
system activation at 10 seconds into flight. The worst-case failure
represents a failure response, immediately following first motion,
which causes the launch vehicle to fly in the uprange direction on a
trajectory that maximizes the impact range. The ten second flight time
represents a conservative estimate of the earliest elapsed time after
launch that a flight safety officer would be able to detect the
malfunction, initiate flight termination action, and actuate the flight
termination system on the expendable launch vehicle. The radius is the
estimated Dmax from the launch point that inert debris is
expected to travel

[[Page 62843]]

and beyond which the overpressure from explosive debris is not expected
to exceed 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi). Dmax accounts
for the public risk posed by the greater of the wind-induced impact
distance of a hazardous piece of inert debris, or the sum of the wind-
induced impact distance of an explosive piece of debris and the debris'
0.5 psi overpressure radius from the explosion.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

Table A-2 and figure A-1 define an overflight exclusion zone.
Because of the risks the early stages of flight create, the FAA
requires an applicant to demonstrate that the public will not be
present in this area during a launch. An overflight exclusion zone is
an area in close proximity to a launch point where the mission risk is
greater than an Ec of 30 x 10 -6 if one member of
the public is present in the open.
Early in the flight phase expendable launch vehicles have large
explosive potential, a low IIP range rate, and an historically higher
probability of failure relative to the rest of pre-orbital flight. The
relatively simple risk estimation analysis defined by appendix C does
not adequately model the true risk during this stage of flight, and
does not serve as the basis for determining that the overflight
exclusion zone represents an area where the FAA's risk threshold is not
satisfied. Instead, the FAA derived the overflight exclusion zone using
a high fidelity risk assessment computer program in use by the national
ranges. The program is a launch area risk analysis program called DAMP
(facility DAMage and Personal injury). DAMP relies on information about
a launch vehicle, its trajectory and failure responses, and facilities
and populations in the launch area to estimate hit probabilities and
casualty expectation. The hazards analyzed by DAMP include impacting
inert debris, and blast overpressures and debris projected from impact
explosions.
Risk assessments were also conducted for the time of flight
immediately after the first major staging event. The results showed a
significant decrease in the Ec estimates, and those
estimates were within the Ec criteria of 30 x 10
-6 . The decrease results from a combination of decreasing
dwell times and a significant reduction in the size of an effective
casualty area following a major staging event.
The FAA requires that an applicant demonstrate either that the
overflight exclusion zone is unpopulated, that there are times when no
one is present, or that the public can be excluded from this area
during launch. Although a determination of this nature encompasses
issues that will be addressed in a launch license, a launch site cannot
support safe launches unless overflight of the highest risk area in
close proximity to a launch point takes place without the public
present.
An applicant must display an overflight exclusion zone on maps in
accordance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of appendix A.

Launch Area

As noted at the beginning of this discussion, appendix A employs a
series of fans as the shape of the foundation of its flight corridor.
The flight corridor fans account for the turning capabilities and wind
dispersed debris of a guided expendable launch vehicle. The launch area
fans have been divided into two regions, of 60 and 30 degrees,
representing the malfunction turn capability of the launch vehicle
relative to its velocity in the downrange direction. Each region is
represented by the estimated maximum turning capability over a ground-
range interval. These angles are the FAA's estimates for the maximum
angles that the launch vehicle velocity vector may turn within a five
second time period.
The initial fan area is described by a 60 deg. half angle extending
ten nautical miles downrange from a launch point. The ten nautical mile
threshold represents the FAA's estimate of where a vehicle's maximum
turning rate capability is reduced to approximately 30 degrees due to
increasing velocity in the downrange direction. A 30 deg. half angle
was used to define the secondary fan area beginning 10 nautical mile
downrange and ending 100 nautical mile downrange. Once an expendable
launch vehicle IIP has reached the 100 nautical mile downrange point,
the increasing velocity in the downrange direction continues to reduce
the launch vehicle's ability to maneuver through a large malfunction
turn.
A 100 nautical mile distance is used as a delimiter between the
launch area and the downrange area. From the launch point out to
approximately the point where the IIP is 100 nautical miles downrange,
most expendable launch vehicles will be subjected to the aerodynamic
forces of wind and drag. Once an expendable launch vehicle's IIP has
cleared the 100 nm limit, the FAA is willing to assume for purposes of
appendix A that most launch vehicles are outside the atmosphere.

Downrange Area

The FAA derived the appendix A flight corridor's downrange area
from hazard areas previously developed by federal launch ranges for the
weight classes of expendable launch vehicles defined in table 1 of
section 420.19. The downrange fan area of the flight corridor is based
on turning capabilities and impact dispersions of guided expendable
launch vehicles. The size of the fan area is necessary for containing
expendable launch vehicle debris in the event that an expendable launch
vehicle failure initiates a maximum-rate malfunction turn and the
flight termination system must be activated. In the later stages of
flight a guided expendable launch vehicle's turn capability is reduced
due to increasing velocities in the downrange direction. Therefore, a
10 deg. half angle was used to define the downrange area, which
reflects a combination of normal vehicle dispersions and malfunction
turns.
The downrange area of a flight corridor begins 100 nm from a launch
point and, for the guided orbital expendable launch vehicle weight
classes, extends 5,000 nm downrange from the launch point. Overflight
dwell times for the flight time remaining after 5,000 nm typically
result in an insignificant increase in risk to the public. In general,
after an orbital expendable launch vehicle IIP has passed the 5,000 nm
point its IIP range rates increase very rapidly as the expendable
launch vehicle approaches orbital insertion. As a result, the dwell
times decrease significantly, reducing the overflight risk to
insignificant levels. For an applicant employing a guided suborbital
expendable launch vehicle, a flight corridor ends with the impact
dispersion area of a final stage.

Appendix B

Appendix B provides another means for creating a hypothetical
flight corridor from an applicant's proposed launch site. As with a
flight corridor created pursuant to appendix A, an appendix B corridor
identifies the populations, those within the defined flight corridor,
that must be analyzed for risk. An appendix B analysis offers an
applicant a means to demonstrate whether a flight corridor from its
launch site satisfies the FAA's risk criteria for a guided orbital or
suborbital expendable launch vehicle. Appendix B allows an applicant to
perform a more individualized containment analysis rather than relying
on the more conservative estimates the FAA derived for appendix A.
Because an appendix B analysis uses actual meteorological data and a
trajectory, whether actual or computer simulated, of a real expendable
launch vehicle, it produces a flight corridor of greater accuracy than
one created in accordance with appendix A. The FAA derived the

[[Page 62844]]

assumptions and simplifications in the appendix B analysis from
expendable launch vehicle data representing historical expendable
launch vehicle malfunction behavior.
A flight corridor created using appendix B contains, on its face,
the same elements as an appendix A flight corridor, including a
circular area around a launch point with a radius of Dmax,
an overflight exclusion zone, a launch area and a downrange area.
Appendix B, however, produces and configures the last two elements
differently than appendix A. The launch area of an appendix B flight
corridor shows where launch vehicle debris would impact in the event of
a vehicle failure, and takes into account local meteorological
conditions. The downrange area of a flight corridor also shows where
launch vehicle debris would impact given a vehicle failure, but takes
into account vehicle imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle
guidance and performance dispersions. Also, like an appendix A flight
corridor, the uprange portion of the flight corridor is described by a
semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most uprange dispersion
circle, or the overflight exclusion zone, whichever is further uprange.
The appendix B launch area analysis assumes a vehicle failure and
destruction at one second intervals along a trajectory z value, which
denotes height as measured from the launch point, up to 50,000 feet. An
applicant must determine the maximum distance a hazardous piece of
debris would travel under local meteorological conditions. The
distances that the debris travels provide the boundaries of an appendix
B flight corridor's launch area. After a height of 50,000 feet, which
is where the FAA estimates, for purposes of this analysis, that debris
created by an expendable launch vehicle's destruction has less exposure
to atmospheric forces, an applicant shall determine how far harmful
debris created by destruction of an expendable launch vehicle would
travel based only on malfunction imparted velocity and vehicle
dispersion in order to create a downrange area. Although the effects of
wind above 50,000 feet are not, in reality, non-existent, once an
expendable launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its
velocity vector has pitched down range so that a malfunction turn and
explosion velocity, rather than atmospheric drag and wind effects, play
the dominant role in determining the dispersion of debris as the debris
falls to the surface.

Dmax Circle

As with an appendix A flight corridor, an applicant must select
each launch point at its proposed launch site from which it expects a
guided expendable launch vehicle to take flight. An applicant must
obtain the latitude and longitude of the launch point to four decimal
places. If relying on a guided orbital expendable launch vehicle, the
applicant must also select an expendable launch vehicle weight class
from section 420.19, table 1, that best represents the largest class
each proposed launch point would support. With this information, the
applicant then ascertains the Dmax that debris is expected
to travel from a launch point if a mishap were to occur in the first 10
seconds of flight by employing table A-1, appendix A. Table A-1 also
provides a maximum distance for guided sub-orbital expendable launch
vehicles. The Dmax distance provided by table A-1 defines a
circular area around the launch point.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

That circular area is part of an overflight exclusion zone. Again,
an applicant uses information from appendix A to create an overflight
exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion zone consists of the circular
area defined by the radius Dmax at the launch point and a
corridor of the length prescribed by table A-2. Its downrange boundary
is defined by an arc with a radius Dmax centered on the
endpoint prescribed by table A-2. The crossrange boundaries consist of
two lines parallel to and to either side of the flight azimuth. Each
line is tangent to the uprange and downrange Dmax circles as
shown in appendix A, figure A-1. Creation of an overflight exclusion
zone is predetermined by the requirements of appendix A and does not
require a trajectory for an actual launch vehicle. As with an appendix
A overflight exclusion zone, and for the reasons described in this
notice's discussion of appendix A, the FAA requires that the public be
excluded from this area during launch.

Launch Vehicle Trajectory

An applicant must also obtain or generate a launch vehicle
trajectory. The applicant may use either commercially available
software or a trajectory provided by the launch vehicle's manufacturer.
Because appendix B is based on equations of motion in three dimensions,
the appendix B analysis requires that the trajectory be described using
a three axis coordinate system. The FAA recommends that an applicant
use a WGS-84 ellipsoidal Earth model \10\ as the trajectory coordinate
system reference ellipsoid in the appendices, because of its wide
availability and its development in accordance with military standards
and requirements. The WGS-84 model reflects the most current and the
most accurate Department of Defense standards for Earth models. WGS-84
provides a basic reference frame and geometric figure for the Earth and
provides a means for relating positions on various local geodetic
coordinate systems, including x,y,z, to an Earth-centered, Earth-fixed
coordinate system such as the EFG system employed in the appendix B
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ Department of Defense World Geodetic System, Military
Standard 2401 (Jan. 11, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA requires time intervals used in the trajectory analysis of
no greater than one second for both launch and downrange areas. Data
frequency of one second is a compromise between the low data frequency
requirements of the launch area, where dwell times are relatively long,
and the high frequency requirements of the downrange area, where dwell
times are correspondingly shorter. Accordingly, one second time
intervals are sufficient to accommodate linear interpolation between
trajectory time points, in the launch and downrange areas, and not
degrade the accuracy requirements of the analysis.
In the launch area, an applicant's trajectory must include position
data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed x,y,z coordinates
centered on the proposed launch point, with the X-axis aligned with the
flight azimuth. In the downrange area, the applicant's trajectory must
show state vector data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed
x, y, z x, y, z, coordinates, centered on the proposed launch point,
with the X-axis aligned with the flight azimuth.

Launch Area

A launch area contains a launch point and an overflight exclusion
zone, and constitutes the part of the flight corridor calculated using
the effects of atmospheric drag forces on debris produced by a series
of hypothetical destructions of an expendable launch vehicle at one
second intervals along that trajectory. For purposes of an appendix B
analysis, a launch area extends from the further uprange of an OEZ arc
or dispersion circle arc downrange to a point on the surface of the
Earth that corresponds to the debris impact locations, assuming a
failure of the vehicle in flight at a height of 50,000 feet. Typically,
federal launch ranges account for five major parameters to

[[Page 62845]]

estimate the size of a flight corridor. These include the effects of
vehicle-imparted velocity on debris, the change in launch vehicle
position and velocity due to a malfunction turn, guidance errors, the
ballistic coefficient of debris, and wind. However, imparted velocity,
malfunction turn, and trajectory dispersion, although not
insignificant, do not play as great a role early in flight as the wind
effects on debris. The wind effect on debris, in turn, depends on the
ballistic coefficient of the debris. The FAA determined that for
purposes of the launch area, of these parameters, launch vehicle debris
and meteorological conditions constitute the most significant, and the
FAA therefore focuses on these two factors in the launch area.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\11\ Note that the determination of the size of Dmax
included considerations of malfunction turns as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA requires an applicant to calculate circles that approximate
the debris dispersion for each one second time point on a launch
vehicle trajectory. The crossrange lines tangent to those circles
provide the borders of a launch area. Calculating the circles consists,
in general terms, of a two step process. An applicant must first define
15 mean geometric height intervals along the proposed trajectory in
order to obtain data, in accordance with subparagraph (c)(4) of
appendix B, accounting for the mean atmospheric density, maximum wind
speed, fall times and debris dispersions in each of those height
intervals. An applicant must then use that data in the calculations in
subparagraph (c)(5) to derive the radius applicable to each height
interval (zi). Having obtained that radius, an applicant
uses it to describe, pursuant to subparagraph (c)(6), a circle referred
to as a debris dispersion circle (Di), around each one
second time interval along the vehicle's trajectory, starting at the
launch point. An applicant will then ascertain the crossrange
boundaries of a flight corridor's launch area by drawing lines that are
tangent to all dispersion circles. The final Di dispersion
circle forms the downrange boundary of a flight corridor's launch area.
The launch area represents the effects of meteorological conditions
on how far inert debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3 lb/ft.\2\
would travel. Debris comes in many sizes and shapes, but the FAA does
not propose to require an applicant's location review analysis to take
all such possibilities into account. A complete analysis for an actual
launch entails the determination of the type and size of debris created
by each credible failure mode, and the velocity imparted to each piece
of debris due to the failure. Instead, for purposes of the appendix B
analysis, the FAA categorizes launch vehicle debris by a ballistic
coefficient that accounts for the smallest inert debris that may cause
harm and that also accounts for the debris most sensitive to wind. A
ballistic coefficient reflects the sensitivity of weight and area
ratios to drag forces, such as wind dispersion effect.
In addition to knowing what debris is of concern, an applicant must
know the local meteorological conditions. The FAA requires an applicant
to obtain meteorological data for 15 height intervals in a launch area
up to 50,000 feet. Appendix B has an upper limit of 50,000 feet in the
launch area containment analysis of debris because winds above this
altitude contribute little to drift distance. As noted above, once an
expendable launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its
velocity vector has pitched down range so that a malfunction turn and
explosion velocity, rather than atmospheric drag and wind effects, play
the dominant role in determining the dispersion of debris as the debris
falls to the surface. The combination of these two factors
significantly reduces the effect of winds on uprange and crossrange
dispersion after an expendable launch vehicle reaches 50,000 feet. For
altitudes less than 50,000 feet, at the same time as low ballistic
coefficient debris pieces are highly sensitive to drag forces, the
velocity of an explosion caused by destroying an expendable launch
vehicle contributes relatively little to the dispersion effect because
the drag produced on these light weight pieces results in a high
deceleration so they achieve terminal velocity almost instantaneously
and drift with the wind. Therefore, launch vehicle induced explosion-
velocities are not considered for the launch area of an appendix B
containment analysis. Instead, an applicant uses local statistical wind
data by altitude for fifteen height intervals. The data must include
altitude, atmospheric density, mean East/West meridianal (u) and North/
South zonal wind (v), the standard deviation of u and v wind, a
correlation coefficient, the number of observations and the wind
percentile.
Data acceptable to the FAA is available from NOAA's National
Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NOAA Data Centers, of which the NCDC is
the largest, provide long-term preservation of, management, and ready
accessibility to environmental data. The Centers are part of the
National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service. The
NCDC data set acceptable to the FAA is the ``Global Gridded Upper Air
Statistics, 1980--1995, V1.1, March 1996 (CD-ROM).'' The Global Gridded
Upper Air Statistics (GGUAS) CD-ROM data set describes the atmosphere
for each month of the represented year on a 2.5 degree global grid at
15 standard pressure levels. NCDC provides compiled mean and standard
deviation values for sea level pressure, wind speed, air temperature,
dew point, height and density. GGUAS also complies eight-point wind
roses. The spatial resolution is a 73 x 144 grid spaced at 2.5 degrees
and the temporal resolution is one month.
To simplify the containment analysis, an applicant may use a mean
wind of 50%. An applicant may also assume that an applicant's launch
pad height is equal to the surface level of the wind measurements
provided by the NCDC database. The actual pad height could be lower or
higher than the surface level wind measurement height. The difference
between the actual pad height and the surface level measurement height
is considered insignificant in terms of its effect on the impact
dispersion radius.
The FAA notes that the NCDC database will not necessarily contain
measurements of winds for any particular launch site proposed. If a
launch point is located in the center of a 2.5 degree NCDC weather grid
cell, the farthest distance to a grid cell corner would be along a
diagonal from the center of the grid cell to a corner of the grid cell.
The wind measurements will be no more than approximately 106 nm from
the launch point. This distance is close enough for purposes of a
location review containment analysis, and occurs only for a grid
located on the equator. In general, the topography within approximately
106 nm of a launch point is assumed to be relatively similar with
respect to height above mean-sea-level. As the launch point latitude
increases the distance from the wind measurement grid point will
decrease, which will reduce errors introduced by this assumption.
Having obtained the necessary meteorological data, an applicant
would use data from the GGUAS CD-ROM to estimate the mean atmospheric
density, maximum wind speed, height interval fall times, and height
interval debris dispersions for 15 mean geometric height intervals.
Altitude intervals are denoted by the subscript ``j''. An applicant
would then calculate the debris dispersion radius (Di) for
each trajectory position whose ``Z'' values,

[[Page 62846]]

are less than 50,000 ft. Each trajectory time considered is denoted by
the variable subscript ``i''. The initial value of ``i'' is one and the
value is increased by increments of one for each subsequent ``Z'' value
evaluated. The major dispersion factors are a combination of wind
velocity and debris fall time. Because the atmospheric density is a
function of altitude and affects the resultant fall time, Di
is estimated by summing the radial dispersions computed for each
altitude interval the debris intersects on its descent trajectory. Once
all the debris dispersion radii have been calculated, the flight
corridor's launch area is produced by plotting each debris dispersion
circle on a map, and drawing enveloping lines that enclose the outer
boundary of the debris dispersion circles. The uprange portion of the
flight corridor is described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of
either the most uprange Di dispersion circle, or the
overflight exclusion zone, whichever is further uprange.\12\ The
enveloping lines that enclose the final Di dispersion circle
forms the downrange boundary of a flight corridor's launch area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ Note that even if a dispersion circle is further uprange
than the overflight exclusion zone, the overflight exclusion zone
remains the same. That is, it is not extended uprange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Downrange Area Containment Analysis

A containment analysis also describes the dimensions of a flight
corridor's downrange area. The FAA designed the downrange area analysis
to accommodate expendable launch vehicle imparted velocity, malfunction
turns, and vehicle guidance and performance dispersions. The analysis
to obtain the downrange area of a flight corridor for guided orbital
and suborbital expendable launch vehicle trajectories starts with
trajectory positions with heights greater than 50,000 feet, that is,
the point where the launch area analysis ends. A downrange area for a
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from
the launch point, or where the IIP leaves the surface of the earth,
whichever is shorter. If an applicant has chosen a guided suborbital
expendable launch vehicle for the analysis, the analysis must define
the impact dispersion area for the final stage, and that impact
dispersion area marks the end of a downrange area.
An applicant computes the crossrange boundaries of the downrange
area of a flight corridor by calculating the expendable launch vehicle
position after a simulated worst-case four second turn, rotating the
launch vehicle state vector to account for vehicle guidance and
performance dispersions, and then computing an instantaneous impact
point. The locus of IIPs describes the impact boundary.
As a first step, an applicant computes a reduction ratio factor
that decreases with increasing launch vehicle range. Secondly, an
applicant computes the launch vehicle position after a simulated worst-
case four-second malfunction turn for each altitude interval along a
trajectory. For purposes of the launch site location review, the FAA
relies on a velocity vector malfunction turn angle initially set at
45 deg.. This turn angle is decreased, using a reduction ratio factor,
as a function of downrange distance to simulate the constraining
effects of increasing velocity in the downrange direction on
malfunction turn capability. See figure B-2. The FAA assumes this
worst-case delay (4 seconds) result in order to account for the maximum
dispersion of the vehicle during the time necessary for a person in
charge of destroying a launch vehicle to detect a vehicle failure and
cause the vehicle's destruction. Figure B-2 in appendix B depicts the
velocity vector movement in the yaw plane of the vehicle body axis
coordinate system. Figure 1 below depicts the state vector axes and
impact locations for a malfunction turn failure and for an on-
trajectory failure.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\13\ For clarity, the flight azimuth in the figure is not
aligned with the x-axis, as would be the case in the launch site
location review.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 62847]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.002

The second step described above assumes perfect performance of the
launch vehicle up until the beginning of the malfunction turn. In
order, however, to account for normal three sigma (3)
performance and guidance dispersions of the launch vehicle prior to the
malfunction turn, the applicant next rotates the trajectory state
vector. The trajectory state-vector rotation is accomplished in
conjunction with an XYZ to ENU coordinate system transformation. This
transformation rotates the X and Y axes about the Z axis. The Z and U
axes are coincident. Both position and velocity components are rotated.
The FAA intends the trajectory azimuth rotation to account for the
normal 3-sigma launch vehicle performance and guidance dispersions that
may exist at the beginning of a malfunction turn. The rotation angle
decreases from three degrees to one degree as the vehicle proceeds
downrange, and the rate of decrease is a function of distance from the
launch point. This is done because the trajectory azimuth of an
expendable launch vehicle with 3-sigma performance and guidance
dispersions early in flight could be approximately 3
degrees from the nominal flight azimuth. Since this azimuth offset is
not considered a failure response, the guidance, navigation, and
control system is expected to achieve steering corrections. These
corrections will eventually reduce the angular offset later in flight
as the launch vehicle targets the mission objectives for orbital
insertion. If an expendable launch vehicle has 3-sigma performance and
guidance dispersions later in flight, the effects of increasing
velocity in the downrange direction limits an expendable launch
vehicle's capability to alter the trajectory's azimuth. Launch vehicles
in the four expendable launch vehicle weight classes were reviewed to
determine the typical range of malfunction-turning rates in the
downrange area. The FAA found these rates to be relatively small
compared to launch area rates. The FAA uses the three and one degree
turn rates because they encompass the turn rates found during the
review process.
Before initiating the IIP computations, an applicant must transform
the ENU coordinate system to an EFG coordinate system. This EFG
coordinate transformation is employed to simplify the IIP computation.
The IIP computations proposed in appendix B are used for
determining the IIPs to either side of a trajectory by creating
latitude and longitude pairs for the left and right flight corridor
boundaries. Connecting the latitude and longitude pairs describes the
boundary of the downrange area of a flight corridor. The launch site
location review IIP calculations assume the absence of atmospheric drag
effects. Equations B46-B69 implement an iterative solution to the
problem of determining an impact point. This iterative technique
includes checks for conditions that will not result in impact point
solutions. The conditions prohibiting impact solutions are: (1) An
initial launch vehicle position below the Earth's surface, (2) a
trajectory orbit that is not elliptical, but, parabolic or hyperbolic,
(3) a positive perigee height, where the trajectory orbit does not
intersect the Earth, and (4) the iterative solution does not converge.
Any one of the conditions given above will prohibit

[[Page 62848]]

the computation of an impact point. The iterative approach of equations
B46-B69 solves these problems.

