Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch

Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.

[Federal Register: July 30, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 146)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 49455-49521]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr30jy02-26]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 413, 415, and 417
[Docket No. FAA-2000-7953; Notice No. 02-12]
RIN 2120-AG37

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is amending an
earlier proposal to amend the commercial space transportation
regulations governing licensing and safety requirements for launch. The
FAA takes this action to propose certain changes, respond to comments
on the earlier proposal, and clarify assumptions underlying the costs
analysis associated with the original proposal. The intended effect of
this action is to allay commenters' concerns that the costs of
launching from a federal launch range will increase as a result of this
rulemaking.

DATES: Send your comments on or before October 28, 2002. The FAA will
host a public meeting in Washington, DC at 800 Independence Avenue,
SW., on September 6, 2002 from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You may also submit and review comments
through the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical information: Michael
Dook, (202) 385-4707. For legal information: Laura Montgomery, (202)
267-3150. If you would like to present a statement at the public
meeting, or if you have questions about the logistics of the meeting,
contact Brenda Parker, (202) 385-4713 before August 23, 2002.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Comments Invited
II. Background
III. Changes to October 2000 Proposal
A. Grandfathering
B. Risk Limit for Each Hazard
C. Debris Thresholds for Use in Flight Safety Analysis
IV. Issues of Concern to Commenters
A. Authority and Need for Rulemaking
B. Cost Impacts on Licensed Launches from Federal Launch Ranges
C. FAA and Air Force Process for Relief from Common Launch
Safety Requirements
V. Section-by-Section Analysis of the SNPRM
VI. Procedural Matters

I. Comments Invited

You may participate in this rulemaking by submitting written data,
views, or arguments. We also invite comments relating to the
environmental, energy, federalism, or economic impact that might result
from adopting the proposals in this document. Substantive comments
should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the
regulatory docket number and be submitted in duplicate to the DOT Rules
Docket address specified above.
You may also present comments at the public meeting. The FAA will
prepare an agenda of speakers, which will be available at the meeting.
If we receive your request after the date specified above, your name
may not appear on the written agenda. To accommodate as many speakers
as possible, the amount of time allocated to each speaker may be less
than the amount of time requested. Persons requiring audiovisual
equipment should notify the FAA when requesting to be placed on the
agenda.
All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed
rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. You may review the public
docket containing comments to these proposed regulations in person in
the Dockets Office between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. The DOT Rules Dockets Office is on the
plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department of Transportation
at the above address. We will consider all comments received on or
before the closing date before taking action on this proposed
rulemaking. Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent
practicable, and consistent with statutory deadlines. The proposals in
this document may be changed in light of the comments received.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed,
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-2000-7953.'' The postcard will be
date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Public Meeting Procedures

The FAA will present a description of the SNPRM at the public
meeting. The FAA will use the following procedures to facilitate the
meeting:
(1) The meeting is designed to give interested parties an overview
of the contents of the SNPRM to facilitate the public comment process.
Therefore, the meeting will be informal and non-adversarial. No
individual will be subject to cross-examination by any other
participant; however, FAA representatives may ask questions to clarify
a statement and to ensure a complete and accurate record. Participants
will also have the opportunity to ask questions about the SNPRM.
(2) There will be no admission fee or other charge to attend or to
participate in the meeting. The meeting will be open to all persons who
are scheduled to present statements or who register between 8:30 a.m.
and 9 a.m. on the day of the meeting. While we will make every effort
to accommodate all persons wishing to participate, admission will be
subject to availability of space in the meeting room. The meeting may
adjourn early if scheduled speakers complete their statements in less
time than is scheduled for the meeting.
(3) Speakers may be limited to a 10-minute statement. If possible,
we will notify speakers if additional time is available.
(4) We will try to accommodate all speakers. If the available time
does not permit this, we will generally schedule speakers on a first-
come-first-served basis. However, we reserve the right to exclude some
speakers if necessary to present a balance of viewpoints and issues.
(5) Sign and oral interpretation can be available at the meeting,
as well as an assistive listening device, if requested at least 10
calendar days before the meeting.
(6) Representatives of the FAA will chair the meeting. A panel of
FAA personnel involved in this proposal will be present.
(7) We will make a transcript of the meeting using a court
reporter. We will include in the public docket a transcript of the
meeting and any material accepted by the FAA representatives during the
meeting. Any person who is interested in buying a copy of the
transcript should contact the court reporter directly. Additional
transcript purchase information will be available at the meeting.
(8) The FAA will review and consider all material presented by
participants at the meeting. Position papers or material presenting
views or arguments related to the SNPRM may be accepted at the
discretion of the presiding officer and subsequently placed in the
public

[[Page 49457]]

docket. We request that persons participating in the meeting provide
six copies of all materials presented for distribution to the FAA
representatives. You may provide other copies to the audience at your
discretion.
(9) Statements made by FAA representatives are intended to
facilitate discussion of the issues or to clarify issues. Any statement
made during the meeting by an FAA representative is not intended to be,
and should not be construed as, an official position of the FAA.

Availability of SNPRM

You can get an electronic copy of this SNPRM using the Internet
through the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm
or the Government Printing Office's web page at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this SNPRM.

II. Background

Under existing regulations, the FAA evaluates, on an individual
basis, a launch operator seeking an FAA license to launch from a non-
federal launch site. A non-federal launch site is not located at a
federal launch range. We issue a safety approval when we determine that
the launch demonstrates an equivalent level of safety to that provided
by a launch from a federal launch range. See 14 CFR part 415, subpart F
for more details. For a licensed launch operator launching from a
federal launch range, 14 CFR part 415, subpart C applies. For launch
from a federal launch range, the FAA issues a safety approval if an
applicant satisfies subpart C and has contracted with a federal launch
range for safety-related launch services and property whose provision
and use are within the experience of the federal launch range. 14 CFR
415.31.
On October 25, 2000, the FAA proposed licensing and safety
requirements for the conduct of a launch. Licensing and Safety
Requirements for Launch; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 FR 63921
(Oct. 25, 2000) (``October 2000 NPRM'' or ``NPRM''). The FAA proposed
requirements for obtaining a license for a launch from a non-federal
launch site. The proposed requirements for obtaining a license would
not, however, apply to any launch from a non-federal launch site where
a federal launch range performed the safety functions. For this type of
launch, the licensing requirements of 14 CFR part 415, subpart C apply.
The FAA proposes no revisions to subpart C of part 415.
The October 2000 NPRM also proposed to codify the safety
requirements that a launch operator must satisfy to protect the public
from the hazards of launch. The safety requirements would apply to all
licensed launches of expendable launch vehicles, whether from a federal
launch range or a non-federal launch site.
The FAA received comments to the original proposal on April 23,
2001.\1\ Comments on the October 2000 NPRM generally fall into three
categories: comments that caused the FAA to propose changes to the NPRM
here; comments that did not cause changes, but did cause the FAA to
address commenters' concerns in this preamble; and comments that the
FAA is still considering and will address in the final rule. The next
two sections of this preamble address the first two categories of
comments. Interested readers should also see the section-by-section
analysis portion later in this preamble for a description of the
specific changes. The changes to the October 2000 NPRM proposed in this
SNPRM include addressing how and when the proposed regulations would
apply to pre-existing launch systems, changes to the measure of
acceptable risk, and changes to the debris thresholds that would be
used in flight safety analysis. The FAA is, through this supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking (``SNPRM''), also revising and
reorganizing its proposed regulations regarding flight safety analysis.
The FAA is still reviewing and considering the many technical comments
and suggestions, which will be addressed in the final rule.
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\1\ Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Apr. 13, 2001; The
Boeing Company, Int'l Launch Services, Lockheed Martin Corporation,
Orbital Sciences Corporation, and Sea Launch Company (the ``Joint
Commenters'') in Consolidated Industry Response to FAA NPRM,
Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, October 25, 2000,
Vol.s 1 and 2 (Apr. 23, 2000) (``JC Vol. I'' and ``JC Vol. II'');
Comments, Hugh Q. Cook, (Mar. 13, 2001); Comments to Licensing and
Safety Requirements for Launch; Notice of Proposed rulemaking
October 25, 2000, Kistler Aerospace Corporation, (Apr. 23, 2001);
Letter from Tom Marsh, Lockheed Martin Corporation, (Apr. 6, 2001);
Comments on DOT NPRM Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch,
Docket No. FAA-2000-7953, Lou Gomez, NMOSC (undated); Orbital
Sciences Corporation (Apr. 23, 2001); Sea Launch Company, L.L.C
(Apr. 20, 2001); XCOR Aerospace Comments in Response to FAA Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on Licensing and Safety Requirements for
Launch (undated) (``XCOR Comments''). Under separate cover, a number
of commenters filed cost impact assessments: Boeing Proprietary Cost
Impact Analysis in Response to NPRM on Licensing and Safety
Requirements (Docket No. FAA-2000-7953), (April 20, 2001) (``Boeing
Costs''); Lockheed Martin Cost Impact Analysis (``Lockheed Cost
Estimates'') (proprietary); Orbital NPRM Cost Impact Assessment,
Orbital Sciences Corporation (Apr. 23, 2001)(``Orbital Cost Impact
Assessment'') (proprietary); Sea Launch Company, L.L.C. (Apr. 20,
2001) (``Sea Launch Costs'') (proprietary).
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Since 1998 \2\, the FAA and the Air Force ranges have been working
together to achieve common safety standards that may be universally
applied to licensed and government launches. The FAA anticipates that
for licensed launches that are conducted at federal launch ranges, the
ranges will continue to implement these requirements. As explained in
past rulemakings, the FAA conducts a baseline assessment of the
adequacy of the federal launch ranges to determine whether the FAA may
rely on the safety requirements of the ranges and on their
implementation of those requirements.\3\ The FAA's baseline assessments
document the capabilities, safety program, standards and policies of
each federal launch range. The FAA recognizes, of course, that the
federal launch ranges of the Department of Defense and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration have their own missions separate
from the support of commercial or otherwise licensed launches.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes to codify the ranges' safety requirements
to fulfill, in part, the FAA's own responsibilities for safety.
Codification identifies those requirements upon which the FAA relies
for licensed launch operators to achieve safety, and, in the unlikely

[[Page 49458]]

event that either of the ranges can no longer provide support on a non-
interference basis for commercial launch, ensures that a launch
operator is informed of the safety requirements with which it must
comply. Because the different ranges experience different
meteorological, geographical and population environments, the ranges do
not always implement their requirements in the same manner. The FAA
attempted, in the NPRM, to identify the underlying intent shared by the
ranges' safety requirements, and then presented those principles in the
NPRM, in a more generally applicable and abstract form, which may be
unfamiliar to those accustomed to launching from a particular range.
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\2\ In recognition of the efforts of the FAA and the ranges to
achieve common safety standards, an interagency working group led by
the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National
Security Council of the White House recommended, among other things,
that the FAA and the U.S. Air Force ``continue their cooperative
development of common safety requirements to be applied to
government and commercial launches at federal and non-federal launch
sites.'' White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and
National Security Council, The Future Management and Use of the
Space Launch Bases and Ranges, 38 (Feb. 8, 2000). At the same time,
the working group recommended that the FAA and the U.S. Air Force
formalize their respective responsibilities for the safety of space
launches through a memorandum of agreement. Id. at 39. The report
urged that the federal ranges retain current responsibilities for
the safety of government activities, and retain safety of commercial
flight activities at the Eastern and Western Ranges. On January 16,
2001, the FAA Administrator and the Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force entered into a Memorandum of Agreement Between Department of
the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration on Safety for
Space Transportation and Range Activities. A copy of the MOA is
available on AST's Web site (http://ast.faa.gov).
\3\ See Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Regulations,
64 FR 19586, 19596-97 (Apr. 21, 1999).
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III. Changes to October 2000 Proposal

A. Grandfathering
Although the proposed requirements are derived from existing range
requirements, there are, for any number of different reasons, launch
vehicles and launch operators who would not comply with the
requirements as proposed in the NPRM. For example, in the NPRM, the FAA
noted that there might be instances where the ranges had granted
waivers to the requirements of Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range
Safety Requirements (``EWR 127-1''). NPRM, 65 FR 63941. Additionally,
the FAA recognizes that there are launch operators operating under
older versions of EWR 127-1 who would not meet current federal range
standards or, therefore, the proposed FAA requirements. In the NPRM,
the FAA noted that launch operators might experience cost impacts from
bringing their operations into compliance with the proposed
requirements, and requested comments on the FAA's plan not to
``grandfather'' such noncompliances.
The FAA received comments suggesting that, in addition to existing
waivers, other candidates for grandfathering exist. JC Vol. I at 9. The
comments noted that the ranges grandfather sub-systems on launch
vehicles that become non-compliant when the ranges implement new safety
requirements. Additionally, comments called the FAA's attention to the
ranges' ``tailoring'' process, by which a range determines whether a
launch operator's proposed alternative, although not compliant with the
letter of the range requirements, nonetheless meets the intent behind
the requirement. Commenters urged the FAA to accept existing tailoring
agreements. For all these scenarios, including waivers, tailoring and
existing range grandfathering arrangements, launch operators urged that
the FAA ``grandfather'' current launch systems. Launch operators urged
cost and range practice as the reasons for grandfathering. The FAA is
considering adopting some of the suggestions contained in the comments
to this rulemaking, but requests additional comment and information in
light of the considerations discussed below.
1. Applicability and Effective Dates of Requirements
Commenting launch operators requested that the FAA provide more
detail regarding how and whether grandfathering would work. The FAA
specifies an effective date for each rule promulgated. There are a
number of options for determining an effective date. A rule might
apply, for example, to all launches that took place after a certain
date, regardless of when the launch vehicle was designed or built.
Usually, for such a decision an agency would provide a fairly lengthy
lead-time. Alternatively, a rule might apply to all launch vehicle
components manufactured after a certain date. Again, a lengthy lead-
time might be necessary to allow a licensee to incorporate any changes
into its design and subsequently manufactured hardware. Finally, in
accordance with Department of Transportation and FAA usage, the FAA's
proposed regulatory requirements will not employ the term
``grandfather,'' but will, instead, describe how and when part 417
would or would not apply.
For a meets intent certification or noncompliance to qualify under
the FAA's proposed version of grandfathering, the federal range
approval of such relief from a safety requirement would have to exist
as of the effective date of proposed part 417. The FAA intends to allow
sufficient time between the issuance of the final rule and the date
that part 417 would become effective for federal ranges to make
decisions on pending requests for relief that might be in work at the
time a final FAA rule is issued. For launches from Air Force ranges,
the Air Force and the FAA intend to have the joint relief process,
discussed in section IV.C of this supplemental notice, in place prior
to the effective date of part 417. This will allow for a smooth
transition from pre-existing Air Force relief approvals that would
qualify for the FAA's proposed version of grandfathering, to the joint
process that will be used to resolve future requests for relief from
launch safety requirements.
2. Range Approach to Implementing new Safety Requirements
At the Air Force's launch ranges, EWR 127-1 governs. The Air
Force's range safety organizations periodically update these
requirements, and determine the extent to which those updates will
affect existing launch vehicles and systems. Commenting launch
operators noted that ``the existence of such new requirements does not
necessarily make an existing system unsafe or expose the public to
greater safety risks.'' JC Vol. I at 9. EWR 127-1 recognizes this, and
grandfathers and maintains the approvals of previously approved systems
unless the Chief of Safety or the launch operator determines one of the
following:
a. Existing programs make major modifications or include the use of
currently approved components, systems, or subsystems in new
application (through tailoring if desire[d]) Exception: Previously
approved existing components, systems, or sub-systems that do not
increase the risks, do not degrade safety, or can survive new
environments [that] are equivalent to or lower [less severe] than the
originally approved qualification levels shall be honored and do not
have to meet new requirements [do not have to be upgraded] as long as
data and analyses show that the criteria have been met.
b. The Range User has determined that it is economically and
technically feasible to incorporate new requirements into the system.
c. The system has been or will be modified to the extent safety
approvals no longer apply. Note: Risk and hazard analyses developed
jointly by Range Safety and the Range User shall be used to determine
applicability of the safety approvals.
d. A previously unforeseen or newly discovered safety hazard exists
that is deemed by either Range Safety or the Range User to be
significant enough to warrant the change.
e. The system does not meet the requirements existing when the
system was originally accepted. Note: This category includes systems
that were previously approved, but when obtaining the approval, the
noncompliances to the original requirement were not identified.
f. A system or procedure is modified and a new requirement reveals
that a significant risk exists.
g. Accident and incident investigations and reports may dictate
compliance with the document.

EWR 127-1, Appendix 1C, 1C.1.4, 1-35 (Dec. 31, 1999).

[[Page 49459]]

As review of the above range exceptions shows, a host of
possibilities may trigger a requirement for a launch operator to change
its launch vehicle or systems to conform to the latest safety
requirements. These possibilities may be divided into two general
conditions: where a launch operator is implementing other changes to
its launch vehicle, and where the safety considerations are so
overriding that a change is required. Accordingly, although
grandfathering may be automatic under the range regime, grandfathering
is not unlimited.
The issue of grandfathering highlights how the Air Force has
successfully dealt with the issue of providing for appropriate public
safety while taking into consideration the issues of cost, schedule,
and mission assurance. The FAA recognizes that there are parallels that
can be drawn between the Air Force's approach to ensuring public
safety, including the use of grandfathering, and the FAA's regulatory
focus on ensuring public safety without placing undue burden on the
launch industry. Since publishing the NPRM, the FAA has considered
further the Air Force's approach to grandfathering and how the Air
Force has successfully implemented its grandfathering policies to
ensure public safety without placing undue burden on the launch
industry. Upon the urging of the commenters, the FAA proposes to adopt
a similar approach to determining when non-compliance with a particular
requirement may be permitted to continue.
3. Applicability of Proposed Requirements to Pre-Existing Range Meets
Intent Certifications
Under this SNPRM, proposed section 417.1(b) would permit a launch
operator not to have to demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to
the FAA for certain range ``meets intent'' determinations if the launch
operator was licensed by the FAA and launched from a federal range. In
the NPRM the FAA, while proposing not to grandfather noncompliances
with the proposed requirements, was silent with respect to how it would
treat meets intent certifications. This meant that all launch operators
would be required to satisfy all the FAA's proposed launch safety
requirements once those requirements went into effect. To satisfy a
requirement, a launch operator would have to meet the requirement as
stated in the FAA's proposed regulations or demonstrate that an
alternative approach provided an equivalent level of safety. For
existing launch vehicles operating from federal ranges, the federal
range safety organizations have granted ``meets intent certifications''
for substitutes preferred by the launch operators to some of the
current range safety requirements. Because the current federal range
safety requirements provide the basis for the FAA's proposed
requirements, any grant by a federal launch range of a meets intent
certification creates the possibility that the launch operator would
not necessarily comply in a literal sense with a proposed FAA
requirement.
The federal ranges have granted meets intent certifications when
they found that a launch operator's proposed approach, although
literally non-compliant with a requirement, complied with the overall
intent of the requirement. To obtain meets intent approval from a
federal range, a launch operator's proposed substitute has to maintain
an equivalent level of safety despite not meeting the exact
requirement. EWR 127-1 at 1-vii (Dec. 31, 1999). For all intents and
purposes, a range safety meets intent certification constitutes one
form of the FAA's equivalent level of safety. Additionally, a federal
range's tailoring of launch safety requirements for specific launch
vehicle programs often includes meets intent certifications that apply
to a launch vehicle program on a permanent basis.
The FAA now proposes through section 417.1(b) that a launch
operator would not need to demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to
the FAA for satisfying an FAA requirement for a licensed launch from a
federal range, if two conditions were met. The first condition would be
that the launch operator would have to have a license from the FAA to
launch from the federal launch range and the license would have to be
in effect as of the effective date of part 417. This is reasonable
because, to date, through its baseline assessments, the FAA has relied
on the federal range determinations that a particular substitute to a
range requirement met the intent of that same requirement. In the
context of meets intent certifications, the FAA sees no need to revisit
or second-guess that past reliance. Under this SNPRM, the possessor of
``meets intent certification'' could continue to rely on the range's
determination, where a future or different licensee could not.
Additionally, even the same licensee would not be able to rely on a
pre-existing meets intent certification for any other vehicle or
application other than the one for which it was originally granted.
Thus, the second condition would be for the launch operator to have
a written pre-existing ``meets intent certification'' for the
requirement from the federal launch range from which the launch will
take place, or a substitute that the same range approved during
tailoring of the range safety requirements for that launch operator.
This proposal is consistent with the ranges' own approach to
``grandfathering.'' Under current practice, range grandfathering
applies only at one launch site. See Appendix 1C, 1C.1.4 a (permitting
grandfathering unless a currently approved component, system or
subsystem is to be used in a ``new application''). If a launch operator
has launched a vehicle from one range and proposes to launch from a
different range, the other range will review the substitution for
acceptability.
Review due to a change in launch site is necessary because
different conditions at different launch sites may dictate different
decisions. If, for example, not performing an environmental test is
acceptable at one range, different environments at a different launch
site may require that the test be conducted. Environmental factors such
as salt, fog and temperature may vary from site to site, as may the
potential for extreme environments, such as earthquakes on the west
coast and hurricanes on the east coast, thus changing the need for and
requirements governing component testing. Similarly, with a change in
trajectory profile brought about by launching from a different site,
vibrations could occur at different times of flight. The ranges see a
need to address and consider these changes and determine whether a
substitution acceptable at one launch site is acceptable at another.
The FAA agrees with this reasoning and proposes to maintain this
practice.
Under this SNPRM, the ``meets intent certification'' would have to
exist as of the effective date of part 417 and the duration of the
``meets intent certification'' would have to include the licensed
launch in question. If a pre-existing meets intent certification did
not apply to a future licensed launch, the launch operator would have
to demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to the FAA. For example,
the ranges have granted some launch operators meets intent
certifications that allowed them to fly without a flight termination
system on an upper stage of their launch vehicles. Such range approvals
are highly dependent on launch specific conditions and do not
necessarily apply outside of certain launch azimuths. The FAA
recognizes, however, that even for a meets intent certification granted
only for a specific launch there may be a possibility that

[[Page 49460]]

the reasons that merited grant of a meets intent certification will
apply again and the FAA will be able to find an equivalent level of
safety. However, just as the ranges reserve the right to make that
determination for a different set of circumstances, so, too, will the
FAA. For future FAA-licensed launches from federal ranges, launch
specific decisions such as these will be handled through a coordinated
FAA and federal range review process as discussed in section IV.C of
this SNPRM.
4. Pre-existing Range Waivers and Non-Compliances That Satisfy Range
Grandfathering Practices
Under proposed section 417.1(b)(1) of this SNPRM, the FAA would not
apply a requirement of proposed part 417 to a licensed launch if the
launch operator is currently licensed by the FAA to launch from a
federal range, and if the range has either previously approved a waiver
for the requirement or if the noncompliance is in accordance with
federal range ``grandfathering'' practices. Unlike a meets intent
certification where a launch operator satisfies a requirement through
an alternative that provides an equivalent level of safety, a launch
operator at a federal range might not satisfy a current range safety
requirement and, therefore, would not satisfy one of the FAA's proposed
launch safety requirements. A federal range may have approved such non-
compliances as specific waivers or the non-compliance may have resulted
from the launch vehicle program being initiated under an earlier
version of the range safety requirements and being subject to Air Force
grandfathering policies.
In the NPRM the FAA proposed not to grandfather non-compliances,
but requested public comments on the issue. Upon consideration of input
from industry and the federal range safety organizations, the FAA now
believes that it would be appropriate to provide a form of
grandfathering that is nearly identical to the Air Force's
grandfathering policy. The FAA's version of grandfathering, namely,
partially limiting the reach of its requirements, would apply to
federal range waivers and other noncompliances that have been
grandfathered by a federal range. Since the NPRM was published, the FAA
has considered further how grandfathering is implemented in current
practice at the federal ranges, including recognizing that there is a
degree of safety assurance that can be derived from the demonstrated
flight history of an existing vehicle.
The FAA now proposes to permit, with some exceptions, that a
requirement of this part would not apply to a licensed launch from a
federal range, if certain conditions were met. These conditions would
be the same as those the FAA is proposing for pre-existing meets intent
certifications, as discussed above. The first condition would be that
the launch operator would have to have a license from the FAA to launch
from the federal launch range and the license would have to be in
effect as of the effective date of proposed part 417. A launch operator
who had a launch license on the day that part 417 became effective
would satisfy this condition. Although the possessor of the waiver will
be able to rely on the range determination, a future or different
licensee will not. Additionally, the same licensee would not be able to
rely on a pre-existing waiver for any vehicle or application other than
the one for which it was originally granted.
The second condition would be that the launch operator, as of the
effective date of proposed part 417, had, for that requirement, a
written waiver from the federal launch range, or a pre-existing
noncompliance that satisfied the federal launch range grandfathering
criteria. The FAA intends this provision to encompass noncompliances
regardless of the avenue through which they arise. In the first
instance, a range may grant a waiver. In the second, a range may have
approved a launch vehicle or system under requirements in place some
time previously. Although the range requirements may change, a launch
operator is not always required to upgrade the launch vehicle or system
as discussed above. This provision would apply to both forms of pre-
existing non-compliance.
The condition that a range approval be in writing would apply to
range waivers. See EWR 127-1 at 1-38, Appendix IC, IC.2.4 (describing
required range approvals). For a launch vehicle that has been
grandfathered, the range maintains a version of the range safety
requirements that apply to the vehicle. These are the requirements that
are ``tailored for that vehicle.'' For any new safety requirement that
the range determines must apply to an existing launch vehicle, the
range will update the tailored set of range safety requirements.
Just as with the FAA's proposed approach to pre-existing meets
intent certifications, the FAA would condition not applying a
requirement for a licensed launch on an existing non-compliance being
already approved for the licensed launch in question. If the range
approval of a pre-existing non-compliance did not apply to a future
licensed launch, the launch operator would have to meet the requirement
as written or demonstrate an equivalent level of safety to the FAA and
the Air Force in the joint relief process discussed in section IV.C of
this notice. Because waivers are granted for situations where an
equivalent level of safety is not achieved, the FAA considers it even
more important than with pre-existing meets intent certifications that
the FAA review the acceptability of a waiver when there are differences
from the circumstances that warranted grant of the waiver in the first
place. As with the meets intent certification, the FAA recognizes that
the reasons for a waiver may exist again. However, just as the ranges
reserve the right to make that determination for a different set of
circumstances, so, too, will the FAA.
5. Limits to Grandfathering
As discussed previously, range grandfathering is not necessarily
guaranteed under current practice at the federal ranges. Depending on
the criticality of an issue and, given time and opportunity, a federal
launch range will strive to bring a launch operator's vehicle and
operations into compliance with current safety requirements.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes to codify that practice as well in
proposed section 417.1(b)(2).
Like the ranges, even if the launch operator were to satisfy the
conditions of proposed section 417.1(b)(1) for a specific requirement
of proposed part 417, the FAA proposes that a launch operator must
comply with proposed part 417, including by providing a demonstration
of an equivalent level of safety, whenever the launch operator makes
modifications that affect the launch vehicle's operation or safety
characteristics. As with the Air Force's current practice, proposed
Sec. 417.1(b)(2) would require a launch operator to upgrade if the FAA
or the launch operator determined that a previously unforeseen or newly
discovered safety hazard existed that was a source of significant risk
to public safety, or if a federal range previously accepted a
component, system, or subsystem, but did not identify a noncompliance
to an original federal range requirement. In the past, this meant that
a launch operator making a major change to its launch vehicle had to
upgrade the launch vehicle to satisfy current safety requirements. For
example, modifications made to a launch vehicle to allow the use of
strap-on solid rocket boosters where none were originally

[[Page 49461]]

approved would be considered major modifications that could affect the
vehicle's operation and safety characteristics. As a result, many
aspects of the original flight termination system would have to be
upgraded to comply with the most current requirements. This change
would have the effect of codifying the federal launch ranges' current
practice.
The FAA also proposes, as under current practice, that a launch
operator bring its launch vehicle or launch into compliance with a
requirement when it uses the launch vehicle or a component, system, or
subsystem in a new application. A new application may include launching
the vehicle from a new launch site or using a safety component on a
different stage of the vehicle other than the stage for which it was
originally approved.
6. Grandfathering of a Launch Vehicle Program at an Air Force Range
The FAA recognizes that the Air Force and licensed launch operators
at Air Force ranges often consider a launch vehicle program as a whole
grandfathered. The FAA's proposed grandfathering provisions would
govern the applicability of individual safety requirements. As is
current practice in implementing the Air Force's requirements, the
FAA's proposed requirements may be applied to a launch vehicle program
such that all aspects of the existing program are grandfathered without
the need to upgrade to satisfy the safety requirements of proposed part
417. The Air Force and the FAA are involved in an extensive effort to
identify and maintain common launch safety requirements through an
interagency group consisting of both Air Force and FAA personnel,
called the Common Standards Working Group.\4\ The Common Standards
Working Group worked to ensure that the FAA's proposed requirements are
consistent with the Air Force's grandfathering requirements and can be
implemented without duplication of effort. A launch vehicle program
that is fully compliant with the Air Force's grandfathering
requirements could be fully compliant under the FAA's proposed
requirements. This would be possible in the event that all the non-
compliances or meets intent certifications for a particular launch
vehicle satisfied the FAA's proposed criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ The Common Standards Working Group consists of, in addition
to FAA representatives, Air Force representatives from Air Force
Space Command, the Air Force Space and Missile Center, Air Force
Safety Center, safety personnel from both the Eastern and Western
Ranges, and each of their contractors working in support of this
joint effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Risk Limit for Each Hazard

1. Changes to NPRM Proposal
In proposed section 417.107 of the NPRM, the FAA proposed to
aggregate the risks attributable to all mission hazards and set a cap
on the total mission risk of all hazards at an expected average
casualty of 30 x 10^-6. The FAA received comments in
opposition to this proposal from the public, and addressed the concerns
with the other members of the Common Standards Working Group. The
changes proposed here constitute the results of the consensus reached
between the FAA and the U.S. Air Force through the Common Standards
Working Group. In summary, the FAA, with the agreement of the U. S. Air
Force, now proposes through this rulemaking to adopt the current
practice at the 45th Space Wing and to set a cap on the risk presented
by each hazard. Because of the differences in underlying assumptions
and methodologies for assessing the risk of each hazard, the FAA will
not require or consider a limit on the total mission risk created by
all the hazards of launch. For any given launch, the risk attributable
to the whole mission tends to arise out of one hazard. Accordingly, as
a general matter, the FAA still expects the aggregated risk of most
launches to remain near an Ec of 30 x 10^-6.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require that an aggregate of the
hazards created by a particular launch not exceed an Ec of
30 x 10^-6. NPRM, 65 FR 63921, 63981 (proposed section
417.107(b)). This meant that a launch operator would have had to
account for all hazards, including, but not limited to, the risks
associated with debris, toxic releases and far field blast
overpressure. The FAA proposed this limit after consultations with Air
Force safety personnel at the 30th and 45th Space Wings. Both wings
were receptive to this approach because it supported a theoretical goal
of launch risk management, which is to quantify all hazards in a
single, normalized risk measure. As noted in the NPRM, the 30th Space
Wing found that one hazard typically served as the source of the risk
attributable to a mission. NPRM, 65 FR 63921, 63936. Conditions that
are conducive to driving up the risk associated with one hazard usually
make another hazard less significant. Accordingly, representatives of
the 30th Space Wing advised that launch availability would not be
jeopardized at Vandenberg Air Force Base with a total mission risk cap
of 30 x 10^-6. Thus, although the 30th Space Wing advised
that it did not, in practice, set a ceiling for aggregate risk at 30 x
10^-6, launches from Vandenberg could meet the standard.
As discussed in the NPRM, the experience of the 45th Space Wing
differed. The current practice of the Eastern Range, as described in
the NPRM, was to cap two hazards, debris and far field blast
overpressure, at an Ec of less than or equal to 30 x
10^-6. NPRM, 65 FR 63921, 63936. Although the Eastern Range
estimates that it accepts a risk at an Ec of 233 x
10^-6 for the risk attributable to a launch's potential toxic
releases, its analysis does not account for a variety of factors that
may reduce risk but are difficult to quantify. A review of licensed
launches between September 4, 1997, and August 23, 2000, shows that
only two out of 39 licensed launches took place with an Ec
for toxic releases in excess of 30 x 10^-6. Eastern Range
Aggregate Risk Study, RTI Int'l (Oct. 2, 2001). One occurred on May 4,
1999, with an Ec for toxics of 57 x 10^-6 for the
launch of a Delta III. The other occurred on July 10, 1999, with an
Ec for toxics of 114 x 10^-6 for a Delta II launch
vehicle. Because all indications pointed to the ability of Western
Range launches to continue to satisfy an aggregated risk criteria, and
because the Eastern Range stated that most of the higher toxic risk
numbers applied only to federal government launches, such as the
Shuttle and Titan vehicles \5\, both ranges and the FAA agreed to
propose the aggregated mission risk cap in the October 2000 NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ The Air Force advises the FAA that it will accommodate this
discrepancy to the common standards through its own granfathering or
waiver process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA received comments opposed to aggregating mission risk.
Launch operators commenting on the October 2000 NPRM stated they expect
the Ec values from downrange debris risk alone to be close
to or surpass the 30 x 10^-6 criteria with flight azimuths
entailing African or European overflight. JC Vol. I at 8 (emphasis in
original); accord Boeing Cost Impact at 2. The launch operators
therefore believed that a single, collective Ec at the
proposed level would restrict launch availability and cause launch
delays, both of which increase launch costs.\6\
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\6\ The FAA would like to clarify a misunderstanding on the part
of the launch operators commenting about how risk is calculated. In
the Joint Comments, the launch operators argue that ``[t]he fact is,
that the actual public risk can only be realized at one given point
in the launch timeline. If a launch vehicle is terminated during up-
range flight, there is no threat to the down-range public.
Conversely, by the time down-range public is potentially endangered,
the up-range public is clear of risk.'' JC Vol. I at 9. Risk
calculations must assess the risk for the entire launch. When making
risk calculations to determine whether the pubic risk criterion is
satisfied for a launch, risk is not calculated during the launch but
before the flight takes place and accumulated for all stages of
flight. The risk calculation must account for all stages of flight
if it is to be used to determine whether flight should be initiated,
which is the intended use of the public risk criterion. The mutual
exclusivity of failure scenarios has long been recognized and
appropriately accounted for in the risk analyses performed at the
Air Force ranges. When calculating risk, one of the important
variables, namely, the probability of the launch vehicle's failure
(Pf), is proportioned as a failure rate over each phase of flight so
that there is some mathematical accounting for the fact that a
launch vehicle can only fail once during flight.

