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• [[pp. 4153-4202]] Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger

[[pp. 4153-4202]] Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger

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 [Federal Register: January 17, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 11)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 4153-4202]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr17ja01-11]

[[pp. 4153-4202]] Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger
Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices

[[Continued from page 4152]]

[[Page 4153]]

made. FRA would expect a railroad to consider the guidance contained in
this paragraph when making its decisions on where equipment containing
brake defects will be repaired. The guidance contained in this
paragraph is based upon, and consistent with, the voluminous case law
which exists that establishes the guiding principles for determining
whether a location constitutes a location where the necessary repairs
can be made as well as previous enforcement actions taken and guidance
provided by FRA regarding such locations. The final rule guidance
incorporates the principles discussed in the ``Overview of Comments and
General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading
``Movement of Equipment with Defective Brakes.''
    Paragraph (g) provides a method by which a railroad may designate
locations where various brake system repairs will be conducted.
Although FRA does not believe that railroads should be permitted to
unilaterally designate locations where brake system repair will be
conducted, FRA does believe that a railroad in cooperation with its
employees could potentially develop a plan that designates locations
where brake system repairs will be effectuated. This paragraph makes
clear that such a plan would have to be consistent with the guidelines
contained in paragraph (f) and that such plans would have to be
approved by FRA prior to being implemented. This paragraph also makes
clear that for FRA to entertain a proposal containing a plan which
designates locations where brake system repairs will be conducted a
railroad and representatives of its employees must submit the proposal
jointly . FRA does not intend to consider proposals nominally submitted
pursuant to this provision that are not supported by a railroad's
employees and their representatives.

Section 223.17   Special Approval Process

    This section contains the procedures to be followed when seeking to
obtain FRA approval of a pre-revenue service acceptance plan under
Sec. 232.505 for completely new brake system technologies or major
upgrades to existing systems or when seeking approval of an alternative
to the test standard incorporated in Secs. 232.305 or 232.307. Several
railroads and manufacturers contended, both in response to the 1994
NPRM and at the RSAC Working Group meetings, that FRA needed to devise
some sort of quick approval process in order to permit the industry to
make modifications to incorporated standards or existing equipment
based on the emergence of new technology. Thus, FRA proposed an
approval process it believed should speed the process for taking
advantage of new technologies over that which is currently available
under the waiver process. However, in order to provide an opportunity
for all interested parties to provide input for use by FRA in its
decision making process, as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act, FRA believes that any special approval provision must, at a
minimum, provide proper notice to the public of any significant change
or action being considered by the agency with regard to existing
regulations.
    This section essentially retains the proposed special approval
process. One private car owner commented that the procedures should
require FRA to publish any petition received within 30 days of receipt
and to rule on the petition within 30 days of receipt of the last
comment. Certain representatives of rail labor asserted that the
special approval procedures should be tightened to be consistent with
the requirements for granting a waiver and that the comment period
should be extended and expanded to provide adequate time for parties to
prepare. As the special approval process only applies to pre-revenue
testing plans and the procedures for conducting single car and repair
track air brake tests and because the purpose of the process is to
speed the decision making process, FRA does not believe it is necessary
to further lengthen the comment periods proposed in the NPRM, and FRA
thinks that the procedures provide an adequate opportunity for
interested parties to comment. Furthermore, if the procedures for these
special approvals are made overly burdensome then the speed intended to
be gained through the process would be lost. However, FRA also does not
believe that the proposed time frames provided for FRA's consideration
of a petition should be reduced. FRA believes that the time frames
included in the proposal for FRA consideration are necessary for FRA to
fully consider all comments and information received.

Section 232.19   Availability of Records

    This section makes clear that unless otherwise provided by this
part, the records and plans required to be developed and maintained by
this part shall be made available to representatives of FRA and States
participating under part 212 of this chapter for inspection and copying
upon request. FRA has added this section to the final rule in order to
specifically clarify the availability of such records while increasing
the readability of the rule and reducing the unnecessary repetition of
the requirement throughout the text of the rule.

Section 232.21   Information Collection

    This section indicates the provisions of this part that have been
approved by the Office of Management and Budget for compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. See 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. A more
detailed discussion of the information collection requirements
contained in this part is provided in the ``Regulatory Impact'' portion
of this preamble.

Subpart B--General Requirements

Section 232.101  Scope

    This section contains a formal statement of the scope of this
specific subpart of the final rule. This subpart is intended to
establish general operating, performance, and design standards for
railroads that operate freight or other non-passenger trains and
further contains specific requirements for equipment used in these
types of operations.

Section 232.103  General Requirements for All Train Brake Systems

    This section contains general requirements that are applicable to
all freight and non-passenger train brake systems. This section
specifically includes certain basic train brake system practices and
procedures that form the foundation for the safe operation of all types
of trains. Some of these basic principles are so obvious that they have
not been specifically included in past rules. For example, paragraphs
(a)-(c) state the most basic safety requirements for all train brake
systems, which include having the ability to stop a train within the
existing signal spacing, maintaining and monitoring the integrity of
the train brake communication line, and having the train brake system
respond as intended to signals from the brake communication line. These
basic requirements were proposed in the NPRM and have been retained in
this final rule without change.
    Paragraph (d) contains the provision requiring trains to have 100
percent operative and effective power brakes prior to use at, or
departure, from certain locations and prohibiting the hauling of a car
with inoperative or ineffective power brakes from certain under 49
U.S.C. 20303. Paragraph (d) has been slightly modified from that

[[Page 4154]]

proposed in the NPRM in order to clarify that the requirement applies
only to trains that are required to receive a Class I brake test at the
location. This modification was made in order to specifically clarify
that the 100 percent operative brake requirement is not intended to
apply to transfer trains that originate at a location where the
necessary brake repairs cannot be effectuated. FRA agrees with the
concerns raised by various commenters that the proposed language could
have been interpreted as applying to transfer trains. FRA agrees that
the 100 percent requirement does not currently apply to such trains,
and it was not FRA's intention when issuing the NPRM to extend its
application to such trains. However, it should be noted that if a
transfer train originates at a location where repairs to the equipment
containing defective brakes can be effectuated, then the train would be
required to have 100 percent operative brakes prior to being used or
departing that location.
    Contrary to the contentions of certain commenters, FRA continues to
believe that there is adequate justification for retaining the 100
percent requirement. The requirement to have 100 percent operative
brakes prior to departing a location where an initial terminal brake
test is required to be performed has existed in the railroad industry
for decades. FRA believes it is not only wise from a safety standpoint,
as it ensures the proper operation of a train's brake system at least
once during its existence, but the requirement sets the proper tone for
what FRA expects to be accomplished at these locations. FRA believes
that requiring 100 percent operative brakes on trains at their origin
provides the railroads with a margin for failure of some brakes while
the train is in transit (up to 15 percent) and tends to ensure that
defective equipment is being repaired in a timely fashion. In addition,
FRA believes that the 100 percent requirement is consistent not only
with Congress' understanding of the AAR inspection standards that were
adopted in 1958, but also with the intent of FRA, rail management, and
rail labor as to what was to occur at initial terminals when the
inspection interval was increased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles in
1982. At that time, carrier representatives committed to the
performance of quality initial terminal inspections in exchange for an
extension in the inspection interval, for which FRA intends to hold
them accountable.
    Some commenters recommended that FRA permit any and all trains that
have 95 percent operative brakes to operate from their point of origin
to destination and noted that Canada currently allows such operation.
FRA believes that such an approach would be completely contrary to the
existing statutory mandate regarding the movement of equipment with
defective brakes. The existing statutory provision regarding the
movement of equipment with defective brakes requires that such
equipment be repaired at the nearest location where the necessary
repairs can be performed. See 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, trains
that originate at or that operate through locations where the necessary
brake repairs can be effectuated are clearly required by the statute to
have 100 percent operative brakes prior to departing those locations.
    FRA realizes that the 100 percent requirement creates a somewhat
illogical situation at some locations by requiring certain trains to
have 100 percent operative brakes prior to departing the location and
yet allowing other trains to pick up defective equipment at the same
location. However, FRA believes that various safety benefits are
created by retaining the 100 percent requirement. The public is assured
that a train's brake system is in near perfect condition at the
beginning of its journey, train crews are more cognizant of the
presence of defective cars in the train when they are picked up en
route, railroads are more likely to perform repairs at a location where
trains are initiated in order to avoid breaking up trains to set out
defective cars once the trains are assembled, and FRA retains a clear
and consistent enforcement standard that can be easily understood by
its inspectors and railroad industry employees.
    Although FRA recognizes that the 100 percent requirement may be
somewhat burdensome for some railroads at certain locations, FRA
believes that the number of locations involved is relatively low and
should be handled on a case-by-case basis through the existing waiver
process. FRA believes that many railroads have created their own
problems by eliminating repair facilities and personnel at many of the
outlying locations that the railroads now claim they lack the ability
to make appropriate repairs. Furthermore, FRA believes that the best
method of assessing the safety implications of permitting a location to
operate trains with less than 100 percent operative brakes is for the
railroad to provide information on how the railroad will handle the
defective equipment based on the specific needs and operating
characteristics of the railroad involved.
    In the NPRM, FRA provided various approaches under which it would
potentially consider allowing a railroad to operate trains from their
initial terminals with less than 100 percent operative brakes. See 63
FR 48310. The methods suggested by FRA were rejected as being overly
burdensome by several commenters. Therefore, FRA believes the burden
falls on each railroad seeking relief from the 100 percent requirement
at certain outlying locations to provide FRA with an operating plan
that will ensure the safe operation of such trains and provide for the
timely and certain repair of any defective equipment moved from those
locations. Consequently, FRA believes that there are a few existing
locations that may be candidates for receiving a waiver from the 100
percent requirement, and FRA is willing to consider waivers for such
locations; however the railroads applying for such waivers must be able
to establish a true need for the exception and must be willing to
provide alternative operating procedures that ensure the safety of the
trains being operated from those locations.
    Paragraph (e) contains a clear and absolute prohibition on train
movement if more than 15 percent of the cars in a train have their
brakes cut out or have otherwise inoperative brakes. Although there is
no explicit limit contained in the statute regarding the number of cars
with inoperative brake equipment that may be hauled in a train, the 15-
percent limitation is a longstanding industry and agency interpretation
of the hauling-for-repair provision currently codified at 49 U.S.C.
20303, and has withstood the test of time. This interpretation is
extrapolated from another statutory requirement which permits a
railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the vehicles
in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the engineer
is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on all other
vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those vehicles in
a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted in 1903,
section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the
authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC issued an
order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 CFR
232.1, which codified the ICC order. One labor representative
recommended that this requirement be eliminated as it creates confusion
regarding the movement of defective equipment. FRA believes that if the
rule is read in its entirety there should be no

[[Page 4155]]

confusion as to the movement of defective equipment, and that this
provision merely sets an outside limit on the percentage of cars that
may be hauled in any train with inoperative brakes. Consequently, FRA
believes the express prohibition is necessary and will continue to
require that equipment with inoperative air brakes make up no more than
15 percent of any train.
    As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power
brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory
requirement cited above is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of
the cars in a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled
for repairs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Therefore, paragraph (f) makes
clear that a train's air brakes shall be in effective and operable
condition unless a car is being hauled for repairs pursuant to the
conditions contained in Sec. 232.15. This section retains the proposed
standard for determining when a freight car's air brakes are not in
effective operating condition based on piston travel. The piston travel
limits for standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders are the same as
currently required under Sec. 232.11(c). Certain labor representatives
asserted that the permissible piston travel for these brake cylinders
should be reduced to 10 inches rather than the currently allowed 10\1/
2\ inches. These commenters provided no technical data to support such
a change, and FRA is not aware of any problems or unsafe conditions
resulting from the current 10\1/2\ inch piston travel allowance on such
brake cylinders. Consequently, the final rule retains the existing
piston travel limits for standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders.
    Due to the proliferation of equipment with other than standard 12-
inch stroke brake cylinders, FRA has found that mechanical forces and
train crew members performing brake system inspections often do not
know the acceptable range of brake piston travel for this non-standard
equipment. In an attempt to improve this situation and to ensure the
proper operation of a car's brakes after being inspected, FRA proposed
that vehicles equipped with other than standard 12-inch stroke brake
cylinders have either the badge plate for the vehicle or a stencil,
sticker, or marker indicate the acceptable range of piston travel for
the brake equipment on that vehicle. FRA also proposed that the
information on the badge plate, sticker, stencil, or marker include
both the permissible brake cylinder piston travel range for the vehicle
at Class I brake tests and the lengths at which the piston travel
renders the brake ineffective. Paragraph (g) generally retains these
proposed requirements. FRA continues to believe that this information
is essential in order for a person to properly perform the brake
inspections contained in this final due to the growing number of cars
with other than standard brake designs. The requirement has been
slightly modified from that proposed to require that the outside piston
travel limit need only be provided if it is different from the Class I
brake test limit. FRA agrees with the contentions of certain commenters
that such information would be unnecessarily redundant if the limits
are the same. Thus, if there is no outside limit indicated on the badge
plate, stencil, sticker, or marker the piston travel limits indicated
for the Class I/ initial terminal brake test for the vehicle will be
considered the outside piston travel limits for that vehicle.
    The AAR recommends that, in addition to vehicles equipped with
standard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders, FRA should also except
vehicles equipped with WABCOPAC or NYCOPAC truck-mounted brake
cylinders from the marking requirements contained in paragraph (g). The
AAR contends that the stenciling or marking of the piston travel limits
on these vehicles is unnecessary because the piston travel limits for
these brake systems are well-known and nearly 30 percent of the fleet
is equipped with them. FRA disagrees with this contention. Based on
FRA's experience in monitoring the performance of various brake tests,
FRA believes that many employees are not aware of the piston travel
limits for the brake systems noted above. Furthermore, there are
numerous truck-mounted brake cylinders currently in use that have
piston travel limits which are different from those of the WABCOPAC and
NYCOPAC truck-mounted systems. Thus, FRA believes all vehicles equipped
with these brake systems need to be marked in order to avoid confusion
by individuals inspecting the equipment and thus ensure the proper
operation of the brakes on such cars. Moreover, FRA is aware that many
vehicles equipped with the type of truck-mounted brake systems sought
to be excepted by AAR, particularly privately owned vehicles, already
have decals, stickers, or stencils containing the information required
by this paragraph.
    The AAR also recommends that railroads be provided eight years in
which to implement the marking requirements contained in this paragraph
in order to perform the work during the required periodic single car or
repair track air brake tests. FRA believes such an allowance of time is
unnecessary and excessive. The reason FRA is permitting the information
to be marked on the car with either a decal, stencil, or sticker is to
provide the railroads with relatively simple and easy methods for bring
cars into compliance without requiring them to be placed in a
maintenance facility or on a repair track to have the information
affixed. FRA believes that the three-year applicability period provided
by this final rule provides railroads with sufficient time to mark cars
as required. Furthermore, many cars are already properly marked with
the necessary information as noted in the previous discussion.
    Paragraph (h) requires that all equipment ordered or placed in
service for the first time on or after the specified dates, be designed
not to require an inspector to place himself or herself on, under, or
between components of the equipment to observe brake actuation or
release. This paragraph allows railroads the flexibility of using a
reliable indicator in place of requiring direct observation of the
brake application or piston travel because the designs of some freight
car brake systems make direct observation extremely difficult unless
the inspector places himself or herself underneath the equipment.
Indicators of brake system piston travel or piston cylinder pressure
have been used with satisfactory results for many years. Although
indicators do not provide 100 percent certainty that the brakes are
effective, FRA believes that they have proven themselves effective
enough to be preferable to requiring an inspector to assume a dangerous
position. Some commenters recommended that the indicator alternative be
eliminated and that railroads should not be allowed to rely on
indicators. FRA believes that these commenters fail to recognize the
need to provide some alternative to direct observation of the piston
travel on certain equipment and fail to acknowledge the existence of
new technologies available to the industry. Further, although the rule
permits the use of an indicator for purposes of determining piston
travel, the individual inspecting such equipment would be required to
inspect all components of the brake system for proper operation.
    This requirement stems primarily from the brake system design of
double-stack equipment currently used by several larger freight
operations. Several commenters have indicated that the functioning of
the brakes on this type of equipment cannot be observed without

[[Page 4156]]

inspectors placing themselves in potentially dangerous positions. In
addition, a complete inspection of the brake equipment and systems used
on double-stack equipment is time consuming. Consequently, inspectors
are reluctant to conduct a complete brake inspection test on departing
trains that contain this type of equipment. FRA thinks that double-
stack equipment is becoming a mainstay of the freight railroad industry
and that this design deficiency must be corrected. Thus, FRA has
attempted to make this a performance requirement by simply specifying
how the equipment must function and allowing the industry to determine
the method of compliance.
    Paragraph (i) retains the proposed requirement that an emergency
brake application feature be available at any time and that it produce
an irretrievable stop. This section merely codifies current industry
practice and ensures that all equipment will continue to be designed
with an emergency brake application feature. In the 1994 NPRM on power
brakes, FRA proposed a requirement that all trains be equipped with an
emergency application feature capable of increasing the train's
deceleration rate a minimum of 15 percent. See 59 FR 47729. This
proposed requirement merely restated the emergency specification
currently contained in Appendix B to part 232. Comments received in
response to that proposal indicated that some brake equipment currently
in use or being developed could provide a deceleration rate with a full
service application that is close to the emergency brake rate and that
the proposed requirement would require the lowering of full service
brake rates, thereby compromising safety and lowering train speeds.
Consequently, the requirement proposed in the 1998 and retained in this
final rule removes the 15-percent differential.
    Paragraphs (j) and (k), which were proposed as paragraphs (k) and
(l), impose on the railroads the responsibility for determining maximum
air brake system working pressure and maximum brake pipe pressure.
These provisions were contained in both the 1994 and 1998 NPRM, and FRA
received no comments objecting to their inclusion. See 59 FR 47743.
Thus, FRA intends to continue to allow individual railroads the wide
latitude currently permitted in determining these pressures.
    Paragraph (l), previously proposed as paragraph (m), provides that
except as provided by other provisions of this part, all equipment used
in freight or other non-passenger trains shall, at a minimum, meet the
performance specification for freight brakes in AAR standard S-469-47.
The AAR standard incorporated by reference in this paragraph contains
all the provisions currently referenced in Sec. 232.3 and contained in
existing Appendix B to part 232. In the NPRM, FRA sought comments from
interested parties as to the necessity of referencing these standards
as well as any information on any updated standards related to the
performance of freight equipment that is currently being used
throughout the industry. Although one commenter generally asserted that
the standards should merely be included as a reference and that their
inclusion would require retroactive validation of proven designs, FRA
finds little merit in this contention since any existing equipment
should already be designed to the specifications as they are currently
part of the existing regulations. Except as noted below, FRA received
no comments seeking specific changes to the referenced specifications
or other objections to their inclusion.
    It should be noted that the provision previously proposed in
paragraph (j) of this section requiring that the air brake components
that control brake application and release be adequately sealed to
prevent contamination by foreign material (63 FR 48359) has been
removed due to its incorporation in another provision contained in this
final rule. As the proposed requirement is contained in AAR standard S-
469-47 as one of the general specification requirements, there is no
reason to retain the specific requirement in this final rule. Thus,
although the requirement has been specifically removed from the rule
text, it is retained by its inclusion in the referenced AAR standard.
Furthermore, FRA finds AAR's objection to this requirement somewhat
hard to understand. FRA is not imposing a new requirement but merely
sets forth an existing requirement contained in an AAR standard.
Contrary to the concerns raised by AAR, FRA does not intend to change
the existing standard of compliance for this requirement.
    Paragraph (m), previously proposed as paragraph (n), retains the
proposed requirement that if an en route train qualified by the Air
Flow Method experiences a brake pipe air flow of greater than 60 CFM or
brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi and the movable pointer does
not return to those limits within a reasonable time the train must be
stopped at the next available location and inspected for leaks in the
brake system. This requirement one of the conditions of the general
waiver granted to the AAR allowing the use of the air flow method to
qualify train air brakes. FRA believes that this requirement is
necessary to prevent trains with excessive leakage from continuing to
operate. If a train has excessive leakage, the engineer may lack the
ability to stop the train using the air brake system. Other than the
general contention raised by certain labor representatives that the Air
Flow Method not be allowed, FRA received no specific comments on the
requirements contained in this paragraph.
    Paragraph (n), previously proposed as paragraph (o), contains
requirements regarding the setting and releasing of hand brakes on
equipment that is left unattended. The requirements contained in this
paragraph differ from those previously proposed in the NPRM. In the
NPRM, FRA proposed various requirements for securing standing
equipment. The requirements proposed in the NPRM were basically a
reiteration of the guidance issued by FRA in Safety Advisory 97-2 on
September 15, 1997. See 62 FR 49046. The securement guidance contained
in Safety Advisory 97-2 was based upon FRA's review of an incident that
occurred on August 20, 1997 near Fort Worth, Texas, and its awareness
of other incidents involving the improper securement of rolling
equipment. The Safety Advisory was issued in order to provide the
industry with some assistance and guidance regarding securement
procedures and to provide information on current practices of the
industry related to the securement of rolling stock. Id.
    The requirements proposed in the NPRM where also intended to
address the practice known as ``bottling the air'' in a standing cut of
cars, an issue related to improperly secured rail equipment. The
practice of ``bottling the air'' occurs when a train crew sets out cars
from a train with the air brakes applied and the angle cocks on both
ends of the train closed, thus trapping the existing compressed air and
conserving the brake pipe pressure in the cut of cars they intend to
leave behind. This practice has the potential of causing, first, an
unintentional release of the brakes on these cars and, ultimately, a
runaway. Many railroad operating rules require that a 20-pound
reduction in brake pipe pressure be made when stopping a train to
remove a cut of cars from the train. Thus, if the trainman closes the
angle cock where the cut is to be made before pressure equalizes in the
trainline, an air wave action may form that can be of sufficient
amplitude to initiate an unintentional release of the brakes.

[[Page 4157]]

    Brake pipe gradient is another factor that makes bottling the air
dangerous. ``Normal gradient'' is a term used to express the difference
between the higher pressure on the front end of the train and the lower
pressure on the rear end of the train, which is dependent upon brake
pipe leakage and train length. Each train establishes its own normal
gradient value. ``Inverse gradients'' and ``False gradients'' are
temporary gradients that are a result of brake operations. Inverse
gradients occur when a brake pipe reduction is made, temporarily making
the brake pipe pressure higher on the rear of the train. The false
gradient is created anytime the train brakes are set and released, thus
temporarily resulting in a higher than normal pressure differential
between the front and rear end of the train as the brake pipe charges.
Therefore, if the engineer sets and releases a train's brakes a
sufficient number of times prior to stopping to remove a cut of cars, a
false gradient could be established. Even if the engineer made a 20-
pound brake pipe reduction and listened for the air to stop exhausting
at the automatic brake valve before giving the signal to the trainman
to cut off the cars, the potential exists for an unintentional release
of air brakes if the air on the cars is bottled. The false gradient
could be of such magnitude that, as the trainline attempts to equalize,
the higher pressure on the front end flowing to the rear will exceed
the 1\1/2\ pound differential across the service piston and cause a
release of air brakes. An inverse gradient can also create an
unintentional release of brakes. As brake pipe pressure is reduced at
the front of the train, the rear end temporarily has a higher pressure.
As the trainline attempts to equalize, the pressure on the front end
will rise. In some circumstances, this rise could be enough to initiate
a release of air brakes.
    On June 5, 1998, the NTSB issued the following recommendation to
FRA:

    Issue a regulation that requires the brake pipe pressure to be
depleted to zero and an angle cock to remain open on standing
railroad equipment that is detached from a locomotive controlling
the brake pipe pressure.

(R-98-17). This recommendation was the result of NTSB's investigation
of an incident that occurred on January 27, 1997, on the Apache Railway
near Holbrook, Arizona. The incident involved the runaway of 77 cars
down a 1.7 percent grade for 14 miles resulting in the eventual
derailment of 46 cars and the release of hazardous materials. Although
there were no fatalities, 150 people were evacuated from nearby
residential areas. The NTSB determined that the 77 cars rolled away
unattended because the conductor of the train had trapped the air in
the brake system, i.e., ``bottled the air,'' which resulted in an
undesired release of the brakes on the standing cars. In its
recommendation the NTSB correctly noted that FRA statistics show that
ten accidents occurred between 1994 and 1995 which were attributable to
the practice of ``bottling the air.''
    FRA received numerous comments from the AAR and various other
representatives of the railroads objecting to the proposed provisions
regarding the securement of standing equipment. Although these
commenters generally agreed with the intended purpose of the proposed
requirements, they believed that the proposed provisions were
overbroad, increased certain safety hazards, and exposed railroad
employees to higher risk of injury. These commenters contend that the
goals of FRA could be accomplished in a less burdensome fashion while
increasing safety and reducing the potential for employee injuries.
After reviewing the comments submitted by these parties, FRA agrees
with most of the recommendations provided. Consequently, the provisions
contained in this paragraph have been modified to reflect those
recommendations.
    FRA agrees with the recommendation that the requirements contained
in this paragraph should be applied only to unattended equipment rather
than to standing equipment generally. FRA agrees that, if the train is
attended, the setting of handbrakes serves no useful purpose and would
result in an enormous cost to the industry. Therefore, paragraph (n)
contains a definition of ``unattended equipment'' to clarify the
applicability of the requirements contained in this paragraph. The term
covers equipment left standing and unmanned in such a manner that the
brake system of the equipment cannot be readily controlled by a
qualified person.
    FRA also agrees that the proposed requirement that railroads
develop a matrix to determine the number of hand brakes that are to be
applied may not be the best approach to ensure that a sufficient number
of hand brakes have been applied to a specific cut of unattended
equipment. FRA agrees that the number of hand brakes required to be
applied depends on a wide variety of factors not easily captured in a
matrix format and that a matrix approach might result in either too few
or too many hand brakes being applied. Thus, paragraph (n)(1)
eliminates the requirement for developing a matrix and is modified to
include a performance-based requirement that a sufficient number of
hand brakes be applied to hold the equipment and a requirement that
railroads develop and implement a process or procedure to verify that
the applied hand brakes will sufficiently hold the equipment when the
air brakes are released. This requirement will permit a railroad to
develop appropriate operating rules to verify the sufficiency of the
handbrakes applied which can be tailored to the specific territory and
equipment operated by the railroad. On some railroads and at some
locations, these operating rules may include the use of a matrix or
some other type of set calculation.
    Paragraph (n)(2) addresses the issue of ``bottling air'' on
unattended equipment. This paragraph requires that an emergency brake
application be initiated on all equipment prior to its being left
unattended. This paragraph no longer requires that the locomotive be
detached to effectuate the emergency application as was proposed. FRA
agrees with the concerns raised by certain parties that the proposed
requirement to detach locomotives to allow an emergency application of
the brakes is not appropriate or desirable in many circumstances. FRA
agrees that it is not necessary to detach locomotives to initiate an
emergency application, that it is safer to leave the locomotives
attached due to redundant securement features on a locomotive, that an
emergency application should not be made until it is known that the
number of hand brakes set is sufficient, and that it would be very
burdensome to detach locomotives every time a train is left unattended.
    Paragraphs (n)(3) and (n)(4) contain the requirements for securing
unattended locomotives. FRA agrees with the recommendations made by
various commenters that the proposed requirements regarding locomotive
securement were over broad by failing to distinguish among (i)
locomotives in the lead consist of a train, (ii) distributed power
locomotives, and (iii) locomotives within yard limits. FRA agrees that
these securement requirements contained in this final rule should not
apply to distributed power locomotives. Consequently, these paragraphs
establish specific securement requirements that apply only to
locomotives in the lead consist of a train and are based on the
location of the locomotive or locomotive consist when it is being left
unattended.
    Paragraph (n)(5) retains the proposed and existing requirement that
any hand brakes applied to secure unattended equipment not be released
until it is

[[Page 4158]]

known that the air brake system is properly charged.
    It should be noted that paragraph (n) reflects FRA's agreement with
the various concerns raised regarding the proposed requirements to use
derails to secure unattended equipment and to chock and chain
locomotives when left unattended on certain grades. FRA agrees that the
use of derails, as proposed in the NPRM, could potentially create
safety hazards if not properly removed and might expose employees to a
greater potential for injury by increasing the handling and movement of
derails. FRA also agrees that if handbrakes are properly applied on
unattended locomotives there is little need to chock and chain
locomotive wheels in most instances and such a requirement merely
creates the potential of exposing railroad employees to unnecessary
risks. Furthermore, FRA believes that the alternative approach
submitted by the CAPUC regarding when and where derails should be
applied is too complicated, requires further research, and might
require unnecessary securement in many instances. Thus, the approach
taken in this final rule is to provide requirements for the setting of
hand brakes and require railroads to ensure the capability of those
hand brakes to hold the equipment. If the applied hand brakes do not
adequately hold the equipment, FRA would expect the railroad to utilize
other methods of securement such as derails, skates, chains, and
chocks.
    Paragraph (o), previously proposed as paragraph (p), requires that
air pressure regulating devices be adjusted in accordance with the air
pressures contained in the chart contained in this paragraph. The chart
is very similar to that proposed in the NPRM, but has been slightly
modified in response to the comments received. The references to
equipment used in passenger operations has been eliminated, and the
pressure of the self-lapping portion for independent air brake has been
modified to read ``30 psi or less'' rather than the proposed ``30-72
psi.''
    Paragraph (p) contains the proposed provision regarding the joint
responsibility of supervisors and inspectors to ensure the proper
condition and functioning of train brake systems. The provision
contained in this paragraph has been slightly modified in order to
remain consistent with the existing requirement regarding such joint
responsibility contained at Sec. 232.11(a). These modifications clarify
that joint responsibility exists to the extent that it is possible to
detect defective equipment by the inspections and tests required by
this part.