Estimating Public Risk

Upon completing a flight corridor, an applicant must estimate the
risk to the public within the flight corridor to determine whether that
risk falls within acceptable levels. If an applicant demonstrates that
no part of the flight corridor is over a populated area, the flight
corridor satisfies the FAA's risk thresholds, and an applicant's
application may rely on its appendix B analysis. If a flight corridor
includes a populated area, an applicant has the option of rotating an
appendix B flight corridor using a different launch point or azimuth to
avoid population, or of conducting an overflight risk analysis in
accordance with appendix C.

Appendix C

Under a launch site location review, once an applicant has created
a flight corridor employing either appendix A or B, the applicant must
ascertain whether there is population within the flight corridor. If
there is no population, the FAA will approve the location of the
proposed launch point for the type and weight class of expendable
launch vehicle analyzed. If there is population, an applicant must
employ appendix C to perform an overflight risk analysis for the
corridor. An appendix C risk analysis determines whether or not the
risk to the public from a hypothetical launch exceeds the FAA's risk
threshold of an estimated expected casualty (Ec) of no more
than 30 x 10-\6\ per launch. The purpose of the
Ec analysis as part of the launch site location review is
not to determine a value of Ec but rather to confidently
demonstrate that Ec is less than the acceptable threshold
value.
An appendix C risk analysis estimates the Ec overflight
contribution from a single hypothetical launch whose flight termination
system is assumed to work perfectly. The analysis takes into account
the probability of a vehicle failing throughout its trajectory, dwell
times \14\ over individual populated areas, and the probability of
impact within those areas. The analysis also takes into account the
effective casualty area of a vehicle class, the size of the populated
area, and the population density of the exposed population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ Although an applicant who calculates an appendix B flight
corridor will know actual dwell times for its Ec
analysis, the FAA has supplied a constant to approximate dwell time
for an applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estimating Ec for an actual launch takes a large number
of variables and considerations into account. The risk analysis
provided in appendix C provides a somewhat simpler approach to
estimating Ec within the boundaries of a flight corridor
than might be necessary in performing a risk analysis for an actual
launch. For purposes of determining the acceptability of a launch
site's location, the FAA relies only on variables relevant to ensuring
that the site itself offers at least one flight corridor sufficiently
isolated from population for safety. Accordingly, many of the factors
that a launch operator will take into account will not be reflected
here.
In brief, in order for an applicant to perform an appendix C risk
analysis, the applicant must first determine whether any populated
areas are present within an appendix A or B flight corridor. If so, the
applicant must obtain area and population data. At this point an
applicant has a choice. Appendix C requires that an applicant calculate
the probability of impact for each populated area, and then determine
an Ec value for each populated area. To obtain the estimated
Ec for an entire flight corridor, the applicant adds--or
sums--the Ec results for each populated area. If the
population within the flight corridor is relatively small, an applicant
may wish to conduct a less rigorous analysis by making conservative
assumptions. Appendix C also offers the option of analyzing a worst-
case flight corridor for those flight corridors where such an approach
might save time and analysis. Examples of such simplifications are
provided.

Identification and Location of Population

In order to perform an Ec analysis, an applicant must
first identify the populated areas within a flight corridor. For the
first 100 nautical miles from a launch point downrange a U.S. census
block group serves as the maximum size of an individual populated area
permitted under an appendix C analysis. The maximum permitted size of
an individual populated area beyond 100 nautical miles downrange is a 1
degree latitude x 1 degree longitude grid. The size of the areas
analyzed will play out differently depending on the location of the
proposed launch site. For example, if an applicant proposed a coastal
site, the applicant would presumably present the FAA with a flight
corridor mostly over water. Population may be limited to that of a few
islands, minimizing the amount of data and analysis necessary. If an
applicant proposes a launch site located further inland, the applicant
would need to obtain the area and population of each census block group
in the first 100 nm of the flight corridor. This may prove time
consuming, although the FAA has alternative approaches that may
simplify the process for such applicants. An applicant may also propose
to operate a launch site on foreign territory, where U.S. census data
does not apply. In that event, the FAA will apply the principles
underlying a launch site location review to the available data on a
case-by-case basis.
The final regulations require the analysis of populations at the
census block group level for the first 100 nm from the launch point in
the flight corridor. An applicant shall employ data from the latest
census. An applicant must also include population that may not be
included in the U.S. census, such as military base personnel. The FAA
recognizes a census block group to be a reasonable populated area for
analysis because the risk early in flight is greatest due to long dwell
times. IIP range rates in a launch area are relatively slow, which
exposes the launch area populations to launch vehicle risks for a
longer period of time when compared to similar populations in the
downrange area. Depending on the launch site and the launch vehicle, a
census block group could be exposed to launch vehicle risks for tens of
seconds. In contrast to the size of a populated area in the downrange
area, the increased risk due to longer dwell times requires a more
detailed evaluation of the launch area for Ec purposes. A
census block group is an appropriate size for analysis because it is
small enough to accommodate the assumption that a populated area
contains homogeneously distributed population without grossly
distorting the outcome of the Ec estimates, and because the
data is readily available for populations in the United States. An
applicant may find the need to use only a portion of a census block
group, such as when a populated area is divided by a flight corridor
boundary. In that case an applicant should use the population density
of the block group to reflect the population in that portion of the
census block group.
The FAA allows an applicant to evaluate the presence of people in
larger increments of area in the downrange area of a flight corridor
than in the launch area of a flight corridor. Populations in the
downrange area of a flight corridor must be analyzed in areas no
greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates.
Because dwell times downrange are shorter, the risk to the individual
populated areas is less and, therefore, the FAA is willing to accept a
different degree of accuracy. IIP range rates in the downrange area

[[Page 62849]]

can achieve speeds of 500 nm/second. Because the longest distance in a
grid space would be approximately 85 nm for a grid on the equator,
which is where the largest grid area will be found, the launch vehicle
IIP dwell time would be less then 0.20 seconds over that grid. This
reduces the risk to population in that grid significantly compared with
population in the launch area.
The data needed for a downrange area analysis is also readily
available. One source for population data in an area no greater than
1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates is a database
of the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. The CDIAC database is ``Global Population
Distribution (1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name Information on a
One by One Degree Grid Cell Basis.'' This database contains one degree
by one degree grid information on the world-wide distribution of
population for 1990 and country specific information on the percentage
of a country's population present in each grid cell.
The CDIAC obtained its population estimates from the United Nations
FAO Yearbook, \15\ the Guinness World Data Book,\16\ and the Rand
McNally World Atlas \17\ for approximately 6,000 cities with
populations greater than 50,000 inhabitants. The population data was
updated by CDIAC to 1990 values with available census data. For the
rural population allocation, the CDIAC developed global rural
population distribution factors based on national population data, data
on approximately 90,000 cities and towns, and the assumption that rural
population is proportional to the number of cities and towns within
each grid cell for each country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\15\ United Nations FAO Yearbook, Vol. 47, Rome, 1993.
\16\ The Guinness World Data Book, Guinness Pub. Ltd.,
Middlessex, England, 1993.
\17\ Rand McNally World Atlas, Rand McNally, New York, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Probability of Impact

The next step in the process is to ascertain the probability of
impact for each populated area. In other words, an applicant must find
the probability that debris will land in each populated area within the
flight corridor under analysis. For this, the applicant must find the
probability of impact in both the crossrange and downrange directions,
by employing equation C1 for an appendix A flight corridor for an
orbital launch or equations C2 through C4 for an appendix A corridor
that describes a suborbital launch. For an analysis based on an
appendix B flight corridor, an applicant will employ equation C5 for an
orbital launch or equations C6 through C8 for a suborbital launch. For
both appendix A and B corridors, the probability of impact
(Pi) within a particular populated area is equal to the
product of the probability of impact in the downrange (Px)
and cross range (Py) directions, and the probability of
vehicle failure (Pf).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.003

The analysis applicable to both appendix A and B flight corridors
is the same for the crossrange direction, but employs a different
equation to determine the probability of impact in the downrange
direction. For an appendix A corridor, the FAA specifies a constant in
equation C1 to approximate dwell time for the downrange direction. In
equation C5 an applicant will employ actual dwell times obtained from
the trajectory generated in accordance with appendix B.
An applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor will use
equation C1 to determine the probability of impact for a particular
populated area in the downrange direction by finding the range rate and
assuming a total thrusting time of 643 seconds. Equation C1 reflects
the fact that appendix A does not employ trajectory data, and
therefore, employs a technique for estimating dwell times as a function
of range and range rate to determine the probability of impact in the
downrange direction. Table C-2 provides the appendix A flight corridor
IIP range intervals and corresponding IIP range rates for use in
Equation C1.
To create table C-2, the FAA employed actual trajectory data to
determine individual range rates for Atlas, Delta and Titan expendable
launch vehicles.
The FAA derived the total average thrusting time of 643 seconds
from the data in table 5 below by dividing the difference of the upper
value of adjacent IIP ranges by the average IIP range rate
corresponding to the largest IIP range and summing the results over the
set of IIP ranges.

Table 5.--Data To Derive Total Thrusting Time
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IIP Range Rate (nm/s)
IIP Range (nm) ---------------------------------------------------- t(s)
Delta Atlas Titan Avg
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-100........................................ 1.03 0.85 0.96 0.91 110.50
101-500...................................... 3.33 3.77 2.23 3.00 133.33
501-1500..................................... 4.17 3.66 2.73 3.20 312.99
1500-2500.................................... 9.01 21.74 12.99 17.37 57.59
2501-3000.................................... 33.33 50.00 41.67 45.84 10.91
3001-4000.................................... 66.67 90.91 83.33 87.12 11.48
4001-5000.................................... 166.67 142.86 166.67 154.77 6.46
-------------
Total-t......................... ........... ........... ........... 643.26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The ``X'' distances were measured directly off the mapping
information source.
An applicant who relies on an appendix B flight corridor will
employ equation C5 or equations C6 through C8 depending on whether the
flight corridor culminates in an impact dispersion area or not.
Equation C5 reflects the fact that, unlike an appendix A flight
corridor, the trajectory data used to create an appendix B flight
corridor provides downrange instantaneous impact points (IIPs).
Accordingly, the dwell time associated with a populated area may be
ascertained for the difference between the closest and furthest
downrange distances of the populated area. See figure C-2.
An applicant may find the following six step procedure helpful in
determining for individual populated areas the dwell time that equation
C5 calls for. The subscripts do not correspond to subscripts in the
appendix.

[[Page 62850]]

Step 1: Determine the trajectory time (t1) associated
with the trajectory IIP position (x1) that immediately
precedes the uprange point on the populated area boundary. This is
accomplished by locating the IIP points in the vicinity of the
populated area, drawing lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground
trace, and choosing the trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal
is closest to the uprange boundary of the populated area but does not
intersect it. The distance from the launch point to x1 may
be determined using the range and bearing equations in appendix A,
paragraph (b).
Step 2: Determine the trajectory time (t2) associated
with the trajectory IIP position (x2) that just exceeds the
downrange point on the populated area boundary. This is accomplished by
locating the IIP points in the vicinity of the populated area, drawing
lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground trace, and choosing the
trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal is closest to the
downrange boundary of the populated area but does not intersect it. The
distance from the launch point to x2 may be determined using
the range and bearing equations in appendix A, section (b).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.133

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.004

Step 4: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the
uprange point (x3) on the populated area boundary. This is
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground
trace and tangent to the uprange boundary of the populated area, and
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground
trace.
Step 5: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the
downrange point (x4) on the populated area boundary. This is
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground
trace and tangent to the downrange boundary of the populated area, and
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground
trace.
Step 6: The dwell time (td) is estimated by the
following equation.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.005

For either type of flight corridor, an applicant determines the
probability of impact in the crossrange direction, (Py),
through a series of steps, of which the first is measuring the distance
from the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace to the closest and
furthest points in the crossrange direction of the area that contains
population. The populated area may consist of a census block group or a
1 degree latitude by 1 degree longitude grid. See figure C-1. To
determine the distribution of the debris pattern in that populated
area, the applicant needs to estimate the standard deviation of debris
impacts. For purposes of an appendix C analysis, the crossrange
boundaries of a flight corridor represent three standard deviations
(3) of all debris impacts from normal and malfunction
trajectories. To apply this to a populated area, an applicant must
first find the distance from the nominal trajectory to the crossrange
boundary, measured on a line normal to the trajectory through the
geographic center of the populated area, and then divide that distance
by three.
Finally, the probability of failure is also an element in
calculating the probability of impact. The FAA assigns a failure
probability (Pf) constant of Pf = 0.10 for guided
expendable launch vehicles. This represents what the FAA intends as a
conservative estimate of the failure percentage of current expendable
launch vehicles, and may be conservative because many current
expendable launch vehicles are more reliable. The appendix C process
assumes that the probability of impacting within the corridor is one,
and the probability of impacting outside the corridor is zero. The
flight termination system is assumed to function perfectly in all
failure scenarios.
A final variation on computing the probability of impact for a
particular populated area is used when computing the probability of
impact (Pi ) within the impact dispersion area of a guided
suborbital expendable launch vehicle. In this case, the probability of
success (Ps) is substituted for the probability of failure
(Pf), and an applicant shall employ a method similar to that
used in appendix D to calculate the probability of impact for any
populated areas inside the impact dispersion area. This divergence, the
use of probability of success rather than probability of failure, from
the variable used for an orbital expendable launch vehicle arises out
of the relative risk associated with an impact dispersion area of a
guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. The same risks associated
with a guided orbital launch are also associated with a guided sub-
orbital launch except for the designated impact area for the final
stage of the guided sub-orbital launch vehicle. The final stage is
intended to return to Earth rather than to enter orbit. On the basis of
past history, the risk due to a planned impact in the dispersion area
is higher than an unplanned impact. The FAA accordingly requires the
use of Ps inside the impact dispersion area rather than
Pf for determining the probability of impact in a guided
suborbital expendable launch vehicle's impact dispersion area.

Totaling Risk of All Populated Areas in Flight Corridor

The Ec estimate for a flight corridor is a summation of
the risk to each populated area and results in an estimate of
Ec inside the corridor, E (Corridor). This means that an
applicant estimates Ec for each individual populated area
within a flight corridor, using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.006

Pi is the probability of hitting the populated area.
Ac is the effective casualty area of the vehicle and may be
obtained from table C-3. Ak is the area of the populated
area. Nk is the population in Ak, and is obtained
from census data. The label ``k'' is used to identify the individual
populated area. The summed Ec for all populated areas added
together is the Ec (Corridor).
The FAA requires an applicant to use an effective casualty area
specific to an expendable launch vehicle class and range when
performing the Ec calculation. An effective casualty area
(Ac) means the aggregate casualty area of each piece of
debris created by a launch vehicle failure at particular points on its
trajectory. The casualty area for each piece of debris is the area
within which 100 percent of the unprotected population on the ground is
assumed to be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of
the debris piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory,
impact explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. In each of
the vehicle classes, the Ac decreases, resulting in a
smaller casualty area, as a function of distance downrange because
vehicle size and explosive potential decreases as explosive propellant
is consumed and expended stages are ejected during vehicle flight.
An effective casualty area as a function of time-after-liftoff is
provided

[[Page 62851]]

in table C-3 for expendable launch vehicle classes listed in table 1 of
section 420.19. The FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table
C-3 from DAMP, a series of risk estimation computer programs used at
federal launch ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in
table 1, section 420.19. DAMP considers other factors besides debris
characteristics, such as the size of a standing person, which increases
the casualty area, and sheltering, which would tend to decrease the
casualty area. Because considering sheltering has a greater effect than
considering the size of a standing person, and was not assumed in table
C-3, the effective casualty areas in table C-3 are conservative with
regards to those factors.
An applicant calculates casualty expectancy for each populated area
within a flight corridor. After the casualty expectancies have been
estimated for all populated areas, the Ec values are summed
to obtain the total corridor risk.
The FAA will not approve the proposed launch site location if the
estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x 10-6. An
applicant may either modify its proposal, or if the flight corridor
used was generated by the method in appendix A, use the typically less
conservative but more accurate method in appendix B to narrow the
flight corridor and perform another appendix C overflight risk
analysis. An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis
described above. Six variations are identified in appendix C. The first
four variations permit an applicant to make conservative assumptions
that would lead to an overestimation of the corridor Ec
compared with the more detailed process described. Although appendix
C's approach simplifies a typical launch safety analysis somewhat by
providing conservative default parameters to use, it may also prove
unnecessarily complex for applicants proposing launch sites with launch
corridors encompassing extremely few people. For those situations,
appendix C, through subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8), provides the option for
an applicant to further simplify the estimation of casualty expectancy
by making worst-case assumptions that produce a higher value of the
corridor Ec compared with the analysis otherwise defined by
appendix C. This may be particularly useful when an applicant believes
Ec is well below the acceptable value.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\18\ As noted above, the purpose of the Ec analysis
as part of the launch site location review is not to determine a
value of Ec but rather to confidently demonstrate that
Ec is less than the acceptable threshold value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These variations allow an applicant to assume that Px
and Py have a value of 1.0 for all populated areas, or
combine populated areas into one or more larger populated areas and use
the greatest population density of the component populated areas for
the combined area or areas. An applicant may also assume Py
has a value of one for any given populated area, or, for any given
Px sector, assume Py has a value of one and use a
worst case population density for the sector. A Px sector is
an area spanning the width of a flight corridor and bounded by two time
points on the trajectory IIP ground trace. All four of these reduce the
number of calculations required for applicants with little population
within a flight corridor.
Another option permitted by appendix C is for an applicant who
would otherwise fail the baseline analysis to perform a more refined EC
analysis by negating the baseline approach's overestimation of the
probability of impact in each populated area. If the flight corridor
includes populated areas that are irregular in shape, the equations for
probability of impact in appendix C may cause Ec to be
overestimated. This is because the result of the Pi
computation for each populated area represents the probability of
impacting within a rectangular area that bounds the populated area. As
shown in figure C-1 of appendix C, the length of two sides of the
rectangle would be x2-x1, and the length of the
other two sides would be y2--y1. Populated areas
used to support the appendix C analysis must be no bigger than a U.S.
census block group for the first 100 nautical miles from a launch point
and no bigger than a 1 degree latitude x 1 degree longitude grid
(1 deg. x 1 deg. grid) beyond 100 nautical miles downrange. Whether the
populated area is a census block group, a 1 deg. x 1 deg. grid, or a
land mass such as a small island, it will not likely be a rectangle.
Even a 1 deg. x 1 deg. grid near the equator, which approximates a
rectangle, will not line up with the trajectory ground trace. Thus, a
portion of the Pi rectangle includes area outside the
populated area being evaluated. The probability of impacting in the
rectangle is higher than impacting just in the populated area being
evaluated. The value of the probability of impact calculated in
accordance with appendix C will thus likely be overestimated.
One approach permitted by appendix C is to divide any given
populated area into smaller rectangles, determine Pi for
each individual rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities
to determine Pi for the entire populated area. A second
approach permitted by appendix C is, for a given populated area, to use
the ratio of the populated area to the area of the original
Pi rectangle.
If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x 10-6,
the FAA will not approve the proposed launch site location. In that
event, the only remaining options for an applicant would be to rely on
one of its potential customers obtaining a launch license for launch
from the proposed site.

