Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site
[Federal Register: October 19, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 203)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 62811-62898]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr19oc00-23]
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Part II
Department of Transportation
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Federal Aviation Administration
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14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420
Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site; Rule
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420
[Docket No. FAA-1999-5833; Amendment No. 401-2, 417-1 and 420-1]
RIN 2120-AG15
Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments on handling of solid
propellants and cooperation with the National Transportation Safety
Board.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends its commercial space
transportation licensing regulations to add licensing and safety
requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date, commercial
launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges under
safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To
enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by
a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific
licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether
that site is located on or off of a federal launch range. These rules
will provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and safety
requirements to protect the public from the risks associated with
activities at a launch site.
DATES: Effective Date: December 18, 2000. An application pending at the
time of the effective date must conform to any new requirements of this
rulemaking as of the effective date. All license terms and conditions,
and all safety requirements of this rulemaking also apply as of the
effective date.
Comment Date: Comments on handling of solid propellants and
cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board must be
submitted on or before December 18, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA-
1999-5833 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two
copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that FAA
received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.
You may also submit comments through the Internet to http://
dms.dot.gov. You may review the public docket containing comments to
these regulations in person in the Dockets Office between 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets
Office is on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department
of Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review public
dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and
Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief
Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-3150.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed explosive siting requirements for
facilities on a launch site that would handle solid and liquid
propellants and other explosives. The FAA did not propose rules for
solid explosives other than ``division 1.3,'' as described below.
As noted in the NPRM, the FAA is adopting the United Nations
Organization (UNO) classification system for the transport of dangerous
goods. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for
dangerous goods, of which explosives are included as UNO ``Class 1,
Explosives.'' Class 1 explosives are further subdivided into six
``divisions'' based on the character and predominance of the associated
hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or property damage.
Two explosive divisions that are likely to be present on a launch site
are division 1 and division 3, referred to as division 1.1 and 1.3,
respectively. Division 1.1 consists of explosives that have a mass
explosion hazard, and division 1.3 consists of explosives that have a
fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection
hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed criteria only for division 1.3
because the FAA believed that the only solid explosives for commercial
launches that would likely affect separation distances on a launch site
were division 1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch
vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1
explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems,
the quantity is small. The FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives
would not likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the
application of Q-D criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors
existing today are from old military missiles, which are not likely to
be used at a commercial launch site.
One government commenter, the 45th Space Wing Range Safety
Engineering Support (45SW/SESE), pointed out that this was not a
correct assumption, and the FAA agrees. As noted by the 45SW/SESE,
experience with explosive siting at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
shows that division 1.1 explosives are often significant enough to
influence explosive site plans.
Accordingly, section 420.65, Handling of Solid Propellants, now
includes requirements for division 1.1 explosives. Because this change
is being adopted without prior notice and public comment, interested
persons are also invited to submit written comments on section 420.65.
The FAA also includes a new requirement in this rulemaking
explicitly requiring a launch site operator licensee to cooperate with
the National Transportation Safety Board in section 420.59 for launch
accidents as well as for launch site accidents. The FAA will implement
this change without prior notice and comment and therefore invites
interested persons to submit written comments on section 420.59.
Pending the evaluation of the public comments, the FAA has decided to
proceed with due diligence to implement its requirements.
The FAA will consider and respond to comments on the new
provisions. The FAA will consider all comments received, and will
publish in the Federal Register a summary of the disposition of those
comments and, if appropriate, changes to the rule that may result from
consideration of those comments.
Comments must include the regulatory docket or amendment number and
must be submitted in triplicate to the address above. The FAA will
review all comments received and will file all comments in the public
docket. The docket is available for public inspection before and after
the comment closing date.
Commenters who want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their
comments submitted in response to this final rule must include a
preaddressed, stamped postcard with those comments on which the
following statement is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.''
The postcard will be date-
[[Page 62813]]
stamped by the FAA and mailed to the commenter.
Availability of Final Rules
You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the
following steps:
(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/
search).
(2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket
number shown at the beginning of this rulemaking document. Click on
``search.''
(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information
for the Docket you selected, click on the final rule.
You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through
FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the
Federal Register's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/
aces140.html.
You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this final
rule.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a
question regarding this document may contact its local FAA official, or
the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find
out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/
arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us 9-AWA-
SBREFA@faa.gov.
Outline of Final Rule
I . Background
A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
C. Current Practices
II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments
A. Overview
B. Environment
C. Policy
D. Explosive Site Plan Review
E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures
F. Launch Site Location Review
G. License Conditions
H. Operational Responsibilities
III. Part Analysis
IV. Required Analyses
I. Background
The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C.
Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701--Commercial Space
Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the
Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a
launch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States.
49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this
responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space
Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the
commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the
Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating
private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on
September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the
lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space
transportation activities.
A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated
commercial space licensing authority to the Federal Aviation
Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the operation
of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing regulations at 14
CFR Ch. III. The first commercial launch licensing regulations were
issued in April 1988, 53 FR 11004, when no commercial launches had yet
taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing process
intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while ensuring public
safety. The Department noted that it would ``continue to evaluate and,
when necessary, reshape its program in response to growth, innovation,
and diversity in this critically important industry.'' 53 FR 11006.
Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach
to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At
the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take
place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and
flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development
of commercial launch sites. The federal launch ranges provided
commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support,
including flight safety services.
Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to
simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The
regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on
launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has
only become a reality during the past few years.
B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
The United States government has, since the 1950s, built, operated,
and maintained a space launch infrastructure for launching satellites
into space. Much of the demand for and use of these launch sites has
traditionally come from U.S. military and civil government agencies.
Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of the government-operated
launch sites began providing support for commercial launch activities
as well, with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
acting as the primary intermediary for providing launch services to
satellite operators. Following the Challenger accident, a White House
decision in August 1986 allowed launch customers to solicit bids
directly from the launch vehicle builders who would, in turn, lease
launch facilities from NASA or the United States Air Force (USAF). This
decision, coupled with the 1984 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act and
its 1988 amendments, did much to foster commercial launch business,
which continues to grow to this day.
The number of commercial space launches has steadily grown over the
years since the first licensed commercial launch in 1989. From March
29, 1989 to July 28, 2000, 130 licensed launches have taken place.
Launch vehicles have included traditional orbital launch vehicles such
as the Atlas, Titan and Delta, as well as suborbital vehicles such as
the Starfire. New vehicles using traditional launch techniques include
Lockheed Martin Corporation's (Lockheed Martin) Atlas III and Athena,
EER's Conestoga, Orbital Sciences Corporation's (Orbital) Taurus, and
The Boeing Company's (Boeing) Delta III. Unique vehicles such as
Orbital's Pegasus and the Zenit 3-SL of Sea Launch Limited Partnership
(Sea Launch), launched from a modified oil rig located in the Pacific
Ocean, are included in this count. New launch vehicles are proposed
every year. On the horizon are Lockheed Martin's Atlas V
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and Boeing's Delta IV. A number of companies are proposing partially
and fully reusable launch vehicles. In addition, some companies are
participating in partnership with NASA to develop X-33 and X-34 launch
vehicles incorporating reusable and single-stage-to-orbit technology, a
partnership which could result in vehicles for commercial use.
The launch site industry, the focus of this final rule, has also
made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on line
with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective
facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When
the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based
their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported
licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral
Air Force Base in Florida (CCAFB), and the Western Range located at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the
U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA;
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S.
Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy.
Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch
infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to
obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including
radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch
services.
Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal
launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites
become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first
license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to
operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB.
Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport
Florida Authority (SFA) received an FAA license to operate Launch
Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight
Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight
Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently,
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to
operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island,
Alaska. It is evident from this list that federal launch ranges still
play a role in the licensed operation of a number of launch sites.
California Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal
launch range property. Two launches each have taken place from
California Spaceport, KLC, and SFA.
Other commercial launch sites are being considered in other states.
The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization proposes to operate
Southwest Regional Spaceport adjacent to the White Sands Missile Range
as a site for reusable launch vehicles. The State of Montana is
proposing to fly reusable launch vehicles from a site near Great Falls,
Montana and Malmstrom Air Force Base. The state of Nevada is supporting
the development of a launch site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County,
Nevada. The State of New Mexico proposes to construct and operate the
Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) located in south central New Mexico
for use by private companies conducting commercial space activities and
operations. The State of Texas has enabled the development of a
commercial Spaceport for reusable launch vehicles. Lastly, in Utah, the
Wah Wah Valley Interlocal Cooperation Entity, proposes to construct and
operate a commercial launch site utilizing approximately 70,000 acres
of Utah State Trust lands located 30 miles southwest of Milford, Utah.
Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site
located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a
launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its
FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply
with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety
rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of
the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to
satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when
launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's
responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance.
In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent
upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and
flight safety to the FAA.
C. Current Practices
Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a
commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been
planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance
concerning the information that might be requested as part of an
application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to
these requests, DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(Office) published ``Site Operators License, Guidelines for
Applicants,'' on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site
operators. The guidelines described the information that DOT, and then
the FAA, expected from an applicant for a license to operate a
commercial launch site. This information included launch site location
information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations
document that governed how the facility would be operated to ensure
public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the
guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application
that are critical to assessing the suitability of the launch site
location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing
safe operations.