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[[Page 49462]]

In light of the concerns raised by launch operators, the FAA again
revisited current practice at the ranges through consultations with the
Common Standards Working Group. The working group explored in detail
the philosophies and limits behind current risk assessment approaches
and what was proposed in the NPRM. Air Force current requirements
permit different aggregation practices. See EWR 127-1, 1-41, Appendix
1D, 1D.1b (``The overall risk levels may or may not be an additive
value that includes risks resulting from debris, toxic and blast
overpressure exposures.'' (Emphasis added))(cited in NPRM, 65 FR at
63936). The current practices at each of the two ranges remain as
described in the NPRM. Results of the study conducted in 2001 indicated
that there were only a few commercial launches in the past five years
that would not have satisfied the aggregation criteria. Having explored
a number of alternatives, the FAA now proposes to codify a less
restrictive practice of not aggregating risks as proposed by the Common
Standards Working Group.
Although the Common Standards Working Group agrees that a risk
assessment that determines the total risk due to all hazards associated
with a single launch would be an ideal approach, the group also agrees
that there are a number of reasons not to codify such an approach at
this time. The Common Standards Working group proposes separate risk
criteria for each hazard because it is current practice for the 45th
Space Wing, the range from which the majority of commercial launches
take place, and because it reflects the disparate approaches to and
abilities in modeling the risks of each hazard. Currently, the
differences between the hazards create differences in how to measure
the risks attributable to each of those hazards. A risk measure
accounts for a number of things, including the probability of the
undesired event occurring (usually related to the launch vehicle's
probability of failure), the characteristics of the hazard, and the
characteristics of any exposed populations. At this most general level,
both ranges assess risk to account for each of these factors. When it
comes to addressing each hazard, however, differences arise. Although
the models of the two Air Force ranges tend to account for similar
factors, the input to those models differs at each coast.
Because the FAA and the Air Force intend for their methodologies to
account for the same factors, such as serious injury, population and
the like, the Common Standards Working Group had to review the current
practice underlying the risk assessment for each hazard. That review
demonstrates how difficult it is to normalize among hazards.
Population characteristics are, at the most abstract level, treated
similarly in that the methodologies and models attempt to describe the
location or other attributes of an exposed population in a reasonably
conservative manner. But what constitutes a reasonably conservative
estimate for one hazard may differ for another hazard, which makes
assessing each hazard through a separate inquiry a reasonable exercise.
For example, when assessing the risks posed by far field blast
overpressure, the conservative approach, in the absence of data
detailing true locations, would be to assume all the population is
located inside buildings and thus exposed to the danger of flying
glass. When assessing the risk posed by a release of toxic substances,
on the other hand, the conservative approach would be to assume that at
least a portion of the exposed population was outdoors, thus increasing
the likelihood of harm from the release. The characteristics of a
population relevant to an assessment will also vary depending on the
hazard at issue. For example, age will play a role in whether a person
is harmed by a toxic release: a toxic exposure that fails to injure a
healthy adult may seriously injure an infant or the infirm. Age is a
much less important parameter for penetration injuries due to flying
glass shards. Accordingly, age characteristics may be necessary for one
assessment but not another.
In analyzing how a particular hazard may cause an injury, the
elements of the risk assessments also diverge. Each hazard causes a
different kind and degree of serious injury, so that employing separate
methodologies and models to address each is reasonable for purposes of
analyzing what harms a person. For example, inert debris causes
injuries of penetration, blunt trauma or crushing. Explosive debris may
cause knockdown and blast injuries, including, for example, ``blast
lung,'' gastrointestinal blast injury, damage to the inner ear, and
eardrum rupture. Air blast loading caused by far field blast
overpressure may break windows and pose a threat of laceration to
building occupants or those nearby. Toxic releases may result in damage
to the respiratory system, skin, and eyes.
These different injuries are produced by different causes and the
thresholds and measures for serious injury from each hazard will vary.
For inert debris, risk assessments tend to account for such
characteristics as the mass of the debris, the impact velocity of the
debris, debris orientation or the projected area of the debris or a
combination of any of these characteristics. The threat posed by a
gaseous toxic release is generally characterized by the concentration
levels, described in parts per million, and the duration of exposure.
An assessment of the far field blast overpressure risk will account for
a variety of window characteristics, including window types, fragment
sizes, velocities, distances propelled, or impacts per unit area.
The result of this review is that it is reasonable to perform
separate risk assessments and employ separate criteria because of the
difficulty in normalizing risk across all the different hazards. The
current models for estimating risk used at the Air Force ranges
represent the state of the art. Nonetheless, current techniques still
cannot aggregate the risk across all hazards in a consistent manner
without introducing additional uncertainty. This is due to differences
in how the hazards are modeled and the nature and quantification of the
serious injuries that result from each hazard.
2. Alternatives Considered
The Common Standards Working Group explored a number of
alternatives before settling on the proposal described above. Those
alternatives and their benefits and drawbacks are discussed here. The
Common Standards Working Group sought to identify risk assessment
procedures that would best protect the general public and reflect
current practice without unduly burdening the launch community. In
doing so, the working group considered several options both
individually and in combination. Chief among the concepts considered
were various forms of risk aggregation and risk accumulation.
Aggregation requires the risk assessment to combine and limit the total
risk

[[Page 49463]]

associated with the three main hazard categories. Aggregation would
ensure that a single risk measure capped the combined risk due to the
three main hazard categories. Accumulation combines the risk in the
launch area with risk incurred downrange. The group also considered
options related to increasing the maximum allowable expected casualty
level and imposing different expected casualty limits on new and mature
vehicles.
In addition, the Common Standards Working Group considered a third
option that would have required the same risk assessment as the
original aggregation and accumulation option outlined in the NPRM. The
only difference between the two proposals would have been an increase
in the maximum allowable Ec value under this option.
Aggregating and accumulating with an increased Ec limit
could have prevented the risk assessment from becoming overly
conservative by adjusting the acceptable risk criterion. However, the
main difficulty with this option would have been that choosing a new
expected casualty limit would have been difficult to justify in the
absence of historical data on which to base it. This difficulty could
be mitigated, however, through a focused scientific study dedicated to
logically determining an expected casualty limit. In fact, the
Department of Defense's Range Commander's Council has previously
conducted a similar study that could be used as a baseline for any
future research.
A fourth option would have required a launch operator to aggregate
risks across the three main categories of hazards without accumulating
the flight risks incurred in the launch area with those incurred
downrange. The result would have been two separate casualty expectation
values for each licensed mission. One value would have represented the
aggregate risk in the launch area while the other would have
represented the risk downrange. In a departure from the current
practice as outlined in EWR 127-1, this option would have imposed
individual caps on aggregate risk in both areas but would not have
imposed a total hazard cap on any single launch. This option may have
had less of an impact on launch operators than the NPRM proposal to
aggregate, but would have recognized the different methods used to
calculate launch area hazards compared to downrange hazards. These
differences include variations in the nature of necessary data and the
fidelity of the analyses. Such variations reflect the fact that the
ranges typically are not concerned with toxic releases or distant
focusing of blast overpressure downrange because most or all of the
fuel on board the vehicle would have been consumed en route, or lost on
reentry due to the break up and dispersion of liquid fuels. Also, data
regarding meteorological conditions tends to be unavailable for most
downrange far field blast overpressure concerns. As a result, downrange
risk would consist almost entirely of the debris risk, whereas launch
area risks would also include overpressures and toxic releases.
However, the underlying premise of this option is flawed by the fact
that separating launch area risks from downrange risks is contrary to
pure risk assessment philosophy in that it considers a launch in
discrete parts instead of as a single continuous event. For missions
involving multiple distinct periods of population overflight, assessing
the risk to each region of overflight separately could result in
missions with a very high expected casualty even though the mission met
the risk criteria for each overflight area. In other words, such an
approach would mask the true risk of the whole mission. Another
disadvantage is that, like with other proposals in favor of
aggregation, it might be difficult to define and calculate a consistent
methodology that normalized the effects of each of the hazards. This
particular disadvantage arises from the fact that the same expected
casualty value may reflect two different things when applied to two
different hazard categories. For example, an Ec of 30 x
10^-6 for toxic releases means something different than 30 x
10^-6 for debris because, in most cases, more people would
have to be exposed to a toxic release to inflict the same number of
casualties as a debris impact. Similarly, the potential for fatalities
is much higher for a launch with an Ec of 30 x
10^-6 for debris than an Ec of 30 x
10^-6 for a toxic release due to the nature of the two
different hazards. In other words, with debris hazards, a higher
percentage of the casualties are fatalities than with toxic hazards.
The final and crucial shortcoming of this option is the difficulty in
distinguishing between where the launch area ends and the downrange
segment begins. This question might not be critical for a coastal range
where the physical boundary between land and sea makes for a logical
divider. However, no such physical partition exists for an inland
launch site.
Under a fifth option, a launch operator would have been required to
aggregate overall risks into a single maximum Ec while also
capping the maximum allowable risk associated with any one hazard
category. Since this option would not have required accumulation, a
risk assessment would have required six separate Ec
calculations for each licensed launch. Launch operators would have
needed to calculate an Ec value for each of the three hazard
categories for the launch area and an Ec value for each of
the three hazard categories for the downrange portion of the launch
resulting in a total of six Ec values. This plan would have
required each of the six Ec values to meet the individual
cap while requiring the sum of the six values to meet the total
allowable aggregate Ec value. The major benefit of this
option would have been the ability to recognize the differences between
the three main hazard categories while still capping the maximum
allowable overall risk level. Unfortunately, not accumulating risks
could lead to problems in defining the point in flight where the launch
area ends and the downrange segment begins as discussed under the
previous option.
The risk assessment proposed under a sixth option would have been
very similar to those outlined in the preceding paragraph in that it
would have aggregated overall risks into a single maximum
Ec, as well as capping the risk of each hazard separately;
however, the cap on the maximum allowable risk associated with any one
hazard category would have been on the accumulation of launch area and
downrange risks for each hazard. This option would have effectively
reduced the number of separate expected casualty values from six to
three. This option would not have offered any significant benefit over
the other options considered and involves the shortcomings associated
with aggregation.
Under a seventh option, one set of risk criteria would have been
developed for new vehicles while a separate set would have been
developed for mature vehicles. This option would have allowed the FAA
and the launch operators to recognize the role that operational
experience with a particular launch system plays in reducing the level
of uncertainty involved in calculating the risk associated with
launching a particular vehicle. However, the differences between new
and mature vehicles are already addressed under current practice by
accounting for the demonstrated reliability of different launch
vehicles. Currently, there are no accepted definitions for new and
mature launch vehicles.

[[Page 49464]]

In summary, the FAA proposes to adopt the Common Standards Working
Group determination that, for the reasons discussed above, risk should
be limited by hazard. The FAA would limit the risk permitted for
debris, far field blast overpressure and toxic release to an
Ec of 30 x 10^-6 for each hazard rather than an
Ec of 30 x 10^-6 for a total of all three hazards
as proposed in the NPRM.

C. Debris Thresholds for Use in Flight Safety Analysis

Based on comments received, the FAA is proposing different
thresholds for inert and explosive debris from those proposed in the
October NPRM. The October 2000 NPRM would have required that certain
probability analyses account for debris with a ballistic coefficient of
three or greater. Under 417.107(c) of this SNPRM, the probability
analyses would have to account for debris with a kinetic energy of 11
ft-lbs or greater at impact. For explosive debris, such as solid
propellant fragments that will explode upon impact, the FAA is changing
its proposal from 3.0 psi blast overpressure to blast overpressure of
1.0 psi or greater. The proposed debris thresholds would be applied
when demonstrating that a launch satisfies the risk criteria for
collective and individual risk of casualties to the public and the
criteria for probability of impact for ships and aircraft.
In proposing requirements governing the calculations that are part
of a launch operator's demonstration of compliance with the public risk
criteria, the FAA's intent is to protect against casualties, the
proposed definition in section 417.3 of the NPRM of which is ``death or
serious injury.'' Not all pieces of debris have the potential to be
lethal or cause a person a serious injury. Accordingly, the FAA does
not intend that a probability analysis account for all debris, only
that which has the potential to cause serious injury or death.
In proposed sections 417.225 and 417.227 and appendices A and B of
the NPRM, the FAA proposed a methodology for conducting a debris risk
analysis and analyses for defining hazard areas used to ensure
compliance with the individual risk and ship and aircraft impact
criteria. See NPRM, 65 FR 64017, 14 CFR 417.225 and 227 and appendixes
A and B (proposed). The NPRM proposed that these analyses account for
debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3.0 or more, and the analysis
would have had to account for a 3.0-psi blast overpressure radius and
projected debris effects for all potentially explosive debris. At the
time the NPRM was drafted, the FAA believed that these thresholds were
consistent with the FAA's definition of casualty, but would not be as
conservative as any such thresholds currently used at the federal
ranges. However, Air Force members of the Common Standards Working
Group raised the concern that any analysis that was limited to these
thresholds would not account for significant potential casualties,
particularly serious injuries that could result from launch vehicle
debris. The FAA has come to agree with the Air Force's concern and has
been working with the Air Force as part of the Common Standards Working
Group and have identified appropriate thresholds for debris.
The Common Standards Working Group is continuing to explore what
measures of concern are most appropriate for distinguishing casualty
due to launch vehicle accidents. Improvements in modeling may provide
room for better measures of what inert or explosive debris might cause
a casualty. Recent models suggest that a change in the proposed measure
for inert debris from ballistic coefficient to kinetic energy would be
appropriate. Overpressure remains the most appropriate casualty measure
for explosive debris; however, a change in the pressure level that
presents a hazard would be appropriate. The FAA is proposing new
thresholds that reflect the latest thresholds for inert and explosive
debris that are being considered by the Common Standards Working Group.
The FAA specifically requests comments on the debris thresholds
proposed in this SNPRM, including any proposals for alternative
approaches to estimating casualties.
The FAA is proposing that a launch operator's demonstration of
compliance with the public risk criteria incorporate one of two
approaches when applying the proposed thresholds for inert and
explosive debris. The more sophisticated of the two approaches, and the
one which would result in the more accurate casualty estimate, would
require the use of probabilistic human vulnerability models. These
models account for the probability of casualty to any person exposed to
the threshold levels or greater for inert and explosive debris. The
simpler of the two approaches would count all members of the public
exposed to the threshold levels or greater as casualties. The simpler
approach would result in a relatively conservative casualty estimation,
which may be sufficient for a launch operator, depending on the
specifics of a proposed launch. Any probabilistic casualty model used
for a launch would have to be approved by the FAA during the licensing
process or, if the launch is from a federal range, accepted as part of
the FAA's baseline assessment of the federal launch range, as is
current practice.
Probabilistic human vulnerability models estimate the likelihood of
a casualty as a function of specific parameters that describe the
contact with the hazard. The parameters may include kinetic energy,
kinetic energy per unit area, overpressure, or toxic concentration.
Probabilistic human vulnerability models possess greater fidelity than
analysis approaches that employ simple conservative assumptions, such
as counting every person exposed to the debris thresholds or greater as
a casualty. These models possess greater fidelity because they
typically account for the variability in how debris may harm different
people such as infants, adults or the elderly to account for age, body
weight and physical health. Probabilistic human vulnerability models
also account for the variability associated with different injury
mechanisms such as blunt trauma, crushing and penetration, as well as
the variability of response associated with different parts of the body
and body positions, such as whether a person is standing, sitting or
supine. These models may account for the variability associated with
fragment shape, weight and density and the inherent mathematical
uncertainties associated with any probabilistic analysis. A human
vulnerability model that reasonably accounts for these factors will
produce more accurate casualty estimations than would the use of simple
conservative assumptions. Accordingly, the use of a probabilistic human
vulnerability model may prove to increase launch availability without
jeopardizing public safety.
It must be noted that there are expenses associated with employing
probabilistic human vulnerability models that can be avoided if the
specifics of a proposed launch allow the use of a simple conservative
approach. These models may possess significant development costs,
including the highly specialized and knowledgeable personnel that would
be involved. Such models would typically require more detailed input
data. For example, in addition to knowing the number of people in a
given area, the input to a probabilistic human vulnerability model
could require statistics on the physical characteristics of the people
and whether they are expected to be in the open or sheltered, and if
sheltered, the characteristics of the shelters. A launch operator would
have to weigh the costs associated with developing and using a

[[Page 49465]]

probabilistic human vulnerability model against the potential for
increased launch availability.
Some of the probabilistic human vulnerability models currently used
by the Air Force use the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) of the
Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine to define
casualties, and to distinguish between serious injuries and those of
lesser severity. The AIS is an anatomical scoring system that provides
a means of ranking the severity of an injury and is widely used by
emergency medical personnel. Within the AIS system, injuries are ranked
on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 being a minor injury, 2 moderate, 3
serious, 4 severe, 5 critical, and 6 a non-survivable injury. A scaling
committee monitors the AIS evolution. A review of the current Air Force
models found that they count an injury that qualifies as AIS Level 3,
4, 5, or 6 as a casualty. The Common Standards Working Group has
recommended that any future casualty models used to satisfy Air Force
and FAA requirements incorporate AIS Level 3 or greater as the standard
for distinguishing casualties from injuries of lessor severity. When
using the AIS for the purpose of casualty modeling, any injury that,
due to its severity, qualifies as AIS Level 3, 4, 5, or 6 would be
counted as a casualty. The FAA agrees that the use of AIS Level 3 or
greater is appropriate for describing a medical condition sufficiently
to allow modeling of casualties for purposes of determining whether a
launch satisfies the public risk criteria.
The FAA recognizes that the 45th Space Wing conducts risk
assessment of debris with a kinetic energy of less than 11 ft-lbs for
blunt trauma on occasion, but the FAA does not currently plan to codify
that practice. The circumstances surrounding that approach currently
appear unique to the 45th Space Wing and constitute a response to the
crowds of visitors that the Eastern Range must protect for launches.
Numerous debris pieces with expected impact kinetic energies of less
than 11 ft-lbs may significantly contribute to the risk of a launch
when population density is sufficiently high. Also, the criterion of 11
ft-lbs of expected kinetic energy at impact does not ensure protection
from serious injuries due to potential penetration wounds. For the time
being, however, the FAA will not address this issue. The Common
Standards Working Group considered a proposal for a threshold level
near 40 ft-lb/in \2\ to protect against serious penetration injuries
from inert debris impacts. However, the Common Standards Working Group
needs more time to evaluate an appropriate debris characteristic to
protect against serious penetration injuries. The FAA invites public
comments on this subject.
1. Inert debris
This SNPRM reflects two changes to the debris measure proposed in
the NPRM: a change of the parameter measured to establish the
probability of a casualty due to debris from ballistic coefficient to
kinetic energy and a possible increase in conservatism, depending on
the characteristics of a debris piece, of the threshold from a
ballistic coefficient of three to a kinetic energy of 11 ft-lbs. The
FAA proposed, throughout the NPRM, using ballistic coefficient as a
metric for human vulnerability to estimate risk from inert debris
impacts. Comments received from the Air Force and its contractor, ACTA
Inc., as part of the Common Standards Working Group highlighted the
pitfalls of relying on that metric. These comments have persuaded the
FAA that defining hazardous debris as all pieces with a ballistic
coefficient (often referred to as beta) of three or greater may fail to
adequately protect the public in some cases. The FAA is now changing
its proposal to use kinetic energy as the metric for estimating risk to
the public from inert debris at a threshold level of 11 ft-lbs.
Specifying ballistic coefficient as a criterion ignores many
important factors. The velocity of a debris piece at impact is an
important factor in establishing whether an injury would result, but
the terminal velocity of a debris piece at impact can vary
significantly depending on the altitude at impact and its ballistic
coefficient. Therefore, using ballistic coefficient as a casualty
measure for inert debris would not indicate the velocity of impacting
debris. Additionally, a debris fragment's ballistic coefficient does
not indicate its mass, which is another important factor in
establishing injury potential due to impact. A heavy fragment with a
large area may be lethal, even though its ballistic coefficient is less
than three. Similarly, a light fragment with a small area may be
harmless even though its ballistic coefficient is greater than three.
For example, consider a 30 pound debris piece, such as a rocket motor
case fragment, that behaves like a tumbling plate, with an aerodynamic
reference area of 11 square feet and a subsonic drag coefficient of
0.9. This piece has a ballistic coefficient of about three. The
terminal velocity for this piece is about 50 feet per second, or 34
miles per hour. This piece would have a kinetic energy of about 1,164
ft-lbs at impact. The NPRM asserts that ``a ballistic coefficient of
three correlates approximately to a hazardous debris piece possessing
58 ft-lbs of kinetic energy.'' NPRM, 65 FR 63935. The above example
shows, however, that the kinetic energy of debris with a beta of three
can be significantly greater than 58 foot-pounds. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to consider other factors for determining whether a
fragment would produce a casualty.
Inert launch vehicle debris of concern to the FAA typically
threatens humans primarily from blunt trauma due to nearly vertical
impact. The debris piece's potential to cause a serious injury upon
impact with a person depends primarily on the mass and shape of the
debris and the velocity at which it impacts. Because kinetic energy on
impact accounts for these three factors, the FAA believes it to be the
appropriate metric for gauging the potential for blunt trauma.
Recently published human vulnerability model results examined by
the Common Standards Working Group suggest that for the general public,
a kinetic energy of 11 ft-lbs at impact would be a reasonable threshold
level for any analysis intending to account for virtually all serious
injuries from blunt trauma. When applied as a threshold, 11 ft-lbs
would represent the kinetic energy level for debris that could,
depending on the specifics of an impact with a person, cause a
casualty. As an example, 11 ft-lbs at impact corresponds to a one-
quarter inch thick square aluminum plate with an edge length of about
two inches and a weight of about 1.5 ounces impacting at a velocity of
approximately 60 mph.
One must note that not every impact of debris at 11 ft-lbs or
greater will necessarily result in a casualty. The probability of
casualty due to such an impact is further dependent on a number of
other factors specific to the debris and the impact scenario.
Probabilistic human vulnerability models are often used to account for
these other factors, and an analysis that employs these models will
produce a more realistic casualty estimate than a deterministic
analysis that counts all expected impacts of 11 ft-lbs or greater as
casualties.
The choice of 11 ft-lbs as a threshold also has practical benefits.
The FAA realizes that there is no standard threshold currently in use,
and the human vulnerability models used at the federal ranges today may
vary depending on the launch vehicle and other factors. The Air Force
members of the Common Standards Working Group have indicated that the
models currently used at Air Force ranges satisfy the

[[Page 49466]]

proposed 11-ft-lb threshold. For example, the debris model used for a
Atlas IIAS launch from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station accounts for
inert debris with kinetic energy at impact greater than or equal to 7
ft-lbs. A standard threshold would facilitate the development and
application of more standardized models with associated efficiencies.
For these reasons, the FAA is proposing to use kinetic energy as the
metric for estimating the risk of casualties due to blunt trauma from
inert debris impacts at a threshold level of 11 ft-lbs.
This SNPRM would require any risk analysis for blunt trauma due to
launch vehicle debris to account for all potential debris with 11 ft-
lbs or greater of kinetic energy at impact. The analysis would apply
the relatively sophisticated approach using probabilistic models to
assess the probability of casualty due to any debris with kinetic
energy at impact of 11 ft-lbs or greater, or it could apply a more
simple approach where each expected impact of a person with kinetic
energy of 11 ft-lbs or greater would be counted as a casualty.
2. Explosive Debris
In sections 417.225 and 417.227 of the October 2000 NPRM, the FAA
proposed that a flight safety analysis, a flight hazard area analysis,
and a debris risk analysis had to account for a 3.0-psi blast
overpressure radius or greater and projected debris effects for all
potentially explosive debris. Explosive debris is debris with the
potential to explode upon surface impact. At the time the NPRM was
drafted, the FAA believed that this threshold was consistent with the
FAA's definition of casualty and would not be more conservative than
any such thresholds currently used at the federal ranges. However,
comments received from the Air Force and its contractor, ACTA Inc., as
part of the Common Standards Working Group indicated that there is a
significant potential for casualties at blast pressures below 3.0 psi.
The FAA has reviewed this issue with the Common Standards Working Group
and now proposes to reduce its threshold for explosive debris to 1.0
psi.
Many factors complicate the determination of threshold blast loads
from explosive debris that could cause serious injury. These factors
include the substantial difference in vulnerability of people in the
open and people in buildings, the substantial variability of protection
afforded by various building types, the complex nature of blast wave
propagation through groups of buildings or hilly terrain, the potential
for far field window breakage due to atmospheric focusing of a blast
wave under special conditions, and the general lack of data on
casualty-blast load relationships for occupants of various building
types. In addition to the direct effect that blast overpressure can
have on a person, blast may cause serious injury by breaking glass that
may strike a person, by blowing people down, or by collapsing a
structure with people in or near it.
People in the open are generally less vulnerable to serious injury
from blast loads than occupants of typical buildings, particularly if
ear damage is discounted as a serious injury. However, persons standing
in the open can be seriously injured as a result of being blown-down by
overpressure. Blow-down potential is a function of both blast
overpressure and impulse. For an explosive yield of 10,000 pounds TNT,
the threshold for serious injury due to blow-down for a 70-kg person is
near 1.4 psi.
The FAA recognizes that blast thresholds used currently at federal
ranges may vary depending on the analysis being performed and the
specifics associated with the people and property being protected. The
October 2000 NPRM's proposal to address the risk associated with 3.0-
psi overpressure would have addressed risks only to someone standing
outside in the open, a typical assumption for overflight risk analysis.
The ranges pointed out that this failed to account for risks to persons
in or near a building or other structures. Glass can break at 1.0 psi--
or even less--which means that a person in a building is at risk from
flying glass shards or other secondary hazards and may be more at risk
than a person in the open. The current practice at the ranges accounts
for such secondary hazards of explosive debris. The Department of
Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) approves the siting of buildings
that may be subject to approximately 1 psi over pressure level in the
event of an accident. Additionally, the Air Force launch ranges use 1.0
psi to determine a hit to ships for probability of impact calculations.
Accordingly, the Common Standards Working Group has reviewed the
casualty models and analysis processes used at the Air Force ranges and
concluded that the use of 1.0 psi as a threshold for explosive debris
would be consistent overall with current practice at those ranges and
in the explosive safety community at large.
Although the FAA is proposing overpressure as a threshold
parameter, blast effects on humans, especially building occupants, are
generally sensitive to the positive phase impulse, as well as the peak
overpressure, of a blast load. For example, an explosion with a 50,000-
lb TNT equivalent from a launch accident would produce on the order of
a 1% probability of serious injury for occupants of typical buildings
in the United States located at the 1.0-psi overpressure radius from
the source of the blast. However, a more typical explosion (1000-lb TNT
equivalent) from a launch accident would produce less than a 0.01%
probability of serious injury in the same circumstances. It is
important to note that these estimates account for the probability of
serious injury due to broken glass shards propelled by the blast and
assumes the occupants are equally likely to be anywhere in the
building. The difference in the probability of serious injury in the
two examples is primarily due to the greater impulse of a large
explosion compared to one with a lesser yield. However, the probability
of serious injury in both cases at the 1.0-psi overpressure radius is
relatively small. Most typical impacts of explosive launch vehicle
debris would result in small yields, far below a 50,000-lb TNT
equivalent; therefore using a 1.0-psi peak incident overpressure level
as a threshold in a simple explosive overpressure vulnerability model
would, the FAA believes, capture any overpressure which would cause
serious injury while at the same time account for the role played by
the impulse of the blast as well.
When applying the 1.0-psi threshold, any probability analysis would
have to account for a 1.0-psi blast overpressure radius for all
potentially explosive impacting debris. The analysis may apply a
relatively sophisticated approach that uses probabilistic models to
determine casualty due to any blast overpressures of 1.0-psi or greater
or apply a simpler approach that counts all people within the 1.0-psi
overpressure radius as a casualty. When using the simple approach, the
peak incident overpressure would be computed with the Kingery-Bulmash
relationship, without regard to sheltering, reflections, or atmospheric
effects. For persons located in buildings, the peak incident
overpressure would be computed at the shortest distance between the
building and the blast source. A person would be considered a casualty
when located anywhere in a building subjected to peak incident
overpressure equal to or greater than 1.0 psi.
The FAA anticipates that launch operators launching smaller
vehicles, such as Pegasus Taurus, will be able to take advantage of the
simple approach. Launch operators conducting launches of larger
vehicles would likely resort to use of probabilistic models. The FAA

[[Page 49467]]

requests comments on the proposed debris thresholds and their
application, which allows for both simple and sophisticated analysis
methods. Because the FAA considers the proposed debris thresholds and
their application to be consistent with current practices at the
federal ranges it does not anticipate cost impacts, but requests
comments on this point.