Section 232.105  General Requirements for Locomotives

    For the most part, this section contains general provisions related
to locomotives that are either currently contained in Sec. 232.10 or
that were previously proposed in the NPRM. As discussed in detail in
the NPRM, FRA does not intend to include provisions in this final rule
related to the inspection and maintenance of locomotive braking
systems. FRA believes that these requirements are adequately addressed
in part 229 and would only add to the complexity of this rule and
potentially cause confusion or misunderstanding by members of the
regulated community. Therefore, while many of the requirements
currently contained in Sec. 232.10 are no longer necessary as they are
adequately addressed in part 229, paragraphs (a) and (c) are provisions
currently contained in Sec. 232.10 which FRA believes need to be
retained. See 49 CFR 232.10(b) and (f)(2).
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed requirement that the hand or
parking brake on a locomotive be inspected and repaired, if necessary,
at least every 368 days. It should be noted that paragraph (c) has been
slightly modified from that proposed in order to allow the date of the
last inspection of the hand brake to be entered on Form FRA F 6180-49A
in lieu of stenciling such information on the car. As the current
regulation permits either the stenciling or tagging of a locomotive
with this information and because many railroads currently record the
information on the form noted above, FRA believes it is appropriate to
continue to allow such a practice. FRA continues to believe that this
inspection requirement will have little or no impact on railroads as
this inspection is intended to coincide with the annual locomotive
inspection required under Sec. 229.27 and many railroads currently
inspect these devices at this annual inspection. FRA also continues to
believe that a thorough inspection of these devices on an annual basis
is sufficient to ensure the proper and safe functioning of the devices.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed requirement that locomotives
ordered or placed in service for the first time after the specified
dates be equipped with a hand or parking brake. Although the final rule
retains the requirements that the hand or parking brake be capable of
being set and released manually, the final rule modifies the
requirement regarding the holding capability of such brakes. Rather
than requiring that the brake be capable of holding the equipment on
the maximum grade anticipated by the operating railroad, the final rule
requires that the brake be capable of holding the equipment on a three-
percent grade. Based on information provided by several locomotive
manufacturers, FRA agrees that current locomotive hand and parking
brakes are designed to achieve a three-percent holding capacity and
that current operating practices are based on this capacity. Several
manufacturers assert that if the holding capacity of these brakes had
to be increased, then the cost of a locomotive would increase
significantly as such an increase would require redesign of the
foundation brake rigging. As the current designs have provided adequate
safety and the enhanced design would be very expensive relative to the
improvement in safety, this paragraph has been amended to require that
the hand or parking brake be capable of holding the unit on a three
percent grade.
    A hand or parking brake is an important safety feature that
prevents the rolling or runaway of parked locomotives. The requirements
contained in this paragraph represent current industry practice. In the
1994 NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposed requiring that a hand brake be
equipped on locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRA received several comments
to that proposal suggesting that the term ``parking brake'' be added to
the requirement since that is what is used on many newly built
locomotives. A parking brake generally can be applied other than by
hand, such as by spring pressure, by air pressure when the brake pipe
air is depleted, or by an electrical motor. Parking brakes usually
incorporate some type of manual application or release feature,
although these features are generally more difficult to operate. FRA
believes that parking brakes are the functional equivalent of a
traditional hand brake and are capable of providing a similar level of
security to stationary equipment. Consequently, FRA added the term
``parking brake'' to the 1998 NPRM and has retained the term in this
final rule.
    In paragraph (d), FRA requires that the leakage of air from
equalizing reservoirs on locomotives and related piping be zero. The
equalizing reservoir contains the controlling volume of air pressure,
which is set to a desired pressure by the locomotive engineer by
setting the regulating valve (also known as the ``feed valve'') on the
automatic air brake system. When the automatic brake valve handle is
moved to the release position, air supplied from the locomotive air
compressor and the main air reservoirs is supplied to the equalizing
reservoir through the

[[Page 4159]]

regulating valve. The brake pipe pressure will then be charged to the
level of the air pressure contained in the equalizing reservoir. When
an application of the train brakes is desired, the engineer moves the
automatic brake valve handle into the application zone. The movement of
the brake valve handle into the application zone shuts off the supply
of air from the regulating valve to the equalizing reservoir, leaving
the volume of air contained in the equalizing reservoir trapped in the
equalizing reservoir. The pressure of the trapped air can then be
reduced to a desired amount by movement of the automatic brake valve
handle. This will result in the brake pipe pressure responding and
being reduced to a pressure equal to the pressure contained in the
equalizing reservoir. Furthermore, the air pressure in the brake pipe
on most freight equipment will be maintained at the pressure in the
equalizing reservoir due to the maintaining features of the brake
system. Consequently, any leakage from the equalizing reservoir will
affect the maintaining feature of the automatic air brake, causing the
engineer to lose the ability to effectively maintain control of the
brake pipe pressure and, thus, affecting the ability of the engineer to
safely control the train in some circumstances.
    One manufacturer of locomotives commented on the requirement
contained in this paragraph, contending that the requirement should not
be applied to locomotives utilizing electronic braking systems because
such leakage is not detectable by the locomotive engineer. This
commenter contends that on these types of braking systems a continuous
demand is made on the compressor to offset any leakage and if the
compressor cannot offset the leakage the engineer is notified and the
train is automatically stopped if necessary. Thus, the systems are
designed to be fail-safe in the event of excessive leakage. This
commenter believes that FRA should recognize these types of designs and
except them from the requirement contained in this paragraph.
    FRA agrees that the electronic brake systems currently in use on
some locomotives are designed to maintain equalizing reservoir pressure
at a set limit. Because these systems are designed to offset equalizing
reservoir leakage, the locomotive engineer would not experience any
problem with the operation of the train's brakes if a minor leak
occurs. However, if the leakage exceeds the ability of the system to
maintain the pressure, a fault message would be displayed to the
locomotive engineer and the train's brakes would be automatically
applied, if necessary. Therefore, this section has been slightly
modified from that proposed in the NPRM to allow locomotives that are
equipped with these types of maintaining features to continue to
operate with some leakage in the equalizing reservoir. However, this
section makes clear that when such systems identify an equalizing
reservoir leak, the railroad is to perform the repairs necessary to
eliminate the leakage at the nearest forward location where such
repairs can be made. Generally a leakage on these electronic braking
systems will be discovered when maintenance personnel review the fault
screen during routine inspections and tests. Therefore, if a locomotive
is equipped with a braking system that has the ability to maintain
equalizing reservoir pressure, with the automatic brake valve set in
the freight position or direct release, an equalizing reservoir leak
will generally not be required to be repaired until it is either
identified by the inspection forces or until the locomotive engineer
identifies the condition during the normal operation of the train.
    In paragraph (e), FRA retains the proposed prohibition on the use
of ``feed or regulating valve braking,'' in which reductions and
increases in the brake pipe pressure are effected by manually adjusting
the feed valve. ``Feed valve braking'' has been recognized by both the
railroad industry and FRA as an unsafe practice. Most railroads already
have some type of operating rule prohibiting this type of braking. No
comments were received objecting to the inclusion of this prohibition
in response to the NPRM.
    In paragraph (f), FRA also retains the proposed prohibition on the
use of the ``passenger'' position on the locomotive brake control stand
on conventional freight trains when the trailing equipment is not
designed for graduated brake release. The ``passenger'' position was
intended only for use with equipment designed for graduated brake
release. Therefore, use of the ``passenger'' position with other
equipment can lead to potentially dangerous situations where undesired
release of the brakes can easily occur due to the slightest movement of
the automatic brake valve. In FRA's view, the only situation when the
use of the passenger position might become necessary to safely control
a train is when equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route. If such a
situation arises, this paragraph makes clear that the train may move
only to the nearest forward location where the equalizing reservoir
leakage can be corrected. No objections were received by FRA in
response to the NPRM with regard to these requirements.
    Paragraph (g) contains an existing requirement which was
inadvertently excluded from the NPRM. This paragraph makes clear that
engineers must know that the brakes on locomotives of which they are
taking charge are in operative condition. This requirement is currently
contained at Sec. 232.10(l). Thus, FRA is not imposing a new burden by
incorporating this requirement into the final rule. Furthermore, FRA
does not intend to create a new inspection requirement by including
this provision, but intends for it to be applied and enforced in the
same manner as the existing requirement. If a locomotive engineer
relieves another engineer, the condition of the brakes could be
determined, based on a conversation or report from the engineer being
relieved. The railroad may also elect to have mechanical forces inspect
the locomotive for proper operation of the brakes and have the
locomotive engineer accept the locomotives based on the mechanical
department's inspection. However, a locomotive engineer may have to
conduct a cursory inspection and perform a running test of the brake
system to satisfy this requirement, if a prior inspection has not been
performed.

Section 232.107  Air Source Requirements

    This section contains requirements directed at ensuring that
freight brake systems are devoid, to the maximum extent practical, of
water and other contaminates which could conceivably deteriorate
components of the brake system and, thus, negatively impact the ability
of the brake system to function as intended. The general preamble
section of this rule provides a detailed discussion as to why FRA
proposed many of the items contained in this paragraph. See discussion
contained in ``Overview of Comments and General FRA Conclusions''
portion of the preamble under the heading ``Air Source Requirements.''
Based on the work performed by and information gathered by the RSAC
Working Group and based on FRA field experience, FRA continues to
believe that requiring locomotives to be equipped with air dryers would
provide minimal safety benefits and would impose an enormous and
unwarranted cost burden on the railroads. Further, FRA continues to
believe that simply requiring that yard air sources be equipped with
air dryers may not necessarily effectuate the

[[Page 4160]]

desired results unless the air dryers are appropriately placed to
sufficiently condition the air source. Many yard air sources are
configured such that a single air compressor services several branch
lines used to charge train air brake systems and, therefore, multiple
air dryers may be required to eliminate the introduction of wet air
into the brake system. FRA believes that, as with locomotives,
requiring yard air sources to be equipped with air dryers would likely
impose a significant and unnecessary cost burden on the railroads.
    This section retains the basic requirements regarding yard air
sources and cold weather operations that were proposed in the NPRM with
minor modification based on the comments submitted in response to the
proposal. Paragraph (a) retains the provisions requiring railroads to
adopt and comply with a plan to monitor all yard air sources to ensure
that the yard air sources operate as intended, are in proper condition,
and do not introduce contaminants into the brake system of freight
equipment. FRA intends to make clear that the inspections required
under this paragraph are to be thorough inspections of the entire yard
air source. This inspection would include all compressors, piping,
hoses, valves, and any other component or part of the yard air source
to ensure it is in proper condition and operates as intended.
    Paragraph (a) modifies some of the proposed requirements related to
the yard air source monitoring plans. FRA agrees with the comments
provided by several labor representatives that the proposed
requirements did not establish a frequency with which inspections of
yard air sources should be conducted. In proposing the requirement, FRA
hoped that various commenters would recommend frequencies for
conducting these inspections. This did not occur. FRA agrees that a set
frequency needs to be established which will ensure that yard air
sources are inspected in a timely manner during various climatic
conditions. Therefore, paragraph (a)(2)(i) requires that the monitoring
plan developed by a railroad ensure that each yard air source be
inspected at least twice each calendar year and that two of the
inspections be no less than five months apart. FRA intends for this
requirement to result in yard air sources being inspected each year
during two different seasonal periods.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) clarifies that remedial action under the
monitoring plans is required only on those yard air sources that are
not operating as intended or that are found introducing contaminants
into brake systems. Thus, the final rule removes the word ``potential''
from the proposed language as FRA agrees that the proposed language was
unclear and may have been over-inclusive. The final rule also
eliminates the proposed requirement for railroads to conduct a detailed
assessment of the remedial actions taken. FRA agrees with the
assertions of AAR that this proposed requirement is unnecessary because
railroads will be conducting regular inspections of the yard air
sources on which they have conducted repairs or taken other remedial
action and will be able to determine if the repair were effective
through those inspections. Paragraph (a)(3) retains the other proposed
record keeping requirements related to yard air monitoring plans but
clarifies that the records can be maintained either electronically or
in writing. FRA continues to believe that these records are necessary
to ensure that railroads are properly conducting the required
inspections and are taking timely and appropriate remedial action when
a problem air source is detected.
    The final rule does not contain provisions requiring FRA approval
of the yard air source monitoring plans prior to their implementation
as suggested by some commenters. FRA does not have the personnel or
resources to review and approve the plan of each railroad and does not
believe such approval is necessary given the specific requirements
contained in the final rule and the records that are required to be
maintained. Although the final rule does not contain requirements
regarding the use of air dryers on either locomotives or yard air
sources, FRA advocates the use of air dryers when possible and agrees
that they have proven effective in reducing the level of moisture
introduced into the brake system. However, FRA believes that a railroad
is in the best position to determine where these devices will provide
the greatest benefit based on the railroad's operation. FRA notes its
disagreement with AAR's contentions regarding both the time and the
cost necessary to implement the required yard air source monitoring
plans. FRA sees no reason why a railroad would need five years to
implement a plan to inspect each of its yard air sources twice a year.
These devices are used on a fairly regular, if not daily, basis and
should not be that difficult to inspect. Consequently, FRA believes
that railroads should easily be able to implement these monitoring
plans by the three-year effective date provided in this final rule.
    Paragraphs (b) and (d) contain additional measures to minimize the
possibility of moisture being introduced into the trainline. Paragraph
(b) of this section reiterates the proposed and current requirement
contained at Sec. 232.11(d), which requires that condensation be blown
from the pipe or hose from which compressed air is taken prior to
connecting the yard air line or motive power to the train. As an
additional precaution, paragraph (d) of this section retains the
proposed requirement that yard air reservoirs be equipped with an
operable automatic drain system, or be manually drained at least once
each day that the devices are used or more often when moisture is
detected in the system.
    Paragraph (c) generally retains the proposed ban on the use of
chemicals in a train air brake system. However, FRA agrees with the
position asserted by several commenters that the proposed prohibition
of all chemicals may have been somewhat overbroad and contrary to FRA's
actual intent. In proposing the prohibition FRA intended to eliminate
the use of chemicals, such as alcohol, which are known to degrade the
rubber of a train's brake system. FRA agrees that there may be
chemicals which are currently available or which are in the process of
being developed which do not cause the problems associated with the use
of alcohol. In fact, FRA believes there are products currently
available which do not degrade a brake system's rubber components. FRA
believes that several railroads are currently testing or using these
chemical alternatives. Therefore, FRA believes that there are
alternatives to using alcohol which currently exist or can be developed
which would provide railroads the ability to address the rare instances
where trainlines become frozen. Consequently, this paragraph slightly
modifies the prohibition on the use of chemicals by imposing the
prohibition on chemicals that are known to degrade or harm brake system
components, such as alcohol.
    It should be noted that FRA recently published a final rule
mandating the incorporation of two-way EOTs on a variety of freight
trains, specifically those operating at speeds of 30 mph or greater or
in heavy grade territories. See 62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs provide
locomotive engineers with the capability of initiating an emergency
brake application that commences at the rear of the train in the event
of a blockage or separation in the train's brake pipe that would
prevent the pneumatic transmission of the emergency brake application
from the front of the train through the rest of the train. These
devices consist of a front unit, located in the cab of the

[[Page 4161]]

controlling locomotive, and a rear unit, located in the rear of the
train and attached to the brake pipe. Radio communication between the
front and rear units is continually monitored and confirmed at regular
intervals, and the rear unit is only activated when continuity of these
radio transmissions is not maintained over a specified time interval.
This discussion of two-way EOTs is particularly appropriate within the
context of the air source requirements. In the unlikely event that
compliance with the requirements contained in this section regarding
dry air fails to sufficiently eliminate moisture from the trainline,
and a restriction or obstruction in the form of ice develops as the
result of freezing of this moisture during cold weather operations, the
two-way EOT device becomes a first-order safety device and will
initiate an emergency application of the brakes from the rear of train.
As such, the vast majority of concerns associated with moisture in the
trainline freezing during cold weather operations have been alleviated
through the incorporation of this technology in most freight
operations.
    Paragraph (e) retains the proposed requirement that a railroad
adopt and comply with detailed written operating procedures tailored to
the equipment and territory of the railroad to promote safe train
operations during cold weather situations. In 1990, the NTSB, in
response to an accident which occurred in Helena, Montana, recommended
that FRA amend the power brake regulations to require additional
testing of air brake systems when operating in extreme cold, especially
when operated in mountain grade territory. See NTSB Recommendation R-
89-081 (February 12, 1990). In response to this recommendation and to
various petitions for rulemaking requesting similar action, FRA in the
1994 NPRM proposed various requirements regarding cold weather
operations, which included: use of two-way EOTs; prohibition on the use
of alcohol in trainlines; air dryers on locomotives; and requirements
for railroads to develop procedures for operating during cold weather
and in mountain grade territories. As noted previously, a final rule
regarding the use of two-way EOTs has been issued and is in effect.
This final rule also prohibits the use of certain anti-freeze
chemicals, contains other requirements to ensure that dry air is being
added to brake systems, and retains the previously proposed requirement
that railroads adopt and comply with operating requirements for cold
weather and heavy-grade operations.
    FRA recognizes that in the past there has been little support for
mandating additional brake system testing during cold weather. FRA
agrees that the development and use of welded pipe fittings, wide-lip
hose couplings, and ferrule clamps have greatly reduced the effects of
cold weather on the air brake system. However, FRA continues to believe
that cold weather situations do involve added safety risks and need to
be further addressed. FRA believes that requiring the development of
written operating procedures will require railroads to go through the
thought process necessary to analyze their operations during cold
weather conditions in order to determine the inherent safety hazards
involved and develop procedures to minimize those hazards. Due to the
unique nature of each railroad and the difficulty in developing
specific requirements that are applicable to all operations, FRA does
not intend to mandate specific operating requirements at this time.
However, FRA might consider mandating specific operating requirements
that should be included in a railroad's cold weather operating
practices if it is found that railroads do not develop sufficient
requirements to address safe cold weather operations.
    FRA recognizes that some railroads have already developed certain
cold weather operating procedures which might be useful as models on
other similarly situated railroads. For example, BNSF has unilaterally
instituted a cold weather operating plan for certain trains at specific
locations in Montana. This plan requires trains with greater than 100
tons per operative brake to be inspected or operated in a certain
manner when temperatures fall below zero degrees. Part of the plan
requires that after the performance of a 1,000-mile or initial terminal
brake test on such trains, the brakes be reset and held for 30 minutes
after which time the train is to be reinspected to ensure that 100
percent of the brakes remained applied. Brakes found not to have
remained applied must be set out of the train or repaired. FRA believes
that procedures such as these could greatly enhance the safety of the
trains operated in cold weather conditions. FRA recognizes that there
may be other types of operating or inspection criteria that could be
implemented in extreme cold weather instead of, or in addition to, that
noted above; such as, limits on the length or tonnage of such trains,
limits on the use of yard air sources, or other enhanced inspection
criteria. At this time, FRA continues to believe that railroads are in
the best position to determine what procedures are best suited to their
operations.

Section 232.109  Dynamic Brake Requirements

    This section contains the operating requirements for trains
equipped with dynamic brakes. Most, if not all, of the railroads
participating in and commenting on this rulemaking have asserted that
they do not consider dynamic brakes to be a safety device. However,
these same commenters admit that they promote and encourage the use of
dynamic brakes for purposes of fuel efficiency and to avoid wear to
brake components. Due to this encouragement, dynamic brakes are relied
on to control train speed and to provide assistance in controlling
trains on heavy grades. Contrary to continued comments of several labor
representatives, FRA does not feel that locomotives should be required
to be equipped with dynamic brakes. FRA believes that the decision to
equip a locomotive with dynamic brakes is mainly an economic one, best
determined by each individual railroad. However, in order to prevent
accidents and injuries that may result from an over-reliance on the
dynamic brake, which may fail at any time, FRA believes that if the
devices are available, engineers should be informed on their safe and
proper use and be provided with information regarding the amount of
dynamic braking power actually available on their respective trains.
FRA continues to believe that by providing an engineer with as much
information as possible on the status of the dynamic brakes on a train,
a railroad better enables that engineer to operate the train in the
safest and most efficient manner.
    Paragraph (a) generally retains the proposed requirement that a
locomotive engineer be informed of the operational status of the
dynamic brakes on the locomotives the engineer will be required to
operate. This paragraph makes clear that the information is to be
provided to the locomotive engineer at a train's initial terminal and
at other locations where a locomotive engineer first begins operation
of a train. This paragraph slightly modifies the proposed method for
providing this information to the locomotive engineer. The NPRM
proposed that the locomotive engineer be provided the required
information in writing. The intent of the proposed requirement to
notify the locomotive engineer in writing as to the operational status
of the dynamic brakes was to ensure that the engineer had timely
information on

[[Page 4162]]

the condition of the locomotives so he or she could operate the train
in the safest possible manner based upon that information. Thus, FRA
tends to agree with the comments of several railroads and their
representatives that the manner in which the information is provided to
the engineer should not be a major concern provided the information is
accurate and up-to-date. Therefore, this paragraph allows railroads to
provide a locomotive engineer with the required information by any
means they deem appropriate. However, this paragraph also makes clear
that a written or electronic record of the information provided shall
be maintained in the cab of the controlling locomotive. This will
ensure that relief or other oncoming engineer will have the information
provided to the previous operator of the train.
    This paragraph also clarifies that the information is to be
provided to the locomotive engineer at the train's initial terminal and
at other locations where an engineer ``first begins operation'' of the
train rather than where the engineer ``takes charge of the train.''
This clarification is in response to comments provided by certain labor
representatives to prevent possible misinterpretation or abuse of the
requirement since most railroads consider the conductor to be in charge
of a train.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed requirement to repair a
locomotive with inoperative dynamic brakes within 30 days of its being
found inoperative or at the locomotive's next periodic inspection,
whichever occurs first. There are currently no requirements governing
the maintenance and repair of dynamic brakes. Experience has shown
that, since railroads do not consider dynamic brakes to be a critical
safety item, repairs are typically effectuated when it is convenient
and economical for the railroad, with little regard for timeliness. FRA
believes that, as railroads have become increasingly dependent on the
use of dynamic brakes as an integral part of their published safe train
handling procedures, it is a reasonable expectation on behalf of
locomotive engineers to have operable dynamic brakes on those
locomotive units which are so equipped. Due to the industry's reliance
on these braking systems, as noted in the discussion above, FRA
continues to believe they should be repaired as soon as possible after
being found inoperative. FRA agrees that there must be an appropriate
balance between the operational considerations important to the
locomotive engineer and the logistical and repair considerations that
will be imposed on the railroads. FRA continues to believe that 30 days
provides a railroad with sufficient time to get a locomotive to a
location where the dynamic brakes can be repaired and allows for the
reallocation of motive power when necessary so as to cause minimal
disruption to a railroad's operation. Although certain commenters
requested that the period allowed for repair be reduced to 15 days or
less, FRA believes such a reduction is unwise as it might jeopardize a
railroad's access to available motive power and could cause delay in
the movement of freight, consequences that may create safety hazards
themselves.
    This paragraph also eliminates the use of the term ``ineffective
dynamic brake'' and replaces it with the term ``inoperative dynamic
brake.'' The term ``inoperative dynamic brake'' is defined in
Sec. 232.5 of the final rule to mean any dynamic brake which no longer
provides its designed retarding force on the train, for whatever
reason. FRA agrees with the comment of the AAR that the use and meaning
of the term ``ineffective dynamic brake'' in the proposal was unclear
and had the potential of creating misunderstandings. Consequently, for
clarity this section uses only the term ``inoperative dynamic brake''
to describe a defective dynamic brake.
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed requirements related to the
tagging of a locomotive found with inoperative dynamic brakes. FRA
believes that the tags required by this paragraph are necessary to
ensure the prompt and timely repair of locomotives found with defective
dynamic brakes and also provide locomotive engineers and a railroad's
ground forces with specific knowledge of the presence of such a
locomotive. Contrary to the comments of some parties, FRA does not
believe that the tagging provisions contained in this paragraph would
require the development of new tags. This paragraph would allow the use
of any type of tag provided it is placed in a conspicuous location on
the cab of the locomotive and contains the required information.
    Paragraph (d) contains a requirement that an electronic or written
record of repairs made to a locomotive's dynamic brakes be maintained
and retained for a period of 92 days. Although this requirement was not
proposed in the NPRM, FRA believes these records fall within the scope
of the notice and are necessary to ensure that repairs are conducted on
a locomotive's dynamic brakes in a timely fashion. FRA also believes
that such a record will provide a railroad with information regarding
the operation of the dynamic brakes and will potentially permit
railroads to identify a repeated problem with a locomotive's dynamic
brakes to prevent recurrences of the problem and thus, increase the
utilization of a locomotive's dynamic brakes.
    The final rule continues to acknowledge that some railroads,
primarily short lines, may own locomotives that are equipped with
dynamic brakes but due to the physical terrain over which the railroad
operates or the operating assignments of the particular locomotive, the
railroad rarely, if ever, has the need to employ the dynamic braking
capabilities of the individual locomotive. In these instances, the
maintenance requirements discussed above become unnecessarily
burdensome. Therefore, FRA continues to believe that relief is
warranted in these situations provided a specified set of parameters is
developed and adhered to that prevents direct and intentional
circumvention of the proposed repair requirements. Therefore, paragraph
(e) retains the proposed provision permitting a railroad to declare a
locomotive's dynamic brakes ``deactivated'' if the following
requirements are met: (i) The locomotive is clearly marked with the
words ``dynamic brake deactivated'' in a conspicuous location in the
cab of the locomotive; and (ii) the railroad has taken appropriate
action to ensure that the deactivated locomotive is incapable of
utilizing dynamic braking effort to retard or control train speed. It
should be noted that the final rule eliminates the requirement to
stencil the outside of a locomotive declared to have deactivated
dynamic brakes. FRA agrees with the comments submitted by the AAR and
other railroad representatives that defacing the exterior of the
locomotive is unnecessary and would do little to inform the locomotive
engineer of the deactivation of the dynamic brake. FRA believes that
the requirements to notify the locomotive engineer of the operational
status of the locomotives and to have the cab of the locomotive clearly
marked that the locomotive's dynamic brakes are deactivated provide
sufficient notice to the locomotive engineer as to the status of that
locomotive.
    This paragraph does not prescribe the specific manner in which a
locomotive is to be deactivated, so long as the unit is not physically
capable of employing its dynamic brakes to aid in train handling.
Although FRA does not envision a significant number of instances where
a locomotive which has been declared ``deactivated'' would need to be
``reactivated,'' FRA does

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recognize that some railroads may need to reactivate the dynamic brakes
in some circumstances, such as changes in a locomotive's operating
environment or situations where a locomotive with previously
``deactivated'' dynamic brakes is purchased by another railroad.
However, FRA intends to interpret the provision for ``deactivating'' a
locomotive's dynamic brakes rather literally to minimize contentions
that railroads are merely playing a cat and mouse game with the
required maintenance interval to avoid repairing the units.
Furthermore, FRA would expect the dynamic brakes on a locomotive to be
fully functional at the time the locomotive is considered reactivated.
    Paragraph (f) contains specific requirements related to the use of
a locomotive with inoperative, deactivated, or no dynamic brakes as a
controlling locomotive. These requirements are based on FRA's review of
the comments submitted in response to FRA's request regarding the
positioning of such locomotives contained in the NPRM. See 63 FR 48314.
FRA tends to agree that there are no technical reasons why a locomotive
with inoperative dynamic brakes cannot function as the controlling
locomotive provided it can control the dynamic brakes on trailing units
in the locomotive consist. However, FRA also agrees that a locomotive
engineer loses the physical sensation of the operation of the dynamic
brakes when the unit the engineer is riding loses dynamic brake
capability because the physical sensation of operating dynamic brakes
provides the engineer with at least some assurance that the dynamic
brakes on some of the units in the consist are operating. Thus, this
paragraph makes clear that locomotives with inoperative, deactivated,
or no dynamic brakes have the capability of controlling the dynamic
brakes on trailing units when operating as the controlling locomotive,
and that such locomotives also have the capability of displaying to the
locomotive engineer the deceleration rate of the train or the total
train dynamic brake retarding force. FRA believes this requirement will
ensure that locomotive engineers have at least some information as to
the operation of the dynamic brakes in the locomotive consist they are
controlling. FRA intends that the information required by this
provision be provided by a device known as an ``accelerometer'',
``predictor'', or a similar type of device; or by a dynamic brake
indicator capable of providing total train dynamic brake retarding
force to the locomotive engineer. An ``accelerometer'' or ``predictor''
is a device currently used in the industry that indicates the predicted
speed in miles per hour of the locomotive 60 seconds from the present,
based on the computed acceleration or deceleration rate. This would
provide the engineer with an indication of the retarding performance of
the dynamic brakes and the train.
    Paragraph (g) contains provisions requiring new locomotives to be
equipped with some sort of dynamic brake indicator. In the NPRM, FRA
sought information and comments regarding the feasibility of dynamic
brake indicators which continually monitor the operation of dynamic
brakes in a train consist. See 63 FR 48334. The NTSB noted that the
NPRM failed to address its recommendation resulting from its
investigation of the January 12, 1997, freight train derailment near
Kelso, California, that all locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes be
equipped with a device in the cab of the controlling locomotive to
indicate real-time condition of the dynamic brakes on each trailing
unit. See NTSB Recommendation R-98-6. Based on a review of the comments
and information provided, FRA continues to believe that the technology
does not currently exist to economically equip existing locomotives
with dynamic brake indicators. However, FRA does believe that the
technology exists or is sufficiently developed to provide new
locomotives with the ability to test the electrical integrity of the
dynamic brakes at rest and to display the total train dynamic brake
retarding force at various speed increments in the cab of the
controlling locomotive. Consequently, this paragraph requires new
locomotives to be equipped with such indicators. FRA recognizes that
the industry will require a little time to incorporate the existing and
developing technology into new locomotives. Therefore, the requirements
contained in this paragraph will apply only to locomotives ordered one
and one-half years after the issuance of this final rule and to
locomotives placed in service for the first time three years after the
effective date of the final rule.
    Paragraph (h) contains requirements for equipping rebuilt
locomotives with devices to provide locomotive engineers with
additional information on the operation of dynamic brakes on other
locomotives in the train consist. This paragraph recognizes that not
all locomotives being rebuilt are designed, or have the capability of
being redesigned to have the capability to display the total train
dynamic brake retarding force in the cab of the controlling locomotive.
Thus, this paragraph allows rebuilt locomotives to be designed to
display the train deceleration rate (i.e., to be equipped with an
accelerometer, predictor, or similar device as described above) in lieu
of being equipped with the dynamic brake indicator required on new
locomotives. FRA believes that the information provided by these
indicators is extremely useful to an engineer, will provide the
engineer with ready access to real-time information on the operation of
the dynamic brakes in a locomotive consist, and will permit the
engineer to control and operate trains in the safest manner possible.
    Paragraph (i) acknowledges that the information provided to a
locomotive engineer by a dynamic brake indicator would satisfy the need
to provide the locomotive engineer with information regarding the
operational status of the dynamic brakes when the engineer first begins
operation of a train. As the indicators would provide real-time
information to the engineer on the operation of the dynamic brakes in
the train consist, a separate set of information received by the
engineer when beginning operation would be unnecessary. Therefore, this
paragraph carves out an exception to the requirement to inform
locomotive engineers of the status of the dynamic brakes for situations
when all of the locomotives in the lead consist are equipped with
dynamic brake indicators of the type required for new locomotives. FRA
believes that this exception makes sense from a practical perspective
and also provides some incentive for railroads to equip existing
equipment with such indicators where possible when the technology for
doing so becomes economically feasible. It should be noted that there
is no requirement that the dynamic brake status of distributed power
units be provided in order to eliminate the need to provide dynamic
brake information to the engineer. FRA agrees that the technology for
transmitting that information to the engineer is not currently
available in a cost effective and reliable manner.
    Paragraphs (j) and (k) retain the proposed provisions requiring
railroads to adopt and comply with written operating rules governing
the use of dynamic brakes and to incorporate training on those
operating rules into the locomotive engineer certification program
pursuant to 49 CFR part 240. Contrary to the assertions of some
commenters FRA does not believe these requirements are unclear. FRA
intends for each railroad to develop appropriate operating rules
regarding train handling

[[Page 4164]]

procedures when utilizing dynamic brakes that cover the equipment and
territory operated by the railroad. Many railroads already have these
procedures in place and already provide training to their employees
which adequately cover the requirements. FRA continues to believe that
training on proper train handling procedures is essential to ensuring
that locomotive engineers can properly handle their trains with or
without dynamic brakes and in the event that these brake systems fail
while the train is being operated. FRA also disagrees that it must
specify the knowledge, skill, and ability criteria that a railroad must
adopt into its training program. FRA believes that each railroad is in
the best position to determine what these criteria should be and what
training is necessary to provide that knowledge, skill, and ability to
its employees.
    FRA continues to believe that the establishment of these
comprehensive operating rules and their incorporation into a railroad's
training plans is the most effective means by which to minimize the
possibility of future accidents caused by excessive reliance on dynamic
brakes by a train crew as a method of controlling the speed of a train
in its descent through a difficult grade, as was the case in the San
Bernardino incident. FRA views as unfortunate the number of existing
train handling and power brake instructions issued by freight railroads
that emphasize the use of dynamic brakes but do not include prominent
warnings that such systems may not be relied upon to provide the margin
of safety necessary to stop short of obstructions and control points or
to avoid overspeed conditions. FRA believes that such instructions,
while not misleading to seasoned locomotive engineers, could lead to an
excessive reliance on these systems. Given the ever-increasing weight
and length of freight trains, and the severe grades that they are often
required to negotiate en route, the need for locomotive engineers who
are thoroughly trained and knowledgeable in all aspects of train
handling is paramount for continued safety in the rail industry.
    Paragraph (j)(2) requires that the operating rules developed by
railroads under this section include a ``miles-per-hour-overspeed''
requirement that requires trains to be immediately stopped if they
exceed the maximum authorized speed by more than 5 mph when descending
grades of one percent or greater. The NTSB recommended that FRA adopt
such a requirement as a result of its investigation of the freight
train derailment near Kelso, California noted above. See NTSB
Recommendation R-98-4. FRA agrees with NTSB's recommendation and also
agrees with the comments provided by both the NTSB and the CAPUC that
this requirement accomplishes a critical safety function and reduces
the potential for runaways because it establishes a clear rule for
stopping a train and removes any discretion from the operator to
continue operation of a train. This paragraph makes clear that the
five-mph limitation is a good base limitation which should be reduced
by a railroad if it so desires or if a reduction is indicated by
validated research. The five-mph limitation may only be increased with
FRA approval. FRA notes that the operating rules of virtually every
Class I railroad already include a five-mph-overspeed provision similar
to that contained in this paragraph. Consequently, FRA's inclusion of
the requirement in this final rule should impose little or no burden on
the operations of most railroads.

Section 232.111  Train Information Handling

    This section retains the proposed requirements regarding the
handling of train information, with slight modification in response to
the comments submitted by interested parties. The purpose of the train-
information handling requirements contained in this section is to
ensure that a train crew is provided accurate information on the
condition of a train's brake system and other factors that affect the
performance of a train's brake system when the crew assumes
responsibility for a train. This section contains a list of the
specific information railroads are to furnish train crew members about
the train and the train's brake system at the time they take charge of
the train. FRA continues to believe that train crews need this
information in order to avoid potentially dangerous train handling
situations and to be able to comply with various Federal safety
standards. Many railroads already provide their train crews with most
of the information required in this section or have a process set up
that can transmit such information; thus, the impact of these
requirements should be relatively minor.
    Paragraph (a) has been slightly modified to clarify that the
information required to be provided in this section may be provided by
any means determined appropriate by the railroad, provided, that a
record of the information is maintained in the cab of the controlling
locomotive. This requirement does not constitute a change from what was
proposed in the NPRM but is merely a clarification to resolve an
apparent misunderstanding of some parties. In the NPRM, FRA noted that
it intended to leave the method in which the required information would
be conveyed to train crews to the discretion of each railroad. FRA
believed that each individual railroad is in the best position to
determine the method in which to dispense the required information
based on the individual characteristics of its operations. However, FRA
noted that the means for conveying the required information would have
to be part of the written operating requirements, and railroads would
be required to follow their own requirements.
    Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) have also been slightly modified, for
purpose of clarity, from what was proposed in the NPRM. Paragraph
(b)(1) clarifies that train crews are to be provided the required
information when ``taking charge of a train'' rather than when ``coming
on duty'' as was proposed. FRA agrees with the comments of the AAR that
the modified language better clarifies when the required information is
to be provided. Paragraph (b)(2) has been modified to clarify that the
weight and length information to be provided should be based on the
best information available to the railroad. FRA agrees with the
comments of the AAR and several railroads that it is impossible to
provide the exact weight of each car in a train because the facilities
to weigh each car do not exist. FRA also agrees that it would be cost
prohibitive and unrealistic to require that each car be weighed prior
to being moved in a train. Consequently, the final rule makes clear
that the weight of the train can be estimated based on the best
information available to the railroad. It should be noted that FRA has
eliminated the proposed requirement that train crews be provided a
record of train configuration changes since performance of the last
Class I brake test. FRA agrees that such information is not necessary
based on the other information that is required to be provided and has
the potential of creating information overload for the train crews.

Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements

Section 232.201 Scope

    This section contains the general statement regarding the scope of
this subpart, indicating that it contains the inspection and testing
requirements for brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger
trains. This section also

[[Page 4165]]

indicates that this subpart contains the general training requirements
for railroad and contract personnel who perform the inspections and
tests required by this part.