Appendix D

Appendix D contains the FAA's method for determining the
acceptability of the location of a launch site for launching unguided
suborbital expendable launch vehicles. Appendix D describes how to
define an overflight exclusion zone and each impact dispersion area to
be analyzed for risk for a representative launch vehicle. Appendix D
also describes how to estimate whether risk to the public, measured by
expected casualty, falls within the FAA's threshold of acceptable risk.
In short, the approach requires an applicant to define an overflight
exclusion zone around a launch point, determine the impact point for
each spent stage and then define an impact dispersion area around each
impact point. If populated areas are located in the impact dispersion
areas and cannot be excluded by altering the launch azimuth, the FAA
requires a risk analysis that demonstrates that risk to the public
remains within acceptable levels.
As a first step, an applicant selects which launch points at the
proposed launch site would be used for the launch of an unguided
suborbital expendable launch vehicle. An applicant must also then
select an existing suborbital expendable launch vehicle, for which
apogee data is available, whose final stage apogee represents the
maximum altitude of any unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle
intended for launch from that launch point. The applicant would then
plot the distance, which is referred to as the impact range, from the
launch point to the nominal impact point on the azimuth for each stage.
Employing the impact dispersion radius of each stage, the applicant
would define an impact dispersion area around each nominal impact
point.
The methodology for the impact dispersion area requirements is
grounded in three assumptions which reflect current practice. For
purposes of this location review, the FAA assumes

[[Page 62852]]

that unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicles are not equipped
with a flight termination system, and that public risk criteria are
accordingly met through the implementation of a wind weighting system,
launch procedures and restrictions, and the proper selection of a
launch azimuth and elevation angles. These aspects are currently
reflected in FAA guidelines and will be addressed in its regulations
for launches from non-federal launch sites. The cumulative launch
experience in unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicles
demonstrates that risk to the public from launches of these vehicles is
attributable to planned stage impact during a successful flight.
Controlling these risks solely through measures implemented prior to
flight rather than relying on active measures during flight, as is the
case for a vehicle equipped with an FTS, has provided historically an
acceptable approach to protection of the public. Accordingly, the
appendix D analysis should adequately address the general suitability
of each launch point for unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle
launches up to the altitude proposed. Operational requirements imposed
on a launch licensee through license conditions should adequately
address risks posed by the actual launch of unguided suborbital
expendable launch vehicles.
The location review for a launch point that will support unguided
suborbital expendable launch vehicles also assumes that intermediate
and final stages impact the Earth within three standard deviations
(3) of each nominal, no wind, impact point. This means that an
appendix D analysis does not account for failures outside of three
standard deviations from each intended impact point.
It also means that an appendix D analysis does not simulate an
actual launch in actual wind conditions. For actual launches, wind
weighting can be used to obtain the nominal, no wind, impact point for
the final stage only. In order to ensure that the launch meets
Ec, ship hit, and aircraft hit probabilities, launch
operators compute the wind drifted impact points of all stages using
the launcher settings determined through wind weighting so that
intermediate stage impacts are determined just prior to launch.
Although appendix D does not address this fact directly, it does show
whether at least some launches can be conducted depending on the wind
conditions.

Defining an Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Areas

The areas an applicant will analyze for risk to the public posed by
the launch of an unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle consist
of an overflight exclusion zone and stage impact dispersion areas.
Having selected a launch point and a launch vehicle for which empirical
data is available, an applicant must define each zone and area using
the methodology provided. An overflight exclusion zone shall consist of
a circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on a launch point. An
overflight exclusion zone is the area which must be free of the public
during a launch. Creation of each impact dispersion area involves
several more steps. For each stage of the analyzed vehicle an applicant
must identify the nominal stage impact point on the azimuth where the
stage is supposed to land, and draw a circle around that point, using
the range and bearing equations of appendix A or geographic information
system (GIS) software. That circle describes the impact dispersion
area, and an applicant defines an impact dispersion area for each
stage.
An applicant must at the outset provide the geodetic latitude and
longitude of a launch point that it proposes to offer for launch, and
select a flight azimuth. Once an applicant has selected a launch point
location and azimuth, the next step is to determine a 1600 foot radius
overflight exclusion zone for that launch point. As with an overflight
exclusion zone created pursuant to appendices A and B, an applicant
must show that the public would be cleared from its overflight
exclusion zone prior to launch. Although suborbital vehicles have a
very low likelihood of failure, failure is more likely to occur in the
early stages of the launch. Consequently, the FAA is guarding against
that risk through requiring an applicant to show the ability to
evacuate an overflight exclusion zone. As with the flight corridors of
appendices A and B, the FAA bases the size of the overflight exclusion
zone on the maximum distance that debris is expected to travel from a
launch point if a mishap were to occur very early in flight. The FAA
has estimated the Dmax for an unguided suborbital expendable
launch vehicle, and the result is 1600 feet. Accordingly, an applicant
would define an appendix D overflight exclusion zone as a circle with a
radius of 1600 feet.
Because an applicant must choose the maximum altitude anticipated
of a suborbital expendable launch vehicle for launch from its site, an
applicant needs to acquire the apogee of each stage of a representative
vehicle. An applicant need not possess full information regarding a
specific representative launch vehicle. All that is necessary is the
apogee of each stage. The apogee height must be obtained from an actual
launch conducted at an 84 deg. elevation angle. If needed, data is
available from the FAA. The FAA has compiled apogee data from past
launches from Wallops Flight Facility for a range of launch vehicles
and payloads. This data will be provided to an applicant upon request
and may be used to perform the analysis.
An applicant then defines impact dispersion areas for each stage's
nominal impact point. Having selected a launch vehicle most
representative of what the applicant intends for launch from the
proposed launch point, an applicant will use either its own empirical
apogee data or data from one of the vehicles in the FAA's data base.
Whether an applicant uses vehicle apogee data obtained from the FAA or
from elsewhere, the applicant must employ the range and dispersion
factors to determine the location of each nominal impact point and the
size of each impact dispersion area.
Under appendix D, an applicant would estimate the impact range and
dispersion parameters by multiplying the apogee of a launch vehicle
intended for the prospective launch site by factors. Impact range and
impact dispersion factors are derived from launch vehicle pedigrees of
sounding rockets used by NASA Wallops Flight Facility in its sounding
rocket program.\19\ The factors provide estimators of staging data for
an unguided vehicle launched at a standard launcher elevation, which is
the angle between the launch vehicle's major axis (x) and the ground,
of 84 deg.. The appendix defines the relationship between the apogee of
a launch vehicle stage, an impact range and a 3 dispersion
radius of a stage. This relationship is expressed as two constants,
which vary with the altitude of the apogee, an impact range factor and
an impact dispersion factor.
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\19\ These vehicles include Nike Orion, Black Brant IX, Black
Brant XI, and Black Brant XII. They are representative of the
current launch vehicle inventory and should approximate any proposed
new launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To locate each nominal impact point, an applicant will calculate
the impact range for the final stage and all other stages. An impact
range describes the distance between an applicant's proposed launch
point and the nominal impact point of a stage, or, in other words, its
estimated landing spot along

[[Page 62853]]

the azimuth selected for analysis. For this estimation, an applicant
would employ the FAA's impact range factors of 0.4 or 0.7 as
multipliers for the apogee of the stage. If an apogee is less than 100
kilometers, the applicant shall employ 0.4 as the impact range factor
for that stage. If the apogee of a stage is 100 kilometers or more, the
applicant shall use 0.7 as a multiplier. In plotting the impact points
on a map, an applicant shall employ the plotting methods provided by
appendix A.
An impact dispersion radius describes the impact dispersion area of
a stage. The FAA relies on an estimated impact dispersion radius of
three standard deviations (3) because significant population,
such as a densely populated city, in areas within distances up to
3 of the impact point could cause significant public risk. An
applicant shall obtain the radius of the impact dispersion area by
multiplying the stage apogee by the FAA's impact dispersion factor of
0.4 for an apogee less than 100 kilometers and of 0.7 for an apogee of
100 kilometers or more. The final stage would typically produce the
largest impact dispersion area.
Once an applicant determines the impact dispersion radii, the
applicant must plot each impact dispersion area on a map in accordance
with the requirements of paragraph (b). This is depicted in figure D-1.
An applicant may then determine if flight azimuths exist which do not
affect populated areas. If all potential flight azimuths contain impact
dispersion areas, which encompass populated areas, then the FAA
requires an Ec estimation of risk.

Public Risk Ec Estimation

The FAA will approve a launch point in accordance with this
appendix if there exists a set of impact dispersion areas for a
representative launch vehicle in which the sum of risk to the public
does not exceed the FAA's acceptable risk threshold. An overflight
exclusion zone must contain no people. If a populated area is present
within the impact dispersion areas, an applicant shall estimate the
risk to the public posed by possible stage impact. An applicant must
then determine whether its estimated risk satisfies the FAA requirement
of an Ec of no more than 30 x 10 -6. The
Ec estimation is performed by computing the sum of the risk
for the impact of each stage and accounting for each populated area
located within a 3 dispersion of an impact point. The equation
used to accomplish this is the same as that used in the impact
probability computation in appendix C. Unlike, however, the method in
appendix C, which accounts for an impact due to a failure, the
probability of a stage impact occurring is Ps =
1-Pf, where Ps is the probability of success, and
Pf is the probability of failure. For the purposes of the
launch site location review, a constant of 0.98 is used for the
probability of success for unguided suborbital expendable launch
vehicles. The probability of success is used in place of Pf
in calculating both the crossrange and downrange probability of impact.
The location review for launch points intended for the launch of
unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicles differs from the review
of the location of launch points intended for the launch of guided
orbital and suborbital expendable launch vehicles. In analyzing whether
risk remains at acceptable levels, Ec equations in appendix
D rely on the probability of success rather than the probability of
failure. The use of stage impact probability, typified as the
probability of success (Ps), for suborbital expendable
launch vehicles is necessary because stage impacts are high probability
events which occur near the launch point with dispersions which may
overlap or be adjacent to the launch point. The difference between the
methods of appendices A, B and C and appendix D reflects the
fundamental differences between the likely dominant source of risk to
the public from guided and unguided vehicles and the methods that have
been developed for guarding public safety against the risks created by
each type of vehicle. In other words, the methods for defining impact
dispersion areas and for conducting an impact risk assessment for an
unguided vehicle are premised on the risks posed by a successful
flight, that is, the planned deposition of stages and debris. In
contrast, the methodology for developing a flight corridor and
associated risk methodology for guided vehicles assumes that the likely
major source of risk to the public arises out of a failure of a mission
and the ensuing destruction of the vehicle.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\20\ The one exception is the impact dispersion area for a
guided suborbital launch vehicle. That area is analyzed assuming
launch success.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The high degree of success recorded for unguided expendable launch
vehicles renders the probability of success the greater source of risk.
Because of their relative simplicity of operation, the failure rate,
over time, for unguided expendable launch vehicles has amounted to
between one and two percent. At this level of reliability, the FAA
believes that its primary focus of concern for assessing the safety of
a launch site should be the more likely event, namely, the public's
exposure to the planned impact of vehicle stages and other vehicle
components, such as fairings, rather than the risk posed by exposure to
debris resulting from a failure. Success is the high risk event.
Although failure rates are low for unguided expendable launch vehicles,
their spent stages have large impact dispersions. Moreover, the FAA's
impact dispersion area estimations generally produce impact dispersion
areas large enough to encompass most of the populations exposed to a
possible failure as well as to a nominal flight, thus ensuring the
inclusion of any large, densely populated area in the analysis. Thus,
all but a small percentage of populated area will be analyzed to some
extent, albeit using impact probabilities based on success.
For appendix D, the FAA assumes that the stage impact dispersion in
both the downrange and cross range directions are equal. This is a
valid assumption for assessing a launch site for suborbital expendable
launch vehicles because their trajectories produce near circular
dispersions. NASA data on sounding rocket impact dispersion supports
this conclusion.
The impact dispersion area is based on a 3 dispersion.
Appendix D uses the effective casualty area data, table D-1, which
contains information similar to appendix C, table C-3. This data
represents the estimation of the area produced by both suborbital
expendable launch vehicle inert pieces. The risk estimation approach in
appendix D has the applicant calculate the probability of impact for
each populated area, and then determining an Ec value for
each populated area. To obtain the estimated Ec for an
entire impact dispersion area, the applicant adds the Ec
results for each populated area. If the population within the impact
dispersion area is relatively small, an applicant may wish to conduct a
less rigorous analysis by making conservative assumptions. Appendix D
offers the option of analyzing a worst-case impact dispersion area for
those locations where such an approach might save time and analysis,
similar to the approach of appendix C.
The final section in subpart B is section 420.31. It requires an
applicant to complete an agreement with the local U.S. Coast Guard
district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to
Mariners prior to a launch and other such measures as the Coast Guard
deems necessary to protect public health and safety. An applicant must
also complete an agreement with the FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC)
office having jurisdiction over the airspace

[[Page 62854]]

through which launches will take place, to establish procedures for the
issuance of a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air
routes during the launch window and other such measures as the FAA
regional office deems necessary to protect public health and safety.
These two provisions clarify from the Launch Site NPRM that the FAA
and Coast Guard agreements must be completed as a requirement for a
license. Section 420.31(c) adds that an applicant that plans to operate
a launch site located on a federal launch range does not have to enter
into those agreements if the applicant is using existing federal launch
range agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA ATC office
having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches will take
place.
Subpart C contains license term and conditions. Section 420.41
specifies the authority granted to a launch site operator by a license
and the licensee's obligation to comply with representations contained
in the license application as well as the FAA's license terms and
conditions. The provision limits a licensee's authorization to the
launch points on the launch site and to the types of launch vehicles
used to demonstrate the safety of the launch site location, and, for
orbital launch vehicles, to vehicles no larger than the weight class
analyzed. The provision also clarifies the licensee's obligation to
comply with any other laws or regulations applicable to its licensed
activities and identifies certain rights that are not conveyed by a
launch site operator license.
Section 420.43 specifies the duration of a license to operate a
launch site, the grounds for shortening the term, and that a license
may be renewed.
Section 420.45 provides the procedures that an applicant must
follow to obtain FAA approval for the transfer of an existing license
to operate a launch site.
Section 420.47 specifies the procedures that the FAA will follow to
modify a license through a license order or written approval, and the
procedures that a launch site operator licensee must follow to obtain
an FAA license modification. A licensee must obtain a license
modification if the licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a
manner not authorized by its license. This means, among other things,
that if a representation in the license application regarding an issue
material to public safety is no longer accurate or does not describe
the licensee's operation or intended operation of the site, a licensee
must obtain a license modification. This is because the representations
a licensee makes in its application become part of the terms and
conditions of its license. A licensee must obtain FAA approval prior to
modifying its operations. In the event of special circumstance and
where safety warrants, the FAA will work with a licensee to accommodate
any timing problems.
Section 420.47 also specifies the procedures for a licensee to
obtain and the FAA to issue a license modification. The FAA may modify
a license using a written approval rather than a license order. This
may occur, for example, in cases where the change addresses an activity
or condition that was represented in the license application but not
spelled out in a license order.
Section 420.49 imposes an obligation on a launch site operator
licensee, its customers, and its contractors to cooperate with the FAA
in compliance monitoring of licensed activities. This requirement
recognizes an FAA compliance monitor's need to observe operations
conducted by all parties at the site and to have access to records and
personnel if the FAA is to be assured that public safety is being
protected.
Subpart D contains the responsibilities of a licensee. Section
420.51 describes a licensee's obligation to operate its launch site in
accordance with the representations in its license application, 49
U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and the FAA's regulations.
Section 420.53 requires a launch site operator licensee to control
public access to the launch site and to protect the public present at
the launch site. The regulation seeks to protect the public from the
consequences of flight and pre-flight activities by separating the
public from hazardous launch procedures. The public could also be at
risk if allowed to enter the launch site or move about without adequate
safeguards. This provision requires the licensee to prevent the public
from gaining unauthorized access to the launch site. The applicant will
be given broad discretion in selecting the method for controlling
access. The provision will also hold the licensee responsible for
informing members of the public of safety precautions before entry and
for warning of emergencies on-site. A licensee will also be responsible
for escorting the public between hazard areas not otherwise controlled
by a launch operator at the launch site, and employing warning signals
or alarms to notify persons on the launch site of any emergency.
Section 420.55 requires a licensee to develop and implement
procedures to schedule operations to ensure that each operation carried
out by a customer at the launch site does not create the potential for
a mishap that could result in harm to the public because of the
proximity of the operations, in time or place, to operations of any
other customer. Customers include any launch operator, and any
contractor, subcontractor or customer of the launch site operator's
customer at the launch site. This requirement is necessary to ensure
that the operations of one launch site customer do not interact with
the operations of another customer to create a public safety hazard at
the launch site or beyond. For example, the testing of equipment using
radio frequency transmissions could trigger ordnance used by someone
elsewhere on the site if the two launch preparation activities are not
coordinated or warnings issued. Likewise, hazardous operations by one
customer with the potential to reach another customer must be
coordinated by the launch site operator. A launch site operator is
required to ensure that all customers at the site are informed of
procedures and adhere to scheduling requirements before commencing
operations at the launch site.
Section 420.57 establishes notification requirements for a
licensee. The licensee is responsible for notifying customers of any
limitations on use of the site. This provision ensures that customer
activities are compatible with other activities at the launch site. It
also ensures that limitations on the use of facilities provided to
customers by a launch site operator are communicated to the customer.
Examples include the maximum quantity of propellant allowed in a
facility, or weight limitations on lifting devices within the facility.
The licensee will be responsible for maintaining agreements with the
Coast Guard to arrange for issuance of Notices to Mariners prior to
launch and with the regional FAA ATC office for Notices to Airmen and
closure of air routes. In addition, the licensee will notify local
officials and landowners adjacent to the launch site of the flight
schedule. This provision places an on-going responsibility on the site
operator licensee for establishing notification procedures, rather than
on the numerous launch licensees whose involvement with the launch site
may be more sporadic and temporary. The requirement does, however,
leave open the option of a launch licensee implementing the procedures
established by the launch site operator.
Section 420.59 requires a licensee to develop and implement a
launch site accident investigation plan containing procedures for
reporting, investigating

[[Page 62855]]

and responding to a launch site accident. The provision extends
reporting, investigation and response procedures currently applicable
to launch related accidents and incidents to accidents occurring during
ground activities at a launch site.
A launch site operator may satisfy the requirements of section
420.59 by using accident investigation procedures developed in
accordance with the requirements of the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) at 29 CFR 1910.119 and 120, and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 40 CFR part 68, to the extent
that the procedures include the elements required by section
420.59.\21\ The FAA wishes to ease the regulatory burden here and in
other parts of the final regulations where other federal regulatory
agencies impose requirements on launch site operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\21\ The EPA's requirements in 40 CFR 68 apply to ``incidents
which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a
catastrophic release.'' 40 CFR 68.60(a). OSHA's requirements in 29
CFR 1910.119 are similar, applying to ``each incident which resulted
in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a
highly hazardous chemical in the workplace'' 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

OSHA's standard at 29 CFR 1910.119 includes provisions for
investigating incidents and emergency response. See 29 CFR 1910.119(m)
and (n). In addition, 29 CFR 1910.120, hazardous waste operations and
emergency response (HAZWOPER), provides for emergency response planning
for operations involving hazardous materials, including those listed by
the Department of Transportation under 49 CFR 172.101.\22\ Launch
operators and launch site operators in compliance with these
requirements will be taking steps to protect the public as well as
their workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\22\ Hazardous materials in AST regulations, section 401.5, are
defined as hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR Sec. 172.101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA's requirements at 40 CFR 68 also include standards for incident
investigation and emergency response. See 40 CFR 68.60, 68.81, 68.90,
and 68.180. For both the OSHA and EPA requirements, compliance with 42
U.S.C. 11003, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know, satisfies
many of the emergency response provisions.
Section 420.59(e) is new since the Launch Site NPRM, and states
that a launch site accident investigation plan must contain procedures
for participating in an investigation of a launch accident for launches
that take place from the launch site. This provision also requires the
licensee to cooperate with FAA or National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) investigations of a launch accident for launches that take place
from the launch site. The FAA believes that any investigation of a
launch accident must have the participation of the launch site
operator. The FAA requests comment on this new provision.
Section 420.61 provides the requirements for launch site operator
retention of records, data, and other material needed to verify that
launch site operator operations are conducted in accordance with
representations contained in the license application, and for record
production in the event of launch site accident investigation, or
compliance monitoring.
Sections 420.63 through 420.69 contains the FAA's explosive
facility siting standards for the protection of the public from launch
site explosive hazards created by liquid and solid propellants and
other explosives. These standards shall be used by an applicant to site
facilities that support activities involving liquid and solid
propellants and other explosives, or facilities potentially exposed to
such activities, and to document the layout of these facilities.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\23\ An analysis may include evaluations of blast hazards;
fragment hazards; protective construction; grounding, bounding and
lightning protection systems; electrical installations; natural or
man-made terrain features; or other mission or local requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 420.63(a) requires a launch site operator to ensure that
the configuration of the launch site is in accordance with the
licensee's explosive site plan, and that its explosive site plan is in
compliance with the requirements of sections 420.65-420.69. Section
420.63 identifies items that must be in an explosive site plan. The
explosive site plan must include a scaled map or maps that show the
location of all proposed explosive hazard facilities where solid and
liquid propellants would be stored or handled.\24\ An applicant must
identify the class and division for each solid propellant and other
explosive and the hazard and compatibility group for each liquid
propellant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\24\ Areas where solid propellants and other explosives would be
stored must be included in the plan even though ATF requirements
apply. Applicants with magazines where solid propellants and other
explosives are to be stored must obtain an ATF permit and meet ATF
quantity-distance requirements. The FAA will use the information to
ensure that those of its requirements unrelated to storage are
satisfied and to coordinate with AFT when necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to the location of explosive hazard facilities, the map
or maps must indicate actual and minimum allowable distances between
each explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities
and each public area, including the launch site boundary. One means by
which an applicant could show that the distances are at least the
minimum required is by drawing a circle or arc with a radius equal to
the minimum allowed distance centered on each explosive hazard
facility.
In addition to containing maps, an explosive site plan should also
describe, through tables or lists, the maximum quantities of liquid and
solid propellants and other explosives to be located at each explosive
hazard facility, and the activities to be conducted within each
explosive hazard facility.
Pursuant to section 420.63(b), a licensee operating a launch site
located on a federal launch range does not have to demonstrate
compliance with the requirements of Secs. 420.65-420.69 if the licensee
is in compliance with the federal launch range's explosive safety
requirements. As proposed in the Launch Site NPRM, this provision
stated that a launch site operator did not have to comply with the
FAA's explosive safety requirements. Out of concern that this might be
misinterpreted as permitting a launch site operator not to comply with
either the range requirements, which are substantially similar to those
contained in this part, or those of the FAA, the FAA wishes to clarify
that it only intended that a launch site operator not have to
demonstrate compliance to the FAA where a launch site operator
demonstrates explosive safety to a federal launch range. Federal launch
ranges have separate rules which are either identical or similar to the
rules proposed, or require mitigation measures which otherwise ensure
safety. The FAA only wishes to see, in accordance with section
420.15(d)(2), the launch site operator's explosive site plan submitted
to the federal launch range.
In accordance with section 420.63(c), for explosive siting issues
not otherwise addressed by the requirements of sections 420.65-420.69,
a launch site operator must clearly and convincingly demonstrate a
level of safety equivalent to that otherwise required by part 420. This
provision is new since the Launch Site NPRM, and has been added because
the explosive siting requirements are designed to codify only core
explosive siting standards. The FAA realizes that some launch site
siting scenarios will involve safety issues not otherwise addressed in
this rulemaking. Thus, this provision was added to make clear that
explosive siting issues outside the provisions issued with this
rulemaking will be resolved in accordance with the requirements of
safety. DOD Standard