The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for
potential developers of launch sites pending this rulemaking, and the
guidelines describe the information that the FAA requests of an
applicant as part of its application for a license to operate a launch
site. The pace of development of the launch site industry has resulted
in the FAA describing the process and requirements for applications for
launch site operator licenses under the guidelines. As noted above, the
FAA issued its first license to operate a launch site to Spaceport
Systems International for the operation of California Spaceport. The
FAA issued this license under its general authority under 49 U.S.C.
70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch. III to license the operation of a launch
site. Because the operation of California Spaceport as a launch site
occurs at a federal launch range, the U.S. Air Force plays a
significant role in California Spaceport's safety process. In fact, the
FAA was able to review the Spaceport Systems International application
expeditiously because the applicant certified its intention to observe
the safety requirements currently applied by the Western Range and
contained in ``Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range Safety
Requirements (EWR 127-1),'' (Mar. 1995).\1\ The FAA determined that
applicant compliance with EWR 127-1, together with Air Force approval
of other important elements of the operation of a launch site protected
public health and safety and the safety of property. In general, the
FAA deems the compliance by a licensed launch site
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operator with these requirements in combination with other safety
practices imposed by a federal launch range as acceptable for purposes
of protecting the public and property from hazards associated with
launch site activities at a licensed launch site operator's facilities.
In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Department
of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration regarding
safety oversight of licensed launch site operators located on federal
launch ranges.
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\1\ EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version
of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/450SW/.
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On June 25, 1999, the FAA released a notice of proposed rulemaking,
Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site, 64 FR
34316 (Jun. 25, 1999). This will be referred to throughout this
document as the Launch Site NPRM.
Comparison of the Guidelines and the Final Rule
The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect as of the
effective date of this final rule. A comparison of some of the
similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The one
aspect of the licensing process that will not change is that the FAA
will issue a license to operate a launch site only if the operation of
the launch site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the
safety of property, or national security or foreign policy interests of
the United States. The guidelines were flexible and were intended to
identify the major elements of an application and lead the applicant
through the application process with the FAA. The final rule codifies
the requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.
The guidelines and the final rule share some common elements,
namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the
FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national
security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in
detail below, in the description of the final regulations. Under the
final regulations, the information requirements for these reviews
remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.
A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch
site is an important component of both the guidelines and the final
regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review,
the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request
an applicant to provide information regarding geographic
characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological
environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an
applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site
location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological
characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local
commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches
such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An
applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general
impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly
land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety
analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where
applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to
launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment,
the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding
temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature
inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch
site operations. Under the guidelines, an application includes the
frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in wind
or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.
In contrast to the guidelines, the final rules require an applicant
to use specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch
site location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle,
including orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed
launch point on the launch site must be evaluated for each type of
launch vehicle that the applicant wishes to have launched from the
launch point. An applicant is provided with a choice of methods to
develop a flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or
guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of
impact dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of
impact dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas,
no additional analysis is required. Otherwise, an applicant is required
to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the public
from a representative launch does not exceed a casualty expectation
(Ec) of 30 x 10-6. The FAA will review the
applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was correct, and
will approve the launch site location if the Ec risk
criteria were met.
Under either the guidelines or the final regulations, little or no
launch site location review is needed if the applicant proposes to
locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The fundamental purpose
of the FAA's proposed launch site location review--to determine whether
a launch may potentially take place safely from the proposed launch
site-- has been amply demonstrated at each of the ranges. Exceptions
may occur if a prospective launch site operator plans to use a launch
site at a federal launch range for launches markedly different from
past federal launch range launches, or if an applicant proposes a new
launch point from which no launch has taken place.
The guidelines and final regulations differ markedly in their
approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the
guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a
comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive
safety is part of the analysis and safety plan. In contrast, the final
regulations require the submission of an explosive site plan, but
impose fewer operational ground safety responsibilities on a launch
site operator. For flight safety, under the guidelines and final rules,
a launch site operator license contains minimal flight safety
responsibilities. The FAA assigns almost all responsibility for flight
safety and significant ground safety responsibility to a licensed
launch operator. Extensive ground and flight safety requirements will
accompany a launch license. This does not mean a launch site operator
cannot offer flight safety services or equipment to its customers.
However, the adequacy of such services and equipment typically will be
assessed in the FAA's review of a launch license application.
II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments
With this rulemaking, the FAA creates in 14 CFR Chapter III a new
part 420 to contain the requirements for obtaining and possessing a
license to operate a launch site. If a prospective launch site operator
proposes to offer its launch site to others, that person must obtain a
license to operate a launch site.
Part 420 does not apply in two notable situations. A launch
operator operating a private site for its own launches does not need a
license to operate a launch site because its launch license would cover
the safety issues associated with the launch site. A person wishing to
operate a site to support amateur rocket activities, as defined in 14
CFR 401.5, also does not need a license to operate a launch site
because the launches taking place from
[[Page 62816]]
the site are exempt from AST's regulations.
By means of operational, explosive safety, and site location
requirements, the FAA's regulations will address public safety issues
associated with launches that take place from a launch site whose
operation the FAA has licensed. Additionally, the FAA will address
environmental issues, and will have international obligations and
national security interests reviewed by the appropriate agencies, in
the course of a license review. Environmental review may precede or
take place concurrently with the licensing process.
The grant of a license to operate a launch site does not guarantee
that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch
proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA
review and licensing.
AST received comments from 11 members of the public and one
government organization. The one government commenter was the 45th
Space Wing Range Safety Engineering Support (45SW/SESE). The public
commenters were:
--ACTA, Inc. \2\
--New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization
--Kistler Aerospace Corporation
--Lockheed Martin Corporation
--National Fire Protection Association
--Don A. Nelson
--Nelson Engineering Co.
--Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission
--Christopher Shove, Ph.D.
--Space Access, LLC
--Texas Aerospace Commission
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\2\ ACTA, Inc. divided its comments into those from ACTA itself
and those from ACTA staff.
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A. Overview
The FAA's approach to licensing the operation of a launch site
focuses on five areas of concern critical to ensuring that operation of
a launch site will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety
of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests or
international obligations of U.S. interests. These reviews encompass
the environment, policy considerations, the siting of explosives and
other explosive safety measures, the safety of a launch site location,
and operational responsibilities.
Part 420 is divided into four subparts. Subpart A includes the
scope and applicability of the part, and definitions applicable to the
part. Subpart B includes the criteria and information requirements for
obtaining a license. Subpart C lists the terms and conditions of a
license to operate a launch site. Subpart D lists the other
responsibilities of a licensee.
Part 420 separates the requirements to obtain a license from the
responsibilities of a licensee. Much of the information required by
subpart B pertains to how the applicant will meet its responsibilities
in accordance with subpart D.
Under the regulations, an applicant is required to provide the FAA
with information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews
and determinations. An applicant is also required to submit an
explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard
facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public
areas.
The regulations provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA
that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing
public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location
approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to
operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the
applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by
the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a
different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact
that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point
at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that is
accomplished by the FAA's launch site location review: namely, a
showing that launch may occur safely from the site.
The FAA is imposing specific operational ground safety
responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and requires that
a license applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A
launch site operator licensee's responsibilities include: preventing
unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing the public
and customers to visit the site; informing customers of limitations on
use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous activities
conducted by customers; maintaining agreements with the U.S. Coast
Guard and with the FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the
airspace through which launches will take place and among other
measures, the issuance of a Notice to Mariners and Notice to Airmen,
respectively, prior to a launch from the launch site; and notifying
adjacent property owners and local jurisdictions of the pending flight
of a launch vehicle. Part 420 also contains launch site operator
responsibilities with regard to record keeping, license transfer,
compliance monitoring, accident investigation and explosives. Other
federal government agencies have jurisdiction over a number of ground
safety issues, and the FAA does not intend to duplicate their
efforts.\3\
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\3\ The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a
role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA
regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product,
help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note
is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous
chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended
to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly
hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or
explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks
associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These
requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA
regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety
from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part
68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner
or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold
quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the
owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program
to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that
occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite
consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case
releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-
case release would reach the public, the source must develop and
implement a prevention program and an emergency response program.
Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to
conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage
of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which
existing systems could fail and result in accidental releases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion of Comments Regarding Overview
A few commentors provided comments that focussed on the FAA's
regulatory approach.
Space Access believed that instead of focussing on the launch site
location, the rule should put primary interest on the activity
occurring on a site, including preparation for a launch, launch, and
any activity or process conducted on or near the site that might
endanger the public health and safety. Space Access at 1. The FAA
agrees, but believes that a launch site location analysis is necessary
in order to determine whether a launch could safely take place from the
location selected. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not plan to
license the operation of a launch site from which even a hypothetical
launch could not take place and has devised the location review to
avoid such an eventuality. The other requirements in part 420, in
conjunction with the ground and flight safety requirements of a launch
license, should address the activity occurring on a site.