IV. Issues of Concern to Commenters

A. Authority and Need for Rulemaking

Some commenters questioned the FAA's authority to conduct this
rulemaking, and whether it was consistent with Congressional intent.
They also questioned its necessity. The FAA has the authority to
conduct this rulemaking,\7\ and codification of the safety requirements
is necessary. The statute and the legislative history support the
proposed codification of launch safety requirements. The rulemaking is
necessary to identify genuine and universal safety requirements, which
includes identifying and codifying the intent behind existing range
safety requirements. Currently, federal requirements consist of a mix
of safety and mission requirements. Some are available readily to the
public. Others are typically only in the possession of range analysts.
This rulemaking identifies those requirements with which a launch
operator must comply under current practice. The FAA intends that
streamlined performance requirements offer the same high level of
safety and the flexibility of current practice. Finally, the FAA is
concerned that adopting the suggestion to only apply proposed part 417
to non-federal launch sites could result in confusion regarding safety
requirements at the federal ranges. This discussion describes the
reasons for the FAA's position that it has the authority to conduct
this rulemaking, that the rulemaking is consistent with Congressional
intent, and that it is necessary for public safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ Accord JC Vol. I at iii (``the FAA has the flexibility under
the CSLA to develop and issue its own rules''), Lockheed at 2, 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Authority for Rulemaking
The Joint Commenters assert that the FAA's regulation of launch
safety is not statutorily mandated, and is inconsistent with the Act's
``finding that private sector launch and associated services should be
regulated only to the extent necessary to protect, among other things,
the public health and safety.'' JC Vol. I at ii. In support of this
argument, the commenters point to the FAA's authority to accept the
assistance of other executive agencies in carrying out the Act, the Air
Force's comprehensive safety requirements and the safety record
achieved at the ranges. JC Vol. I at ii; Lockheed at 6. Lockheed Martin
and other commenters suggest that the rulemaking is inconsistent with
Congressional intent, as embodied in legislative history, to streamline
the licensing process. JC Vol. I at iii; Lockheed at 6.
Congress found that the FAA should ``only to the extent necessary,
regulate * * * launches, reentries and services to ensure compliance
with international obligations of the United States and to protect the
public health and safety, safety of property, national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States.'' 49 U.S.C. 70101(a)(7).
This rulemaking would identify and codify regulations containing the
standards that protect public safety. Congress also found that the
provision of launch services would be ``facilitated by stable, minimal,
and appropriate regulatory guidelines that are fairly and expeditiously
applied.'' 49 U.S.C. 70101(a)(6).
The commenters acknowledge that the FAA has the authority under 49
U.S.C. 70101-70121 (referred to as ``Chapter 701'' or ``the Act'') to
issue safety regulations. JC Vol. I at iii; accord Lockheed at 2, 5.
Accordingly, the commenters' position that the rulemaking fails to
satisfy the Act appears to be based on the belief that the FAA's
rulemaking may somehow be inconsistent with Congressional intent. As a
preliminary matter, the FAA notes that intent becomes a matter of
significance to statutory interpretation only when the statute itself
is unclear. The Act is not unclear.
Chapter 701 authorizes the Department of Transportation and thus
the FAA, through delegations, to oversee, license and regulate
commercial launch and reentry activities and the operation of launch
and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. citizens or within the United
States. 49 U.S.C. 70103, 70104, 70105. The Act directs the FAA to
exercise this responsibility consistent with public health and safety,
safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105.
2. Congressional Intent
Despite the commenters' claims to the contrary, review of
legislative history shows that the FAA's rulemaking would satisfy
Congressional intent. Review of the commenters' proposed interpretation
of Congressional intent shows that Congress did not attempt to
foreclose this rulemaking. Instead, some of the comments take
legislative history out of context and argue that observations offered
for a different day apply to the current situation. The comments
attempt to portray Congressional intent as opposing a rulemaking--such
as this--that codifies safety requirements. As explained below, the FAA
does not share this interpretation.
Even if intent were an issue, the best expression of Congressional
intent is contained in the language of the Act itself. This meaning may
be discerned by analyzing the design of the statute as a whole. The Act
itself specifically created a civilian regulatory regime for safety.
Congress in 1984 neither foresaw nor forbade the conduct of this
rulemaking. Instead, Congress gave the FAA responsibility for safety
and authority to conduct rulemakings. Where Congress intended to bar
duplication of responsibilities in the Act, it did so explicitly. See,
e.g., 49 U.S.C. 70117(b); S. Rep. No. 98-656, 15 (1984)(explaining that
because regulatory regimes for communications satellites and land
remote sensing satellites already exist, a duplicative process would be
unnecessary). The regulatory regime for launch safety is that of the
FAA. Had Congress viewed the Air Force's safety oversight as sufficient
to require no codification of safety standards, Congress could have
done so as explicitly as it ensured against duplication of the roles of
the Federal Communications Commission and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.\8\ Moreover, Congress could have failed to
vest safety responsibility in the FAA. Congress did neither of these
things.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ That the FAA may seek the assistance of the head of another
executive agency does not accomplish nearly as much as the
commenters suggest. Given the FAA's continued reliance on the
federal launch ranges, now and for the foreseeable future, it is
certainly a statutory provision of which the FAA is aware, but not
one that stands in the way of the FAA identifying safety standards
through rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lockheed Martin separately urges reliance on a Senate report that
accompanied passage of the original Commercial Space Launch Act to
support its claim that this rulemaking runs counter to Congressional
intent. Lockheed at 6. The cited legislative history does not go as far
as Lockheed recommends. Lockheed states, that ``Congress stated
unambiguously that the Act, and implementation of the Act, should
reduce the regulatory burden for commercial launch operators and that
the authority of * * * the

[[Page 49468]]

Secretary* * * to issue additional requirements and regulations must
conform with the Congress' expressed desire to streamline the licensing
process for commercial launch * * *.'' Lockheed at 6. The FAA first
notes that what Lockheed cites in support of its assertion is not the
language of the statute itself, but the regulatory impact statement of
the Senate Report. S. Rep. No. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5328, 5332. More significant, however,
is the fact that Lockheed has added a word, the word ``must,'' to the
cited language, thereby changing the meaning of the statement from one
of description to one of admonition. Accordingly, the Senate report
does not have the meaning that Lockheed would ascribe to it. Instead,
in discussing the new authority conferred upon the Secretary, the
report notes that the Secretary's authority ``to issue additional
requirements and regulations conforms with the Committee's desire to
streamline the commercial launch and launch operations process and to
facilitate compliance with the required regulations.'' Sen. Rep. No.
656 at 5. A better interpretation is that the Committee thought that
the new authority streamlined the existing situation.
Indeed, the situation at that time was a difficult one for a launch
operator. Prior to passage of the Act, a launch operator, for example,
had to obtain an export license under the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations. Sen. Rep. No. 656 at 37. This was why the legislation gave
the Secretary ``exclusive licensing authority'' for commercial launch.
Sen. Rep. No. 656 at 5, 37. The FAA's interpretation is also more
consistent than Lockheed's with the Committee's other statement to the
effect that ``the legislation would provide for a more stable
regulatory environment than that which currently exists.* * *'' Sen.
Rep. No. 656 at 6. The regulatory environment that existed at the time
would have required a launch operator to satisfy the requirements of
numerous federal agencies.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ Contemporaneous and historical accounts describe the
regulatory environment with which a launch operator had to comply as
consisting of 18 federal agencies and 22 federal statutes. Kay,
W.D., ``Space Policy Redefined: The Reagan Administration and the
Commercialization of Space,'' Business and Economic History, 237-247
(Fall 1998); ``Industry Observer,'' Av. Week & Space Technology, 15
(Oct. 22, 1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Likewise, although Lockheed does accurately describe Congressional
encouragement to avoid duplicative and unnecessary regulation,
(Lockheed at 6 (citing Sen. Rep. No. 656 at 3, 19)), the FAA's work
with the Air Force in achieving common standards is designed to attain
that very goal. In summary, the history at the time indicates, and the
actual words used by the Committee demonstrate that Congress intended
to streamline the existing regulatory process, not to argue against the
possible future codification of safety requirements.
3. Necessity for This Rulemaking
Although some commenters assert that this rulemaking is not
necessary to protect public safety, Chapter 701 directs the FAA to
regulate to the extent necessary to protect public safety. The FAA
believes that if a launch operator is to be expected to satisfy safety
requirements, those requirements must be clear, open and published. In
the October 2000 NPRM, the FAA announced that it considered the range
safety requirements necessary because they were the requirements with
which the ranges had achieved their level of safety. The FAA continues
to find that the proposed requirements are necessary to achieving
safety. The following discussion provides the reasons for the FAA's
position.
Launch operators should achieve the same level of safety,
regardless of whether they launch from a federal launch range or a non-
federal launch site. Safety standards should be common between the FAA
and the ranges. Most significantly, the FAA must identify the standards
by which it judges safety; and, having identified those standards, the
FAA must provide full disclosure that those standards apply at both
federal launch ranges and at non-federal launch sites. Not only has the
FAA identified its own proposed standards, in doing so, it has provided
the additional benefit of identifying what the federal launch ranges
themselves in fact require, and the standards they impose on launch
operators through their own internal requirements.
a. Genuine and Universal Safety Requirements
Different federal launch ranges have implemented different
approaches to achieving the same safety goals. The FAA proposes to
codify the intent behind these different requirements where possible.
In the interest of achieving universal applicability, namely,
requirements that can apply regardless of differences in geography,
mission, meteorological conditions and other factors, the FAA worked
with the ranges to identify the underlying intent. Additionally, some
of the range requirements documents require a launch operator to
provide data that the range, in turn, subjects to standards contained
in internal range documents. The internal standards are available upon
request and provide greater insight into the intent behind particular
information or safety requirements. This rulemaking would codify those
as well.
Although, generally, Lockheed Martin maintains that the proposed
requirements are new and different from EWR 127-1, Lockheed Martin
stated that it would object as well to the proposed requirements, even
if it thought that the FAA could succeed in codifying the Air Force
requirements, on the grounds that those requirements are not the
``real, ultimate requirements'' of public safety, which the Air Force
is able to accept through ``tailoring.'' \10\ Lockheed at 3. The FAA's
intent, however, has been to determine what those ``real, ultimate
requirements'' are, so that they may be shared and codified as
performance standards.\11\ For example, the standards governing the
creation of impact limit lines are not contained in EWR 127-1, but may
be found instead in a flight safety analysis handbook, Flight Control
and Analysis General Reference Handbook, RTI Rep. No. RTI/6762/03-02F
(Apr. 24, 1997). This rulemaking attempts to unveil those requirements.
Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act directs that an agency's
requirements be public. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ ``Tailoring,'' as explained by EWR 127-1, permits the
preparation of an individually ``tailored'' requirements document to
ensure that only applicable or alternative equivalent requirements
are levied upon a launch vehicle program.'' EWR 127-1, 1-21, 1.6.3
(Oct. 31, 1997).
\11\ An unintended consequence of translating some of the
details of EWR 127-1 into performance requirements has been to
appear to create new requirements. See, e.g., discussion of
surveillance requirements, IV.B. Additionally, as described in the
NPRM and elsewhere here, the FAA has proposed more detailed
requirements to serve as a roadmap for what the FAA considers
demonstrates satisfaction of those performance requirements, and
against which alternatives might be measured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA's requirements may appear different from EWR 127-1 because
they attempt to capture both the written requirements of EWR 127-1 and
how the ranges have implemented those requirements. The FAA, aware of
the safety expertise resident at the federal launch ranges, consulted
with the ranges and reviewed the ranges' own requirements, as embodied
in the EWR 127-1 and in NASA's Range Safety Manual for Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC)/Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), RSM-93. Range
safety personnel advised the FAA that not all of their requirements
were enforced in a standardized manner because the ranges

[[Page 49469]]

had granted waivers, deviations and ``meets intent certifications'' to
launch operators in response to the requests of the launch operators
for relief. The ranges have also used ``tailoring.'' Typically, this
involves not imposing requirements that do not apply, and rewriting any
requirement where the intent of the requirement is satisfied through
other means. EWR 127-1, Appendix 1A, 1-23 (Dec. 31, 1997).
The FAA is building in similar flexibility by recognizing where the
ranges have been willing to grant relief and incorporating those
determinations into the requirements as proposed through this
rulemaking so that particular non-compliances would no longer require
waivers. For example, the lot acceptance and qualification test
requirements for percussion activated device (PAD) primer charges used
in a flight termination system that were proposed in the FAA's October
2000 NPRM (proposed 14 CFR E417.31) are relaxed in comparison to the
Air Force's current version of EWR 127-1. The NPRM proposes to reduce
the number of units to be tested and to reduce the types of tests to be
conducted. These proposed changes from current Air Force requirements
are based on lessons learned over the past few years and earlier
decisions made by Air Force range safety to waive or tailor such
requirements for existing launch vehicle systems. One launch operator
that currently launches from Air Force ranges, having seen the proposed
PAD requirements in the FAA NPRM has since approached the Air Force
with a request to apply the FAA requirements to its launch vehicle.
These improvements and others identified during the development of the
October 2000 NPRM are now being incorporated into the Air Force's new
Space Command manual that will replace 127-1. Thus, in many ways,
particularly with respect to the particulars of the flight safety
system requirements, the FAA believes that this rulemaking may provide
a more comprehensive and streamlined version of the ranges' own
requirements.
During the discussions between the ranges and the FAA regarding
safety requirements for non-federal launch sites, the FAA attempted to
identify the common underpinnings of the range requirements to achieve
more universal applicability, particularly in the area of flight safety
analysis. Flight safety analyses that the Air Force ranges apply on
each coast are directed toward each coast's geography, meteorological
conditions, and mission profiles. As the FAA worked to make the range
requirements more general so that they might apply wherever a launch
took place, the question arose as to why the safety requirements for
licensed launch operators should differ from site to site. No good
reason was evident. Moreover, with the goal of achieving universal
applicability of as many of the requirements as possible by identifying
the common intent underlying different approaches to similar safety
questions, permitting different standards seemed unnecessary.
In the course of these discussions, the ranges and the FAA saw a
number of benefits to having common standards. Common standards would
provide launch operators certainty in planning. Common standards would
permit a body of expertise to support those standards. In the unlikely
event that the Air Force ever pulled back from its oversight of
commercial activity, a step the Air Force has contemplated within past
years, standards will already be in place for FAA licensed launches
from a federal range. Also, it might be difficult to justify imposing
different standards of safety on licensed launch operators based merely
on whether the launch took place from a non-federal launch site or from
a federal launch range.
In summary, the applicability of part 417 to all licensed launches,
regardless of their launch location is necessary. Universality ensures
a single standard of safety. Publication of the requirements currently
in place permits a launch operator to know and plan for the
requirements with which it must comply. The comments' suggestion that
part 417 only apply to non-federal launch sites is based on a
misperception that the FAA has proposed ``significant changes,'' in the
form of new, more conservative requirements, JC Vol. I at 8, 12, to a
proven process, when, to the contrary, this rulemaking only identifies
and proposes to codify the intent underlying existing requirements in a
performance standard format.\12\ This is not to say that there were no
problems with the regulations proposed in the October 2000 NPRM. The
commenters identified certain areas of the FAA's proposed regulatory
text that might be interpreted as more conservative than current
practice at the federal ranges. This was not the FAA's intent and the
FAA is working to make the appropriate adjustments, some of which are
presented in this SNPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ The presence of design requirements shows what the FAA
proposes to find acceptable. Launch operators should note that the
opportunity to provide a clear and convincing demonstration of an
equivalent level of safety is embedded in each design oriented
requirement. See also NPRM, 65 FR 63940-41 (discussing reasons for
acceptability of Sea Launch's comparable flight safety system).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Identification of Standards and Resulting Application
Commenters' suggestion that the FAA refrain from applying part 417
to launch from a federal launch range does not address the need to
identify safety standards, fails to recognize that this exercise has
identified those standards, and falls prey to the law of unintended
consequences. Having identified its standards, the FAA does not believe
that it would be helpful to claim that they do not apply. The logic of
how the FAA evaluates the acceptability of the federal launch ranges
should alleviate concerns over any seeming duplication between the FAA
and the Air Force. The Joint Commenters proposed that the FAA apply
part 417 only to non-federal launch sites. For the FAA to agree that
part 417 would only apply at non-federal launch sites would, however,
be confusing at best and misleading at worst.
Part 417 would contain the standards by which the FAA would assess
the adequacy of both a licensee and a federal launch range. The FAA
assesses a launch operator through the licensing process and a federal
launch range through a baseline assessment. Because the FAA obtained
the standards in part 417 from the federal launch ranges own standards
and practices, the FAA, of course, anticipates that the federal launch
ranges will satisfy proposed part 417. Nonetheless, whether through
changes in Air Force or NASA policy or because of the failure of a
range safety system, it is conceivable that some element of range
safety might not satisfy the ranges' own current requirements. In fact,
the ranges advise that they may, from time to time, waive requirements
for their own equipment, and a launch operator may remain unaware of
this waiver.
Even if the FAA acquiesced in the commenters' proposal and declared
that part 417 only applied at non-federal launch sites, it would still
have to use some set of standards against which to measure the
continued adequacy of the federal launch ranges whenever the FAA
updated its baseline assessments. Those standards would be found in
part 417. Accordingly, to say that part 417 did not ``apply'' at the
federal launch ranges might confuse some into thinking that part 417
had no applicability whatsoever, even in the baseline assessment
context. Others might believe that the FAA was misleading them
regarding the applicability of part 417 at federal launch ranges given
that the FAA would assess the adequacy of

[[Page 49470]]

the ranges against part 417. The FAA does not consider it advisable to
create such confusion. None of the points raised by the comments
address this fundamental issue, and the FAA invites the public to take
this additional opportunity to present alternatives that take this
consideration into account. It is one that the FAA does not believe it
can ignore, but recognizes that those with a different perspective may
be able to offer insights currently unavailable to the FAA.
Because the range safety requirements are part of how the ranges
have achieved their high level of safety, the FAA considers those
requirements necessary for continuing to achieve that same level of
safety for FAA-licensed launches at both non-federal launch sites and
federal launch ranges. The FAA and the commenters take away different
lessons from the past safety records. Although the Joint Commenters
point to the safety record of the past as justification for not
requiring further regulation, the FAA looks to the safety record of the
past and attributes that successful record, in some measure, to the
launch safety requirements themselves. Accordingly, when the FAA began
its own attempt to codify requirements that would govern launch safety
at non-federal launch sites, it looked first to the ranges' own
requirements and the FAA has continually worked with the Air Force to
ensure that in the future the two agencies' requirements are consistent
and do not conflict.
c. Implementation
Other comments received in response to the NPRM include concerns
about how the FAA would implement the proposed requirements at the
federal launch ranges, whether the FAA would grant waivers as readily
as the ranges, and whether FAA oversight would result in reduced
flexibility, both in meeting the intent rather than the letter of the
requirement and in terms of operational flexibility. Because the Act
directs the FAA to encourage, facilitate and promote private sector
launches, 49 U.S.C. 70103(b), the Joint Commenters indicate that the
FAA should streamline its licensing and regulating regime by continuing
to rely on the ranges for the implementation of launch safety
requirements. JC Vol. I at ii.
One of the reasons the commenters argue that this rulemaking is not
necessary is because they fear that the FAA's identification of the
safety standards would constitute duplication of oversight. This is not
so much a concern regarding the necessity of having safety standards as
a concern with their implementation. The comments recommend that a
single entity be responsible for the safety of licensed launches.
A review of what the FAA proposed in the NPRM should allay these
concerns. Of first and foremost importance, the commenters should note
that the FAA intends no duplication of oversight. The proposed
standards themselves, which were derived from range requirements and
practices, will apply to all licensed launches, regardless of the
location of the launch site. Applicability of standards is different,
however, from duplication of oversight. Oversight means inspection,
monitoring and otherwise checking whether a licensee is in compliance
with the requirements of the Act, the FAA's regulations and its
license. As the FAA noted in the October 2000 NPRM, the FAA does not
now and does not intend through this rulemaking to duplicate the work,
evaluation, inspection and monitoring conducted by the federal launch
ranges. NPRM, 65 FR 63924. The FAA relies on its baseline assessments
of the ranges, and those baseline assessments have found the ranges
safety requirements acceptable. NPRM, 65 FR 63924. Likewise, the FAA
has found acceptable the ranges' implementation of those requirements.
There are situations, however, where the ranges may, for reasons of
their own, change their support for licensed launches. In such a case,
the launch operator would likely have to perform its safety work
itself. Also, as noted, if ``a documented range safety service has
changed significantly or has experienced a recent failure'' the burden
of demonstrating safety at a range shifts to the launch operator. NPRM,
65 FR 63924. The FAA sees little change from current practice in this
regard.
The FAA does not agree that this rulemaking will result in loss of
flexibility. The NPRM would allow for flexibility through the use of
performance requirements, where appropriate. The FAA worked extensively
with federal range safety personnel to develop common launch safety
requirements that refine and adapt many of the current federal range
standards into performance requirements.
For each specific safety issue, the NPRM may contain different
levels of performance requirements as needed to respond to the
complexity of space launch systems and the potential for negative
consequences to public safety. For example, a flight termination system
is one of the most critical systems on a launch vehicle for ensuring
public safety. Hence, to ensure flight termination system reliability
the NPRM contains comprehensive design and test performance
requirements for the systems, components and piece parts. Also, the FAA
does not attempt to mandate requirements related to achieving the
success of the mission, and will permit the launch operator to accept
its own risks on that score, where there is no impact on public safety.
For example, where safety is ensured by the working of the flight
safety system, the NPRM calls for a launch operator to provide for
launch vehicle tracking without specifying detailed requirements to
ensure reliable tracking. Aside from some general performance
requirements, the reliability of the tracking system is left to the
launch operator with the understanding that if all tracking data is
lost during flight the flight termination system will be used to
destroy the vehicle. For a licensed launch from a federal range, the
launch operator typically relies on the range to provide reliable
launch vehicle tracking. The FAA's proposed requirements do not dictate
a change from such practices.
In addition to the use of performance requirements, the FAA
proposes to allow flexibility by permitting a license or a license
modification applicant to demonstrate an equivalent level of safety for
a proposed alternative approach. Although the proposed regulations
would provide the requirements with which a licensee must comply, the
FAA anticipated that a launch operator might wish to employ alternative
means of achieving an equivalent level of safety. In that case, if a
launch operator clearly and convincingly demonstrated an equivalent
level of safety, the FAA would accept the alternative. Once accepted,
an alternative approach would become part of the terms of the license,
and the FAA would consider making the substitute available for the
benefit of others through the advisory circular process or some other
means. The FAA has also demonstrated its flexibility with the licensing
of launches such as those of Sea Launch, where there are a number of
aspects that do not conform to current practice at U.S. launch ranges.
Also, the FAA recognizes that the NPRM represents only a version of
current practice: the safety methods used at the U.S. ranges often
differ from one another. The FAA has worked with the federal range
organizations to develop common launch safety requirements that present
a more generalized description of the current practices at the ranges.
Where there may

[[Page 49471]]

be differences between the methodologies defined in the NPRM and those
used at a federal range, the current practices at the federal ranges
typically do provide an equivalent level of safety to the NPRM.
The Joint Commenters expressed concern that if the NPRM were
implemented as drafted, launch operators on federal ranges would have
to demonstrate compliance with two sets of requirements overseen and
administered by two separate and independent government agencies. The
commenters believe that this would be cumbersome and inevitably would
lead to costly and duplicative safety efforts with no appreciable
increase in public safety. The FAA is continuing to work with the
federal ranges to eliminate these concerns. Under current regulations,
the FAA issues a license to an applicant proposing to launch from a
federal launch range if the applicant satisfies the requirements of
part 415, subpart C, of the licensing regulations and has contracted
with the federal launch range for the provision of safety-related
launch services and property, as long as the safety related launch
services and proposed use of property are within the experience of the
federal launch range. The NPRM does not propose to change this overall
approach. The FAA does not duplicate analyses performed by the federal
launch ranges or routinely review those analyses during the launch
safety review. Instead, the FAA relies on its knowledge of the range
processes as documented in the FAA's baseline assessments. The FAA's
baseline assessments document each federal launch range's capabilities,
safety program, standards and policies. The January 16, 2001 Memorandum
of Agreement between the FAA and the U.S. Air Force explains the roles
and responsibilities of the Air Force and the FAA for overseeing safety
of commercial space launch and reentry.
The Joint Commenters expressed doubt that the Air Force and the FAA
would be able to work together in an efficient way toward a common
goal. The commenters indicated that if the FAA NPRM were implemented,
it would result in competing safety requirements at the Air Force
ranges. These concerns are unfounded. The Air Force and the FAA remain
committed to the partnership outlined in the MOA and to ensuring that
competing safety requirements do not exist. The MOA calls for
developing common launch safety requirements and for coordinating the
common requirements. The Common Standards Working Group is continuing
to participate in developing the FAA's final rule and a revised Air
Force range safety requirements document. The common standards will be
contained in the Code of Federal Regulations and Air Force documents.
FAA rules appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. The Air Force
range safety requirements, which must address a broader range of
issues, will encompass the same common launch safety requirements as
well as other issues unrelated to launch safety. When the final Air
Force and FAA documents are in place, a licensed launch operator at an
Air Force range, in day-to-day practice would only need to work from
the Air Force's range safety document so long as the FAA's launch
safety requirements are contained there as well. This would be no
different from the process in place for licensed launch operators
today. The FAA and the Air Force are also working under the MOA to
develop processes for implementing the common launch safety
requirements together, including coordinated review and disposition of
requests for relief from common requirements, as explained in section
IV.C of this discussion. Although part 417 would contain the legal
requirements with which a licensee must comply, when launching at a
federal range, a licensed launch operator's primary day-to-day
interface would continue to be the federal range. A unified launch
safety community that includes FAA representatives will address any
issues that may arise to ensure that all federal launch range and FAA
licensing concerns are addressed.

B. Cost Impacts on Licensed Launches From Federal Launch Ranges

Comments in response to the October 2000 NPRM indicate that the
launch industry has concerns about how the proposed rule would work,
and how the FAA and the Air Force work together. The concerns have led
to a perception that this rulemaking will result in significantly
increased costs for the launch operators. To address some of these
concerns, the FAA is proposing changes to the October 2000 NPRM in this
SNPRM, as described earlier in this preamble. The FAA also hopes to
clarify some of these issues. Some possible cost impacts identified by
the commenters have led the FAA to revisit whether its proposed
requirements actually captured current practice. The majority of the
concerns underlying the costs the launch operators attribute to this
rulemaking are, however, unfounded. The following discussion explains
why.
1. Commenters believed some of the proposed requirements were new.
Commenters may not be fully familiar with the precise nature of the
safety services the ranges provide, and thus believe that some of the
proposed requirements in the October 2000 NPRM are new, but, in fact,
those requirements are already in place. Similarly, launch operators
believe that a number of the more abstract expressions of different
range requirements are new. Instead, a number of them are the FAA's
proposed attempt to describe the common standards underlying different
approaches taken at different federal launch ranges.
2. The launch operators believe that this rulemaking changes their
legal responsibility for safety. They are, however, already responsible
for safety under the statute and their licenses, and they would not be
required to duplicate the work of the federal ranges as a result of
this rulemaking.
3. Some of the commenters think that the more onerous requirements
governing how to obtain a license apply to federal range launches. The
licensing requirements proposed in this rulemaking, however, would
apply to an applicant obtaining a license to launch from a non-federal
launch site.
4. Commenters expressed concern over a loss of flexibility. These
concerns should be allayed by the FAA's proposal to permit a
demonstration of an equivalent level of safety, the grandfathering
proposal and waiver coordination.
5. Although not a concern raised by the commenters, the FAA
requests comment on the neighboring launch operator issue addressed
below.
All this is not to say that the comments lack merit. There are a
number of instances where the FAA wishes to make changes based upon the
comments received. To determine whether it captures current practice,
the FAA will revisit the issues raised by such comments. Some changes
have already been proposed through this SNPRM, and the FAA requests
views on whether the commenters still assign costs to these
matters.\13\ As one example, commenters attributed an array of costs to
the FAA's original proposal not to grandfather. If the launch operators
satisfy the FAA's proposed conditions, these same launch operators may
be eligible for the FAA's

[[Page 49472]]

version of ``grandfathering'' and need no longer anticipate costs
associated with making changes in their operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\13\ See Boeing Costs at 2, 3, 4 (first and second comments), 9
(first comment), 11 (fifth comment), 12 (first and second comments),
22 (second comment), 23 (fourth comment), 24 (first and sixth
comments), 25 (first and second comments), 27 (second comment), 28
(first comment), 29 (first and third comments), 33 (second and third
comments), 37 (first and third comments), 40 (all comments);
Lockheed Costs Estimates 2, 19 and 26; Orbital Cost Impact
Assessment at 6 (item 2 regarding aggregation, items 4, 5 and 7);
Sea Launch Costs at 23, 24 (second comment labeled a, b and c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addressing these cost issues, the FAA found several comments
that it does not understand. Because this SNPRM provides an opportunity
through its additional comment period to obtain clarity, the FAA urges
those commenters who provided the cited comments to assist the FAA in
better understanding their differences.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ See Boeing at 10 (fifth comment); 23 (second, third and
fourth comments); 24 (second comment); 27 (first comment); 28
(second comment); Orbital Cost Impact Assessment at 6 (items 3b, 9
and 13-16); Sea Launch Costs at 2 (first and second comments), 7, 10
(first comment), 11, 18-19, 22, 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. ``New'' Requirements
Some launch operators attributed costs to their launches from
federal launch ranges in the belief that the FAA proposed new
requirements that the launch operators would not be able to satisfy.
The confusion appears to stem from several sources, including the FAA's
more generalized description of different range practices, and
unfamiliar requirements contained in Air Force handbooks. For instance,
in the NPRM, the FAA proposed a number of requirements that attempted
to reconcile the different approaches of the Eastern and Western Ranges
and thus restated the requirements in a more abstract or generalized
fashion. Additionally, the comments appear to indicate a lack of
familiarity with some of the particulars of the range's analyses
requirements and existing FAA requirements. The last category of
seemingly new requirements appears to consist, to the best of the FAA's
ability to interpret them, of misreadings of the proposal.
Commenters attributed a number of costs to generalized expressions
of different range practices. For example, in the NPRM, proposed
sections 417.113(b)(2), 417.121(f), 417.225, and appendix C, 417.5(g),
(h) and (i) would determine whether downrange surveillance was needed
on the day of launch. To protect ship traffic down range of the launch
area, the FAA proposed that a launch operator identify where its launch
vehicle's stages or other planned ejected debris would impact,
determine the corresponding hazard area or areas \15\, use statistical
ship density data to determine whether the launch operator needed to
survey the downrange hazard areas for ships, and if downrange
surveillance was necessary, determine whether risks at the time of
flight required that the launch operator wait until any ships departed
from downrange ship hazard areas before initiating flight. See 14 CFR
417.107(b)(3), 417.121, 417.225, and appendix C, C417.5(g) (proposed),
65 FR 63931 (discussion accompanying proposed regulations). A launch
operator would be permitted to initiate flight only if the collective
probability of impacting any ship in the downrange hazard areas with
planned debris would be less than or equal to 1 x 10^-5. 65
FR 63931. If a launch operator demonstrated, using statistical ship
density data and the formula provided in the NPRM, that the collective
ship-hit probability in the downrange flight hazard areas was less than
or equal to 1 x 10^-5, the launch operator would not have to
survey the downrange hazard areas on the day of flight. Id. In their
comments, launch operators expressed concern over this proposed
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\15\ For both ships and aircraft, the FAA proposed in the NPRM
and proposes in appendix A of this SNPRM section A417.23(k) and (1)
that an impact hazard area for ships down range of the launch site
would consist of an area centered on the planned impact point and
defined by the larger of the three-sigma impact dispersion ellipse
or an ellipse with the same semi-major and semi-minor axis ratio as
the impact dispersion,w here, if a ship were located on the boundary
of the ellipse, the probability of hitting the ship would be less
than or equal to 1 x 10^-5. Each aircraft hazard area
downrange of the launch site would encompass an air space region,
from an altitude of 60,000 feet to impact on the Earth's surface,
that contains the larger of the three-sigma drag impact dispersion
or an ellipse with the same semi-major and semi-minor axis ratio as
the impact dispersion,w here, if an aircraft were located on the
boundary of the ellipse the probability of hitting the aircraft
would be less than or equal to 1 x 10^-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commenters claimed that the proposed requirement was new and would
mean that launch operators would have to survey downrange impact areas
for launches from the Eastern Range. JC Vol. II at 50, 83; see JC Vol.
I at 8. The FAA does not agree with either of these assertions. When
preparing the NPRM, the FAA consulted extensively with both the Eastern
and Western Ranges to ensure that the FAA would capture current
requirements. The FAA also considered its own experience with the
launches of Sea Launch. As far as the FAA is aware, the overwhelming
majority of licensed launches conducted from federal launch ranges
today would satisfy the FAA's proposed requirements without having to
survey downrange hazard areas located in broad ocean waters.
The Joint Commenters stated that if the FAA considers the
surveillance efforts of the federal launch ranges sufficient, then the
FAA should not change or add the requirements. JC Vol. II at 50.
According to the commenters, surveillance of multiple downrange impact
hazard areas for a single launch could require multiple aircraft. JC
Vol. II at 50. Mechanical problems on the surveillance craft and
weather could require a scrub of the launch with resulting cost
impacts.
Currently, a range surveys its launch area (which correlates to the
FAA's proposed flight hazard area) for the presence of ships and
aircraft prior to launch. The ranges do not typically survey downrange
stage impact areas located in broad ocean waters. This does not,
however, mean that the proposed requirement is new or that the ranges
would not currently survey downrange impact areas if it were determined
necessary to protect the public.\16\ To the contrary, both the Eastern
and Western Ranges have advised the FAA that range analysts have
addressed the issue. The ranges have not needed to survey downrange
impact areas because of the low density of ship traffic and the nature
of the traffic, in broad ocean waters, where spent stages currently
land. For example, unlike the recreational craft closer to shore, much
of the shipping downrange for a typical launch from Cape Canaveral is
commercial in nature and the ranges anticipate that those ships monitor
the notices to mariners that advise of the presence of hazard areas.
However, if a stage impact area proved to be located near a greater
density of ship traffic that did not monitor notices to mariners as
closely as commercial shipping pilots do, a range could well require
surveillance at that stage impact hazard area. Downrange hazard area
surveillance is often performed for launches from Wallops Flight
Facility. These launches typically involve small rockets with downrange
stage impacts that are relatively close to shore where there are
significant numbers of pleasure craft and fishing vessels. The FAA
proposes to formalize the analysis process that the ranges have been
implementing, and would establish a proposed formula and threshold for
determining when surveillance of down range impact areas would be
necessary. The FAA believes that typical orbital launches from the
federal launch ranges meet the FAA's proposed criteria, and that
downrange surveillance would continue not to be required for typical
launches from those ranges. The comments to the NPRM indicate that the
launch operators believe the contrary. Accordingly, the FAA requests
that, through the comment period, the launch