Section 232.203  Training Requirements

    This section contains the general training requirements for
railroad employees and contractor employees that are used to perform
the inspections required by this part. (See ``Overview of Comments and
General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading
``V. Training and Qualifications of Personnel'' for a detailed
discussion pertaining to the provisions contained in this section.)
This section retains the basic structure and concepts regarding the
training and qualification of individuals performing inspections and
tests required by this part that were proposed in the NPRM. The
training requirements contained in this final rule have been slightly
revised from those proposed in the NPRM in order to clarify FRA's
intent, to recognize existing training, and to reduce some of the
burden that may have been inadvertently created by the proposed
requirements.
    Paragraph (a) requires that each railroad and each contractor adopt
and comply with a training, qualification, and designation program for
railroad employees and contractor employees who perform air brake
system tests, inspections and maintenance. This paragraph modifies the
proposed provision that would have required a railroad to provide
training to the personnel of a contractor whom the railroad uses to
perform the various tasks required by the rule. This paragraph makes
clear that the contractor is responsible for providing appropriate
training to its employees and maintaining the required records and
information. FRA agrees with the comments submitted on behalf of
numerous railroads that asserted that railroads should not bear the
burden of training the employees of a contractor. However, FRA notes
that this change does not relieve the railroad from potential civil
penalties for, e.g., failure to perform a proper Class I brake test, if
the employees of a contractor are found not to be qualified to perform
the task for which they are assigned responsibility. Both the railroad
and the contractor would remain liable for potential civil penalties if
the employees used to perform a particular task were not trained and
qualified in accordance with the training requirements contained in
this final rule.
    For purposes of this section, a ``contractor'' is defined as a
person under contract with a railroad or a car owner or an employee of
a person under contract with a railroad or a car owner. FRA intends for
the training and qualification requirements to apply not only to
railroad personnel but also to contract personnel that are responsible
for performing brake system inspections, maintenance, or tests required
by this part. FRA believes that railroads and contractors are in the
best position to determine the precise method of training that is
required for the personnel they use to conduct required brake system
inspections, tests, and maintenance. Although FRA provides railroads
and contractors with broad discretion to develop training programs
specifically tailored to their operations and personnel, FRA will
expect railroads and contractors to fully comply with the training and
qualification plans they adopt. A critical component of this training
will be making employees aware of specific Federal requirements that
govern their work. Currently, many railroad training programs fail to
distinguish Federal requirements from company policy.
    Paragraph (b) contains general requirements or elements which must
be part of any training and qualification plan adopted by a railroad or
contractor. FRA believes that the elements contained in this section
are specific enough to ensure high quality training and broad enough to
permit a railroad or contractor to adopt a training plan that is best
suited to its particular operation. This paragraph retains the proposed
requirement that the plan identify the tasks related to the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of the brake system required to be performed
by the railroad or contractor and identify the skills and knowledge
necessary to perform each task. FRA believes that most railroads
already have a training plan and would merely need to revise it to
reflect changes made to existing requirements by this final rule. The
final rule eliminates the proposed requirement to develop written
procedures for performing each task identified. Although FRA believes
that each railroad or contractor should and will develop such
procedures, FRA does not believe it is necessary to require their
development as FRA believes they will either be developed in the
required training curricula or are sufficiently detailed in the
regulation itself.
    This paragraph also clarifies that the required training is
intended to provide employees with the skills and knowledge necessary
to perform the tasks required by this final rule. FRA does not believe
it is necessary to train an employee on every different type of
equipment that a railroad operates or on each and every task an
employees will be required to perform. FRA's intent when issuing the
NPRM was to ensure that the training received by an employee provides
that individual with the knowledge and skills needed to perform the
tasks he or she is assigned on the various types of brake systems on
the equipment the railroad operates. Therefore, this paragraph
clarifies this intent by specifically stating that the training
curriculum, the examinations, and the ``hands-on'' capability should
address the skills and knowledge needed to perform the various required
tasks rather than focusing strictly on the tasks themselves or on the
specific types of equipment operated by the railroad. However, FRA does
intend for the training developed by the railroad or contractor to
address the various types of brake systems the employee will be
required to inspect, test, or maintain. For example, if an employee
were trained on how to perform a Class I brake test and demonstrated
hands-on capability to perform that task, FRA would not expect the
employee to demonstrate hands-on capability to perform a Class IA or
Class II brake test since the components of a Class I brake test cover
these other inspections. However, FRA would expect the employee to
receive classroom training on when these other inspections are required
and the tasks that are involved in each.
    This paragraph also clarifies that the training that an employee is
required to receive need only address the specific skills and knowledge
related to the tasks that the person will be required to perform under
this part. Thus, a railroad or contractor may tailor its training
programs to the needs of each of its employees based on the tasks that
each of its employees will be required to perform. FRA tends to agree
with several commenters that there is no reason for an individual who
performs strictly brake inspections and tests to be as highly trained
as a carman since carmen perform many other duties related to the
maintenance and repair of equipment in addition to brake inspections.
    This paragraph also clarifies that previous training and testing
received by an employee may be considered by the railroad. FRA did not
intend to require the complete retraining of every employee performing
a task required in this final rule. When proposing the training
requirements, FRA intended for railroads to incorporate existing
training

[[Page 4166]]

regimens and curricula into the proposed training programs. In order to
clarify this intent, this paragraph permits railroads and contractors
to incorporate an already existing training program, such as an
apprenticeship program, and contains a specific provision which permits
railroads and contractors to consider previous training and testing
received by an employee when determining whether an employee is
qualified to perform a particular task. Thus, railroads and contractors
would most likely not need to provide much additional training, except
training specifically addressing the new requirements contained in this
part and possibly refresher training, to its carmen forces that have
completed an apprentice program for their craft. However, the final
rule also makes clear that any previous training or testing considered
by a railroad or contractor must be documented as required in the final
rule. Thus, previous training or testing which has not been properly
documented cannot be considered. The final rule also makes clear that
employees must be trained on the specific regulatory requirements
contained in this final rule related to the tasks that the employee
will be required to perform. Therefore, all employees will require at
least some training which covers the specific requirements detailed in
this final rule.
    This paragraph retains the proposed requirements that any program
developed must include experiential or ``hands-on'' training as well as
classroom instruction. FRA believes that classroom training by itself
is not sufficient to ensure that an individual has retained or grasped
the concepts and duties explained in a classroom setting. In order to
adequately ensure that an individual actually understands the training
provided in the classroom, some sort of ``hands-on'' capability must be
demonstrated. FRA believes that the ``hands-on'' portion of the
training program would be an ideal place for a railroad to fully
involve its labor force in the training process. Appropriately trained
and skilled employees would be perfectly suited to provide much of the
``hands-on'' training envisioned by FRA. Consequently, FRA strongly
suggests that railroads work in partnership with their employees to
develop a training program which utilizes the knowledge, skills, and
experience of the employees to the greatest extent possible.
    This paragraph also retains, with modification for clarity, the
proposed requirement that employees pass either a written or oral
examination and demonstrate ``hands-on'' capability. This paragraph
clarifies that the tests and demonstration of ``hands-on'' capability
cover the skills and knowledge the employee will need to possess in
order to perform the tasks required by this part that the employee will
be responsible for performing rather than focusing strictly on the
tasks themselves or on the specific types of equipment operated by the
railroad. However, FRA does intend for the testing and ``hands-on''
demonstration to cover the various types of brake systems the employee
will be required to inspect, test, or maintain. FRA continues to
believe that in order for a person to be adequately trained to perform
a task, the individual must not only possess the knowledge of what is
required to be performed but also must possess the capability of
applying that knowledge.
    This paragraph also retains the proposed requirement regarding the
performance of periodic refresher training and testing. The final rule
retains the requirement that refresher training be provided at least
once every three years and that it include both classroom and
experiential ``hands-on'' training and testing. FRA continues to
believe that periodic refresher training is essential to ensuring the
continued ability of an employee to perform a particular task. FRA does
not intend for such training to be as lengthy or as formal as the
initial training originally provided, but believes that the training
should reemphasize key elements of various tasks and focus on items or
tasks that have been identified as being problematic or of poor quality
by the railroad, contractor, or its employees through the periodic
assessment of the training program. This paragraph makes clear that a
railroad or contractor may use efficiency testing to meet the hands-on
portion of the required refresher training provided such testing is
properly documented and covers the necessary tasks to ensure retention
of the knowledge and skill required to perform the employee's duties
required by this part. FRA agrees that such testing provides the
necessary assurances that the individual continues to have the
knowledge and skills necessary to perform the task for which the
employee is being tested.
    This paragraph contains a provision that was not specifically
included in the NPRM but which was intended by FRA to be covered by the
established training programs. This paragraph requires that new brake
systems be added to training programs prior to their introduction into
revenue service. Several labor representatives recommended that this
provision be explicitly added to the training provisions, and FRA
believes this requirement is only logical and makes sense. FRA believes
that, prior to the introduction of any new brake system, the employees
responsible for inspecting and maintaining the equipment need to be
specifically trained on the systems in order to adequately perform
their required tasks.
    This paragraph also retains the proposed requirement that
supervisors exercise oversight to ensure that all identified tasks are
performed in accordance with the railroad's procedures and the specific
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part. Although the
final rule also does not specifically address the training that must be
provided to supervisors as suggested by some commenters, FRA believes
that supervisors are sufficiently covered by the requirements contained
in this section. FRA believes that in order for a supervisor to
properly exercise oversight of an employee's work, the supervisor must
be trained and qualified to perform the tasks for which they have
oversight responsibilities.
    Paragraph (c) requires each railroad that operates trains required
to be equipped with two-way EOTs and each contractor that maintains
such devices adopt and comply with a training program which
specifically addresses the testing, operation, and maintenance of the
devices. The final rule requiring the use of two-way EOTs became
effective on July 1, 1997. Since that time, FRA has discovered numerous
operating and mechanical employees who do not fully understand when the
devices are required or how the inspection and testing of the devices
are to be accomplished. Furthermore, FRA believes that it is vital for
those employees responsible for the use of the devices (e.g. engineers
and conductors) to be intimately familiar with the use and operation of
the devices to ensure that the full safety potential of the devices is
utilized and available. Consequently, FRA believes that adequate
training must be provided to those employees responsible for the
inspection, testing, operation and use of two-way EOTs.
    Paragraph (d) requires railroads that operate trains under
conditions that require their employees to set retaining valves to
develop training programs which specifically address the use of
retainers and provide such training to those employees responsible for
using or setting retainers. This provision has been added in response
to an NTSB recommendation which FRA supports. See NTSB Recommendation
R-98-7. The NTSB specifically suggested that an explicit requirement to
provide this

[[Page 4167]]

training be contained in the final rule. The NTSB had previously
recommended such a requirement in early 1998 based on its investigation
of the 1997 derailment of a freight train near Kelso, California. Many
railroads are currently providing such training based on that
recommendation and FRA believes that a specific requirement to provide
such training will ensure that all railroads that require their
employees to set retainers adequately train their employees responsible
for performing the task on the use of retainers.
    Paragraph (e) retains the record keeping requirements proposed in
the NPRM with slight modification for consistency with the changes
noted above regarding the application of the skills and knowledge
necessary to perform a particular task. FRA continues to believe that
the record keeping and designation requirements contained in this final
rule are the cornerstone of the training requirements. Contrary to the
views of some commenters, FRA believes that something more than mere
lists of qualified employees is needed. Because the rule allows each
railroad and contractor the flexibility to develop a training program
that best fits its operation and does not impose specific curriculum or
experience requirements, FRA continues to believe it is vital for
railroads and contractors to maintain detailed records on the training
they do provide. Such documentation will allow FRA to judge the
effectiveness of the training provided and will provide FRA with the
ability to independently assess whether the training provided to a
specific individual adequately addresses the skills and knowledge
required to perform the tasks that the person is deemed qualified to
perform. Moreover, requiring these records will deter railroads and
contractors from circumventing the training requirements and discourage
them from attempting to utilize insufficiently trained personnel to
perform the inspections and tests required by this rule.
    This paragraph makes clear that the required records may be
maintained either electronically or on paper. Many railroads currently
maintain their training records in an electronic format, and FRA sees
no reason not to permit such a practice if the information can be
provided to FRA in a timely manner upon request. The proposed provision
requiring the railroad's chief mechanical or chief operating officer to
sign a statement regarding each employee's qualifications has been
modified in the final rule to merely require identification of the
person or persons making the determination that the employee has
completed the necessary training. This modification will permit the
information to be maintained electronically and will still provide the
accountability which FRA intended by the provision in the NPRM. FRA
believes it is absolutely essential that those individuals making the
determinations regarding an employee's qualification be identified in
order to ensure the integrity of the training programs developed and to
prevent potential abuses by a railroad or contractor.
    FRA also objects to the portrayal by some commenters that the
requirement to maintain training records is overly burdensome.
Virtually all of the items required to be recorded are currently
maintained by most railroads in some fashion or another. Contrary to
the concerns raised by some commenters, the rule does not require that
the contents of each training program be maintained in each employee's
file. Railroads are free to develop whatever type of cross-referencing
system they desire, provided the contents of the training program are
maintained in some fashion and can be readily retrieved. Furthermore,
railroads currently maintain lists of individuals they deem to be
qualified persons, and the companies inform those individuals as to
their status to perform particular tasks. FRA believes this is a good
practice and is necessary to ensure that individual employees do not
attempt to perform, or are not asked to perform, tasks for which they
have not been trained.
    Paragraph (e) requires that each railroad or contractor adopt and
comply with a plan to periodically assess the effectiveness of its
training program. This paragraph modifies the proposed requirement that
railroads develop an internal audit process to evaluate the
effectiveness of their training. Although FRA agrees that a formal
audit process may not be necessary, FRA continues to believe that
railroads and contractors should periodically assess the effectiveness
of their training programs. However, rather than require a formal
internal audit, FRA believes that periodic assessments may be conducted
through a number of different means and each railroad or contractor may
have a need to conduct the assessment in a different manner. This
paragraph requires that a railroad or contractor institute a plan to
periodically assess its training program and, as suggested by some
commenters, the paragraph permits the use of efficiency tests or
periodic review of employee performance as methods for conducting such
review. FRA agrees that many railroads, due to their small size, are
capable of assessing the quality of the training their employees
receive by conducting periodic supervisory spot checks or efficiency
tests of their employees' performance. However, FRA continues to
believe that on larger railroads the periodic assessment of a training
program should involve all segments of the workforce involved in the
training. FRA believes it is vital that labor be intrinsically involved
in the assessment process, from beginning to end. For example,
evaluation of training techniques might best be approached through a
``team'' method, where several observers, including labor
representatives, periodically evaluate course or ``hands-on'' training
content and presentation.

Section 232.205  Class I Brake Test-Initial Terminal Inspection

    This section describes the circumstances that would mandate the
performance of a Class I brake test and outlines the tasks that must be
performed when performing this inspection. Most of the provisions
contained in this section are currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a) and
(c)-(h) or were proposed in the 1998 NPRM in order to clarify existing
requirements, to eliminate potential abuses, and to standardize certain
provisions. Basically a Class I brake test is intended to be the
functional equivalent to what is currently referred to as an ``initial
terminal brake inspection.''
    Paragraph (a) identifies those trains that are required to receive
a Class I brake test prior to movement from a location. The provisions
contained in this paragraph are virtually identical to those proposed
in the NPRM, with slight modification for clarity. Paragraph (a)(1)
requires that a train receive a Class I brake test at the location
where it is originally assembled. It should be noted that the final
rule eliminates the term ``point of origin'' proposed in the NPRM. FRA
agrees that the proposed definition of this term was duplicative of the
term ``initial terminal'' and merely created potential
misunderstandings. Moreover, FRA agrees that the problems attempted to
be addressed by the use of this term are sufficiently addressed by the
various inspections required in this final rule when cars are added to
a train.
    Paragraph (a)(2) requires the performance of a Class I brake test
when the train consist is changed other than by adding or removing a
solid block of cars. Currently, there appears to be some confusion over
what constitutes a ``solid block of cars.'' In order to clarify the

[[Page 4168]]

issue, FRA proposed a definition of ``solid block of cars'' in the
NPRM. In response to numerous comments regarding the proposed
definition and to further clarify the issue, FRA has modified the
definition in this final rule and referenced that definition in this
paragraph. Although FRA believes that the definition it proposed is
consistent with current interpretations and enforcement of the
requirement, FRA agrees with some of the commenters that the proposed
definition may have been too narrow and did not directly address FRA's
primary concern, the block of cars itself. FRA's primary concern is the
condition of the block of cars being added to the train, especially
when the block of cars is made up of cars from more than one train.
Thus, the final rule will permit a solid block of cars to be added to a
train without triggering a requirement to perform a Class I brake test
on the entire train. However, depending on the make-up of that block of
cars, certain inspections will have to be performed on that block of
cars at the location where it is added to the train.
    FRA believes that limits have to be placed on the number of blocks
of cars being added to a train in order to ensure that cars are being
inspected in a timely manner and in accordance with the intent of the
regulations. Some commenters suggest that a block of cars should be
permitted to be added to a train with no inspection other than a
continuity test regardless of the number of different trains the cars
making up the block came from provided all the cars received a Class I
brake test at their point of origin. Other commenters suggest that any
number of blocks of cars should be permitted to be added to a train at
a single location. FRA believes that to accept either of these
positions would be tantamount to eliminating initial terminal and
intermediate inspections and would drastically reduce the safety of
freight trains being operated across the country. In FRA's view, both
of the positions noted above are merely means to circumvent inspections
and are akin to a practice known as ``block swapping'' in the
mechanical inspection context, a practice that FRA does not permit. In
FRA's opinion, the authority to add multiple blocks of cars to a train
at one location or add a single block of cars to a train that is
composed of cars from numerous different trains without inspecting the
cars in those blocks, would essentially allow railroads to assemble new
trains without performing any direct inspection of any of the cars in
the train. Furthermore, if cars are permitted to be moved in and out of
a train at will, determining when and where a Class IA brake test must
be performed on the train will be impossible.
    This paragraph requires the performance of a Class I brake test at
locations where more than one ``solid block of cars'' is added to or
removed from a train. It should be noted that the final rule permits
both the addition and the removal of a ``solid block of cars'' at a
location without requiring the performance of a Class I brake test on
the entire train. Although this practice is not permitted under the
existing regulations, FRA believes that the inspection requirements
contained in this final rule ensure the safety of cars being added and
removed in this fashion. This paragraph also contains an additional
caveat that will permit the removal of defective equipment at locations
where other cars are added or removed without triggering the
requirement to perform a Class I brake test on the entire train. FRA
currently permits this practice, and it is consistent with the
requirements aimed at having defective equipment repaired as quickly as
possible.
    Paragraph (a)(3) incorporates FRA's longstanding administrative
interpretation which permits trains to remain disconnected from a
source of compressed air (``off air'') for a short length of time
without having to be retested. Currently, FRA permits trains to remain
``off air'' only for a period of approximately two hours before an
initial terminal brake inspection must be performed. This paragraph
retains the proposed extension of the permissible time ``off air'' to
four hours. A detailed discussion regarding FRA's retention of the
proposed extension of the permissible time cars may be left ``off-air''
is contained in the preceding ``Overview of Comments and General FRA
Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading ``II. C.
Charging of Air Brake System.''
    Paragraph (a)(4) retains the proposed requirement that unit or
cycle trains receive a Class I brake test every 3,000 miles. The final
rule has been slightly modified from the provision contained in the
NPRM to clarify that this requirement applies to unit or cycle trains.
FRA has also added a definition of ``unit train'' and ``cycle train''
to the final rule in order to clarify the applicability of the
requirement. Historically, these trains operate for extended periods of
time with only a series of brake inspections similar to Class IA brake
inspections. FRA believes that the proposed 3,000-mile limitation is
appropriate as it represents the approximate distance that a train
would cover when traveling from coast to coast. In addition, the 3,000-
mile requirement is consistent with the interval for performing Class
IA brake tests and would equate to every third inspection on these
trains being a Class I brake test rather than a Class IA brake test.
Furthermore, AAR does not seek a moderate extension of a couple hundred
miles so a few trains could complete their cycle, but seeks to extend
the distance to more than 4,500 miles in many instances. FRA is not
willing to modify the proposed requirement to that extent and believes
that a 3,000-mile interval for these types of trains provides
sufficient flexibility to the railroads to perform periodic Class I
brake tests on these train in a cost-effective manner.
    Paragraph (a)(5) retains the proposed provisions for when trains
received in interchange must receive a Class I brake test. These are
similar to what is currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a)(1)(iii);
however, this paragraph retains two proposed provisions that are not
contained in the existing regulations. The final rule will permit
trains received in interchange to have a previously tested solid block
of cars added to the train without requiring the performance of a Class
I brake test. Currently, the addition of these types of cars to a train
received in interchange would require the performance of an initial
terminal inspection. As long as the added block of cars has been
previously tested, FRA sees no safety hazard in permitting the cars to
be added to a train at an interchange location. Furthermore, the final
rule will permit a train that is received in interchange, and that will
travel no more than 20 miles from the interchange location, to have its
consist changed other than as provided in paragraph (a)(5) without
being required to receive a Class I brake test; provided that, any cars
added to the consist at the interchange location receive at least a
Class II brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.209. Historically, FRA has not
had a problem with these shorter distance trains and believes that a
Class II brake test on those cars added to the train is sufficient to
ensure the safety of these operations.
    Paragraph (b) details the required tasks comprising a Class I brake
test. A proper Class I brake test ensures that a train is in proper
working condition and is capable of traveling to its destination with
minimal problems en route. The final rule retains virtually all of the
provisions proposed in the NPRM regarding the specific tasks that are
to be part of the Class I brake test, which include most of the tasks
currently

[[Page 4169]]

required by Sec. 232.12(c)-(h) for an initial terminal brake test, with
some modification in the interest of standardization and clarity.
    The final rule retains a standardized brake-pipe reduction of 20
psi for virtually all brake inspections and tests as was proposed in
the 1994 and 1998 NPRMs. FRA agrees with both labor and management
commenters that a standard brake-pipe reduction will simplify train
brake tests and will make it easier to train workers. The 20-psi
standardized reduction was suggested by both labor and management
representatives.
    The brake-pipe leakage test will continue to be a valid method of
qualifying brake systems. However, the final rule retains the air flow
method of testing the condition of the brake pipe as an acceptable
alternate to the brake-pipe leakage test. The air flow method (AFM)
would be an alternative only for trains having a lead locomotive
equipped with a 26-L brake valve or equivalent and outfitted with an
EOT device. The maximum allowable flow would be 60 CFM. The AFM of
qualifying train air brake systems has been allowed in Canada as an
alternative to the leakage test since 1984. In addition, several
railroads in the United States have been using the AFM since 1989 when
FRA granted the AAR's petition for a waiver of compliance to permit the
AFM as an alternative to the leakage test. FRA recognizes the concerns
of several labor organization commenters opposing the adoption of the
AFM; however, FRA believes these commenters' apprehension is based on
their unfamiliarity with the method. As FRA pointed out in the ANPRM,
the 1994 NPRM, and the 1998 NPRM, the AFM is a much more comprehensive
test than the leakage test. See 57 FR 62551, 59 FR 47682-47683, 63 FR
48305-06. The AFM tests the entire brake system just as it is used,
with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in. FRA believes the AFM is
an effective and reliable alternative method of qualifying train
brakes. In the 1998 NPRM, FRA expressed some concern regarding the use
of the AFM on short trains. However, based on consideration of the
comments received and FRA's experiences in observing the use of the
AFM, FRA agrees that the AFM should be permitted as an alternative on
any train provided the 15 psi gradient is maintained on the train.
    The brake-pipe gradient of 15 psi has been retained for both the
leakage and air flow method of train brake testing; however, the
minimum rear-car pressure has been increased to at least 75 psi, which
will require a locomotive brake-pipe pressure of at least 90 psi. FRA
feels that the added margin of braking power justifies the increase in
pressure. The final rule modifies the language used in the proposed
provisions related to the air pressure at which the brake tests are to
be conducted based on comments submitted by the NTSB. The NTSB noted
that the language used by FRA in the NPRM to describe the air pressure
settings for conducting the required brake tests would permit some road
trains to be tested at a lower pressure than that at which the train
would be operated. The NTSB contends that although most road freight
trains operate at 90 psi, some road freight trains are operated at 100
psi and the proposal would permit them to be tested at 90 psi. FRA
agrees with NTSB's suggestion that a train's brake system should be
tested at the pressure at which the train will operate and has modified
the language of the final rule accordingly. Consequently, the final
rule requires that the brake system be charged to the pressure at which
the train will be operated and that the rear car pressure be within 15
psi of that pressure and not less than 75 psi when conducting the
required brake tests and inspections.
    Based on FRA's experience over the last several years and based on
numerous comments received by FRA verifying the high reliability of the
rear-car pressure transducers used in reporting brake-pipe pressure by
an end-of-train (EOT) device, FRA now feels comfortable and justified
in allowing the use of EOT devices in establishing the rear car
pressure for Class I brake tests. FRA currently has requirements in
place for the inspection and testing of EOT devices at the time of
installation, which have been incorporated into subpart E of this
proposal. However, in using an EOT to verify rear car pressure during a
Class I brake test, the reading of the rear car air pressure is only
permitted from the controlling or hauling locomotive of the train.
Under no circumstances may train air brake pressure be read from a
remote highway vehicle, another locomotive not attached to the train,
or at any other location such as a remote unit installed in an office
or shop.
    Paragraph (b)(2) retains the proposed language regarding the duties
of individuals performing brake inspections contained in this final
rule. The language in this paragraph is reiterated in the final rule
provisions on both the Class IA and Class II brake tests in order to
ensure the proper performance of brake inspections. Contrary to the
assertions of some commenters, FRA believes that the proposed
provisions sufficiently detailed how the various inspections were to be
performed while providing flexibility for railroads to conduct the
inspections in a manner most conducive to their operations. The methods
of inspection proposed in the 1998 NPRM incorporated current practices
and technical guidance previously issued by FRA.
    Over the last few years there has been extensive debate concerning
what constitutes a proper train air brake test under the current
provisions contained in part 232, particularly relating to the
positioning of the person performing the brake inspection. In early
1997, FRA issued a technical bulletin to its field inspectors in an
attempt to clarify what must be done in order to properly perform a
brake test. This technical bulletin stated that inspectors must
position themselves in such a manner so as to be able to observe all of
the movable parts of the brake system on each car. At a minimum, this
requires that the inspector observe both sides of the equipment
sometime during the inspection process. FRA continues to believe that
both sides of the equipment must be observed sometime after the
occurrence of activities that have the likelihood of compromising the
integrity of the brake components of the equipment, such as: hump
switching; multiple switching; loading; or unloading. FRA also agrees
with the comments submitted by several railroad representatives that if
one side of the equipment is inspected to ensure the proper attachment
and condition of brake components and the proper condition of brake
shoes on that side and the application of the brakes is observed from
the other side of the equipment, then based on the design of brake
systems today it can be safely assumed that in virtually every case an
application of the brakes is occurring on the other side of the
equipment. Consequently, FRA would like to again make clear that both
sides of the equipment do not necessarily have to be inspected while
the brakes are applied if an adequate inspection of the brake
components was conducted on both sides of the equipment sometime during
the inspection process. However, FRA also intends to make clear that
the piston travel on each car must be inspected while the brakes are
applied; thus, an inspector must take appropriate steps to make this
observation.
    As indicated in the NPRM, FRA does not intend to mandate specific
methods for how the various inspections are to be performed. FRA
believes that each

[[Page 4170]]

railroad is in the best position to determine the method of inspection
that best suits its operations at different locations. To require that
all inspections be performed by walking the train, as suggested by
several labor representatives, would impose a huge financial and
operational burden on the railroads and would ignore the various
different methods by which inspections are currently performed and have
been performed for years. FRA has never mandated specific step-by-step
procedures for conducting brake inspections but merely requires that,
whichever method is used, it must ensure that all of the components
required to be inspected will be so inspected.
    Paragraph (b)(4) contains the requirements for ensuring that a
proper application of a car's brakes is made during the performance of
brake inspections and provides the procedures for retesting a car found
not to be properly applied during the initial performance of a brake
inspection. In proposing the requirements contained in this paragraph,
FRA attempted to clarify language contained in the current regulation
which requires that the brakes ``apply.'' The existing language has
been misinterpreted by some to mean that if the piston applies in
response to a command from a controlling locomotive or yard test
device, and releases before the release signal is given, the brake
system on that car is in compliance with the regulation because the
brake simply applied. The intent of the regulation has always been that
the brakes apply and remain applied until the release signal is
initiated from the controlling locomotive or yard test device. In order
to eliminate any confusion, this paragraph requires that the brakes on
a car must remain applied until the appropriate release signal is
given. If the brakes on a car fail to do so, the car must either be
removed from the train or repaired in the train and retested as
discussed below.
    This paragraph retains the general concepts for retesting cars with
brakes that are found not to apply or not to remain applied that were
proposed in the NPRM. However, some of the specific requirements for
performing a retest have been modified from those proposed in the NPRM
based on FRA's consideration of the comments submitted and its
determination that the proposed retesting provisions may have been
overly restrictive. This paragraph modifies the proposed retest
requirements by permitting any car found with brakes not applied during
a required inspections to be retested rather than just cars with
obvious defective conditions. FRA agrees with the assertions of several
commenters that there are a number of circumstances where the reason
for the failure of the brakes to apply is not readily apparent. This
paragraph reduces the amount of time that the brakes on a retested car
must remain applied to three minutes from the proposed five minutes.
The final rule makes clear that the brakes on a retested car remain
applied until the release is initiated and that the release be
initiated no less than three minutes after the application of the
brakes. FRA believes three minutes is consistent with the amount of
time it would take a person to conduct a complete inspection of the
retested car's brakes. This paragraph also permits a car to be retested
with the use of a suitable device positioned at the car being retested
rather than from the head of the consist or from the controlling
locomotive. When a retest is performed in this fashion, the final rule
requires that the compressed air be depleted from the car being
retested prior to separating the train line to perform the retest in
order to prevent potential injury to employees conducting the retest.
This paragraph also makes clear that any retest performed must be
conducted at the air pressure at which the train will be operated. The
modifications made to the retesting requirements in this paragraph are
reiterated or referenced in the other types of brake inspections
required in this subpart. A detailed discussion regarding the
modifications made to the retesting provision is contained in the
preceding ``Overview of Comments and General FRA Conclusions'' portion
of the preamble under the heading ``II. D. Retesting of Brakes.''
    Paragraph (b)(5) retains the proposed and current requirement that
piston travel be adjusted during the performance of a Class I brake
test if it is found outside the nominal limits established for standard
8\1/2\ inch and 10-inch diameter brake cylinder or outside the limits
established for other types, which will be contained on a stencil,
sticker, or badge plate. This provision is identical to that proposed
in the NPRM and is similar to the provision currently contained at
Sec. 232.12(f). The major difference is that FRA has modified the
existing provision to require that piston travel found to be less than
7 inches or more than 9 inches must be adjusted nominally to 7\1/2\
inches. This change is based on a request by AAR to change the
adjustment to 7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches as its member railroads were
finding it extremely difficult to adjust the piston travel to precisely
7 inches and that in some cases the adjustment would be marginally less
than 7 inches, thus requiring a readjustment. Thus, AAR sought the
extra \1/2\ inch in order to provide a small measure for error when the
piston travel is adjusted. As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are
validly placed and would have no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated
the request.
    Paragraph (b)(7) retains the proposed provision which clarified
that brake connection bottom rod supports will no longer be required on
bottom connection rods secured with locking cotter keys. FRA recognizes
that there is no need for bottom rod safety supports in these
circumstances and intends to relieve railroads of this unnecessary
expense, which will provide the industry a cost savings without
compromising safety.
    Paragraph (b)(8) retains the proposed provisions relating to the
performance of ``roll-by'' inspections of the release of the brakes on
the cars of the train. This method of inspection has been used for
years even though there is nothing in the current regulation which
specifically addresses the method. The authority to use this method of
inspection of the brake release permits railroads to expedite the
movement of trains and has not proven to create a safety hazard.
Therefore, this paragraph is intended to clarify the authority of
railroads to use such a method and to ensure that the inspection is
performed properly. This paragraph makes clear that when a railroad is
performing a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release the train's
speed shall not exceed 10 mph, that the qualified person performing the
``roll-by'' inspection shall notify the engineer when and if the
``roll-by'' has been successfully completed, and that the operator of
the train shall note successful completion of the release portion of
the inspection on the written or electronic notification required by
this final rule. FRA intends to make clear that the notification to the
engineer may be made through a hand held radio, a cellular telephone,
or communication with a train dispatcher but that such information must
be provided to the engineer prior to the train's departure. Based on
the rationale provided for permitting only one side of a train to be
inspected during the application of the brakes, FRA intends to make
clear that only one side of the train must be inspected during the
release portion of a brake test. However, paragraph (b)(2) makes clear
that a ``roll-by'' inspection of the brake release shall not constitute
an inspection of that side

[[Page 4171]]

for purposes of inspecting both sides during the inspection.
    Paragraph (c) generally retains the provision as it was proposed in
the NPRM and as currently contained in Sec. 232.12(a), with slight
modification for clarity, stating that a carman alone will be
considered a qualified person if a railroad's collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) provides that carmen are to perform the inspections and
tests required by this section. FRA received a number of comments from
various labor representatives objecting to FRA's proposed modification
of the provision that currently exists in Sec. 232.12(a). These
commenters contended that the proposed language would alter the meaning
of the existing provision and effectively eliminate its enforceability.
Particularly, they objected to the proposed addition of the word
``only'' in the first sentence of the provision and the proposed
elimination of the phrase ``existing or future collective bargaining
agreement.'' They contend that no CBA provides that only a carman may
perform the inspections and that it is unclear whether the provision
will apply to future CBAs due to the elimination of the specific
language to that effect. They also asserted that it is unnecessary to
require that carmen be trained as a qualified person or a QMI since
carmen were recognized as the craft qualified to perform the inspection
in 1982.
    FRA's intent in proposing this provision was to clarify the meaning
of the provision and explain FRA's ability to enforce the existing
provision. FRA's intent was neither to expand nor reduce the
applicability of the provision. FRA recognizes that its proposed
addition of the word ``only'' could have the effect of altering the
provision in a way that was not intended as FRA agrees that many
existing CBAs do not require that only a carman perform the
inspections. Thus, the language of the provision in this final rule
eliminates the word ``only'' from the proposed clause, ``Where a
railroad's collective bargaining agreement provides that only a carman
is to perform the inspections and tests required by this section. * *
*'' However, FRA does not agree that it is necessary to include the
phrase ``existing or future collective bargaining agreement,'' as
suggested by some commenters. FRA intends for the reference to a
collective bargaining agreement to include any existing or future CBA.
FRA believes that the inclusion of the suggested phrase is unnecessary
because the plain meaning of the text is the CBA that applies at the
time the issue arises. FRA sees no way to read the provision contained
in this final rule as not to include both existing and future CBAs.
    FRA also believes that it is essential for railroads to ensure that
the individuals required to perform the inspections covered by this
provision are properly trained and qualified to perform the
inspections. As the requirements contained in this final rule for
performing these inspections differ somewhat from the existing
regulation, FRA believes it is necessary for employees performing the
inspections to be trained on these new requirements. This paragraph
merely makes clear that, in circumstances where a collective bargaining
agreement requires that a carman is to perform the inspections and
tests required by this section, the railroad shall bear the
responsibility of ensuring that the carman responsible for performing
this task is properly trained and designated as qualified to perform
the task. In these circumstances, FRA believes that the railroad must
ensure that the employees with whom they have collectively bargained to
perform the inspections and tests required by this section are properly
trained and designated to perform the task. Furthermore, FRA believes
that on virtually all railroads carmen will be sufficiently trained and
experienced to be considered ``qualified persons'' and ``qualified
mechanical inspectors'' as defined in this proposal, provided they
receive some additional training on the specific requirements contained
in this final rule.
    The original provision was added to the regulations in 1982 when
the distance between brake inspections was increased from 500 miles to
1,000 miles. The provision was included as part of an agreement between
the railroads and rail labor for permitting the maximum distance
between brake tests to be increased and was presented to FRA at the
time. The language contained in that agreement was included in the 1982
regulatory revisions without change by FRA. Consequently, due to the
circumstances under which this provision was added to the regulations
and because it has existed for over 16 years, FRA feels compelled to
retain the language in this final rule. FRA will continue to interpret
the provision as it has always interpreted the provision. In
circumstances where a railroad's collective bargaining agreement
requires that a carman perform the inspections and tests required by
this section, a carman alone will be considered a qualified person.
This has been FRA's approach to the provision since its inception.
    As FRA lacks the authority to issue binding interpretations of
collective bargaining agreements, FRA lacks the authority to settle a
dispute between a railroad and its employees as to which group of its
employees is to perform what work. FRA intends to make clear, that in
order for FRA to proceed with an enforcement action under the provision
contained in this paragraph, one of the parties to the collective
bargaining agreement would first have to obtain a decision from a duly
authorized body interpreting the relevant agreement, specifically
identifying the involved location, and adequately resolving all of the
interpretative issues necessary for FRA to conclude that the work
belongs to a particular group of employees.
    Paragraph (d) contains the requirement regarding the notification
to the locomotive engineer and train crew of the successful completion
of a Class I brake test by a qualified person. This paragraph slightly
modifies the notification requirement from that proposed in the NPRM.
In the NPRM, FRA proposed that the engineer be informed in writing of
the successful completion of the Class I brake test. The intent of this
proposed requirement was to ensure that the locomotive engineer was
adequately informed of the results of the inspection; however, FRA
recognizes that a requirement to provide the information in writing
ignores technological advances and operational efficiencies.
Consequently, this paragraph permits the notification to be made in
whatever format the railroad deems appropriate; provided that the
notification contains the proper information and a record of the
notification and the requisite information is maintained in the cab of
the controlling locomotive. FRA believes these changes are consistent
with the intent and purpose of the proposed requirement for written
notification and ensure necessary information is relayed to the
operator of the train.
    Paragraph (f) retains the proposed and existing requirements
relating to the adding of cars or blocks of cars while a train is en
route. This paragraph informs railroads that cars picked up en route
that have not been previously tested and kept connected to a source of
compressed air are to receive a Class I brake test when added to the
train. Alternatively, a railroad may elect to perform only a Class II
brake test at the time that a car is added to the train en route, but
FRA intends to make clear that if this option is elected then the cars
added in this fashion must be given a Class I brake test at the next
forward location where facilities are available for providing such
attention.