Space Access also notes that the rule must achieve minimum safety
standards but not require excessive agency
[[Page 62817]]
oversight or business duplication of effort. Space Access at 2. The
desire to avoid duplication of effort was also expressed by Kistler
Aerospace Corporation and Christopher Shove, Ph.D., a Senior Consultant
for Space Data Systems, Inc. Although Kistler commends the FAA for
striving to keep the regulatory environment free from redundant
requirements levied by multiple agencies, Kistler Aerospace Corporation
at 2; Christopher Shove at 1. Kistler also states that this goal should
be expanded to include launch site operators operating out of
localities that already address similar concerns through local rules or
ordinances.
The FAA agrees that it should not impose requirements that
duplicate other federal regulations. That is why there are relatively
few operational responsibilities of a launch site licensee in part 420.
For example, OSHA and the EPA have many regulations that apply to
launch site operators, which the FAA does not duplicate. If an
applicant is required to fulfill other safety requirements because of
state or local regulations, or rules of property owners, the FAA will
work with the applicant to avoid duplication of paper work. However,
applicants must meet FAA and other federal standards.
The New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization (NMOSC) thought
that the proposed regulations should not relate only to launch
operations. NMOSC suggested that the proposed regulations be expanded
to include recovery operations. New Mexico Office for Space
Commercialization at 1. The FAA agrees that recovery operations are
important. However, recovery operations are covered in another
rulemaking. Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing, 65 FR 56617 (Sept. 19, 2000).
Because the FAA stated in the NPRM that when launching from a non-
federal launch site, a launch operator's responsibility for ground and
flight safety takes on added importance, NMOSC suggested that the FAA
is willing to accept a double standard on safety. NMOSC believes that
New Mexico will be treated differently from Florida and California
because their launch sites are federal, and New Mexico's is not. NMOSC
at 2. This is not true. The FAA did not mean to imply that a launch
operator has more responsibility for flight safety from a commercial
launch site than from a federal launch site. In both cases, the launch
operator is responsible for the safety of its flight. The FAA was only
pointing out that a launch operator at a non-federal launch site will
not be able to depend on an established flight safety infrastructure
that currently exists at federal launch ranges.
Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) recommended, in the interest of
standardization and interoperability, that a launch site operator be
required to establish and maintain at its facility a range safety/
tracking system that functions at an industry-wide standard and
demonstrate that it meets the standard. LMC at 4. A launch operator
should be required to demonstrate to the FAA that its launch vehicle
interfaces with this standardized range safety/tracking system. The FAA
agrees on the importance of range safety and tracking for most launch
operations. Because launch safety is the responsibility of the launch
operator, because interoperability and standardization are business
issues about which a launch site operator may wish to make its own
decisions, the FAA notes with interest but declines to pursue this
suggestion. Although the federal launch ranges offer a standardized
form of range safety and tracking, the FAA is reluctant to enshrine
particular standards through regulation, especially when the ranges
themselves are re-visiting how to provide tracking, transmission and
other launch safety services. Nothing precludes a launch site operator
from providing such services as well; a launch operator will continue,
of course, to remain responsible under its launch license for the
safety of the flight of its vehicle, regardless of with whom it
contracts for supporting services.
B. Environmental
Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action
for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental
impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to
determine whether these activities will significantly affect the
quality of the environment. Because the FAA is responsible under NEPA
regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement (EIS), part 420 requires a license applicant to
provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an analysis in
accordance with the requirements of the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of
NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering
Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. An applicant will typically
engage a contractor with specialized experience in the NEPA process to
conduct the study underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis.
The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review,
including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the
assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has
defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The
FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)
may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an
environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is
necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at
a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future
use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an
environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable
alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as
interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a
site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable
alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental
process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will
not issue a license if the FAA has not concluded an environmental
review in accordance with all applicable regulations and guidelines.
Discussion of Comments Regarding the Environmental Review
Nelson Engineering Co. stated that the X-33 EIS process included
overflight and safety issues. Nelson Engineering felt that including
overflight and safety issues for licensed activities was a duplication
of effort since these safety issues are covered in the license process
as well. It noted that the public has the right to know and comment on
overflight and safety issues, but it would be best to handle it
separate from the EIS process. Nelson Engineering at 2. The FAA agrees.
Safety issues are better addressed in the licensing process where
safety standards exist. When the question of safety comes up during the
FAA's environmental review process, the FAA notes in the environmental
documentation that safety issues are addressed in the licensing
process.
NMOSC commented on the FAA's statement that an applicant may
acquire property for future use as a launch site. NMOSC states that
according to the CEQ regulations as interpreted by the courts, an
applicant may not use the purchase of a site or construction at the
site to limit the array of reasonable alternatives. NMOSC at 2. The FAA
partially agrees with NMOSC in that purchasing a site with the intent
to
[[Page 62818]]
build a launch facility, without looking at other possible locations,
limits the launch site selection and evaluation of alternatives and is
contrary to the requirements of the National Environmental Protection
Act (NEPA). NEPA requires an applicant to show that it looked at
several feasible sites based on certain criteria and that it chose one
of those sites as the preferred or selected alternative. However, an
applicant can in fact purchase property for future use as a launch site
if the applicant can show that it looked at several sites and picked a
particular site based on certain parameters. It must also document the
evaluation of those alternative sites.
C. Policy
The FAA conducts a policy review of an application for a license to
operate a launch site to determine whether operation of the proposed
launch site would jeopardize national security, foreign policy
interests, or international obligations of the United States. The FAA
conducts the policy review in coordination with other federal agencies
that have responsibility for national and international interests. The
Department of Defense is consulted to determine whether a license
application presents any issues affecting national security. The
Department of State reviews an application for issues affecting foreign
policy or international obligations. Other agencies, such as NASA, are
consulted as appropriate. By this rulemaking, the regulations require
an applicant to supply information relevant to the FAA's policy
approval, including, for example, identification of foreign ownership
of the applicant. The FAA will obtain other information required for a
policy review from information submitted by an applicant in other parts
of the application. During a policy review, the FAA will consult with
an applicant regarding any questions or issues before making a final
determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any
questions before completion of the review.
No comments regarding policy review were received and no changes
have been made to part 420 from the Launch Site NPRM.
D. Explosive Site Plan Review
The final rules establish criteria and procedures for the siting of
facilities at a launch site where solid propellants, liquid
propellants, and other explosives are located to prepare launch
vehicles and payloads for flight. These criteria and procedures are
commonly referred to as quantity-distance (Q-D) requirements because
they provide minimum separation distances between explosive hazard
facilities, surrounding facilities and locations where the public may
be present on the basis of the type and quantity of explosive material
located within the area. Minimum prescribed separation distances are
necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards on a launch site
so that the effects of an explosion do not reach the public.
An applicant must provide the FAA with an explosive site plan that
demonstrates compliance with the Q-D requirements. Because the FAA must
approve this plan, applicants are cautioned not to begin construction
of facilities requiring an explosive site plan until obtaining FAA
approval. Note also that the Q-D requirements do not address any toxic
hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through procedural means, and
the FAA addresses toxic hazards in a separate rulemaking on licensing
and safety requirements for launch. If a toxic hazard is a controlling
factor in siting, a prudent launch site operator will address the issue
when preparing its site plan.
The quantity-distance criteria are a critical mitigation measure
required in a launch site operator application to provide the public
protection from ground operations at a launch site. The final rules
have other mitigation measures, including launch site operator
responsibilities that address accident prevention measures, and
procedural requirements to protect other launch site customers and
visitors on the launch site. Any other procedural requirements
necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards will be the
responsibility of a launch operator under a launch license.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ A launch license encompasses ground activities involved in
the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in
the United States. This may include the storage and handling of
explosives involved with the handling and assembly of launch
vehicles at a launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA has made certain changes in response to comments to part
420, from what was proposed in the Launch Site NPRM regarding the
explosive site plan requirements. A brief summary of these changes is
discussed below and is discussed in further detail in the Part
analysis.
The NPRM did not require an applicant proposing to locate
a launch site at a federal launch range to submit an explosive site
plan. In the final rule, the applicant must submit an explosive site
plan to the federal launch range operator.
Q-D requirements for hazard class 1.1 were added,
including a provision for public traffic route distance.
The assumption that solid and liquid stages on a launch
vehicle would not explode simultaneously has been removed from the Q-D
requirements for locating solid and liquid propellants together.
The explosive site plan requirements were moved from
subpart B, Application Requirements, to subpart D, Licensee
Responsibility. Although an applicant must complete an explosive site
plan to obtain a license, this section was moved because the explosive
site plan is a document with which a licensee must comply and keep up
to date at all times.
A provision was added to clarify that explosive siting
issues outside the scope of the part 420 requirements will be evaluated
by the FAA on an individual basis consistent with industry safety
standards.
A discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the reason the FAA
is adopting explosive siting criteria, current Q-D standards, the FAA's
use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other approaches to explosive
safety, and the application of ATF, DOD or NASA standards are covered
in the Launch Site NPRM. 64 FR at 34320--34322. Solid explosive
divisions, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid
and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads are discussed below.