[[Page 49473]]

operators share the reasoning underlying their conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\16\ The commenters' assertion, see JC Vol. II at 83, that the
ranges do not conduct downrange surveillance for reasons of
impracticality is not consistent with what the ranges have advised
the FAA. The range do not, in most cases, conduct downrange
surveillance because a safety analysis shows that it is not
currently necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

After discussion with some of the launch operators, the FAA
believes that the launch operators did not recognize that the FAA, to
identify requirements that can be applied to the majority of licensed
launch activity, wherever it might occur, was merely articulating a
more generalized, abstract version of what the ranges are already doing
in order to identify the underlying intent. Accordingly, where some of
the commenters attributed costs to this requirement,\17\ the FAA does
not, either for launches from a federal launch range or from a non-
federal launch site. The surveillance issue constitutes one example of
the tendency to characterize as new what were, in fact, generalized
expressions of different range requirements. The commenters attributed
other costs on the basis of this misconception as well.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\17\ See, e.g., LM Cost Impact Analysis at 3, 13, 23, 26
(proprietary).
\18\ See Lockheed Cost Estimates 5 and 7; Orbital Cost Items 2,
3, 5 and 8; Sea Launch Costs at 15-16, 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additionally, the comments appear to assume that many of the
ranges' own internal requirements, when proposed in the NPRM, were new.
A range conducts its own flight safety analyses based upon raw data
provided by a launch operator. Because the launch operators may only be
familiar with the data that they themselves provide the ranges, they
worried that the standards that the FAA identified were new.\19\ In
fact, the federal ranges have been performing the analyses and
satisfying these requirements on behalf of the launch operators under
current practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\19\ See Boeing Costs at 14 (first comment), 15, 16, 17 (first
comment), 18, 38 (first comment); Lockheed Cost Estimates 11 and 13;
Orbital Cost Impact Assessment at 6 (items 1 and 2a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA has grouped remaining concerns regarding proposed
requirements that are only seemingly new into two categories. The one
category consists of comments that attribute costs to existing FAA
requirements.\20\ The other category consists of comments that
attribute costs where the commenter misread the proposed
requirement.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\20\ See Boeing Costs at 6 (first, second and third comments),
12 (third comment), 30 (second comment); Lockheed Cost Estimate 6;
Sea Launch Costs at 1 (first and second comment), 4-5 (comments
labeled a, j, k, n) 7 (first comment), 8 (first, second and third
comments), 10 (first comment), 13 (second comment), 17 (comment
labeled a) and 20.
\21\ See Boeing Costs at 19 (fourth comment), 29 (fourth
comment), 34 (fifth comment), 37 (second comment) and 38 (second
comment); Sea Launch Costs at 2 (second comment), 5 (comments
labeled 1 and m), 7 (second comment), 9 (first comment), 21 (first
full comment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. No Change in Responsibility
As a separate issue, commenting launch operators stated that this
rulemaking would change their responsibility for safety, and thus
increase their costs. This was not an issue that the FAA addressed in
the NPRM because the FAA already considers a launch operator
responsible for safety under the statute, the regulations and its
launch license. See 14 CFR 415.71. The FAA recognizes, however, that
this comment may arise from a belief that the launch operator must use
its own employees, rather than continue to rely on the services
provided by a federal launch range.\22\ If that is the case, the FAA
believes that it can set that concern to rest. Under existing 14 CFR
415.31, the FAA grants a safety approval to a launch operator proposing
to launch from a federal launch range if the applicant satisfies the
requirements of subpart C and has contracted with the range for the
provision of safety related services. The Commercial Space Operations
Support Agreement and its annex constitutes such a contract. The FAA is
proposing to codify the safety requirements of the range and
anticipates that the ranges will continue to satisfy those
requirements. Nonetheless, to ensure that there is no remaining
confusion on this score, the FAA is revising its current proposal to
include a provision in proposed 14 CFR 417.203(d) that if a launch
operator has contracted with a federal launch range for the provision
of any flight safety analysis for a licensed launch, and the FAA has
assessed the range and found that the range's analysis methods satisfy
the requirements of this subpart, the FAA will treat the federal launch
range's analysis as that of the launch operator. For any such analysis,
the launch operator need not provide the FAA any further demonstration
of compliance. The FAA hopes that this clarifies that licensed launch
operators may continue their existing arrangements with the federal
launch ranges, and that the primary interface for a launch operator
launching from a federal launch range remains the range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\22\ See, e.g., Boeing Costs at 1, 20, 30 (first comment), 38
(first comment); Lockheed Martin Estimate 8 (attributing costs to
requirement that launch operator conduct flight safety analyses now
provided by the range); Orbital Cost Impact Assessment at 6 (Items 2
and 10: attributing costs to dual safety approval submittals and
shif to FAA oversight).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Operational or Licensing Changes
Commenting launch operators raised concerns grounded in the notion
that the October 2000 NPRM would result in large changes for licensed
launch operators operating at federal launch ranges. Specifically, they
feared that the requirements for obtaining and maintaining a license
would change. JC Vol. I at 3. The FAA requests that in light of the
following discussion, the launch operators revisit whether they should
ascribe costs to these perceived changes.
On the basis of information provided by the comments, it appears to
the FAA that some commenters assigned costs to what they saw as
proposed changes in maintaining license compliance if they launched
from a federal launch range.\23\ Many of these purported costs arise
out of the belief that the proposed requirements would subject a launch
operator at a range to dual administrative requirements. In the NPRM,
however, the FAA proposed that the administrative requirements for
submitting material to the FAA contained in part 417 applied in total
to all licensed launches from a non-federal launch site. NPRM, 65 FR
63977 (proposed 14 CFR 417.1). Accordingly, unless a range changed its
processes, the FAA does not anticipate that this rulemaking would
require a launch operator launching from a federal range to demonstrate
satisfaction of a part 417 requirement twice. Other costs in this
category of concern appear to arise out of the launch operators' fear
that the federal ranges will not obtain a satisfactory baseline
assessment from the FAA for one requirement or another. Given that the
FAA proposes these requirements in coordination with the Air Force
through the Common Standards Working Group, the FAA has every reason to
expect that the federal ranges will continue to satisfy the
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\23\ Boeing Costs at 1 (second comment), 5 (all comments), 7
(all comments), 8 (all comments), 9 (second, third and fourth
comments), 10 (first, second and fourth comments), 11 (first and
fourth comments), 12 (second comment), 13 (first, second, third and
fourth comment), 14 (second comment), 15, 16, 17 (first second and
third comments), 18, 19 (first, second and third comments), 21, 22,
23 (first comment), 26 (second and third comments) 27 (third
comment), 28 (first and third comment), 30 (second comment), 31
(first and second comment) and 38 (first comment); Lockheed Cost
Estimates 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 23, 24, and 25(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Similarly, commenters assigned costs to a perceived change in the
requirements for obtaining a license to launch from a federal launch
range. Commenting launch operators, apparently referring to proposed 14
CFR part 415, subpart F, contended that the new requirements for
obtaining a license would be unduly burdensome and unwieldy. JC Vol. I
at 10-11. They believe they will be required to

[[Page 49474]]

demonstrate compliance with two sets of requirements when launching
from a federal range. JC Vol. I at 3. The FAA can, however, reassure
launch operators who launch from federal launch ranges that proposed
subpart F would not apply to them. Existing part 415, subpart C (Safety
Review and Approval for Launch from a Federal Launch Range), which
governs safety reviews for launch license applications from a federal
launch range, will continue to apply. Proposed subpart F, (Safety
Review and Approval for Launch of an Expendable Launch Vehicle from a
Non-Federal Launch Site), applies to license applications for launch
from outside of a federal launch range. See NPRM, 65 FR 63944, 63965
(proposed section 415.101 and accompanying discussion). Indeed, as
stated in the NPRM, not only would proposed subpart F not apply to a
license governing a launch from a federal launch range, but ``the
proposed regulations for obtaining a license would not * * * apply to
any launch from a non-federal launch site where a federal launch range
performs the safety functions.'' Id. at 63922.
In the event that the Joint Commenters meant to warn that proposed
subpart F would be unduly burdensome for obtaining a license for launch
from a non-federal launch site, the FAA notes that, for such launches,
it must require the same level of safety at non-federal launch sites as
the ranges have achieved in the operation of their federal launch
sites. Accordingly, information demonstrating that the current
standards, as proposed in part 417, are satisfied is necessary.
4. Flexibility and Performance and Design Requirements
Commenters claimed costs on account of a perceived loss of
flexibility.\24\ The Joint Commenters stated that the October 2000 NPRM
contained additional detailed design and testing requirements that will
increase operating costs for all launch programs. Promulgating new
requirements is not the FAA's intent, and should not be the effect of
the FAA's final rule. Instead, the FAA's provision of a route for a
launch operator to demonstrate an equivalent level of safety for a
proposed alternative, willingness to grandfather and coordination on a
waiver process should demonstrate that the FAA will be flexible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\24\ Boeing Costs at 25 (third comment), 26 (fourth comment), 29
(third and fourth comments), 34 (first comment), 35 (fourth and
seventh comments); Lockheed Cost Estimate 21; Oribital Cost Impact
Assessment at 6 (items 1, 2a, 5, 6, 11 and 12); Sea Launch Costs at
2 (first and second comments), 5 (comments labeled 1 and m), 8
(first and second comments), 16 (lightning), 22 (alternate flight
safety system), 26-35, 38, 40-42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The commenters believe that the regulatory language used in the
NPRM would reduce flexibility in implementing the requirements and that
the FAA has changed standards that are currently goals and presented
them as hard requirements. The FAA recognized early in the development
of the NPRM that it was not always possible to adopt the range safety
standards as written in current federal range safety documents because
regulations must contain only that which is actually required. EWR 127-
1 contains both guidance and requirements. Recommended FAA approaches
may appear in guidance documents, such as FAA advisory circulars.
Alternatives may be approved through the licensing process.
When faced with a current standard that was in the form of a goal
or preferred approach, the FAA, in coordination with federal range
personnel, often had to either rewrite the standard as a performance
requirement that described the intent of the original goal or omit it
from the NPRM if it was determined to be unnecessary. For example, the
federal launch ranges have a reliability goal of a minimum of 0.999 at
the 95% confidence level for the flight termination system onboard a
launch vehicle. Such a goal does not directly translate into a
regulatory requirement for which compliance must be demonstrated. A
0.999 reliability at a 95% confidence level can be demonstrated only
through a large number of launches or tests of the complete system
while exposed to flight environments. The FAA worked with the federal
ranges to understand the intent of the goal and how it has actually
been implemented. As a result, the FAA's proposed regulations would
require each flight termination system and command control system to
have a reliability design of 0.999 at a confidence level of 95% to be
demonstrated through an analysis of the design. The FAA is not
proposing that this reliability be demonstrated through testing because
it is not always practical to require the thousands of system level
tests necessary to demonstrate compliance with the confidence level.
Instead, the FAA is proposing an approach that has been developed in
close coordination with the federal launch ranges, and that
incorporates performance oriented design requirements for components
coupled with comprehensive qualification and acceptance testing of
components and preflight confidence tests of the entire system. The
design and test requirements together with the required reliability
analysis should ensure the reliability of the flight termination
system.
In their discussion on the highly detailed requirements of the
NPRM, the Joint Commenters referenced the FAA's licensing of Sea Launch
and stated their belief that if Sea Launch had sought FAA approval
under a regulatory regime as set forth in the NPRM, the process would
have been far slower and more expensive for the launch operator. JC
Vol. I at 7. The FAA disagrees. In licensing Sea Launch, the FAA used
the current range safety requirements as the basis for evaluating the
safety of the proposed launch vehicle and operations: the same
requirements used as the basis for the October 2000 NPRM. It was during
the evaluation of Sea Launch that the FAA developed various approaches
for allowing flexibility in implementing specific requirements,
including demonstrating an equivalent level of safety. These
requirements and provisions for flexibility were refined and included
in the NPRM. The FAA's conclusion was that Sea Launch could satisfy the
requirements in the NPRM with no greater effort than was expended
during its initial licensing. In effect, Sea Launch was held to the
FAA's current requirements. Published requirements, however, with an
appropriate level of detail should provide for a consistent, open and
fair licensing process for all launch operators.
5. Neighboring Launch Operators
The FAA has learned that each Air Force launch range treats a
portion of the public differently. For a launch conducted by a licensed
launch operator, the FAA considers other launch operators at a launch
site members of ``the public.'' Historically the Eastern Range and the
Western Range did not consider anyone who operated at the range to be a
member of the public. For approximately the past five years, however,
the Eastern Range has been applying the FAA definition of the public
when calculating the public risk associated with a licensed launch. At
the Western Range other launch operators are not counted to ascertain
their contribution to the collective risk to the general public. Some
few personnel of other launch operators, at the request of those launch
operators, are subjected to a higher level of risk than the rest of the
public, which may include allowing them inside impact limit lines or
hazard areas during the flight of a launch vehicle.
For the FAA, this approach has both safety and financial
responsibility

[[Page 49475]]

implications. A launch operator may face issues surrounding launch
availability and possible increases in insurance premiums. Although the
FAA currently proposes no changes from its current practice, the FAA
wishes to bring this issue to the attention of the public to obtain
comments regarding the impact of the current approach and possible
alternatives. The FAA notes that it is willing to entertain
alternatives and implementation proposals. The issue is discussed in
greater depth below.
In addition to placing the general public at risk, a launch
operator's activities may place its neighbors at risk. Different launch
operators are each others' neighbors at a single launch site. When, for
example, launch operator A launches from one launch pad, adjacent
launch operator B may be located within the impact limit lines or a
hazard area created by launch operator A's launch. Nonetheless, for
reasons of safety, security, or mission assurance, launch operator B
may wish to keep some of its personnel working at the second launch
point, even during the hazardous activities, including the flight of
launch operator A's launch vehicle. Launch operator B's pressure
vessels may require tending. Launch operator B may need to maintain the
security of the site. Launch operator B may be interested in meeting a
tight schedule. Typically, because the location exposes people to
greater risk, the range will require the neighboring launch operator to
train, shelter and otherwise attempt to protect its people from the
increased risks.
The launch operators in this example are engaged in activities in
support of separate launches and do not contract with each other for
the launch that is about to take place. For these reasons, the FAA
treats them as ``the public'' with respect to each other.\25\ In
existing 14 CFR part 420, which governs licensing and safety
requirements for the operation of a launch site, the FAA defines the
``public'' as ``people and property that are not involved in supporting
a licensed launch, and includes those people and property that may be
located within the boundary of a launch site, * * *, and any other
launch operator and its personnel.'' 14 CFR 420.5. In the October 2000
NPRM at Sec. 417.3, the FAA proposed a similar definition for ``public
safety'' as the safety of other launch operators and their personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\25\ Although the FAA does not regulate or oversee the safety of
the workers of a licensee, the workers of a neighboring launch
operator are members of the public and the FAA has always intended
that they be protected as such.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Likewise, for determining financial responsibility under existing
14 CFR part 440, the FAA treats other launch operators and their
personnel as third parties. A licensed launch operator does not sign
cross waivers with neighboring launch operators, see generally 14 CFR
440.17, and the personnel of neighboring launch operators are treated
as third parties in the maximum probable loss analysis that determines
the amount of financial responsibility a licensee must shoulder. 14 CFR
440.3(15). The FAA, when calculating the maximum probable loss that may
occur to members of the public, requires that a licensee demonstrate
financial responsibility for those members of the public who have a
chance of being harmed on the order of 1 x 10^-7 or more. See
14 CFR 440.3(11)(i). This means that if any personnel of launch
operator B are within the contours of an area where there is chance of
an individual being harmed of 1 x 10^-7 or more, the FAA will
assess the contribution of those individuals to the final financial
responsibility determination.
The 30th Space Wing takes a different approach. At the Western
Range, the 30th Space Wing relies on the definitions in EWR 127-1 to
treat certain identified personnel of neighboring launch operators as
not being members of the public, or, in the parlance of EWR 127-1, as
``Wing-essential.'' EWR 127-1 defines ``mission-essential'' and ``non-
essential'' personnel, and, by implication, Wing-essential personnel.
For the first two categories, different levels of risk, protection and
exposure are available. In the portion relevant to this discussion, EWR
127-1 defines mission-essential personnel as ``those persons necessary
to successfully and safely complete a hazardous or launch operation and
whose absence would jeopardize the completion of the operation.'' EWR
127-1 at 1-vii (Dec. 31, 1999). This category includes, among others,
``persons specifically authorized by the Wing Commander to perform
scheduled activities.'' Id. The ranges have a different mission than
that of the FAA. Being military installations, they include within
their mission not only the successful launch of a given launch vehicle,
but the continued operations of other vehicles and programs deemed
essential to the mission of the wing by the Wing Commander. These
activities include, for example, support of commercial launches, launch
of national need payloads, strategic weapons testing, warfighter
support, payload processing and other activities that promote the
function of the range as a whole.
``Non-essential'' personnel, on the other hand, are persons who are
not otherwise mission or Wing-essential, and include the general
public, visitors, members of the media, and ``any persons who can be
excluded from Safety Clearance Zones with no effect on the operation or
parallel operations.'' EWR 127-1 at 1-viii. EWR 127-1 does not contain
a definition for Wing-essential, but the 30th Space Wing interprets the
mention of Wing-essential personnel in the two definitions to permit a
category of persons to be treated as mission-essential for purposes of
calculating risk and requiring sheltering. This category may include
personnel of neighboring launch operators who are present to perform
safety, security or other tasks necessary to continue that second
launch operator's operations at the launch site, but does not include
anyone performing routine administrative, maintenance, or janitorial
functions. Under the interpretation of the 30th Space Wing, when an
employee of launch operator B is present within the impact limit lines
or, albeit very infrequently, a hazard area for launch operator A's
launch, that employee must be sheltered, and is included in a higher
risk threshold. See EWR 127-1 at 1-12, 1.4d (Oct. 31, 1997). In
contrast to the permissible Ec of 30 x 10^-6 for
the general public, the workers of the launch operator conducting the
launch may be exposed to a higher risk of 300 x 10^-6. Based
on information from the 30th Space Wing, there may be, for a given
licensed launch at the Western Range, over 100 people who are members
of the public under the FAA's definitions, but who the FAA has not
identified as such in its financial responsibility determinations due
to the differences in definitions.
At the Eastern Range, the 45th Space Wing treats other launch
operators as members of the public when calculating public risk due to
a licensed launch. The Eastern Range may permit the personnel of
neighboring launch operators to remain within the impact limit lines or
the flight hazard area in approved hardened structures for a launch.
The Eastern Range, when assessing collective risk to the public, counts
the neighboring launch operator's personnel as members of the public.
In other words, the presence of too many of such people may produce an
Ec in excess of 30 x 10^-6. Accordingly, their
numbers are limited for that reason.
The FAA and the Air Force now confront the question of whether to

[[Page 49476]]

continue the FAA and 45th Space Wing approach, or to adopt a variation
on the approach of the 30th Space Wing. The Air Force intends to
standardize these approaches at its ranges. The former is current
practice for the bulk of licensed launches, but the latter was the
practice at both ranges prior to the adoption by the 45th Space Wing of
the FAA's definition of ``the public,'' and may provide greater
operational flexibility, both for the launch operator conducting the
launch and for the neighboring launch operator who wants to continue
operations during the hazardous activities of the first launch
operator. Greater operational flexibility may come with a price,
however. Although the FAA could, through rulemaking, permit some
members of the public to be exposed to greater risk than others,
especially if they are protected,\26\ the FAA must point out that the
launch operator conducting the launch would have to demonstrate
sufficient financial responsibility under part 440 to protect
financially against loss to those members of the public. In other
words, where a neighboring launch operator's personnel are exposed to
risk sufficient to trigger a requirement for financial responsibility
coverage, the insurance premiums of the launch operator who is about to
launch may increase. Conversely, that first launch operator may find
the increased flexibility in its own operations worth the potential
increase in premiums.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\26\ The Eastern and Western Ranges advice that risk assessments
account for any sheltering of the neighboring launch operator's
personnel.
\27\ The FAA notes that it has not been aware, in the course of
conducting its maximum probable loss analyses in accordance with 14
CFR part 440, that some of the personnel identified as mission
essential at the ranges were, in fact, what the FAA considers
members of the public, and should therefore have been considered at
the 10^-7 threshold instead of the 10^-5
threshold. Because of this possible confusion, the FAA may not have
addressed third parties who should have been considered in financial
responsibility determinations for licensed launches from both the
Eastern and the Western Range. If the FAA determines that their
presence requires an increase in the financial responsibility for
which a licensee must prepare, that increase would be mandated by
existing requirements and would be a decision that was independent
of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA and the Common Standards Working Group intend to explore
this issue further so as to ensure a common approach. Before the FAA
conducts any rulemaking on this issue, the FAA requests comments on the
public's experience with the impacts of the two approaches that have
been in practice to date. Are there cost impacts associated with either
approach? Do the benefits of one outweigh the advantages of the other?
Do concerns for worker safety of the neighboring launch operator
suggest that no one other than the participants in that launch be
allowed in the areas of greater risk? In other words, even with the
benefits of increased operational flexibility, would launch operator B
not want its employees exposed to greater risk than the general public?
Additionally, implementation raises issues. Were the FAA and the ranges
to adopt the Western Range's approach, the ranges could oversee and
coordinate the presence of different launch operators and their
personnel. At a launch site operated by a licensed launch site
operator, the FAA already requires that a launch site operator schedule
its customers. 14 CFR 420.55. However, the launch site operator does
not assess risk under current requirements. The FAA requests comments
on the advisability of imposing such a requirement on a launch site
operator.

C. FAA and Air Force Process for Relief From Common Launch Safety
Requirements

Launch operators commenting on the October 2000 NPRM expressed
concern for problems they believe will arise if both the Air Force and
the FAA oversee the safety of launches from Air Force ranges. JC Vol. I
at 1; Lockheed at 3. In response, the Air Force and the FAA have
established a permanent safety working group to develop common launch
safety standards and implementation processes. This working group has
drafted a process for coordinated review of requests for relief from
launch safety requirements as well as tailoring of requirements for
future programs. This process is outlined in a draft Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between Air Force Space Command and the FAA Office
of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation for
Resolving Requests for Relief from Common Launch Safety Requirements.
The MOU will provide for Air Force and FAA coordination on issues that
may arise for a specific launch. For day-to-day operations at an Air
Force range, the Air Force will remain the primary point of contact for
the launch operators. For a licensed launch, when a request for relief
from a common requirement is made to either agency, each agency will
ensure notification of the other, and the two agencies will coordinate
activities with the launch operator to ensure an efficient and timely
resolution.
The draft coordination process contains provisions to address
issues ``prior to day of launch,'' when there is time to coordinate and
formally document the resolution of an issue before launch, and ``day-
of-launch'' (flight minus 24 hours, often called ``real-time'')
coordination on issues that arise, albeit infrequently, during a launch
countdown prior to flight. The Air Force and the FAA will also jointly
participate with launch operators in tailoring of common launch safety
requirements during the development of launch vehicle systems to be
used for licensed launches from Air Force ranges. The coordination
process between the Air Force and the FAA will provide for sharing of
data to avoid duplication of effort. This coordination will allow for
joint resolution of issues regarding common launch safety requirements
while ensuring that both agencies' requirements and concerns are
addressed without placing undue burden on launch operators. A copy of
the draft Air Force/FAA MOU is available on AST's Web site at http://
ast.faa.gov.
The agencies will continue to administer their own waiver
processes. In conjunction with the Air Force/FAA Common Standards
Working Group, the two agencies addressed whether the FAA could
baseline the Air Force's waiver process. The group determined that the
FAA, once its requirements became final, could not baseline the Air
Force's waiver process. The FAA cannot delegate its responsibility for
safety. The FAA has the authority to waive its own requirements. 49
U.S.C. 70105(c)(3). As the January 2001 Safety MOA between the FAA and
the Air Force recognized, neither agency may waive the requirements of
the other. Although Chapter 701 allows another agency to assist the
FAA, and the FAA plans to continue to accept the assistance of the Air
Force, Chapter 701 does not permit the FAA to delegate its ultimate
statutory responsibility for safety to another agency. Accordingly,
although the FAA will continue to rely on the Air Force to ensure
compliance with the codified standards so long as the baseline
assessments show that the Air Force continues to maintain the common
standards, the FAA will not be able to accept the Air Force ``non-
compliance'' process through the FAA's baseline assessment. Non-
compliances signify a break from the baseline assessment, and they
require the appropriate amount of scrutiny from both agencies. Once the
common standards are codified, they will be FAA requirements and
require FAA approval of a waiver. The FAA's waiver requirements are
contained in 14 CFR part 404.
On a practical level, the FAA and the Air Force perceive benefits
in the FAA's involvement in the waiver process. The 45th Space Wing has
over the course of

[[Page 49477]]

the past two years invited FAA participation in the range's waiver
decisions. Members of the Common Standards Working Group have suggested
that coordination between the agencies would be eased by an FAA
presence at the ranges, both so that the FAA has greater familiarity
with the different launch programs and so that the FAA will be
accessible to range and launch operator personnel. The FAA is
considering this option.
Legal considerations surrounding waivers and equivalent level of
safety determinations result, in part, in the protection of the launch
operator. For the FAA, approval of a request for relief may create
precedent: for example, if one launch operator receives a waiver
because it satisfies certain conditions, a similarly situated launch
operator might also expect, absent relevant differences, to receive the
same waiver. The FAA, whether through its log of decisions required by
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2), or through advisory
circulars must allow access to its waiver decisions, and, in so doing,
permit others interested in obtaining a decision to grant a request for
relief to see how one might be obtained, taking into account
proprietary considerations as appropriate. Although the FAA recognizes
that the federal ranges make every effort to treat range users equally,
the FAA, unlike the federal ranges, is required by the APA to treat
similarly situated persons in a similar manner. The Air Force advises
that it has generally found that circumstances surrounding every waiver
are sufficiently different that a waiver applies only to the program
requesting it. The FAA must have a rational basis for distinguishing
between different waiver applicants requesting similar waivers. There
are implications to this. The requirement for a rational basis creates
an incentive for the FAA to carefully consider all possible
implementations when developing a requirement so that the agency can
identify exceptions where possible during the rulemaking process.
Additionally, after a rule goes into effect, the FAA must fully
scrutinize any waiver request so that granting one waiver does not
result in the grant of so many others that the requirement is
effectively nullified. This approach should also ensure fair treatment
between launch operators. As discussed below, the FAA and the Air Force
have developed plans to coordinate their determinations. Although that
coordination is a matter internal to the workings of the government,
both agencies designed the process to minimize disruption on the launch
operator, and a description of it follows.
An area of particular concern to launch operators appears to be how
the agencies would handle a request for relief from launch safety
requirements. On January 16, 2001, the Department of the Air Force and
the Federal Aviation Administration signed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) on Safety for Space Transportation and Range Activities. The MOA
directs the Air Force and the FAA to work together to achieve common
launch safety requirements and to establish a process for communication
with respect to interpretations of the common safety requirements as
they apply to U.S. Government and FAA-licensed launches. The MOA
further directs the two agencies to coordinate on the resolution of
requests for relief from any common launch safety requirement.
The FAA understands that the complex nature of launch vehicle
system safety causes occasional situations where strict compliance with
requirements may be difficult, impossible or impractical. In these
situations, the launch operator may seek ``relief'' from the
requirement. Relief from a launch safety requirement at an Air Force
range typically takes the form of a waiver, or ``meets-intent''
certification. The Air Force may permit a waiver when the mission
objectives of a launch operator cannot otherwise be achieved. The
launch operator must obtain a waiver when proposing an activity that
does not satisfy an Air Force requirement or when that activity results
in greater risk. For the Wing Commander to make an informed decision,
personnel responsible for range safety will typically attempt to
describe any increase in risk either quantitatively using formal risk
analysis techniques or qualitatively based on the specifics of the
launch. In some cases the Air Force may waive the public risk
criterion. Typically, this would require a significant effort to
mitigate risk, such as by increasing reliability of the launch vehicle,
and there would have to be a critical national need for the launch. A
``meets intent'' certification is used when it can be successfully
shown that a launch operator's proposed approach, although non-
compliant with a requirement in a literal sense, complies with the
overall intent of the requirement. To obtain a ``meets intent''
certification, a launch operator's proposed approach must provide for
an ``equivalent level of safety.'' Tailoring of requirements is
typically performed when it can be shown that a requirement is not
applicable to a given launch vehicle program. Tailoring also typically
includes meets intent approvals that apply to a program on a permanent
basis. A ``meets intent'' certification may also be obtained outside of
the tailoring process.
There are many similarities between the way the FAA approaches
relief from safety requirements and the Air Force approach. FAA
regulations permit waivers to safety requirements; however, the FAA's
focus on the public safety aspects of licensed launches restricts
consideration of mission objectives, including cost or schedule
considerations, as justification for approval. The range safety
organizations within the Air Force do this as well. Although cost,
schedule, and mission assurance are range safety considerations, they
are considered secondary to public safety. For government launches, the
Air Force Wing Commander may grant a waiver based on national need.
Typically, these decisions do not involve FAA-licensed launches. The
FAA may grant a waiver if it decides that the waiver is in the public
interest and will not jeopardize the public health and safety, safety
of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 70105(c)(3). Preferably, a launch
operator subject to FAA regulations would demonstrate an equivalent
level of safety to obtain relief from an FAA launch safety requirement.
The October 2000 NPRM proposed in each part that a launch operator
either meet the launch safety requirements as written or, for any
proposed alternative, demonstrate an ``equivalent level of safety.''
For all intents and purposes, a range safety ``meets intent''
certification constitutes one form of the FAA's equivalent level of
safety. The Common Standards Working Group has agreed upon common
terminology and definitions of these relief categories to minimize the
overall impact on launch operators while maintaining the current
flexibility.
Commenting launch operators expressed concern that the process of
clearly and convincingly demonstrating to the FAA that an alternative
approach provides an equivalent level of safety would prove unduly
burdensome, and in some instances, unworkable, compared to the
tailoring process with the federal ranges. JC Vol. I at 5. The FAA does
not foresee an increase in the level of effort on the part of a launch
operator to obtain an equivalent level of safety determination and
believes that industry's concerns in this area have been addressed. The
Common Standards Working Group does not anticipate that FAA involvement
will increase the difficulty or lengthen the

[[Page 49478]]

tailoring process. The FAA has reviewed a sampling of meets intent
certifications and tailoring granted by federal ranges in the past and
finds that they would satisfy the FAA equivalent level of safety
criterion. In addition, the FAA has demonstrated on numerous occasions
its willingness and ability, within the context of its regulations and
processes, to be flexible in the implementation of its requirements.
The FAA has taken into account the unique aspects of the program of
each current licensee as the FAA worked with that licensee to achieve
its goals while meeting everyone's mutual public safety
responsibilities. For launches from a non-federal launch site, the
October 2000 NPRM proposes that the FAA and a launch license applicant
use the license application process to identify requirements that are
not applicable and to ensure that any alternative approach that
provides an equivalent level of safety becomes part of the terms of the
license. For future launch vehicle programs that will conduct licensed
launches at a federal range, the launch operators will continue to
follow the Air Force process with participation from the FAA. The FAA
and the Air Force will work in a coordinated effort with the launch
operator to tailor the common launch safety requirements and make
equivalent level of safety decisions for the launch operator's systems.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis of the SNPRM

Part 415--Launch Licensee

Subpart F--Safety Review and Approval for Launch of an Expendable
Launch Vehicle from a Non-Federal Launch Site

The only changes that this SNPRM proposes to make to subpart F of
part 415 involve references made to sections of proposed subpart C of
part 417. This SNPRM modifies and reorganizes proposed subpart C of
part 417. As a result, a number of references in proposed subpart F of
part 415 to sections in subpart C of part 417 must be changed.

Part 417--Launch Safety

This SNPRM would revise the table of contents for proposed subpart
C of part 417 to reflect the modifications that this SNPRM makes to
that subpart.