[[Page 62856]]

6055.9 is perhaps the best example of a standard governing many more
explosive safety issues than those addressed to date in this part.
In order to demonstrate compliance with the explosive site
standards, a launch site operator applicant first determines those
areas at its proposed launch site where solid or liquid propellant and
other explosives will be stored or handled, and which the FAA
designates as explosive hazard facilities. Explosive hazard facilities
may include payload processing facilities, launch pads, propellant
storage or transfer tanks, and solid rocket motor assembly buildings. A
launch site operator must then determine the types and maximum quantity
of propellants and other explosives to be located at each explosive
hazard facility. For solid propellants and other explosives, the
applicant determines the total weight, expressed in pounds, of
explosive material to be contained in the items that will be located at
each explosive hazard facility. For liquid propellants, the applicant
determines either the explosive equivalency of a fuel and oxidizer
combination if fuels and oxidizers would be located together at, what
is referred to as, incompatible distances; or, if fuels and oxidizers
would not be located together, an applicant would determine the net
weight in pounds of liquid propellant in each explosive hazard
facility.
The next step for a launch site operator applicant would be to
determine the minimum allowable separation distance between each
explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities,
the launch site boundary, and other public areas such as the launch
complex of another launch operator, public railways and highways
running through the launch site, and any visitor centers. The distances
between explosive hazard facilities are important to ensure that an
explosive event in one explosive hazard facility would not cause an
explosive event in another explosive hazard facility. The distances
between explosive hazard facilities and public areas are important to
ensure that the public is protected from blast, debris, and thermal
hazards. Exact distances must be given between the wall or corner of
the facility closest to the closest wall or corner of other explosive
hazard facilities and public areas. Minimum allowable distances are
determined using tables in appendix E. These tables reflect distances
based on the type and quantity of propellant or other explosive to be
located within an explosive hazard facility. Determining the minimum
allowable distance between two explosive hazard facilities is
accomplished by applying the applicable criteria to each and then
separating them by at least the greater distance prescribed for each
explosive hazard facility. For example, if a certain amount of
explosive division 1.3 solid propellant would be located at explosive
hazard facility A, and twice as much explosive division 1.3 solid
propellant would be located at explosive hazard facility B, the
prescribed distance generated by explosive hazard facility B would
serve as the minimum distance permitted between explosive hazard
facility A and explosive hazard facility B.
The criteria for determining the minimum required distances between
each explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard
facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary,
are contained in section 420.65 for solid propellants and other solid
explosives and section 420.67 for liquid propellants. Section 420.69
includes rules for when liquid and solid propellants and other
explosives are located together.
Section 420.65 covers quantity determinations and minimum required
distances for explosive hazard facilities where solid propellants and
other solid explosives would be handled. Under section 420.65(a), an
applicant first determines the maximum total quantity, by class and
division, of explosive in each explosive hazard facility where solid
propellants and other solid explosives would be handled. The total
quantity of explosives in an explosive hazard facility shall be the
maximum total weight, expressed in pounds, of explosive material in the
contents of the explosive hazard facility. For example, if a facility
could hold up to ten solid rocket motors of a particular type, even
though it might only rarely hold that many motors, the applicant would
calculate the total weight of division 1.3 explosive material in the
ten motors.
Section 420.65(b) addresses the situation where explosive divisions
1.1 and 1.3 explosives are located in the same explosive hazard
facility. The section states that when explosive divisions 1.1 and 1.3
explosives are planned to be located in the same explosive hazard
facility, the total quantity of explosive shall be considered division
1.1 for quantity-distance determinations, or, the applicant may add the
net explosive equivalent weight of the division 1.3 items to the net
weight of division 1.1 items to determine the total quantity of
explosives. This latter provision will decrease the required distance.
Once a launch site operator has determined the total quantity of
solid propellants and other solid explosives in each explosive hazard
facility, section 420.65(c) requires a launch site operator to separate
each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants and other solid
explosives will be handled from all other explosive hazard facilities
and each public area, including the launch site boundary, in accordance
with the minimum separation distances contained in table E-1 in
appendix E. Table E-1 provides two distances for each quantity and
division level. The first, a public area distance, is the minimum
distance permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard
facility. The second, an intraline distance, is the minimum distance
permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by one
launch site customer. Other explosive hazard facilities may constitute
public areas, because the definition of public area includes any area
in the possession or ownership, or otherwise under the control of a
launch site operator's other customers. Distance calculations would be
made accordingly.
Section 420.65(d) provides separation rules. Section 420.65(d)(1)
states that a launch site operator shall employ no less than the
applicable public area distance to separate an explosive hazard
facility from each public area and from the launch site boundary.
Section 420.65(d)(2) states that a launch site operator shall employ no
less than an intraline distance to separate an explosive hazard
facility from all other explosive hazard facilities that will be used
by a single customer.
Section 420.65(d)(3) allows a launch site operator to employ no
less than 60% of the applicable public area distance, or the public
traffic route distance, to separate an explosive hazard facility from a
public area that consists only of a public highway or railroad line,
for explosive division 1.1 only. This is new since the Launch Site NPRM
and was included because explosive division 1.1 explosives have been
added. This option does not apply to explosive division 1.3 because for
explosive division 1.3 explosives, the public traffic route distance is
the same as the public area distance. Public traffic route distance can
be applied to division 1.1 explosives when a public area consists of
airplane taxiways, open recreational facilities not possessing
structures, and public traffic routes. Streets and roads within the
licensee's control are not considered public highways unless they are
used for through traffic other than that related to the work of the
launch site.

[[Page 62857]]

Section 420.65(d)(4) allows a launch site operator to use linear
interpolation for NEW quantities between table entries.
Finally, section 420.65(d)(5) states that a launch site operator
shall measure separation distance from the closest debris or explosive
hazard source in an explosive hazard facility. For example, for a
building, a launch site operator would measure from the wall or corner
of the facility closest to the closest wall or corner of other
explosive hazard facilities and public areas. When solid rocket motors
or motor segments are freestanding, an applicant would measure from the
closest motor or motor segment. An acceptable way to demonstrate that
minimum distance requirements are met is to draw a circle or arc
centered on the closest source of debris or hazard showing that no
other explosive hazard facility or public area is within the distance
permitted.
Note that Q-D requirements address siting of facilities, not
operational control of hazard areas. During actual operations, the
existence and size of a hazard area is dependent on the actual amount
of explosive material in an explosive hazard facility.
Section 420.67 remains unchanged from the Launch Site NPRM, and
covers quantity determinations and distance requirements for explosive
hazard facilities that support the storage or handling of liquid
propellants. In addition to applying to distances between an explosive
hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas,
distance requirements may apply within an explosive hazard facility as
well.
Liquid propellants are classified and separated differently than
solid propellants and other solid explosives. Where solid propellants
and other solid explosives are classified by class and division, each
liquid propellant is assigned to one of three hazard groups and one of
two compatibility groups. A hazard group categorizes liquid propellants
according to the hazards they cause. Hazard group 1 represents a fire
hazard, hazard group 2 represents a more serious fire hazard, and,
because a liquid propellant in hazard group 3 can rupture a storage
container, it represents a fragmentation hazard. Each liquid propellant
also falls into one of two compatibility groups. Liquid propellants are
compatible when storing them together does not increase the probability
of an accident or, for a given quantity of propellant, the magnitude of
the effects of such an accident. Propellants in the same compatibility
group do not increase the probability or magnitude of an accident.
Group A represents oxidizers such as LO2 and N2O4, and group C
represents fuels such as RP-1 and LH2. Appendix E provides the hazard
and compatibility groups for current launch vehicle liquid propellants
in table E-3.
Explosive equivalency serves as another source of difference
between the treatment of solid explosives and liquid propellants. Only
if fuels and oxidizers are to be located within certain distances of
each other do the separation requirements designed to account for the
hazardous consequences of their potential combination apply. That
combination is measured in terms of explosive equivalency. Explosive
equivalency for liquid propellants is a measure of the blast effects
from explosion of a given quantity of fuel and oxidizer mixture
expressed in terms of the weight of TNT that would produce the same
blast effects when detonated. Fuels should not be located near
oxidizers if possible. The significance of the hazard groups and
compatibility groups is that if fuels are located far enough from
oxidizers, the minimum distance requirements to public areas and other
explosive hazard facilities depend only on the quantity and hazard
group of the individual liquid propellants. If operational requirements
require fuels and oxidizers to be located near each other, that is, at
less than the minimum public area and incompatible distances contained
in tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, the explosive equivalency of the
incompatible propellants must be calculated and used to determine the
distances required by table E-7 to other explosive hazard facilities
and public areas.
Appendix E contains four distance tables with separation
requirements for liquid propellants. Tables E-4, E-5 and E-6 contain
separation distances for hazard groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table
E-7 contains separation distances for when fuels and oxidizers are
located less than prescribed distances apart so that explosive
equivalency applies. Table E-7 contains distances similar to those for
explosive division 1.1 solid explosives. This is because the
``explosive equivalency'' of a fuel and oxidizer mixture is measured in
terms of its equivalent explosive blast effect to TNT, which is a class
1.1 explosive. Table E-7 also prescribes public area and intraline
distances.
Tables E-4, E-5, and E-6 have two distances listed for each
quantity of liquid propellant by hazard group. The first, a ``public
area and incompatible'' distance, is the minimum distance permitted
between a given quantity of liquid propellant and a public area. The
distance is also the same distance by which incompatible propellants
must be separated (e.g., the minimum distance between a fuel and an
oxidizer) for explosive equivalency and table E-7 not to apply to the
distance calculations. The second distance, an ``intragroup and
compatible'' distance, is the distance by which propellants in the same
hazard group, or propellants in the same compatibility group must be
separated (e.g. the minimum distance between two fuels) to avoid adding
the quantity of each propellant container being separated in
calculating distances. This is because if two propellant tanks are far
enough apart, they cannot react with one another, even were a mishap to
occur. This introduces the third difference between liquid propellant
separation requirements and the requirements for solid propellants and
other explosives.
The third area where liquid propellant separation requirements are
different than those for solid propellants and other explosives may be
found in calculations of the quantity of liquid propellant that
determines the distance relationship with other explosive hazard
facilities and public areas. Quantity calculations may depend on
distance. As an example, suppose one was determining the minimum
distance required between a tank farm having many containers of fuel,
and a launch site boundary. If the containers were all close together
the applicant would simply take the total amount of fuel, look up the
``public area and incompatible'' distance in the table that
corresponded to the hazard group of the fuel, and ensure that the
distance between the closest wall or corner of the explosive hazard
facility and the launch site boundary was at least the distance listed
in the table. However, if the containers were separated from each other
so that the distance between each container met the minimum
``intragroup and compatible'' \25\ distance in the table, the total
quantity of propellant to be used for the ``public area'' distance
determination is only the quantity in each container. Therefore, as
discussed below, although quantity determination requirements may be
found in section 420.67(a), and section 420.67(b) contains distance
determination requirements, quantity determinations for liquid
propellants may depend on distances between containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\25\ The category is called ``intragroup and compatible'' to
cover propellants that are in different hazard groups but are still
compatible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Like the procedure for solid propellant quantity and distance
determinations, an applicant's first step in siting liquid propellants
would be to

[[Page 62858]]

determine the quantity of liquid propellant or, if applicable, the
explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant to be located in each
explosive hazard facility. An applicant determines this through three
steps specified in section 420.67(a). First, section 420.67(a)(1)
requires that the quantity of propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or
other container is the net weight in pounds of the propellant in that
container. The weight of liquid propellant in associated piping must be
included in the determination of quantity to any point where positive
means, such as shutoff valves, are provided for interrupting the flow
through the pipe, or for interrupting a reaction in the pipe in the
event of a mishap.
Next, section 420.67(a)(2) applies when two or more containers of
compatible propellants are stored together in an explosive hazard
facility. When liquid propellants are compatible, the quantity of
propellant used to determine the minimum separation distance between
the explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and
public areas shall be the total quantity of liquid propellant in all
containers unless either the containers are separated one from the
other by the ``intragroup and compatible'' distance contained in
appendix E, table E-4, E-5 or E-6, depending on the hazard group, or
the containers are subdivided by intervening barriers to prevent their
mixing. In those two cases, the quantity of propellant in the explosive
hazard facility requiring the greatest separation distance must be used
to determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive
hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and public
areas.
Finally, section 420.67(a)(3) applies to quantity determinations
when two or more containers of incompatible liquid propellants are
stored together in an explosive hazard facility. If each container is
not separated from every other container by the ``public area and
incompatible'' distances identified in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5 and
E-6, an applicant must determine the total quantity of explosives by
calculating the explosive equivalent in pounds of the combined liquids,
using formulas contained in table E-2, to determine the minimum
separation distance between the explosive hazard facility and other
explosive hazard facilities and public areas. If the containers are, in
fact, to be separated one from the other by the appropriate
``incompatible'' distance, an applicant would determine the minimum
separation distance to another explosive hazard facility or public area
using the quantity of propellant within the explosive hazard facility
requiring the greatest separation distance.
Section 420.67(a)(4) requires an applicant to convert liquid
propellant quantities from gallons to pounds using conversion factors
in table E-3, and the equation provided.
After an applicant has determined the quantity of liquid propellant
or, if applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellants
to be located in each explosive hazard facility, an applicant must then
determine the separation distances between each explosive hazard
facility and public areas. Section 420.67(b) specifies the rules by
which an applicant determines the separation distances between
propellants within explosive hazard facilities, and between explosive
hazard facilities and public areas. An applicant would first use table
E-3 to determine hazard and compatibility groups. An applicant would
then separate propellants from each other and from each public area
using at least the distances provided by tables E-4 through E-7.
Section 420.67(b)(1) requires that an applicant measure minimum
separation distances from the container, building, or positive cutoff
point in piping which is closest to each public area or explosive
hazard facility requiring separation.
Section 420.67(b)(2) imposes a minimum separation distance between
compatible propellants. An applicant measures the separation distance
between compatible propellants using the ``intragroup and compatible''
distance for the propellant quantity and group that requires the
greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6. The distance
between any two propellants is computed by first determining what the
minimum required distance is for each propellant based on the quantity
and hazard group of that propellant. The one requiring the greater
distance is controlling for the pair.
Section 420.67(b)(3) applies to the minimum separation distance
between incompatible propellants. An applicant must measure the
separation distance between propellants of different compatibility
groups using the ``public area and incompatible'' distance for the
propellant quantity and group that requires the greater distance
prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the propellants of
different compatibility groups are subdivided by intervening barriers
to prevent their mixing. If intervening barriers are to be present, the
minimum separation distance shall then be the ``intragroup and
compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and group that
requires the greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
Section 420.67(b)(4) applies to the separation of liquid
propellants from public areas. A launch site operator shall separate
these propellants from public areas using no less than the ``public
area'' distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
Section 420.67(b)(5) applies to propellants where explosive
equivalents apply prescribed by subparagraph (a)(3). A launch site
operator shall separate each explosive hazard facility that will
contain propellants where explosive equivalents apply from all other
explosive hazard facilities that are under the control of the same
customer using at least the intraline distance in table E-7. The
minimum separation distance from public areas is the public area
distance in table E-7.
Section 420.69 specifies the rules to be used when solid and liquid
propellants are located together, such as at launch pads and test
stands. This provision has changed since the Launch Site NPRM. The
Launch Site NPRM allowed applicants to site an explosive hazard
facility where solid and liquid propellants were to be located together
based on either the liquid propellants or solid propellants alone. As
discussed in the comments section above, this is not always
appropriate.
Section 420.69 now provides three options for a launch site
operator proposing an explosive hazard facility where solid and liquid
propellants are to be located together. First, an applicant may
determine the minimum separation distances required for the liquid
propellants and then add the minimum separation distances required for
the solid propellants, treating the solid propellants as explosive
division 1.1.
The second option is similar in that a launch site operator would
determine the minimum separation distances required for the liquid
propellants and then add the minimum separation distances required for
the solid propellants. However, in this option, a launch site operator
that knows the explosive equivalent of the explosive division 1.3 solid
propellants may use it instead of treating the solid propellants as
explosive division 1.1.
The third option for a launch site operator is to conduct an
analysis of the maximum credible event (MCE), or the worst case
explosion that is expected to occur. If it shows that an explosion due
to the liquid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of
the solid propellants, and an explosion due to the

[[Page 62859]]

solid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of the liquid
propellants, the distance between the explosive hazard facility and all
other explosive hazard facilities and public areas should be based on
the MCE.
Section 420.71(a) requires a launch site operator to ensure that
the public is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of
explosives by lightning. Unless an explosive hazard facility has a
lightning warning system to permit termination of operations and
withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior to the incidence
of an electrical storm, or the explosive hazard facility is to contain
explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning, it must have a
lightning protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by
lightning. A lightning protection system shall include an air terminal
to intentionally attract a lightning strike, a low impedance path--
called a down conductor--connecting an air terminal to an Earth
electrode system, and an Earth electrode system to dissipate the
current from a lightning strike to ground.
A lightning protection system shall also include measures for
bonding and surge protection. For bonding, all metallic bodies shall be
bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal
everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Fences within six feet of
the lightning protection system shall have bonds across gates and other
discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning protection
system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the lightning
protection system shall be bonded to the lightning protection system.
For surge protection, a lightning protection system shall include surge
protection for all metallic power, communication, and instrumentation
lines coming into an explosive hazard facility to reduce transient
voltages due to lightning to a harmless level.
Lightning protection systems shall be visually inspected
semiannually and shall be tested once each year for electrical
continuity and adequacy of grounding. A record of results obtained from
the tests, including action taken to correct deficiencies noted, must
be maintained at the explosive hazard facility.
Section 420.71(b) requires a launch site operator to ensure that
electric power lines on the launch site meet the distance requirements
provided. A full discussion of explosive hazard mitigation measures is
provided in the general preamble above.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This rule contains an information collection requirement. As
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, (44 U.S.C. 3507(d),
the U.S. Department of Transportation submitted the information
collection requirements to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
for its review and assignment of an OMB control number. The agency
received no comments on the paperwork burden. According to the
regulations implementing the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (5 CFR
1320.8(b)(2)(vi), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is
not required to respond to a collection of information unless an agency
displays a currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control number
for this information collection is 2120-0644.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

Final changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency to
propose or adopt a regulation only if the agency makes a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities.
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. section 2531-2533) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S.
standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider international
standards. Where appropriate, agencies are directed to use those
international standards as the basis of U.S. standards. And fourth, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects of proposed
or final rules. This requirement applies only to rules that include a
Federal mandate on State, local or tribal governments or the private
sector, likely to result in a total expenditure of $100 million or more
in any one year (adjusted for inflation.)
In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this rule: (1) Has
benefits which do justify its costs, is not a ``significant regulatory
action'' as defined in the Executive Order; (2) will not have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities; (3) does
not affect international trade; and (4) does not impose an unfunded
mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private
sector.
The FAA has placed these analyses in the docket and summarized them
below. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is amending its
commercial space licensing regulations to add licensing requirements
for the operation of a launch site. The final rule will provide launch
site operators with licensing and operating requirements to protect the
public from the risks associated with operations at a launch site. The
FAA currently issues licenses to launch site operators on a case-by-
case approach. Elements of that approach are reflected in the
guidelines, ``Site Operators License Guidelines for Applicants,'' which
describe the information that applicants provide the FAA for a license
to operate a launch site. The FAA's interpretation and implementation
of the guidelines constitute another element of the case-by-case
approach and additional elements, such as policy review, not reflected
in the guidelines.
The final rule represents quantifiable changes in costs compared to
the guidelines (current practice) in the following two areas. They are
the launch site location review and approval and the launch site
operations review and approval. The FAA has estimated the costs and
cost savings of these changes under two different cost scenarios over a
10-year period discounted at 7 percent in 2000 dollars. The total 10-
year undiscounted cost savings is estimated to be between $93,000 and
$172,000 (or between $65,000 and $124,000, discounted). The most
burdensome cost scenario (where net cost savings is the least) to the
industry will result in the costs to the launch site operators of
$3,000 (or $2,000, discounted) for the launch site location reviews and
approval provisions and a cost savings of $12,000 (or $9,000,
discounted) for the launch site operations review and approval
provisions. Although there will be no cost impact to the FAA, there
will be cost savings to the FAA from the most burdensome cost scenario
of $114,000 or $84,000 discounted.
There are significant nonquantifiable benefits in two areas. First,
the final rule eliminates overlapping responsibilities. Second, the
final rule provides increased details and specificity, which are not
present in the guidelines.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes,
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation.'' To achieve that principle,

[[Page 62860]]

the Act requires agencies to solicit and consider flexible regulatory
proposals and to explain the rationale for their actions. The Act
covers a wide-range of small entities, including small businesses, not-
for-profit organizations and small governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in
the Act.
However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that
the head of the agency may so certify and an regulatory flexibility
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning
should be clear.