Solid Explosive Divisions
The Launch Site NPRM proposed requirements for division 1.3 solid
explosives. As noted in the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA is adopting the
United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system, a system that
governs transport of dangerous goods. The Department of
Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration assigns
dangerous goods to the appropriate class in accordance with 49 CFR part
173. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for
dangerous goods, of which ammunition and explosives are included as the
UNO ``Class 1, Explosives.'' Class 1 explosives are further subdivided
into ``divisions'' based on the character and predominance of the
associated hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or
property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:
Division 1.1--consists of explosives that have a mass
explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the
entire load instantaneously.
[[Page 62819]]
Division 1.2--consists of explosives that have a
projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.3--consists of explosives that have a fire
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or
both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
Division 1.4--consists of explosives that present a minor
explosion hazard.
Division 1.5--consists of very insensitive explosives.
Division 1.6--consists of extremely insensitive articles
which do not have a mass explosion hazard.
The FAA originally proposed criteria only for division 1.3 because
it believed that the only solid explosives for commercial launches that
would likely affect separation distances on a launch site were division
1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch vehicles frequently
have components incorporating division 1.1 explosives, such as those
used to initiate flight termination systems, the quantity is small. The
FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives will not likely be present
in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria. The
only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are from old
military missiles, which are not likely to be used at a commercial
launch site.
In response to comments from the 45th Space Wing pointing out the
errors underlying this assumption, part 420 now includes quantity-
distance requirements for explosive division 1.1 explosives. Compared
with explosive division 1.3 explosives, the distances are greater due
to their more hazardous nature.
Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements
The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) initiated a DOD Explosive
Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and established an
interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants Working Group
(LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of possible
inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the current
approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D criteria for
most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in hazard group and
compatibility group definitions, and possible inaccurate
characterization of blast overpressure hazards of liquid propellant
explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of explosive
equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance criteria, and
to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9, which addresses
liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials.
The DDESB work is almost completed, and the recommendations of the
LPWG should be incorporated in the DOD standard in the near future.
Because the DDESB is possibly the best-equipped group in the country to
address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its
recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the final rule should
not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard and
compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and the
public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible
adoption by the FAA.
Solid and Liquid Bi-Propellants at Launch Pads
In the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at
launch pads for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid
propellant components. The required separation distance would be the
greater of the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the
liquid propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant
would not have to add the separation distances of both. This proposal
rested on the conclusion that, generally, no credible scenario existed
that could produce a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid
propellant tanks and solid propellant motors. This requirement has
changed because the assumption may not always be correct.
Under the final rule, an applicant must conduct an analysis of the
maximum credible event (MCE), or the worst case explosion that is
expected to occur. If analysis shows that an explosion caused by the
liquid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of the solid
propellants, and an explosion due to the solid propellants will not
cause a simultaneous explosion of the liquid propellants, the distance
between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard
facilities and public areas should be based on the MCE.
Discussion of Comments
The 45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division
(45SW/SESE), provided a number of comments on the FAA's proposed
explosive safety requirements. First, the 45SW/SESE suggests including
alternative approaches to Q-D standards such as risk-based thresholds
and limits. 45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division
at 1. The FAA agrees that alternative approaches to Q-D may be
appropriate. However, the FAA will not formally adopt such an approach
at this time for the following reasons.
On December 9, 1999, the DDESB approved, for limited use at DOD
facilities, the use of risk-based explosives safety siting of
explosives facilities for calendar years 2000 through 2002.
Specifically, on a case-by-case basis, a risk-based explosives safety
analysis that supports an explosives facility siting may be submitted
to the DDESB Secretariat for review and approval.\5\ A risk based
analysis is used when a waiver or exemption would be required to
approve a facility. The FAA will monitor the experience of the DDESB
during those three years, and may take regulatory action at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Memorandum from USAF Colonel Daniel T. Tompkins to the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps board members (Dec. 9, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the meantime, an applicant unable to meet the Q-D requirements
might attempt a risk-based approach if able to provide a clear and
convincing demonstration that the proposed method provides an
equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. Such a
demonstration would have to include an explosives safety analysis that
analyzes hazards associated with handling explosive materials on the
launch site. The applicant should examine the relationship between an
explosive hazard facility and an exposed facility to determine what
effect one has on the other in the event of an accidental explosion. As
discussed in the NPRM, net explosives weight is used to calculate Q-D
separations by means of the formula: D=KW 1/3, where D is
the required distance (in feet), K is the protection factor depending
on the degree of risk assumed or permitted, and W 1/3 is the
cube root of the net explosives weight (NEW) in pounds. This formula is
also used for assessing risk. Dividing the distance by the cube root of
the NEW will give the actual K factor of protection. A K factor equates
to an overpressure, as shown in table 1. Knowing the expected
overpressure can help in understanding the facility or equipment damage
and the personnel injuries expected to be sustained by a particular
blast overpressure. Hazardous fragments must also be considered when
preparing a risk assessment.
For more information on blast pressure, blast effects, and fragment
hazards, see Air Force Manual
[[Page 62820]]
(AFMAN) 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, sections 4.48 and 4.49
(Mar. 7, 2000).
Table 1.--K-Factor to PSI Relationship \6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
K-factor PSI K-factor PSI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0............................ 1000 20 3.0
1.2............................ 763 21 2.8
1.4............................ 597 22 2.6
1.6............................ 475 23 2.4
1.8............................ 384 24 2.3
2.0............................ 315 25 2.2
2.5............................ 200 26 2.1
3.0............................ 135 27 2.0
3.5............................ 95 28 1.9
4.0............................ 70 29 1.8
4.5............................ 53 30 1.7
5.0............................ 42 31 1.63
6.0............................ 28 32 1.56
7.0............................ 20 33 1.5
8.0............................ 15 34 1.4
9.0............................ 12 35 1.4
10............................. 9.6 36 1.3
11............................. 8.0 37 1.3
12............................. 6.8 38 1.25
13............................. 5.9 39 1.2
14............................. 5.2 40 1.2
15............................. 4.7 45 1.0
16............................. 4.2 50 0.9
17............................. 3.8 60 0.7
18............................. 3.5 70 0.6
19............................. 3.2 80 0.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
45SW/SESE asks whether there is an assumption that all DOD
explosive site plan approval is current for launch sites on a federal
range? What if formal DDESB approval is not on record? 45SW/SESE at 1.
The FAA does assume that all DOD explosive site plan approval is
current for launch sites on a federal range and that formal DDESB
approval is on record. The FAA's launch site safety assessments of the
national launch ranges show that the DOD ranges enforce their
standards. However, if the FAA discovers through its safety inspection
program that a licensee is operating out of compliance with the DDESB
approved explosive site plan, it will consider this a violation of the
license and may take appropriate enforcement action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Table 4.2 in AFMAN 91-201 (Mar. 7, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the FAA's statement that a launch site operator is
responsible for preventing unauthorized public access to the site, the
45SW/SESE commented that this should include surrounding areas
designated as posing an environmental or explosives hazard. 45SW/SESE
at 2. The FAA agrees in principle. With respect to environmental
hazards, surrounding areas posing an environmental hazard will be
addressed in the environmental review process.
With respect to explosives, to comply with these rules adopted
today, areas posing an explosive hazard during ground activities must,
by regulatory requirement, be contained within the launch site. A
launch site operator is responsible for preventing unauthorized access
to the site. It is also responsible for ensuring that hazardous areas
within the site are clear and that other users of the site are not
placed at risk during hazardous operations. In the NPRM, the FAA stated
that minimum prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect
the public from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects
of an explosion do not reach the public. 45SW/SESE notes that some
other reasons for separation distances include to prevent unnecessary
injuries or casualty to workers related to the explosive operation; to
protect property; to avoid propagation from one explosive location to
another; and remote explosives testing. 45SW/SESE at 2. The FAA agrees,
but wishes to stress that these requirements are intended to protect
public safety because public safety is the FAA's mandate. Property
belonging to members of the public also achieves some measure of
protection in accordance with these requirements. Also, propagation
from one explosive location to another is covered through part 420's
intraline distance requirements.
In the NPRM, the FAA states that it must approve the explosive site
plan that an applicant provides to the FAA. The 45SW/SESE asks whether
explosive site plans already approved by the DDESB will be granted FAA
approval. 45SW/SESE at 3. The answer is yes. A new requirement from the
NPRM is that the FAA now requires applicants for launch sites located
on a federal launch range to provide the FAA with a copy of an
explosive site plan. However, the FAA will not approve it. The FAA will
use the explosive site plan for compliance monitoring purposes only.
The 45SW/SESE notes that ``launch site'' in some contexts implies
``launch complex,'' which excludes other launch processing facilities
or areas at the launch range. 45SW/SESE at 3. The FAA does not wish to
imply that a launch site is merely a launch complex on a launch site.
To clarify, a launch site includes the entire land area operated by a
launch site operator, including all launch complexes and facilities
within.\7\
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\7\ The Act and the regulations define launch site as the
location on Earth from which a launch takes place (as defined in a
license the Secretary issues or transfers under this chapter) and
necessary facilities. 49 USC 70102(6); 14 CFR 401.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the proposed requirements do not
account for the use of barricades and other protective measures to
mitigate the effect of an explosion on exposed areas.