Subpart A--General

This SNPRM modifies Sec. 417.1 of the October 2000 NPRM to include
provisions for existing launch vehicle systems to which some of the
safety requirements proposed in part 417 would not apply. These changes
represent a form of grandfathering as discussed in section III.A of
this SNPRM.
The title of Sec. 417.1 has been changed to ``scope and
applicability.'' The NPRM's Sec. 417.1, which provides the scope of
part 417, is now paragraph Sec. 417.1(a), General. This paragraph
contains the same language as the October 2000 NPRM except for the
second, fourth and fifth sentences. The second sentence now reads:
``The safety requirements contained in this part apply to all licensed
launches of expendable launch vehicles unless paragraph (b) of this
section applies.'' The fourth and fifth sentences now read: ``For a
licensed launch from a federal launch range, the administrative
requirements contained in this part do not apply if the FAA, through
its baseline assessment of the range, finds that the range satisfies
the requirements of part 417. For a licensed launch from a federal
range where the range does not satisfy one or more or the requirements
of part 417, the FAA will identify the administrative requirements that
apply to the launch during the licensing process.'' The new proposed
fourth and fifth sentences provide clarification for whether the
proposed administrative requirements in part 417 would apply for a
proposed launch from a federal range. As indicated in the new proposed
second sentence, the SNPRM proposes to add paragraph Sec. 417.1(b),
which would contain provisions for determining whether a specific
requirement would apply to a licensed launch operator at a federal
range. Unless one or more of the conditions of paragraph (b)(2) of
proposed section 417.1 occurs, if a launch operator has a license from
the FAA to launch from a federal launch range as of the effective date
of part 417 and, for a specific requirement of this part and launch, if
the launch operator employs an alternative to the requirement for which
the federal range has granted a written meets intent certification as
of the effective date of part 417, the launch operator would not be
required to demonstrate to the FAA that its alternative provided an
equivalent level of safety. If the launch operator had, as of the
effective date of part 417, a written waiver from the federal launch
range or a pre-existing noncompliance that satisfied the federal launch
range's grandfathering criteria, the requirement would not be
applicable to the launch. A discussion on the issue of grandfathering
and the FAA's reasons for proposing these changes from the October 2000
NPRM is provided in paragraph III.A of this SNPRM.
Paragraph Sec. 417.1(b)(2) would contain criteria for when a
requirement would be applicable to a launch operator even if the launch
operator satisfied the provisions of Sec. 417.1(b)(1). Even if a launch
operator satisfied paragraph (b)(1) for a specific requirement of part
417, the launch operator would be required to bring its launch and
launch vehicle, components, systems, and subsystems into compliance
with the requirement, including any demonstration of equivalent level
of safety, whenever one or more of the following conditions occurred:
(i) The launch operator makes modifications that affect the launch
vehicle's operation or safety characteristics; (ii) the launch operator
uses the launch vehicle, component, system, or subsystem in a new
application; (iii) the FAA or the launch operator determines that a
previously unforeseen or newly discovered safety hazard exists that is
a source of significant risk to public safety; or (iv) the federal
range previously accepted a component, system, or subsystem, but, at
that time, a noncompliance to an original federal range requirement was
not identified. For all intents and purposes these are the same
criteria currently used by the Air Force for determining when range
safety grandfathering expires.
The Common Standards Working Group has developed a number of
definitions to help ensure common interpretation and implementation of
launch safety requirements. For any term with a common definition that
the FAA uses in its launch safety regulations, the FAA proposes to
include the common definition in Sec. 417.3. The SNPRM proposes to
replace or insert the definitions into Sec. 417.3 in alphabetical order
as follows:
Equivalent level of safety would mean an ``approximately equal''
level of safety. ``Approximately equal'' has mathematical meaning, and
is clarified by the fact that an equivalent level of safety
determination could involve a change to the level of expected risk that
was not statistically or mathematically significant as determined by
qualitative or quantitative risk analysis.
Explosive debris would mean solid propellant fragments or other
pieces of a launch vehicle or payload that result from break up of the
launch vehicle during flight and that explode upon impact with the
Earth's surface and cause overpressure.
Meets intent certification would mean a decision by a federal
launch range to accept a substitute means of satisfying a safety
requirement where the substitute provides an equivalent level of safety
to that of the original requirement.

[[Page 49479]]

Normal flight would mean the flight of a properly performing launch
vehicle whose real-time instantaneous impact point does not deviate
from the nominal instantaneous impact point by more than the sum of the
wind effects and the three-sigma guidance and performance deviations in
the uprange, downrange, left-crossrange, or right-crossrange
directions.
Normal trajectory would mean a trajectory that describes normal
flight.
Risk would mean a measure that accounts for both the probability of
occurrence and the consequence of a hazard to persons or property.
Although the FAA proposed to include its definition of ``serious
injury'' in proposed part 417, it is withdrawing that definition
because it is better suited to the reporting requirements for which is
was originally intended. See 14 CFR 415.41(b) (reporting requirements
for an accident investigation plan). For purposes of determining
whether exposure to a given quantity of a hazard could create a serious
injury, the proposed definition was not adequate, and the FAA does
intend to employ it in proposed part 417. The reporting definition was
not adequate because it does not provide the information necessary for
realistic modeling of casualties and is not always consistent with the
models currently used to estimate potential casualties due to a
proposed launch. The FAA notes that the Abbreviated Injury Scale
discussed earlier in this SNPRM provides a useful means of
distinguishing between serious injuries and those of lessor severity.
Waiver would mean a decision that allows a launch operator to
continue with a launch despite not satisfying a specific safety
requirement where the launch operator is not able to demonstrate an
equivalent level of safety. A waiver may apply where a failure to
satisfy a safety requirement involves a statistically or mathematically
significant increase in expected risk as determined through
quantitative or qualitative risk analysis, and where the activity may
or may not exceed the public risk criteria.

Part 417 subpart B--Launch Safety Requirements

417.107 Flight safety.

This SNPRM modifies the FAA's proposed public risk criteria in
paragraph Sec. 417.107(b) of the original NPRM to reflect
understandings reached in the Common Standards Working Group in
consideration of public comments. The primary change being proposed in
this SNPRM in the area of risk is that the FAA proposes to limit the
risk attributable to each hazard rather than to limit an aggregate of
the risk for all hazards as was proposed in the original NPRM. A
detailed discussion on the modified public risk criteria proposal is
contained in paragraph III.B of this SNPRM.
Paragraph Sec. 417.107(b) of the October 2000 NPRM proposed that a
launch operator would be required to conduct all launches in accordance
with the proposed public risk criteria. This SNPRM changes the wording
of paragraph Sec. 417.107(b) to clarify that a launch operator's flight
safety analysis must demonstrate that any proposed launch satisfies the
public risk criteria. This modification is meant as a clarification and
does not represent a change to the proposed requirements.
Paragraph Sec. 417.107(b)(1) has been modified and would require
that a launch operator initiate the flight of a launch vehicle only if
the total risk associated with the flight to all members of the public,
excluding those members of the public in waterborne vessels and
aircraft, does not exceed an expected average number of 0.00003
casualties (EC [le] 30 x 10 ^-6) from hazards due
to impacting inert and explosive debris, (EC [le] 30 x
10^-6 for toxic hazards, and EC [le] 30 x
10^-6 for far field blast overpressure hazards. The FAA
proposes in this SNPRM that a launch operator may initiate flight only
if the total risk associated with the flight satisfies the criteria.
The FAA proposes to add the term ``total'' to clarify that the risk
criteria applies to all phases of flight, including both the uprange
and downrange portions. See also 14 CFR 415.35. The FAA proposes to
identify both types of impacting debris with specificity because it
wants to avoid confusion regarding what kinds of debris a debris risk
assessment has always addressed. The FAA proposes to specify both
because it is possible that either type of debris or a combination
could exceed the expected casualty risk criteria, and the FAA wants to
ensure that both are addressed. The FAA proposes here to change the
name of the hazard from distant focus overpressure to far field blast
overpressure to better reflect that a flight safety analysis must
account for any potential source of overpressure due to explosions
during launch vehicle flight that may cause window breakage, not just
that caused by debris impacts, which is typically described as distant
focus overpressure. The FAA proposes to determine whether to approve
public risk due to any other hazard associated with the proposed flight
of a launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis. The EC
criterion for each hazard would apply to each launch from lift-off
through orbital insertion, including each planned impact, for an
orbital launch, and through final impact for a suborbital launch.
Proposed Sec. 417.107(b)(2) has been modified to change the
individual risk criterion from probability of casualty (PC)
PC [le] 1 x 10^-6, to clarify that the criterion
would be applied to each hazard, and would exclude persons in
waterborne vessels and aircraft. This proposed change would delete all
but the first sentence of Sec. 417.107(b)(2) as proposed in the NPRM.
Comments received from the Air Force indicated that the use of
PC as a risk criterion is not consistent with the definition
of risk. The changes do not represent any new requirements. They are
being proposed to improve clarity and to achieve consistent terminology
with the ranges. The proposed addition of the flight safety analysis
requirement at the beginning of Sec. 417.107(b) eliminates the need to
state anything further in Sec. 417.107(b)(2).
The SNPRM changes the NPRM proposed paragraph Sec. 417.107(b)(3) by
deleting all but the first sentence. The addition of the flight safety
analysis reference in Sec. 417.107(b) eliminates the need to state
anything further in Sec. 417.107(b)(3). A launch operator would
initiate flight only if, the probability of debris impact to all water-
borne vessels (P^iv) that are not operated in direct support
of the launch does not exceed 0.00001 (Piv [le] 1 x
10^-5) in each debris impact hazard area of Sec. 417.223. To
achieve commonality with the Air Force, the SNPRM eliminates the use of
the term ``collective risk'' and states the proposed criterion in terms
of probability of debris impact to all water-borne vessels to express
the collective risk concept. For example, if there were five vessels in
the vicinity of the launch, in order to initiate flight, a launch
operator would have to demonstrate that if each vessel's individual
probability of impact at the time of flight were calculated and those
five probabilities were added together, the total would satisfy the
criterion. The reference to the requirements for impact hazard areas
has been changed to ``each debris impact hazard area of Sec. 417.223''
to reflect organizational changes and the performance level flight
hazard area analysis requirements proposed in the SNPRM.
Paragraph Sec. 417.107(b)(4) in the SNPRM remains the same, minor
editorial changes aside, as proposed in the NPRM. A launch operator
would initiate flight only if the probability of debris impact to any
individual aircraft (Pia) not operated in direct support of
the launch does not exceed 0.00000001

[[Page 49480]]

(Pia [le] 1 x 10^-8 in each debris impact hazard
area of Sec. 417.223. The reference to the requirements for impact
hazard areas has been changed to ``each debris impact hazard area of
Sec. 417.223'' to reflect organizational changes and the performance
level flight hazard area analysis requirements proposed in the SNPRM.
The FAA is requesting public comment on an alternative requirement
to protect individual aircraft not operated in direct support of the
launch. The FAA and Air Force Common Standards Working Group is
considering a change in the proposed requirements of paragraph
Sec. 417.107(b)(4) such that the probability of impact to any
individual aircraft (Pia) not operated in direct support of
the launch does not exceed 0.0000001 (Pia [le] 1 x
10^-7 in each debris impact hazard area. This would relax the
FAA's proposed aircraft probability of impact standard from
10^-8 to 10^-7. Such a change would be consistent
with the current Range Commander Council Standard 321-00 and the FAA's
``Supplemental Application Guidance for Unguided Suborbital Launch
Vehicles.'' Such a change would not affect the currently proposed
Sec. 417.107(c)(4) which would require that the aircraft impact
analysis account for all debris with the potential to impact an
aircraft with 11 ft-lbs of kinetic energy or greater and account for
the aircraft velocity.
The SNPRM proposes new paragraph Sec. 417.107(c) that would require
a launch operator's flight safety analysis to account for any inert
debris impact with a mean expected kinetic energy at impact greater
than or equal to 11 ft-lbs and, except for the far field blast
overpressure effects analysis of Sec. 417.229, a peak incident
overpressure greater than or equal to 1.0 psi due to any explosive
debris. The 11 ft-lbs threshold for inert debris would apply when
determining expected casualties due to blunt trauma. The 1.0 psi
threshold for explosive debris would apply when determining expected
casualties due to overpressure effects. The far field blast
overpressure effects analysis of proposed Sec. 417.229 would account
for overpressure levels below 1.0 psi that could cause window breakage
and related casualties due to falling or projected glass shards. The
SNPRM also proposes that, when using the debris thresholds to determine
potential casualties, a flight safety analysis would use either
probabilistic models or a more simple and conservative approach. The
FAA and Air Force Common Standards Working Group is considering these
debris thresholds as proposed common launch safety requirements. The
FAA is requesting public comment on the proposed use of these
thresholds. A complete discussion on the proposed thresholds and their
applicability is provided in section III.C of this SNPRM.
In addition, Sec. 417.107(c) would clarify that a flight safety
analysis would be required to apply the thresholds for inert and
explosive debris to demonstrate whether a launch satisfied the
probability of impact criterion for water-borne vessels of
Sec. 417.107(b)(3) and the probability of impact criterion for aircraft
of Sec. 417.107(b)(4). Proposed Sec. 417.107(c)(4) would require the
analysis to account for the aircraft velocity. Accounting for the
aircraft velocity is important when determining the kinetic energy of a
potential debris impact with the aircraft. Accounting for the
aircraft's velocity is not a new proposal. It was included in appendix
A of the NPRM and is being added to proposed Sec. 417.107(c)(4) to
clarify that it is an important part of the criterion.
The SNPRM proposes a new paragraph Sec. 417.107(d), which would
require that a probabilistic casualty model used by a launch operator
must be based on accurate data and scientific principles and be
statistically valid. A launch operator would be required to obtain FAA
approval of any probabilistic casualty model that is used in the flight
safety analysis. If the launch takes place from a federal launch range,
the analysis would be allowed to employ any probabilistic casualty
model that is accepted as part of the FAA's baseline assessment of the
federal launch range's safety process. The proposed provisions for the
use of probabilistic models as part of a launch operator's flight
safety analysis are intended to provide greater flexibility in
demonstrating that a proposed launch satisfies the public risk criteria
and to provide greater consistency with the current practices at
federal ranges. A complete discussion on the use of probabilistic
models as part of flight safety analysis in provided in conjunction
with the discussion on casualty thresholds in paragraph III.C of this
SNPRM.
The SNPRM re-letters Sec. 417.107(c), (d), (e) and (f) as proposed
in the NPRM to (e), (f), (g), and (h) respectively. The title of
proposed Sec. 417.107(e) has been changed from ``Conjunction on launch
assessment'' to ``Collision avoidance.'' This change is being made to
reflect common terminology used at the federal ranges. The references
to subpart C and appendix A in the last sentence of proposed paragraph
Sec. 417.107(e) have been modified to be consistent with the other
changes made by this SNPRM.
The second and third sentences of proposed paragraph
Sec. 417.107(f) have been replaced with a reference to Sec. 417.203(d)
that contains provisions for when a flight safety analysis performed by
a federal range for a licensed launch may be treated as the licensed
launch operator's analysis. This change is meant to clarify that at a
federal range, licensed launch operators need not perform analysis
ordinarily performed by the range. This is consistent with the FAA's
current practice of accepting the federal range process through its
baseline assessments. The public comments on the original NPRM
indicated that there was significant misunderstanding with regard to
this issue, and this change is intended to clear up that
misunderstanding.
This SNPRM changes the title of proposed paragraph 417.121(c) from
``Conjunction of launch'' to ``Collision avoidance'' to reflect common
terminology used at the federal ranges.
The remaining changes that this SNPRM proposes to make to subpart B
of part 417 involve references made to sections of proposed subpart C
of part 417. This SNPRM modifies and reorganizes proposed subpart C of
part 417. As a result, a number of references made in proposed subpart
B of part 417 to sections in subpart C of part 417 must be changed
accordingly.

Subpart C--Flight Safety Analysis

Subpart C contains proposed requirements governing performance of
flight safety analysis to demonstrate a launch operator's capability to
manage risk to the public from normal and malfunctioning launches. As
originally proposed, subpart C in the NPRM contained both performance
level flight safety analysis requirements and additional detailed
requirements regarding how to satisfy the performance standards.
Comments received from the public as well as the Common Standards
Working Group indicated that subpart C of the original NPRM contained
detail beyond the performance level, and not all the detail described
flight safety analysis methods used by the ranges. In addition,
commenters were concerned that proposed subpart C rigidly mandated an
approach to performing some of the flight safety analyses, even though
more than one acceptable approach might exist. Accordingly, to reflect
the Common Standards Working Group understandings regarding common
flight safety analysis performance requirements, the FAA now proposes
to separate the performance standards

[[Page 49481]]

from the more detailed methodology requirements, which are now proposed
in appendix A. Although the NPRM provided that the FAA would accept
alternate analyses if a launch operator provided a clear and convincing
demonstration of an equivalent level of safety, 14 CFR Sec. 417.203(f)
(proposed in the October 2000 NPRM), the FAA made this organizational
change to promote the understanding that it has the ability to accept
alternate approaches. A launch operator who satisfied the subpart C
requirements with an alternate analysis would not need to use appendix
A. This is the FAA's intent for licensed launches that take place at a
federal launch range where the FAA baseline safety assessment of the
federal range will document the range's implementation of the subpart C
requirements. Appendix A requirements would typically apply for
licensed launches from non-federal launch sites. As part of the effort
to develop common launch safety requirements, the FAA worked with the
federal ranges to develop the performance level requirements for flight
safety analysis presented in this SNPRM.
This SNPRM proposes a rewritten subpart C that only contains
performance requirements for flight safety analysis developed by the
Common Standards Working Group (CSWG). The intent is for each section
of subpart C to contain common performance requirements agreed to by
the Air Force and the FAA that apply to flight safety analysis,
regardless of who performs the analysis, with the understanding that
the methodologies implemented to satisfy the performance requirements
may vary. The public comments on the original NPRM also indicated that
there was significant misunderstanding with regard to the proposed
administrative requirements associated with flight safety analysis. The
revised subpart C in this SNPRM contains modifications to clarify when
a launch operator would be required to perform analyses and submit
analysis products to the FAA and when the launch operator would not,
depending on whether a launch is from a federal range or a non-federal
launch site.
There are criteria that apply to the methodologies used to perform
flight safety analysis that are necessary to define the acceptable
level of fidelity and, when satisfied, ensure consistent analysis
results from one launch to the next. Where the federal ranges typically
strive to ensure that their analysis methodologies are the state of the
art, the FAA's regulations must include methodology requirements that
ensure consistent analysis results for launches from non-federal launch
sites. Therefore, the analysis methodology requirements that were in
the original subpart C of the October 2000 NPRM have been streamlined
and are now contained in appendix A with only a few material changes to
better reflect current practice. In addition, the requirements for
analysis products that would have to be submitted to the FAA, depending
on whether the analysis was performed by a federal range or the launch
operator and in accordance with any specific terms of the license, have
been revised and moved to appendix A (see discussion on revised
appendix A).
The title of Sec. 417.201 is now proposed as ``scope and
applicability.'' Subpart C would contain performance requirements for a
flight safety analysis to be performed as required by Sec. 417.107(d).
As was proposed in the original NPRM, the flight safety analysis
requirements of Sec. 417.233 would apply to the flight of any unguided
suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind weighting safety system. All
other analyses required by subpart C would apply to the flight of any
launch vehicle that is required to use a flight safety system in
accordance with Sec. 417.107(a). A major concern raised in the public
comments to the original NPRM was that many of the analysis
requirements in subpart C may not apply depending on the specifics of
an alternative flight safety system. The last sentence of revised
Sec. 417.201 would clarify that for any alternative flight safety
system approved by the FAA in accordance with 417.107(a)(3), the
applicability of the analysis requirements in subpart C would be
determined during the licensing process, which is current practice.
Section 417.203 now contains proposed requirements related to how a
launch operator would demonstrate compliance with the flight safety
analysis requirements. The requirements of Sec. 417.203(a) and (b) were
taken from Sec. 417.203(a) of the original NPRM. A new sentence was
added to the end of 417.203 (a) to clarify that a launch operator's
flight safety analysis may rely on a previously accepted analysis for
an identical or similar launch if the analysis still applies to the
later launch. This change was made in response to comments expressing
concern that a launch operator might be required to unnecessarily
repeat analyses, which was not the intent of the FAA original proposal
in the NPRM.
Proposed section 417.203(c) reflects the fact that the FAA
anticipates that different launch operators will employ different
methods for satisfying the requirements of proposed subpart C. In the
course of the licensing process the FAA would approve an alternate
flight safety analysis if a launch operator provided a clear and
convincing demonstration that its proposed analysis provided an
equivalent level of safety to that required by proposed subpart C. A
launch operator would be required to demonstrate that an alternate
flight safety analysis was based on accurate data and scientific
principles and was statistically valid. The FAA would not find the
launch operator's application for a license or license modification
sufficiently complete to begin review until the FAA approved the
alternate flight safety analysis. Accordingly, a launch operator may
not change its methods for conducting a flight safety analysis without
FAA approval. A launch operator would have to submit any change to its
flight safety analysis methods to the FAA as a request for license
modification prior to proceeding with the proposed launch.
Sec. 417.203(c) in the SNPRM was taken from Sec. 417.203(f) of the
October 2000 NPRM and provides for flexibility by allowing for
alternate flight safety analysis methods.
Proposed Sec. 417.203(d) has been added to address the issue of
licensed launches that involve federal ranges. The FAA would accept an
alternate flight safety analysis used by a federal launch range for a
licensed launch, if the FAA documented and approved the alternate
flight safety analysis in the FAA baseline safety assessment of that
federal launch range. In this case the FAA would treat the federal
launch range's analysis as that of the launch operator and the launch
operator would not need to provide any further demonstration of
compliance. Licensees are advised to remember that there are different
procedures for complying with part 417, depending on whether a launch
takes place from a federal launch range or from a non-federal launch
site. For a licensee proposing to launch from a federal launch range
where an FAA assessment shows that the safety services of that range
are acceptable, the licensee would not need to provide the FAA any
additional information to comply with subpart C. Only if one of the
range safety analysis methods did not satisfy a subpart C requirement
would a launch operator have to demonstrate satisfaction to the FAA.
Additionally, if an FAA baseline assessment showed that a proposed
licensed launch from a federal range was in some way outside the
experience of the range, the licensee would also have to address any
outstanding issues

[[Page 49482]]

with the FAA, which is current practice under the FAA's current
regulations. Thus, although the part 417 requirements apply to a
licensee proposing to launch from a federal launch range, this
rulemaking does not require the licensee to change its practices at the
range. Only changes in range practice would result in a change for the
launch licensee. A licensee proposing to launch from a launch site for
which no federal launch range provides safety services would, of
course, have to demonstrate compliance with all applicable requirements
to the FAA.
Proposed Sec. 417.203(e) would now contain the timing requirements
for submitting analysis products to the FAA as were proposed in the
original NPRM. Sec. 417.203(e) would further clarify that the
requirements for submitting analysis products apply for licensed
launches that do not qualify for the provisions of paragraph (d) of
this section, that is, the requirements for submitting analysis
products would apply to analyses that have not been performed by a
federal range. The analysis products that were in the various sections
of subpart C of the original NPRM have been streamlined and moved to
appendix A as discussed below. The license application analysis
submittal requirements in Sec. 417.203(e)(1) are repeated without
change from Sec. 417.203(c)(1) of the original NPRM. The six-month
submittal requirements of Sec. 417.203(e)(2) are unchanged from
Sec. 417.203(c)(2) of the original NPRM; however, paragraph (iii) was
added to clarify that if an analysis product has not changed since the
launch operator's license application submittal, the launch operator's
six-month submittal need not repeat the data. The thirty-day submittal
requirements remain unchanged from Sec. 417.203(c)(3) of the original
NPRM; however the second sentence was added to clarify that if an
analysis product has not changed since the six-month analysis
submittal, the launch operator's thirty-day submittal need not repeat
the data. Proposed Sec. 417.203(e)(4) has been added to provide
clarification on how a programmatic flight safety analysis would be
treated. A launch operator would not be required to submit the 6-month
analysis or 30-day analysis update for a launch if the launch operator
submitted complete analysis products during the licensing process and
demonstrated that all parts of the analysis applied to each launch to
be conducted under the license and that the analysis did not need to be
updated to account for launch specific factors.
Proposed Sec. 417.205 would now contain general performance
requirements that apply to all the various sub-analyses that make up a
flight safety analysis. The first sentence of paragraph Sec. 417.205(a)
contains the same requirement for controlling risk to the public as the
first sentence in Sec. 417.203(a) of the original NPRM, except that the
requirements are now placed on the flight safety analysis regardless of
who performs the analysis. The FAA intends this editorial change to
clarify that the analysis may be performed by the launch operator or a
federal range. The remainder of Sec. 417.205(a) of the SNPRM proposes
new performance requirements for how an analysis demonstrates control
of risk by employing risk assessment or hazard isolation or a
combination of both. The ranges have historically preferred the use of
hazard isolation over risk assessment as the safer approach to the
extent practicable. The FAA does recognize that most launches from the
ranges reflect a combination of hazard isolation and risk assessment.
The FAA agrees that hazard isolation is preferable; however, because a
regulation must identify the acceptable limit for purposes of safety,
admonitions to use the safer of two acceptable options are not readily
codified. The FAA does, however, expect hazard isolation to be the
method of choice whenever practical while permitting a combination or
choice of either approach. Hazard isolation not only offers the safer
approach, it also tends to be analytically easier to demonstrate
satisfaction of the requirements. Risk assessment may, however, while
requiring more analysis to prove satisfaction of the requirements, also
provide greater operational flexibility on the day of launch.
Proposed paragraph Sec. 417.205(b) contains performance
requirements for the input and output of dependent analyses to be
compatible to ensure accuracy of the analysis products and is
essentially the same as Sec. 417.203(e) of the original NPRM.
Proposed section 417.207 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any trajectory analysis. Sec. 417.207
does not contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000
NPRM. Sec. 417.207 combines Sec. 417.205(a) of the October 2000 NPRM
with the general requirements that were in other paragraphs of
Sec. 417.205 of the NPRM and reflects input from the CSWG to better
capture current practice at the Air Force ranges. The remaining
trajectory analysis methodology requirements that were proposed by
Sec. 417.205 of the October 2000 NPRM have been streamlined and moved
to A417.7 of appendix A of part 417. Many of the other analyses, such
as those performed to establish flight safety limits and hazard areas,
would use the products of the trajectory analysis as input.
Sec. 417.207 would require that a trajectory analysis determine, for
any time after lift-off, the limits of a launch vehicle's normal
flight. Normal flight is defined as proposed in section 417.103 the
flight of a properly performing launch vehicle whose real-time
instantaneous impact point does not deviate from the nominal
instantaneous impact point by more than the sum of the wind effects and
the three-sigma performance deviations in the uprange, downrange, left-
crossrange, or right-crossrange directions. In Sec. 417.205(f) of the
October 2000 NPRM, the FAA proposed that a launch operator use a six-
degree-of-freedom trajectory model to generate each required three-
sigma trajectory. The FAA now proposes to require that only the final
trajectory analysis must employ a six-degree of freedom trajectory
model because the CSWG concluded that three-degree of freedom
trajectory models may satisfy preliminary trajectory analysis
requirements. The FAA proposes to delete the use of instantaneous
impact point distance from its nominal location as a reference because
specifying the reference might appear to rule out other acceptable
alternatives. The FAA is making this change to allow for greater
flexibility.
Proposed section 417.209 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any malfunction turn analysis.
Proposed section 417.209 combines Sec. 417.207(a) of the October 2000
NPRM with the more general requirements that were in other paragraphs
of Sec. 417.207 of the NPRM and reflects input from the CSWG to better
capture current practice at the Air Force ranges. The remaining
malfunction turn analysis methodology requirements that were proposed
in Sec. 417.207 of the October 2000 NPRM have been streamlined and
moved to A417.9 of appendix A of part 417. A malfunction turn analysis
would be required to determine a launch vehicle's turning capability
using sets of malfunction turn curves, consistent with current
practice. The FAA has deleted ``greatest turning capability'' from the
first sentence of Sec. 417.207(a) of the October 2000 NPRM, which is
now in Sec. 417.209 of the SNPRM. This change is being made to clarify
that the products of a malfunction turn analysis are not limited to
just the greatest

[[Page 49483]]

turning capability. The greatest turning capability of the launch
vehicle, which would be defined by the envelope of a set of turn
curves, would be used for establishing flight safety limits.
The FAA is now proposing that a malfunction turn analysis account
for the relative probability of occurrence of each malfunction turn.
Although not proposed in the October 2000 NPRM, this performance
requirement is consistent with current practice at the federal ranges
and is necessary to facilitate use of risk analysis, which is an option
that may provide a launch operator greater flexibility. Malfunction
turns are typically described in terms of either their cause or effect.
The FAA proposes that a malfunction turn analysis account for the cause
in order for probabilities to be assigned, and the effects in order to
assess debris impact probabilities. Typical causes of malfunction turns
include thrust offset and burn through. Thrust offset may include
failures in the gimbals or in the flow of thrust vector control fluid.
A nozzle burn through may result in an imbalance in the thrust. If a
nozzle breaks off, the loss may produce an imbalance in the thrust of
the launch vehicle and consequent changes in its velocity vector.
Launch vehicle systems such as the examples discussed above and others
that could be the cause of a malfunction turn may fail in many ways. If
a flight safety analysis is to make greater use of risk analysis the
causes of possible malfunction turns need to be identified and their
probabilities determined.
Proposed section 417.211 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any debris analysis. Sec. 417.211 does
not contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM;
however, the provisions of the NPRM have been reorganized, and
modifications are proposed to better reflect current practice at the
federal ranges. Sec. 417.211 combines Sec. 417.209(a) of the October
2000 NPRM with some general requirements from other paragraphs of
Sec. 417.209 of the NPRM. The remaining debris analysis methodology
requirements that were in Sec. 417.209 of the October 2000 NPRM have
been streamlined and moved to A417.11 of appendix A to part 417.
Section 417.211 would require a debris analysis to identify the
inert, explosive, and other hazardous launch vehicle debris that
results from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight. A debris
model would consist of lists of the debris fragments that are planned
as part of a launch or that result from breakup of the launch vehicle.
The lists would account for and describe all debris fragments and their
physical characteristics. These debris lists would be necessary as
input to other flight safety analyses such as those performed to
establish flight safety limits and hazard areas and to determine if the
launch satisfies the public risk criteria.
Proposed section 417.213 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to flight safety limits analysis and
would capture current practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.213 does
not contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM;
however, the provisions of the NPRM have been reorganized. Sec. 417.213
combines Sec. 417.213(a) of the October 2000 NPRM with the performance
requirements from other paragraphs of Sec. 417.213 of the NPRM. The
remaining flight safety limits analysis methodology requirements that
were in Sec. 417.213 of the NPRM have been streamlined and moved to
A417.13 of appendix A to part 417. Sec. 417.213 also combines specific
flight control lines analysis requirements from Sec. 417.211 of the
October 2000 NPRM. The SNPRM would eliminate the requirement for a
separate flight control line analysis. The flight control lines
analysis was proposed in the NPRM to identify the protected areas and
account for map and tracking errors. The FAA now proposes to include
the identification of protected areas and accounting for map and
tracking errors as part of the flight safety limits analysis.
Proposed section 417.213 would require a flight safety limits
analysis to identify the location of populated or other protected areas
and establish flight safety limits that define when a flight safety
official must terminate a launch vehicle's flight to prevent the
hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts from reaching any
populated or other protected area and ensure that the launch satisfies
the public risk criteria of Sec. 417.107(b). The public risk management
requirements of proposed Sec. 417.205(a), in general, allow a flight
safety analysis to employ risk assessment or hazard isolation, or a
combination of risk assessment and partial isolation of the hazards to
demonstrate control of the risk to the public. Because flight safety
limits are to be implemented for the specific situation when a
malfunctioning launch vehicle is heading for a protected area, the FAA
proposes that the flight safety limits should provide for a measure of
isolation from impacting debris hazards. Were risk the sole measure
used to establish flight safety limits, a low probability of launch
vehicle failure might result in flight safety limits that would not
represent the boundaries of safe flight in the event of a failure.
Although flight safety limits provide a form of hazard isolation,
they must also reflect and support how a launch satisfies the public
risk criterion for debris. Current practice provides a good example of
how this approach works. At the Eastern Range, the 45th Space Wing
establishes destruct lines, which constitute one kind of flight safety
limit, to prevent debris with a ballistic coefficient of three \28\ or
more from reaching protected areas. Nonetheless, debris with a
ballistic coefficient of less than three may still reach protected
areas and may cause casualties, as discussed previously. A flight
safety analysis would assess the ``residual risk,'' risk due to any
hazard not isolated from the public, to determine whether the public
risk criterion is satisfied. The FAA proposes in this SNPRM to require
that the debris risk assessment of proposed section 417.225 account for
the risk due to debris with kinetic energy at impact of 11 ft-lbs. With
this measure of what may cause a casualty, the risk assessment may show
that flight safety limits designed to isolate debris with a ballistic
coefficient of three still permit too much risk due to more wind
sensitive debris pieces with ballistic coefficients of less than three.
For example, a large number of small pieces of debris or large crowds
at the edge of the flight safety limits might increase risk to
unacceptable levels. In that case, the FAA's proposed requirements
would mandate that the flight safety limits be adjusted to ensure that
the launch satisfied the public risk criteria of proposed section
417.107(b). If the flight safety limits were designed to isolate debris
with a kinetic energy of 11 ft-lbs at impact, there would be no need to
assess the residual risk due to debris outside of the flight safety
limits. Of course, a flight safety analysis would still need to assess
the risk due to the potential for flight termination system failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\28\ As proposed in Appendix A of part 417 of this SNPRM, the
FAA proposes to rely on a ballistic coefficient of three to
establish flight safety limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed section 417.215 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any straight-up time analysis and
captures current practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.215 does not
contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM;
however, the provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been reorganized.
Proposed section 417.215 combines Sec. 417.215(a) of the October 2000
NPRM with the top-level