[[Page 4172]]

Section 232.207  Class IA Brake Tests--1,000-Mile Inspection

    This section retains the proposed requirements related to the
performance of a Class IA brake test. Many of the provisions contained
in this section are currently contained at Sec. 232.12(b) regarding the
performance of 1,000-mile inspections. FRA has modified some of the
existing requirements for purposes of clarity and has added a few
additional requirements in order to make the inspection requirement
more enforceable and to prevent some of the current abuses which FRA
field inspectors have observed in their enforcement activities.
    FRA recognizes that since 1982 new technologies and improved
equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate longer
distances with fewer defects. The data submitted by AAR appear to
support this assertion, and FRA does not dispute the potential
capability of certain equipment to travel distances in excess of 1,000
miles without becoming defective. However, the capability of the
equipment to travel extended distances safely is contingent on the
condition of the equipment when it begins operation and on the nature
of the operation in which it is to be engaged. FRA believes that in
order for brake equipment to travel extended distances between brake
inspections, the condition and planned operation of the equipment must
be thoroughly assessed at the beginning of a train's journey through
high quality inspections. As noted in the general preamble discussion
above, FRA believes that railroads are not conducting high quality
initial terminal inspections at many locations because the railroads
are utilizing employees who are not sufficiently qualified or trained
to perform the inspections. Therefore, FRA believes that the 1,000-mile
brake inspection interval continues to be necessary and important to
ensure the safe operation of trains inspected by qualified personnel
pursuant to this final rule. Furthermore, no trains operated in the
United States are currently permitted to travel greater than 1,000
miles between brake inspections. Consequently, FRA is not willing to
permit trains to travel in excess of 1,000 miles between brake
inspections, except in the limited, controlled situations where data on
the equipment can be gathered. (See discussion and provisions related
to ``Extended Haul Trains.'') FRA notes that Canada eliminated
intermediate inspections in 1994. However, Canada has different
inspection requirements than those contained in this final rule and
vastly different operating conditions and environments than those
prevalent on most American railroads, operating conditions and
environments that are more conducive to the inspection regimen imposed
by that country.
    Paragraph (a) provides that each train shall receive a Class IA
brake test at a location that is not more than 1,000 miles from the
point where any car in the train last received a Class I or Class IA
brake test. FRA intends to make clear that the most restrictive car or
block of cars in the train will determine the location where this test
must be performed. For example, if a train departs point A and travels
500 miles to point B where it picks up a previously tested block of
cars en route which has travelled 800 miles since its last Class I
brake test and the crew does not perform a Class I brake test when
entraining the cars, then the entire train must receive a Class IA
brake test within 200 miles from point B even though that location is
only 700 miles from point A.
    Paragraph (b) contains the tasks which must be performed when
conducting a Class IA brake test. These task are virtually identical to
some of the tasks required to be performed during a Class I brake test.
A leakage or air flow test must be performed. Thus, when locomotives
are equipped with a 26-L brake valve or equivalent, FRA will permit the
use of the air flow method as an alternative to the brake pipe leakage
test. This paragraph makes clear that the brakes shall apply on each
car in the train in response to a 20-psi brake pipe reduction and shall
remain applied until a release is initiated. In addition, the paragraph
reiterates the parameters for performing a retest of the brakes on
those cars found not to have sufficiently applied, which are contained
in the Class I brake test requirements. It should be noted that,
defective equipment may be moved from or past a location where a Class
IA brake test is performed only if all of the requirements contained in
Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied. The only change to the tasks contained
in this paragraph from those proposed in the NPRM is the clarification
that the brake system be charged to the pressure at which the train
will be operated and that the rear car pressure be within 15 psi of
that pressure and not less than 75 psi when conducting the required
brake tests and inspections. This change is identical to the change
made in the Class I brake test and is discussed in detail in that
section.
    This paragraph also makes clear that in order to properly perform a
Class IA brake test under this section both sides of the equipment must
be observed sometime during the inspection process. FRA finds the
comments of AAR and other railroad representatives contending that both
sides of the equipment should not be required to be inspected at Class
IA brake tests to lack merit. The Class IA brake test basically
incorporates the current 1,000-mile brake inspection, which FRA
believes requires an inspection of both sides of the equipment during
the inspection process. The current 1,000-mile inspection requires that
brake rigging be inspected to ensure it is properly secure and does not
bind or foul and that the brakes apply on each car in the train. See 49
CFR 232.12(b). In order to make these inspections properly, FRA
believes that both sides of the equipment must be observed sometime
during the inspection process and, to FRA's knowledge, railroads
currently conduct these inspections in this manner. Thus, the NPRM and
the final rule merely clarify what is required to be performed under
the current regulations to properly perform a 1,000-mile inspection.
Therefore, contrary to the contentions of certain commenters, retention
of this current requirement does not impose any additional burden on
the railroads.
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed provision which would require
railroads to maintain a list of locations where Class IA inspections
will be performed and that FRA be notified at least 30 days in advance
of any change to that list of locations. Based on a review of the
comments submitted, FRA recognizes that the proposed requirement for
designating locations where Class IA inspections will be performed was
somewhat unclear and may have caused confusion. The intent of the
proposed requirement was to ensure that FRA was informed of those
locations where a railroad intends to perform Class IA brake
inspections and that FRA had the information with which to hold the
railroad responsible for conducting the inspections at those locations.
FRA was not intending to require that railroad separately identify a
specific Class IA inspection location for each train it operates.
Consequently, this paragraph has been slightly modified from that
proposed in order to make clear that the designation required is for
locations where such inspections will be performed and permits deviance
from those locations only in emergency situations.
    The current regulations merely require that railroads designate
locations where intermediate 1,000-mile brake inspections will be
performed but place no limitation on changing the locations. Therefore,
FRA has found

[[Page 4173]]

some railroads changing the locations where these intermediate
inspections are to occur on a daily basis which prevents FRA from
observing these inspections being performed or avoids full performance
of the required inspection by mechanical forces. In order to ensure
that these types of inspections are being properly performed, FRA must
be able to determine where the railroad plans to conduct these types of
inspections. This paragraph recognizes that there may be occurrences or
emergencies, such as derailments, that make it impossible or unsafe for
a train to reach a location that the railroad has designated as a Class
IA inspection site. Consequently, this paragraph permits railroads to
bypass the 30-day written notification requirement in these instances
provided FRA is notified within 24 hours after a designation has been
changed. This paragraph also makes clear that failure to perform a
Class IA brake test at a designated location will constitute a failure
to properly perform the inspection.

Section 232.209  Class II Brake Tests--Intermediate Inspection

    This section contains the requirements related to the performance
of Class II brake tests. The requirements contained in this section are
similar to the proposed requirements and the requirements currently
contained in Sec. 232.13(d) but have been slightly modified for clarity
and to address situations where solid blocks of cars are added to an en
route train. Paragraph (a) identifies those cars that are required to
receive a Class II brake test when added to a train. This paragraph has
been modified to address situations when certain ``solid blocks of
cars'' are added to a train. As discussed previously, the final rule
modifies the definition of ``solid block of cars'' from that proposed
in the NPRM. (See section-by-section analysis of Sec. 232.5.) Although
FRA believes the definition it proposed was consistent with current
interpretations and enforcement of the requirement, FRA agrees with
some of the commenters that the definition may have been too narrow and
did not directly address FRA's primary concern, the block of cars
itself. FRA's primary concern is the condition of the block of cars
being added to the train especially when the block of cars is made up
of cars from more than one train. Thus, the final rule permits a
``solid block of cars'' to be added to a train without triggering a
requirement to perform a Class I brake test on the entire train.
However, this paragraph identifies the situations when ``solid blocks
of cars'' must be inspected when added to a train.
    This paragraph makes clear that a car or a solid block of cars that
has not previously received a Class I brake test or that has been off a
source of compressed air for longer than four hours must, at a minimum,
receive a Class II brake test when added to an en route train. This
paragraph also makes clear that a Class II brake test is required to be
performed on each ``solid block of cars'' added to a train which is
composed of cars from more than one other train or that is composed of
cars from only one other train but that have not remained continuously
and consecutively coupled together. It should be noted that this
paragraph specifically acknowledges that the removal of defective
equipment from a solid block of cars will not result in the solid block
of cars being considered not to be continuously and consecutively
coupled together. FRA believes this approach is consistent with the
intent of both FRA and Congress to have defective equipment repaired as
quickly as possible.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed tasks which must be performed
when conducting a Class II brake test. The only changes to the tasks
contained in this paragraph from those proposed in the NPRM is the
clarification that the brake system be charged to the pressure at which
the train will be operated and that the rear car pressure be within 15
psi of that pressure and not less than 75 psi when conducting the
required brake tests and inspections and the procedures for performing
retests on cars. These changes are identical to the changes made in the
Class I and Class IA brake tests and are discussed in detail in those
sections.
    A Class II brake test is intended to ensure that the brakes on
those cars added apply and release and that the added cars do not
compromise the integrity of the train's brake system. Therefore, a
leakage or air flow test must be performed when the cars are added to
the train to ensure the integrity of the train's brake system. This
paragraph makes clear that in order to properly perform an inspection
under this section both sides of the equipment must be observed
sometime during the inspection process. This paragraph also makes clear
that the brakes shall apply on each car added to the train and remain
applied until a release is initiated and reiterates the parameters that
are contained in the Class I brake test requirements for performing a
retest on those cars whose brakes were found not to have sufficiently
applied. It should be noted that, defective equipment may be moved from
or past a location where a Class II brake test is performed only if all
of the requirements contained in Sec. 232.15 have been satisfied.
Paragraph (b) also requires that the release of the brakes on those
cars added to the train and on the rear car of the train be verified
and allows railroads to conduct ``roll-by'' inspections for this
purpose.
    Paragraph (c) continues to permit the proposed and existing
alternative to the rear car application and release portion of this
test. This alternative permits the locomotive engineer to rely on a
rear car gauge or end-of-train device to determine that the train's
brake pipe pressure is being reduced by at least 5 psi and then
restored by at least 5 psi in lieu of direct observation of the rear
car application and release. Although certain labor representatives
contended that this practice should not be allowed and that it is in
violation of the existing regulations, this alternative has been
permitted for years under the current regulations (Sec. 232.13(c)(1),
(d)(1)) without any degradation of safety, and thus, FRA intends to
permit the practice to continue.
    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed and existing requirements
relating to the inspection of cars or blocks of cars added to a train
while a train is en route. This paragraph makes clear that if cars are
given a Class II brake test when added to a train then the cars added
must receive a Class I brake test at the next forward location where
the facilities are available for performing such an inspection.

Section  232.211  Class III Brake Tests--Trainline Continuity
Inspection

    This section contains the requirements related to the performance
of Class III brake tests. The requirements contained in this section
are generally the same as those proposed, which incorporated the
requirements currently contained in Sec. 232.13(c), but have been
slightly modified for clarity and standardization with the changes made
in other inspection requirements contained in this final rule. Some of
the changes made in this section from that proposed clarify the need to
perform a Class III brake test when a solid block of cars is added to a
train which does not require the performance of either a Class I or
Class II brake test. Paragraph (b) of this section has been modified to
incorporate the clarification that the brake system be charged to the
pressure at which the train will be operated and that the rear car
pressure be within 15 psi of that pressure and not less than 75 psi
when conducting the required inspection.

[[Page 4174]]

    The purpose of a Class III brake test is to ensure the integrity of
the trainline when minor changes in the train consist occur. Basically,
a Class III brake test ensures that the train brake pipe is properly
delivering air to the rear of the train. FRA intends to make clear that
this inspection is designed to be performed whenever the continuity of
the brake system is broken or interrupted. For example, if a railroad
disconnects a locomotive from a train consist to perform switching
duties for a short period and then reattaches the locomotive to the
consist, without any other change being made in the consist, the
railroad would be required to perform a Class III brake test prior to
the train's departure. Similarly, a Class III brake test would be
required if a railroad disconnects a locomotive from the train and adds
a different locomotive to the train, only to discover that the added
locomotive is not operating properly, and thus, adds the original
locomotive back into the consist. Because the continuity of the
trainline was interrupted when the locomotive was removed and then
placed back in the train, even though the same cars and locomotives
remained in the consist, a Class III brake test must be performed.
    Paragraphs (b) and (c) contain the tasks related to the performance
of a Class III brake test. These paragraphs require that the brakes on
the rear car of the train apply in response to a 20-psi brake pipe
reduction and that the brakes subsequently release on the rear car of
the train when the release is initiated. Similar to a Class II brake
test, paragraph (c) permits an alternative to direct observation of the
application and release of the rear car's brakes by permitting the
operator to rely on a rear car gauge or end-of-train device to
determine that the brake pipe pressure is being reduced and restored in
response to the controlling locomotive.

Section 232.213  Extended Haul Trains

    This section generally retains the proposed provisions, which
permit an extension of the allowable maximum distance a train may
travel between train brake system tests. After consideration of all the
comments submitted on this matter, FRA continues to believe that if a
train is properly and thoroughly inspected, with as many defective
conditions being eliminated as possible, then the train is capable of
traveling much greater than 1,000 miles between brake inspections. (A
detailed discussion of the comments submitted on this issue is
contained in the preceding ``Overview of Comments and General FRA
Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under the heading ``II. B.
Extended Haul Trains.'') Therefore, the final rule retains the
provisions permitting railroads to designate trains as extended haul
trains and allowing such trains to be operated up to 1,500 miles
between brake inspections. Although FRA recognizes that retention of
the 1,500-mile limitation may limit the utility of the provision on
some railroads, FRA is not willing to increase the proposed mileage
restriction at this time. Currently, no train is permitted to travel
more than 1,000 miles without receiving an intermediate brake
inspection. Therefore, FRA does not believe it would be prudent to
immediately double or triple the currently allowed distance without
evaluating the safety and operational effects of an incremental
increase in the distance. Consequently, until sufficient information
and data are collected on trains operating under the provisions
contained in this final rule, FRA is not willing to permit trains to
travel the distances suggested by some commenters without additional
brake inspections. FRA continues to believe that the requirement for
performing inbound inspections and the requirement to maintain records
of all defective conditions discovered on these trains provides the
basis for developing the information and data necessary to determine
the viability of allowing greater distances between brake inspections.
    After consideration of the comments submitted, FRA agrees that the
benefits estimated in the NPRM in association with the extended haul
provisions may have been overstated. FRA realizes that the retention of
the 1,500-mile limitation may eliminate certain trains from being
operated pursuant to the extended haul provisions and reduce the
benefits estimated at the NPRM stage of the proceeding. (See detailed
discussion in the Regulatory Impact Analysis portion of the preamble
below.) In order to increase the viability of the extended haul
provisions, the final rule provides some flexibility for designating
extended haul trains and allows for the limited pick-up and set-out of
equipment as discussed below.
    Certain commenters have portrayed the provisions related to
extended haul trains as merely being an extension of the current
intermediate inspection distances. FRA objects to such a
characterization. In FRA's view, the extended haul provisions contained
in this section constitute a completely new inspection regimen. This
section contains stringent inspection requirements, both brake and
mechanical, by highly qualified inspectors and establishes stringent
requirements whenever cars are added to or removed from such trains.
This section also contains a means to assess the safety of such
operations by requiring that records be maintained of the defective
conditions that develop on these trains while en route. Consequently,
FRA believes that the requirements related to extended haul trains not
only ensure the safe operation of the trains operated under them, but
actually increase the safety of such operations over that which is
provided in the current regulations.
    In paragraph (a), FRA generally retains the proposed provisions
permitting railroads to designate specific trains that will move up to
1,500 miles between brake and mechanical inspections provided the
railroad meets various stringent inspection and monitoring
requirements, which FRA believes will ensure the safe and proper
operation of these trains. FRA intends to make clear that a railroad
must meet all of the requirements contained in this paragraph in order
to designate a train as an extended haul train. Paragraph (a)(1)
contains the requirements for designating trains a railroad intends to
move in accordance with this section. Several commenters contended that
the proposed provisions regarding the advance designation of extended
haul trains would prohibit certain unscheduled trains from being
operated as extended haul trains. In an effort to provided some
flexibility in this area, this paragraph has been modified to allow
railroads to designate certain locations as locations where extended
haul trains will be initiated and requires railroads to describe those
trains that will be so operated rather than requiring specific
identification of every train. FRA believes this modification will
allow railroads to capture some of their unscheduled trains by
identifying the trains by the locations where they originate. This
paragraph sets forth the information that must be provided to FRA in
writing when designating a train or a location for such operation. The
information required to be submitted is necessary to facilitate FRA's
ability to independently monitor a railroad's operation of these
extended haul trains.
    FRA continues to believe that in order for a train to be permitted
to travel 1,500 miles between inspections, the train must receive
inspections that ensure the optimum condition of both the brake system
and the mechanical components. In paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and
(a)(8), FRA retains the proposed requirement that these inspections be
performed by highly qualified and experienced

[[Page 4175]]

inspectors in order to ensure that quality inspections are being
performed. As FRA intends the Class I brake tests that are required to
be performed on these trains to be as in-depth and comprehensive as
possible, FRA continues to believe that these inspections must be
performed by individuals possessing not only the knowledge to identify
and detect a defective condition in all of the brake equipment required
to be inspected but also the knowledge to recognize the interrelational
workings of the equipment as well as a general knowledge of what is
required to repair the equipment. Therefore, paragraphs (a)(2) and
(a)(8) retain the use of the term ``qualified mechanical inspector'' to
identify and describe those individuals it believes possess the
necessary knowledge and experience to perform the required Class I
brake tests on these trains. A ``qualified mechanical inspector'' is a
person with training or instruction in the troubleshooting, inspection,
testing, maintenance, or repair of the specific train brake systems for
which the person is assigned responsibility and whose primary
responsibilities include work generally consistent with those
functions. (See Sec. 232.5 of this section-by-section analysis for a
more detailed discussion of ``qualified mechanical inspector.'') FRA
also continues to believe these same highly qualified inspectors must
be the individuals performing the required inbound inspection,
contained in paragraph (a)(6) of this section, on these extended haul
trains in order to ensure that all defective conditions are identified
at the train's destination or 1,500 mile location. Similarly, in
paragraph (a)(3), FRA requires that all of the mechanical inspections
required to be performed on these trains be conducted by inspectors
designated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11, rather than train crew members,
in order to ensure that all mechanical components are in proper
condition prior to the trains departure.
    As discussed in detail above, FRA is not willing to allow more than
1,500 miles between brake inspections until appropriate data are
developed which establish that equipment moved under the criteria
contained in this final rule remains in proper condition throughout the
train's journey. FRA believes that the provisions contained in
paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7), requiring the performance of an inbound
inspection at destination or at 1,500 miles and requiring carriers to
maintain records of all defective conditions discovered on these trains
for a period of one year, create the basis for developing such data.
FRA believes the information generated from these inbound inspections
will be extremely useful in assessing the quality of a railroad's
inspection practices and will help FRA identify any systematic brake or
mechanical problems that may result in these types of operations. It
should be noted that paragraph (a)(7) has been slightly modified from
what was proposed in order to clarify that the required records may be
maintained either electronically or on paper.
    Paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(8) retain the proposed requirements that
these trains have 100 percent operative brakes and contain no cars with
mechanical defects under part 215 at either the train's initial
terminal or at the time of departure from a 1,500-mile point, if moving
in excess of 1,000 miles from that location. FRA has modified the
provision proposed in paragraph (a)(5) that restricted extended haul
trains from conducting any pick-ups or set-outs en route, except for
the removal of defective equipment. Paragraph (a)(5) is modified to
permit extended haul trains the limited ability make one pick-up and
one set-out while en route. This modification will provide railroads
the flexibility to set out a block of cars at one location and pick up
a block of cars at the same or another location. FRA believes that this
limited ability provides the railroads with some flexibility to move
equipment efficiently while minimizing the disruptions made to the
train's brake system and ensuring that cars added to such trains can be
adequately tracked and inspected. Paragraph (a)(5) makes clear that any
cars added to extended haul trains must be inspected in the same manner
as the cars at the train's initial terminal. This paragraph also makes
clear that any car removed from the train must be inspected in the same
manner as a car at the train's point of destination or 1,500-mile
location.
    Paragraph (b) is retained as proposed and makes clear that failure
to comply with any of the restrictions contained in this section will
be considered an improper movement of a designated extended haul train
for which appropriate civil penalties may be assessed. FRA has included
specific civil penalties in appendix A to this final rule pertaining to
the improper movement of these types of trains. In addition to the
imposition of civil penalties, this paragraph makes clear that FRA
reserves the right to revoke a railroad's authority to designate any or
all trains for repeated or willful noncompliance with any of the
provisions contained in this section.

Section 232.215  Transfer Train Brake Tests

    This section generally retains the proposed requirements related to
the performance of transfer train brake tests. The final rule
requirements have been slightly modified for consistency with other
inspection requirements and to clarify when a transfer train brake test
is to be performed. The requirements contained in this section
generally incorporate the requirements currently contained in
Sec. 232.13(e). ``Transfer train'' is defined in Sec. 232.5 of this
final rule as a train that travels between a point of origin and a
point of destination, located not more than 20 miles apart. The
definition makes clear a transfer train may pick up or deliver freight
equipment while en route to its destination. This final rule makes
clear that the decision as to whether a particular consist is subject
to the transfer train inspection requirements is primarily based on a
determination that the movement the train is engaged in is considered a
``train movement'' rather than a ``switching movement.'' FRA's
determination of whether the movement of cars is a ``train movement,''
subject to the requirements of this section, or a ``switching
movement'' is and will be based on the voluminous case law developed by
various courts of the United States. (See section-by-section analysis
for Sec. 232.5 for a detailed discussion of the terms ``train
movement'' and ``switching movement.'')
    FRA intends to make clear that a train will be considered a
transfer train only if the train moves no more than 20 miles between
its point of origin and its point of final destination. If the train
will move greater than 20 miles between the point of origin and point
of final destination, it cannot be considered a transfer train, and a
Class I brake test must be performed on the train prior to departure
from its point of origin. Although cars may be added to a transfer
train while the train is en route, as discussed below, with a transfer
train brake test being performed on the cars added, the train is
limited to a total of 20 miles from its point of origin, not from the
location where new cars are added. The distance the entire train will
move between its point of origin and point of final destination is the
determinative factor in determining whether the train is a transfer
train, cars dropped-off or picked-up en route do not affect this
distance.
    Paragraph (a) retains the proposed tasks that are required to be
performed when conducting a transfer train brake test. Due to the short
distance these

[[Page 4176]]

types of trains will travel, FRA will continue to permit the brake
system to be charged to only 60 psi but will make clear that this must
be verified by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device. Although the
current regulations do not require the use of a gauge or device, FRA is
at a loss to understand how an inspector can know the pressure in the
brake system without getting a reading from the rear of the train. This
paragraph also retains the requirement that the brakes apply in
response to a 15-psi brake pipe reduction. FRA continues to believe
that the reduced pressure at which this test is performed (i.e., 60 psi
rather than 75 psi) requires that an application be obtained with a
smaller pressure reduction than that required for other brake tests.
This paragraph also makes clear that the brakes shall apply on each car
added to the train and remain applied until a release is initiated and
reiterates the parameters for performing a retest on those cars found
not to have sufficiently applied that are contained in the Class I
brake test requirements.
    Paragraph (b) clarifies that cars may be added to a transfer train
while it is en route to its destination. This activity is currently
conducted by these trains, and it was not FRA's intent when issuing the
NPRM to propose prohibiting these trains from being used in this
fashion. This paragraph makes clear that when cars are added to a
transfer train the added cars are to be inspected pursuant to the
requirements contained in paragraph (a) of this section. This is
generally consistent with what FRA currently requires when cars are
added to a transfer train, and this paragraph has been added to clarify
FRA's retention of the existing practice.

Section 232.217  Train Brake System Tests Conducted Using Yard Air

    This section contains the requirements for performing train brake
system tests when using yard air. The requirements contained in this
section have been modified from those proposed in the NPRM in response
to the comments and recommendations received. Paragraph (a) retains the
proposed requirements regarding the use of an engineer's brake valve or
a suitable test device capable of making any increase or decrease of
brake pipe air pressure at the same, or slower, rate as an engineer's
brake valve when conducting brake tests utilizing yard air. The
requirement to use such a device also applies when retesting cars
during Class I, Class IA, Class II, and transfer train brake tests.
    Paragraph (b) generally retains the requirement to connect the air
test device to the end of the cut of cars that will be nearest to the
controlling locomotive. However, this paragraph permits the test device
to be connected to other than the end nearest the controlling
locomotive if a railroad has appropriate procedures in place to ensure
the safety of such a practice. FRA recognizes that some currently
existing yards are designed in such a manner so that performance of a
test from the front of the consist is extremely difficult or
impossible. FRA also recognizes that the safety concerns that arise
when cars are charged from other than the head-end of the consist can
be eliminated if proper procedures are in place to ensure that
overcharge conditions do not occur. An ``overcharge condition''
describes a situation in which the brake equipment of cars, or
locomotives, or both is charged to a higher pressure than the maximum
brake pipe pressure that can normally be achieved in that part of the
train; this may result in the locomotive engineer's lacking the ability
to control the application or release of the brakes at the rear of the
train. This paragraph recognizes that there are a number of operating
or testing procedures which may be used to eliminate the existence of
potential overcharge conditions. Rather than specify a procedure, this
paragraph permits a railroad to adopt and comply with whatever
procedure it determines is best suited to its operation. However, this
paragraph makes clear that the procedure must be in writing and that
the procedure must be followed by the railroad. Consequently, FRA will
hold a railroad responsible for complying with whatever procedure it
adopts.
    Paragraph (c) modifies some of the provisions related to conducting
brake tests utilizing yard air sources that were proposed in the NPRM.
Rather than requiring yard air tests to be performed at 80 psi as was
proposed, this paragraph reduces the required pressure to 60 psi at the
end of the consist as is currently required. FRA recognizes that many
yard air sources and rental compressors are not capable of producing 80
psi of air pressure. In order to address the concerns raised regarding
the inadequacy of conducting a leakage or air flow test at this lower
pressure, this paragraph includes a requirement that leakage and air
flow tests be conducted at the operating pressure of the train. Thus,
if the yard air is not capable of producing the air pressure at which
the train will be operated, then the leakage or air flow test must be
conducted when the locomotives are attached. This paragraph also
retains the proposed requirement that a Class III brake test as
proposed in Sec. 232.211 must be performed on cars tested with yard air
at the time that the road locomotive is attached. This paragraph also
retains the proposed requirement for retesting cars that remain
disconnected from a source of compressed air for more than four hours.
    Paragraph (c) and (d) retain the proposed requirements regarding
the calibration and accuracy of yard test devices and gauges with
slight modification for clarity. Paragraph (c) requires that mechanical
yard test devices and gauges be calibrated every 92 days and that
electronic yard test devices and gauges be calibrated annually. Based
on observations made by FRA's field inspectors, FRA has some concerns
regarding the condition of many yard test devices and gauges. FRA has
found numerous mechanical gauges the condition of which creates serious
doubt as to the accuracy of the gauge. Mechanical gauges have been
found with broken or missing glass which would allow moisture and other
contaminates to be present in the gauge. As many of the yard test
plants being used today are portable, they are exposed to a wide array
of handling and environmental hazards while being transported from
location to location. Therefore, this paragraph requires that
mechanical devices and gauges be tested and calibrated every 92 days.
On the other hand, electronic gauges and devices appear to have much
less exposure to many of the hazards encountered by mechanical devices
and gauges and tend to be much more reliable and accurate for a longer
period of time. Consequently, this paragraph requires electronic yard
test devices and gauges to be tested or calibrated, or both, on an
annual basis. Paragraph (d) retains the proposed requirement that any
yard air test device and any yard air test equipment used to test a
train be accurate and function as intended. FRA will consider a device
or gauge to be accurate if it is within the calibration parameters
contained in paragraph (c) of this section.

Section 232.219  Double Heading and Helper Service

    This section contains the requirements related to double heading
and helper service. This section has been modified from that proposed
in order to clarify that the requirements contained in this section do
not apply to distributed power units and to remove unnecessary
provisions. Thus, the second sentence of proposed paragraph (a) has
been removed as the brake valve on distributed power units

[[Page 4177]]

are left cut in to accelerate response time. In addition, proposed
paragraph (b) has been eliminated as it was originally intended to
apply to passenger equipment and is not applicable to freight
operations. Paragraph (a) retains the proposed clarification regarding
the inspection that is to be performed when a controlling locomotive is
changed. Paragraph (a) clearly identifies that a Class III brake test
pursuant to Sec. 232.211 must be performed when a new locomotive is
placed in control of the train. FRA believes that the provisions
retained in paragraph (a) are necessary and have been in place for
years in order to ensure that locomotives taking control of a train
have the ability to actually control the brakes on the train.
    Paragraph (b), previously proposed as paragraph (c), retains the
proposed requirement aimed at ensuring that the brake systems on helper
locomotives respond as intended to brake commands from the controlling
locomotive at the time it is placed in the train. Although the brake
system on locomotives are required to be inspected on a daily basis,
FRA continues to believe that a visual confirmation of the proper
operation of a helper locomotive's brakes should be made at the time
the locomotive is added to a train. Failure of a helper locomotive to
respond to the command of the controlling locomotive could result in a
very serious safety hazard in that a helper locomotive may continue to
push the rear of the train while the brakes are applied, potentially
resulting in a derailment or other incident. FRA intends to make clear
in this paragraph that a helper locomotive found with inoperative or
ineffective brakes is to be repaired prior to use or else removed from
the train.
    Paragraph (c) contains basic design and testing requirements for
helper locomotives utilizing a Helper Link device or similar
technology. The Helper Link device is an electronic device, mounted on
the front end of the lead helper locomotive and is used to control the
automatic air brakes on helper locomotive consists. When this device is
used, the train's brake pipe is not connected between the rear car of
the train being pushed and the helper locomotives. The end-of-train
device, attached to the rear car of the train, sends a radio signal
which is received by the Helper link device. The Helper Link device is
connected to the brake pipe of the helper locomotives, and electronic
commands from the EOT device cause the air pressure in the helper
locomotive brake pipe to be reduced or increased, thus applying or
releasing the brakes on the helper locomotives. A signal is transmitted
from the EOT device to the Helper Link device at 10-second intervals to
ensure communication. The Helper Link is also used to operate the
uncoupling lever to detach the helper locomotives from the rear of the
train without stopping the train.
    Based on information currently available to FRA, it appears that
when there is a loss of communication between the EOT device and the
Helper Link device, the engineer of the helper locomotive consist is
not immediately aware of the failure. If the communication between the
EOT device and the Helper Link is not reestablished within the next 40-
second communication cycle, the Helper Link device will automatically
disable itself. Consequently, if the train experiences an emergency
application of the air brakes while the Helper Link device is disabled,
the brakes on the helper locomotives would not apply and would result
in the helper locomotives continuing to push under power. Furthermore,
in order for communications to be reestablished between the EOT and
Helper Link, the engineer must leave the locomotive controls, exit the
locomotive cab, and proceed to the front of the locomotive to manually
press the reset buttons located on the Helper Link device itself. In
addition, there are currently no regulations which address the use,
testing, or calibration of these Helper Link devices.
    On August 22, 1996, the UTU submitted a petition for rulemaking
with FRA regarding Helper Link devices raising many of the concerns
noted above. See Petition for Proposed Rulemaking, Docket 96-1. In
order to address the UTU petition in this rulemaking and to address the
concerns of FRA noted above, FRA sought information and comment from
persons interested in the NPRM. See 63 FR 48345. A presentation and
discussion regarding the use, operation, and design of Helper Link
devices was engaged in at the technical conference conducted in Walnut
Creek, California, on November 23 and 24, 1998. Written comments
regarding the device were also submitted by the manufacturer of the
device. Based on consideration of this information, FRA has determined
that certain minimum design and testing requirements should be included
in this final rule to ensure the safety of those trains utilizing
Helper Link technology.
    Paragraph (c) contains the design and testing requirements that FRA
believes are appropriate when railroads utilize Helper Link devices or
similar technology. This paragraph ensures that a locomotive engineer
is notified by a distinctive alarm of any loss of communication for
more than 25 seconds between the device and the two-way EOT. This
paragraph also requires that the engineer be provided a method of
resetting the device in the cab of the helper locomotive and that the
device be tested and calibrated on an annual basis. Due to the limited
number of Helper Link devices currently being used, FRA believes that
the manufacturer of these devices can easily provide railroads
utilizing the devices with the information and hardware to meet the
requirements contained in this paragraph at a minimal cost to the
railroad.

Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements

    This subpart provides the periodic brake system maintenance and
testing requirements for equipment used in freight and other non-
passenger trains. As stated in the 1994 NPRM and 1998 NPRM, FRA firmly
believes that the new repair track test and single car test, which have
been used industry-wide since January of 1992, are a much better and
more comprehensive method of detecting and eliminating defective brake
equipment and components than the old, time-based COT&S requirements.
FRA believes that performance of these tests has significantly reduced
the number of defective components found and has dramatically increased
the reliability of brake equipment. Through the implementation of the
repair track and single car tests, the safety of both railroad
employees and the public has greatly improved due to brake equipment
being in better and safer condition. At the same time, however, FRA is
cognizant that contentions by rail labor regarding the carrier's direct
and intentional circumvention of these revised requirements through the
elimination of repair tracks, by moving cars to expediter tracks for
repair, or simply by making repairs in the field raise a legitimate
concern that needs to be addressed to ensure that the industry fully
benefits from the advantages of the improved tests.
    Although this subpart retains many of the proposed maintenance
requirements, several modifications have been made in this final rule
in response to comments received and based upon the current best
practices occurring within the industry. FRA agrees that the proposed
incorporation of AAR Rule 3, Chart A, is unnecessary as it would remove
the determination of when certain maintenance is performed from the
discretion of the railroads, and

[[Page 4178]]

would make it difficult for railroads to change the requirements
related to the performance of that maintenance. FRA believes that a
railroad is in the best position to determine when and where it will
perform various maintenance on its equipment and should not have its
hands tied in this area by overly prescriptive federal requirements.
Furthermore, FRA's primary intent when proposing incorporation of AAR
Rule 3, Chart A, was to codify the existing requirements for performing
single car and repair track air brake tests and eliminate the ability
of the industry to unilaterally change the frequency and method of
performing these tests. As this subpart retains the requirements for
when and how these tests are to be completed and retains certain
inspections that are to be performed when equipment is on a shop or
repair track, FRA believes that it is unnecessary to incorporate every
maintenance procedure covered in AAR's Rule 3, Chart A. Consequently,
the final rule does not incorporate AAR's Rule 3, Chart A, and
continues to allow railroads some flexibility in determining
appropriate maintenance practices. (A detailed discussion of the
comments and recommendations submitted on the maintenance requirements
contained in this subpart is contained in the preceding ``Overview of
Comments and General FRA Conclusions'' portion of the preamble under
the heading ``VII. Maintenance Requirements.'')

Section 232.303  General Requirements

    This section contains the general requirements regarding the
maintenance, repair, and testing of freight cars. Paragraph (a)
contains various definitions for determining whether a particular track
or facility constitutes a shop or repair track. The definitions
contained in this paragraph were not previously proposed in the NPRM
but are consistent with current FRA enforcement policies and are
necessary to clarify when various tests and inspections required in
this section are to be performed.
    As the current regulations and this subpart require that certain
inspections and tests are to be performed when a car is on a shop or
repair track and because a repair track air brake test is required to
be performed when a car is on a repair track and such a test has not
been performed within the last twelve months, FRA believes it is
necessary to clarify what constitutes a shop or repair track. This
issue has become more prevalent over the last few years due to the
growing use of mobile repair trucks and due to the requirements for
conducting repair track air brake tests. For years, many railroads have
conducted minor repairs on tracks called ``expedite tracks.''
Generally, the types of repairs that were performed on these tracks
were minor repairs that could be made quickly with a limited amount of
equipment, and neither the railroads or FRA considered the tracks to be
repair tracks. However, recently railroads have started performing
virtually every type of repair on these expedite tracks. These tracks
are no longer limited to minor repairs but are being used to perform
heavy, complex repairs that require the jacking of entire cars or the
disassembly and replacement of major portions of a car's truck or brake
system. At many locations these expedite tracks are positioned next to
operative repair shops. Furthermore, several railroads have closed
previously existing repair shop facilities and are now using fully
equipped mobile repair trucks to perform the same type of repairs that
were previously performed in the shop or on established repair tracks
and are attempting to call the tracks serviced by these mobile repair
trucks ``expedite'' or ``light repair'' tracks. Thus, the line between
what constitutes a repair or shop track and what constitutes an
``expedite'' or ``light repair'' track has become unclear or
nonexistent.
    Appendix A of AAR's Field Manual of Interchange Rules provides a
definition of both ``shop or repair track'' and ``expedite track.''
Although FRA does not consider these definitions to be controlling with
regard to what constitutes a repair track under the current
regulations, FRA does believe that AAR's definitions of the above terms
have created confusion within the industry regarding what constitutes a
repair track. If the AAR's definitions are read together they appear to
exclude repairs made by mobile repair trucks, regardless of where they
are made or the nature of the repairs conducted, from ever being
considered as being performed on a repair track. FRA believes it is
both illogical and inconsistent with the intent and meaning of the
existing regulations and with the provisions proposed in the NPRM to
exclude from the definition of ``shop or repair track'' tracks at
locations where repairs of all types are regularly and consistently
performed from merely because they are serviced by a mobile repair
vehicle. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent with previous technical
bulletins and enforcement guidance issued by FRA to allow major repair
work to be performed on ``expedite'' or ``light repair'' tracks merely
because the repairs are performed by a mobile repair vehicle.
    FRA believes that the operational changes, noted above, are partly
an attempt by the railroads to circumvent the requirements that
currently apply when a car is on a shop or repair track. Currently, if
a car is on a shop or repair track, it must have its brakes inspected,
under 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv), and the car is to receive a repair
track air brake test if it has not received one in the last twelve
months under AAR Rule 3, Chart A. Some railroads contend that an
expedite track is not a repair or shop track; therefore, the
requirements of Sec. 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv) and AAR Rule 3, Chart A, do
not apply. FRA finds this practice and interpretation to be
unacceptable and believes that railroads are abusing the concept of
expedite tracks to avoid performing required maintenance. Therefore,
the industry's own actions have caused the need for FRA to clarify what
constitutes a shop or repair track. Consequently, paragraph (a)
includes a definition of what FRA will consider to be repair or shop
tracks requiring the performance of certain tests and inspections.
    Paragraph (a) makes clear that FRA will consider certain tracks to
be repair or shop tracks based on the frequency and types of repairs
that are made on the tracks, not necessarily the designation given by a
railroad. The definitions in this paragraph also make clear that it is
the nature of the repairs being conducted on a certain track that is
the determining factor not whether a mobile repair truck is being used
to make the repairs. Due to the ability of mobile repair trucks to make
virtually any type of repair necessary and due to their growing use,
FRA does not believe that tracks regularly and continually serviced by
these types of vehicles should be excepted from the definition of
``repair track.'' FRA believes that if a track is designated by the
railroad as an ``expedite'' track (i.e., one where minor repairs will
be conducted) then the railroad should ensure that only cars needing
minor repairs are directed to that track for repair. FRA does not
intend to eliminate the concept of expedite tracks but limits the use
of such tracks to those types of repairs that are truly minor in nature
and that require a limited amount of equipment to perform. At locations
where a railroad conducts repairs of all types on a regular and
consistent basis, either with fixed facilities or with mobile repair
trucks, FRA would expect the railroad to designate certain trackage at
the location as repair tracks and certain trackage as ``expedite
tracks'' where only minor repairs would be conducted.

[[Page 4179]]

In such circumstances, FRA would expect railroads to direct cars in
need of heavier repairs, the kind that have been traditionally
performed on a shop or repair track, to be directed to trackage
designated at the location as a repair track.
    Paragraph (a) places the burden on the railroad to designate those
tracks it will consider repair tracks at locations where it performs
both minor and heavy repairs on a regular and consistent basis, and
makes the railroad responsible for directing the equipment in need of
repair to the appropriate trackage. If the railroad determines that
repairs of a heavy nature will be performed on certain trackage, then
the track should be treated as a repair track, and any car repaired on
that trackage should be provided the attention required by this final
rule for cars on a shop or repair track. Further, if a railroad
determines that minor repairs will be performed on certain trackage,
then the railroad bears the burden of ensuring that only cars needing
minor repairs are directed to that trackage. If the railroad fails to
adequately distinguish the tracks performing minor repairs from those
tracks performing heavy repairs or improperly performs heavy repairs on
a track designated as an ``expedite track,'' then the railroad will be
required to treat all cars on the trackage at the time that the heavy
repairs are being conducted as though they are on a repair or shop
track.
    It should be noted that the issue of what constitutes a repair or
shop track for the purposes of this subpart is completely separate and
distinct from the issue of whether a location is a location where
necessary repairs can be performed for purposes of 49 U.S.C. 20303 and
Sec. 232.15 of this final rule. Although an outlying location might be
considered a location where certain brake repairs can be conducted,
that does not mean the track where those repairs are performed should
be considered a repair track. FRA does not intend for trackage located
at outlying locations or sidings which are occasionally or even
regularly serviced by mobile repair trucks to be considered repair
tracks. FRA believes that repair or shop tracks should exist at
locations that have fixed repair facilities and at locations where
repairs of all types are performed on a regular and consistent basis
regardless of whether the repairs are performed in fixed facilities or
by mobile repair vehicles.
    Paragraphs (b)-(d) retain the proposed provisions requiring certain
tests and inspections to be performed whenever a car is on a shop or
repair track. Although the AAR asserts that it did away with the
requirements to perform a set and release of the brakes and adjust
piston travel on all cars on repair or shop tracks, the requirements
are currently contained in power brake regulations separate and apart
from any AAR requirements. See 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv). FRA
believes that repair and shop tracks provide an ideal setting for
railroads to conduct an individualized inspection on a car's brake
system to ensure its proper operation and that such an inspection is
necessary to reduce the potential of cars with excessive piston travel
being overlooked when employees are performing the ordinary brake
inspections required by this final rule. If any problems are detected
at that location, the personnel needed to make any necessary
corrections are already present. Furthermore, performing these
inspections at this time ensures proper operation of the cars' brakes
and eliminates the potential of having to cut cars out of an assembled
train and, thus, should reduce inspection times and make for more
efficient operations.
    Paragraph (b) retains the proposed requirement that a car on a shop
or repair track be tested to determine that its air brakes apply and
remain applied until a release is initiated. This paragraph requires
that the air brakes remain applied until the release signal is
initiated and is intended to maintain consistency with the requirement
contained in Sec. 232.205(b)(4). Paragraph (b)(4) is an attempt to
clarify language contained in the current regulation which require that
the brakes ``apply.'' This language has been misinterpreted by some to
mean that if the piston applies in response to a command from a
controlling locomotive or yard test device, and releases before the
release signal is given, the brake system on that car is in compliance
with the regulation because the brake simply applied. The intent of the
regulation has always been that the brakes apply and remain applied
until the release signal is initiated from the controlling locomotive
or yard test device. Therefore, clarifying language was proposed in
this paragraph to eliminate all doubt as to what is required.
Consequently, this paragraph makes clear that the brakes on a car must
remain applied until the appropriate release signal is given. If it
fails to do so, the car must be repaired and retested.
    Paragraph (c) retains the proposed requirement that if piston
travel is found to be less than 7 inches or more than 9 inches, it must
be adjusted to nominally 7\1/2\ inches, which is a change from the 7
inches as currently required, in order to maintain consistency with the
requirement proposed at Sec. 232.205(b)(5). This change was proposed in
the NPRM and is based on a request by AAR to change the adjustment to
7\1/2\ inches from 7 inches as its member railroads were finding it
extremely difficult to adjust the piston travel to precisely 7 inches
and that in some cases the adjustment would be marginally less than 7
inches, thus requiring a readjustment. Therefore, AAR sought the extra
\1/2\ inch in order to provide a small margin for error when the piston
travel is adjusted. As FRA believes that AAR's concerns are validly
placed and would have no impact on safety, FRA has accommodated the
request.
    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed listing of brake system
components that are to be inspected prior to a car being released from
a shop or repair track. Many of the items contained in this paragraph
are currently required to be inspected pursuant to
Sec. 232.17(a)(2)(iv). It should be noted that the proposed
requirement, retained in this final rule, regarding the proper
functioning of angle cocks was modified in the NPRM from the existing
requirement by clarifying that angle cocks must be inspected to ensure
that they are properly positioned to allow maximum air flow. This is a
clarification regarding the normal functioning of the angle cock, and
should pose little, if any, additional inspection burden on the
railroads. This paragraph adds two items to the inspections that are to
be conducted when a car is on a shop or repair track. They are an
inspection of a car's hand brake and an inspection of the accuracy and
operation of any brake indicators on cars so equipped. As the final
rule does not provide for the specific inspection of these items during
any of the other required brake tests, FRA believes this is an ideal
time for the railroad to inspect these items while imposing the least
burden on the railroad's inspection and repair forces.
    Paragraph (e) retains the proposed provisions permitting cars to be
moved from a location where necessary repairs are made to a location
where a single car or repair track air brake test can be performed if
it cannot be performed at the same location where the repairs are
conducted. FRA disagrees with the assertions of some commenters that
air brake repairs should not be required at locations that lack the
ability to perform single car or repair track air brake tests. FRA
believes that position is not only contrary to the statutory mandates
regarding the movement of equipment with defective brakes but would
open the door to potential abuse by railroads.

[[Page 4180]]

Furthermore, the operation of a car's brake system can generally be
tested after a repair without performing a complete repair track air
brake test. For the most part, single car and repair track air brake
tests are intended to be maintenance requirements that attach based on
a condition in which a car is found or on a repair that is required to
be performed. If the condition of a car is such that a repair track air
brake test is necessary to determine the defect, then the final rule
would permit movement of the car to the nearest location where a repair
track air brake test can be performed. However, FRA believes that most
defective conditions can be easily determined without performing a
repair track air brake test. Moreover, for years FRA has required the
performance of repairs where they can be performed and has allowed such
equipment to be moved to the next forward location for performance of a
single car or repair track air brake test and has not found that such a
practice has created any potential safety hazard.
    Paragraph (e) also retains the proposed requirements for tagging
equipment which is being hauled for the performance of a single car or
repair track air brake test after the appropriate repairs have been
conducted. FRA believes that the tagging requirements are necessary not
only to provide notice to a railroad's ground forces as to the presence
of the car but also to ensure that railroads are properly performing
the tests at appropriate locations. Furthermore, many railroads
currently move equipment in this fashion, and there has been no
indication that safety has been compromised. The final rule also
retains the requirement that a copy or record of the tag be retained
for 90 days and made available to FRA upon request. Contrary to the
objections of some commenters, FRA continues to believe that the record
keeping requirements are necessary so that there is accountability on
the part of the railroads to conduct these tests at the proper
locations and that equipment is not moved for extended periods without
receiving its required maintenance. It should be noted that the final
rule clarifies that the record or copy of the tag may be maintained
either electronically or in writing provided all the required
information is recorded. This paragraph retains the proposed
alternative to the tagging requirements, which permits a railroad to
utilize an automated tracking system to monitor these cars and ensure
they receive the requisite tests as prescribed in this section provided
the automated system is approved by FRA. It should be noted that the
final rule does not define or require identification of locations that
can or will perform single car or repair track air brake tests as
suggested by some commenters. FRA does not believe that such a
requirement is necessary because the rule specifically establishes when
the tests are to be performed and it is in the railroad's best
interests to perform the tests in a timely manner.
    Paragraph (f) contains the requirements for railroads to adequately
track when single car or repair track air brake tests were last
performed on a piece of equipment. This paragraph modifies the proposed
requirements regarding the use of an automated tracking system in lieu
of stenciling equipment with the date and location of the last single
car or repair track test received. Since 1992, the industry has
utilized the AAR's UMLER reporting system to electronically track the
performance of single car and repair track air brake test as well as
other repair information. Based on the performance and use of this
system over the last seven years, FRA believes that the AAR's UMLER
system has proven itself effective for tracking the information
required in this paragraph and ensuring the timely performance of
single car and repair track air brake tests. Furthermore, FRA continues
to believe that the information required to be tracked in this
paragraph with regard to these tests is easily maintained through an
electronic medium. Moreover, FRA has found no substantiated instances
of railroads falsifying or altering the information monitored and
tracked by AAR's UMLER system. Thus, this paragraph permits railroads
to utilize an electronic record keeping system to track single car and
repair track air brake tests without obtaining prior FRA approval of
the system. The final rule makes clear that FRA will monitor the
performance of such systems and retains the right to revoke a
railroad's authority to utilize the system if FRA finds that it is not
properly secure, inaccessible to FRA or a railroad's employees, or
fails to properly or adequately track and monitor the equipment.

Section 232.305  Repair Track Air Brake Tests and Section 232.307
Single Car Tests

    These sections generally retain the proposed requirements related
to the performance of single car and repair track air brake tests.
Contrary to the assertions of some commenters, FRA continues to believe
that certain maintenance procedures are critical to ensuring the safe
and proper operation of the brake equipment on the nation's fleet of
freight cars. FRA does not believe that the determination of what
maintenance should be performed should be left solely to the discretion
of the railroads operating the equipment in all circumstances. As
periodic COT&S maintenance has been eliminated and replaced with the
performance of single car and repair track tests, which FRA agrees is a
better and more comprehensive method of detecting defective brake
equipment and components, FRA believes that specific and determinable
limits must be placed on the manner and frequency of performing these
tests. Therefore, these sections generally retain the proposed
requirements regarding the performance of single car and repair track
brake tests.
    FRA recognizes that the procedures for performing single car and
repair track tests proposed in the NPRM have been modified by the AAR
since the issuance of the proposal. As it is FRA's intent to
incorporate the most recent version of the single car and repair track
air brake test procedures, paragraph (a) of each section incorporates
by reference the test procedures that were issued by the AAR in April
of 1999. These test procedures are contained in AAR standard S-486-99,
Sections 3.0 and 4.0, which are located in the AAR's ``Manual of
Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E'' (April 1999). Both
these sections recognize that the industry may find it necessary to
modify the test procedures from time to time in order to address new
equipment or utilize new technology. Thus, paragraph (a) of each
section permits railroads to seek approval of alternative procedures
through the special approval process contained in Sec. 232.17 of this
final rule. The special approval process is intended to speed FRA's
consideration of a party's request to utilize an alternative procedure
from the ones identified in the rule itself. FRA believes that it is
essential for FRA to approve any change made in the procedures for
conducting these safety-critical tests in order to prevent unilateral
changes and to ensure consistency in the method in which the tests are
performed.
    It should be noted that the incorporated procedures for performing
single car and repair track air brake tests are the minimum
requirements for performing such tests. The special approval process is
required to be used only if the incorporated procedures are to be
changed in some manner. For instance, if the industry were to elect to
add a new test protocol to the incorporated procedures, there would be
no need to seek approval of such an

[[Page 4181]]

addition as long as the procedures contained in the incorporated
standard are still maintained. This final rule is not intended to
prevent railroads from voluntarily adopting additional or more
stringent maintenance standards provided they are consistent with the
standards incorporated.
    Both sections retain the proposed frequency at which single car and
repair track air brake tests are to be performed. As noted in the
preceding discussion, the primary intent of the proposed provisions was
to codify the existing requirements regarding the performance of single
car and repair track air brake tests and prevent any unilateral changes
to those requirements. FRA believes that the frequency at which these
tests are currently required to be performed under industry standards
has proven to be sufficient and a substantial economic burden would be
imposed if the frequency were increased. Both sections also retain the
requirement that these tests be conducted by a qualified person. FRA
continues to believe that the person performing these tests must be
specifically trained and tested on how the test is to be performed and
be able to determine the appropriate actions that must be taken based
on the results of the test. FRA does not believe that the mere fact
that a person is a carman or a QMI is sufficient to make that person
qualified to perform single car or repair track air brake tests. FRA
believes that the training and testing requirements required by this
final rule ensures that a person is qualified to perform these tests.
    Section 232.305(b) generally retains the proposed list of
conditions that would require the performance of a repair track air
brake test. However, two of the proposed conditions for when a repair
track air brake test would be required to be performed have been
slightly modified in order to make them consistent with the currently
existing AAR requirements for performing these tests. FRA agrees that
the proposed requirement to perform a repair track air brake test on
any car removed from a train for a brake-related defect is overly
restrictive and inconsistent with the requirements of AAR's Rule 3,
Chart A. FRA agrees that the proposed requirement would require the
performance of the test when minor brake system repairs are conducted,
which is not the intent of the AAR's rule. Therefore, this paragraph
modifies the proposed condition to require the performance of a repair
track test on cars that have inoperative or cut-out air brakes when
removed from a train. Furthermore, the proposed provisions requiring
the performance of a repair track air brake test whenever a car is
found with a wheel with built-up tread or slid flat have been slightly
modified. Under the final rule, the test will not be required if the
built-up tread or slid flat wheel is known to have been caused by a
hand brake that was left applied. These modifications are consistent
with what is currently required under AAR Rule 3, Chart A.
    Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 232.305 retain the proposed
requirements that each freight car receive a repair track air test
within eight years from the date the car was built or rebuilt, and
within every five years thereafter. FRA strongly believes that these
minimum attention periods are sufficient to ensure the safety of the
freight car fleet when considered in conjunction with the increased
attention that freight cars receive when these types of tests are
performed.
    Paragraph (c) of Sec. 232.307 retains the proposed requirement that
a single car test be conducted by a qualified person prior to a new or
rebuilt car being placed in or returned to revenue service. FRA
believes that it is essential for new and rebuilt cars to receive this
test prior to being placed in revenue service in order to ensure the
proper operation of the brake system on the vehicle. Most railroads
already require this attention to be given to new and rebuilt cars;
thus, the cost of this requirement is minimal and merely incorporates
the best practices currently in place in the industry.

Section 232.309   Repair Track Test and Single Car Test Equipment and
Devices

    This section generally retains the proposed requirements for
maintaining the equipment and devices used in performing repair track
and single car air brake tests. This section modifies some of the
proposed provisions regarding the testing and calibration of single car
test devices and other mechanical devices used to perform single car
and repair track air brake tests. FRA's intent when proposing the
requirements contained in this section was to codify the current best
practices of the industry. Thus, FRA did not intend to propose testing
and calibration requirements that were more stringent that those
currently imposed by AAR standards. Therefore, FRA agrees with the
comments submitted by AAR that the testing and calibration requirements
for single car test devices should not be imposed until the devices are
actually placed in service, which is consistent with current AAR
requirements. FRA recognizes that the proposed calibration and testing
requirements may have resulted in the unnecessary acquisition of single
car testing devices. Consequently, this section has been modified to
clarify that the 92-day and the 365-day calibration and testing
requirements related to single car test devices are to be calculated
from the day on which the device is first placed in service. FRA
continues to believes that the devices and equipment used to perform
these single car and repair track air brake tests are safety-critical
items. Consequently, FRA believes that these devices must be kept
accurate and functioning properly in order to ensure that repair track
and single car tests are properly performed.

Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices

    This subpart incorporates the design, performance, and testing
requirements relating to end-of-train devices (EOTs) that were issued
on January 2, 1997, which became effective for all railroads on July 1,
1997, except for those for which the effective date was extended to
December 1, 1997 by notice issued on June 4, 1997. See 62 FR 278 and 62
FR 30461. This subpart also incorporates the recent modifications made
to the two-way EOT requirements to clarify the applicability of the
requirements to certain passenger train operations where multiple units
of freight-type equipment, material handling cars, or express cars are
part of a passenger train's consist. See 63 FR 24130.
    As noted in the discussion of the applicability provisions
contained in Sec. 232.3 of this final rule, this subpart applies to all
trains unless specifically excepted by the provisions contained in this
subpart. As the provisions contained in this subpart were just recently
issued, there is little need to discuss these requirements in detail as
they were fully discussed in the publications noted above. However,
after their issuance, FRA discovered that a few of the provisions were
in need of minor modification for clarification purposes and to address
some valid concerns that have been raised both internally by FRA
inspectors and by outside parties. Consequently, in the NPRM FRA
proposed various changes to the provisions related to end-of-train
devices and discussed other issues which might require modification of
the existing provisions. See 63 FR 48347-49. This discussion is
intended to focus on the proposed changes and address those issues
discussed in the preamble to the NPRM as well as address the issues
raised at the public hearings and in written comments.

[[Page 4182]]

Section 232.405  Design and Performance Standards for Two-Way End-of-
Train Devices

    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed modification of the requirement
relating to the diameter of the valve opening and hose on two-way EOTs,
which is currently contained in Sec. 232.21(d). The current regulation
requires that the valve opening and hose have a minimum diameter of \3/
4\ inch to effect an emergency application. FRA has discovered that
sometime prior to the issuance of the final rule on two-way EOTs, Pulse
Electronics began manufacturing its two-way EOT with the internal
diameter of the hose being \5/8\ inch. Testing of the devices
manufactured with these smaller diameter hoses showed that they met all
criteria for emergency application capability based on standards and
guidelines set forth by the AAR. Furthermore, testing of the devices at
the Westinghouse facility in Wilmerding, Pennsylvania, demonstrated
that the \5/8\ inch diameter hose permitted 14 consecutive 50-foot cars
with cut-out control valves or 750 feet of brake pipe to be jumped.
This is more than double the AAR standard for control valve
requirements. Moreover, FRA's intent when issuing the two-way EOT
design requirements was to incorporate designs that existed at the time
the rule became effective. Consequently, paragraph (d) of this section
is modified to permit the use of a \5/8\ inch internal diameter hose in
the design of the devices.
    Paragraph (e) has been slightly modified, from what is currently
required in Sec. 232.21(e), to permit the manually operated switch
capable of initiating an emergency brake command to the rear unit to be
located either on the front unit itself or on the engineer control
stand. Several railroads and a manufacturer of locomotives recommended
that the provision regarding the placement of the manually operated
switch be modified to recognize existing designs of the devices and the
locomotives on which they are placed. These commenters stated that many
front units do not have the switch located directly on the front unit
itself but that the switch is located on the engineer's control stand.
FRA agrees with this recommendation and currently does not take
exception to locomotives designed in the manner described above.
Consequently, this paragraph permits the manually operated switch to be
located either on the front unit itself or on the engineer's control
stand.
    A new paragraph (f) has been added to this section which
incorporates a recommendation from AAR and its member railroads that
new locomotives be equipped with a means to automatically activate an
emergency brake application from the rear unit whenever the locomotive
engineer places the train air brakes in emergency. On June 1, 1998, FRA
issued Safety Advisory 98-2, which recommended that railroads adopt a
procedure to require activation of the rear unit to effectuate an
emergency brake application either by using the manual toggle switch or
through automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for a
locomotive engineer to place the train air brakes in emergency using
either the automatic brake valve or the conductor's emergency brake
valve or whenever an undesired emergency application of the train air
brakes occurs. See 63 FR 30808. FRA applauds the industry for taking
the initiative to incorporate available technology on new locomotives
and agrees with the representatives of the railroads that it is not
economically feasible to require existing equipment to be retrofitted
with this capability at this time. Furthermore, existing equipment is
addressed in Sec. 232.407(f)(3), which retains the proposed requirement
for the engineer to manually activate an emergency application from the
rear unit when the engineer initiates an emergency application in the
controlling locomotive if the locomotive is not equipped to do so
automatically.
    FRA issued Safety Advisory 98-2 in response to several recent
freight train incidents potentially involving the improper use of a
train's air brakes, events that caused FRA to focus on railroad air
brake and train handling procedures related to the initiation of an
emergency air brake application, particularly as they pertain to the
activation of the two-way EOT from the locomotive. The NPRM discussed
four accidents in which a train was placed into emergency braking by
use of the normal emergency brake valve handles on the locomotive, and
although the train in each instance was equipped with an armed and
operable two-way EOT, the device was not activated by the locomotive
engineer. See 63 FR 48348. Preliminary findings indicate that in all of
the incidents noted above, there was evidence of an obstruction
somewhere in the train line, caused by either a closed or partially
closed angle cock or a kinked air hose. This obstruction prevented an
emergency brake application from being propagated throughout the entire
train, front to rear, after such an application was initiated from the
locomotive using either the engineer's automatic brake valve handle or
the conductor's emergency brake valve. Furthermore, the locomotive
engineers in each of the incidents stated that they did not think to
use the two-way EOT, when asked why they failed to activate the device.