Potentially Affected Entities

Entities who are licensed, or have begun the licensing process,
were contacted to determine their size and to gain insight into the
impacts of the final regulations on the licensing process. Spaceport
Florida Authority (SFA), Spaceport Systems International, L.P. (SSI),
the Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA), and the
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) are all licensed to
operate launch sites.
The Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) is a not-
for-profit subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia, responsible for
oversight of the activities of the Virginia Commercial Space Flight
Center (VCSFC). The VCSFC is located within the boundaries of the
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). As a subdivision of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, the VCSFA is empowered by the Acts of the General Assembly to
do all things necessary to carry out its mission of stimulating
economic growth and education through commercial aerospace activities.
The Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA) was created by Florida's
Governor and Legislature as the nation's first state government space
agency. The authority was established to develop space-related
enterprise, including launch activities, industrial development and
education-related projects. SFA operates Spaceport Florida (SPF),
located on Cape Canaveral Air Station.
Launch site operator California Spaceport is located on Vandenberg
Air Force Base. The launch site is operated and managed by Spaceport
Systems International, L.P. who is in partnership with ITT Federal
Services Corporation (ITT FSC). ITT FSC is one of the largest U.S.-
based technical and support services contractors in the world.
The Kodiak Launch Complex is being built by the Alaska Aerospace
Development Corporation. AADC is a public corporation created by the
State of Alaska to develop aerospace related economic and technical
opportunities for the state.

Definition of Small Entities

The Small Business Administration has defined small business
entities relating to space vehicles [SIC codes 3761, 3764 and 3769] as
entities comprising fewer than 1000 employees. Although the above
mentioned entities have fewer than 1000 employees in their immediate
segment of the business, they are affiliated with/or funded by state
governments and large parent companies. The VCSFA is a not-for-profit
subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia; the SFA is a government
space agency; the SSI is affiliated with ITT FSC; and AADC is a
government sponsored corporation.
The FAA conducted the required review of this final rule and
determined that they will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, pursuant to the
regulatory Flexibility Act, U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation
Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

International Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international
standards and where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S.
standards. In addition, consistent with the Administration's belief in
the general superiority and desirability of free trade, it is the
policy of the Administration to remove or diminish to the extent
feasible, barriers to international trade, including both barriers
affecting the export of American goods and services to foreign
countries and barriers affecting the import of foreign goods and
services into the United States.
The Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch
Site (14 CFR part 420) will not constitute a barrier to international
trade, including the export of U.S. goods and services out of the
United States. The final rule affects launch sites that are currently
located or being proposed within the United States.
The final rule is not expected to affect trade opportunities for
U.S. firms doing business overseas or for foreign firms doing business
in the United States.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted as Pub.
L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, is intended, among other things, to curb
the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on State, local, and
tribal governments.
Title II of the Act requires each Federal agency to prepare a
written statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a
proposed or final agency rule that may result in a $100 million or more
expenditure (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private
sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory
action.''
This final rule does not meet the cost thresholds described above.
Furthermore, this final rule will not impose a significant cost or
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, the requirements of Title
II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. Therefore, we determined that this final rule does not have
federalism implications.

Environmental Assessment

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS).
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i),
regulatory documents which cover administrative or procedural
requirements qualify for a categorical exclusion. Sections in subpart B
of part 420 would require an applicant to submit sufficient
environmental information for the FAA

[[Page 62861]]

to comply with NEPA and other applicable environmental laws and
regulations during the processing of each license application.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes that this rule qualifies for a
categorical exclusion because no significant impacts to the environment
are expected to result from finalization or implementation of its
administrative provisions for licensing.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the rulemaking action has been assessed in
accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and
Public Law 94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). It has been determined
that it is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the
EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420

Confidential business information, Environmental protection,
Organization and functions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Rockets, Space transportation and exploration.

The Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends Chapter III of Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to read as follows:

PART 401--ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITIONS

1. The authority citation for part 401 continues to read as
follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

Sec. 401.5 [Amended]

2. Section 401.5 is amended by adding the words ``launch site
accident,'' after the word ``incident.''

PART 417--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

3. Part 417 is removed and reserved.

4. Subchapter C of Chapter III, title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, is amended by adding a new part 420 to read as follows:

PART 420--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE

Subpart A--General
Sec.
420.1 Scope.
420.3 Applicability.
420.5 Definitions.
420.6-420.14 [Reserved]
Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a
License
420.15 Information requirements.
420.17 Bases for issuance of a license.
420.19 Launch site location review--general.
420.21 Launch site location review--launch site boundary.
420.23 Launch site location review--flight corridor.
420.25 Launch site location review--risk analysis.
420.27 Launch site location review--information requirements.
420.29 Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.
420.31 Agreements.
420.32--420.40 [Reserved]
Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions
420.41 License to operate a launch site--general.
420.43 Duration.
420.45 Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.
420.47 License modification.
420.49 Compliance monitoring.
Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee
420.51 Responsibilities--general.
420.53 Control of public access.
420.55 Scheduling of launch site operations.
420.57 Notifications.
420.59 Launch site accident investigation plan.
420.61 Records.
420.63 Explosive siting.
420.65 Handling of solid propellants.
420.67 Storage or handling of liquid propellants.
420.69 Solid and liquid propellants located together.
420.71 Lightning protection.
Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis
Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Areas and Casualty
Expectancy Estimate for Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicles
Appendix E to Part 420--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

Subpart A--General

Sec. 420.1 Scope.

This part prescribes the information and demonstrations that must
be provided to the FAA as part of a license application, the bases for
license approval, license terms and conditions, and post-licensing
requirements with which a licensee shall comply to remain licensed.
Requirements for preparing a license application are contained in part
413 of this subchapter.

Sec. 420.3 Applicability.

This part applies to any person seeking a license to operate a
launch site or to a person licensed under this part. A person operating
a site that only supports amateur rocket activities, as defined in 14
CFR 401.5, does not need a license under this part to operate the site.

Sec. 420.5 Definitions.

For the purpose of this part.
Ballistic coefficient means the weight of an object divided by the
quantity product of the coefficient of drag of the object and the area
of the object.
Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be
located together without increasing the probability of an accident or,
for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.
Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination early in flight. For
an expendable launch vehicle, flight termination is assumed to occur at
10 seconds into flight.
Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles from the launch
point, or where the IIP leaves the surface of the Earth, whichever is
shorter, for an orbital launch vehicle; and ending with an impact
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is
at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive
directed though 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis
is positive directed north. The EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed
away from the Earth.
Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty,
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to
be a casualty. An effective casualty area accounts for the

[[Page 62862]]

characteristics of the debris piece, including its size, the path angle
of its trajectory, impact explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and
bounce. An effective casualty area also accounts for the size of a
person.
Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that,
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or
deflagrate.
Explosive division means the division within hazard class 1 of an
explosive as defined in the United Nations Organization classification
system for transport of dangerous goods, and as determined in
accordance with 49 CFR part 173, subpart C.
Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast
effects when detonated.
Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where
solid propellant, liquid propellant, or other explosives are stored or
handled.
Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees.
Flight corridor means an area on the Earth's surface estimated to
contain the hazardous debris from nominal flight of a launch vehicle,
and non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle assuming a perfectly
functioning flight termination system or other flight safety system.
Guided suborbital launch vehicle means a suborbital rocket that
employs an active guidance system.
Hazard class means the class of an explosive as defined by the
United Nations Organization classification system for transport of
dangerous goods, and as determined in accordance with 49 CFR part 173,
subpart C.
Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated
three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a
stage apogee, a three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch
vehicle.
Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a radius that
defines an impact dispersion area.
Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the
impact point of a suborbital launch vehicle stage.
Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, when
multiplied by a stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following
thrust termination of a launch vehicle. IIP may be calculated with or
without atmospheric drag effects.
Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface.
Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control
of one launch site customer.
Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined in accordance with
appendix A of this part, the portion of a flight corridor from the
launch point to a point 100 nautical miles in the direction of the
flight azimuth. For a flight corridor defined in accordance with
appendix B of this part, a launch area is the portion of a flight
corridor from the launch point to the enveloping line enclosing the
outer boundary of the last debris dispersion circle.
Launch point means a point on the Earth from which the flight of a
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by its geodetic latitude,
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to
property not associated with the activity.
Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an
item.
Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance,
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle
internal and external systems perform as planned, and there are no
external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric
drag and gravity.
Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measured
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch
vehicle.
Populated area means a land area with population.
Population density means the number of people per unit area in a
populated area.
Position data means data referring to the current position of a
launch vehicle with respect to flight time expressed through the X, Y,
Z coordinate system.
Public means people and property that are not involved in
supporting a licensed launch, and includes those people and property
that may be located within the boundary of a launch site, such as
visitors, any individual providing goods or services not related to
launch processing or flight, and any other launch operator and its
personnel.
Public area means any area outside a hazard area and is an area
that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of a launch
site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns or
otherwise controls that hazard area.
Public area distance means the minimum distance permitted between a
public area and an explosive hazard facility.
Public traffic route distance means the minimum distance permitted
between a public highway or railroad line and an explosive hazard
facility.
Trajectory means the position and velocity components as a function
of time of a launch vehicle relative to an x, y, z coordinate system,
expressed in x, y, z, x, y, z.
Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that
does not have a guidance system.
X, Y, Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system
is at a launch point. The x-axis coincides with the initial launch
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The y-axis is
positive to the left looking downrange. The xy-plane is tangent to the
ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to
the geodetic vertical. The z-axis is normal to the xy-plane and
positive directed away from the earth.
0,0,h0 means a
latitude, longitude, height system where 0 is the
geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is the east

[[Page 62863]]

longitude of the launch point, and h0 is the height of the
launch point above the reference ellipsoid. 0 and
0 are expressed in degrees-decimal-degrees.

Secs. 420.6-420.14 [Reserved]

Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a
License

Sec. 420.15 Information requirements.

(a) General. (1) Launch site operator. An applicant shall identify
the name and address of the applicant, and the name, address, and
telephone number of any person to whom inquiries and correspondence
should be directed.
(2) Launch site. An applicant shall provide the name and location
of the proposed launch site and include the following information:
(i) A list of downrange equipment;
(ii) A description of the layout of the launch site, including
launch points;
(iii) The types of launch vehicles to be supported at each launch
point;
(iv) The range of launch azimuths planned from each launch point;
and
(v) The scheduled operational date.
(3) Foreign ownership. Identify foreign ownership of the applicant,
as follows:
(i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, all foreign owners or
partners;
(ii) For a corporation, any foreign ownership interest of 10
percent or more; and
(iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, any
foreign entities participating in the entity.
(b) Environmental. An applicant shall provide the FAA with
information for the FAA to analyze the environmental impacts associated
with the operation of the proposed launch site. The information
provided by an applicant must be sufficient to enable the FAA to comply
with the requirements of the National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
4321 et seq. (NEPA), the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations
for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-
1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts,
FAA Order 1050.1D. An applicant shall submit environmental information
concerning a proposed launch site not covered by existing environmental
documentation, and other factors as determined by the FAA.
(c) Launch site location. (1) Except as provided by paragraph
(c)(2) of this section, an applicant shall provide the information
necessary to demonstrate compliance with Secs. 420.19-420.29.
(2) An applicant who is proposing to locate a launch site at an
existing launch point at a federal launch range is not required to
comply with paragraph (c)(1) of this section if a launch vehicle of the
same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been safely
launched from the launch point.
(d) Explosive site plan. (1) Except as provided by paragraph (d)(2)
of this section, an applicant shall submit an explosive site plan that
complies with Secs. 420.63, 420.65, 420.67, and 420.69.
(2) If an applicant plans to operate a launch site located on a
federal launch range, and if the applicant is required by the federal
launch range to comply with the federal launch range's explosive safety
requirements, the applicant shall submit the explosive site plan
submitted to the federal launch range.
(e) Launch site operations. An applicant shall provide the
information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the requirements
of Secs. 420.53, 420.55, 420.57, 420.59, 420.61, and 420.71.

Sec. 420.17 Bases for issuance of a license.

(a) The FAA will issue a license under this part when the FAA
determines that:
(1) The application provides the information required by
Sec. 420.15;
(2) The FAA has completed an analysis of the environmental impacts
associated with the proposed operation of the launch site, in
accordance with NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and FAA Order 1050.1D;
(3) The launch site location meets the requirements of
Secs. 420.19, 420.21, 420.23, 420.25, 420.27, and 420.29;
(4) The applicant has completed the agreements required by
Sec. 420.31;
(5) The application demonstrates that the applicant shall satisfy
the requirements of Secs. 420.53, 420.55, 420.57, 420.59, 420.61 and
420.71;
(6) The explosive site plan meets the criteria of Secs. 420.63,
420.65, 420.67 and 420.69; and
(7) Issuing a license would not jeopardize foreign policy or
national security interests of the United States.
(b) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue arising
during an application review that would lead to denial. The applicant
may respond in writing, submit additional information, or amend its
license application.

Sec. 420.19 Launch site location review--general.

(a) To gain approval for a launch site location, an applicant shall
demonstrate that for each launch point proposed for the launch site, at
least one type of expendable or reusable launch vehicle can be flown
from the launch point safely. For purposes of the launch site location
review:
(1) A safe launch must possess a risk level estimated, in
accordance with the requirements of this part, not to exceed an
expected average number of 0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the
collective member of the public exposed to hazards from the flight
(Ec 30 x 10-6).
(2) Types of launch vehicles include orbital expendable launch
vehicles, guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, unguided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles.
Orbital expendable launch vehicles are further classified by weight
class, based on the weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a
100-nm orbit, as defined in table 1.
(b) If an applicant proposes to have more than one type of launch
vehicle flown from a launch point, the applicant shall demonstrate that
each type of expendable or reusable launch vehicle planned to be flown
from the launch point can be flown from the launch point safely.
(c) If an applicant proposes to have more than one weight class of
orbital expendable launch vehicles flown from a launch point, the
applicant shall demonstrate that the heaviest weight class planned to
be flown from the launch point can be flown from the launch point
safely.

Table 1 of Sec. 420.19.--Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight class
100 nm orbit -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Medium Medium large Large
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 degrees inclination*................. 4400 >4400 to 11100 to 18500
eq>11100 thn-eq>18500
90 degrees inclination.................. 3300 >3300 to 8400 to 15000
eq>8400 eq>15000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.

[[Page 62864]]

Sec. 420.21 Launch site location review--launch site boundary.

(a) The distance from any proposed launch point to the closest
launch site boundary must be at least as great as the debris dispersion
radius of the largest launch vehicle type and weight class proposed for
the launch point.
(b) For a launch site supporting any expendable launch vehicle, an
applicant shall use the largest distance provided by table 2 for the
type and weight class of any launch vehicle proposed for the launch
point.
(c) For a launch site supporting any reusable launch vehicle, an
applicant shall determine the debris dispersion radius that represents
the maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a
worst-case launch vehicle failure in the launch area. An applicant must
clearly and convincingly demonstrate the validity of its proposed
debris dispersion radius.

Table 2 of Sec. 420.21.--Minimum Distance From Launch Point to Launch Site Boundary (feet)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital expendable launch vehicle class Type of suborbital launch vehicle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Medium Medium large Large Guided Unguided
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7300 9300 10600 13000 8000 1600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 420.23 Launch site location review--flight corridor.

(a) Guided orbital expendable launch vehicle. For a guided orbital
expendable launch vehicle, an applicant shall define a flight corridor
that:
(1) Encompasses an area that the applicant estimates, in accordance
with the requirements of this part, to contain debris with a ballistic
coefficient of 3 pounds per square foot, from any non-
nominal flight of a guided orbital expendable launch vehicle from the
launch point to a point 5000 nm downrange, or where the IIP leaves the
surface of the Earth, whichever is shorter;
(2) Includes an overflight exclusion zone where the public risk
criteria of 30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were
present in the open; and
(3) Uses one of the methodologies provided in appendix A or B of
this part. The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix A
or B of this part.
(b) Guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. For a guided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicle, an applicant shall define a flight
corridor that:
(1) Encompasses an area that the applicant estimates, in accordance
with the requirements of this part, to contain debris with a ballistic
coefficient of 3 pounds per square foot, from any non-
nominal flight of a guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle from
the launch point to impact with the earth's surface;
(2) Includes an impact dispersion area for the launch vehicle's
last stage;
(3) Includes an overflight exclusion zone where the public risk
criteria of 30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were
present in the open; and
(4) Uses one of the methodologies provided in appendices A or B to
this part. The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix A
or B of this part.
(c) Unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle.
(1) For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, an
applicant shall define the following using the methodology provided by
appendix D of this part:
(i) Impact dispersion areas that the applicant estimates, in
accordance with the requirements of this part, to contain the impact of
launch vehicle stages from nominal flight of an unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicle from the launch point to impact with the
earth's surface; and
(ii) An overflight exclusion zone where the public risk criteria of
30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were present in
the open.
(2) The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix D
of this part.
(3) An applicant shall base its analysis on an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage apogee represents the
intended use of the launch point.
(d) Reusable launch vehicle. For a reusable launch vehicle, an
applicant shall define a flight corridor that contains the hazardous
debris from nominal and non-nominal flight of a reusable launch
vehicle. The applicant must provide a clear and convincing
demonstration of the validity of its flight corridor.

Sec. 420.25 Launch site location review--risk analysis.

(a) If a flight corridor or impact dispersion area defined by
section 420.23 contains a populated area, the applicant shall estimate
the casualty expectation associated with the flight corridor or impact
dispersion area. An applicant shall use the methodology provided in
appendix C to this part for guided orbital or suborbital expendable
launch vehicles and appendix D for unguided suborbital launch vehicles.
The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant provides a
clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides an
equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix C or D of this
part. For a reusable launch vehicle, an applicant must provide a clear
and convincing demonstration of the validity of its risk analysis.
(b) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds
30 x 10-\6\, the FAA will not approve the location of the
proposed launch point.

Sec. 420.27 Launch site location review--information requirements.

An applicant shall provide the following launch site location
review information in its application:
(a) A map or maps showing the location of each launch point
proposed, and the flight azimuth, IIP, flight corridor, and each impact
range and impact dispersion area for each launch point;
(b) Each launch vehicle type and any launch vehicle class proposed
for each launch point;
(c) Trajectory data;
(d) Wind data, including each month and any percent wind data used
in the analysis;
(e) Any launch vehicle apogee used in the analysis;
(f) Each populated area located within a flight corridor or impact
dispersion area;
(g) The estimated casualty expectancy calculated for each populated
area within a flight corridor or impact dispersion area;
(h) The effective casualty areas used in the analysis;

[[Page 62865]]

(i) The estimated casualty expectancy for each flight corridor or
set of impact dispersion areas; and
(j) If populated areas are located within an overflight exclusion
zone, a demonstration that there are times when the public is not
present or that the applicant has an agreement in place to evacuate the
public from the overflight exclusion zone during a launch.

Sec. 420.29 Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.

An applicant for a license to operate a launch site for an unproven
launch vehicle shall provide a clear and convincing demonstration that
its proposed launch site location provides an equivalent level of
safety to that required by this part.

Sec. 420.31 Agreements.

(a) Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this section, an
applicant shall complete an agreement with the local U.S. Coast Guard
district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to
Mariners prior to a launch and other such measures as the Coast Guard
deems necessary to protect public health and safety.
(b) Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this section, an
applicant shall complete an agreement with the FAA Air Traffic Control
(ATC) office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which
launches will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a
Notice to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air routes during
the launch window and other such measures as the FAA ATC office deems
necessary to protect public health and safety.
(c) An applicant that plans to operate a launch site located on a
federal launch range does not have to comply with section 420.31 if the
applicant is using existing federal launch range agreements with the
U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA ATC office having jurisdiction over the
airspace through which launches will take place.

Secs. 420.32-420.40 [Reserved]

Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions

Sec. 420.41 License to operate a launch site--general.

(a) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to
operate a launch site in accordance with the representations contained
in the licensee's application, with terms and conditions contained in
any license order accompanying the license, and subject to the
licensee's compliance with 49 U.S.C. subtitle IX, ch. 701 and this
chapter.
(b) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to
offer its launch site to a launch operator for each launch point for
the type and any weight class of launch vehicle identified in the
license application and upon which the licensing determination is
based.
(c) Issuance of a license to operate a launch site does not relieve
a licensee of its obligation to comply with any other laws or
regulations; nor does it confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive
right in the use of airspace or outer space.

Sec. 420.43 Duration.

A license to operate a launch site remains in effect for five years
from the date of issuance unless surrendered, suspended, or revoked
before the expiration of the term and is renewable upon application by
the licensee.

Sec. 420.45 Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.

(a) Only the FAA may transfer a license to operate a launch site.
(b) The FAA will transfer a license to an applicant who has
submitted an application in accordance with 14 CFR part 413, satisfied
the requirements of Sec. 420.15, and obtained each approval required by
Sec. 420.17 for a license.
(c) The FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made part of
the record that supported a prior related licensing determination.

Sec. 420.47 License modification.

(a) Upon application or upon its own initiative, the FAA may modify
a license to operate a launch site at any time by issuing a license
order that adds, removes, or modifies a license term or condition to
ensure compliance with the Act and the requirements of this chapter.
(b) After a license to operate a launch site has been issued, a
licensee shall apply to the FAA for modification of its license if:
(1) The licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a manner
that is not authorized by the license; or
(2) The licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a manner
that would make any representation contained in the license application
that is material to public health and safety or safety of property no
longer accurate and complete.
(c) An application to modify a license shall be prepared and
submitted in accordance with part 413 of this chapter. The licensee
shall indicate any part of its license or license application that
would be changed or affected by a proposed modification.
(d) The FAA approves a modification request that satisfies the
requirements of this part.
(e) Upon approval of a license modification, the FAA issues either
a written approval to the licensee or a license order modifying the
license if a stated term or condition of the license is changed, added,
or deleted. A written approval has the full force and effect of a
license order and is part of the licensing record.

Sec. 420.49 Compliance monitoring.

A licensee shall allow access by and cooperate with federal
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to
observe any activities of the licensee, its customers, its contractors,
or subcontractors, associated with licensed operation of the licensee's
launch site.

Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee

Sec. 420.51 Responsibilities--general.

(a) A licensee shall operate its launch site in accordance with the
representations in the application upon which the licensing
determination is based.
(b) A licensee is responsible for compliance with 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and for meeting the requirements of this chapter.

Sec. 420.53 Control of public access.

(a) A licensee shall prevent unauthorized access to the launch
site, and unauthorized, unescorted access to explosive hazard
facilities or other hazard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch
operator, through the use of security personnel, surveillance systems,
physical barriers, or other means approved as part of the licensing
process.
(b) A licensee shall notify anyone entering the launch site of
safety rules and emergency and evacuation procedures prior to that
person's entry unless that person has received a briefing on those
rules and procedures within the previous year.
(c) A licensee shall employ warning signals or alarms to notify any
persons at the launch site of any emergency.