[[Page 62821]]
An applicant proposing to use such measures in order to deviate from
the proposed siting rules may, during the application process, provide
a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides
an equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. 45SW/SESE states
that this use of a waiver is inconsistent with the way the Air Force
uses them. A waiver is used to document a condition or requirement that
is not achieved, not one where the condition or requirement is being
met. 45SW/SESE at 4. The FAA did not mean ``waiver'' in the way the Air
Force uses it. If a launch site operator plans to use barricades or
other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an explosion on
exposed area, the applicant would have to submit a clear and convincing
demonstration of an equivalent level of safety.
In the NPRM, the FAA stated that proposed subpart B would establish
criteria and procedures for the siting of facilities at a launch site
where solid and liquid propellants are located to prepare launch
vehicles and payloads for flight. 45SW/SESE notes that propellants are
not enough. The requirements should include other explosives as well
including linear shaped charges, safe and arm devices, initiators, and
igniters. 45SW/SESE at 2, 4. The FAA agrees, and has modified the
explosive siting requirements to include those explosives, which are
division 1.1 explosives.
In the NPRM, the FAA stated that division 1.1 explosives would not
likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of
Q-D criteria. 45SW/SESE points out that this is incorrect, and the FAA
agrees. The linear shaped charge, which is an explosive division 1.1
explosive, is the driver of distance requirements because in most cases
a solid rocket booster is zero percent trinitrotoluene (TNT)
equivalency. 45SW/SESE at 5. ACTA adds that DOD 6055.9 states that the
inhabited building distance for division 1.1 solid propellants ranging
from 1-35,000 lb is 1250 ft. Proposed table E-1 only requires 800 ft.
for quantities up to 1,000,000 lb. This is true even when quantities of
1.1 explosives are present. ACTA at 5. The FAA agrees that its
assumption that division 1.1 explosives would not likely be present in
sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria was
incorrect. The FAA has added division 1.1 explosives to this final
rule.
In the NPRM, the FAA also stated that because division 1.3 solid
propellants are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not
incorporate compatibility groups for solid propellants. 45SW/SESE asks
how compatibility would be determined if there was a need to store
other explosives with the solids? 45SW/SESE at 5. Ensuring that
explosives in an explosives hazard facility are compatible is a
procedural requirement of a launch operator. Ground safety will be
covered in a separate proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety
requirements for launch.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at launch pads
for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant
components. The required separation distance would be the greater of
the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid
propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant did not
have to add the separation distances of both. The NPRM assumed that
generally, no credible scenario existed that could produce a
simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and
solid propellant motors. 45SW/SESE states that the general assumption
that a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks
and solid propellant motors is unlikely is not a prudent approach.
45SW/SESE recommends analyses be performed on a case-by-case basis to
determine a credible scenario. A number of current Q-D site plans
considered TNT equivalencies from both the solids and liquids. 45SW/
SESE at 5, 6; but see Lockheed Martin at 3 (agreeing with the NPRM
proposal as permitting greater flexibility in operations and launch
vehicle design).
The FAA agrees with 45SW/SESE, and adopts the suggestion to require
that an applicant address an explosion of both solid and liquid
propellants at the same time. Air Force standard AFMAN 91-201, section
3.8 states that the combined bulk explosive weight of explosive items
is not necessarily the weight used for Q-D calculations. Q-D is based
on the maximum credible event (MCE), namely, the worst case explosion,
that is expected to occur. Section 3.8.3 further states the basic rule
when combining mass-detonating (e.g., the explosive equivalent of
liquid propellants) and nonmass-detonating explosives (e.g., an
explosive division 1.3 solid rocket motor). Consider the distance for
the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3 first as 1.1. Then
consider the distance for the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3
as 1.3. The required distance is the greater of the two. However,
section 3.8 further states that exceptions are granted when analyses or
test results demonstrate that the explosive division 1.1 (for liquid
propellants) will not cause detonation of the explosive division 1.3
explosives.
This approach has now been incorporated into the final rule, in
section 420.69. Note that the FAA still considers a simultaneous
explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and solid propellant
motors to be unlikely. The FAA requires that this improbability be
demonstrated. Otherwise, a launch site operator will have to use the
combined explosive weight of the solids and liquids to determine
required distances.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to adopt a provision of DOD STD
6055.9 that exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a
local lightning warning system is used to terminate operations before
the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and will be
provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route distance.
The 45SW/SESE notes that this exception is not prudent in Florida where
lightning strikes can occur without warning, except possibly an
unmanned small licensed location where the value of the facility and
its content are assumable risks. 45SW/SESE at 6.
The FAA agrees that if lightning strikes can occur without warning,
then it would be prudent to have a lightning protection system. The
final rule would require a lightning protection system in that
situation. A licensee must ensure the withdrawal of the public to a
public area distance prior to an electrical storm. If this is not
possible, then a lightning protection system is required. Note also
that the objective is not to protect the licensee's property or that of
its contractors, subcontractors, or customers, but members of the
public and their property.
In the NPRM, the FAA defined intraline distance as the minimum
distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities in the
ownership, possession or control of one launch site customer. The FAA
notes that unlike distances to protect the public, intraline distance
will not protect workers with the same level or protection as the
public. If intraline distances are not maintained between two explosive
hazard facilities, then the larger area encompassing both quantities
must be used for Q-D purposes when determining prescribed distances to
the public. The 45SW/SESE questions how that could be acceptable when
worker safety is diminished, and personnel protection must be
established to be consistent with OSHA. 45SW/SESE at 7. Worker safety
comes under the jurisdiction of OSHA, and, as noted in the NPRM, the
FAA does not
[[Page 62822]]
plan to duplicate the requirements of other regulatory agencies.
45SW/SESE also notes that inhabited building distance, which the
FAA proposed as public area distance, has an assumed 20% facility
damage and some injury. 45SW/SESE states that this may be a reasonable
risk on a DOD installation, and asks whether 20% facility damage and
injury is acceptable to the general public? 45SW/SESE at 8; see also
ACTA at 3 (noting that the Q-D criterion for public buildings allows a
glass fragment serious injury probability of up to 30%). This would not
be acceptable if Q-D requirements were the only measures taken to
protect the public. The protection offered by Q-D along with the
procedural requirements covered in a proposed rulemaking governing
licensing and safety requirements for launch will be adequate to
protect the public to an acceptable level. These other safety controls
are the responsibility of a launch operator and will be covered in a
separate proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for
launch.
ACTA staff notes that the FAA uses DOD and NASA standards as the
basis for explosive safety requirements. ACTA asked that since OSHA,
EPA, and ATF have the responsibility for safety during production and
assembly of hazardous materials, why shouldn't this apply to launch
site operations as well. ACTA at 8.
OSHA and EPA regulations do apply on launch sites, but neither
agency has Q-D requirements. ATF does have Q-D requirements, but, as
noted in the NPRM, they only cover the storage of explosives at a
launch site. ATF regulations do not cover the handling of explosives,
which includes the majority of hazardous activities at launch sites.
DOD and NASA standards are currently used at every major launch site in
the United States, and the FAA requirements reflect the current
practice. Note also that the distances used in this final rule for the
``use'' of explosives are consistent with ATF regulations on the
``storage'' of explosives, and that the FAA is not duplicating the ATF
storage requirements. An ACTA staff member stated that the NPRM
provides excruciating details on how to handle explosives but does not
consider public risks associated with either toxicity or blast
overpressure focussing. These are major factors in siting decisions.
ACTA at 7. The FAA agrees that these are important issues, but are not
critical for the layout of a launch site. These issues are covered in
the proposed rulemaking governing licensing and safety requirements for
launch.
Space Access, LLC, (Space Access) also commented on the explosive
siting requirements. In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the DDESB is
likely to specify new hazard and compatibility groups, distance values,
and equivalency values, and the public may anticipate their eventual
consideration and possible adoption by the FAA. Space Access recommends
the FAA accelerate this work and provide these values as soon as
possible. These proposed changes could have a major financial impact to
both the site operators and launch vehicle operators in terms of launch
acquisition, usage, safety separation distances for storage and public
access and procedures for use in all phases of operations leading up to
the launch. Space Access was concerned that launch operators will never
achieve aircraft-like operations if they are continually evacuating
sites and areas to meet outdated policies and suggested that no
flexibility to meet safety criteria by means other than total
separation distance. Space Access at 2. The FAA would like to stress
that the work is being conducted by the DDESB, and is not in the
control of the FAA. It is, however, near completion and the FAA will
consider it once it is completed and adopted by the DDESB.
Space Access also states that there seems to be a lack of
discussion of the distances required by the Department of
Transportation (DOT). Space Access wants a single standard for
propellants. DOT uses numbers in tens of feet for public safety
distances. Other standards also exist in the National Fire Protection
Agency (NFPA) publications and in local fire codes. Space Access at 2,
3. The FAA agrees that other liquid Q-D standards are much different
than those proposed by the FAA, but the FAA selected standards
representing current procedures for the launch industry. That is why
the new liquid Q-D standards that the DDESB will likely adopt are
important since they are based on a review of all relevant government
and industry standards in this area, including those of DOT. There will
not likely be a single standard for propellants, as Space Access would
like, but the standards applicable to launch sites will be more
consistent with other commercial and government standards.