Section 232.407  Operations Requiring Use of Two-Way End-of-Train
Devices; Prohibition on Purchase of Nonconforming Devices

    Paragraph (e) generally retains the proposed modification of the
provision, currently contained in Sec. 232.23(e)(1), which excepts from
the two-way EOT requirements trains operating with a locomotive capable
of effectuating an emergency application located in the rear third of
the train. In the NPRM, FRA proposed to modify this exception so that
it would be applicable only to trains operating with a locomotive on
the rear of the train. Data supplied by VOLPE demonstrates that
stopping distances are greatly increased, and could potentially result
in a runaway train or derailment depending on the length of the train,
if an obstruction of the brake pipe were to occur directly behind a
locomotive located in the rear third of the train. Therefore, FRA
proposed that a train with a locomotive located in the rear third of
the consist no longer be excepted from the two-way EOT requirements,
unless the train qualifies for relief under one of the other specific
exceptions contained in Sec. 232.407(e). Although FRA received no
objections to this specific change, several commenters did recommend
that the exception contained in paragraph (e)(1) be modified to include
locomotive consists at the rear of a train. These commenters asserted
that the existing rule needed to recognize that some locomotives have
fuel tenders attached. FRA finds this requested modification to be
sensible and logical. Consequently, paragraph (e)(1) has been retained
as proposed, with a slight modification to clarify that the exception
extends to trains with either a locomotive or a locomotive consist
located at the rear of the train.
    A new exception to the two-way EOT requirements has been added at
paragraph (e)(9) to address the practice of ``doubling a hill.'' The
practice of ``doubling a hill'' occurs in situations where a train must
be divided in two in order to traverse a particularly heavy grade due
to the lack of sufficient motive power to haul the entire train up the
grade. This issue was discussed in the NPRM and at the public technical
conference conducted subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM. Initially,
FRA believed that the two-way EOT should

[[Page 4183]]

be connected to that portion of the train traversing the grade.
However, such an approach creates a multitude of operational as well as
safety concerns. Such an approach would require train crews to
repeatedly switch the rear unit from one portion of the train to
another, which would require these individuals to repeatedly walk
sections of the train at locations where it may not be safe to do so.
Alternatively, such an approach might require some trains to carry
extra devices while in transit. At the public technical conference,
there was universal agreement between all representatives at the
conference that the device should remain on the rear unit of the train
in these circumstances. Consequently, paragraph (e)(9) has been added
to except trains from the two-way EOT requirements that must be divided
into two sections in order to traverse a grade. This paragraph makes
clear that the exception only applies to the extent necessary to
traverse the grade and only while the train is divided into two to
conduct that movement.
    Paragraph (f)(1) has been slightly modified from what is currently
contained Sec. 232.23(f)(1) in order to clarify and address an issue
related to the ability of a railroad to dispatch a train with an
inoperative two-way EOT from a location where the device is installed.
Section 232.23(f)(1) of the current regulations, Sec. 232.407(f)(1) of
the NPRM, requires that ``the device shall be armed and operable from
the time the train departs from the point where the device is installed
until the train reaches its destination.'' Therefore, the existing
regulations clearly require a train to be equipped with an armed and
operable two-way EOT when dispatched from a location where the device
is installed. When issuing this requirement, FRA intended railroads to
install repeater stations at locations where communication problems are
prevalent.
    Several commenters, both at the public hearings and in written
comments, assert that this requirement is impossible to meet at some
locations regardless of whether repeater stations are installed. These
commenters contend that certain locations have dead spots where it is
impossible to establish communication between the front and rear unit.
These parties recommend that some allowance be provided to permit
trains at these locations to be moved a short distance to restore
communication. FRA agrees that there are a few locations where dead
spots exist which make it difficult if not impossible to establish
communication between the two units when they are installed. Therefore,
paragraph (f)(1) has been modified to allow a train that experiences a
loss of communication or that fails to establish communication between
the two units at the location where the device is installed to move up
to one mile from that location in order to establish communication. FRA
believes that this allowance should be sufficient at most locations to
establish the required communication. Furthermore, if communication
cannot be established within these limits, then FRA believes the
railroad needs to install additional repeater stations. If additional
repeater stations still fail to address the issue, then FRA believes
that a railroad should be required to apply for a waiver of the
requirement at a particular location, pursuant to the requirements of
49 CFR part 211. This approach will allow FRA to address the unique
circumstances of each location on a case-by-case basis and ensure that
the railroad implements other operational safeguards to ensure the
safety of those trains dispatched without armed and operable devices.
    Paragraph (f)(3) generally retains the proposed provision requiring
the two-way EOT to be activated to effectuate an emergency brake
application either by using the manual toggle switch or through
automatic activation, whenever it becomes necessary for the locomotive
engineer to initiate an emergency application of the train's air brakes
using either the automatic brake valve or the conductor's emergency
brake valve. As discussed previously in regard to the addition of
Sec. 232.405(f), the proposed requirement incorporates the
recommendations contained in FRA's Safety Advisory 98-2, issued on June
1, 1998. See 63 FR 30808. FRA believes that the operational requirement
contained in this paragraph must be stressed by the railroads when
conducting the two-way EOT training required in Sec. 232.203 of this
final rule. FRA continues to believe that the likelihood of future
incidents, such as the ones described in the NPRM, will be greatly
reduced if the train handling procedure contained in this paragraph is
made part of a train crew's training and followed by members of the
crew in emergency situations. FRA believes that this additional
procedure, together with the required training, will not only ensure
that an emergency brake application is commenced from both the front
and rear of the train in emergency situations, but will familiarize the
engineer with the activation and operation of the devices and will
educate the engineer to react in the safest possible manner whenever
circumstances require the initiation of an emergency brake application.
    FRA recognizes that a number of railroads have already adopted
procedures similar to those required in this paragraph and commends
such actions. Although this paragraph allows the device to be activated
either manually or automatically, FRA intends to make clear that the
front unit of the device or the engineer's control stand must be
equipped with a manually operated switch. See Sec. 232.405(e). Although
some railroads have developed, and this final rule requires, new
locomotives to be equipped with a means by which the rear unit is
automatically activated when an engineer makes an emergency application
with the brake handle, FRA believes that an engineer must also be
provided a separate, manually operated switch which is independent of
any automatic system in order to ensure the activation of the rear unit
in the event that the automatic system fails.
    It should be noted that the provision contained in paragraph (f)(3)
has been slightly modified from that proposed in the NPRM. This final
rule has eliminated the requirement to activate the rear unit when an
undesired emergency brake application occurs to a train. FRA agrees
with the assertions of various commenters that such a requirement might
distract a locomotive engineer from performing other critical duties
required to bring a train to a stop when an undesired emergency brake
application occurs. As an undesired emergency brake application is not
initiated by the locomotive engineer, such an event will usually take
the engineer by surprise, and FRA agrees that the engineer's attention
would be best focused on the activity of bringing the train to a stop
in such circumstances. Furthermore, all of the instances where an
engineer failed to activate the rear device that were discussed in the
NPRM occurred in conjunction with an emergency brake application
knowingly initiated by the engineer.
    Based on the above discussion regarding paragraph (e)(1) of this
section, paragraph (g)(1) retains the proposed modification of the
requirements for operating a train that experiences an en route failure
of the two-way EOT over a section of track with an average grade of two
percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles. In the
NPRM, FRA proposed modification of the alternative measure, currently
contained at Sec. 232.23(g)(1)(iii), which permits the operation over
such a grade if a radio-controlled locomotive is placed in the

[[Page 4184]]

rear third of the train consist and under the continuous control of the
engineer in the head end of the train. FRA proposed modification of
this alternative measure to permit such operation only if the radio-
controlled locomotive is placed at the rear of the train consist. This
modification is retained in this final rule in order that the
alternative methods of operation over a heavy grade remain consistent
with the exception from the two-way EOT requirements contained in
Sec. 232.407(e)(1) as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Although
some commenters suggested elimination of all of the requirements
related to operating a train experiencing an en route failure of its
two-way EOT over heavy grades, FRA believes that the alternative
methods are necessary to ensure the safety of such a train when
descending a heavy grade and ensure that railroads properly maintain
the required devices.
    Paragraphs (g)(1)(i)(A) and (B) have also been slightly modified to
clarify the requirements that a train be stopped in certain situations
where communication is lost between a helper locomotive and the
controlling locomotive. The final rule makes clear that the stopping of
trains in such circumstances should be in accordance with the
railroad's operating rules. When issuing the two-way EOT requirements,
FRA did not intend for engineers to place themselves in unsafe
situations when they encounter an en route failure of the device when
traversing a heavy grade. Although the existing rule prohibits the
operation of a train over certain heavy grades when a failure of the
device occurs en route, FRA did not intend that the train be
immediately stopped when a failure of the device occurs while operating
on a heavy grade. Rather, FRA intended for the locomotive engineer to
conduct the movement in accordance with the railroad's operating rules
for bringing the train safely to a stop at the first available
location. Therefore, safety may require that the train continue down
the grade or to a specific siding rather than come to an immediate
halt. Consequently, the modifications contained in these paragraphs are
intended to reflect FRA's expectations when issuing the two-way EOT
regulations.
    Paragraph (g) has also been slightly modified in order to clarify
what constitutes a loss of communication between the front and the rear
units on two-way EOTs. The 16 minutes 30 seconds time period for
determining when a loss of communication between the front and the rear
unit was adopted based on the design of the devices, which
automatically checks communication between the front and rear units
every ten minutes. If no response is received, the front unit
automatically requests communication from the rear unit 15 seconds
later; if no response is received to that request, another request is
made six minutes later; and if there is still no response, the front
unit makes another request 15 seconds later. If there is still no
response, a message is displayed to the locomotive engineer that there
is a communication failure. This has caused some confusion in the
industry, in that many people believe the 16 minutes and 30 seconds
time frame should start when the message is first displayed on the
front unit. This is incorrect. Based on the design of the currently
operating devices, the 16 minutes and 30 seconds has elapsed when the
failure message is broadcast. This paragraph has been modified to
explain this design feature. Thus, appropriate action should be taken
immediately upon receiving the failure message on the front unit. FRA
also realizes that there may be some time lapse when the requests are
made and the message is displayed, therefore the manufacturers of the
devices should take care to factor any time lag into the 16 minute and
30 second time frame designed into the devices.

Section 232.409  Inspection and Testing of End-of-Train Devices

    Paragraph (c) of this section regarding the notification of the
locomotive engineer when the device is tested by someone other than a
train crew member has been slightly modified from that proposed in the
NPRM. In the NPRM, FRA proposed that the locomotive engineer be
notified in writing in such circumstances. FRA agrees that this
proposed requirement may have been overly burdensome and believes that
the intent of the proposed requirement can be met without specifically
requiring written notification. FRA's intent in proposing the written
requirement was to ensure that locomotive engineers are provided
sufficient information to confirm that the devices are properly
inspected and tested and to provide locomotive engineers with a measure
of confidence that the devices will work as intended. FRA believes
these goals can be accomplished by permitting the required information
to be provided by any means a railroad deems appropriate. FRA believes
that the information required to be provided to an engineer (the date
and time of the test, the location where the test was performed, and
the name of the person performing the test) will ensure that the proper
tests and inspections are performed. The modifications made in this
paragraph make clear that a written or electronic record of the
required information must be maintained in the cab of the controlling
locomotive.
    Paragraph (d) retains the proposed changes to the language related
to the annual calibration and testing of EOT devices currently
contained at Sec. 232.25(d). The regulation currently states that the
devices shall be ``calibrated'' annually. FRA intends to make clear
that it intended for railroads to perform whatever tests or checks are
necessary to ensure that the devices are operating within the
parameters established by the manufacturers of the devices. Several
railroads have attempted to ``sharp shoot,'' or narrowly interpret, the
language currently contained in the regulation, claiming that the
manufacturer states that front units do not need to be calibrated on an
annual basis, in order to avoid doing any testing of the devices.
Although FRA agrees that the front units may not have to be calibrated
every year, the devices must be tested in some fashion to verify that
they are operating within the manufacturer's specification with regard
to radio frequency, signal strength, and modulation and do not require
recalibration. FRA has been provided written instructions from the
manufacturers of the devices which contain procedures for testing both
the front and rear units. Furthermore, railroads using the devices in
Canada acknowledge that the radio functions of the front and rear units
are tested periodically. Consequently, this paragraph retains the
proposed clarifying language in order to avoid any misconceptions as to
what actions are required to be performed on these devices on an annual
basis.
    Paragraph (d) has also been slightly modified to require the ready
accessibility of the information regarding the calibration and testing
of a front unit, which the current regulation requires to be placed on
a sticker or other marking device affixed to the exterior of the front
unit. Recently, FRA has discovered that some railroads have locked the
cabinets that house the front units and that there is no way for either
FRA or railroad operating crews to inspect the marking devices and
verify the information required to be maintained. In order for the
marking device to serve its intended purpose, it must be readily
capable of being inspected by both FRA and railroad operating crews.
FRA intends to make clear that the required information regarding the
date and location that the unit was last calibrated is to be easily
accessible to both FRA and train crews

[[Page 4185]]

for inspection either on the marking device attached to the outside of
the front unit or, if the front unit is inaccessible, in a readily
accessible location in the cab of the locomotive.
    In the NPRM, FRA discussed the potential need to amend paragraph
(c) of this section by including specific provisions in this final rule
to address the performance of bench testing on the front and rear units
of two-way EOTs. See 63 FR 48322. After consideration of the comments
received, FRA believes that specific regulatory requirements for
performing these tests are unnecessary. FRA believes that its existing
guidance, FRA Technical Bulletin MP&E 97-8, regarding the performance
of bench tests on two-way EOTs is sufficient at this time. Since the
issuance of this guidance on July 28, 1997, FRA has discovered very few
instances where the issued guidance was not being followed and has
found no evidence indicating that bench tests have compromised the
proper operation of the devices. Consequently, FRA will not issue
specific regulations regarding the performance of bench test at this
time. However, FRA will continue to monitor the performance of these
tests and will continue to expect railroads to perform the tests in
accordance with the guidance previously issued by FRA.
    FRA issued Technical Bulletin MP&E 97-8 to its inspectors to
clarify what is required when a railroad performs a bench test. In this
guidance, FRA made clear that a bench test may be performed on both the
front and rear units, independent of each other, if the test is
performed within the yard limits or location where the unit will be
installed on the train. In FRA's view, bench testing the rear unit
requires applying air pressure to the device and then transmitting an
emergency brake application from a front unit using the front unit
manual switch; the individual performing the test would determine that
the emergency valve functions properly either by observing the
emergency indicator pop out or by observing brake pipe pressure at the
rear device go to zero while hearing the exhaust of air from the
device. On the other hand, bench testing the front unit would entail
transmitting an emergency brake application from the front unit, using
the front unit manual switch, and observing that a rear unit
successfully receives the signal and activates the emergency air valve.
    The guidance also indicated that both tests must be performed
within a reasonable time period prior to the device being armed and
placed on the train. To determine a reasonable time period, the
environment where the device is stored and the conditions the device is
subjected to after completing a successful bench test have to be
considered. If the device is tested and stored in a controlled
environment that is free from weather elements, excessive dust, grease,
and dirt prior to the immediate installation on a train, then four to
eight hours would be acceptable. If the device is tested and
haphazardly thrown into a corner of a shop or are placed in the rear of
a truck to be bounced around a yard, one hour would likely be
considered reasonable before installation. The guidance also made clear
that bench tests must be performed at the location or yard where the
device will be installed on a train.

Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology

    This subpart retains, without change, the proposed tests and
procedures required to introduce new train brake system technology into
revenue service. The technology necessary for the introduction of
advanced braking systems is quickly developing. The new technology
includes various forms of electronic braking systems, a variety of
braking sensors, and computer-controlled braking systems. In order to
allow and encourage the development of new technology, this subpart
establishes tests and procedures for introducing new brake system
technology. These provisions require the submission to FRA of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan.
    FRA intends to make clear that this subpart applies only to new
train brake system technology that complies with the statutory mandates
contained in 49 U.S.C. 20102, 20301-20304, 20701-20703, 21302, and
21304, but that is not specifically covered by this final rule. Any
type of new train brake system that requires an exemption from the
Federal railroad safety laws in order to be operated in revenue service
may not be introduced into service pursuant to this section. In order
to grant a waiver of the Federal railroad safety laws, FRA is limited
by the specific statutory provisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20306 as
well as any FRA procedural requirements contained in this chapter.

Section 232.503  Process to Introduce New Brake System Technology

    This section retains the proposed procedural requirements which
must be met when a railroad intends to introduce new brake system
technology into its system. This section makes clear that the approval
of FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety must be obtained by a
railroad prior to the railroad's implementation of a pre-revenue
service acceptance test plan and before introduction of new brake
system technology into revenue service. This section requires that such
approval be obtained pursuant to the special approval process contained
in Sec. 232.17 of this final rule. FRA believes the special approval
process should speed the process for taking advantage of new
technologies over that which is currently available under the waiver
process. However, in order to provide an opportunity for all interested
parties to provide comment for use by FRA in its decision making
process, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA believes
that any special approval provision must, at a minimum, provide proper
notice to the public of any significant change or action being
considered by the agency with regard to existing regulations.

Section 232.505  Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan

    This section retains the proposed requirements for pre-revenue
service testing of new brake system technology. These tests are
extremely important in that they are intended to prove that the new
brake system can be operated safely in its intended environment. For
equipment that has not previously been used in revenue service in the
United States, paragraph (a) requires the operating railroad to develop
a pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan and obtain FRA approval
of the plan under the procedures stated in Sec. 238.17 before beginning
testing. Previous testing of the equipment at the Transportation Test
Center, on another railroad, or elsewhere will be considered by FRA in
approving the test plan. Paragraph (b) requires the railroad to fully
execute the tests required by the plan, to correct any safety
deficiencies identified by FRA, and to obtain FRA's approval to place
the equipment in revenue service prior to introducing the equipment in
revenue service. Paragraph (c) requires the railroad to comply with any
operational limitations imposed by FRA. Paragraph (d) requires the
railroad to make the plan available to FRA for inspection and copying.
Paragraph (e) enumerates the elements that must be included in the
plan. FRA believes this set of steps and the documentation required by
this section are necessary to ensure that all safety risks have been
reduced to a level that permits the new brake system technology to be
used in revenue service. In lieu of the requirements of paragraphs (a)
through (e), paragraph (f) provides for an abbreviated testing
procedure for new brake system technology that has previously been

[[Page 4186]]

used in revenue service in the United States. The railroad need not
submit a test plan to FRA; however, a description of the testing shall
be maintained by the railroad and made available to FRA for inspection
and copying.

IV. Regulatory Evaluation

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This final rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures and is considered to be significant under both
Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034;
Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a regulatory
evaluation of this final rule. This evaluation estimates the costs and
consequences of this final rule as well as its anticipated economic and
safety benefits. It may be inspected and photocopied during normal
business hours by visiting the FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief
Counsel, FRA, Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., in Washington,
DC. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a written request by
mail to the FRA Docket Clerk at the Office of Chief Counsel, Federal
Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Mail Stop 10,
Washington, DC 20590.
    FRA believes that this rule will produce net benefits to society.
The estimated Net Present Value (NPV) of the total 20-year costs
associated with this final rule is approximately $109 million. The
total 20-year benefits (safety and economic) consist of quantified
benefits estimated at between approximately $112 and $130 million and
various non-quantified benefits discussed in detail below. The
following tables contain the estimated 20-year quantified costs and
quantified benefits associated with this final rule.

                        Table 3.--Estimated Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Category                             NPV costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training................................................     $61,221,156
Retest..................................................       8,276,574
Piston Travel Stickers..................................       3,385,681
Air Quality.............................................       1,819,214
Dynamic Brake...........................................      11,657,846
Cycle Trains............................................      16,012,217
Class I Brake Test Notification.........................       4,414,173
Helper Locomotive Inspection............................       1,929,071
Helper Link.............................................         164,933
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................     108,880,865
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Table 4.--Estimated Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Category                           NPV benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extended Haul..........................................    $29,590,556--
                                                             $46,735,494
Safety Improvements....................................       57,460,452
EOT Use at Class I Brake Test..........................       22,070,863
Bottom Rod Safety Supports.............................        3,239,650
                                                        ----------------
      Total............................................    112,361,521--
                                                             129,506,459
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the quantified benefits of this final rule exceed the
quantified costs of the rule, FRA believes that the quantified benefits
significantly underestimate the total benefits of this rule for several
reasons. The information available to FRA on the value of property
damage significantly understates the true value of the damage in
railroad accidents. The property damage estimate provided by the
railroad(s) in the aftermath of an accident are only for ``railroad
property damage'' (equipment, track, and structures). Although the
numbers provided by the railroads regarding railroad property damage
have been enhanced to account for chronic underestimation of these
damages, the figures used by FRA do not include the costs of
evacuations, individual (non-railroad employee) or community health
expenses, environmental cleanup, the closure of adjacent roads, or any
of the other potential costs which are borne by society after a
railroad accident.
    A review of recent incidents that involve a train that loses its
ability to stop or decrease speed show that there is a significant risk
that such an occurrence could result in the release of large amounts of
hazardous materials which, if the incident occurred in a densely
populated or environmentally sensitive area, could produce truly
catastrophic results. The costs of evacuation and medical treatment for
those near the accident site could be substantial, and associated road
closures could also produce significant economic impact to travelers
and the communities nearby. Should a hazardous material release impact
a river or stream, the consequences to wildlife in the area could also
be severe and lasting. Furthermore, because derailments or collisions
of trains which lose the ability to stop or decrease speed often occur
due to overturning on curves or entering congested areas, third party
casualties and property damage can also be substantial. As the
inspection, testing, and maintenance provisions of this final rule are
intended to ensure that the brakes on a train are effective and
operable and because this final rule will ensure that a locomotive
engineer is provided information regarding the condition of the brakes
on the train they are operating, FRA believes that this final rule will
reduce the number of instances where a train loses its ability to stop
or decrease speed that create the potential for catastrophic
consequences.
    An example of the catastrophic consequences that could result when
a freight train loses the ability to stop or decrease speed occurred on
February 1, 1996, in Cajon Pass in California. This accident resulted
in two fatalities, 32 injuries (32 emergency responders required
medical treatment due to inhalation of toxic chemicals), the release of
hazardous materials, and the subsequent evacuation of the surrounding
area. In addition, a 20 mile segment of Interstate 15, the main route
between Los Angeles and Las Vegas, was closed for 5 days as a result of
the hazardous materials release. The road closure forced 89,000
vehicles a day to use detours. This added approximately 2 hours to the
travel time between Las Vegas and Los Angeles. The losses to the
surface transportation sector due to road and track closure, revenue
losses to businesses and tourism, and the costs of emergency response
related to this incident were not included in the estimated $15 million
damage figure used by FRA when including this incident in the
regulatory impact analysis of the two-way end-of-train device final
rule. See 62 FR 291. FRA recognizes that an exact figure cannot be
placed on these costs, but believes that the figure would be in the
tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars. As devastating and
costly as this incident was, it is probable that the results of this
particular incident could have been much more disastrous. An Amtrak
passenger train passed 17 minutes ahead of the train involved in the
incident. Had the Amtrak train been stopped on the tracks or otherwise
delayed, the consequences of the incident would have been much more
severe, with the potential for scores of fatalities. (As illustration
of potential consequences, a freight-to-passenger train collision at
Hinton, Alberta, on February 8, 1986, resulted in 29 fatalities.)
    Other power-brake related accidents illustrate the potential for
high severity when a heavy-tonnage freight train loses braking control.
On May 12, 1989, a Southern Pacific Transportation Company train
accelerated out of control descending a 2.2 percent grade into San
Bernardino, California. Two employees were killed and three injured.
The entire train was effectively

[[Page 4187]]

destroyed. The incident destroyed seven residences adjacent to the
right-of-way, killing two residents and injuring a third. A 14-inch
gasoline pipeline which may have been damaged in either the incident or
the ensuing clean-up, ruptured 13 days later, resulting in the death of
two additional residents, serious injuries to two residents, and minor
injuries to 16 others. Eleven additional homes were destroyed, along
with 21 motor vehicles.
    On February 2, 1989, near Helena, Montana, freight cars from a
Montana Rail Link train rolled eastward down a mountain grade and
struck a helper locomotive consist, slightly injuring two crewmembers.
Hazardous materials in the consist which included hydrogen peroxide,
isopropyl alcohol, and acetone were later released. The release of
these hazardous materials resulted in a fire and explosions
necessitating the evacuation of approximately 3,500 residents of Helena
for over two days. According to the National Transportation Safety
Board, railroad and other property damage alone exceeded $6 million,
and all of the buildings of Carroll College sustained damage.
Furthermore, the City of Helena received 154 reports of property damage
from residents within a three-mile radius of the incident.
Consequently, FRA believes that the potential unquantified benefits
derived from the prevention of just one accident similar to the Cajon
Pass incident or the other incidents noted above would most likely
outweigh the potential costs of this final rule.
    In addition to the potential underestimation of the quantified
safety benefits, there may also be significant non-quantified business
benefits that may be available as a consequence of this rule. The
quantified benefits from the extended haul provisions may be
significantly understated. FRA's estimates for the number of trains
eligible for this benefit, and the cost saving that it produces, were
much higher in the NPRM than those supplied by AAR in response to the
NPRM. While we have used the figures provided by AAR to develop a range
for the benefits related to the extended haul provisions, FRA continues
to believe that more potential benefits are available to the industry
than have been quantified in the Regulatory Impact Analysis.
    Another business benefit for which FRA has insufficient information
to form a credible estimate relates to the provision permitting
previously tested cars to be added to trains received in interchange
and the allowance to conduct a Class II brakes test on only those cars
added to trains received in interchange that will move less than 20
miles from the interchange location. Under the existing regulations the
addition of cars to such trains would require the performance of either
an initial terminal brake test or a transfer train brake test on the
entire train. The industry may realize substantial cost savings by
being permitted to add cars to such trains without inspection of the
entire train. By permitting the addition of cars to trains received in
interchange, FRA allows the railroads to save significant time (labor
and train delay costs) by not having to inspect the entire train
consist when such cars are added to these trains. Because FRA does not
have information on the number of interchanged trains engaging in such
activity (and none were provided in response to the NPRM), we have not
estimated the extent of this potential benefit. Actual business
benefits to be realized due to this rule, therefore, may be
significantly understated.
    Moreover, Congress mandated that FRA review and revise the existing
power brake regulations where necessary and specifically required that
FRA prescribe standards regarding dynamic brakes, where applicable.
Consequently, FRA believes that this final rule produces a net benefit
to society. The costs that have been quantified represent the maximum
that this rule is expected to cost, and the quantified projected
benefits are the minimum which should be realized.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
requires an assessment of the impacts of proposed and final rules on
small entities. FRA has conducted a regulatory flexibility analysis of
this rule's impact on small entities, and the assessment has been
placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.
1. Why Action By the Agency Is Being Considered
    In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C.
20141. These amendments specifically address the revision of the power
brake regulations by adding a new subsection which states:

    (r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a
review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to
railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall
revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented
during that review.
    (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where
applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment. *
* * Pub. L. No. 102-365, section 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141,
superseding 45 U.S.C. 431(r).

    In addition to this statutory mandate, FRA received various
recommendations and petitions for rulemaking, and determined on its own
that the power brake regulations were in need of revision. FRA has been
in the process of revising the power brake regulations since 1992. An
ANPRM and two NPRMs revising the power brake regulations were
previously issued on December 31, 1992, September 16, 1994, and
September 9, 1998, respectively. See 57 FR 62546, 59 FR 47676, and 63
FR 48294. A detailed discussion of the history leading up to this final
rule is contained in the preamble. The reasons for the actual
provisions of the action considered by the agency are explained in the
body of the preamble and the section-by-section analysis.
2. The Objectives and Legal Basis for the Rule
    The objective of the rule is to enhance the safety of rail
transportation, protecting both those people traveling and working on
the system, and those people off the system who might be affected by a
rail incident by revising the regulations related to the braking
systems used and operated in freight and other non-passenger trains to
address potential deficiencies in the existing regulations, better
address the needs of contemporary railroad operations, and facilitate
the use of advanced technologies. The legal basis for this action is
reflected in the response to 1. above and in the preamble.
3. A Description of and an Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to
Which the Final Rule Would Apply
    The Small Business Administration (SBA) uses an industry wide
definition of ``small entity'' based on employment. Railroads are
considered small by SBA definition if they employ fewer than 1,500
people for line haul railroads, and 500 for switching and terminal
railroads. An agency may establish one or more other definitions of
this term, in consultation with the SBA and after an opportunity for
public comment, that are appropriate to the agency's activities.
    The classification system used in this analysis is that of the FRA.
Prior to the SBA regulations establishing size categories, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) developed a classification system
for freight railroads as Class I, II, or III, based on annual operating
revenue. A Class I railroad has

[[Page 4188]]

operating revenue of $250 million or more, a Class II railroad has
operating revenue greater than $20 million dollars but less than $250
million and a Class III railroad has operating revenue of $20 million
or less. The Department of Transportation's Surface Transportation
Board, which succeeded the ICC, has not changed these classifications.
The ICC/STB classification system has been used pervasively by FRA and
the railroad industry to identify entities by size. In the NPRM, FRA
discussed these revenue thresholds in terms of the revenue levels
actually achieved by these different classes of railroads rather than
by the specific limits established in the Surface Transportation
Board's regulations. See 49 CFR part 1201 1-1.
    After consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the SBA and as
explained in detail in the ``Interim Policy Statement Concerning Small
Entities Subject to the Railroad Safety Laws,'' published August 11,
1997 at 62 FR 43024, FRA has decided to define ``small entity,'' on an
interim basis, to include only those entities whose revenues would
bring them within the Class III definition. In response to FRA's
request for comments on its alternate definition, the American Short
Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA) suggested that the
definition include all Class II and Class III railroads. However, the
ASLRRA offered no support for this request nor provided any rationale
for why such a large number of railroads should be considered ``small
entities.'' Consequently, this final rule retains the alternate
definition of ``small entity'' which includes only Class III railroads.
    All of the small entities directly affected by this rule are Class
III railroads. FRA certifies that this final rule is expected to have a
significant impact on a substantial number of Class III railroads.
Although FRA did not quantify the estimated annual cost or benefit to
the average Class III railroad (of which there are approximately 600-
650 at any given time), the Regulatory Impact Analysis contains
discussions and cost estimates for certain specific provisions where
the impact could be estimated for non-Class I and Class III railroads.
    The only significant costs to Class III railroads imposed by this
final rule are related to the training of employees. In the NPRM, FRA
estimated that Class III railroads would absorb approximately 15
percent of the training costs being imposed on non-Class I railroads.
This estimate was based on the fact that Class III railroads employ
approximately 15 percent of the employees on non-Class I railroads and
because virtually all of the training costs are related to the number
and types of employees employed by a railroad. FRA received no specific
comment from any interested party objecting to this estimate. The final
rule has been modified to reduce the potential impact of the training
requirements on these small railroads based on comments received, by
eliminating the need to develop internal audit programs and by allowing
efficiency tests to be utilized to assess the effectiveness of a
railroad's training program. Moreover, as discussed above and below,
the training that employees of Class III railroads will be required to
receive is significantly less than the required training of many
employees on Class I and Class II railroads. Thus, although FRA
believes that the actual cost to Class III railroads will be much less
than the 15 percent originally assigned, FRA will retain the very
conservative cost estimate related to training for Class III railroads
of 15 percent of the training costs for non-Class I railroads which
results in an estimated impact of approximately $740,579, or less than
$1,200 for the average Class III railroad. These cost will be
apportioned among the 600 to 650 Class III railroads, and will vary
according to the number of employees each railroad must train. This is
a rough estimate based on the number of Class III employees as a
percentage of total employees. Actual impact should be less, as
discussed below.
4. A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements of the Final Rule, Including an Estimate of the
Classes of Small Entities Which Will Be Subject to the Requirements and
the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for Preparation of the Report
or Record
    Other than the training requirements discussed above, this rule
will have a de minimus impact on small entities. Most of the final rule
provisions will not effect small railroad costs because of the nature
and limits to their operations, or the small railroad costs are
inseparable from the industry-wide costs. For example, small railroads
do not generally operate helper locomotives, so they will not be
subject to the costs associated with that new rule provision. In the
case of provisions such as those requiring piston travel stickers, FRA
has no basis for assigning to any particular segment of the industry
the costs for equipping the entire fleet of non-standard piston travel
cars with piston travel stickers. But in reality, it is unlikely that
these costs will fall on the smaller railroads.
    In various places in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, FRA has
attempted to assign burdens to the smaller members of the industry
based on some measure of their size relative to the rest of the
industry. In those cases, FRA has probably overestimated the burden for
the smaller carriers. A good example is the requirement regarding the
repair and documentation of dynamic brake failures. While FRA has
assigned these costs based on the total number of locomotives operated
by each segment of the industry, the reality is that few small
railroads operate locomotives equipped with operative dynamic brakes
and they will not actually be subject to these costs. The costs shown
in the Regulatory Impact Analysis should be viewed as a maximum.
Similarly, smaller railroads perform a limited number of Class I brake
tests, do not generally own and operate yard air sources, and do not
usually perform the type of maintenance that will trigger the new
record keeping requirements, thus the reporting and record keeping
requirements related to those activities will be minimal or non-
existent for these smaller carriers.
5. Federal Rules Which May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Rule
    None.
    Significant Alternatives:
    1. Differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables
which take into account the resources available to small entities:
    2. Clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance
and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities:
    3. Exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
such small entities:
    FRA considered the role that non-Class I railroads (Class II and
III railroads) have in today's freight industry. FRA believes that the
current marketplace requires Class I railroads and these smaller
railroads to operate as an integrated system. Many of today's smaller
railroads rely on Class I railroads for the training of their employees
and the maintenance of their equipment. In addition, many non-Class I
railroads and Class I railroads interchange and operate each other's
equipment. Therefore, except in limited circumstances, it is
impossible, from a regulatory standpoint, to separate these smaller
railroads from the larger Class I railroads. Therefore, in order to
ensure the safety and quality of train and locomotive power braking
systems throughout the entire freight industry, this final rule
generally imposes a consistent set of requirements on Class

[[Page 4189]]

I, II, and III railroads as a group. Although FRA recognizes that many
of the operational benefits created by this final rule are not
available to many of the smaller operations, FRA feels that the
integrated nature of the freight industry requires that universally
consistent requirements be imposed on both Class I and non-Class I
railroads.
    Where possible, efforts were taken in this final rule to minimize
the impact on non-Class I railroads. The dynamic brake provisions of
this final rule provide railroads with the option of declaring the
dynamic brake portion of a locomotive deactivated. Thus, smaller
railroads which do not choose to utilize dynamic brakes are not
required to incur the cost of maintaining the equipment. The final rule
also eliminates the proposed requirement to stencil a locomotive with
deactivated dynamic brakes which further reduces the cost to smaller
railroads. The final rule permits railroads to perform Class II brake
tests on cars added to a train received in interchange, if the train
will travel a distance not to exceed 20 miles from the point at which
it was received in interchange. The current regulations require the
performance of at least a transfer train brake test on the entire
train, rather than testing only those cars added. FRA believes this
will provide a cost savings to smaller railroads as they generally move
short distances from interchange points to destination. Furthermore,
virtually all of the inspection and testing requirements imposed by
this final rule on Class III railroads reflect current practices on
those operations.
    The final rule also modifies some of the proposed training
requirements in order to reduce the costs to smaller railroads based on
comments received by the ASLRRA. The final rule eliminates the
requirement that railroads develop an internal audit program to assess
the effectiveness of their training programs and allows efficiency
tests to be utilized to assess the effectiveness of such programs. This
was a change requested by the ASLRRA and will reduce the impact of the
training requirements by permitting smaller railroads to utilize
existing supervisory oversight to assess the effectiveness of training.
The final rule also clarifies that each employee need only be trained
on the knowledge and skills necessary to perform the tasks they are
required to perform. Because employees of Class III railroads generally
are not required to perform many of the tasks covered by this final
rule, these employees would not be required to be trained on those
tasks. For example, Class III railroads generally do not operate a
large variety of brake systems on their lines thus, their employees
would only have to be trained on a limited number of different brake
systems. In addition, the employees of Class III railroads generally
will not be required to receive any training in the areas of EPIC
brakes, dynamic brakes, two-way EOT devices, or on some of the brake
tests and maintenance mandated in this final rule due to the limited
distances traveled by trains on these operations, the low tonnages
hauled, and because many of the maintenance functions on these smaller
railroads are contracted out to larger railroads. Thus, the final rule
has attempted to narrow the training requirements for employees of
smaller railroads to only those tasks they are required to perform and
thus, reduce the economic impact of the requirements.
4. Use of performance, rather than design standards:
    Where possible, especially with regard to advanced technologies and
certain brake system components, an attempt was made to tie the
proposed requirements to performance.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this final rule have
been submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
The sections that contain the new information collection requirements
and the estimated time to fulfill each requirement are as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Average time per     Total annual burden    Total annual burden
            CFR section                Respondent universe   Total annual responses         response                hours              cost (dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.27--Annual tests...............  20,000 locomotives....  18,000 tests..........  15 minutes...........  4,500 hours..........  157,500
231.31--Drawbars for freight cars--  545 railroads.........  0 letters.............  N/A..................  N/A..................  N/A
 approval to operate on track with
 non-standard gage.
232.1--Purpose and Scope--Requests   545 railroads.........  4 requests/letters....  60 minutes...........  4 hours..............  180
 for Earlier Application to comply
 with Subparts D through F.
232.3--Applicability-- Export,       545 railroads.........  8 cards...............  10 minutes...........  1 hour...............  45
 industrial, & other cars not owned
 by railroads-identification.
232.7--Waivers.....................  545 railroads.........  10 petitions..........  40 hours.............  400 hours............  18,000
232.11--Penalties--Knowing           545 railroads.........  1 falsified recd/rpt..  10 minutes...........  .20 hour.............  9
 falsifying a record/report.
232.15--Movement of Defective
 Equipment:
    --Tags.........................  1,620,000 cars........  128,400 tags..........  2.5 minutes..........  5,350 hours..........  187,250
    -- Written Notification........  1,620,000 cars........  21,200 notices........  3 minutes............  1,060 hours..........  37,100
232.17--Special Approval Procedure:
    --Petitions for special          545 railroads.........  4 petition............   100 hours...........  400 hours............  18,000
     approval of safety-critical
     revision.
    --Petitions for special          545 railroads.........  2 petitions...........  100 hours............  200 hours............  9,000
     approval of pre-revenue
     service acceptance plan.
    --Service of petitions.........  545 railroads.........  6 petitions...........  40 hours.............  240 hours............  10,800
    --Statement of interest........  Public/railroads......  20 statements.........  8 hours..............  160 hours............  7,200
    --Comments.....................  Public/railroads......  15 comments...........  4 hours..............  60 hours.............   2,700