Sec. 420.55 Scheduling of launch site operations.

(a) A licensee shall develop and implement procedures to schedule
operations to ensure that each operation carried out by a customer at
the launch site does not create the potential for a mishap that could
result in harm to the public because of the proximity of the
operations, in time or place, to operations of any other customer. A

[[Page 62866]]

customer includes any launch operator, and any contractor,
subcontractor or customer of the launch site operator's customer at the
launch site.
(b) A licensee shall provide its launch site scheduling
requirements to each customer before the customer begins operations at
the launch site.

Sec. 420.57 Notifications.

(a) A licensee shall notify each launch operator and any other
customer of any limitations on the use of the launch site. A licensee
shall also communicate limitations on the use of facilities provided to
customers by the launch site operator.
(b) A licensee shall maintain its agreement, made in accordance
with Sec. 420.31(a), with the local U.S. Coast Guard district.
(c) A licensee shall maintain its agreement, made in accordance
with Sec. 420.31(b), with the FAA ATC office having jurisdiction over
the airspace through which launches will take place.
(d) At least two days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, the
licensee shall notify local officials and all owners of land adjacent
to the launch site of the flight schedule.

Sec. 420.59 Launch site accident investigation plan.

(a) General. A licensee shall develop and implement a launch site
accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for
reporting, responding to, and investigating launch site accidents, as
defined by Sec. 420.5, and for cooperating with federal officials in
case of a launch accident. The launch site accident investigation plan
must be signed by an individual authorized to sign and certify the
application in accordance with Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter.
(b) Reporting requirements. A launch site accident investigation
plan shall provide for--
(1) Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a launch site
accident.
(2) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, within
five days of any launch site accident. The report must include the
following information:
(i) Date and time of occurrence;
(ii) Location of the event;
(iii) Description of the event;
(iv) Number of injuries, if any, and general description of types
of injuries suffered;
(v) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
(vi) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined by
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event;
(vii) Any action taken to contain the consequences of the event;
and
(viii) Weather conditions at the time of the event.
(c) Response plan. A launch site accident investigation plan shall
contain procedures that--
(1) Ensure the consequences of a launch site accident are contained
and minimized;
(2) Ensure data and physical evidence are preserved;
(3) Require the licensee to report to and cooperate with FAA or
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and
designate one or more points of contact for the FAA or NTSB; and
(4) Require the licensee to identify and adopt preventive measures
for avoiding recurrence of the event.
(d) Investigation plan. A launch site accident investigation plan
must contain--
(1) Procedures for investigating the cause of a launch site
accident;
(2) Procedures for reporting launch site accident investigation
results to the FAA; and
(3) Delineated responsibilities, including reporting
responsibilities for personnel assigned to conduct investigations and
for any one retained by the licensee to conduct or participate in
investigations.
(e) Launch accidents. A launch site accident investigation plan
shall contain--
(1) Procedures for participating in an investigation of a launch
accident for launches launched from the launch site;
(2) Require the licensee to cooperate with FAA or National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations of a launch accident
for launches launched from the launch site.
(f) Applicability of other accident investigation procedures.
Accident investigation procedures developed in accordance with 29 CFR
1910.119 and 40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the requirements of paragraphs
(c) and (d) of this section to the extent that they include the
elements required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.

Sec. 420.61 Records.

(a) A licensee shall maintain all records, data, and other material
needed to verify that its operations are conducted in accordance with
representations contained in the licensee's application. A licensee
shall retain records for three years.
(b) In the event of a launch or launch site accident, a licensee
shall preserve all records related to the event. Records shall be
retained until completion of any federal investigation and the FAA
advises the licensee that the records need not be retained.
(c) A licensee shall make available to federal officials for
inspection and copying all records required to be maintained under the
regulations.

Sec. 420.63 Explosive siting.

(a) Except as otherwise provided by paragraph (b) of this section,
a licensee shall ensure that the configuration of the launch site is in
accordance with an explosive site plan, and that the licensee's
explosive site plan is in compliance with the requirements of
Secs. 420.65--420.69. The explosive site plan shall include:
(1) A scaled map that shows the location of all proposed explosive
hazard facilities at the proposed launch site and that shows actual and
minimal allowable distances between each explosive hazard facility and
all other explosive hazard facilities and each public area, including
the launch site boundary;
(2) A listing of the maximum quantities of liquid and solid
propellants and other explosives to be located at each explosive hazard
facility, including the class and division for each solid explosive and
the hazard and compatibility group for each liquid propellant; and
(3) A description of each activity to be conducted in each
explosive hazard facility.
(b) A licensee operating a launch site located on a federal launch
range does not have to comply with the requirements in Secs. 420.65-
420.69 if the licensee is in compliance with the federal launch range's
explosive safety requirements.
(c) For explosive siting issues not otherwise addressed by the
requirements of Secs. 420.65-420.69, a launch site operator must
clearly and convincingly demonstrate a level of safety equivalent to
that otherwise required by part 420.

Sec. 420.65 Handling of solid propellants.

(a) A launch site operator shall determine the maximum total
quantity of solid propellants and other solid explosives by class and
division, in accordance with 49 CFR part 173, Subpart C, to be located
in each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants or other
solid explosives will be handled.
(b) When explosive divisions 1.1 and 1.3 explosives are located in
the same explosive hazard facility, the total quantity of explosive
shall be treated as

[[Page 62867]]

division 1.1 for quantity-distance determinations; or, a launch site
operator may add the net explosive equivalent weight of the division
1.3 items to the net weight of division 1.1 items to determine the
total quantity of explosives.
(c) A launch site operator shall separate each explosive hazard
facility where solid propellants and other solid explosives are handled
from all other explosive hazard facilities, each public area and the
launch site boundary by a distance no less than those provided for each
quantity and explosive division in appendix E, table E-1.
(d) A launch site operator shall follow the following separation
rules:
(1) A launch site operator shall employ no less than the applicable
public area distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from each
public area and from the launch site boundary.
(2) A launch site operator shall employ no less than an intraline
distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from all other
explosive hazard facilities used by a single customer.
(3) For explosive division 1.1 only, a launch site operator may
employ no less than 60% of the applicable public area distance, or the
public traffic route distance, to separate an explosive hazard facility
from a public area that consists only of a public highway or railroad
line.
(4) A launch site operator may use linear interpolation for NEW
quantities between table entries.
(5) A launch site operator shall measure separation distance from
the closest debris or explosive hazard source in an explosive hazard
facility.

Sec. 420.67 Storage or handling of liquid propellants.

(a) For an explosive hazard facility where liquid propellants are
handled or stored, a launch site operator shall determine the total
quantity of liquid propellant and, if applicable pursuant to paragraph
(a)(3) of this section, the explosive equivalent of liquid propellant
in each explosive hazard facility in accordance with the following:
(1) The quantity of liquid propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or
other container is the net weight in pounds of the propellant in the
container. The determination of quantity shall include any liquid
propellant in associated piping to any point where positive means are
provided for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or interrupting a
reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
(2) Where two or more containers of compatible liquid propellants
are handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, the
total quantity of propellant to determine the minimum separation
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and each public area shall be the total quantity of
liquid propellant in all containers, unless:
(i) The containers are separated one from the other by the
appropriate distance as provided by paragraph (b)(2) of this section;
or
(ii) The containers are subdivided by intervening barriers, such as
diking, that prevent mixing.
(iii) If paragraph (a)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section apply, a
launch site operator shall use the quantity of propellant requiring the
greatest separation distance pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section
to determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive
hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and each
public area.
(3) Where two or more containers of incompatible liquid propellants
will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, a
launch site operator shall determine the explosive equivalent in pounds
of the combined liquids, using the formulas provided in appendix E,
table E-2, to determine the minimum separation distance between the
explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and
public areas unless the containers are separated one from the other by
the appropriate distance as determined in paragraph (b)(3) of this
section. A launch site operator shall then use the quantity of liquid
propellant requiring the greatest separation distance to determine the
minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard facility and
all other explosive hazard facilities and each public area.
(4) A launch site operator shall convert quantities of liquid
propellants from gallons to pounds using the conversion factors
provided in appendix E, table E-3 and the following equation:
Pounds of propellant = gallons x density of propellant (pounds per
gallon).
(b) A launch site operator shall use appendix E, table E-3 to
determine hazard and compatibility groups and shall separate liquid
propellants from each other and from each public area using distances
no less than those provided in appendix E, tables E-4 through E-7 in
accordance with the following:
(1) A launch site operator shall measure minimum separation
distances from the hazard source in an explosive hazard facility, such
as a container, building, segment, or positive cutoff point in piping,
closest to each explosive hazard facility.
(2) A launch site operator shall measure the minimum separation
distance between compatible liquid propellants using the ``intragroup
and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and hazard group
that requires the greater distance prescribed by appendix E, tables E-
4, E-5, and E-6.
(3) A launch site operator shall measure the minimum separation
distance between liquid propellants of different compatibility groups
using the ``public area and incompatible'' distance for the propellant
quantity and hazard group that requires the greater distance provided
in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the propellants of
different compatibility groups are subdivided by intervening barriers
that prevent mixing. If such barriers are present, the minimum
separation distance shall be the ``intragroup and compatible'' distance
for the propellant quantity and group that requires the greater
distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
(4) A launch site operator shall separate liquid propellants from
each public area using a distance no less than the ``public area and
incompatible'' distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-
6.
(5) A launch site operator shall separate each explosive hazard
facility that contains liquid propellants where explosive equivalents
apply pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section from all other
explosive hazard facilities of a single customer using the intraline
distance provided in appendix E, table E-7, and from each public area
using the public area distance provided in appendix E, table E-7.

Sec. 420.69 Solid and liquid propellants located together.

(a) A launch site operator proposing an explosive hazard facility
where solid and liquid propellants are to be located together shall
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas in
accordance with one method provided in paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of
this section.
(b) A launch site operator shall determine the minimum separation
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and public areas required for the liquid propellants
in accordance with section 420.67(b)(5), and add the minimum separation
distances between

[[Page 62868]]

the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities
and public areas required for the solid propellants in accordance with
section 420.65, treating the solid propellants as explosive division
1.1.
(c) A launch site operator shall determine the minimum separation
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and public areas required for the liquid propellants
in accordance with section 420.67(b)(5), and add the minimum separation
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive
hazard facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants
in accordance with section 420.65, using the explosive equivalent of
the explosive division 1.3.
(d) A launch site operator shall conduct an analysis of the maximum
credible event (MCE), or the worst case explosion that is expected to
occur. If the MCE shows that there will be no simultaneous explosion
reaction of the liquid propellant tanks and the solid propellant
motors, then the minimum distance between the explosive hazard facility
and all other explosive hazard facilities and public areas must be
based on the MCE.

Sec. 420.71 Lightning protection.

(a) Lightning protection. A licensee shall ensure that the public
is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of explosives by
lightning.
(1) Elements of a lighting protection system. Unless an explosive
hazard facility meets the conditions of paragraph (a)(3) of this
section, all explosive hazard facilities shall have a lightning
protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by lightning.
A lightning protection system shall meet the requirements of this
paragraph and include the following:
(i) Air terminal. An air terminal to intentionally attract a
lightning strike.
(ii) Down conductor. A low impedance path connecting an air
terminal to an earth electrode system.
(iii) Earth electrode system. An earth electrode system to
dissipate the current from a lightning strike to ground.
(2) Bonding and surge protection. A lightning protection system
must meet the requirements of this paragraph and include the following:
(i) Bonding. All metallic bodies shall be bonded to ensure that
voltage potentials due to lightning are equal everywhere in the
explosive hazard facility. Any fence within six feet of a lightning
protection system shall have a bond across each gate and other
discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning protection
system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the lightning
protection system shall be bonded to the lightning protection system.
(ii) Surge protection. A lightning protection system shall include
surge protection to reduce transient voltages due to lightning to a
harmless level for all metallic power, communication, and
instrumentation lines entering an explosive hazard facility.
(3) Circumstances where no lightening protection system is
required. No lightning protection system is required for an explosive
hazard facility when a lightning warning system is available to permit
termination of operations and withdrawal of the public to public area
distance prior to an electrical storm, or for an explosive hazard
facility containing explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning.
If no lightning protection system is required, a licensee must ensure
the withdrawal of the public to a public area distance prior to an
electrical storm.
(4) Testing and inspection. Lightning protection systems shall be
visually inspected semiannually and shall be tested once each year for
electrical continuity and adequacy of grounding. A licensee shall
maintain at the explosive hazard facility a record of results obtained
from the tests, including any action taken to correct deficiencies
noted.
(b) Electrical power lines. A licensee shall ensure that electric
power lines at its launch site meet the following requirements:
(1) Electric power lines shall be no closer to an explosive hazard
facility than the length of the lines between the poles or towers that
support the lines unless an effective means is provided to ensure that
energized lines cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive
hazard facility.
(2) Towers or poles supporting electrical distribution lines that
carry between 15 and 69 KV, and unmanned electrical substations shall
be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the public area
distance for that explosive hazard facility.
(3) Towers or poles supporting electrical transmission lines that
carry 69 KV or more, shall be no closer to an explosive hazard facility
than the public area distance for that explosive hazard facility.

Issued in Washington, DC on September 29, 2000.
Patricia G. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.

Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method for constructing a flight
corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle
or any one of the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles
from table 1, Sec. 420.19, without the use of local meteorological
data or a launch vehicle trajectory.
(2) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in a
launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an impact
dispersion area in a downrange area. A flight corridor for a guided
suborbital launch vehicle ends with the impact dispersion area, and,
for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles, 5000
nautical miles (nm) from the launch point.

(b) Data requirements

(1) Maps. An applicant shall use any map for the launch site
region with a scale not less than 1:250,000 inches per inch in the
launch area and 1:20,000,000 inches per inch in the downrange area.
As described in paragraph (b)(2), an applicant shall use a
mechanical method, a semi-automated method, or a fully-automated
method to plot a flight corridor on maps. A source for paper maps
acceptable to the FAA is the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service.
(i) Projections for mechanical plotting method. An applicant
shall use a conic projection. The FAA will accept a ``Lambert-
Conformal'' conic projection. A polar aspect of a plane-azimuthal
projection may also be used for far northern launch sites.
(ii) Projections for semi-automated plotting method. An
applicant shall use cylindrical, conic, or plane projections for
semi-automated plotting. The FAA will accept ``Mercator'' and
``Oblique Mercator'' cylindrical projections. The FAA will accept
``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' conic projections.
The FAA will accept ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and ``Azimuthal
Equidistant'' plane projections.
(iii) Projections for fully-automated plotting method. The FAA
will accept map projections used by geographical information system
software scaleable pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1).
(2) Plotting Methods.
(i) Mechanical method. An applicant may use mechanical drafting
equipment such as pencil, straight edge, ruler, protractor, and
compass to plot the location of a flight corridor on a map. The FAA
will accept straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5
times the map scale on map scales greater than or equal to
1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); or straight lines representing
100 nm or less on map scales less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
(ii) Semi-automated method. An applicant may employ the range
and bearing techniques in paragraph (b)(3) to create

[[Page 62869]]

latitude and longitude points on a map. The FAA will accept straight
lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale on
map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/
in); or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales
less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
(iii) Fully-automated method. An applicant may use geographical
information system software with global mapping data scaleable in
accordance with paragraph (b)(1).
(3) Range and bearing computations on an ellipsoidal Earth
model.
(i) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal
Earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to
calculate geodetic latitude (+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch
point geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E), range (nm), and
bearing (degrees, positive clockwise from North).
(A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input in making
range and bearing computations. Angle units must be in radians.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.007

(B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations
to determine the latitude (2) and longitude
(2) of a target point situated ``S'' nm from the
launch point on an azimuth bearing (12) degrees.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.008

where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.009

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.010

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[[Page 62870]]

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[[Page 62871]]

(ii) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal
Earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to
calculate the distance (S) of the geodesic between two points
(P1 and P2), the forward azimuth
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the
back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at
P2, given the geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E) of
P1 and P2. Azimuth is measured positively
clockwise from North.
(A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input. Units
must be in radians.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.030

(B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations
to determine the distance (S), the forward azimuth
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the
back azimuth (12) of the geodesic at
P2.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.031

where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.032

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(1) To define a flight corridor, an applicant shall:
(i) Select a guided suborbital or orbital launch vehicle, and,
for an orbital launch vehicle, select from table 1 of Sec. 420.19 a
launch vehicle weight class that best represents the launch vehicle
the applicant plans to support at its launch point;
(ii) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from
table A-1 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch vehicle or
orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i);
(iii) Select a launch point geodetic latitude and longitude; and
(iv) Select a flight azimuth.
(2) An applicant shall define and map an overflight exclusion
zone using the following method:
(i) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from
table A-1 and a downrange distance (DOEZ) from table A-2
to define an overflight exclusion zone for the guided suborbital
launch vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph
(c)(1)(i).
(ii) An overflight exclusion zone is described by the
intersection of the following boundaries, which are depicted in
figure A-1:
(A) An applicant shall define an uprange boundary with a half-
circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length twice
Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The
uprange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint
positioned on the launch point with the chord oriented along an
azimuth 90 deg.from the launch azimuth and the half-
circle arc located uprange from the launch point.
(B) An applicant shall define the downrange boundary with a
half-circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length
twice Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The
downrange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint
intersecting the nominal flight azimuth line at a distance
DOEZ inches downrange with the chord oriented along an
azimuth 90 deg.from the launch azimuth and the half-
circle arc located downrange from the intersection of the chord and
the flight azimuth line.

[[Page 62873]]

(C) Crossrange boundaries of an overflight exclusion zone are
defined by two lines segments. Each is parallel to the flight
azimuth with one to the left side and one to the right side of the
flight azimuth line. Each line connects an uprange half-circle arc
endpoint to a downrange half-circle arc endpoint as shown in figure
A-1.
(iii) An applicant shall identify the overflight exclusion zone
on a map that meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
(3) An applicant shall define and map a flight corridor using
the following method:
(i) In accordance with paragraph (b), an applicant shall draw a
flight corridor on one or more maps with the Dmax origin
centered on the intended launch point and the flight corridor
centerline (in the downrange direction) aligned with the initial
flight azimuth. The flight corridor is depicted in figure A-2 and
its line segment lengths are tabulated in table A-3.
(ii) An applicant shall define the flight corridor using the
following boundary definitions:
(A) An applicant shall draw an uprange boundary, which is
defined by an arc-line GB (figure A-2), directly uprange from and
centered on the intended launch point with radius Dmax.
(B) An applicant shall draw line CF perpendicular to and
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 10 nm downrange
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line CF
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph
(c)(1)(i).
(C) An applicant shall draw line DE perpendicular to and
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 100 nm downrange
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line DE
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph
(c)(1)(i).
(D) Except for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant
shall draw a downrange boundary, which is defined by line HI and is
drawn perpendicular to and centered on the flight azimuth line, and
positioned 5,000 nm downrange from the launch point. The applicant
shall use the length of line HI provided in table A-3 corresponding
to the orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i).
(E) An applicant shall draw crossrange boundaries, which are
defined by three lines on the left side and three lines on the right
side of the flight azimuth. An applicant shall construct the left
flight corridor boundary according to the following, and as depicted
in figure A-3 :
(1) The first line (line BC in figure A-3) is tangent to the
uprange boundary arc, and ends at endpoint C of line CF, as depicted
in figure A-3;
(2) The second line (line CD in figure A-3) begins at endpoint C
of line BC and ends at endpoint D of line DH, as depicted in figure
A-3;
(3) For all orbital launch vehicles, the third line (line DH in
figure A-3) begins at endpoint D of line CD and ends at endpoint H
of line HI, as depicted in figure A-3; and
(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the line DH begins
at endpoint D of line CD and ends at a point tangent to the impact
dispersion area drawn in accordance with paragraph (c)(4) and as
depicted in figure A-4.
(F) An applicant shall repeat the procedure in paragraph
(c)(3)(ii)(E) for the right side boundary.
(iii) An applicant shall identify the flight corridor on a map
that meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight
corridor and show the impact dispersion area on a map, as depicted
in figure A-4, in accordance with the following:
(i) An applicant shall select an apogee altitude
(Hap) for the launch vehicle final stage. The apogee
altitude should equal the highest altitude intended to be reached by
a guided suborbital launch vehicle launched from the launch point.
(ii) An applicant shall define the impact dispersion area by
using an impact range factor [IP(Hap)] and a dispersion
factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown below:
(A) An applicant shall calculate the impact range (D) for the
final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set D equal to the
maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the impact
range factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.048

where: IP(Hap) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km; and
IP(Hap) = 0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.

(B) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius
(R) for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R
equal to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by
the dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.049

where: DISP(Hap) = 0.05

(iii) An applicant shall draw the impact dispersion area on a
map with its center on the predicted impact point. An applicant
shall then draw line DH in accordance with paragraph
(c)(3)(ii)(E)(4).

(d) Evaluate the Flight Corridor

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the
presence of any populated areas. If an applicant determines that no
populated area is located within the flight corridor, then no
additional steps are necessary.
(2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight
exclusion zone during a launch.
(3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor,
an applicant may modify its proposal and create another flight
corridor pursuant to appendix A, use appendix B to narrow the flight
corridor, or complete a risk analysis in accordance with appendix C.