[[Page 49484]]

requirements that were in other paragraphs of Sec. 417.215 of the
October 2000 NPRM. The remaining straight-up time analysis methodology
requirements that were in Sec. 417.215 of the October 2000 NPRM have
been streamlined and moved to A417.15 of appendix A to part 417. A
straight-up time analysis would be required to establish the straight-
up time as the latest time after liftoff, assuming a launch vehicle
malfunctions and flies in a vertical or near vertical direction above
the launch point, at which activation of the launch vehicle's flight
termination system or breakup of the launch vehicle would not cause
hazardous debris or critical overpressure to affect any populated or
other protected area. Straight-up time is a special type of flight
safety limit used to address this specific type of failure. In the
event of such a failure, the flight safety official would terminate
flight at the straight-up time to ensure that hazardous debris effects
do not extend to populated or other protected areas.
Proposed section 417.217 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any no longer terminate gate analysis
and captures current practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.217 does
not contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM;
however, the provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been reorganized.
Section 417.217 combines Sec. 417.219(a) of the October 2000 NPRM with
the performance requirements that were in other paragraphs of
Sec. 417.219 of the October 2000 NPRM. The remaining analysis
methodology requirements that were in Sec. 417.219 of the October 2000
NPRM have been streamlined and moved to A417.17 of appendix A to part
417.
A no longer terminate gate analysis would be required to determine
the portion, referred to as a gate, of a flight safety limit, through
which a launch vehicle's tracking icon is allowed to proceed without a
launch operator being required to terminate flight. A tracking icon is
the representation of a launch vehicle's position in flight available
on a flight safety official console during real-time tracking of the
launch vehicle's flight. The products of a no longer terminate gate
analysis are necessary for establishing flight termination rules for
any planned launch vehicle flight over a populated or other protected
area. Once a launch vehicle traversed a gate, flight would not be
terminated while the vehicle's debris impact dispersion footprint was
over the protected area.
Proposed section 417.219 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any data loss flight time analysis and
captures current practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.219 does not
contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM;
however, the provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been reorganized
and some modifications have been made to better reflect current
practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.219 combines Sec. 417.221(a)
of the October 2000 NPRM with the performance requirements that were in
other paragraphs of Sec. 417.221 of the October 2000 NPRM. The
remaining analysis methodology requirements that were in Sec. 417.221
of the October 2000 NPRM have been streamlined and moved to A417.19 of
appendix A to part 417.
Proposed section 417.219 would require a flight safety analysis to
establish data loss flight times and a no longer terminate time for use
in establishing flight termination rules that apply when launch vehicle
tracking data is not available to the flight safety official. A data
loss flight time would be the shortest elapsed thrusting time during
which a launch vehicle could move from its normal trajectory to a
condition where the launch vehicle's hazardous debris impact dispersion
extended to any protected area. A flight safety official uses data loss
flight times as the longest time he would wait before terminating
flight when launch vehicle tracking data became unavailable. Current
practice recognizes that loss of tracking data does not necessarily
mean that a launch vehicle failure has occurred. The launch may
continue in the absence of tracking data, but only for the period of
time that the launch vehicle debris impact dispersion could not reach a
protected area. The analysis would assume that a malfunction occurred
when the tracking data was lost and that the launch vehicle headed for
the nearest protected area. If tracking was not restored before the
launch vehicle debris impact dispersion could reach the protected area,
the flight would have to be terminated. Although the October 2000 NPRM
proposed that the time describe the shortest elapsed time in which
public endangerment could become possible, because current practice
only accounts for debris as a hazard for purposes of determining flight
safety limits, the FAA proposes to modify this provision to reflect the
true nature of the concern: namely, debris impacts. Because the
earliest destruct time is in fact the first data loss flight time, the
SNPRM eliminates as redundant all references to the earliest destruct
time. A flight safety analysis would also determine the no longer
terminate time for a launch, which would replace the term ``no longer
endanger time.'' The CSWG recommended that the FAA propose this change
in terminology because no longer endanger time has different uses at
different ranges and in some cases may be somewhat of a misnomer. No
longer terminate time is a more generally applicable term that better
reflects its actual implementation. The SNPRM proposes to provide
streamlined definitions and requirements for data loss flight times and
the no longer terminate time that are consistent with current practice.
The analysis for no longer terminate time would establish the time
after liftoff that a launch vehicle's hazardous debris impact
dispersion could no longer reach any protected area from that time
forward to final impact or orbital insertion as the no longer terminate
time for the launch. Different federal ranges use different terminology
for data lose flight times and no longer terminate time. The FAA is
proposing the use of generic terms and requirements that, for all
intents and purposes, are consistent with current practice at the
federal ranges.
The SNPRM contains a modification to better reflect current
practice at the federal ranges for launches where a gate permits
overflight of a protected area and where orbital insertion occurs after
reaching the gate. In such cases, the no longer terminate time would be
the time after liftoff when the time for the launch vehicle's
instantaneous impact point to reach the gate is less than the time for
the instantaneous impact point to reach any flight safety limit.
Current practice embraces this approach for at least two reasons. If a
launch vehicle performs normally until that point in its trajectory, it
will almost certainly enter the gate. If flight were terminated after
that time, there would be a greater likelihood of debris impacting the
protected area than if the flight were allowed to continue.
Proposed section 417.221 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any time delay analysis and captures
current practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.221 does not contain
any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM; however, the
provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been reorganized. Sec. 417.221
combines Sec. 417.223(a) of the October 2000 NPRM with the requirements
that were in other paragraphs of Sec. 417.223 of the October 2000 NPRM.
The remaining analysis methodology requirements that were in
Sec. 417.223 of the October 2000 NPRM

[[Page 49485]]

have been streamlined and moved to A417.21 of appendix A to part 417.
Proposed section 417.221 would require a time delay analysis to
determine the mean elapsed time between the violation of a flight
termination rule and the time when the flight safety system is capable
of terminating flight so that flight termination would occur. A time
delay analysis would have to account for all sources of time delay that
could have an effect on identifying when a launch vehicle malfunction
occurred and how quickly flight could be terminated once a malfunction
was identified. Proposed Sec. 417.221 would clarify that a time delay
analysis would be required to account for the variance of time delays
for each potential failure scenario, including but not limited to, the
range of malfunction turn characteristics and the time of flight when
the malfunction occurred.
Proposed section 417.223 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any hazard area analysis and captures
current practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.223 does not contain
any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM; however, the
provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been reorganized. Sec. 417.223
contains the requirements that were in Sec. 417.225(a) of the October
2000 NPRM. The remaining analysis methodology requirements that were in
Sec. 417.225 of the October 2000 NPRM have been streamlined and moved
to A417.23 of appendix A to part 417.
The FAA would require a flight hazard area analysis to identify any
regions of land, sea, or air that must be monitored, publicized,
controlled, or evacuated to control the risk to the public from debris
impact hazards. The risk management requirements of Sec. 417.205(a)
would apply. Proposed section 417.225(a) of the October 2000 NPRM
stated that hazard areas must be implemented to ``ensure public
safety.'' The requirements for satisfying the various public risk
criteria were spread throughout other paragraphs in Sec. 417.225 of the
October 2000 NPRM. In keeping with the intent of defining the
performance requirements, the new proposed section 417.223 now states
that the risk management requirements of proposed Sec. 417.205(a) would
apply. Managing the risk to the public, which involves employing risk
assessment or hazard isolation, or a combination of risk assessment and
partial isolation of the hazards to demonstrate control of the risk to
the public and that the public risk criteria are satisfied as required
by proposed Sec. 417.205(a), in effect, provides for the necessary
assurance of public safety. Consistent with current practice at the
federal ranges, the analysis would account for, but need not be limited
to, regions of land potentially exposed to debris resulting from normal
flight events and events resulting from any potential malfunction,
regions of sea and air potentially exposed to debris from normal flight
events, including planned impacts, and in the vicinity of the launch
site, any waterborne vessels or aircraft exposed to debris from events
resulting from any potential abnormal flight events, including launch
vehicle malfunction.
For sea and air regions beyond the vicinity of the launch site, a
typical flight hazard area analysis would only account for normal
flight events, including planned impacts. Historically, the probability
of impacts to aircraft and waterborne vessels due to potential launch
vehicle malfunctions has been significant only during the initial
stages of flight that take place in the vicinity of the launch site.
Typically, once a launch vehicle is beyond the vicinity of the launch
site the impact dispersions are large enough and the instantaneous
impact point moves fast enough that the probability of impacts to
aircraft and waterborne vessels due to potential launch vehicle
malfunctions is negligible in comparison to those in the vicinity of
the launch site. Furthermore, the probability of a launch vehicle
malfunction is typically at its highest during the initial stages of
flight, which generally includes the point where the vehicle
experiences the maximum dynamic pressure. Once a launch vehicle has
completed the initial stages of flight and is beyond the vicinity of
the launch site, aerodynamic forces on the launch vehicle are generally
small due to the reduced atmospheric density at high altitudes.
However, proposed Sec. 417.205(a) would require the analysis to
identify any regions of land, sea, or air that must be monitored,
publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to control the risk to
the public from debris hazards and would not limit where flight hazard
areas may need to be established.
Proposed section 417.225 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any debris risk analysis and includes
requirements for the debris thresholds to be applied when calculating
debris risk. The current practice for debris risk analysis may vary
from launch site to launch site and from vehicle to vehicle. Proposed
section 417.225 of this SNPRM contains proposed common performance
requirements that would apply to all launches at federal ranges and
non-federal launch sites. Proposed section 417.225 combines
Sec. 417.227(a) of the October 2000 NPRM with the requirements from
other paragraphs of Sec. 417.227 of the October 2000 NPRM. The
remaining analysis methodology requirements that were in Sec. 417.227
of the October 2000 NPRM have been streamlined and moved to A417.25 of
appendix A to part 417.
The FAA would require that a debris risk analysis would demonstrate
that the risk to the public potentially exposed to inert and explosive
debris hazards from any one flight of a launch vehicle satisfied the
public risk criterion of proposed Sec. 417.107(b)(1) for debris. A
debris risk analysis would account for risk to populations on land,
including regions under launch vehicle flight following passage through
any gate in a flight safety limit established in accordance with
Sec. 417.217. A debris risk analysis would account for any potential
casualties to the public in accordance with the debris thresholds and
requirements of proposed Sec. 417.107(c). The October 2000 NPRM
provided that a debris risk analysis need not account for debris with a
ballistic coefficient of less than three. The FAA realizes that
ballistic coefficient may not be the best parameter to use as an
indication of casualty. A casualty could result from debris with a
ballistic coefficient of less than three. The reverse may also be true.
An impact of debris with a ballistic coefficient just greater than
three might not result in casualty. The FAA in coordination with the
Air Force has reviewed the recent human vulnerability modeling results
and believes that, for typical space launch vehicle debris masses and
shapes, for the purposes of a debris risk analysis, it is reasonable to
consider the potential for casualty due to blunt trauma when a human is
subjected to any inert debris impact with a mean expected kinetic
energy greater than or equal to 11 ft-lbs. Further discussion and
results of the research on this issue are provided in paragraph III.C.1
of this notice. Proposed section 417.225 would now reference proposed
Sec. 417.107(c), which requires that an analysis account for inert
debris impacts with mean expected kinetic energy at impact greater than
or equal to 11 ft-lbs.
The October 2000 NPRM proposed that in a debris risk analysis, the
effective casualty area of any explosive debris, such as solid
propellant fragments that would result from break up of the launch
vehicle during flight and that would explode upon impact with the
Earth's surface, would account for a 3.0 psi blast overpressure radius.

[[Page 49486]]

This is typical of current practice for analysis of people in the open.
However, using a 3.0-psi blast overpressure radius is generally
inappropriate for analysis of people in typical buildings. The FAA in
coordination with the Air Force has reviewed the recent human
vulnerability modeling results and now proposes that a peak incident
overpressure of 1.0 psi or greater due to any explosive debris impact
as a practical threshold for explosive debris, excluding window
breakage effects treated in the far field blast overpressure analysis.
Further discussion and results of the research on this issue are
provided in paragraph III.C.2 of this notice. Proposed section 417.225
would now reference proposed Sec. 417.107(c), which requires that the
analysis account for any public risk in populated areas potentially
subject to peak incident overpressure of 1.0 psi or greater due to any
explosive debris impact.
Proposed section 417.227 of the SNPRM contains performance
requirements that would apply to any toxic release hazard analysis and
captures current practice at the federal ranges. Sec. 417.227 does not
contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM;
however, the provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been reorganized.
The requirements of Sec. 417.227 were moved from Sec. 417.229 of the
October 2000 NPRM. The proposed analysis methodology requirements
continue to be provided in appendix I to part 417, which remains
unchanged from the October 2000 NPRM.
A toxic release analysis would be required to establish flight
commit criteria that ensure compliance with the public risk criterion
of Sec. 417.107(b)(1). The analysis would account for any toxic release
that would occur during normal or malfunctioning launch vehicle flight.
The analysis would account for any operational constraints and
emergency procedures that would provide protection from toxic release.
The analysis would account for all members of the public on land and on
any waterborne vessels and aircraft not operated in direct support of
the launch.
Proposed section 417.229 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to any far-field overpressure blast
effects analysis, which was referred to in the NPRM as distant focus
overpressure blast effects analysis. Proposed section 417.229 combines
Sec. 417.231(a) of the October 2000 NPRM with the other performance
requirements from other paragraphs of Sec. 417.231 of the October 2000
NPRM. Section 417.229 of the SNPRM contains modified requirements with
substantial streamlining and modifications made for clarity, to provide
more flexibility, and to better capture current practice at the federal
ranges. Section 417.229(a) combines paragraphs (a) and (c) from
Sec. 417.231 of the October 2000 NPRM. Section 417.229(a) now states
that a flight safety analysis must establish flight commit criteria
that ensure compliance with the public risk criterion. Thus, the SNPRM
now proposes the option of performing a risk analysis to assess the
potential for casualties due to window breakage consistent with the
updated public risk criteria regarding blast risk. To provide greater
consistency with current practice, paragraph (a) clarifies that a
flight safety analysis must demonstrate that any potential source of
far field blast overpressure due to explosions during launch vehicle
flight, not just distant focus overpressure from debris impacts, will
not cause window breakage. Alternatively, the analysis must demonstrate
satisfaction of the risk criteria. The SNPRM emphasizes that the hazard
of concern is ``far field blast overpressure due to explosions during
launch vehicle flight,'' which excludes consideration of potential
sonic boom effects due to normal flight in this analysis. Potential
sonic boom effects are typically considered in the environmental review
process. Given the proposed 1.0 psi threshold for debris risk analysis,
the FAA proposes that the far field blast overpressure analysis must
account for any potential source of far field blast overpressure to
ensure adequate public protection from potential window breakage
hazards and remain consistent with current practice. Past experience at
the Eastern and Western Ranges demonstrates that debris impacts are the
overwhelmingly dominant source of public risk due to far field blast
overpressure (peak incident overpressures below 1.0 psi). However,
improperly designed flight termination systems may produce propellant
explosions at altitude with the potential to break windows in protected
areas.
Section 417.229(b) would provide performance requirements that
apply to any far-field blast overpressure analyses, in lieu of the
prescriptive requirements proposed in the October 2000 NPRM. Although
proposed paragraph (b)(5) would require an analysis to account for the
characteristics of potentially affected windows, including size,
location, orientation, glazing material, and condition, the FAA does
not intend this to require a physical survey of potentially affected
public areas. Instead, reasonable assumptions based on the building
construction and characteristics typical of the affected public areas
may be applied to account for the characteristics of potentially
affected windows. For example, as described in A417.29 of appendix A of
this SNPRM, the FAA foresees that a launch operator could demonstrate
that far field blast overpressure due to potential explosions during
launch vehicle flight will not cause windows to break based on the
equations and assumptions of the American National Standard
``Estimating Air Blast Characteristics for Single Point Explosions in
Air, with a Guide to Evaluation of Atmospheric Propagation and
Effects,'' ANSI S2.20-1983. The remaining analysis methodology
requirements of Sec. 417.231 of the October 2000 NPRM have been
streamlined and moved to A417.29 of appendix A to part 417.
Proposed section 417.231 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to collision avoidance analysis and
captures current practice at federal ranges. Proposed section 417.231
does not contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000
NPRM; however, the provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been
reorganized. Proposed section 417.231 contains the requirements that
were in Sec. 417.233(a) of the October 2000 NPRM. The title of
Sec. 417.233 in the NPRM was ``Conjunction on launch assessment, ``
which is a term used by United States Space Command. The SNPRM changes
the title of the proposed section to ``Collision avoidance analysis,''
to be more consistent with common terminology used at the federal
ranges. The analysis methodology requirements that were in Sec. 417.233
of the October 2000 NPRM have been moved to A417.31 of appendix A to
part 417.
A federal launch range will typically perform a collision avoidance
analysis for any launch from that range. If no federal range is
involved in the launch, the launch operator would obtain a collision
avoidance analysis from United States Space Command. A launch operator
would implement any waits in the launch window, as identified by United
States Space Command, during which flight must not be initiated in
order to maintain a 200-kilometer separation from any habitable
orbiting object.
Proposed section 417.233 of the SNPRM contains the performance
requirements that would apply to the flight safety analysis for launch
of an unguided suborbital rocket flown with a wind weighting safety
system and

[[Page 49487]]

captures current practice at federal ranges. Proposed section 417.233
does not contain any new requirements as compared to the October 2000
NPRM; however, the provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been
reorganized. Proposed section 417.233 contains the requirements that
were in Sec. 417.235(a) of the October 2000 NPRM. The remaining
analysis methodology requirements that were in Sec. 417.235 of the
October 2000 NPRM have been moved to A417.33 of appendix A to part 417.
The analysis would be required to establish the launch commit criteria
and other launch safety rules to control the risk to the public due to
potential adverse effects resulting from normal and malfunctioning
flight and ensure satisfaction of the public risk criteria. The
analysis would establish any wind constraints under which launch could
occur and include a wind weighting analysis that established the
launcher azimuth and elevation settings that corrected for the
windcocking and wind-drift effects on the unguided suborbital rocket..
Appendix A--Flight Safety Analyses Methodologies and Products
The SNPRM combines requirements that were in the original appendix
A to part 417 of the October 2000 NPRM with requirements moved from
part 417, subpart C of the October 2000 NPRM to create a comprehensive
flight safety analysis methodologies and products appendix. A417.1
would provide the scope of the appendix. Appendix A would contain
requirements for the methods used in performing flight safety analysis
as required by Sec. 417.107(d) and subpart C of part 417. The
methodologies contained in appendix A would represent acceptable means
of satisfying the analysis performance requirements of subpart C and
provide a standard against which any proposed alternative analysis
approach would be measured. Appendix A would also identify the analysis
products that a launch operator would be required to submit to the FAA
in accordance with Sec. 417.203(e).
Comments received regarding the October 2000 NPRM indicated that
there was confusion as to who had to perform various flight safety
analyses and regarding when the various analysis methodology
requirements applied, in particular with regard to licensed launches
from federal ranges. A417.3 would clarify that the requirements of
appendix A would apply to a launch operator and the launch operator's
flight safety analysis unless the launch operator demonstrated that an
alternative approach provided an equivalent level of safety. If a
federal launch range performed the launch operator's analysis,
Sec. 417.203(d) would apply. Proposed appendix A section A417.33 would
apply to the flight of any unguided suborbital launch vehicle that used
a wind weighting safety system. All other sections of appendix A would
apply to the flight of any launch vehicle required to use a flight
safety system in accordance with proposed Sec. 417.107(a). For any
alternative flight safety system approved by the FAA in accordance with
417.107(a)(3), the FAA would determine the applicability of appendix A
during the licensing process.
Proposed section A417.5 references important requirements of the
new proposed Sec. 417.205 that a launch operator would need to know
when satisfying the requirements of appendix A. These requirements are
the general performance requirements for public risk management and the
requirements for the compatibility of the input and output of dependent
analyses.
The remaining sections of appendix A do not contain any new
requirements as compared to the October 2000 NPRM and current practice;
however, the provisions of the October 2000 NPRM have been reorganized
and in a number of cases, the requirements have been significantly
streamlined in response to comments received on the NPRM and to provide
greater consistency with current practice. Comments will be addressed
in the final rule. Requirements that were in subpart C of part 417 of
the October 2000 NPRM were streamlined where possible and moved to
appendix A. For example, paragraph A417.7(a) references the new top
level performance requirement, now in section 417.207. The rest of the
material in A417.7 comes from section 417.205 of the original NPRM. The
other sections in appendix A now follow this same approach. For each
new performance requirement section in the revised part 417 subpart C,
there is a section in appendix A. As another example, performance
malfunction turn analysis requirements would now appear in
Sec. 417.211. The methodology requirements for calculating malfunction
turn data and the requirements for analysis products that would apply
to a launch operator's demonstration of compliance would now appear in
A417.11. The flight hazard area analysis requirements that were in the
original appendix A, have now been combined with the flight hazard area
requirements that were in Sec. 417.225 of the October 2000 NPRM and the
combined requirements are now in A417.23. The FAA's goal is to have a
single, all inclusive flight safety analysis appendix that contains
detailed requirements necessary to demonstrate compliance with the
flight safety analysis performance requirements that are now in subpart
C of part 417.
Proposed section A417.7 contains trajectory analysis methodology
requirements that were in Sec. 417.205 of the October 2000 NPRM with
some significant modifications. The NPRM would have allowed the use of
annual or monthly composite wind profiles in a launch operator's
trajectory analysis. Proposed A417.7(b) changes the proposed
requirement to composite wind profiles for the month that a proposed
launch will take place or winds that are as severe or more severe than
the winds for the month that a proposed launch will take place. Annual
winds may or may not represent worst case conditions. Use of annual
winds in some cases can result in significant launch restrictions and
in other cases may result in unsafe analysis results. Use of monthly
wind profiles is current practice at both Air Force ranges and does not
represent any increase in analysis effort. A launch operator would
still be allowed to use ``worst case winds'' in a trajectory analysis.
The October 2000 NPRM would have required that the three-sigma
trajectories be determined assuming a normal bivariate Gaussian
distribution. The SNPRM contains changes that recognize that the
distribution may in fact be something else. Paragraph A417.7(d) now
proposes only that the trajectory analysis describe the distribution.
The original requirements for a Gaussian distribution in the following
paragraphs have been deleted and the paragraphs have been reworded to
reflect the possibility of different distributions. These changes
provide for greater flexibility and broader applicability of the
requirements.
The proposed requirements for a fuel-exhaustion trajectory in SNPRM
paragraph A417.7(d)(3) have been streamlined as compared to
Sec. 417.205(d)(3) of the October 2000 NPRM. As indicated by comments
received on the NPRM the subparagraphs under Sec. 417.205(d)(3) of the
NPRM were in some ways repetitive. The SNPRM contains no new fuel-
exhaustion trajectory requirements. Proposed paragraph A417.7(d)(3) in
the SNPRM has been reworded and the subparagraphs have been deleted to
eliminate repetitiveness. The SNPRM clarifies that the requirements for
a fuel-exhaustion trajectory only apply to launch vehicles with a last
suborbital stage that will terminate thrust nominally without burning
to fuel exhaustion.

[[Page 49488]]

Proposed A417.7(e) of the SNPRM contains requirements for a
straight-up trajectory that remain unchanged from Sec. 417.205(e) of
the October 2000 NPRM.
Proposed A417.7(f) of the SNPRM contains significantly streamlined
requirements from Sec. 417.205(f) of the October 2000 NPRM. The NPRM
would have directed the use of a root-sum-square analysis method or
equivalent and provided some detailed requirements that would apply
only to the root-sum-square method. The revised proposed requirements
of A417.7(f) of the SNPRM provide a more performance oriented approach
that recognizes that there is more than one acceptable analysis
approach. A417.7(f) would still require the use of a six degree of
freedom trajectory model; however, the paragraph would now contain
performance requirements for how the model was used. The root-sum-
square and Monte Carlo methods are now only referred to as examples of
approaches that would satisfy the performance requirements. The
detailed requirements proposed in the NPRM for performing a root-sum-
square analysis have been deleted. Proposed section A417.7(e)(1) now
requires that the analysis identify the distribution of each
performance parameter rather than its standard deviation in recognition
that the distribution may be other than normal.
A417.7(g) of the SNPRM contains requirements for trajectory
analysis products from Sec. 417.205(g) of the October 2000 NPRM with
some streamlining and modifications to remain consistent with changes
made to other paragraphs in section A417.7. Paragraph (g)(2) now
requires a description of the distribution of each performance error as
discussed earlier. Consistent with current practice, the proposed
altitude intervals for the required wind profiles in paragraph (g)(3)
have been changed from 1000 feet to 5000 feet, which results in fewer
data points without any negative effect on the analysis. The last
sentence in paragraph (g)(3) has been deleted in the SNPRM as
redundant. Paragraph (g)(7) was modified in the SNPRM to combine the
original paragraph Sec. 417.205(g)(7) with paragraphs Sec. 417.205
(g)(8) and (9) of the October 2000 NPRM. The SNPRM clarifies the
proposed requirement for total thrust paragraph (g)(7)(xi) is total
vacuum thrust. The requirements for dynamic pressure and Coriolis
displacement proposed in paragraph Sec. 417.205(g)(7)(xiii) and (xiv)
of the NPRM have been deleted in the SNPRM as redundant because they
can be determined from, or are incorporated into, other data that would
be submitted.
Proposed A417.9 of the SNPRM contains requirements for malfunction
turn analysis from Sec. 417.207 of the October 2000 NPRM with some
streamlining and modifications made for clarity, flexibility, and
consistency with current practice. Paragraph (b)(1) now clarifies that
malfunction turn data must be provided for a duration of no less than
12 seconds or the product of 1.2 times the three-sigma upper bound time
delay determined in accordance with A417.21, whichever is greater. New
text in paragraph (b)(1) clarifies that these duration limits apply
regardless of whether or not the vehicle would break up before the
prescribed duration for the turn data. New text in paragraph (b)(2)
states that the analysis must produce malfunction turn data for
malfunctions initiated at intervals of no more than four seconds over
the flight, instead of every trajectory time as proposed previously.
The new text in paragraph (b)(2) is consistent with current 127-1
requirements. The definitions of the different types of malfunction
turns that were in paragraph (b)(3) have been moved to paragraph (d).
This change is purely an organizational change made to improve
readability. Paragraph (b)(4) is revised to clarify that the first
malfunction turn start time must correspond to lift-off. Paragraph
(b)(4) is also revised to clarify that subsequent malfunction turns
must be initiated at regular nominal trajectory time intervals not to
exceed the greater of the three-sigma lower bound delay time or four
seconds. Consistent with current Air Force requirements in EWR127-1,
paragraph (b)(7) is modified to prescribe that gravity effect must be
omitted from all malfunction turn data.
Proposed (d)(7)(ii) would require that if flying a trim turn is not
possible even for a period of only a few seconds, the malfunction turn
analysis would need only establish tumble turns. Otherwise, the
malfunction turn analysis would be required to establish a series of
trim turns, including the maximum-rate trim turn, and the family of
tumble turns. During the part of launch vehicle flight where the
maximum trim angle of attack is small, tumble turns may result in the
greatest malfunction turn angles. If the maximum trim angle of attack
is large, trim turns may lead to higher malfunction turn angles than
tumble turns.
In proposed (d)(7)(iii), where a launch operator would be required
to establish the maximum turning capability of the launch vehicle, a
launch operator would have to account for a launch vehicle that was
unstable at low angles attack but stable at some higher angles of
attack. If both large and small constant engine deflections of the
launch vehicle resulted in tumbling, regardless of how small the
deflection might be, the analysis would have to use the malfunction
turn capabilities achieved at the stability angle of attack, assuming
no upsetting thrust moment, in addition to the turns achieved by a
tumbling vehicle. This situation arises because the stability at high
angles of attack is insufficient to arrest the angular velocity, which
is built up during the initial part of a tumble turn where the launch
vehicle is unstable. Although the launch vehicle cannot arrive at this
stability angle of attack as a result of the constant engine
deflection, there is some deflection behavior, such as the nozzle's
rate of deflection, that will produce this result. If a launch operator
did not elect to employ such a deflection program, the launch operator
could simplify the analysis by assuming that the launch vehicle
instantaneously rotated to the trim angle of attack and stabilized at
this point. In such a case, tumble turn angles could be used during
that part of launch vehicle flight for which the tumble turn envelope
curve maintained a positive slope throughout the duration of the
computation.
The phrase, ``if thrust augmenting rocket motors are used on a
launch vehicle,'' is deleted from paragraph (e)(4)(iii) because the
launch operator would be required to submit vehicle orientation data in
all cases. This modification is consistent with current EWR 127-1
requirements and necessary because the potential for non-symmetric
induced velocities exists irrespective of the presence of thrust
augmenting rocket motors.
Proposed section A417.11 of the SNPRM contains requirements for
debris analysis taken from Sec. 417.227 of the October 2000 NPRM with
some streamlining and modifications made for clarity, to provide more
flexibility, and to remain consistent with current practice. This
section streamlines the October 2000 NPRM in that the same debris
analysis requirements now apply to both intentionally jettisoned debris
and debris resulting from launch vehicle break-up. Paragraph (c)(1)
clarifies that a debris model must provide debris fragment data for the
number of temporal segments sufficient to meet the requirements for
smooth and continuous contours used to define hazard areas as required
by A417.23. Paragraph (c)(8) and sub-paragraphs to (c)(3) are now
consistent with the current Air Force requirements of EWR 127-1. Debris
analysis requirements proposed by the October 2000 NPRM in