Space Access also notes that in addition to having realistic
numbers for Q-D, there needs to be procedures and policies such that
incentives are in place for actually designing and operating in a safe
manner. For example, earthen berms can be used to reduce separation
distances. This should be the same with adequate design and procedures.
According to Space Access, there is no motivation for improving the
design or procedures because all that matters is total quantity or TNT
equivalency. Space Access strongly recommends the FAA adopt a
methodology that trades design and procedures for distance. Space
Access at 3.
The FAA agrees that separation distances can be reduced if certain
features are built into a facility. The FAA has chosen not to include
design standards in the final rule at this time because of their
complexity. In recognition of the availability of such substitutes, the
final rule now provides that for explosive siting issues not otherwise
addressed by the requirements of Secs. 420.65-420.69, a launch site
operator must clearly and convincingly demonstrate a level of safety
equivalent to that otherwise required by part 420. This means that the
FAA may permit design features that provide an equivalent level of
safety to substitute for separation distances.
Lockheed Martin Corporation also commented on the Q-D requirements.
First, it believes the FAA should consider applying DOD Standard 6055.9
at non-federal launch sites instead of developing a new standard
because 6055.9 represents a well-developed and mature regime with an
impressive safety record; and because implementation of 6055.9 at non-
federal launch sites would help ensure consistent regulation of
explosives both at federal and non-federal launch ranges. Lockheed
Martin at 3. The FAA agrees that 6055.9 represents a well-developed and
mature regime with an impressive safety record. That is why the FAA's
Q-D standards are modeled after this standard. The FAA believes,
however, that codifying, instead of adopting by reference, the basic
requirements of the standard in a regulation are beneficial for a
number of reasons. First, codification permits the standard to be
tailored to the needs of commercial launch sites. DOD standard 6055.9
is applicable to all military bases, worldwide. Second, the language
within standards such as DOD regulation 6055.9 is not always stated in
a regulatory manner. Often, discretion based on military need by the
DDESB or other body is embedded in the standard. Third, changes to that
standard by the DDESB could not automatically apply to applicants for a
license. By adopting the basic requirements of that standard in the
final rule, the FAA can monitor changes in the DDESB standard, consider
the applicability and appropriateness of changes to commercial launch
sites, and go through
[[Page 62823]]
notice and comment rulemaking to adopt any change. Therefore, the FAA
retains the approach of adopting pertinent requirements of that
standard in the final rule rather than referencing the entire DOD
standard 6055.9.
Lockheed Martin agrees with the FAA's approach to addressing
hardening on a case-by-case basis, and suggests referring to National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70 and 496. Lockheed Martin at 3.
NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code (1999), includes safety
requirements for all types of electrical installations. It is useful
for work that involves electrical design, installation, identification,
or inspection. NFPA 496, Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclosure
for Electrical Equipment, 1988, specifies requirements for design and
operation of purged and pressurized electrical equipment enclosures to
reduce or eliminate the hazardous location classification within the
enclosures.
Those two standards are incorporated by reference in OSHA's
Occupational Safety and Health Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.6. Because
OSHA requires them, and because the FAA is seeking to avoid duplicating
the requirements of other civilian regulatory agencies, the standards
will not be incorporated into this final rule. In any event, the FAA
will be willing to consider those standards in the event a launch site
operator attempts to use them to demonstrate an equivalent level of
safety.
E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures.
Application of the quantity-distance rules alone will not prevent
mishaps from occurring on a launch site. The Q-D rules merely reduce
the risk to the public to an acceptable level if a mishap occurs, and
if the public is kept away from the mishap by a distance that is at
least as great as the public area distance. Safe facility design and
prudent procedural measures are critical to preventing a mishap from
occurring in the first place. Because the public at a launch site
cannot be protected by prudent site planning alone, the FAA today
adopts launch site operator responsibilities to prevent mishaps
involving propellants and other explosives.
Part 420 focuses on measures that are appropriate to be taken by a
launch site operator. For the most part, the FAA considers it prudent
to place the responsibility on a launch site operator for those
measures that must be built into facilities. Requirements of a more
operational nature will be covered in another FAA rulemaking.
Part 420 focuses on appropriate measures. These are particularly
important for electro-explosive devices. Electric hazards include
lightning, static electricity, electric supply systems, and
electromagnetic radiation. The FAA is adopting launch site operator
requirements for two of these electric hazards: lightning and electric
supply systems. A full discussion of these can be found in the Launch
Site NPRM. 64 FR at 34324-34325.
Other measures were considered but rejected because the FAA's
proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for launch
will cover other procedural measures to guard against inadvertent
initiation of propellants from electricity. Moreover, launch and launch
site operators should implement prudent design and construction
measures to comply with local, state, and other federal law, such as
OSHA requirements.
Discussion of Comments
In the NPRM, the FAA noted that the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA), Batterymarch Park, Quincy, Massachusetts, has
published NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation of Lightning
Protection Systems. The latest edition was published in 1997. NFPA 780
provides for the protection of people, buildings, special occupancies,
heavy duty stacks, structures containing flammable liquids and gases,
and other entities against lightning damage. The FAA asked for the
public's views on the use and applicability of this code.
A number of commenters supported the FAA's adoption of NFPA 780.
45SW/SESE noted that the Air Force uses NFPA 780 as a core document to
design lightning protection systems. 45SW/SESE at 6. The NFPA stated
that the FAA should adopt NFPA 780, which dates back to Benjamin
Franklin's era. NFPA at 1, 2; see also Lockheed Martin at 3. The FAA
agrees with the commentors regarding the importance of NFPA 780.
However, the FAA will not incorporate NFPA 780 by reference because it
does not always include mandatory language. Due to its importance and
utility, the FAA will undoubtedly refer to it for appropriate guidance.
Although LMC believes NFPA 780 is an appropriate and useful
standard for a lightning protection system, it states that a launch
site operator should not be required to install and maintain an
independent lightning protection system. A launch operator will likely
have one as a way to attract customers. Lockheed Martin at 3. The FAA
disagrees. The FAA has learned from experience that while most launch
site operators might be expected to adhere to commonly held standards;
this is not always the case. Without such requirements, an adequate
level of safety or risk mitigation cannot be achieved. If most would do
this anyway, then the impact is minimal. In any event, because it
involves the construction of facilities, the FAA has made the
installation of a lightning protection system a requirement for a
launch site operator license to ensure its availability.
In addition to NFPA 780, the 45SW/SESE suggested that the FAA
review DOD 6055.9, and applicable Air Force instructions to provide
full regulatory requirements. The FAA has reviewed DOD 6055.9, Air
Force Manual 91-201, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) ``Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants,
and Pyrotechnics,'' NSS 1740.12 (Aug.1993). The FAA believes that the
requirements in the final rule cover the basic safety issues that need
to be addressed for lightning protection systems. The FAA expects
applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and
NASA standard.
Another explosive mishap prevention measure is the control of
static electricity. The FAA did not propose any requirements in the
NPRM regarding the control of static electricity because the FAA
believed that the control of static electricity in launch operations is
primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by the FAA in
another proposed rulemaking governing licensing and safety requirements
for launch. The FAA asked for the public's view.
LMC agreed with the FAA and noted that new rules on control of
static electricity should reflect current procedures used by the launch
operators. Lockheed Martin at 4. The NFPA recommended NFPA 77,
Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (1993), as a reference
document. NFPA 77 provides a basic understanding of the phenomena of
static electric discharges and how they can serve as ignition sources,
and includes useful information on bonding and grounding.
F. Launch Site Location Review
The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether
the location of a proposed launch site could support launches that
would not jeopardize public health and safety, and the safety of
property. To that end, the FAA will determine whether at least one
hypothetical launch could take place safely from a launch point at the
proposed site. The FAA will not license
[[Page 62824]]
the operation of a launch site from which a launch could never safely
take place. An applicant should, however, bear in mind that an FAA
license to operate a launch site does not guarantee that a launch
license would be issued for any particular launch proposed from that
site. Accordingly, much of the decision making with respect to whether
a particular site will be economically successful will rest, as it
should, with a launch site operator, who will have to determine whether
the site possesses sufficient flight corridors for economic viability.
Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at
the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is
hypothetically possible to launch at least one type of launch vehicle
on at least one trajectory from each launch point at the proposed site
while meeting the FAA's collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to
ensure that there exists at least one flight corridor or set of impact
dispersion areas from a proposed launch site that would contain debris
away from population. Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will
allow to occur only when the risk to people is below an expected
casualty (Ec) of 30 x 10-6. In other words, if
there are too many people around a launch site or in a flight corridor
the FAA will not license the site.
All this is not to say that the FAA is requiring an applicant for a
license to operate a launch site to perform a complete flight safety
analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that an applicant
may or may not have customers or a particular launch vehicle in mind.
Accordingly, the FAA's launch site location review methods only
approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions and recognizing that
not all factors need to be taken into account, a full flight safety
analysis that would normally be performed for an actual launch. Of
course, if an applicant does have a customer who satisfies the FAA's
flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a license for launch from
the site, that showing would also demonstrate to the FAA that a launch
may occur safely from the proposed site, and the FAA could issue a
license to operate the launch site on the basis of the actual launch
proposed.