Table A-1.--Debris Dispersion Radius (Dmax) (in)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital
----------------------------------------------------------- launch
vehicles
Small Medium Medium large Large -------------
Guided
------------------------------------------------------------------------
87,600 111,600 127,200 156,000 96,000
(1.20 nm) (1.53 nm) (1.74 nm) (2.14 nm) (1.32 nm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 62874]]

Table A-2.--Overflight Exclusion Zone Downrange Distance (Doez) (in)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital
----------------------------------------------------------- launch
vehicles
Small Medium Medium large Large -------------
Guided
------------------------------------------------------------------------
240,500 253,000 310,300 937,700 232,100
(3.30 nm) (3.47 nm) (4.26 nm) (12.86 nm) (3.18 nm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method to construct a flight
corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle
or any one of the four weight classes of guided orbital launch
vehicles from table 1, Sec. 420.19, using local meteorological data
and a launch vehicle trajectory.
(2) A flight corridor is constructed in two sections--one
section comprising a launch area and one section comprising a
downrange area. The launch area of a flight corridor reflects the
extent of launch vehicle debris impacts in the event of a launch
vehicle failure and applying local meteorological conditions. The
downrange area reflects the extent of launch vehicle debris impacts
in the event of a launch vehicle failure and applying vehicle
imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle guidance and
performance dispersions.
(3) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in
the launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an
impact dispersion area in the downrange area. A flight corridor for
a guided suborbital launch vehicle ends with an impact dispersion
area and, for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles,
5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch point, or where the IIP
leaves the surface of the Earth, whichever is shorter.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) Launch area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy
the following data requirements to perform the launch area analysis
of this appendix. The data requirements are identified in table B-1
along with sources where data acceptable to the FAA may be obtained.
(i) An applicant must select meteorological data that meet the
specifications in table B-1 for the proposed launch site.

[[Page 62879]]

Table B-1.--Launch Area Data Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data category Data item Data source
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meteorological Data......... Local statistical These data may be
wind data as a obtained from:
function of Global Gridded Upper
altitude up to Air Statistics,
50,000 feet. Climate
Required data Applications Branch
include: altitude National Climatic
(ft), atmospheric Data Center.
density (slugs/ft
\3\), mean East/
West meridianal (u)
and North/South
zonal (v) wind (ft/
sec), standard
deviation of u and
v wind (ft/sec),
correlation
coefficient, number
of observations and
wind percentile (%).
Nominal Trajectory Data..... State vector data as Actual launch
function of time vehicle trajectory
after liftoff in data; or trajectory
topocentric launch generation software
point centered that meets the
X,Y,Z,X,Y,Z requirements of
coordinates with paragraph
the X-axis aligned (b)(1)(ii).
with the flight
azimuth. Trajectory
time intervals
shall not be
greater than one
second. XYZ units
are in feet and
X,Y,Z units are in
ft/sec.
Debris Data................. A fixed ballistic N/A.
coefficient equal
to 3 lbs/ft \2\ is
used for the launch
area.
Geographical Data........... Launch point Geographical surveys
geodetic latitude or Global
on a WGS-84 Positioning System.
ellipsoidal Earth
model.
Launch point
longitude on an
ellipsoidal Earth
model.
Maps using scales of Map types with scale
not less than and projection
1:250,000 inches information are
per inch within 100 listed in the
nm of a launch Defense Mapping
point and Agency, Public
1:20,000,000 inches Sale, Aeronautical
per inch for Charts and
distances greater Publications
than 100 nm from a Catalog. The
launch point. catalog and maps
may be ordered
through the U.S.
Dept. of Commerce,
National Oceanic
and Atmospheric
Administration,
National Ocean
Service.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) For a guided orbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall
obtain or create a launch vehicle nominal trajectory. An applicant
may use trajectory data from a launch vehicle manufacturer or
generate a trajectory using trajectory simulation software.
Trajectory time intervals shall be no greater than one second. If an
applicant uses a trajectory computed with commercially available
software, the software must calculate the trajectory using the
following parameters, or clearly and convincingly demonstrated
equivalents:
(A) Launch location:
(1) Launch point, using geodetic latitude and longitude to four
decimal places; and
(2) Launch point height above sea level.
(B) Ellipsoidal Earth:
(1) Mass of Earth;
(2) Radius of Earth;
(3) Earth flattening factor; and
(4) Gravitational harmonic constants (J2, J3, J4).
(C) Vehicle characteristics:
(1) Mass as a function of time;
(2) Thrust as a function of time;
(3) Specific impulse (ISP) as a function of time; and
(4) Stage dimensions.
(D) Launch events:
(1) Stage burn times; and
(2) Stage drop-off times.
(E) Atmosphere:
(1) Density as a function of altitude;
(2) Pressure as a function of altitude;
(3) Speed of sound as a function of altitude; and
(4) Temperature as a function of altitude.
(F) Winds:
(1) Wind direction as a function of altitude; and
(2) Wind magnitude as a function of altitude.
(I) Aerodynamics: drag coefficient as a function of mach number
for each stage of flight showing subsonic, transonic and supersonic
mach regions for each stage.
(iii) An applicant shall use a ballistic coefficient ()
of 3 lbs/ft2 for debris impact computations.
(iv) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting
requirements for a launch area of appendix A, paragraph (b).
(2) Downrange area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy
the following data requirements to perform the downrange area
analysis of this appendix.
(i) The launch vehicle weight class and method of generating a
trajectory used in the launch area shall be used by an applicant in
the downrange area as well. Trajectory time intervals must not be
greater than one second.
(ii) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data
requirements for a downrange area of appendix A, paragraph (b).

(1) An applicant shall construct a launch area of a flight
corridor using the processes and equations of this paragraph for
each trajectory position. An applicant shall repeat these processes
at time points on the launch vehicle trajectory for time intervals
of no greater than one second. When choosing wind data, an applicant
shall use a time period of between one and 12 months.
(2) A launch area analysis must include all trajectory positions
whose Z-values are less than or equal to 50,000 ft.
(3) Each trajectory time is denoted by the subscript ``i''.
Height intervals for a given atmospheric pressure level are denoted
by the subscript ``j'.
(4) Using data from the GGUAS CD-ROM, an applicant shall
estimate the mean atmospheric density, maximum wind speed, height
interval fall times and height interval debris dispersions for 15
mean geometric height intervals.
(i) The height intervals in the GGUAS source data vary as a
function of the following 15 atmospheric pressure levels expressed
in millibars: surface, 1000, 850, 700, 500, 400, 300, 250, 200, 150,
100, 70, 50, 30, 10. The actual geometric height associated with
each pressure level varies depending on the time of year. An
applicant shall estimate the mean geometric height over the period
of months selected in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each of
the 15 pressure levels as shown in equation B1.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.055

where:

Hj = mean geometric height hm = geometric
height for a given month nm = number of observations for
a given month
k = number of wind months of interest

[[Page 62880]]

(ii) The atmospheric densities in the source data also vary as a
function of the 15 atmospheric pressure levels. The actual
atmospheric density associated with each pressure level varies
depending on the time of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean
atmospheric density over the period of months selected in accordance
with subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each of the 15 pressure
levels as shown in equation B2.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.056

where:

j = mean atmospheric density
__
m = atmospheric density for a given month
nm = number of observations for a given month
k = number of wind months of interest

(iii) An applicant shall estimate the algebraic maximum wind
speed at a given pressure level as follows and shall repeat the
process for each pressure level.
(A) For each month, an applicant shall calculate the monthly
mean wind speed (Waz) for 360 azimuths using equation B3;
(B) An applicant shall select the maximum monthly mean wind
speed from the 360 azimuths;
(C) An applicant shall repeat subparagraphs (c)(4)(iii)(A) and
(B) for each month of interest; and
(D) An applicant shall select the maximum mean wind speed from
the range of months. The absolute value of this wind is designated
Wmax for the current pressure level.
(iv) An applicant shall calculate wind speed using the means for
winds from the West (u) and winds from the North (v). An applicant
shall use equation B3 to resolve the winds to a specific azimuth
bearing.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.057

where:

az = wind azimuth
u = West zonal wind component
v = North zonal wind component
Waz = mean wind speed at azimuth for each month

(v) An applicant shall estimate the interval fall time over a
height interval assuming the initial descent velocity is equal to
the terminal velocity (VT). An applicant shall use
equations B4 through B6 to estimate the fall time over a given
height interval.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.058

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.059

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.060

where:

HTj= height difference between two mean
geometric heights
= ballistic coefficient
__
x= mean atmospheric density for the corresponding mean
geometric heights
VTj = terminal velocity

(vi) An applicant shall estimate the interval debris dispersion
(Dj) by multiplying the interval fall time by the
algebraic maximum mean wind speed (Wmax) as shown in
equation B7.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.061

(5) Once the Dj are estimated for each height interval, an
applicant shall determine the total debris dispersion
(Di) for each Zi using a linear interpolation
and summation exercise, as shown below in equation B8. An applicant
shall use a launch point height of zero equal to the surface level
of the nearest GGUAS grid location.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.124

where:
n = number of height intervals below jth height interval

(6) Once all the Di radii have been calculated, an
applicant shall produce a launch area flight corridor in accordance
with the requirements of subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(iv).
(i) On a map meeting the requirements of appendix A, paragraph
(b), an applicant shall plot the Xi position location on
the flight azimuth for the corresponding Zi position;
(ii) An applicant shall draw a circle of radius Di
centered on the corresponding Xi position; and
(iii) An applicant shall repeat the instructions in
subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(ii) for each Di radius.
(iv) The launch area of a flight corridor is the enveloping line
that encloses the outer boundary of the Di circles as
shown in Fig. B-1. The uprange portion of a flight corridor is
described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most
uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion
zone (defined by subparagraph (c)(7)), whichever is further uprange.
(7) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone in
the launch area in accordance with the requirements of appendix A,
subparagraph (c)(2).
(8) An applicant shall draw the launch area flight corridor and
overflight exclusion zone on a map or maps that meet the
requirements of table B-1.

[[Page 62881]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.062

(d) Construction of a Downrange Area of a Flight Corridor
(1) The downrange area analysis estimates the debris dispersion
for the downrange time points on a launch vehicle trajectory. An
applicant shall perform the downrange area analysis using the
processes and equations of this paragraph.
(2) The downrange area analysis shall include trajectory
positions at a height (the Zi-values) greater than 50,000
feet and nominal trajectory IIP values less than or equal to 5,000
nm. For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the final IIP value for
which an applicant must account is the launch vehicle final stage
impact point. Each trajectory time shall be one second or less and
is denoted by the subscript ``i'.
(3) An applicant shall compute the downrange area of a flight
corridor boundary in four steps, from each trajectory time
increment: determine a reduction ratio factor; calculate the launch
vehicle position after simulating a malfunction turn; rotate the
state vector after the malfunction turn in the range of three
degrees to one degree as a function of Xi distance
downrange; and compute the IIP of the resulting trajectory. The
locus of IIPs describes the boundary of the downrange area of a
flight corridor. An applicant shall use the following subparagraphs,
(d)(3)(i)-(v), to compute the downrange area of the flight corridor
boundary:
(i) Compute the downrange Distance to the final IIP position for
a nominal trajectory as follows:
(A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP
coordinates (max, max) for
the nominal state vector before the launch vehicle enters orbit
where in equation B30 is the nominal flight azimuth angle
measured from True North.
(B) Using the range and bearing equations of appendix A,
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Smax) from the
launch point coordinates (lp,
lp) to the IIP coordinates
(max, max) computed in
accordance with (3)(i)(A) of this paragraph.
(C) The distance for Smax may not exceed 5000 nm. In
cases when the actual value exceeds 5000 nm the applicant shall use
5000 nm for Smax.
(ii) Compute the reduction ratio factor (Fn) for each
trajectory time increment as follows:
(A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP
coordinates (i, i) for the
nominal state vector where in equation B30 is the nominal
flight azimuth angle measured from True North.
(B) Using the range and bearing equations of appendix A,
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Si) from the
launch point coordinates (lp,
lp) to the IIP coordinates
(i, i) computed in
(3)(ii)(A) of this paragraph.
(C) The reduction ratio factor is:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.122

(iii) An applicant shall compute the launch vehicle position and
velocity components after a simulated malfunction turn for each
Xi using the following method.
(A) Turn duration (t) = 4 sec.
(B) Turn angle ()
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.123

The turn angle equations perform a turn in the launch vehicle's
yaw plane, as depicted in figure B-2.

[[Page 62882]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.063

(C) Launch vehicle velocity magnitude at the beginning of the
turn (Vb) and velocity magnitude at the end of the turn
(Ve)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.064

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.065

(D) Average velocity magnitude over the turn duration (V)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.066

(E) Velocity vector path angle (i) at turn
epoch
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.121

(F) Launch vehicle position components at the end of turn
duration

[[Page 62883]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.067

where: g1 = 32.17405 ft/sec2
(G) Launch vehicle velocity components at the end of turn
duration
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.068

(iv) An applicant shall rotate the trajectory state vector at
the end of the turn duration to the right and left to define the
right-lateral flight corridor boundary and the left-lateral flight
corridor boundary, respectively. An applicant shall perform the
trajectory rotation in conjunction with a trajectory transformation
from the X90, Y90, Z90,
X90, Y90, Z90, components to E, N,
U, E, N, U. The trajectory subscripts ``R'' and ``L'' from equations
B15 through B26 have been discarded to reduce the number of
equations. An applicant shall transform from to E,N,U,E,N,U to
E,F,G,E,F,G. An applicant shall use the equations of paragraph
(d)(3)(iv)(A)-(F) to produce the EFG components necessary to
estimate each instantaneous impact point.
(A) An applicant must calculate the flight angle ()
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.069

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.101

(B) An applicant shall transform
X90,Y90,Z90 to E,N,U

[[Page 62884]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.102

(D) An applicant shall transform the launch point coordinates
(00,h0) to
E0,F0,G0
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.104

(E) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to
E90,F90,G90
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.070

(F) An applicant shall transform to E,N,U TO E,F,G
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.071

(v) The IIP computation implements an iterative solution to the
impact point problem. An applicant shall solve equations B46 through
B69, with the appropriate substitutions, up to a maximum of five
times. Each repetition of the equations provides a more accurate
prediction of the IIP. An applicant shall use the required IIP
computations of paragraphs (d)(3)(v)(A)-(W) below. An applicant
shall use this IIP computation for both the left-and right-lateral
offsets. The IIP computations will result in latitude and longitude
pairs for the left-lateral flight corridor boundary and the right-
lateral flight corridor boundary. An applicant shall use the lines
connecting the latitude and longitude pairs to describe the entire
downrange area boundary of the flight corridor up to 5000 nm or a
final stage impact dispersion area.
(A) An applicant shall approximate the radial distance
(rk,l) from the geocenter to the
IIP. The distance from the center of the Earth ellipsoid to the
launch point shall be used for the initial approximation of
rk,l as shown in equation B46.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.072

(B) An applicant shall compute the radial distance (r) from the
geocenter to the launch vehicle position.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.073

If r rk,l then the launch
vehicle position is below the Earth's surface and an impact point
cannot be computed. An applicant must restart the calculations with
the next trajectory state vector.
(C) An applicant shall compute the inertial velocity components.

[[Page 62885]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.074

where: = 4.178074 x 10-\3\ deg/sec

(D) An applicant shall compute the magnitude of the inertial
velocity vector.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.075

(E) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly
at epoch c).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.076

where: K = 1.407644 x 1016 ft3/sec2

(F) An applicant shall compute the semi-major axis of the
trajectory ellipse (at).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.077

If at 0 or at then the trajectory orbit is
not elliptical, but is hyperbolic or parabolic, and an impact point
cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has achieved escape velocity
and the applicant may terminate computations.
(G) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the sine of the eccentric anomaly
at epoch s).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.078

(H) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse squared t(1-)-aE] > 0 and
0 then the trajectory perigee height is positive and an
impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has achieved
Earth orbit and the applicant may terminate computations.
(I) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly
at impact (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.080

(J) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the sine of the eccentric anomaly
at impact (sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.081

If sk 0 then the trajectory orbit does not
intersect the Earth's surface and an impact point cannot be
computed. The launch vehicle has achieved Earth orbit and the
applicant may terminate computations.
(K) An applicant shall compute the cosine of the difference
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at
epoch (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.082

(L) An applicant shall compute the sine of the difference
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at
epoch (sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.083

(M) An applicant shall compute the f-series expansion of
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.084

(N) An applicant shall compute the g-series expansion of
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.085

(O) An applicant shall compute the E,F,G coordinates at impact
(Ei,Fi,Gi).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.086

(P) An applicant shall approximate the distance from the
geocenter to the launch vehicle position at impact
(rk,2).

[[Page 62886]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.087

where:

aE = 20925646.3255 ft
e\2\ = 0.00669437999013
(Q) An applicant shall let rk+1,1 = rk,2,
substitute rk+1,1 for rk,1 in equation B55 and
repeat equations B55--B64 up to four more times increasing ``k'' by
an increment of one on each loop (e.g. k{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}).
If |r5,1-r5,2| > 1 then the iterative solution
does not converge and an impact point does not meet the accuracy
tolerance of plus or minus one foot. An applicant must try more
iterations, or restart the calculations with the next trajectory
state vector.
(R) An applicant shall compute the difference between the
eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at epoch
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.088

(S) An applicant shall compute the time of flight from epoch to
impact (t).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.089

(T) An applicant shall compute the geocentric latitude at impact
(').
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.090

Where: +90 deg.>'i> -90 deg.

(U) An applicant shall compute the geodetic latitude at impact
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.091

Where: +90 deg.>i> -90 deg.

(V) An applicant shall compute the East longitude at impact
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.092

(W) If the range from the launch point to the impact point is
equal to or greater than 5000 nm, an applicant shall terminate IIP
computations.
(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight
corridor and show the area on a map using the following procedure:
(i) For equation B70 below, an applicant shall use an apogee
altitude (Hap) corresponding to the highest altitude
reached by the launch vehicle final stage in the applicant's launch
vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with paragraph
(b)(1)(ii).
(ii) An applicant shall define the final stage impact dispersion
area by using a dispersion factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown
below. An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius (R)
for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R equal
to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the
dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.093

where: DISP(Hap) = 0.05

(5) An applicant shall combine the launch area and downrange
area flight corridor and any final stage impact dispersion area for
a guided suborbital launch vehicle.
(i) On the same map with the launch area flight corridor, an
applicant shall plot the latitude and longitude positions of the
left and right sides of the downrange area of the flight corridor
calculated in accordance with subparagraph (d)(3).
(ii) An applicant shall connect the latitude and longitude
positions of the left side of the downrange area of the flight
corridor sequentially starting with the last IIP calculated on the
left side and ending with the first IIP calculated on the left side.
An applicant shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
(iii) An applicant shall connect the left sides of the launch
area and downrange portions of the flight corridor. An applicant
shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
(iv) An applicant shall plot the overflight exclusion zone
defined in subparagraph (c)(7).
(v) An applicant shall draw any impact dispersion area on the
downrange map with the center of the impact dispersion area on the
launch vehicle final stage impact point obtained from the
applicant's launch vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance
with subparagraph (b)(1)(ii).

(e) Evaluate the Launch Site

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the
presence of populated areas. If no populated area is located within
the flight corridor, then no additional steps are necessary.
(2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight
exclusion zone during a launch.
(3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor,
an applicant may modify its proposal or complete an overflight risk
analysis in accordance with appendix C.

Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method for an applicant to estimate
the expected casualty (Ec) for a launch of a guided
expendable launch vehicle using a flight corridor generated either
by appendix A or appendix B. This appendix also provides an
applicant options to simplify the method where population at risk is
minimal.
(2) An applicant shall perform a risk analysis when a populated
area is located within a flight corridor defined by either appendix
A or appendix B. If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x 10
-\6\, an applicant may either modify its proposal, or if
the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A method, use
the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and then redo
the overflight risk analysis pursuant to this appendix. If the
estimated expected casualty still exceeds 30 x 10 -\6\,
the FAA will not approve the location of the proposed launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) An applicant shall obtain the data specified by
subparagraphs (b)(2) and (3) and summarized in table C-1. Table C-1
provides sources where an applicant may obtain data acceptable to
the FAA. An applicant must also employ the flight corridor
information

[[Page 62887]]

from appendix A or B, including flight azimuth and, for an appendix
B flight corridor, trajectory information.
(2) Population data. Total population (N) and the total landmass
area within a populated area (A) are required. Population data up to
and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the U.S.
census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm are
required at no greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude
grid coordinates.
(3) Launch vehicle data. Launch vehicle data consist of the
launch vehicle failure probability (Pf), the launch
vehicle effective casualty area (Ac), trajectory position
data, and the overflight dwell time (td). The failure
probability is a constant (Pf = 0.10) for a guided
orbital or suborbital expendable launch vehicle. Table C-3 provides
effective casualty area data based on IIP range. Trajectory position
information is provided from distance computations provided by this
appendix for an appendix A flight corridor, or trajectory data used
in appendix B for an appendix B flight corridor. The dwell time
(td) may be determined from trajectory data produced when
creating an appendix B flight corridor.