[[Page 49489]]

paragraph (c)(9) were moved to the debris risk analysis section
(A417.25) because computation of the effective casualty area for inert
fragments depends on the path angle of the fragment trajectory at
impact. Consistent with current Air Force requirements in EWR 127-1,
paragraph (c)(10)(ii) now allows grouping of fragments with sub-sonic
ballistic coefficients less than or equal to three within a class.
Paragraph (c)(10)(iii) also proposes greater consistency with current
Air Force requirements in EWR 127-1. Minor non-material changes were
made to paragraph (d) and elsewhere to provide more clarity.
Section A417.13 of the SNPRM contains requirements for flight
safety limits analysis from Sec. 417.211 and Sec. 417.213 of the
October 2000 NPRM with some streamlining and modifications made for
clarity, to provide more flexibility, and to remain consistent with
current practice. As previously mentioned, the SNPRM eliminates the
requirement for a separate flight control line analysis. The pertinent
requirements to account for map and tracking errors that were part of
the flight control lines analysis in the October 2000 NPRM are now
included as part of the flight safety limits analysis. The October 2000
NPRM proposed that the flight safety limits ``must ensure that the
launch vehicle's debris impact dispersion does not extend beyond the
flight control lines.'' In keeping with current practice at the federal
ranges, paragraph (b) of the SNPRM expands and clarifies that for a
flight termination at any time during launch vehicle flight, the flight
safety limits would: (1) Represent, but need to be limited to, the
extent of the debris impact dispersion for all debris fragments with
ballistic coefficient greater than or equal to three; and (2) ensure
that the debris impact area on the Earth's surface that is bounded by
the debris impact dispersion in the uprange, downrange and crossrange
directions; does not extend to any populated or other protected area.
Using flight safety limits to protect the public from debris with
ballistic coefficient greater than or equal to three is consistent with
current practice at the federal ranges. Any risk due to more wind
sensitive debris with ballistic coefficients less than three are
typically addressed using risk assessment. Paragraph (c) of the SNPRM
presents the risk management options of employing flight safety limits
that provide hazard isolation or defining flight safety limits that
generally contain hazardous debris together with debris risk assessment
to ensure the public risk criteria are satisfied.
Section A417.15 of the SNPRM contains requirements for straight-up
time analysis from Sec. 417.215 of the October 2000 NPRM with some
streamlining. The SNPRM references sources of debris impact dispersion
of A417.13(b)(4)(ii) through (xiii) instead of re-listing those. In
addition, the SNPRM eliminates the requirement for a sample set of
straight-up time calculations because a description of the methodology
used will suffice.
The SNPRM does not contain a section dedicated to wind analysis
requirements such as Sec. 417.217 of the October 2000 NPRM. Instead,
wind analysis elements have been incorporated into those sections that
involve wind analysis products.
Section A417.17 of the SNPRM contains requirements for a no-longer
terminate gate analysis from Sec. 417.219 of the October 2000 NPRM with
some streamlining. Paragraph (b)(4) was modified to clarify that the
width of the gate must restrict a launch vehicle's normal trajectory
ground trace. Because a ``normal trajectory'' means a trajectory within
three-sigma of nominal with wind effects, the remainder of the (b)(4)
was eliminated as redundant. Similarly, the definition of tracking
representation was eliminated from (c)(1) since the SNPRM provides this
definition in Sec. 417.217.
Section A417.19 of the SNPRM contains requirements for the data
loss flight time and no-longer terminate time analyses taken from
Sec. 417.221 of the October 2000 NPRM, with some streamlining and
modifications made for clarity and to remain consistent with current
practice. Paragraph (b) of the October 2000 NPRM was eliminated as
redundant because the earliest destruct time is, in fact, the first
data loss flight time. Paragraph A417.19(b) of the SNPRM modifies
paragraph (c) of the October 2000 NPRM to provide requirements for the
no-longer terminate time that are consistent with current practice. The
SNPRM effectively replaces the term the no-longer endanger time in
proposed section A417.19 with the more generic term ``no-longer
terminate time'' to be consistent with the performance requirements of
proposed Sec. 417.219. Proposed paragraph (b) adds the clarification
that when determining the no-longer terminate time the analysis would
account for a launch vehicle malfunction that would direct the vehicle
toward the nearest flight safety limit or protected area following the
same requirements proposed for determining the data loss flight times.
Proposed paragraph (c) of the SNPRM modifies paragraph (d) of the
October 2000 NPRM to provide the streamlined definition and
requirements for data loss flight times that are consistent with
current practice.
Section A417.21 of the SNPRM contains requirements for the time
delay analysis from Sec. 417.223 of the October 2000 NPRM with some
streamlining and modifications made for clarity and to remain
consistent with current practice.
Section A417.23 of the SNPRM contains requirements for flight
hazard area analysis from Sec. 417.225 of the October 2000 NPRM with
streamlining and substantial modifications made to enhance clarity, to
provide greater flexibility, and to remain consistent with current
practice. The SNPRM eliminates the reference to ``safety clear zones''
in paragraph (b) because no definition or requirements for such existed
in the October 2000 NPRM with regard to flight safety analysis.
However, the term was used in the proposed ground safety requirements
of subpart E of the NPRM. In keeping with current practice, paragraph
(b) was modified to present the options of employing a launch site
flight hazard area that encompasses the flight safety limits when the
hazard isolation option is employed in accordance A417.13(c) or
encompasses all hazard areas established in accordance with paragraphs
(d) through (i).
Proposed paragraph (d) of section A417.23 would now require that a
debris impact hazard area account for the effects of impacting debris
resulting from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight,
excluding toxic effects, and accounts for potential impact locations of
all debris fragments. The October 2000 NPRM had required the debris
hazard area to account for any toxic effects of debris, which is not
consistent with current practice at the Eastern Range or Western Range.
Paragraph (d)(1) and its sub-paragraphs would provide requirements that
are consistent with current practice at the Eastern Range and Western
Range for determination of an individual casualty contour.
Specifically, the SNPRM clarifies that a debris hazard area must be
bounded by an individual casualty contour that defines where the risk
to an individual would exceed an expected casualty (EC)
criterion of 1 x 10^-6 if one person were assumed to be in
the open and inside the contour during launch vehicle flight. The SNPRM
clarifies that an individual casualty contour would be determined using
the blunt trauma and overpressure effects thresholds common to the Air
Force and the FAA. Elements of the sub-paragraphs to (d) in the

[[Page 49490]]

October 2000 NPRM are re-organized for greater clarity. Also, the sub-
paragraphs to (d) are revised to provide greater flexibility by
specifying performance level requirements. In sub-paragraph (d)(5), the
SNPRM now requires only that the analysis must account for the type of
vehicle breakup, either by the flight termination system or by
aerodynamic forces, eliminating the excess conservatism associated with
the phrase ``whichever results in the greater debris dispersion'' that
appeared in sub-paragraph (d)(4) of the October 2000 NPRM. In sub-
paragraph (d)(6), the SNPRM now requires that the analysis use a
probability of occurrence equal to one for the planned debris fragments
produced by normal separation events during flight, consistent with
current practice. This correction to the October 2000 NPRM provides
positive public protection from planned jettison debris regardless of
the probability of mission success.
Proposed paragraph (e) in section A417.23 of the SNPRM contains
modified requirements for the near-pad blast hazard area that are more
consistent with current practice than those in the October 2000 NPRM.
The paragraph (e) would require a hazard area analysis to define a
blast overpressure hazard area as a circle centered at the launch point
with a radius equal to the 1.0-psi overpressure distance produced by
the equivalent TNT commensurate with the explosive capability of the
vehicle, in lieu of the 3.0 psi overpressure level specified in the
October 2000 NPRM. This modification is generally consistent with
current practice, although overpressure levels used to define near-pad
blast hazard areas for flight vary significantly between ranges. The
Eastern Range uses an overpressure level that is more conservative than
1.0 psi. Also consistent with current practice, the paragraph would
require the establishment of a minimum near-pad blast hazard area to
provide protection from hazardous fragments potentially generated and
propelled by an explosion. These modifications to paragraph (e) are not
expected to produce more restrictive hazard areas because the overall
flight hazard area must envelope the near-pad blast hazard area, the
individual casualty contour, any ship-hit contours, and any aircraft-
hit contour. Typically, a near-pad blast hazard area established to
meet the proposed requirements would not extend beyond the individual
casualty contour.
Proposed paragraph (g) in section A417.23 of the SNPRM contains
modified requirements for the flight hazard area ship-hit contours that
are more consistent with current practice and provide greater
flexibility by specifying performance level requirements. Whereas the
NPRM of October 2000 specified that the ship-hit contour need not
account for debris with a ballistic coefficient less than three, the
SNPRM requires that the ship hit use the blunt trauma and overpressure
effects thresholds common to the Air Force and the FAA. As previously
discussed, these thresholds provide a level of protection commensurate
with current practice.
Proposed section A417.25 of the SNPRM contains requirements for
debris risk requirements from Sec. 417.227 of the October 2000 NPRM
with some streamlining and modifications made for clarity, to provide
more flexibility, and to remain consistent with current practice.
Paragraph (b)(3) would be streamlined by replacing ``planned launch
vehicle events and breakup of a launch vehicle due to activation of a
flight termination system or spontaneous breakup due to a launch
vehicle failure during launch vehicle flight'' with ``normal and
malfunctioning launch vehicle flight.'' Whereas the NPRM of October
2000 indicated that the debris risk analysis would not need to account
for debris with a ballistic coefficient less than three, the SNPRM
specifies that the debris risk analysis must use the blunt trauma and
overpressure effects thresholds common to the Air Force and the FAA.
New text in paragraph (b)(4)(i) of section A417.25 clarifies the
portion of trajectory time for which a debris risk analysis must
account. The text, ``planned flight events and from launch vehicle
failure'' is replaced with ``normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle
flight'' in accordance with discussions with the Common Standards
Working Group. Modifications in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) clarify that the
factors accounted for in the dispersion for each debris class include
the variance produced by break-up imparted velocities and the variance
produced by aerodynamic properties for each debris class. Variance in
the impact dispersion due to aerodynamic properties includes the
effects of lift and drag, whereas the NPRM inadvertently omitted the
influence of lift. Paragraph (b)(4)(iii) is streamlined to delete
redundant text. The phrase, ``performs a survivability analysis and''
is deleted from the second sentence of this paragraph to allow an
assumption of 100% survivability to substitute for a survivability
analysis.
Paragraph (b)(8) of section A417.25 is modified to require the use
the blunt trauma and overpressure effects thresholds common to the Air
Force and the FAA. New text is added as (b)(8)(i) and (b)(8)(ii) to
provide more flexibility in casualty area analysis for inert debris
fragments. The SNPRM proposes a two-tier approach to the casualty area
estimates that allows a simple and conservative estimate (that the
effective casualty area equals seven times the maximum projected area
of the fragment) to substitute for an analysis of the effective
casualty area for each inert debris fragment that accounts for bounce,
skip, slide, and splatter effects based on the path angle of the
fragment trajectory at impact among other influences.
The first sentence of paragraph (b)(9) clarifies that
``traditional'' population growth rate equations are exponential in
nature. The second sentence in this paragraph is deleted as
unnecessarily prescriptive and inflexible. The population model
requirements are streamlined and clarified to define population centers
that are similar enough to be described and treated as a single average
set of characteristics without degrading the accuracy of the debris
risk estimate.
The second sentence in paragraph (b)(10)(iii) of section A417.25 is
modified for clarity by deleting the word ``census.'' Population
density information may come from other sources. Paragraph (c)(3) was
reorganized and modified for clarity to include subparagraphs (i),
(ii), and (iii). Paragraph (c)(3)(i) states, ``Flies within normal
limits until some malfunction causes spontaneous breakup or results in
a commanded flight termination.'' Paragraph (c)(3)(ii) is modified to
read, ``Experiences malfunction turns.'' This new failure scenario text
is consistent with current EWR 127-1 requirements. Paragraph
(c)(3)(iii) is added to read, ``Flight safety system fails to
function.'' The word ``cell'' in Paragraph (c)(4) is replaced with
``center'' to reflect current practice. New text is added to account
for a population model containing a description of the shelter
characteristics within the population center. The new text in paragraph
(c)(4) identifies a population characteristic currently used in Range
Safety population models.
The SNPRM proposes minor modifications to paragraph (c) form
completeness, to enhance clarity, and to require that the debris risk
analysis products are consistent with current practice as well as the
proposed requirements. In sub-paragraph (7)(i), the SNPRM clarifies
that the debris analysis products must describe the

[[Page 49491]]

propellant composition, instead of its ingredients. This correction
indicates that the relevant information is the product of propellant
formulation process. Whereas the October 2000 NPRM required simply that
the debris analysis products must include a description of the ``thrust
profile,'' the SNPRM clarifies this requirement by specifying the
``vacuum thrust profile'' in sub-paragraph (7)(ii). Because the SNPRM
specifies that the ``vacuum thrust profile'' is used to describe the
``thrust profile,'' the FAA proposes to add sub-paragraph (7)(viii) to
require description of the corresponding nozzle entrance and exit areas
for completeness. Section A417.229 of the SNPRM contains modified
requirements based on Sec. 417.231 of the October 2000 NPRM with
substantial streamlining and modifications made for clarity, to provide
more flexibility, and to remain consistent with current practice.
Paragraph (a) combines paragraphs (a) and (c) from Sec. 417.231 of the
October 2000 NPRM. Paragraph (a) now states that a flight safety
analysis must account for distant focus overpressure and any
overpressure enhancement to establish the potential for broken windows
due to peak incident overpressures below 1.0 psi and related casualties
due to falling or projected glass shards. Paragraph (a) also provides
the option to perform a risk analysis to assess the potential for
casualties due to window breakage consistent with the updated public
risk criteria regarding blast risk. To provide greater consistency with
current practice, paragraph (a) clarifies that a flight safety analysis
must account for any potential source of far-field overpressure that
may cause window breakage, not exclusively distant focus overpressure
from debris impacts. Given the proposed 1.0 psi threshold for debris
risk analysis, the FAA and Air Force concluded that the proposed far-
field blast overpressure analysis must account for any potential source
of far-field overpressure to ensure adequate public protection from
potential window breakage hazards. Past experience at the ER and WR
demonstrates that debris impacts are the overwhelmingly dominant source
of public due risk due to far field overpressure (peak incident
overpressures below 1.0 psi). Paragraph (b) now provides performance
level requirements that apply to both hazard analysis and probabilistic
far-field blast overpressure analyses, in lieu of the prescriptive
requirements put forth in the October 2000 NPRM.
Section A417.31 of the SNPRM contains requirements for collision
avoidance analysis taken from Sec. 417.233 of the October 2000 NPRM
with some streamlining and modifications made for clarity. The terms
``licensee'' and ``license applicant'' in A417.31 are now renamed
``launch operator'' to reflect similar terminology used throughout
other sections. The second sentence in paragraph (b)(3) now states,
``If an updated conjunction on launch assessment is needed due to a
launch delay, a launch operator must submit the request to United
States Space Command at least 12 hours prior to the beginning of the
new launch window.'' This clarifies the agency responsible for
receiving collision avoidance analysis requests and the lead-time for
such requests. The launch assessment worksheet, figure A417.31 1., in
paragraph (c) is no longer necessary. All data requirements are
described in the following text. Removal of the figure streamlines this
section and eliminates the requirement to revise this section when the
assessment worksheet format changes. The second sentence in paragraph
(c)(5) originally read, ``The term `vector at injection' is used to
identify the position and velocity vectors after the thrust for a
segment has ended.'' This is now changed to read, ``The term `vector at
injection' is used to identify the position and velocity of all orbital
or suborbital segments after the thrust for a segment has ended.'' This
is more technically correct. Paragraph (c)(5) is streamlined by
deleting the third sentence. This sentence is unnecessary since it
provides a previous definition to a term that is no longer used.
Position and velocity information in paragraph (c)(5)(ii) is modified
for the purposes of clarity to read, ``The position coordinates in the
EFG coordinate system measured in kilometers and the EFG components
measured in kilometers per second, of each launch vehicle stage or
payload after any burnout, jettison, or deployment.''
Appendixes B Through I of Part 417
The only changes that this SNPRM makes to appendixes B though I of
part 417 involve references made to sections of proposed subpart C of
part 417. This SNPRM modifies and reorganizes proposed subpart C of
part 417. As a result a number of references made in proposed
appendixes B through I of part 417 to sections in subpart C of part 417
must be changed accordingly. The necessary reference changes are
identified in this SNPRM.

VI. Procedural Matters

Paperwork Reduction Act

As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501
et seq., the Federal Aviation Administration has reviewed the
information collection requirements of this supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking. The FAA has determined that this supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking does not alter the information collection
requirements of the notice of proposed rulemaking issued October 25,
2000. With that notice of proposed rulemaking, the FAA determined that
there would be no additional burden to respondents over and above that
which the Office of Management and Budget has already approved under
the existing rule titled, ``Commercial Space Transportation Licensing
Regulations'' (OMB control number 2120-0608). Under the existing rule,
the FAA considers license applications to launch from non-federal sites
on a case-by-case basis. In conducting a case-by-case review, the FAA
gives due consideration to current practices in space transportation,
generally involving launches from federal sites. Accordingly, the FAA
believes that, under the proposals of the NPRM and this SNPRM, there
would be no additional information collection not already included in
the previously approved information collection activity. This rule
would eliminate the case-by-case review, thereby streamlining the
licensing process, and would not place any additional burden on the
respondent.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary; Introduction

Proposed and final rule changes to federal regulations must undergo
several economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that
each federal agency propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities.
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531-2533) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S.
standards, the Trade Agreements Act also requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, use them as the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
requires agencies to prepare a written assessment

[[Page 49492]]

of the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules
that include a federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by
state, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for
inflation).
In conducting these analyses, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has determined that the Supplement to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (SNPRM): (1) Is ``a significant regulatory action'' as
defined in the Executive Order, and is ``significant'' as defined in
the Department of Transportation's Regulatory Policies and Procedures;
(2) will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small
entities; (3) will not reduce barriers to international trade; and (4)
does not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal
governments, or on the private sector. These analyses are available in
the docket, and are summarized below.

Regulatory Background

The FAA's Associate Administrator for Commercial Space
Transportation, on October 25, 2000, issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed to amend the commercial space
transportation regulations by codifying the license application process
for launches from non-federal launch-sites. The NPRM was also intended
to codify the current safety requirements for launch operators
regarding license requirements, criteria, and responsibilities in order
to protect the public from hazards of launches from federal and non-
federal sites. Comments received on the NPRM resulted in the
development of the SNPRM, which offers clarifications and proposed
changes to the NPRM based on certain comments to the NPRM. The SNPRM,
together with the NPRM, would codify the Federal Aviation
Administration's license application process for launch from non-
federal launch sites, and would codify the safety requirements for
licensed launch operators in order to protect the public from the
hazards of launch from either a federal range or non-federal launch
site.

Identification of Current Practice

Whether launching from a federal range, a launch site located on a
federal range, or a non-federal launch site, a launch operator is
responsible for ground and flight safety under its FAA license. At a
federal launch range a launch operator is currently required to comply
with the rules and procedures of the federal range. It is current
practice for the FAA to accept federal range safety requirements for
licensed launches from federal ranges, as current federal range
procedures and practices satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety
concerns. In the absence of federal launch range oversight, each launch
operator would be required to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground
and flight safety programs to the FAA in order to satisfy the FAA's
statutory responsibility. Current practice for licensed launches from
non-federal launch sites is for operators to achieve a level of safety
equivalent to that at the federal ranges.

Regulatory Requirements

Two revisions to the NPRM--section 417.107(b), public risk
criteria, and section 417.203, compliance--as presented in the SNPRM,
would result in economic impacts. These two sections are the principal
focus of this regulatory evaluation of the SNPRM. They contain the
following regulatory proposals that have changed relative to the NPRM:
(1) Applying the risk criteria of Ec [le]30 x
10^-6 to each hazard individually rather than aggregating the
risk over all hazards as was proposed in the NPRM, and (2) requiring
the FAA to perform more intensive and timely baseline assessments of
federal range flight safety analyses in order to verify launch operator
compliance with range safety.

Costs of the Supplement to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

The SNPRM would impose a total estimated cost of approximately
$700,000 ($530,000 discounted), in 2001 dollars, on the commercial
space transportation industry over the 5-year period from 2003 through
2007. The FAA would incur some costs to administer the SNPRM but there
is insufficient information to quantify and develop an estimate at this
time.
Commercial Space Transportation Industry Costs
Commercial space transportation launch operators would incur
additional costs to comply with the requirements contained in Section
417.107(b) of the SNPRM only. This requirement proposes that the risk
criteria be applied to each hazard individually, rather than
aggregating the risk, as was proposed in the NPRM. The proposed limits
and method of applying risk on a per hazard basis are less stringent
than that of aggregating the risk for all hazards. Existing FAA
regulations establish a risk criteria of Ec [le]30 x
10^-6 for the debris hazard. It is current practice for the
FAA to accept the federal range requirements for launches from federal
ranges, in accordance with an assessment performed by the FAA. The
majority of licensed launches to date have taken place primarily from
the Air Force's Eastern Range, which calculates risk and applies risk
criteria on a per hazard basis without considering the aggregate risk.
The Air Force's Western Range also calculates the risk due to each
hazard; however, the Western Range does consider the aggregate risk in
its decision-making process. Therefore, current practice could be
either approach, depending on from which range the launch takes place.
The Eastern Range has allowed a launch when the toxic risk was 233
x 10^-6 for expected casualty, which is less stringent than
the 30 x 10^-6 per hazard proposed in the SNPRM. While it is
mainly government launches that rely on this risk ceiling for toxic
hazards in excess of 30x10^-6, there have been few licensed
launches that have exceeded this level. The regulatory evaluation
associated with the NPRM did not address the probability that licensed
launches from the Eastern Range would exceed 30 x 10^-6 for
toxic risk. Further evaluation and a better understanding of current
range practice indicates that Eastern Range launches have proceeded
with a significantly higher toxic risk criteria (i.e., up to 114 x
10^-6 for a licensed launch) than that being proposed.
Therefore, the FAA is now prepared to assume that there may be some
future launches that would be delayed due to the proposed requirement.
There were 39 launches of commercial launch vehicles from the
Eastern Range from the years 1997 to August 2001. Two of these 39
launches exceeded the toxic risk ceiling proposed by the SNPRM due to
meteorological conditions, but were launched anyway because they fell
within the acceptable range of the Eastern Range. If these precise
meteorological launch conditions existed under the SNPRM, then the two
launches, which took place under the current practice at the Eastern
Range, would not have launched. Therefore, the proposed requirement,
under the same meteorological launch conditions, would cause a
commercial launch operator to delay a planned launch from the Eastern
Range until more favorable weather prevailed. Launch delays from the
Eastern Range would cause a launch operator to incur additional costs.
The FAA estimates that the average cost of a one-day delay to
commercial space launch operators would be $380,000. Using the Air
Force Eastern Range experience mentioned above--that two out of 39
launches might have to be delayed under the SNPRM--the

[[Page 49493]]

FAA estimates the probability of a launch delay in any given year
during the 2003 to 2007 period would be five percent (calculated as 2/
39 = .051282). Accordingly, due to the proposed toxic risk ceiling
requirement, as many as two of the 36 expected Eastern Range launches
from 2003 through 2007 could be delayed (calculated as .051282 x 36 =
1.85). It is important to note that the estimate of two delays
attributable to this proposed requirement over the five-year period may
be an overstatement. The likelihood of launch delays resulting from
toxicity limits is expected to decrease, as future launch vehicle
toxicity is expected to be reduced significantly, and future launches
are likely to be conducted from launch complexes that are farther away
from populated areas. Collectively, these launch characteristics will
result in Ec values significantly lower than that
experienced historically as well as the proposed ceiling.
Because it is not possible to ascertain with certainty when during
the 2003 through 2007 period there will be a launch delay at the
Eastern Range as a result of the toxic standard in the SNPRM, the
probability of a delay based on past experience is multiplied by all
projected launches per annum, yielding the expected number of launch
delays. The average cost to a commercial space launch operator of a
one-day delay (i.e., $380,000) is multiplied by the expected number of
launch delays over the five year period, resulting in a cost of
approximately $700,000 ($530,000 discounted) to commercial space
transportation industry launch operators to comply with the proposed
requirement at the Eastern Range.
This proposed amendment would codify and standardize this
requirement for all launches regardless of launch site, and would not
differ from current practice for launch operators seeking licenses to
perform launches from non-federal launch sites. Accordingly, commercial
launch operators would not incur additional costs to comply with this
requirement as it pertains to non-federal launch sites.
Federal Aviation Administration Costs
The FAA would incur additional costs to administer the requirements
contained in Section 417.203 of the SNPRM. It is a current, customary,
and standard operating practice of the FAA to perform baseline
assessments of federal range flight safety analyses. However, this
proposed requirement creates some urgency in the frequency with which
these assessments are performed (i.e., it is imperative that the
baseline assessments be updated so as to be consistent with current
federal range flight safety analyses, thereby permitting application of
this proposed requirement). Further, the FAA believes that more
extensive reviews of federal range flight safety programs would be
required in order to keep abreast of the increasing number, diversity,
and complexity of commercial launches from federal ranges and
associated flight safety analyses. As a result of this proposed
amendment, the FAA would expend additional effort and incur associated
incremental costs to perform more rigorous and timely baseline
assessments. Although the FAA believes that these incremental costs
would not be substantial, there is insufficient information currently
available to provide a supportable estimate of these costs at this
time.
Additionally, federal organizations other than the FAA, such as DOD
and NASA (i.e., federal personnel that are range operators), may be
required to expend additional effort and incur incremental costs
preparing for more rigorous, extensive, and frequent baseline
assessments and cooperating with the FAA during their conduct.
Additionally, federal range operating contractors may also be similarly
affected by these activities. The FAA solicits comments and detailed
information to help better address this subject in this regulatory
evaluation.

Total Cost Impact of Supplement to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

The FAA estimates that the total costs of the SNPRM would be
approximately $700,000; these would be incurred entirely by the
commercial space transportation launch operators to comply with the
proposed requirements contained in the SNPRM. The incremental costs to
the FAA to administer the SNPRM would not be substantial and there is
insufficient information currently available to develop a supportable
estimate.

Safety Benefits From the Supplement to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking

The SNPRM would result in some additional safety benefits
associated with licensed commercial launches from the Eastern Range
only. This is due to the proposed requirement associated with section
417.107(b), public risk criteria. The positive safety benefits would be
the accident costs avoided (i.e., the dollar value of fatalities,
injuries, and property damage) due to applying the toxic risk criteria
of 30 x 10^-6 (which is less than the 114 x 10^-6
that was the highest toxic risk allowed for a licensed launch at the
Eastern Range in the past five years). Although the FAA has not
quantified the accident prevention or damage limiting effects the
proposed requirement would have on Eastern Range launches, it does
believe that section 417.107(b) would yield some incremental safety
benefits.

Qualitative Benefits From the Supplement to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking

The proposed SNPRM offers a variety of impacts that would benefit
both the commercial space transportation industry and the FAA that are
not readily quantified. Formalizing and identifying licensing
responsibilities by establishing a specific regulation would emphasize
commercial launch operator responsibilities and FAA expectations, and
would enhance launch operators' understanding of such. Consequently,
the proposed requirement may yield some operating efficiencies and
associated cost savings that the FAA has not quantified or estimated.
Further, as the number of applications for launch licensing
increases, formality (in the way of a regulation) would also help
ensure consistency in implementing the licensing process. This could
lead to cost savings to the FAA as a result of economies of scale from
repetitive operations. These cost savings would spill over to
commercial space transportation entities by reducing the turnaround
time between application submittal and licensing approval.
Additionally, consistent application of the licensing process would
help commercial space transportation entities gain familiarity with its
requirements, leading to proficiency in their ability to interact with
the process and the FAA. This in turn would lead to industry cost
savings, possibly due to less rework or paperwork avoided.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) requires agencies to
fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation. The Act covers a wide-range of small entities, including
small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and small governmental
jurisdictions. Agencies are required to determine whether a proposed or
final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, then
the agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis. If an agency
determines that a proposed or final rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial

[[Page 49494]]

number of small entities, then the head of the agency may so certify
and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.
The FAA conducted the required review of the SNPRM and determined
that it would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. To make this determination, the FAA has
identified the commercial space transportation industry launch
operators that would be affected by the SNPRM and found that only a
small number of businesses that would be affected by the SNPRM could be
considered a small entity. For manufacturers, a small entity is one
with 1,500 or fewer employees.
The FAA has identified two companies, Astrotech Space Operations
and Interorbital Systems, that have fewer than 1,500 employees.
Astrotech Space Operations is a wholly owned subsidiary of Spacehab,
which has average annual revenues of approximately $100 million. The
total cost of the SNPRM to industry would be $700,000. This total cost
for the industry is less than one percent of Spacehab's annual revenue.
Hence, the cost of the SNPRM would not constitute a significant
economic impact on a firm with revenues of this magnitude. The cost of
a delayed launch might have a significant impact on Interorbital
Systems. Even if delay costs are significant for this entity, one
impacted entity is not considered a substantial number of small
entities. Accordingly, on this basis and pursuant to the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the FAA certifies that the SNPRM
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. The FAA solicits comments with regard to this
certification and requests that supporting documentation be supplied.

International Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from
promulgating any standards or engaging in any related activities that
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
In accordance with the above statute and policy, the FAA has
assessed the potential effect of the SNPRM and has determined that it
would impose the same costs on domestic and international entities, and
thus has a neutral trade impact.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The FAA has determined
that this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the
states, on the relationship between the national U.S. Government and
the states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government. Therefore, the FAA has determined
that this final rule does not have federalism implications.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA),
enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, is intended among other
things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded federal mandates on
state, local, and tribal governments.
Title II of the Act requires each federal agency to prepare a
written statement assessing the effects of any federal mandate in a
proposed or final agency rule that may result in the expenditure of
$100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year
by state, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant
regulatory action.''
The SNPRM does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do
not apply.

Environmental Assessment

The FAA has determined that the proposed amendments to the
commercial space transportation licensing and safety rules are
categorically excluded from environmental review under 102(2)(C) of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The proposed rules, which
address obtaining and maintaining a license, are administrative and
procedural in nature and are therefore categorically excluded under FAA
Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i). In addition, part 415
already requires an applicant to submit sufficient environmental
information for the FAA to comply with NEPA and other applicable
environmental laws and regulations during the processing of each
license application, thereby ensuring that any significant adverse
environmental impacts from licensing commercial launches will be
considered during the application process. Accordingly, the FAA has
determined that this rule is categorically excluded because no
significant impacts to the human environment will result from
finalization or implementation of its administrative and procedural
provisions for licensing commercial launches.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the rulemaking action has been assessed in
accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and
Public Law 94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). It has been determined
that it is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the
EPCA.

List of Subjects

14 CFR 415

Rockets, Space transportation and exploration.

14 CFR 417

Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Rockets,
Space transportation and exploration.

The Proposed Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend parts 415 and 417 of Chapter III Title
14, Code of Federal Regulations (as proposed to be revised at 65 FR
63922, Oct. 25, 2000) as follows:

PART 415--LAUNCH LICENSEE

Subpart F--Safety Review and Approval for Launch of an Expendable
Launch Vehicle from a Non-Federal Launch Site

1. In Sec. 415.109(g) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63966,
revise ``Sec. 417.205'' to read ``Sec. 417.207''.
2. In Sec. 415.115(b) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63967,
revise ``Sec. 417.233'' to read ``Sec. 417.231''.
3. In Sec. 415.115(d)(5) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63967,
revise ``Sec. 417.225'' to read ``Sec. 417.223''.
4. In Sec. 415.115(f) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63967,
revise ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.233''.
5. In Sec. 415.115(f)(2) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63967,
revise ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.233''.
6. In Sec. 415.117(c)(2)(ii) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR
63969, revise ``Sec. 417.229'' to read ``Sec. 417.227''.
7. In Sec. 415.119(h) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63970,
revise ``Sec. 417.225'' to read ``Sec. 417.223''.

PART 417--LAUNCH SAFETY

8. Revise Sec. 417.1 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63977 to
read as follows:

[[Page 49495]]

Subpart A--General

Sec. 417.1 Scope and Applicability.

(a) General. This part prescribes the responsibilities of a launch
operator conducting a licensed launch of an expendable launch vehicle
and the requirements with which a licensed launch operator must comply
to maintain a license and conduct a launch.
(1) The safety requirements of this part apply to all licensed
launches of expendable launch vehicles, except for a launch from a
federal launch site that meets one of the conditions of paragraph (b)
of this section.
(2) All the administrative requirements of this part for submitting
material to the FAA apply to all licensed launches from a non-federal
launch site. For a licensed launch from a federal launch range, an
administrative requirement of this part does not apply if the FAA,
through its baseline assessment of the range, finds that the range
satisfies the requirement. For a licensed launch from a federal range
where the range does not satisfy one or more of the requirements of
part 417, the FAA will identify, during the licensing process, the
administrative requirements that the launch operator must meet.
(3) Requirements for preparing a license application to conduct a
launch, including all related policy, safety and environmental reviews
and payload determinations, are contained in parts 413 and 415.
(b) Federal launch range meets intent certifications, waivers, and
noncompliances due to grandfathering.
(1) If a launch operator has a license from the FAA to launch from
a federal launch range as of the effective date of this part and, for a
specific requirement of this part and launch:
(i) If the launch operator employs an alternative to the
requirement for which the federal range has granted a written meets
intent certification on or before the [EFFECTIVE DATE OF] this part,
the launch operator need not demonstrate to the FAA that its
alternative provides an equivalent level of safety; or
(ii) If the launch operator has, on or before the [EFFECTIVE DATE
OF] this part, a written waiver from the federal launch range or a
noncompliance that satisfies the federal launch range's grandfathering
criteria, the requirement of this part does not apply to the launch.
(2) Even if a launch operator satisfies paragraph (b)(1) of this
section for a specific requirement of this part, the launch operator
must bring its launch and launch vehicle, including components,
systems, and subsystems, into compliance with the requirement, whenever
one or more of the following conditions occurs:
(i) The launch operator makes modifications that affect the launch
vehicle's operation or safety characteristics;
(ii) The launch operator uses the launch vehicle, component,
system, or subsystem in a new application;
(iii) The FAA or the launch operator determines that a previously
unforeseen or newly discovered safety hazard exists that is a source of
significant risk to public safety; or
(iv) The federal range previously accepted a component, system, or
subsystem, but, at that time, did not identify a noncompliance to a
federal range requirement.
9. Amend proposed Sec. 417.3 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR
63977 by removing the definition of serious injury; and adding the
following definitions in alphabetical order:

Sec. 417.3 Definitions.