[[Page 4190]]

232.103--Gen'l requirements--all     1,600,000 cars........  246,866 stickers......  10 minutes...........  41,144 hours.........  835,156
 train brake systems:
    --Locomotives--1st Year--        545 railroads.........  50 procedures.........  4 hours..............  200 hours............  9,000
     Procedures.
    --Locomotives--Subsequent        25 new railroads......  1 procedure...........  4 hours..............  4 hours..............  180
     Years--Procedures.
232.105--Gen'l requirements for      545 railroads.........  20,000 insp. forms....  5 minutes............  1,667 hours..........  58,345
 locomotives-Inspection.
232.107--Air source requirements:..
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  50 plans..............  40 hours.............  2,000 hours..........  90,000
    --Subsequent Years.............  25 new railroads......  1 plan................  40 plans.............  40 hours.............  1,800
    --Amendments to Plan...........  50 existing plans.....  10 amendments.........  20 hours.............  200 hours............  9,000
    --Recordkeeping................  50 existing plans.....  1,150 records.........  20 hours.............  23,000 hours.........  1,035,000
    --Cold weather situations......  545 railroads.........  37 plans..............  20 hours.............  740 hours............  33,300
232.109--Dynamic brake
 requirements:.
    --status.......................  545 railroads.........  1,656,000 records.....  4 minutes............  110,400 hours........  3,864,000
    --Inoperative dynamic brakes...  20,000 locomotives....  6,358 repair recds....  4 minutes............  424 hours............  14,840
    --Tag bearing words              20,000 locomotives....  6,358 tags............  30 seconds...........  53 hours.............  1,855
     ``inoperative dynamic brakes''.
    --Deactivated dynamic brakes--   8,000 locomotives.....  2,800 stencilings.....  5 minutes............  233 hours............  8,155
     1st Year.
    --Subsequent Years.............  8,000 locomotives.....  20 stencilings........  5 minutes............  2 hours..............  70
    --Displays to Locomotive         8,000 locomotives.....  2,800,000 Disp........  .50 second...........  400 hours............  0
     Engineer-Deceleration rate.
    --Operating rules--1st Year....  545 railroads.........  300 oper. rules.......  4 hours..............  1,200 hours..........  54,000
    --Subsequent Years.............  5 new railroads.......  5 operating rules.....  4 hours..............  20 hours.............  900
    --Amendments...................  545 railroads.........  15 amendments.........  1 hour...............  15 hours.............  675
    --Miles-per-hour-overspeed-top   545 railroads.........  545 rules.............  60 minutes...........  545 hours............  24,525
     rule in operating proc..
    --Requests to increase 5 mph     545 railroads.........  5 requests/lttrs......  30 min. + 20 hrs.....  103 hours............  4,635
     overspeed restriction.
    --Knowledge criteria--           545 railroads.........  300 amendments........  16 hours.............  4,800 hours..........  216,000
     locomotive engineers--1st Year.
    --Subsequent Years.............  5 new railroads.......  5 amendments..........  16 hours.............  80 hours.............  3,600
232.111--Train information
 handling:
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  545 procedures........  50 hours.............  27,250 hours.........  1,226,250
    --Subsequent Years.............  10 new railroads......  10 procedures.........  40 hours.............  400 hours............  18,000
    --Amendments...................  100 railroads.........  100 amendments........  20 hours.............  2,000 hours..........  90,000
    --Report requirements to train   545 railroads.........  2,112,000 reports.....  10 minutes...........  352,000 hours........  12,320,000
     crew.
232.203--Training requirements--Tr.
 Prog.:
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  300 programs..........  100 hours............  30,000 hours.........  1,350,000
    --Subsequent years.............  15 railroads..........  1 program.............  100 hours............  100 hours............  4,500
    --Amendments to written program  545 railroads.........  545 amendments........  8 hours..............  4,360 hours..........  196,200
    --Training records.............  545 railroads.........  67,000 records........  8 minutes............  8,933 hours..........  312,655
    --Training notifications.......  545 railroads.........  67,000 notific........  3 minutes............  3,350 hours..........  117,250
    --Audit program................  545 railroads.........  545 plans.............  40 hours.............  21,800 hours.........  981,000
    --Amendment to audit program...  545 railroads.........  50 amendments.........  20 hours.............  1,000 hours..........  45,000
232.205--Class 1 brake test--        545 railroads.........  1,656,000 notific.....  45 seconds...........  20,700 hours.........  724,500
 Notifications.
232.207--Class 1A brake tests:       545 railroads.........  25 lists..............  30 minutes...........  13 hours.............  585
    --1st Year.....................  545 railroads.........  1 list................  1 hour...............  1 hour...............  45
    --subsequent years.............
    --Notification.................  545 railroads.........  5 amendments..........  1 hour...............  5 hours..............  225
232.209--Class II brake tests-       545 railroads.........  1,600,000 comnnt......  3 seconds............  1,333 hours..........  46,655
 intermediate inspection.
    --Operator of train............  545 railroads.........  1,600,000 comm........  2 seconds............  889 hours............  31,115
    --Electronic communication link  545 railroads.........  32,000 messages.......  2 seconds............  18 hours.............  630

[[Page 4191]]

232.211--Class II brake test-        545 railroads.........  500,000 commun........  5 seconds............  694 hours............  24,290
 trainline continuity insp..
    --Electronic communication link  545 railroads.........  5,000 messages........  5 seconds............  7 hours..............  245
232.213--Extended haul trains......  84,000 long dist.       70 letters............  15 minutes...........  18 hours.............  810
                                      mvmts..
    --Record of all defective/       84,000 long dist.       25,200 records........  20 minutes...........  8,400 hours..........  294,000
     inoperative brakes.              mvmts..
232.303--Gen'l requirements--single  1,600,000 frgt. cars..  5,600 tags............  5 minutes............  467 hours............  16,345
 car test.
    --Last repair track brake test/  1,600,000 frgt. cars..  320,000 stncl.........  5 minutes............  26,667 hours.........  993,345
     single car test.
232.307--Single Car................  545 railroads.........  Inc. under 232.17.....  Inc. under 232.17....  Inc. under 232.17....  Inc. under 232.17
232.309--Repair track brake test...  640 shops.............  5,000 tests...........  30 minutes...........  2,500 hours..........  87,500
232.403--Design stds--1 way end-of-  545 railroads.........  4 billion mess........  1/186,000 sec........  6 hours..............  0
 train (EOTs) dev..
    --Unique Code..................  545 railroads.........  12 requests...........  5 minutes............  1 hour...............  35
232.405--Design + Performance        545 railroads.........  8 billion mess........  1/186,000 sec........  12 hours.............  0
 stds.--2 way EOTs.
232.407--Operations 2-way EOTs.....  545 railroads.........  50,000 comm...........  30 seconds...........  417 hours............  14,595
232.409--Insp. and Testing of EOTs.  245 railroads.........  450,000 comm..........  30 seconds...........  3,750 hours..........  168,750
    --Telemetry Equipment--Testing   245 railroads.........  32,708 units..........  1 minute.............  545 hours............  24,525
     and Calibration.
232.503--Process to introduce new    545 railroads.........  1 letter..............  1 hour...............  1 hour...............  45
 brake technology.
    --Special approval.............  545 railroads.........  1 request.............  3 hours..............  3 hours..............  135
232.505--Pre-revenue service
 accept. test plan:
    --1st Yr.......................  545 railroads.........  1 main. procedure.....  160 hours............  160 hours............  7,200
    --Subsequent years.............  545 railroads.........  1 main. procedure.....  160 hours............  160 hours............  7,200
    --Amendments...................  545 railroads.........  1 main. procedure.....  40 hours.............  40 hours.............  1,800
    --Design description...........  545 railroads.........  1 petition............  67 hours.............  67 hours.............  3,015
    --Report to FRA Assoc. Admin..   545 railroads.........  1 report..............  13 hours.............  13 Hours.............  585
     for Safety.
    --Brake system technology        545 railroads.........  5 descriptions........  40 hours.............  200 hours............  9,000
     testing.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions;
searching existing data sources; gathering or maintaining the needed
data; and reviewing the information. For information or a copy of the
paperwork package submitted to OMB contact Robert Brogan at 202-493-
6292.
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of
information requirements contained in this final rule between 30 and 60
days after publication of this document in the Federal Register.
    FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information
collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control
number, if required. This final rule has been assigned OMB control
number 2130-0008.

D. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with its
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA
Procedures)(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental
statutes, Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA
has determined that this final rule is not a major FRA action
(requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment) because it is categorically excluded from
detailed environmental review pursuant to section 4(c) of FRA's
Procedures. Section 4(c) of FRA's Procedures identifies twenty classes
of FRA actions that are categorically excluded from the requirements
for conducting a detailed environmental review. FRA further considered
this final rule in accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's
Procedures to determine if extraordinary circumstances exist with
respect to this final rule that might trigger the need for a more
detailed environmental review. After conducting this review, FRA has
determined that extraordinary circumstances do not exist because this
final rule: Is not judged to be environmentally controversial; is not
inconsistent with Federal, State, or local laws, regulations,
ordinances, or judicial or administrative determinations relating to
environmental protection; will not have any significant adverse impact
on any natural, cultural, recreational, or scenic environments; will
not use protected properties, involve new construction in wetlands, or
affect a base floodplain; and will not cause a significant short- or
long-term increase in traffic congestion or other adverse environmental
impact on any mode of transportation. As a result, FRA finds that this
regulation is not a major Federal action significantly effecting the
quality of the human environment.

[[Page 4192]]

E. Federalism Implications

    FRA believes it is in compliance with Executive Order 13132. This
final rule will not have a substantial effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. This final rule will not have federalism implications that
impose substantial direct compliance costs on State and local
governments. FRA notes that States involved in the State Participation
Program, pursuant to 49 CFR part 212, may incur minimal costs
associated with the training of their inspectors involved in the
enforcement of this final rule. Meanwhile, State officials were
consulted to a practicable extent through their participation in the
RSAC, a federal advisory committee discussed earlier in the preamble.
Although this rule was removed from the RSAC process prior to the
issuance of the 1998 NPRM, representatives of state officials were
represented in the RSAC Power Brake Working Group and the concerns and
comments raised by these representatives during that process were fully
considered during the development of both the 1998 NPRM and this final
rule. Specifically, the National Association of Regulatory
Commissioners, the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, and the California Public Utilities
Commission (CAPUC) were all represented when this rule was being
considered by the RSAC Power Brake Working Group. The CAPUC submitted
extensive comments in response to the 1998 NPRM which are detailed and
addressed in the preamble to this final rule.
    In any event, Federal preemption of a State or local law occurs
automatically as a result of the statutory provision contained at 49
U.S.C. 20106 when FRA issues a regulation covering the same subject
matter as a State or local law unless the State or local law is
designed to reduce an essentially local safety hazard, is not
incompatible with Federal law, and does not place an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce (see discussion in the section-by-section
analysis of Sec. 232.13). It should be noted that the potential for
preemption also exists under various other statutory and constitutional
provisions. These include: the Locomotive Inspection Act (now codified
at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703), the Safety Appliance Acts (now codified at
49 U.S.C. 20301-20304), and the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 229

    Railroad locomotive safety, Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 231

    Railroad safety, Railroad safety appliances.

49 CFR Part 232

    Incorporation by reference, Railroad power brakes, Railroad safety,
Two-way end-of-train devices.

The Rule

    In consideration of the following, FRA amends chapter II, subtitle
B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

Part 229--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority citation for part 229 is revised to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20137-20138,
20143, 20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

    2. Section 229.5 is amended by adding a new paragraph (p) to read
as follows:

Sec. 229.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    (p) Electronic air brake means a brake system controlled by a
computer which provides the means for control of the locomotive brakes
or train brakes or both.

    3. Section 229.25 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:

Sec. 229.25  Tests: Every periodic inspection.

* * * * *
    (a) All mechanical gauges used by the engineer to aid in the
control or braking of the train or locomotive, except load meters used
in conjunction with an auxiliary brake system, shall be tested by
comparison with a dead-weight tester or a test gauge designed for this
purpose.
* * * * *

    4. Section 229.27 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as
follows:

Sec. 229.27  Annual tests.

* * * * *
    (b) The load meter shall be tested. Each device used by the
engineer to aid in the control or braking of the train or locomotive
that provides an indication of air pressure electronically shall be
tested by comparison with a test gauge or self-test designed for this
purpose. An error of greater than five percent or three pounds per
square inch shall be corrected. The date and place of the test shall be
recorded on Form FRA F 6180-49A, and the person conducting the test and
that person's supervisor shall sign the form.
* * * * *

    5. Section 229.53 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 229.53  Brake gauges.

    All mechanical gauges and all devices providing indication of air
pressure electronically that are used by the engineer to aid in the
control or braking of the train or locomotive shall be located so that
they may be conveniently read from the engineer's usual position during
operation of the locomotive. A gauge or device shall not be more than
five percent or three pounds per square inch in error, whichever is
less.

Part 231--[AMENDED]

    6. The authority citation for part 231 is revised to read as
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20131, 20301-20303,
21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

    7. Section 231.0 is amended by adding paragraphs (b)(3) through (5)
and paragraph (g) to read as follows:

Sec. 231.0  Applicability and penalties.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Freight and other non-passenger trains of four-wheel coal cars.
    (4) Freight and other non-passenger trains of eight-wheel standard
logging cars if the height of each car from the top of the rail to the
center of the coupling is not more than 25 inches.
    (5) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph
(b)(4) of this section when the locomotive and cars of the train are
used only to transport logs.
* * * * *
    (g) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
Sec. 231.31 also applies to an operation on a 24-inch, 36-inch, or
other narrow gage railroad.

    8. Part 231 is further amended by adding Sec. 231.31 to read as
follows:

Sec. 231.31  Drawbars for freight cars; standard height.

    (a) Except on cars specified in paragraph (b) of this section--
    (1) On standard gage (56\1/2\-inch gage) railroads, the maximum
height of drawbars for freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the
level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be
34\1/2\ inches, and the minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on
such standard gage railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be
31\1/2\ inches.

[[Page 4193]]

    (2) On 36-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for
freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the level of the tops of
the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be 26 inches, and the
minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on such 36-inch gage
railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be 23 inches.
    (3) On 24-inch gage railroads, the maximum height of drawbars for
freight cars (measured perpendicularly from the level of the tops of
the rails to the centers of the drawbars) shall be 17\1/2\ inches, and
the minimum height of drawbars for freight cars on 24-inch gage
railroads (measured in the same manner) shall be 14\1/2\ inches.
    (4) On railroads operating on track with a gage other than those
contained in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) of this section, the
maximum and minimum height of drawbars for freight cars operating on
those railroads shall be established upon written approval of FRA.
    (b) This section shall not apply to a railroad all of whose track
is less than 24 inches in gage.

    9. Appendix A of Part 231 is amended by adding an entry for
Sec. 231.31 to the end of the Schedule of Civil Penalties to read as
follows:

Appendix A to Part 231--Schedule of Civil Penalties

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Willful
     FRA safety appliance defect code section       Violation  violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  *        *        *        *        *
231.31  Drawbars, standard height.................     2,500      5,000

                  *        *        *        *        *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    10. Part 232 is revised to read as follows:

PART 232--BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETY STANDARDS for FREIGHT and OTHER NON-
PASSENGER TRAINS and EQUIPMENT; END-of-TRAIN DEVICES

Subpart A--General

Sec.
232.1  Scope.
232.3  Applicability.
232.5  Definitions.
232.7  Waivers.
232.9  Responsibility for compliance.
232.11  Penalties.
232.13  Preemptive effect.
232.15  Movement of defective equipment.
232.17  Special approval procedure.
232.19  Availability of records.
232.21  Information collection.
Subpart B--General Requirements
232.101  Scope.
232.103  General requirements for all train brake systems.
232.105  General requirements for locomotives.
232.107  Air source requirements and cold weather operations.
232.109  Dynamic brake requirements.
232.111  Train handling information.
Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements
232.201  Scope.
232.203  Training requirements.
232.205  Class I brake tests--initial terminal inspection.
232.207  Class IA brake tests--1,000-mile inspection.
232.209  Class II brake tests--intermediate inspection.
232.211  Class III brake tests--trainline continuity inspection.
232.213  Extended haul trains.
232.215  Transfer train brake tests.
232.217  Train brake tests conducted using yard air.
232.219  Double heading and helper service.
Subpart D--Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements
232.301  Scope.
232.303  General requirements.
232.305  Repair track air brake tests.
232.307  Single car tests.
232.309  Repair track air brake test and single car test equipment
and devices.
Subpart E--End-of-Train Devices
232.401  Scope.
232.403  Design standards for one-way end-of-train devices.
232.405  Design and performance standards for two-way end-of-train
devices.
232.407  Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices;
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.
232.409  Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.
Subpart F--Introduction of New Brake System Technology
232.501  Scope.
232.503  Process to introduce new brake system technology.
232.505  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

Appendix A--Schedule of Civil Penalties

Appendix B--49 CFR part 232 prior to April 1, 2001

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20301-
20303, 20306, 21301-21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

Subpart A--General

Sec. 232.1  Scope.

    (a) This part prescribes Federal safety standards for freight and
other non-passenger train brake systems and equipment. Subpart E of
this part prescribes Federal safety standards not only for freight and
other non-passenger train brake systems and equipment, but also for
passenger train brake systems. This part does not restrict a railroad
from adopting or enforcing additional or more stringent requirements
not inconsistent with this part.
    (b) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this paragraph or
in this part, railroads to which this part applies shall comply with
all the requirements contained in subparts A through C and subpart F of
this part beginning on April 1, 2004. Sections 232.1 through 232.13 and
232.17 through 232.21 of this part will become applicable to all
railroads to which this part applies beginning on April 1, 2001.
Subpart D of this part will become applicable to all railroads to which
this part applies beginning on August 1, 2001. Subpart E of this part
will become applicable to all trains operating on track which is part
of the general railroad system of transportation beginning on April 1,
2001.
    (c) A railroad may request earlier application of the requirements
contained in subparts A through C and subpart F of this part upon
written notification to FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety. Such
a request shall indicate the railroad's readiness and ability to comply
with all of the requirements contained in those subparts.
    (d) Except for operations identified in Sec. 232.3(c)(1), (c)(4),
and (c)(6) through (c)(8), all railroads which are part of the general
railroad system of transportation shall operate pursuant to the
requirements contained in this part 232 as it existed on April 1, 2001
and included as Appendix B to this part until they are either required
to operate pursuant to the requirements contained in this part or the
requirements contained in part 238 of this chapter or they elect to
comply earlier than otherwise required with the requirements contained
in this part or the requirements contained in part 238 of this chapter.

Sec. 232.3  Applicability.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section,
this part applies to all railroads that operate freight or other non-
passenger train service on standard gage track which is part of the
general railroad system of transportation. This includes the operation
of circus trains and private cars when hauled on such railroads.
    (b) Subpart E of this part, ``End-of-Train Devices,'' applies to
all trains operating on track which is part of the general railroad
system of transportation unless specifically excepted in that subpart.
    (c) Except as provided in Sec. 232.1(d) and paragraph (b) of this
section, this part does not apply to:

[[Page 4194]]

    (1) A railroad that operates only on track inside an installation
that is not part of the general railroad system of transportation.
    (2) Intercity or commuter passenger train operations on standard
gage track which is part of the general railroad system of
transportation;
    (3) Commuter or other short-haul rail passenger train operations in
a metropolitan or suburban area (as described by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1)),
including public authorities operating passenger train service;
    (4) Rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not
connected with the general railroad system of transportation;
    (5) Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations, whether on
or off the general railroad system;
    (6) Freight and other non-passenger trains of four-wheel coal cars;
    (7) Freight and other non-passenger trains of eight-wheel standard
logging cars if the height of each car from the top of the rail to the
center of the coupling is not more than 25 inches; or
    (8) A locomotive used in hauling a train referred to in paragraph
(c)(7) of this subsection when the locomotive and cars of the train are
used only to transport logs.
    (d) The provisions formerly contained in Interstate Commerce
Commission Order 13528, of May 30, 1945, as amended, now revoked, are
codified in this paragraph. This part is not applicable to the
following equipment:
    (1) Scale test weight cars.
    (2) Locomotive cranes, steam shovels, pile drivers, and machines of
similar construction, and maintenance machines built prior to September
21, 1945.
    (3) Export, industrial, and other cars not owned by a railroad
which are not to be used in service, except for movement as shipments
on their own wheels to given destinations. Such cars shall be properly
identified by a card attached to each side of the car, signed by the
shipper, stating that such movement is being made under the authority
of this paragraph.
    (4) Industrial and other than railroad-owned cars which are not to
be used in service except for movement within the limits of a single
switching district (i.e., within the limits of an industrial facility).
    (5) Narrow-gage cars.
    (6) Cars used exclusively in switching operations and not used in
train movements within the meaning of the Federal safety appliance laws
(49 U.S.C. 20301-20306).

Sec. 232.5  Definitions.

    For purposes of this part--
    AAR means the Association of American Railroads.
    Air brake means a combination of devices operated by compressed
air, arranged in a system, and controlled manually, electrically,
electronically, or pneumatically, by means of which the motion of a
railroad car or locomotive is retarded or arrested.
    Air Flow Indicator, AFM means a specific air flow indicator
required by the air flow method of qualifying train air brakes (AFM).
The AFM Air Flow Indicator is a calibrated air flow measuring device
which is clearly visible and legible in daylight and darkness from the
engineer's normal operating position. The indicator face displays:
    (1) Markings from 10 cubic feet per minute (CFM) to 80 CFM, in
increments of 10 CFM or less; and
    (2) Numerals indicating 20, 40, 60, and 80 CFM for continuous
monitoring of air flow.
    Bind means restrict the intended movement of one or more brake
system components by reduced clearance, by obstruction, or by increased
friction.
    Brake, dynamic means a train braking system whereby the kinetic
energy of a moving train is used to generate electric current at the
locomotive traction motors, which is then dissipated through resistor
grids or into the catenary or third rail system.
    Brake, effective means a brake that is capable of producing its
required designed retarding force on the train. A car's air brake is
not considered effective if it is not capable of producing its designed
retarding force or if its piston travel exceeds:
    (1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke
brake cylinders; or
    (2) the piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or
badge plate for that brake cylinder.
    Brake, hand means a brake that can be applied and released by hand
to prevent or retard the movement of a locomotive.
    Brake indicator means a device which indicates the brake
application range and indicates whether brakes are applied and
released.
    Brake, inoperative means a primary brake that, for any reason, no
longer applies or releases as intended.
    Brake, inoperative dynamic means a dynamic brake that, for any
reason, no longer provides its designed retarding force on the train.
    Brake, parking means a brake that can be applied by means other
than by hand, such as spring, hydraulic, or air pressure when the brake
pipe air is depleted, or by an electrical motor.
    Brake pipe means the system of piping (including branch pipes,
angle cocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors, hoses, and hose couplings)
used for connecting locomotives and all railroad cars for the passage
of compressed air.
    Brake, primary means those components of the train brake system
necessary to stop the train within the signal spacing distance without
thermal damage to friction braking surfaces.
    Brake, secondary means those components of the train brake system
which develop supplemental brake retarding force that is not needed to
stop the train within signal spacing distances or to prevent thermal
damage to wheels.
    Emergency application means an irretrievable brake application
resulting in the maximum retarding force available from the train brake
system.
    End-of-train device, one-way means two pieces of equipment linked
by radio that meet the requirements of Sec. 232.403.
    End-of-train device, two-way means two pieces of equipment linked
by radio that meet the requirements of Secs. 232.403 and 232.405.
    Foul means any condition which restricts the intended movement of
one or more brake system components because the component is snagged,
entangled, or twisted.
    Freight car means a vehicle designed to carry freight, or railroad
personnel, by rail and a vehicle designed for use in a work or wreck
train or other non-passenger train.
    Initial terminal means the location where a train is originally
assembled.
    Locomotive means a piece of railroad on-track equipment, other than
hi-rail, specialized maintenance, or other similar equipment, which may
consist of one or more units operated from a single control stand--
    (1) With one or more propelling motors designed for moving other
railroad equipment;
    (2) With one or more propelling motors designed to transport
freight or passenger traffic or both; or
    (3) Without propelling motors but with one or more control stands.
    Locomotive cab means that portion of the superstructure designed to
be occupied by the crew operating the locomotive.
    Locomotive, controlling means the locomotive from which the
engineer exercises control over the train.
    Off air means not connected to a continuous source of compressed
air of at least 60 pounds per square inch (psi).
    Ordered date or date ordered means the date on which notice to
proceed is given by a procuring railroad to a contractor or supplier
for new equipment.

[[Page 4195]]

    Piston travel means the amount of linear movement of the air brake
hollow rod (or equivalent) or piston rod when forced outward by
movement of the piston in the brake cylinder or actuator and limited by
the brake shoes being forced against the wheel or disc.
    Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan means a document, as
further specified in Sec. 232.505, prepared by a railroad that explains
in detail how pre-revenue service tests of certain equipment
demonstrate that the equipment meets Federal safety standards and the
railroad's own safety design requirements.
    Previously tested equipment means equipment that has received a
Class I brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.205 and has not been off air
for more than four hours.
    Primary responsibility means the task that a person performs at
least 50 percent of the time. The totality of the circumstances will be
considered on a case-by-case basis in circumstances where an individual
does not spend 50 percent of the day engaged in any one readily
identifiable type of activity.
    Qualified mechanical inspector means a qualified person who has
received, as a part of the training, qualification, and designation
program required under Sec. 232.203, instruction and training that
includes ``hands-on'' experience (under appropriate supervision or
apprenticeship) in one or more of the following functions:
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance or repair of the
specific train brake components and systems for which the person is
assigned responsibility. This person shall also possess a current
understanding of what is required to properly repair and maintain the
safety-critical brake components for which the person is assigned
responsibility. Further, the qualified mechanical inspector shall be a
person whose primary responsibility includes work generally consistent
with the functions listed in this definition.
    Qualified person means a person who has received, as a part of the
training, qualification, and designation program required under
Sec. 232.203, instruction and training necessary to perform one or more
functions required under this part. The railroad is responsible for
determining that the person has the knowledge and skills necessary to
perform the required function for which the person is assigned
responsibility. The railroad determines the qualifications and
competencies for employees designated to perform various functions in
the manner set forth in this part. Although the rule uses the term
``qualified person'' to describe a person responsible for performing
various functions required under this part, a person may be deemed
qualified to perform some functions but not qualified to perform other
functions. For example, although a person may be deemed qualified to
perform the Class II/intermediate brake test required by this part,
that same person may or may not be deemed qualified to perform the
Class I/initial Terminal brake test or authorize the movement of
defective equipment under this part. The railroad will determine the
required functions for which an individual will be deemed a ``qualified
person'' based upon the instruction and training the individual has
received pursuant to Sec. 232.203 concerning a particular function.
    Railroad means any form of non-highway ground transportation that
runs on rails or electromagnetic guideways, including:
    (1) Commuter or short-haul railroad passenger service in a
metropolitan or suburban area and commuter railroad service that was
operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation on January 1, 1979; and
    (2) High speed ground transportation systems that connect
metropolitan areas, without regard to whether those systems use new
technologies not associated with traditional railroads. The term
``railroad'' is also intended to mean a person that provides
transportation by railroad, whether directly or by contracting out
operation of the railroad to another person. The term does not include
rapid transit operations in an urban area that are not connected to the
general railroad system of transportation.
    Rebuilt equipment means equipment that has undergone overhaul
identified by the railroad as a capital expense under the Surface
Transportation Board's accounting standards.
    Refresher training means periodic retraining required for employees
or contractors to remain qualified to perform specific equipment
troubleshooting, inspection, testing, maintenance, or repair functions.
    Respond as intended means to produce the result that a device or
system is designed to produce.
    ``Roll-by'' inspection means an inspection performed while
equipment is moving.
    Service application means a brake application that results from one
or more service reductions or the equivalent.
    Service reduction means a decrease in brake pipe pressure, usually
from 5 to 25 psi at a rate sufficiently rapid to move the operating
valve to service position, but at a rate not rapid enough to move the
operating valve to emergency position.
    Solid block of cars means two or more freight cars consecutively
coupled together and added to or removed from a train as a single unit.
    State inspector means an inspector of a participating State rail
safety program under part 212 of this chapter.
    Switching service means the classification of freight cars
according to commodity or destination; assembling of cars for train
movements; changing the position of cars for purposes of loading,
unloading, or weighing; placing of locomotives and cars for repair or
storage; or moving of rail equipment in connection with work service
that does not constitute a train movement.
    Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursion operations are railroad
operations that carry passengers, often using antiquated equipment,
with the conveyance of the passengers to a particular destination not
being the principal purpose.
    Train means one or more locomotives coupled with one or more
freight cars, except during switching service.
    Train line means the brake pipe or any non-pneumatic system used to
transmit the signal that controls the locomotive and freight car
brakes.
    Train, unit or train, cycle means a train that, except for the
changing of locomotive power and the removal or replacement of
defective equipment, remains coupled as a consist and continuously
operates from location A to location B and back to location A.
    Transfer train means a train that travels between a point of origin
and a point of final destination not exceeding 20 miles. Such trains
may pick up or deliver freight equipment while en route to destination.
    Yard air means a source of compressed air other than from a
locomotive.

Sec. 232.7  Waivers.

    (a) Any person subject to a requirement of this part may petition
the Administrator for a waiver of compliance with such requirement. The
filing of such a petition does not affect that person's responsibility
for compliance with that requirement while the petition is being
considered.
    (b) Each petition for waiver must be filed in the manner and
contain the information required by part 211 of this chapter.
    (c) If the Administrator finds that a waiver of compliance is in
the public interest and is consistent with railroad safety, the
Administrator may grant the waiver subject to any conditions the
Administrator deems necessary. If a waiver is granted, the
Administrator

[[Page 4196]]

publishes a notice in the Federal Register containing the reasons for
granting the waiver.

Sec. 232.9  Responsibility for compliance.

    (a) A railroad subject to this part shall not use, haul, permit to
be used or hauled on its line, offer in interchange, or accept in
interchange any train, railroad car, or locomotive with one or more
conditions not in compliance with this part; however, a railroad shall
not be liable for a civil penalty for such action if such action is in
accordance with Sec. 232.15. For purposes of this part, a train,
railroad car, or locomotive will be considered in use prior to
departure but after it has received, or should have received, the
inspection required for movement and is deemed ready for service.
    (b) Although many of the requirements of this part are stated in
terms of the duties of a railroad, when any person performs any
function required by this part, that person (whether or not a railroad)
is required to perform that function in accordance with this part.
    (c) Any person performing any function or task required by this
part shall be deemed to have consented to FRA inspection of the
person's operation to the extent necessary to determine whether the
function or task is being performed in accordance with the requirements
of this part.

Sec. 232.11  Penalties.

    (a) Any person (including but not limited to a railroad; any
manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a
railroad; any owner, manufacturer, lessor, or lessee of railroad
equipment, track, or facilities; any employee of such owner,
manufacturer, lessor, lessee, or independent contractor) who violates
any requirement of this part or causes the violation of any such
requirement is subject to a civil penalty of at least $500, but not
more than $11,000 per violation, except that: Penalties may be assessed
against individuals only for willful violations, and, where a grossly
negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations has created an
imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or
injury, a penalty not to exceed $22,000 per violation may be assessed.
Each day a violation continues shall constitute a separate offense.
Appendix A to this part contains a schedule of civil penalty amounts
used in connection with this rule.
    (b) Any person who knowingly and willfully falsifies a record or
report required by this part is subject to criminal penalties under 49
U.S.C. 21311.

Sec. 232.13  Preemptive effect.

    (a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part
preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering
the same subject matter, except for a provision necessary to eliminate
or reduce a local safety hazard if that provision is not incompatible
with this part and does not impose an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
    (b) Preemption should also be considered pursuant to the Locomotive
Boiler Inspection Act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703), the
Safety Appliance Acts (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20301-20304), and the
Commerce Clause based on the relevant case law pertaining to preemption
under those provisions.
    (c) FRA does not intend by issuance of the regulations in this part
to preempt provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for
reckless conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage
to property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad
employees or generally to the public at large.

Sec. 232.15  Movement of defective equipment.