Table C-1.--Overflight Analysis Data Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data category Data item Data source
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Data............. Total population Within 100 nm of the
within a populated launch point: U.S.
area (N). census data at the
census block-group
level. Downrange
from 100 nm beyond
the launch point,
world population
data are available
from:
Total landmass area Carbon Dioxide
within the Information
populated area (A). Analysis Center
(CDIAC) Oak Ridge
National Laboratory
Database--Global
Population
Distribution
(1990), Terrestrial
Area and Country
Name Information on
a One by One Degree
Grid Cell Basis
(DB1016 (8-1996)
Launch Vehicle Data......... Failure probability-- N/A.
Pf = 0.10.
Effective casualty See table C-3.
area (Ac).
Overflight dwell Determined by range
time. from the launch
point or trajectory
used by applicant.
Nominal trajectory See appendix B,
data (for an table B-1.
appendix B flight
corridor only).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) A corridor casualty expectation [EC(Corridor)]
estimate is the sum of the expected casualty measurement of each
populated area inside a flight corridor.
(2) An applicant shall identify and locate each populated area
in the proposed flight corridor.
(3) An applicant shall determine the probability of impact in
each populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (5) or (6)
of this paragraph. Figures C-1 and C-2 illustrate an area considered
for probability of impact (Pi ) computations by the
dashed-lined box around the populated area within a flight corridor,
and figure C-3 illustrates a populated area in a final stage impact
dispersion area. An applicant shall then estimate the EC
for each populated area in accordance with subparagraphs (7) and (8)
of this paragraph.
(4) The Pi computations do not directly account for
populated areas whose areas are bisected by an appendix A flight
corridor centerline or an appendix B nominal trajectory ground
trace. Accordingly, an applicant must evaluate Pi for
each of the bi-sections as two separate populated areas, as shown in
figure C-4, which shows one bi-section to the left of an appendix A
flight corridor's centerline and one to its right.
(5) Probability of impact (Pi) computations for a
populated area in an appendix A flight corridor. An applicant shall
compute Pi for each populated area using the following
method:
(i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not for a final
stage impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle,
an applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area
using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.094

where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange
distance (nm) along the flight corridor centerline to the populated
area (see figure C-1)
y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance (nm) to the populated area measured from the flight
corridor centerline (see figure C-1)
y = one-third of the cross range distance from
the centerline to the flight corridor boundary (see figure C-1)
exp = exponential function (e \x\)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
R = IIP range rate (nm/sec) (see table C-2)
C = 643 seconds (constant)

Table C-2.--IIP Range Rate vs. IIP Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IIP range
IIP range (nm) rate (nm/
s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-75....................................................... 0.75
76-300..................................................... 1.73
301-900.................................................... 4.25
901-1700................................................... 8.85
1701-2600.................................................. 19.75
2601-3500.................................................. 42.45
3501-4500.................................................. 84.85
4501-5250.................................................. 154.95
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact
dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the
following method:

[[Page 62888]]

(A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage
impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the
final stage impact dispersion area using equations C2 and C3:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.095

where:

X1,X2 = closest and farthest downrange
distance, measured along the flight corridor centerline, measured
from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see figure C-3)
x = one-third of the impact dispersion radius
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e \x\)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.096

where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance to the populated area measured from the flight corridor
centerline (see figure C-3)
y = one-third of the impact dispersion radius
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e \x\)

(B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for
populated area A in figure C-3 is an example. If a populated area
intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C3
by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall
determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and
y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1
= 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The
probability Py is then equal to the sum of the
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area intersects the
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an
applicant shall solve equation C2 by obtaining the solution in two
parts in the same manner as with the values of x.
(C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for
each populated area using equation C4 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.097

where: Ps = 1-Pf = 0.90

[[Page 62889]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.098

(6) Probability of impact computations for a populated area in
an appendix B flight corridor. An applicant shall compute
Pi using the following method:
(i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not for a final
stage impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle,
an applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area
using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.099

where:

y1,y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance (nm) to a populated area measured from the nominal
trajectory IIP ground trace (see figure C-2)
y = one-third of the cross range distance (nm)
from nominal trajectory to the flight corridor boundary (see figure
C-2)
exp = exponential function (ex)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
t = flight time from lift-off to orbital insertion (seconds)
td = overflight dwell time (seconds)

(ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact
dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the
following method:
(A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage
impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the
final stage impact dispersion area using equations C6 and C7:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.100

where:

x1,x2 = closest and farthest downrange
distance, measured along nominal trajectory IIP ground trace,
measured from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see
figure C-3)

[[Page 62890]]

x = one-third of the impact dispersion radius
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (ex)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.105

where:

y1,y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance to the populated area measured from the nominal trajectory
IIP ground trace (see figure C-3)
y = one-third of the impact dispersion radius
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (ex)

(B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the x2
or y2 distance should be set equal to the impact
dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for populated
area A in figure C-3 is an example. If a populated area intersects
the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C7 by
obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall determine,
first, the probability between y1 = 0 and y2 =
a and, second, the probability between y1 = 0 and y2
= b, as depicted in figure C-4. The probability Py is
then equal to the sum of the probabilities of the two parts. If a
populated area intersects the line that is normal to the flight
azimuth on the impact point, an applicant shall solve equation C6 by
obtaining the solution in two parts in a similar manner with the
values of x.
(C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for
each populated area using equation C8 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.106

where: Ps = 1-Pf = 0.90

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.107

[[Page 62891]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.108

(7) Using the Pi calculated in either subparagraph
(c)(5) or (6) of this paragraph, an applicant shall calculate the
casualty expectancy for each populated area within the flight
corridor in accordance with equation C9. Eck is the
casualty expectancy for a given populated area as shown in equation
C9, where individual populated areas are designated with the
subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.109

[[Page 62892]]

where:

Ac = casualty area (from table C-3)
Ak = populated area
Nk = population in Ak

Table C-3.--Effective Casualty Area (miles \2\) as a Function of IIP Range (nm)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- launch
vehicles
IIP Range (nmi) Small Medium Medium large Large -------------
Guided
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-49...................................... 0.43 0.53 0.71 1.94 0.43
50-1749................................... 0.13 0.0022 0.11 0.62 0.13
1750-5000................................. 3.59 x 10-6 8.3 x 10-4 1.08 x 10-1 7.17 x 10-1 3.59 x 10-6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(8) An applicant shall estimate the total corridor risk
using the following summation of risk:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.110

(9) Alternative casualty expectancy (EC ) analyses.
An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined
by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). Those variations are identified in
subparagraphs (9)(i) through (vi) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs
(i) through (iv) permit an applicant to make conservative
assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the corridor
EC compared with the analysis defined by subparagraphs
(c)(1)-(8). In subparagraphs (v) and (vi), an applicant that would
otherwise fail the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8)
may avoid (c)(1)-(8)'s overestimation of the probability of impact
in each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall
identify the variation used, show and discuss the specific
assumptions made to modify the analysis defined by subparagraphs
(c)(1)-(8), and demonstrate how each assumption leads to
overestimation of the corridor EC compared with the
analysis defined by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(c)(8).
(i) Assume that Px and Py have a value of
1.0 for all populated areas.
(ii) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas
equal to the most densely populated area.
(iii) For any given populated area, assume Py has a
value of one.
(iv) For any given Px sector (an area spanning the
width of a flight corridor and bounded by two time points on the
trajectory IIP ground trace) assume Py has a value of one
and use a population density for the sector equal to the most
densely populated area.
(v) For a given populated area, divide the populated area into
smaller rectangles, determine Pi for each individual
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine
Pi for the entire populated area.
(vi) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated
area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the
subparagraph (c)(1)-(8) analysis.

(d) Evaluation of Results

(1) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed
30x10-\6\, the FAA will approve the launch site location.
(2) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds
30 x 10-\6\, then an applicant may either modify its
proposal, or, if the flight corridor used was generated by the
appendix A method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight
corridor and then perform another appendix C risk analysis.

Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Areas and Casualty Expectancy
Estimate for an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method for determining the
acceptability of the location of a launch point from which an
unguided suborbital launch vehicle would be launched. The appendix
describes how to define an overflight exclusion zone and impact
dispersion areas, and how to evaluate whether the public risk
presented by the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle
remains at acceptable levels.
(2) An applicant shall base its analysis on an unguided
suborbital launch vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage apogee
represents the intended use of the launch point.
(3) An applicant shall use the apogee of each stage of an
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle with a final launch
vehicle stage apogee equal to the one proposed, and calculate each
impact range and dispersion area using the equations provided.
(4) This appendix also provides a method for performing an
impact risk analysis that estimates the expected casualty
(Ec) within each impact dispersion area. This appendix
provides an applicant options to simplify the method where
population at risk is minimal.
(5) If the estimated Ec is less than or equal to
30 x 10-6, the FAA will approve the launch point for
unguided suborbital launch vehicles. If the estimated Ec
exceeds 30 x 10-6, the proposed launch point will fail
the launch site location review.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) An applicant shall employ the apogee of each stage of an
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle whose final stage apogee
represents the maximum altitude to be reached by unguided suborbital
launch vehicles launched from the launch point. The apogee shall be
obtained from one or more actual flights of an unguided suborbital
launch vehicle launched at an 84 degree elevation.
(2) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data
requirements of appendix A, paragraph (b).
(3) Population data. An applicant shall use total population (N)
and the total landmass area within a populated area (A) for all
populated areas within an impact dispersion area. Population data up
to and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the
U.S. census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm
are required at no greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude
grid coordinates.

(1) An applicant shall choose a flight azimuth from a launch
point.
(2) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone as a
circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on the launch point.
(3) An applicant shall define an impact dispersion area for each
stage of the suborbital launch vehicle chosen in accordance with
subparagraph (b)(1) in accordance with the following:
(i) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for the final
launch vehicle stage (Dn). An applicant shall set
Dn equal to the last stage apogee altitude
(Hn) multiplied by an impact range factor
[IP(Hn)] in accordance with the following:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.111

where:

IP(Hn) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
IP(Hn) = 0.7 for an apogee of 100 km or greater.

[[Page 62893]]

(ii) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each
intermediate stage (Di), where i {1, 2, 3, . .
. (n- 1)}, and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages.
Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate
stage, an applicant shall use equation D1 to compute the impact
range of each stage by substituting Hi for Hn.
An applicant shall use the impact range factors provided by equation
D1.
(iii) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius
for the final launch vehicle stage (Rn). An applicant
shall set Rn equal to the last stage apogee altitude
(Hn) multiplied by an impact dispersion factor
[DISP(Hn)] in accordance with the following:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.112

where:

DISP(Hn) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
DISP(Hn) = 0.7 for an apogee of 100 km or greater.

(iv) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius
for each intermediate stage (Ri), where i {1,
2, 3, . . . (n- 1)} and where n is the total number of launch
vehicle stages. Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each
intermediate stage, an applicant shall use equation D2 to compute an
impact dispersion radius of each stage by substituting Hi
for Hn. An applicant shall use the dispersion factors
provided by equation D2.
(4) An applicant shall display an overflight exclusion zone,
each intermediate and final stage impact point (Di
through Dn), and each impact dispersion area for the
intermediate and final launch vehicle stages on maps in accordance
with paragraph (b)(2).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.113

(d) Evaluate the Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion
Areas

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the overflight exclusion zone
and each impact dispersion area for the presence of any populated
areas. If an applicant determines that no populated area is located
within the overflight exclusion zone or any impact dispersion area,
then no additional steps are necessary.
(2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight
exclusion zone during a launch.
(3) If a populated area is located within any impact dispersion
area, an applicant may modify its proposal and define a new
overflight exclusion zone and new impact dispersion areas, or
perform an impact risk analysis in accordance with paragraph (e).

(e) Impact Risk Analysis

(1) An applicant shall estimate the expected average number of
casualties, EC, within the impact dispersion areas
according to the following method:
(i) An applicant shall calculate the Ec by summing
the impact risk for the impact dispersion areas of the final launch
vehicle stage and all intermediate stages. An applicant shall
estimate Ec for the impact dispersion area of each stage
by using equations D3 through D7 for each of the populated areas
located within the impact dispersion areas.
(ii) An applicant shall estimate the probability of impacting
inside the X and Y sectors of each populated area within each impact
dispersion area using equations D3 and D4:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.114

where:

[[Page 62894]]

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange
distance to populated area (see figure D-2)
x = one-third of the impact dispersion radius
(see figure D-2)

exp = exponential function (e\x\)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.115

where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range
distance to the populated area (see figure D-2)
y = one-third of the impact dispersion radius
(see figure D-2)
exp = exponential function (e\x\)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.116

(iii) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for
populated area A in figure D-2 is an example.
(iv) If a populated area intersects the flight azimuth, an
applicant shall solve equation D4 by obtaining the solution in two
parts. An applicant shall determine, first, the probability between
y1 = 0 and y2 = a and, second, the probability
between y1 = 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in
figure D-3. The probability Py is then equal to the sum
of the probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area
intersects the line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the
impact point, an applicant shall solve equation D3 by obtaining the
solution in two parts in the same manner as with the values of x.

[[Page 62895]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.117

(v) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact
(Pi) for each populated area using the following
equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.118

where:
Ps = probability of success = 0.98

(vi) An applicant shall calculate the casualty expectancy for
each populated area. Eck is the casualty
expectancy for a given populated area as shown in equation D6, where
individual populated areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.119

where:

k { {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}
Ac = casualty area (from table D-1)
Ak = populated area
Nk = population in Ak

Table D-1.--Effective Casualty Area (Ac) vs. Impact Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective
Impact range (nm) casualty area
(miles\2\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-4..................................................... 9 x 10-\3\
5-49.................................................... 9 x 10-\3\
50-1,749................................................ 1.1 x 10-\5\
1,750-4,999............................................. 3.6 x 10-\6\
5,000-more.............................................. 3.6 x 10-\6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(vii) An applicant shall estimate the total risk using the
following summation of risk:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.120

(viii) Alternative casualty expectancy (Ec) analysis.
An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined
by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). Those variations are identified in
subparagraphs (viii)(A) through (F) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs
(A) through (D) permit an applicant to make conservative assumptions
that would lead to an overestimation of Ec compared with
the analysis defined by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). In
subparagraphs (E) and (F), an applicant that would otherwise fail
the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii) may avoid
(d)(1)(i)-(vii)'s overestimation of the

[[Page 62896]]

probability of impact in each populated area. An applicant employing
a variation shall identify the variation used, show and discuss the
specific assumptions made to modify the analysis defined by
subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii), and demonstrate how each assumption
leads to overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with
the analysis defined by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii).
(A) Assume that Px and Py have a value of
1.0 for all populated areas.
(B) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas
equal to the most densely populated area.
(C) For any given populated area, assume Px has a
value of one.
(D) For any given populated area, assume Py has a
value of one.
(E) For a given populated area, divide the populated area into
smaller rectangles, determine Pi for each individual
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine
Pi for the entire populated area.
(F) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated
area to the area of the Pi rectangle used in the
subparagraph (d)(1)(i)-(vii) analysis.
(2) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30 x
10-\6\, the FAA will approve the launch point.
(3) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x
10-6, then an applicant may modify its proposal and then
repeat the impact risk analysis in accordance with this appendix D.
If no set of impact dispersion areas exist which satisfy the FAA's
risk threshold, the applicant's proposed launch site will fail the
launch site location review.

Appendix E to Part 420--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

Table E-1.--Quantity Distance Requirements for Solid Explosives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public area Public area Intraline Intraline
Quantity distance (ft.) distance (ft.) distance (ft.) distance (ft.)
Quantity (lbs.) (over) (lbs.) (not for division for division for division for division
over) 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0............................... 1,000 1,250 75 D = 18 W1/3 50
1,000........................... 5,000 .............. 115 .............. 75
5,000........................... 10,000 .............. 150 .............. 100
10,000.......................... 20,000 .............. 190 .............. 125
20,000.......................... 30,000 .............. 215 .............. 145
30,000.......................... 40,000 D = 40 W1/3 235 .............. 155
40,000.......................... 50,000 .............. 250 .............. 165
50,000.......................... 60,000 .............. 260 .............. 175
60,000.......................... 70,000 .............. 270 .............. 185
70,000.......................... 80,000 .............. 280 .............. 190
80,000.......................... 90,000 .............. 195 .............. 195
90,000.......................... 100,000 .............. 300 .............. 200
100,000......................... 200,000 D=2.42 375 .............. 250
W\0.577\
200,000......................... 250,000 .............. 413 .............. 275
250,000......................... 300,000 D = 50 W1/3 450 .............. 300
300,000......................... 400,000 .............. 525 .............. 350
400,000......................... 500,000 .............. 600 .............. 400
500,000......................... 1,000,000 .............. 800 .............. 500
Greater than 1,000,000.......... .............. D = 50 W1/3 D = 8 W1/3 D = 5 W1/3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet.
``W'' equals the NEW of propellant.

Table E-2.--Liquid Propellant Explosive Equivalents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Propellant combinations Explosive equivalent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LO2/LH2................................ The larger of: 8W2/3 where W is
the weight of LO2/LH2, or
14% of W.
LO2/LH2 + LO2/RP-1..................... Sum of (20% for LO2/RP-1) + the
larger of: 8W2/3 where W is
the weight of LO2/LH2, or
14% of W.
LO2/R-1................................ 20% of W up to 500,000 pounds
plus 10% of W over 500,000
pounds, where W is the weight
of LO2RP-1.
N2O4/N2H4 (or UDMH or UDMH/N2H4 10% of W, where W is the weight
Mixture). of the propellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-3.--Propellant Hazard and Compatibility Groupings and Factors To Be Used When Converting Gallons of
Propellant Into Pounds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
At temperature
Propellant Hazard group Compatibility group Pounds/ gallon deg.F
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hydrogen Peroxide................. II A 11.6 68
Hydrazine......................... III C 8.4 68
Liquid Hydrogen................... III C 0.59 -423
Liquid Oxygen..................... II A 9.5 -297
Nitrogen Tetroxide................ I A 12.1 68
RP-1.............................. I C 6.8 68
UDMH.............................. III C 6.6 68
UDMH/Hydrazine.................... III C 7.5 68
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 62897]]

Table E-4.--Hazard Group I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pounds of propellant Public area Intragroup Pounds of propellant Public area Intragroup
------------------------------------------------------------------------- and and -------------------------- and and
incompatible compatible incompatible compatible
--------------------------- --------------------------
Over Not over Distance in Distance in Over Not over Distance in Distance in
feet feet feet feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.......................................................... 100 30 25 5,000 6,000 80 60
100........................................................ 200 35 30 6,000 7,000 85 65
200........................................................ 300 40 35 7,000 8,000 85 65
300........................................................ 400 45 35 8,000 9,000 90 70
400........................................................ 500 50 40 9,000 10,000 90 70
500........................................................ 600 50 40 10,000 15,000 95 75
600........................................................ 700 55 40 15,000 20,000 100 80
700........................................................ 800 55 45 20,000 25,000 105 80
800........................................................ 900 60 45 25,000 30,000 110 85
900........................................................ 1,000 60 45 30,000 35,000 110 85
1,000...................................................... 2,000 65 50 35,000 40,000 115 85
2,000...................................................... 3,000 70 55 40,000 45,000 120 90
3,000...................................................... 4,000 75 55 45,000 50,000 120 90
4,000...................................................... 5,000 80 60 50,000 60,000 125 95
60,000..................................................... 70,000 130 95 500,000 600,000 185 140
70,000..................................................... 80,000 130 100 600,000 700,000 190 145
80,000..................................................... 90,000 135 100 700,000 800,000 195 150
90,000..................................................... 100,000 135 105 800,000 900,000 200 150
100,000.................................................... 125,000 140 110 900,000 1,000,000 205 155
125,000.................................................... 150,000 145 110 1,000,000 2,000,000 235 175
150,000.................................................... 175,000 150 115 2,000,000 3,000,000 255 190
175,000.................................................... 200,000 155 115 3,000,000 4,000,000 265 200
200,000.................................................... 250,000 160 120 4,000,000 5,000,000 275 210
250,000.................................................... 300,000 165 125 5,000,000 6,000,000 285 215
300,000.................................................... 350,000 170 130 6,000,000 7,000,000 295 220
350,000.................................................... 400,000 175 130 7,000,000 8,000,000 300 225
400,000.................................................... 450,000 180 135 8,000,000 9,000,000 305 230
450,000.................................................... 500,000 180 135 9,000,000 10,000,000 310 235
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table E-5.--Hazard Group II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pounds of propellant Public area Intragroup Pounds of propellant Public area Intragroup
------------------------------------------------------------------------- and and -------------------------- and and
incompatible compatible incompatible compatible
--------------------------- --------------------------
Over Not over Distance in Distance in Over Not over Distance in Distance in
feet feet feet feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.......................................................... 100 60 30 50,000 60,000 250 125
100........................................................ 200 75 35 60,000 70,000 255 130
200........................................................ 300 85 40 70,000 80,000 260 130
300........................................................ 400 90 45 80,000 90,000 265 135
400........................................................ 500 100 50 90,000 100,000 270 135
500........................................................ 600 100 50 100,000 125,000 285 140
600........................................................ 700 105 55 125,000 150,000 295 145
700........................................................ 800 110 55 150,000 175,000 305 150
800........................................................ 900 115 60 175,000 200,000 310 155
900........................................................ 1,000 120 60 200,000 250,000 320 160
1,000...................................................... 2,000 130 65 250,000 300,000 330 165
2,000...................................................... 3,000 145 70 300,000 350,000 340 170
3,000...................................................... 4,000 150 75 350,000 400,000 350 175
4,000...................................................... 5,000 160 80 400,000 450,000 355 180
5,000...................................................... 6,000 165 80 450,000 500,000 360 180
6,000...................................................... 7,000 170 85 500,000 600,000 375 185
7,000...................................................... 8,000 175 85 600,000 700,000 385 190
8,000...................................................... 9,000 175 90 700,000 800,000 395 195
9,000...................................................... 10,000 180 90 800,000 900,000 405 200
10,000..................................................... 15,000 195 95 900,000 1,000,000 410 205
15,000..................................................... 20,000 205 100 1,000,000 2,000,000 470 235
20,000..................................................... 25,000 215 105 2,000,000 3,000,000 505 255
25,000..................................................... 30,000 220 110 3,000,000 4,000,000 535 265
30,000..................................................... 35,000 225 110 4,000,000 5,000,000 555 275
35,000..................................................... 40,000 230 115 5,000,000 6,000,000 570 285
40,000..................................................... 45,000 235 120 6,000,000 7,000,000 585 295
45,000..................................................... 50,000 240 120 7,000,000 8,000,000 600 300
8,000,000 9,000,000 610 305
9,000,000 10,000,000 620 310
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 62898]]

Table E-6.--Hazard Group III
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pounds of propellant Public area Intragroup Pounds of propellant Public area Intragroup
------------------------------------------------------------------------- and and -------------------------- and and
incompatible compatible incompatible compatible
--------------------------- --------------------------
Over Not over Distance in Distance in Over Not over Distance in Distance in
feet feet feet feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.......................................................... 100 600 30 60,000 70,000 1,200 130
100........................................................ 200 600 35 70,000 80,000 1,200 130
200........................................................ 300 600 40 80,000 90,000 1,200 135
300........................................................ 400 600 45 90,000 100,000 1,200 135
400........................................................ 500 600 50 100,000 125,000 1,800 140
500........................................................ 600 600 50 125,000 150,000 1,800 145
600........................................................ 700 600 55 150,000 175,000 1,800 150
700........................................................ 800 600 55 175,000 200,000 1,800 155
800........................................................