The launch site location review applies to both expendable launch
vehicles (ELVs) and reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). Detailed
methodologies for the launch site location review are only provided for
expendable launch vehicles with a flight history. The reusable launch
vehicles currently proposed by industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly,
the FAA considered it unwise to define a detailed analytical method for
determining the suitability of a launch site location for RLVs. An
applicant proposing a launch site limited to the launch of reusable
launch vehicles would still need to define a flight corridor and
conduct a risk analysis if population were present within the flight
corridor, but the FAA will review such an analysis on a case-by-case
basis, consistent with the principles discussed in this rulemaking.
Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical
method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for
unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited
to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to
the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.
A launch site location review provides an applicant with
alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site
satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must
demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas
exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to
an Ec risk of greater than 30 x 10-6. Each
proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch
vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided
sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched
from each point.
Each of the three methods for evaluating the acceptability of a
launch site's location require an applicant to identify an area,
whether a flight corridor or a set of impact dispersion areas,
emanating from a proposed launch site. That area identifies the public
that the applicant must analyze for risk of impact and harm. An
applicant who anticipates customers who use guided orbital launch
vehicles must define a flight corridor for a class of vehicles launched
from a specific point along a specified trajectory, that extends 5,000
nautical miles from the launch point or until the launch vehicle's
instantaneous impact point leaves the Earth's surface, whichever is
shorter. For guided sub-orbital launch vehicles, the flight corridor
ends at an impact dispersion area of a final stage. An applicant must
demonstrate either that there are no populated areas within the flight
corridor or that the risk to any population in the corridor does not
exceed the FAA's risk criteria. Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch
of an unguided vehicle, an applicant must analyze the risks associated
with a series of impact dispersion areas around the impact points for
spent stages. If there are people in the dispersion areas, the
applicant must demonstrate that the expected casualties from stage
impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk criteria.
Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure
of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a
launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of
casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were
thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were
added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and
the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This
Ec value defines the acceptable collective risk associated
with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and,
as prescribed by the regulations, shall not exceed an expected average
number of casualties of 0.00003 (30 x 10-6) for each
launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This Ec
value defines acceptable collective risk.
The FAA's methods for identifying a flight corridor or impact
dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital expendable launch
vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles without an FTS.\8\ For purposes of part 420,
references to a guided expendable launch vehicle, whether orbital or
sub-orbital, may be taken to mean that the vehicle has an FTS.
References to an unguided sub-orbital may be understood to mean that
the vehicle does not possess an FTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Part 420 does not include a means for analyzing risks posed
by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch
vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have
been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a
launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles,
the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA
does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in
the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with
the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated
areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 420 divides guided orbital expendable launch vehicles into
four classes, with each class defined by its payload weight capability,
as shown in table 2. Sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are not
divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as either
guided or unguided. Table 3 shows the payload weight and corresponding
classes of existing orbital expendable launch vehicles. For a launch
site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant
[[Page 62825]]
defines a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the
proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated''
which the FAA anticipates will be based on expected customers.
Table 2.--Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight class
100 nm orbit -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Medium Medium large Large
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 degrees inclination *................ 4400 >4400 to 11100 to 18500
eq>11100 thn-eq>18500
90 degrees inclination.................. 3300 >3300 to 8400 to 15000
eq>8400 eq>15000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.
Table 3.--Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Payload weight (lbs) Payload weight (lbs)
--------------------------------------------
Vehicle 100 nm Orbit 28 deg. 100 nm Orbit 90 deg. Class
inc. inc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conestoga 1229..................... 600 450 Small.
Conestoga 1620..................... 2,250 1,750 Small.
Athena-1........................... 1,755 1,140 Small.
Athena-2........................... 4,390 3,290 Small.
Pegasus............................ 700 N/A Small.
Pegasus XL......................... 1,015 769 Small.
Scout.............................. 560 460 Small.
Taurus............................. 3,100 2,340 Small.
Atlas II........................... 14,500 12,150 Medium/Large.
Atlas IIA.......................... 16,050 13,600 Medium/Large.
Atlas IIAS......................... 19,050 16,100 Large.
Atlas IIIA......................... 19,050 15,700 Large.
Atlas IIIB......................... 23,630 20,240 Large.
Atlas V 404........................ 27,550 23,700 Large.
Atlas V 552........................ 44,200 37,400 Large.
Delta 6920......................... 8,780 6,490 Medium.
Delta 7920......................... 11,330 8,590 Medium/Large.
Delta 3............................ 18,280 14,920 Medium/Large.
Delta 4 M.......................... 18,600 15,150 Large.
Delta 4 M (5,4).................... 30,000 23,000 Large.
Delta 4 Heavy...................... 56,900 46,000 Large.
Titan II........................... N/A 4,200 Medium.
Titan III.......................... 31,200 N/A Large.
Titan IV........................... 47,400 41,000 Large.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch
site for guided orbital and sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are
presented in appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions
for creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method
to appendix A. Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a
flight corridor for guided expendable launch vehicles, but provides
more detailed calculations to employ so that, although an appendix B
flight corridor is typically less conservative than that of appendix A,
it should prove more representative of actual vehicle behavior.
Appendix C contains the FAA's method for applicants to analyze the risk
posed by guided expendable launch vehicles within a flight corridor
created in accordance with appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicles are presented in appendix D, which describes
how an applicant should estimate impact dispersion areas and analyze
the risk in those areas.
Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor
than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle
trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under
appendix A. Because appendix A provides a more simple methodology, an
applicant may want to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can
define a flight corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A,
that does not overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the
launch site location review requirements with the least effort. If,
however, the corridor includes populated areas, the applicant may
create an appendix B flight corridor that may be more narrow, or may
conduct a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required to
try appendix A before employing appendix B.
The FAA's location review reflects a number of assumptions designed
to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or addressing a
particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more fully below,
but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for appendices A
and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that launch failure
debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful containment
must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination system. A
perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure that any
debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a flight
corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but launch
success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital
expendable launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still
proposes
[[Page 62826]]
a location review based on an assumption of containment.
The approaches provided in the four location review appendices are
based on some common assumptions that reflect limitations of the launch
site location review analysis. The FAA is not requiring an applicant to
analyze the risks posed to the public by toxic materials that might be
handled at the proposed site, nor the risk to ships or aircraft from
launch debris or planned jettisoning of stages. The FAA recognizes that
these assumptions represent a limitation in the launch site location
review. The FAA intends that these three risks will be dealt with
through pre-flight operational controls and flight commit criteria
which are partially addressed through part 420 coordination
requirements and which also will be identified as part of a launch
license review. All launches that take place from a U.S. launch site
whose operation is licensed will either be regulated by the FAA through
a launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the
government carries out for the government.
The two methods for creating guided expendable launch vehicle
flight corridors are intended to account for expendable launch vehicle
failure rate, malfunction turn capability, and the expendable launch
vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by the impact dispersions of these
vehicles. The premise undergirding each of these methods is that debris
would be contained within the defined flight corridor or impact
dispersion areas. Accordingly, for purposes of a launch site location
review, only the populations within the defined areas need to be
analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that were a flight termination
system to fail to destroy a vehicle as intended, a launch vehicle could
stray outside its planned flight corridor. That concern will be better
accommodated through another forum, namely, the licensing of a launch
operator and the review of that launch operator's flight safety system.
Because a containment analysis only looks at how far debris would
travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed, the containment
analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight termination
system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the acceptability of
a launch site's location for launching guided expendable launch
vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning vehicle will be
destroyed and debris will always impact within acceptable boundaries.
Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to explore, for purposes of
determining the acceptability of a launch site's location, the
possibility that a vehicle's flight termination system may fail and
that the vehicle could continue to travel toward populated areas. Any
proposed site may present such risks--indeed, any proposed launch
presents such risks--but they are best addressed in the context of
individual launch systems. This working assumption of a perfectly
reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply to the
licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider the
reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of a
launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that for
the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced
debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need
for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight
corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.
Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to
analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally
jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for
the final stage of a guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. The
FAA does not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to
assess the general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable
launch vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently
launch vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided
expendable launch vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks
from nominally jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A
launch license review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not
going to impact in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed
for launches from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low
risk posed by controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the
risk posed by wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.
Each of the FAA's approaches to defining flight corridors or impact
dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk launch event
associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is not meant to
imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily acceptable; only
that they will not be considered in the course of this review. For a
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle, that event is vehicle
failure. For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the
launch event of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted
impact of stages. For a guided expendable launch vehicle the overflight
risk, which results from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction
(assuming no FTS failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally
jettisoned debris are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For
an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the FAA proposes
that risk due to stage impact be analyzed instead of the overflight
risk. This distinction is necessitated by the fact that the failure
rate during thrust is historically significantly lower for unguided
vehicles than for guided vehicles. Current unguided expendable launch
vehicles with many years of use are highly reliable. They do not employ
an FTS; therefore, debris pieces usually consist of vehicle components
that are not broken up. Another reason for the difference between
analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact dispersions are
significantly larger than guided vehicle impact dispersions. These
differences add up to greater risk within an unguided expendable launch
vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas outside the
dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only performed on
those populations within an unguided expendable launch vehicle stage
impact dispersion area.