    (a) General provision. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section, a railroad car or locomotive with one or more conditions not
in compliance with this part may be used or hauled without civil
penalty liability under this part only if all of the following
conditions are met:
    (1) The defective car or locomotive is properly equipped in
accordance with the applicable provisions of 49 U.S.C. chapter 203 and
the requirements of this part.
    (2) The car or locomotive becomes defective while it is being used
by the railroad on its line or becomes defective on the line of a
connecting railroad and is properly accepted in interchange for repairs
in accordance with paragraph (a)(7) of this section.
    (3) The railroad first discovers the defective condition of the car
or locomotive prior to moving it for repairs.
    (4) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is
from the location where the car or locomotive is first discovered
defective by the railroad.
    (5) The defective car or locomotive cannot be repaired at the
location where the railroad first discovers it to be defective.
    (6) The movement of the car or locomotive is necessary to make
repairs to the defective condition.
    (7) The location to which the car or locomotive is being taken for
repair is the nearest available location where necessary repairs can be
performed on the line of the railroad where the car or locomotive was
first found to be defective or is the nearest available location where
necessary repairs can be performed on the line of a connecting railroad
if:
    (i) The connecting railroad elects to accept the defective car or
locomotive for such repair; and
    (ii) The nearest available location where necessary repairs can be
performed on the line of the connecting railroad is no farther than the
nearest available location where necessary repairs can be performed on
the line of the railroad where the car or locomotive was found
defective.
    (8) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is
not by a train required to receive a Class I brake test at that
location pursuant to Sec. 232.205.
    (9) The movement of the defective car or locomotive for repairs is
not in a train in which less than 85 percent of the cars have operative
and effective brakes.
    (10) The defective car or locomotive is tagged, or information is
recorded, as prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (11) Except for cars or locomotives with brakes cut out en route,
the following additional requirements are met:
    (i) A qualified person shall determine--
    (A) That it is safe to move the car or locomotive; and
    (B) The maximum safe speed and other restrictions necessary for
safely conducting the movement.
    (ii) The person in charge of the train in which the car or
locomotive is to be moved shall be notified in writing and inform all
other crew members of the presence of the defective car or locomotive
and the maximum speed and other restrictions determined under paragraph
(a)(11)(i)(B) of this section. A copy of the tag or card described in
paragraph (b) of this section may be used to provide the notification
required by this paragraph.
    (iii) The defective car or locomotive is moved in compliance with
the maximum speed and other restrictions determined under paragraph
(a)(11)(i)(B) of this section.
    (12) The defective car or locomotive is not subject to a Special
Notice for Repair under part 216 of this chapter, unless the movement
of the defective

[[Page 4197]]

car is made in accordance with the restrictions contained in the
Special Notice.
    (b) Tagging of defective equipment.
    (1) At the place where the railroad first discovers the defect, a
tag or card shall be placed on both sides of the defective equipment or
locomotive and in the cab of the locomotive, or an automated tracking
system approved for use by FRA shall be provided with the following
information about the defective equipment:
    (i) The reporting mark and car or locomotive number;
    (ii) The name of the inspecting railroad;
    (iii) The name and job title of the inspector;
    (iv) The inspection location and date;
    (v) The nature of each defect;
    (vi) A description of any movement restrictions;
    (vii) The destination of the equipment where it will be repaired;
and
    (viii) The signature, or electronic identification, of the person
reporting the defective condition.
    (2) The tag or card required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section
shall remain affixed to the defective equipment until the necessary
repairs have been performed.
    (3) An electronic or written record or a copy of each tag or card
attached to or removed from a car or locomotive shall be retained for
90 days and, upon request, shall be made available within 15 calendar
days for inspection by FRA or State inspectors.
    (4) Each tag or card removed from a car or locomotive shall contain
the date, location, reason for its removal, and the signature of the
person who removed it from the piece of equipment.
    (5) Any automated tracking system approved by FRA to meet the
tagging requirements contained in paragraph (b)(1) of this section
shall be capable of being reviewed and monitored by FRA at any time to
ensure the integrity of the system. FRA's Associate Administrator for
Safety may prohibit or revoke a railroad's authority to utilize an
approved automated tracking system in lieu of tagging if FRA finds that
the automated tracking system is not properly secure, is inaccessible
to FRA or a railroad's employees, or fails to adequately track and
monitor the movement of defective equipment. FRA will record such a
determination in writing, include a statement of the basis for such
action, and provide a copy of the document to the railroad.
    (c) Movement for unloading or purging of defective cars. If a
defective car is loaded with a hazardous material or contains residue
of a hazardous material, the car may not be placed for unloading or
purging unless unloading or purging is consistent with determinations
made and restrictions imposed under paragraph (a)(11)(i) of this
section and the unloading or purging is necessary for the safe repair
of the car.
    (d) Computation of percent operative power brakes.
    (1) The percentage of operative power brakes in a train shall be
based on the number of control valves in the train. The percentage
shall be determined by dividing the number of control valves that are
cut-in by the total number of control valves in the train. A control
valve shall not be considered cut-in if the brakes controlled by that
valve are inoperative. Both cars and locomotives shall be considered
when making this calculation.
    (2) The following brake conditions not in compliance with this part
are not considered inoperative power brakes for purposes of this
section:
    (i) Failure or cutting out of secondary brake systems;
    (ii) Inoperative or otherwise defective handbrakes or parking
brakes;
    (iii) Piston travel that is in excess of the Class I brake test
limits required in Sec. 232.205 but that does not exceed the outside
limits contained on the stencil, sticker, or badge plate required by
Sec. 232.103(g) for considering the power brakes to be effective; and
    (iv) Power brakes overdue for inspection, testing, maintenance, or
stenciling under this part.
    (e) Placement of equipment with inoperative brakes.
    (1) A freight car or locomotive with inoperative brakes shall not
be placed as the rear car of the train.
    (2) No more than two freight cars with either inoperative brakes or
not equipped with power brakes shall be consecutively placed in the
same train.
    (3) Multi-unit articulated equipment shall not be placed in a train
if the equipment has more than two consecutive individual control
valves cut-out or if the brakes controlled by the valves are
inoperative.
    (f) Guidelines for determining locations where necessary repairs
can be performed. The following guidelines will be considered by FRA
when determining whether a location is a location where repairs to a
car's brake system or components can be performed and whether a
location is the nearest location where the needed repairs can be
effectuated.
    (1) The following general factors and guidelines will be considered
when making determinations as to whether a location is a location where
brake repairs can be performed:
    (i) The accessibility of the location to persons responsible for
making repairs;
    (ii) The presence of hazardous conditions that affect the ability
to safely make repairs of the type needed at the location;
    (iii) The nature of the repair necessary to bring the car into
compliance;
    (iv) The need for railroads to have in place an effective means to
ensure the safe and timely repair of equipment;
    (v) The relevant weather conditions at the location that affect
accessibility or create hazardous conditions;
    (vi) A location need not have the ability to effectuate every type
of brake system repair in order to be considered a location where some
brake repairs can be performed;
    (vii) A location need not be staffed continuously in order to be
considered a location where brake repairs can be performed;
    (viii) The ability of a railroad to perform repair track brake
tests or single car tests at a location shall not be considered; and
    (ix) The congestion of work at a location shall not be considered
    (2) The general factors and guidelines outlined in paragraph (f)(1)
of this section should be applied to the following locations:
    (i) A location where a mobile repair truck is used on a regular
basis;
    (ii) A location where a mobile repair truck originates or is
permanently stationed;
    (iii) A location at which a railroad performs mechanical repairs
other than brake system repairs; and
    (iv) A location that has an operative repair track or repair shop;
    (3) In determining whether a location is the nearest location where
the necessary brake repairs can be made, the distance to the location
is a key factor but should not be considered the determining factor.
The distance to a location must be considered in conjunction with the
factors and guidance outlined in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this
section. In addition, the following safety factors must be considered
in order to optimize safety:
    (i) The safety of the employees responsible for getting the
equipment to or from a particular location; and
    (ii) The potential safety hazards involved with moving the
equipment in the direction of travel necessary to get the equipment to
a particular location.
    (g) Based on the guidance detailed in paragraph (f) of this section
and consistent with other requirements contained in this part, a
railroad and the representatives of the railroad's

[[Page 4198]]

employees may submit, for FRA approval, a joint proposal containing a
plan designating locations where brake system repairs will be
performed. Approval of such plans shall be made in writing by FRA's
Associate Administrator for Safety and shall be subject to any
modifications or changes determined by FRA to be necessary to ensure
consistency with the requirements and guidance contained in this part.

Sec. 232.17  Special approval procedure.

    (a) General. The following procedures govern consideration and
action upon requests for special approval of an alternative standard
under Secs. 232.305 and 232.307; and for special approval of pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plans under subpart F of this part.
    (b) Petitions for special approval of an alternative standard. Each
petition for special approval of an alternative standard shall contain:
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition;
    (2) The alternative proposed, in detail, to be substituted for the
particular requirement of this part;
    (3) Appropriate data or analysis, or both, for FRA to consider in
determining whether the alternative will provide at least an equivalent
level of safety; and
    (4) A statement affirming that the railroad has served a copy of
the petition on designated representatives of its employees, together
with a list of the names and addresses of the persons served.
    (c) Petitions for special approval of pre-revenue service
acceptance testing plan. Each petition for special approval of a pre-
revenue service acceptance testing plan shall contain:
    (1) The name, title, address, and telephone number of the primary
person to be contacted with regard to review of the petition; and
    (2) The elements prescribed in Sec. 232.505.
    (d) Service.
    (1) Each petition for special approval under paragraph (b) or (c)
of this section shall be submitted in triplicate to the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 7th
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
    (2) Service of each petition for special approval of an alternative
standard under paragraph (b) of this section shall be made on the
following:
    (i) Designated employee representatives responsible for the
equipment's operation, inspection, testing, and maintenance under this
part;
    (ii) Any organizations or bodies that either issued the standard
incorporated in the section(s) of the rule to which the special
approval pertains or issued the alternative standard that is proposed
in the petition; and
    (iii) Any other person who has filed with FRA a current statement
of interest in reviewing special approvals under the particular
requirement of this part at least 30 days but not more than 5 years
prior to the filing of the petition. If filed, a statement of interest
shall be filed with FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety and shall
reference the specific section(s) of this part in which the person has
an interest.
    (e) Federal Register notice. FRA will publish a notice in the
Federal Register concerning each petition under paragraph (b) of this
section.
    (f) Comment. Not later than 30 days from the date of publication of
the notice in the Federal Register concerning a petition under
paragraph (b) of this section, any person may comment on the petition.
    (1) A comment shall set forth specifically the basis upon which it
is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the
commenter in the proceeding.
    (2) The comment shall be submitted in triplicate to the Associate
Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 7th
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
    (3) The commenter shall certify that a copy of the comment was
served on each petitioner.
    (g) Disposition of petitions.
    (1) If FRA finds that the petition complies with the requirements
of this section and that the proposed alternative standard or pre-
revenue service plan is acceptable and justified, the petition will be
granted, normally within 90 days of its receipt. If the petition is
neither granted nor denied within 90 days, the petition remains pending
for decision. FRA may attach special conditions to the approval of any
petition. Following the approval of a petition, FRA may reopen
consideration of the petition for cause.
    (2) If FRA finds that the petition does not comply with the
requirements of this section and that the alternative standard or pre-
revenue service plan is not acceptable or justified, the petition will
be denied, normally within 90 days of its receipt.
    (3) When FRA grants or denies a petition, or reopens consideration
of the petition, written notice is sent to the petitioner and other
interested parties.

Sec. 232.19  Availability of records.

    Except as otherwise provided, the records and plans required by
this part shall be made available to representatives of FRA and States
participating under part 212 of this chapter for inspection and copying
upon request.

Sec. 232.21  Information Collection.

    (a) The information collection requirements of this part were
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and are
assigned OMB control number 2130-0008.
    (b) The information collection requirements are found in the
following sections: Secs. 229.27, 231.31, 232.1, 232.3, 232.7, 232.11,
232.15, 232.17, 232.103, 232.105, 232.107, 232.109, 232.111, 232.203,
232.205, 232.207, 232.209, 232.211, 232.213, 232.303, 232.307, 232.309,
232.403, 232.405, 232.407, 232.409, 232.503, 232.505.

Subpart B--General Requirements

Sec. 232.101  Scope.

    This subpart contains general operating, performance, and design
requirements for each railroad that operates freight or other non-
passenger trains and for specific equipment used in those operations.

Sec. 232.103  General requirements for all train brake systems.

    (a) The primary brake system of a train shall be capable of
stopping the train with a service application from its maximum
operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the track over
which the train is operating.
    (b) If the integrity of the train line of a train brake system is
broken, the train shall be stopped. If a train line uses other than
solely pneumatic technology, the integrity of the train line shall be
monitored by the brake control system.
    (c) A train brake system shall respond as intended to signals from
the train line.
    (d) One hundred percent of the brakes on a train shall be effective
and operative brakes prior to use or departure from any location where
a Class I brake test is required to be performed on the train pursuant
to Sec. 232.205.
    (e) A train shall not move if less than 85 percent of the cars in
that train have operative and effective brakes.
    (f) Each car in a train shall have its air brakes in effective
operating condition unless the car is being moved for repairs in
accordance with Sec. 232.15. The air brakes on a car are not in
effective

[[Page 4199]]

operating condition if its brakes are cut-out or otherwise inoperative
or if the piston travel exceeds:
    (1) 10\1/2\ inches for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke
brake cylinders; or
    (2) The piston travel limits indicated on the stencil, sticker, or
badge plate for the brake cylinder with which the car is equipped.
    (g) Except for cars equipped with nominal 12-inch stroke (8\1/2\
and 10-inch diameters) brake cylinders, all cars shall have a legible
decal, stencil, or sticker affixed to the car or shall be equipped with
a badge plate displaying the permissible brake cylinder piston travel
range for the car at Class I brake tests and the length at which the
piston travel renders the brake ineffective, if different from Class I
brake test limits. The decal, stencil, sticker, or badge plate shall be
located so that it may be easily read and understood by a person
positioned safely beside the car.
    (h) All equipment ordered on or after August 1, 2002, or placed in
service for the first time on or after April 1, 2004, shall have train
brake systems designed so that an inspector can observe from a safe
position either the piston travel, an accurate indicator which shows
piston travel, or any other means by which the brake system is
actuated. The design shall not require the inspector to place himself
or herself on, under, or between components of the equipment to observe
brake actuation or release.
    (i) All trains shall be equipped with an emergency application
feature that produces an irretrievable stop, using a brake rate
consistent with prevailing adhesion, train safety, and brake system
thermal capacity. An emergency application shall be available at all
times, and shall be initiated by an unintentional parting of the train
line or loss of train brake communication.
    (j) A railroad shall set the maximum main reservoir working
pressure.
    (k) The maximum brake pipe pressure shall not be greater than 15
psi less than the air compressor governor starting or loading pressure.
    (l) Except as otherwise provided in this part, all equipment used
in freight or other non-passenger trains shall, at a minimum, meet the
Association of American Railroads (AAR) Standard S-469-47,
``Performance Specification for Freight Brakes,'' contained in the AAR
Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section E (April 1,
1999). The incorporation by reference of this AAR standard was approved
by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You may obtain a copy of the incorporated
document from the Association of American Railroads, 50 F Street, NW,
Washington, DC. 20001. You may inspect a copy of the document at the
Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW,
Suite 7000, Washington, DC or at the Office of the Federal Register,
800 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20408.
    (m) If a train qualified by the Air Flow Method as provided for in
subpart C of this part experiences a brake pipe air flow of greater
than 60 CFM or brake pipe gradient of greater than 15 psi while en
route and the movable pointer does not return to those limits within a
reasonable time, the train shall be stopped at the next available
location and be inspected for leaks in the brake system.
    (n) Securement of unattended equipment. A train's air brake shall
not be depended upon to hold equipment standing unattended on a grade
(including a locomotive, a car, or a train whether or not locomotive is
attached). For purposes of this section, ``unattended equipment'' means
equipment left standing and unmanned in such a manner that the brake
system of the equipment cannot be readily controlled by a qualified
person. Unattended equipment shall be secured in accordance with the
following requirements:
    (1) A sufficient number of hand brakes shall be applied to hold the
equipment. Railroads shall develop and implement a process or procedure
to verify that the applied hand brakes will sufficiently hold the
equipment with the air brakes released.
    (2) Where possible, an emergency brake application of the air
brakes shall be initiated prior to leaving equipment unattended.
    (3) The following requirements apply to the use of hand brakes on
unattended locomotives:
    (i) All hand brakes shall be fully applied on all locomotives in
the lead consist of an unattended train.
    (ii) All hand brakes shall be fully applied on all locomotives in
an unattended locomotive consist outside of yard limits.
    (iii) At a minimum, the hand brake shall be fully applied on the
lead locomotive in an unattended locomotive consist within yard limits.
    (4) A railroad shall adopt and comply with a process or procedures
to verify that the applied hand brakes will sufficiently hold an
unattended locomotive consist. A railroad shall also adopt and comply
with instructions to address throttle position, status of the reverse
lever, position of the generator field switch, status of the
independent brakes, position of the isolation switch, and position of
the automatic brake valve on all unattended locomotives. The procedures
and instruction required in this paragraph shall take into account
winter weather conditions as they relate to throttle position and
reverser handle.
    (5) Any hand brakes applied to hold unattended equipment shall not
be released until it is known that the air brake system is properly
charged.
    (o) Air pressure regulating devices shall be adjusted for the
following pressures:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Locomotives                              PSI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Minimum brake pipe air pressure:
    Road Service..............................  90
    Switch Service............................  60
(2) Minimum differential between brake pipe     15
 and main reservoir air pressures, with brake
 valve in running position.
(3) Safety valve for straight air brake.......  30-55
(4) Safety valve for LT, ET, No. 8-EL, No. 14   30-68
 El, No. 6-DS, No. 6-BL and No. 6-SL equipment.
(5) Safety valve for HSC and No. 24-RL          30-75
 equipment.
(6) Reducing valve for independent or straight  30-50
 air brake.
(7) Self-lapping portion for electro-pneumatic  50
 brake (minimum full application pressure).
(8) Self-lapping portion for independent air    30 or less
 brake (full application pressure).
(9) Reducing valve for high-speed brake         50
 (minimum).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (p) Railroad or contract supervisors shall be held jointly
responsible with the inspectors and train crew members they supervise
for the condition and proper functioning of train brake systems to the
extent that it is possible

[[Page 4200]]

to detect defective equipment by the inspections and tests required by
this part.

Sec. 232.105  General requirements for locomotives.

    (a) The air brake equipment on a locomotive shall be in safe and
suitable condition for service.
    (b) All locomotives ordered on or after August 1, 2002, or placed
in service for the first time on or after April 1, 2004, shall be
equipped with a hand or parking brake that is:
    (1) Capable of application or activation by hand;
    (2) Capable of release by hand; and
    (3) Capable of holding the unit on a three (3) percent grade.
    (c) On locomotives so equipped, the hand or parking brake as well
as its parts and connections shall be inspected, and necessary repairs
made, as often as service requires but no less frequently than every
368 days. The date of the last inspection shall be either entered on
Form FRA F 6180-49A or suitably stenciled or tagged on the locomotive.
    (d) The amount of leakage from the equalizing reservoir on
locomotives and related piping shall be zero, unless the system is
capable of maintaining the set pressure at any service application with
the brakes control valve in the freight position. If such leakage is
detected en route, the train may be moved only to the nearest forward
location where the equalizing-reservoir leakage can be corrected. On
locomotives equipped with electronic brakes, if the system logs or
displays a fault related to equalizing reservoir leakage, the train may
be moved only to the nearest forward location where the necessary
repairs can be made.
    (e) Use of the feed or regulating valve to control braking is
prohibited.
    (f) The passenger position on the locomotive brake control stand
shall be used only if the trailing equipment is designed for graduated
brake release or if equalizing reservoir leakage occurs en route and
its use is necessary to safely control the movement of the train until
it reaches the next forward location where the reservoir leakage can be
corrected.
    (g) When taking charge of a locomotive or locomotive consist, an
engineer must know that the brakes are in operative condition.

Sec. 232.107  Air source requirements and cold weather operations.

    (a) Monitoring plans for yard air sources.
    (1) A railroad shall adopt and comply with a written plan to
monitor all yard air sources, other than locomotives, to determine that
they operate as intended and do not introduce contaminants into the
brake system of freight equipment.
    (2) This plan shall require the railroad to:
    (i) Inspect each yard air source at least two times per calendar
year, no less than five months apart, to determine it operates as
intended and does not introduce contaminants into the brake system of
the equipment it services.
    (ii) Identify yard air sources found not to be operating as
intended or found introducing contaminants into the brake system of the
equipment it services.
    (iii) Repair or take other remedial action regarding any yard air
source identified under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section.
    (3) A railroad shall maintain records of the information and
actions required by paragraph (a)(2). These records shall be maintained
for a period of at least one year from the date of creation and may be
maintained either electronically or in writing.
    (b) Condensation and other contaminants shall be blown from the
pipe or hose from which compressed air is taken prior to connecting the
yard air line or motive power to the train.
    (c) No chemicals which are known to degrade or harm brake system
components shall be placed in the train air brake system.
    (d) Yard air reservoirs shall either be equipped with an operable
automatic drain system or be manually drained at least once each day
that the devices are used or more often if moisture is detected in the
system.
    (e) A railroad shall adopt and comply with detailed written
operating procedures tailored to the equipment and territory of that
railroad to cover safe train operations during cold weather. For
purposes of this provision, ``cold weather'' means when the ambient
temperature drops below 10 degrees Fahrenheit (F) (minus 12.2 degrees
Celsius).

Sec. 232.109  Dynamic brake requirements.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (i) of this section, a
locomotive engineer shall be informed of the operational status of the
dynamic brakes on all locomotive units in the consist at the initial
terminal or point of origin for a train and at other locations where a
locomotive engineer first begins operation of a train. The information
required by this paragraph may be provided to the locomotive engineer
by any means determined appropriate by the railroad; however, a written
or electronic record of the information shall be maintained in the cab
of the controlling locomotive.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, all
inoperative dynamic brakes shall be repaired within 30 calendar days of
becoming inoperative or at the locomotive's next periodic inspection
pursuant to Sec. 229.23 of this chapter, whichever occurs first.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, a
locomotive discovered with inoperative dynamic brakes shall have a tag
bearing the words ``inoperative dynamic brake'' securely attached and
displayed in a conspicuous location in the cab of the locomotive. This
tag shall contain the following information:
    (1) The locomotive number;
    (2) The name of the discovering carrier;
    (3) The location and date where condition was discovered; and
    (4) The signature of the person discovering the condition.
    (d) An electronic or written record of repairs made to a
locomotive's dynamic brakes shall be retained for 92 days.
    (e) A railroad may elect to declare the dynamic brakes on a
locomotive deactivated without removing the dynamic brake components
from the locomotive, only if all of the following conditions are met:
    (1) The locomotive is clearly marked with the words ``dynamic brake
deactivated'' in a conspicuous location in the cab of the locomotive;
and
    (2) The railroad has taken appropriate action to ensure that the
deactivated locomotive is incapable of utilizing dynamic brake effort
to retard or control train speed.
    (f) If a locomotive consist is intended to have its dynamic brakes
used while in transit, a locomotive with inoperative or deactivated
dynamic brakes or a locomotive not equipped with dynamic brakes shall
not be placed in the controlling (lead) position of a consist unless
the locomotive has the capability of:
    (1) Controlling the dynamic braking effort in trailing locomotives
in the consist that are so equipped; and
    (2) Displaying to the locomotive engineer the deceleration rate of
the train or the total train dynamic brake retarding force.
    (g) All locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes and ordered on or
after August 1, 2002, or placed in service for the first time on or
after April 1, 2004, shall be designed to:
    (1) Test the electrical integrity of the dynamic brake at rest; and
    (2) Display the available total train dynamic brake retarding force
at various speed increments in the cab of the controlling (lead)
locomotive.

[[Page 4201]]

    (h) All rebuilt locomotives equipped with dynamic brakes and placed
in service on or after April 1, 2004, shall be designed to:
    (1) Test the electrical integrity of the dynamic brake at rest; and
    (2) Display either the train deceleration rate or the available
total train dynamic brake retarding force at various speed increments
in the cab of the controlling (lead) locomotive.
    (i) The information required by paragraph (a) of this section is
not required to be provided to the locomotive engineer if all of the
locomotives in the lead consist of a train are equipped in accordance
with paragraph (g) of this section.
    (j) A railroad operating a train with a brake system that includes
dynamic brakes shall adopt and comply with written operating rules
governing safe train handling procedures using these dynamic brakes
under all operating conditions, which shall be tailored to the specific
equipment and territory of the railroad. The railroad's operating rules
shall:
    (1) Ensure that the friction brakes are sufficient by themselves,
without the aid of dynamic brakes, to stop the train safely under all
operating conditions.
    (2) Include a ``miles-per-hour-overspeed-stop'' rule. At a minimum,
this rule shall require that any train, when descending a grade of 1
percent or greater, shall be immediately brought to a stop, by an
emergency brake application if necessary, when the train's speed
exceeds the maximum authorized speed for that train by more than 5
miles per hour. A railroad shall reduce the 5 mile per hour overspeed
restriction if validated research indicates the need for such a
reduction. A railroad may increase the 5 mile per hour overspeed
restriction only with approval of FRA and based upon verifiable data
and research.
    (k) A railroad operating a train with a brake system that includes
dynamic brakes shall adopt and comply with specific knowledge, skill,
and ability criteria to ensure that its locomotive engineers are fully
trained in the operating rules prescribed by paragraph (j) of this
section. The railroad shall incorporate such criteria into its
locomotive engineer certification program pursuant to Part 240 of this
chapter,

Sec. 232.111  Train handling information.

    (a) A railroad shall adopt and comply with written procedures to
ensure that a train crew employed by the railroad is given accurate
information on the condition of the train brake system and train
factors affecting brake system performance and testing when the crew
takes over responsibility for the train. The information required by
this paragraph may be provided to the locomotive engineer by any means
determined appropriate by the railroad; however, a written or
electronic record of the information shall be maintained in the cab of
the controlling locomotive.
    (b) The procedures shall require that each train crew taking charge
of a train be informed of:
    (1) The total weight and length of the train, based on the best
information available to the railroad;
    (2) Any special weight distribution that would require special
train handling procedures;
    (3) The number and location of cars with cut-out or otherwise
inoperative brakes and the location where they will be repaired;
    (4) If a Class I or Class IA brake test is required prior to the
next crew change point, the location at which that test shall be
performed; and
    (5) Any train brake system problems encountered by the previous
crew of the train.

Subpart C--Inspection and Testing Requirements

Sec. 232.201  Scope.

    This subpart contains the inspection and testing requirements for
brake systems used in freight and other non-passenger trains. This
subpart also contains general training requirements for railroad and
contract personnel used to perform the required inspections and tests.

Sec. 232.203  Training requirements.

    (a) Each railroad and each contractor shall adopt and comply with a
training, qualification, and designation program for its employees that
perform brake system inspections, tests, or maintenance. For purposes
of this section, a ``contractor'' is defined as a person under contract
with the railroad or car owner. The records required by this section
may be maintained either electronically or in writing.
    (b) As part of this program, the railroad or contractor shall:
    (1) Identify the tasks related to the inspection, testing, and
maintenance of the brake system required by this part that must be
performed by the railroad or contractor and identify the skills and
knowledge necessary to perform each task.
    (2) Develop or incorporate a training curriculum that includes both
classroom and ``hands-on'' lessons designed to impart the skills and
knowledge identified as necessary to perform each task. The developed
or incorporated training curriculum shall specifically address the
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part that are related
to the performance of the tasks identified.
    (3) Require all employees to successfully complete a training
curriculum that covers the skills and knowledge the employee will need
to possess in order to perform the tasks required by this part that the
employee will be responsible for performing, including the specific
Federal regulatory requirements contained in this part related to the
performance of a task for which the employee will be responsible;
    (4) Require all employees to pass a written or oral examination
covering the skills and knowledge the employee will need to possess in
order to perform the tasks required by this part that the employee will
be responsible for performing, including the specific Federal
regulatory requirements contained in this part related to the
performance of a task for which the employee will be responsible for
performing;
    (5) Require all employees to individually demonstrate ``hands-on''
capability by successfully applying the skills and knowledge the
employee will need to possess in order to perform the tasks required by
this part that the employee will be responsible for performing to the
satisfaction of the employee's supervisor or designated instructor;
    (6) Consider training and testing, including efficiency testing,
previously received by an employee in order to meet the requirements
contained in paragraphs (b)(3) through (b)(5) of this section;
provided, such training and testing can be documented as required in
paragraph (e) of this section;
    (7) Require supervisors to exercise oversight to ensure that all
the identified tasks are performed in accordance with the railroad's
written procedures and the specific Federal regulatory requirements
contained in this part;
    (8) Require periodic refresher training at an interval not to
exceed three years that includes classroom and ``hands-on'' training,
as well as testing. Efficiency testing may be used to meet the ``hands-
on'' portion of this requirement; provided, such testing is documented
as required in paragraph (e) of this section; and
    (9) Add new brake systems to the training, qualification and
designation program prior to its introduction to revenue service.
    (c) A railroad that operates trains required to be equipped with a
two-way

[[Page 4202]]

end-of-train telemetry device pursuant to Subpart E of this part, and
each contractor that maintains such devices shall adopt and comply with
a training program which specifically addresses the testing, operation,
and maintenance of two-way end-of-train devices for employees who are
responsible for the testing, operation, and maintenance of the devices.
    (d) A railroad that operates trains under conditions that require
the setting of air brake pressure retaining valves shall adopt and
comply with a training program which specifically addresses the proper
use of retainers for employees who are responsible for using or setting
retainers.
    (e) A railroad or contractor shall maintain adequate records to
demonstrate the current qualification status of all of its personnel
assigned to inspect, test, or maintain a train brake system. The
records required by this paragraph may be maintained either
electronically or in writing and shall be provided to FRA upon request.
These records shall include the following information concerning each
such employee:
    (1) The name of the employee;
    (2) The dates that each training course was completed;
    (3) The content of each training course successfully completed;
    (4) The employee's scores on each test taken to demonstrate
proficiency;
    (5) A description of the employee's ``hands-on'' performance
applying the skills and knowledge the employee needs to possess in
order to perform the tasks required by this part that the employee will
be responsible for performing and the basis for finding that the skills
and knowledge were successfully demonstrated;
    (6) A record that the employee was notified of his or her current
qualification status and of any subsequent changes to that status;
    (7) The tasks required to be performed under this part which the
employee is deemed qualified to perform; and
    (8) Identification of the person(s) determining that the employee
has successfully completed the training necessary to be considered
qualified to perform the tasks identified in paragraph (e)(7) of this
section.
    (9) The date that the employee's status as qualified to perform the
tasks identified in paragraph (e)(7) of this section expires due to the
need for refresher training.
    (f) A railroad or contractor shall adopt and comply with a plan to
periodically assess the effectiveness of its training program. One
method of validation and assessment could be through the use of
efficiency tests or periodic review of employee performance.

Sec. 232.205  Class I brake test-initial terminal inspection.

    (a) Each train and each car in the train shall receive a Class I
brake test as described in paragraph (b) of this section by a qualified
person, as defined in Sec. 232.5, at the following points:
    (1) The location where the train is originally assembled (``initial
terminal'');
    (2) A location where the train consist is changed other than by:
    (i) Adding a single car or a solid block of cars;
    (ii) Removing a single car or a solid block of cars;
    (iii) Removing cars determined to be defective under this chapter;
or
    (iv) A combination of the changes listed in paragraphs (a)(2)(i)
through (a)(2)(iii) of this section (See Secs. 232.209 and 232.211 for
requirements related to the pick-up of cars and solid blocks of cars en
route.);
    (3) A location where the train is off air for a period of more than
four hours;
    (4) A location where a unit or cycle train has traveled 3,000 miles
since its last Class I brake test; and
    (5) A location where the train is received in interchange if the
train consist is changed other than by:
    (i) Removing a car or a solid block of cars from the train;
    (ii) Adding a previously tested car or a previously tested solid
block of cars to the train;
    (iii) Changing motive power;
    (iv) Removing or changing the caboose; or
    (v) Any combination of the changes listed in paragraphs (a)(5) of
this section.
    (A) If changes other than those contained in paragraph (a)(5)(i)-
(a)(5)(v) of this section are made to the train consist when it is
received in interchange and the train will move 20 miles or less, then
the railroad may conduct a brake test pursuant to Sec. 232.209 on those
cars added to the train.
    (B) Reserved.
    (b) A Class I brake test of a train shall consist of the following
tasks and requirements:
    (1) Brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air
flow shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (i) Leakage Test. The brake pipe leakage test shall be conducted as
follows:
    (A) Charge the air brake system to the pressure at which the train
will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the train shall be
within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be operated, but
not less than 75 psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train
device at the rear end of train;
    (B) Upon receiving the signal to apply brakes for test, make a 20-
psi brake pipe service reduction;
    (C) If the locomotive used to perform the leakage test is equipped
with a means for maintaining brake pipe pressure at a constant level
during a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction, this feature shall be cut
out during the leakage test; and
    (D) With the brake valve lapped and the pressure maintaining
feature cut out (if so equipped) and after waiting 45-60 seconds, note
the brake pipe leakage as indicated by the brake-pipe gauge in the
locomotive, which shall not exceed 5 psi per minute.
    (ii) Air Flow Method Test. When a locomotive is equipped with a 26-
L brake valve or equivalent pressure maintaining locomotive brake
valve, a railroad may use the Air Flow Method Test as an alternate to
the brake pipe leakage test. The Air Flow Method (AFM) Test shall be
performed as follows:
    (A) Charge the air brake system to the pressure at which the train
will be operated, and the pressure at the rear of the train shall be
within 15 psi of the pressure at which the train will be operated, but
not less than 75 psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train
device at the rear end of train; and
    (B) Measure air flow as indicated by a calibrated AFM indicator,
which shall not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (iii) The AFM indicator shall be calibrated for accuracy at
periodic intervals not to exceed 92 days. The AFM indicator calibration
test orifices shall be calibrated at temperatures of not less than 20
degrees Fahrenheit. AFM indicators shall be accurate to within
 3 standard cubic feet per minute (CFM).
    (2) The inspector shall position himself/herself, taking positions
on each side of each car sometime during the inspection process, so as
to be able to examine and observe the functioning of all moving parts
of the brake system on each car in order to make the determinations and
inspections required by this section. A ``roll-by'' inspection of the
brake release as provided for in paragraph (b)(8) of this section shall
not constitute an inspection of that side of the train for purposes of
this requirement;
    (3) The train brake system shall be charged to the pressure at
which the

[[Continued on page 4203]] 

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