An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion
zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate
that the OEZ can be clear of members of the public during a flight. An
OEZ defines the area where the public risk criteria of 30
x 10-6 would be exceeded if one person were present in the
open. The overflight exclusion zone was estimated from risk
computations for each expendable launch vehicle type and class. An
applicant must define an OEZ because expendable launch vehicle range
rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle effective casualty
areas, the area within which all casualties are assumed to occur
through exposure to debris, are large, and impact dispersion areas are
dense with debris so that the presence of one person inside this
hazardous area is expected to produce Ec values exceeding
the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant must either own the
property, demonstrate to the FAA that there are times when people are
not present, or that it could clear the public from the overflight
exclusion zone prior to flight. Evacuating an overflight exclusion zone
for an inland site, might, for example, require an applicant to
demonstrate that agreements have been reached with local communities to
close any public roads during a launch.
The FAA has made a few changes to the Launch Site NPRM for this
final rule. First, the launch site location
[[Page 62827]]
review regulatory text has been expanded to better map out the launch
site location review for both ELVs and RLVs. The appendices remain
essentially the same.
Second, the size of the flight corridors that are generated in
either appendix A or B are now assumed in appendix C to reflect a
three-sigma event. The NPRM had used five-sigma. To review, for
purposes of the launch site location review, a flight corridor is an
area on the Earth's surface estimated to contain debris of a ballistic
coefficient of 3 pounds per square foot from nominal and
non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle, assuming a perfectly
functioning flight termination system. The land encompassed by the
flight corridor includes the population most at risk due to a launch.
The data used to develop a flight corridor does not directly provide
statistical significance. However, the relative risk to any specific
populated area can be assumed to vary proportionally with the populated
area's distance from the nominal trajectory ground trace. The NPRM
assumed the boundaries were five-sigma distances, which proved unwise
because the statistical probability of an event occurring between
three-sigma and five-sigma is extremely small. The launch site location
review procedures are not precise enough for the FAA to claim that a
flight corridor contains all of the population at risk at such a low
probability level. Assuming that the distance to the flight corridor
boundary is three-sigma is a more reasonable assumption.
Third, the multipliers in the launch site location review have been
taken out. In the Launch Site NPRM, to add conservatism to the launch
site location review, applicants would multiply the final Ec
value obtained through either appendix C or appendix D by a multiplier
of two and five, respectively. This final rule does not make use of
multipliers because the FAA, upon reconsideration, now believes that
the procedures for estimating risk in appendices A-D are conservative
enough to not require a multiplier at the end of the process.
Lastly, the FAA clarified in the regulatory text that orbital
expendable launch vehicles are classified by weight class, based on the
weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a 100-nm orbit, as
defined in table 2.
Discussion of Comments
The FAA received comments on the launch site location review from
ACTA, Inc; the New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization; Oklahoma
Aeronautics and Space Commission; Space Access, LLC; Christopher Shove;
and the Texas Aerospace Commission.
ACTA stated that medium to large vehicles launched from Cape
Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) do not meet the risk criteria. ACTA at 1.
The FAA disagrees. Using Appendix B, medium to large vehicles do pass
the launch site location review.
ACTA stated that unlike under EWR 127-1, the FAA has decided not to
permit any risk above 30 x 10-6. This coupled with a very
conservative approach to risk analysis could prove detrimental to the
U.S. industry. ACTA at 1. The FAA disagrees. The expected casualty
acceptable risk level, 30 x 10-6, is not new. It is a
current requirement for launches. Second, the very conservative
approach proposed is conservative because simplifying assumptions were
made. In many instances the FAA believes that such approaches
adequately demonstrate the acceptability of the site location without
the added burden of more complex analysis. It should not prove
detrimental because applicants may do a more refined, less conservative
analysis. To make this option explicit, sections 420.23 and 420.25,
covering the flight corridor and risk analysis, respectively,
explicitly state that the FAA will approve an alternate method if an
applicant provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its
proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required
in the appendices.
ACTA also states that the risk analysis methodology presented in
the document is very simplistic. There are better methods available,
albeit more complex, but the NPRM does not allow for any other
methodology. ACTA recommended that an applicant be allowed to use
equivalent approved analysis methods and processes that have been
validated by use at federal ranges involved in ELV and RLV activities.
ACTA at 2, 6 and 7. The FAA agrees and has modified the launch site
location review to allow such methods without a waiver. The analysis
methodology is intended to be simplistic and conservative. The actual
risks will be less than that estimated by the methodologies provided.
In many cases, the site applicant may not have available the inputs
necessary to provide a detailed risk analysis. In addition, many launch
sites are so remote that they do not need detailed analyses to show
that the risk levels are acceptable. New under these final rules is
that an applicant has the option of using higher fidelity
methodologies.
ACTA states that the NPRM offers no insight into the source of
numbers, such as casualty areas, that the FAA directs the license
applicant to use. The references should be identified. ACTA at 1.
Review of the Launch Site NPRM shows that the FAA provided its sources.
The NPRM stated, for example, to address the issues raised, that the
FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table C-3 from DAMP, a
series of risk estimation computer programs used at federal launch
ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in table 1, section
420.21. 64 FR at 34353.
ACTA and ACTA staff raised concerns regarding issues not addressed
in this rulemaking. ACTA stated that the NPRM did not address launch-
related risk from potential toxic releases, from far-field window
breakage, or debris risk to ships and aircraft. ACTA at 1, 2. ACTA
staff added that ignoring the existence of established major air
corridors or shipping lanes seems shortsighted. ACTA at 9. The FAA
disagrees. Air corridors and shipping lanes are not ignored. A launch
site operator must have an agreement in place with FAA Air Traffic and
the Coast Guard covering those issues before it will get a license.
The FAA agrees that the issues of toxicity and windows breaking
should not be ignored for launch safety, and launch -related risk from
potential toxic releases, from far-field window breakage, or debris
risk to ships and aircraft are covered in launch license application
reviews. Toxic and blast risks were not covered in this rulemaking
because launching only when circumstances such as wind are favorable
can minimize such risks. The FAA considers these issues better
addressed through the launch license. Second, debris risk to ships and
aircraft are addressed in these regulations. An applicant must conclude
agreements with the Coast Guard and the FAA Air Traffic in order to
address ship and aircraft risk, and a separate rulemaking addresses
these issues with additional specificity.
ACTA states that the level of analysis in the NPRM seems to assume
that the applicant will be very naive, and not have access to good
tools or consultant support. ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees. Not all
applicants are flight safety specialists. The FAA believes that
providing tools and data to conduct risk and other analyses is
beneficial to the industry. The proposed appendices take an applicant
step by step through the process.
ACTA states that the FAA's lack of methodology for risk analysis in
the back azimuth direction other than the
[[Page 62828]]
exclusion zone implies that there is no back azimuth risk. ACTA at 2.
The FAA does not wish to imply that there is no back azimuth risk.
There is. However, as noted in the NPRM, the launch site location
review assumes a perfectly functioning flight safety system. Therefore,
population behind the launch site is only addressed if it is within the
overflight exclusion zone or within the flight corridor due to wind
effects. Otherwise back azimuth population is not reviewed. A launch
license applicant will need to adequately address all flight risks in
order to receive a license.
ACTA states that the instantaneous impact point (IIP) rates are
unrealistically low, particularly late in flight. If only powered
flight is considered, the average IIP rate will increase. Using a lower
IIP rate inflates the computed risk. ACTA at 2. The FAA notes that the
IIP range rate data was intended to be conservative but, as discussed
in the NPRM, they are not unrealistically low. 64 FR at 34342.
ACTA states that the effective casualty areas seem very high. The
casualty area numbers are a prime contributor to the unrealistically
high risks computed by these methods. ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees that
the casualty area are unrealistically high if one considers, for each
piece of debris, its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact
explosions, the size of a person, and debris skip, splatter, and
bounce. They are also intended to be conservative. Higher fidelity
analyses will be necessary for the launch license application. Also,
now that the FAA will permit higher fidelity analyses that produce an
equivalent level of safety, the FAA finds that the concern is
addressed.
ACTA states that the overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) is designed to
protect an individual in the public at a risk level of
30 x 10-6 casualties. ACTA further states that this seems
rather loose, and that the Range Commanders Council Standard suggests
1 x 10-7 fatalities and the Eastern Range (ER) and Western
Range (WR) have used 1 x 10-6 casualties as an individual
risk limit for the general public. ACTA at 3. The FAA disagrees. ACTA
misunderstood what was stated in the NPRM. The NPRM actually states
that an overflight exclusion zone is the area where the collective risk
to the public would be greater than 30 x 10-6 if one person
were present in the open. 64 FR 34329. The overflight exclusion zone
does not incorporate an individual risk standard per se, but is merely
an area that must be clear of population for the collective risk
standard to be met.
ACTA states that if 30 x 10-6 was used as the basis for
developing the distance Dmax, then Dmax appears
quite conservative for that risk level. ACTA at 3. The FAA did not use
the criteria of 30 x 10-6 as the basis for develo ![[logo] US EPA](http://www.epa.gov/epafiles/images/logo_epaseal.gif){kind=logo}