* * * * *
Equivalent level of safety means an ``approximately equal'' level
of safety. An equivalent level of safety may involve a change to the
level of expected risk that is not statistically or mathematically
significant as determined by qualitative or quantitative risk analysis.
* * * * *
Explosive debris means solid propellant fragments or other pieces
of a launch vehicle or payload that result from breakup of the launch
vehicle during flight and that explode upon impact with the Earth's
surface and cause overpressure.
* * * * *
Meets intent certification means a decision by a federal launch
range to accept a substitute means of satisfying a safety requirement
where the substitute provides an equivalent level of safety to that of
the original requirement.
* * * * *
Normal flight means the flight of a properly performing launch
vehicle whose real-time instantaneous impact point does not deviate
from the nominal instantaneous impact point by more than the sum of the
wind effects and the three-sigma guidance and performance deviations in
the uprange, downrange, left-crossrange, or right-crossrange
directions.
Normal trajectory means a trajectory that describes normal flight.
* * * * *
Risk means a measure that accounts for both the probability of
occurrence of a hazardous event and the consequence of that event to
persons or property.
* * * * *
Waiver means a decision that allows a launch operator to continue
with a launch despite not satisfying a specific safety requirement and
where the launch operator is not able to demonstrate an equivalent
level of safety. A waiver may apply where a failure to satisfy a safety
requirement involves a statistically or mathematically significant
increase in expected risk as determined through qualitative or
quantitative risk analysis, and where the activity may or may not
exceed the public risk criteria.
10. Amend Sec. 417.107 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63981 by
revising paragraph (b); redesignating paragraphs (c) through (f) as
paragraphs (e) through (h), respectively; adding new paragraphs (c) and
(d); and revising newly redesignated paragraphs (e) and (f) to read as
follows:

Subpart B--Launch Safety Requirements

Sec. 417.107 Flight safety.

* * * * *
(b) Public risk criteria. A launch operator may initiate the flight
of a launch vehicle only if flight safety analysis performed under
paragraph (f) of this section demonstrates that any risk to the public
satisfies the following public risk criteria:
(1) A launch operator may initiate the flight of a launch vehicle
only if the risk associated with the total flight to all members of the
public, excluding persons in waterborne vessels and aircraft, does not
exceed an expected average number of 0.00003 casualties
(EC[le] 30 x 10^-6) from impacting inert and
impacting explosive debris, EC[le] 30 x 10^-6 for
toxic release, and EC[le] 30 x 10^-6 for far field
blast overpressure. The FAA will determine whether to approve public
risk due to any other hazard associated with the proposed flight of a
launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis. The EC criterion for
each hazard applies to each launch from lift-off through orbital
insertion, including each planned impact, for an orbital launch, and
through final impact for a suborbital launch. ^-6
(2) A launch operator may initiate flight only if the risk to any
individual member of the public does not exceed a casualty expectation
(EC) of 0.000001 per launch (EC[le] 1 x
10^-6) for each hazard, excluding persons in waterborne
vessels and aircraft.
(3) A launch operator may initiate flight only if the probability
of debris impact to all water-borne vessels (Piv)

[[Page 49496]]

that are not operated in direct support of the launch does not exceed
0.00001 (Piv [le] x 10^-5) in each debris impact
hazard area of Sec. 417.223.
(4) A launch operator may initiate flight only if the probability
of debris impact to any individual aircraft (Pia) not
operated in direct support of the launch does not exceed 0.00000001
(Pia[le] 1 x 10^-8) in each debris impact hazard
area of Sec. 417.223.
(c) Debris thresholds. A launch operator's flight safety analysis,
performed as required by paragraph (f) of this section, must account
for any inert debris impact with a mean expected kinetic energy at
impact greater than or equal to 11 ft-lbs and, except for the far field
blast overpressure effects analysis of Sec. 417.229, a peak incident
overpressure greater than or equal to 1.0 psi due to any explosive
debris impact.
(1) When using the 11ft-lb threshold to determine potential
casualties due to blunt trauma from inert debris impacts, the analysis
must:
(i) Incorporate a probabilistic model that accounts for the
probability of casualty due to any debris expected to impact with
kinetic energy of 11 ft-lbs or greater and satisfies paragraph (d) of
this section; or
(ii) Count each expected impact with kinetic energy of 11 ft-lbs or
greater to a person as a casualty.
(2) When applying the 1.0-psi threshold to determine potential
casualties due to overpressure effects, the analysis must:
(i) Incorporate a probabilistic model that accounts for the
probability of casualty due to any blast overpressures of 1.0-psi or
greater and satisfies paragraph (d) of this section; or
(ii) Count each person within the 1.0-psi overpressure radius of
the source explosion as a casualty. When using this approach, the
analysis must compute the peak incident overpressure using the Kingery-
Bulmash relationship and may not take into account sheltering,
reflections, or atmospheric effects. For persons located in buildings,
the analysis must compute the peak incident overpressure for the
shortest distance between the building and the blast source. The
analysis must count each person located anywhere in a building
subjected to peak incident overpressure equal to or greater than 1.0
psi as a casualty.
(3) The analysis must account for any inert debris impact with a
mean expected kinetic energy at impact greater than or equal to 11 ft-
lbs and a peak incident overpressure greater than or equal to 1.0 psi
due to any explosive debris impact when demonstrating that a launch
satisfies the probability of impact criterion for waterborne vessels of
Sec. 417.107(b)(3).
(4) The analysis must account for any inert or explosive debris
impact with a mean expected kinetic energy at impact greater than or
equal to 11 ft-lbs when demonstrating whether a launch satisfies the
probability of impact criterion for aircraft of Sec. 417.107(b)(4). The
analysis must account for the aircraft velocity.
(d) Casualty modeling. A probabilistic casualty model must be based
on accurate data and scientific principles and must be statistically
valid. A launch operator must obtain FAA approval of any probabilistic
casualty model that is used in the flight safety analysis. If the
launch takes place from a federal launch range, the analysis may employ
any probabilistic casualty model that is accepted as part of the FAA's
baseline assessment of the federal launch range's safety process.
(e) Collision avoidance. (1) A launch operator must ensure that a
launch vehicle, any jettisoned components, and its payload do not pass
closer than 200 kilometers to a habitable orbital object:
(i) Throughout a sub-orbital launch; and
(ii) During ascent to initial orbital insertion through at least
one complete orbit for an orbital launch.
(2) A launch operator must obtain a collision avoidance analysis
for each launch from United States Space Command. United States Space
Command also calls this analysis a conjunction on launch assessment.
Sections 417.231 and A417.31 of appendix A of this part contain the
requirements for obtaining a collision avoidance analysis. A launch
operator must use the results of the collision avoidance analysis to
develop flight commit criteria for collision avoidance as required by
Sec. 417.113(b).
(f) Flight safety analysis. A launch operator must perform and
document a flight a safety analysis as required by subpart C of this
part. A launch operator must not initiate flight unless the flight
safety analysis demonstrates that any risk to the public satisfies the
public risk criteria of paragraph (b) of this section. For a licensed
launch that involves a federal launch range, the FAA may treat an
analysis performed and documented by the federal range as that of the
launch operator as provided in Sec. 417.203(d) of subpart C. A launch
operator must use the flight safety analysis products to develop flight
safety rules that govern a launch. Section 417.113 contains the
requirements for flight safety rules.
11. In Sec. 417.113(b)(1) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63982,
revise ``Sec. 417.233'' to read ``Sec. 417.231''.
12. In Sec. 417.113(b)(2) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63982,
revise ``Sec. 417.225'' to read ``Sec. 417.223''.
13. In Sec. 417.113(c)(4) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63983,
revise ``Sec. 417.221'' to read ``Sec. 417.219''.
14. In Sec. 417.113(c)(5) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63983,
revise ``Sec. 417.219'' to read ``Sec. 417.217''.
15. In Sec. 417.117(h) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63984,
revise the fourth sentence to read as follows: * * * * A post launch
report must contain the results of any monitoring of flight
environments and any measured wind profiles used for the launch.
Section 417.307(b) contains requirements for monitoring flight
environments.
* * * * *
16. Revise Sec. 417.121(c) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63985
to read as follows:

Sec. 417.121 Safety critical preflight operations.

* * * * *
(c) Collision avoidance. A launch operator must coordinate with
United States Space Command to obtain a collision avoidance analysis,
also referred to as a conjunction on launch assessment. Sections
417.107(e), 417.231, and A417.31 of appendix A of this part contain
requirements for collision avoidance analysis. A launch operator must
develop and incorporate flight commit criteria for collision avoidance
as required by Sec. 417.113(b).
* * * * *
17. In Sec. 417.121(e)(3) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63985,
revise ``Sec. 417.225'' and ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.223''
and ``Sec. 417.233'' respectively.
18. In Sec. 417.121(e)(4) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63985,
revise ``Sec. 417.225'' and ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.223''
and ``Sec. 417.233'' respectively.
19. In Sec. 417.121(f) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63985,
revise ``Sec. 417.225'' and ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.223''
and ``Sec. 417.233'' respectively.
20. In Sec. 417.121(i) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63985,
revise ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.233''.
21. In Sec. 417.125(c)(2) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63986,
revise ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.233''.
22. In Sec. 417.125(f) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63986,
revise ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.233''.
23. In Sec. 417.125(g)(2) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 63986,
revise ``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 417.233''.

[[Page 49497]]

24. In Sec. 417.323(c) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64030,
revise ``Sec. 417.221(c) with Sec. 417.219(c).
25. In Sec. 417.327(g)(10) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR
64033, revise ``Sec. 417.221'' to read ``Sec. 417.219''.
26. Revise subpart C of part 417 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR
63987 to read as follows:
Subpart C--Flight Safety Analysis
417.201 Scope and applicability.
417.203 Compliance.
417.205 General.
417.207 Trajectory analysis.
417.209 Malfunction turn analysis.
417.211 Debris analysis.
417.213 Flight safety limits analysis.
417.215 Straight-up time analysis.
417.217 No-longer-terminate gate analysis.
417.219 Data loss flight time and no longer terminate time
analyses.
417.221 Time delay analysis.
417.223 Flight hazard area analysis.
417.225 Debris risk analysis.
417.227 Toxic release hazard analysis.
417.229 Far-Field overpressure blast effects analysis.
417.231 Collision avoidance analysis.
417.233 Analysis for launch of an unguided suborbital rocket flown
with a wind weighting safety system.
417.234-417.300 [Reserved]

Subpart C--Flight Safety Analysis

Sec. 417.201 Scope and applicability.

(a) This subpart contains performance requirements for performing
the flight safety analysis required by Sec. 417.107(f).
(b) Except as permitted by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section,
the flight safety analysis requirements of this subpart apply to the
flight of any launch vehicle that must use a flight safety system as
required by Sec. 417.107(a).
(c) The flight safety analysis requirements of Sec. 417.233 apply
to the flight of any unguided suborbital launch vehicle that uses a
wind weighting safety system.
(d) For any alternative flight safety system approved by the FAA
under Sec. 417.107(a)(3), the FAA will determine during the licensing
process which of the analyses required by this subpart apply.

Sec. 417.203 Compliance.

(a) General. A launch operator's flight safety analysis must
satisfy the performance requirements of this subpart. The flight safety
analysis must also meet the requirements for methods of analysis
contained in appendices A and B for an orbital launch and appendices B
and C for a suborbital launch except as otherwise permitted by this
section. A flight safety analysis for a launch may rely on an earlier
analysis from an identical or similar launch if the analysis still
applies to the later launch.
(b) Method of analysis. For each launch, a launch operator's flight
safety analysis must use methods approved during the licensing process
by the FAA, as a license modification, or, if the launch takes place
from a federal launch range, approved as part of the FAA's baseline
assessment of the federal range's processes. Appendix A to this part
contains requirements that apply to flight safety methods of analysis.
A licensee must submit any change to the methods to the FAA as a
request for license modification before the launch to which the
proposed change would apply. Section 415.73 contains requirements
governing a license modification.
(c) Alternate analysis. The FAA will approve an alternate flight
safety analysis if a launch operator provides a clear and convincing
demonstration that its proposed analysis provides an equivalent level
of safety to that required by this subpart. A launch operator must
demonstrate that an alternate flight safety analysis is based on
accurate data and scientific principles and is statistically valid. The
FAA will not find the launch operator's application for a license or
license modification sufficiently complete to begin review under
Sec. 413.11 of this chapter until the FAA approves the alternate flight
safety analysis.
(d) Analyses performed by a federal range. The FAA will accept a
flight safety analysis used by a federal launch range for a licensed
launch, if the launch operator has contracted with a federal launch
range for the provision of flight safety analysis for a licensed
launch, and the FAA has assessed the range and found that the range's
analysis methods satisfy the requirements of this subpart. In this
case, the FAA will treat the federal launch range's analysis as that of
the launch operator and the launch operator need not provide any
further demonstration of compliance.
(e) Analysis products. For a licensed launch that does not satisfy
paragraph (d) of this section, the launch operator must demonstrate to
the FAA compliance with the requirements of this subpart, and must
include in its demonstration the analysis products required by
appendices A, B, and C, depending on whether the launch vehicle uses a
flight safety system or a wind weighting safety system. A launch
operator must submit analysis products to the FAA as follows:
(1) License application flight safety analysis. At the time of
license application, a launch operator must submit the required
analysis products as part of the launch operator's safety review
document in accordance with Sec. 415.115. The FAA will evaluate the
analysis to determine whether the methods of analysis for each launch
comply with the requirements of this subpart.
(2) Six-month analysis. A launch operator must submit launch
specific analysis products to the FAA no later than six months before
each planned flight. The launch operator:
(i) Must account for vehicle and mission specific input data.
(ii) May reference previously submitted analysis products and data
that are applicable to the launch or data that is applicable to a
series of launches.
(iii) May state that an analysis product has not changed since the
launch operator's license application submittal. In this case, the six-
month submittal need not repeat the data.
(iv) Must identify any analysis product that may change as a flight
date approaches and describe what needs to be done to finalize the
product and when it will be finalized.
(v) Must submit the analysis products using the same format and
organization used during the license application process.
(vi) Must, if requested by the FAA, present the six-month flight
safety analysis products in a technical meeting at the FAA.
(3) Thirty-day flight safety analysis update. A launch operator
must submit updated analysis products no later than 30 days before
flight. If an analysis product has not changed since the six-month
analysis submittal, the launch operator's thirty-day submittal need not
repeat the data. The launch operator:
(i) Must account for potential variations in input data that may
affect the analysis products within the final 30 days prior to flight.
(ii) May submit the analysis products using the same format and
organization used in its license application.
(iii) May not change an analysis product within the final 30 days
before flight unless the launch operator identified a process for
making a change in that period as part of the launch operator's flight
safety analysis process and the FAA approved the process through the
licensing process.
(4) Programmatic flight safety analysis. A launch operator need not
submit the 6-month or 30-day analysis if the launch operator:
(i) Submits complete analysis products during the licensing
process;
(ii) Demonstrates that the analysis satisfies all the requirements
of this subpart; and

[[Page 49498]]

(iii) Demonstrates the analysis does not need to be updated to
account for launch specific factors.

Sec. 417.205 General.

(a) Public risk management. A flight safety analysis must
demonstrate that the launch operator will, for each launch, control the
risk to the public from hazards associated with normal and
malfunctioning launch vehicle flight. The analysis must employ risk
assessment or hazard isolation, or a combination of risk assessment and
partial isolation of the hazards to demonstrate control of the risk to
the public.
(1) Risk assessment. When demonstrating control of risk through
risk assessment, the analysis must demonstrate that any risk to the
public satisfies the public risk criteria of Sec. 417.107(b) of this
part. The analysis must account for, but need not be limited to, the
variability associated with:
(i) Each source of a hazard during flight,
(ii) Normal flight and each failure response mode of the launch
vehicle,
(iii) Each external and launch vehicle flight environment,
(iv) Populations potentially exposed to the flight, and
(v) The performance of any flight safety system, including time
delays associated with the system.
(2) Hazard isolation. When demonstrating control of risk through
hazard isolation, the analysis must establish the geographical areas
from which the public must be excluded during flight and any
operational controls needed to isolate all hazards from the public.
(3) Combination of risk assessment and partial isolation of
hazards. When demonstrating control of risk through a combination of
risk assessment and partial isolation of the hazards from the public,
the analysis must demonstrate that the residual public risk due to any
hazard not isolated from the public under paragraph (a)(2) of this
section satisfies the public risk criteria.
(b) Dependent analyses. Because some analyses required by this
subpart are inherently dependent on one another, the data output of any
one analysis must be compatible in form and content with the data input
requirements of any other analysis that depends on that output. Figure
417.203-1 illustrates the flight safety analyses that might be
performed for a launch that uses a flight safety system and the typical
dependencies that exist among the analyses.

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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Sec. 417.207 Trajectory analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a trajectory
analysis that establishes:
(1) For any time after lift-off, the limits of a launch vehicle's
normal flight, as defined by the nominal trajectory and potential
three-sigma trajectory dispersions about the nominal trajectory.
(2) A fuel exhaustion trajectory that produces instantaneous impact
points with the greatest range for any given time-after-liftoff.
(3) A straight-up trajectory that would result if the launch
vehicle malfunctioned and flew in a vertical or near vertical direction
above the launch point.
(b) Trajectory model. A final trajectory analysis must use a six-
degree of freedom trajectory model to satisfy the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Wind effects. A trajectory analysis must account for wind
effects, including profiles of winds that are no less severe than the
worst wind conditions under which flight might be attempted, and must
account for uncertainty in the wind conditions.

Sec. 417.209 Malfunction turn analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a malfunction
turn analysis that establishes the launch vehicle's turning capability
in the event of a malfunction during flight. A malfunction turn
analysis must account for each cause of a malfunction turn, such as
thrust vector offsets or nozzle burn-through. For each cause, the
analysis must establish the launch vehicle's turning capability using a
set of turn curves. The analysis must account for:
(1) All trajectory times during the thrusting phases of flight.
(2) When a malfunction begins to cause each turn throughout the
thrusting phases of flight. The analysis must use trajectory time
intervals between malfunction turn start times that are short enough to
establish

[[Page 49500]]

smooth and continuous flight safety limits and hazard areas.
(3) The relative probability of occurrence of each malfunction turn
of which the launch vehicle is capable.
(4) When each malfunction turn will terminate expressed as a single
value or a probability time distribution.
(5) What terminates each malfunction turn, such as, aerodynamic or
inertial breakup.
(6) The launch vehicle's turning behavior from the time when a
malfunction begins to cause a turn until aerodynamic breakup, inertial
breakup, or ground impact. The analysis must use trajectory time
intervals during the malfunction turn that are short enough to
establish turn curves that are smooth and continuous.
(7) For each malfunction turn, the launch vehicle velocity vector
turn angle as a function of time from the start of the turn and
measured relative to the nominal launch vehicle velocity vector at the
start of the turn.
(8) For each malfunction turn, the launch vehicle velocity turn
magnitude as a function of time from the start of the turn and measured
relative to the nominal velocity magnitude that corresponds to the
velocity vector turn angle.
(9) For each malfunction turn, the orientation of the launch
vehicle longitudinal axis as a function of time from the start of the
turn and measured relative to the nominal launch vehicle velocity
vector at the start of the turn.
(b) Set of turn curves for each malfunction turn cause. For each
cause of a malfunction turn, the analysis must establish a set of turn
curves that satisfies paragraph (a) of this section and must establish
the associated envelope of the set of turn curves. Each set of turn
curves must describe the variation in the malfunction turn
characteristics for each cause of the turn. The envelope of each set of
curves must define the limits of the launch vehicle's malfunction turn
behavior for each cause of a malfunction turn. For each malfunction
turn envelope, the analysis must establish the launch vehicle velocity
vector turn angle deviation from the nominal launch vehicle velocity
vector. For each malfunction turn envelope, the analysis must establish
the vehicle velocity turn magnitude deviation from the nominal velocity
magnitude that corresponds to the velocity vector turn angle envelope.

Sec. 417.211 Debris analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a debris
analysis. For an orbital or suborbital launch, a debris analysis must
identify the inert, explosive and other hazardous launch vehicle debris
that results from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight.
(b) Launch vehicle breakup. A debris analysis must account for each
cause of launch vehicle breakup, such as:
(1) Any flight termination system activation,
(2) Launch vehicle explosion,
(3) Aerodynamic loads,
(4) Inertial loads,
(5) Atmospheric reentry heating, and
(6) Impact of intact vehicle.
(c) Debris fragment lists. A debris analysis must produce lists of
debris fragments for each cause of breakup and any planned jettison of
debris, launch vehicle components, or payload. The lists must account
for all launch vehicle debris fragments, individually or in groupings
of fragments whose characteristics are similar enough to be described
by a single set of characteristics. The debris lists must describe the
physical, aerodynamic, and harmful characteristics of each debris
fragment, such as:
(1) Origin on the vehicle;
(2) Whether it is inert or explosive;
(3) Weight, dimensions, and shape;
(4) Lift and drag characteristics;
(5) Properties of the incremental velocity distribution imparted by
breakup; and
(6) Axial, transverse, and tumbling area.

Sec. 417.213 Flight safety limits analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must identify the location of
populated or other protected areas. The analysis must also establish
flight safety limits that define when a flight safety official must
terminate a launch vehicle's flight to prevent the hazardous effects of
the resulting debris impacts from reaching any populated or other
protected area and ensure that the launch satisfies the public risk
criteria of Sec. 417.107(b).
(b) Flight safety limits. The analysis must establish flight safety
limits for use in establishing flight termination rules. Section
417.113(c) contains requirements for flight termination rules. The
flight safety limits must account for the temporal and geometric
extents on the Earth's surface of a launch vehicle's hazardous debris
impact dispersion resulting from any planned or unplanned event for all
times during flight. Flight safety limits must account for potential
contributions to the debris impact dispersions, such as:
(1) Time delays, as established by the time delay analysis of
Sec. 417.221,
(2) Residual thrust remaining after flight termination
implementation,
(3) Wind effects,
(4) Velocity imparted to vehicle fragments by breakup,
(5) Lift and drag forces on the malfunctioning vehicle and falling
debris,
(6) Vehicle guidance and performance errors,
(7) Launch vehicle malfunction turn capabilities, and
(8) Any uncertainty due to map errors and launch vehicle tracking
errors.
(c) Gates. If a launch involves flight over any populated or other
protected area, the flight safety analysis must establish a gate
through a flight safety limit. Section 417.217 contains requirements
for establishing a gate.

Sec. 417.215 Straight-up time analysis.

A flight safety analysis must establish the straight-up time for a
launch for use as a flight termination rule. Section 417.113(c)
contains requirements for flight termination rules. The analysis must
establish the straight-up time as the latest time after liftoff,
assuming a launch vehicle malfunctioned and flew in a vertical or near
vertical direction above the launch point, at which activation of the
launch vehicle's flight termination system or breakup of the launch
vehicle would not cause hazardous debris or critical overpressure to
affect any populated or other protected area.

Sec. 417.217 No longer terminate gate analysis.

For a launch that involves flight over a populated or other
protected area, the flight safety analysis must include a no longer
terminate gate analysis. The analysis must establish the portion,
referred to as a gate, of a flight safety limit through which a launch
vehicle's tracking representation will be allowed to proceed without
requiring the flight to be terminated. A tracking representation is a
launch vehicle's present position, instantaneous impact point position,
debris impact footprint, or other vehicle performance icon or symbol
displayed on a flight safety official console during real-time tracking
of the launch vehicle's flight. When establishing a gate in a flight
safety limit, the analysis must demonstrate that the launch vehicle
flight satisfies the public risk criteria of Sec. 417.107(b).

Sec. 417.219 Data loss flight time and no longer terminate time
analyses.

(a) General. For each launch, a flight safety analysis must
establish data loss flight times, as identified in paragraph (b) of
this section, and a no longer terminate time to establish flight

[[Page 49501]]

termination rules that apply when launch vehicle tracking data is not
available to the flight safety official. Section 417.113(c) contains
requirements for flight termination rules.
(b) Data loss flight times. A flight safety analysis must establish
the shortest elapsed thrusting time during which a launch vehicle can
move from normal flight to a condition where the launch vehicle's
hazardous debris impact dispersion extends to any protected area as a
data loss flight time. The analysis must establish a data loss flight
time for all times along the nominal trajectory from liftoff through
the no longer-terminate time established under paragraph (c) of this
section.
(c) No longer terminate time. The analysis must establish a no-
longer-terminate time as follows:
(1) For a suborbital launch, the analysis must establish the no
longer terminate time as the time after liftoff that a launch vehicle's
hazardous debris impact dispersion can no longer reach any protected
area.
(2) For an orbital launch where the launch vehicle's instantaneous
impact point does not overfly a protected area before reaching orbit,
the analysis must establish the no-longer terminate time as the time
after liftoff that the launch vehicle's hazardous debris impact
dispersion can no longer reach any protected area or orbital insertion,
whichever occurs first.
(3) For an orbital launch where a gate permits overflight of a
protected area and where orbital insertion occurs after reaching the
gate, the analysis must establish the no longer terminate time as the
time after liftoff when the time for the launch vehicle's instantaneous
impact point to reach the gate is less than the time for the
instantaneous impact point to reach any flight safety limit.

Sec. 417.221 Time delay analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a time delay
analysis that establishes the mean elapsed time between the violation
of a flight termination rule and the time when a flight safety system
is capable of terminating flight for use in establishing the flight
safety limits of Sec. 417.213.
(b) Analysis constraints. A time delay analysis must determine a
time delay distribution that accounts for the following:
(1) The variance of time delays for each potential failure
scenario, including but not limited to the range of malfunction turn
characteristics and the time of flight when the malfunction occurs;
(2) A flight safety official's decision and reaction time,
including variation in human response time, and
(3) Flight termination hardware and software delays including those
delays inherent in:
(i) Tracking systems;
(ii) Data processing systems, including filter delays;
(iii) Display systems;
(iv) Command control systems; and
(v) Flight termination systems.

Sec. 417.223 Flight hazard area analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a flight hazard
area analysis that identifies any regions of land, sea, or air that
must be monitored, publicized, controlled, or evacuated in order to
control the risk to the public from debris impact hazards. The risk
management requirements of Sec. 417.205(a) apply. The analysis must
account for, but need not be limited to:
(1) Trajectory times from liftoff to the no longer terminate time
of Sec. 417.219(c).
(2) Regions of land potentially exposed to debris resulting from
normal flight events and events resulting from any potential
malfunction.
(3) Regions of sea and air potentially exposed to debris from
normal flight events, including planned impacts.
(4) In the vicinity of the launch site, any waterborne vessels or
aircraft exposed to debris from events resulting from any potential
abnormal flight events, including launch vehicle malfunction.
(5) Any operational controls implemented to control risk to the
public from debris hazards.
(6) Debris identified by the debris analysis of Sec. 417.211.
(7) All launch vehicle trajectory dispersion effects in the surface
impact domain.
(b) Public notices. A flight hazard areas analysis must establish
the ship and aircraft hazard areas for notices to mariners and notices
to airmen. Section 417.121(e) requires notices to mariners and airmen.

Sec. 417.225 Debris risk analysis.

A flight safety analysis must demonstrate that the risk to the
public potentially exposed to inert and explosive debris hazards from
any one flight of a launch vehicle satisfies the public risk criterion
for debris of Sec. 417.107(b)(1). A debris risk analysis must account
for risk to populations on land, including regions of launch vehicle
flight following passage through any gate in a flight safety limit
established under Sec. 417.217. A debris risk analysis must account for
any potential casualties to the public using the debris thresholds and
as required by Sec. 417.107(c).

Sec. 417.227 Toxic release hazard analysis.

A flight safety analysis must establish flight commit criteria that
ensure compliance with the public risk criterion for toxic release of
Sec. 417.107(b)(1). The analysis must account for any toxic release
that will occur during the proposed flight of a launch vehicle or that
would occur in the event of a flight mishap. The analysis must account
for any operational constraints and emergency procedures that provide
protection from toxic release. The analysis must account for all
members of the public who may be exposed to the toxic release,
including all members of the public on land and on any waterborne
vessels and aircraft except those operated in direct support of the
launch.

Sec. 417.229 Far-field blast overpressure effects analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must establish flight commit
criteria that ensure compliance with the public risk criterion for far
field blast overpressure of Sec. 417.107(b)(1). The analysis must
demonstrate that any far field blast overpressure due to potential
explosions during launch vehicle flight will not cause windows to break
or that any risk to the public due to potential far field overpressure
complies with the public risk criteria.
(b) Analysis constraints. The analysis must account for:
(1) The potential for distant focus overpressure or overpressure
enhancement given current meteorological conditions and terrain
characteristics;
(2) The potential for broken windows due to peak incident
overpressures below 1.0 psi and related casualties;
(3) The explosive capability of the launch vehicle at impact and at
altitude and potential explosions resulting from debris impacts,
including the potential for mixing of liquid propellants;
(4) Characteristics of the launch vehicle flight and the
surroundings that would affect the population's susceptibility to
injury, such as, shelter types and time of day of the proposed launch;
(5) Characteristics of the potentially affected windows, including
their size, location, orientation, glazing material, and condition; and
(6) The hazard characteristics of the potential glass shards, such
as falling from upper building stories or being propelled into or out
of a shelter toward potentially occupied spaces.

[[Page 49502]]

Sec. 417.231 Collision avoidance analysis.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a collision
avoidance analysis that establishes any launch waits in a planned
launch window during which a launch operator must not initiate flight,
in order to maintain a 200-kilometer separation from any habitable
orbiting object. The launch operator must apply any launch waits as
flight commit criteria.
(b) Orbital launch. For an orbital launch, the analysis must
establish any launch waits needed to ensure that the launch vehicle,
any jettisoned components, and its payload do not pass closer than 200
kilometers to a habitable orbiting object during ascent to initial
orbital insertion through at least one complete orbit.
(c) Suborbital launch. For a suborbital launch, the analysis must
establish any launch waits needed to ensure that the launch vehicle,
any jettisoned components, and any payload do not pass closer than 200
kilometers to a habitable orbital object throughout the flight.

Sec. 417.233 Analysis for an unguided suborbital rocket flown with a
wind weighting safety system.

For launch of an unguided suborbital rocket flown with a wind
weighting safety system, the flight safety analysis must establish the
launch commit criteria and other launch safety rules that the launch
operator must implement to control the risk to the public from
potential adverse effects resulting from normal and malfunctioning
flight. The risk management requirements of Sec. 417.205(a) apply. The
analysis must include a trajectory analysis, flight hazard area
analysis, debris risk analysis, and collision avoidance analysis that
satisfy Sec. 417.207, Sec. 417.223, Sec. 417.225, and Sec. 417.231,
respectively. In addition, for each launch, the analysis must establish
any wind constraints under which launch may occur and include a wind
weighting analysis that establishes the launcher azimuth and elevation
settings that correct for the windcocking and wind-drift effects on the
unguided suborbital rocket.
27. Revise appendix A to part 417 as proposed to be revised at 65
FR 64041 to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 417--Flight Safety Analysis Methodologies and
Products

A417.1 Scope

This appendix contains requirements that apply to the methods
for performing the flight safety analysis required by
Sec. 417.107(f) and subpart C of part 417. The methodologies
contained in this appendix provide an acceptable means of satisfying
the requirements of subpart C and provide a standard and a measure
of fidelity against which the FAA will measure any proposed
alternative analysis approach. This appendix also identifies the
analysis products that a launch operator must submit to the FAA as
required by Sec. 417.203(e).

A417.3 Applicability.

The requirements contained in this appendix apply to a launch
operator and the launch operator's flight safety analysis unless the
launch operator clearly and convincingly demonstrates that an
alternative approach provides an equivalent level of safety. If a
federal launch range performs the launch operator's analysis,
Sec. 417.203(d) applies. Section A417.33 applies to the flight of
any unguided suborbital launch vehicle that uses a wind weighting
safety system. All other sections of this appendix apply to the
flight of any launch vehicle required to use a flight safety system
in accordance with Sec. 417.107(a). For any alternative flight
safety system approved by the FAA in accordance with
Sec. 417.107(a)(3), the FAA will determine the applicability of this
appendix during the licensing process.

A417.5 General.

A launch operator's flight safety analysis must satisfy the
requirements for public risk management and the requirements for the
compatibility of the input and output of dependent analyses of
Sec. 417.205.

A417.7 Trajectory.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a trajectory
analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.207. The
requirements of this section apply to the computation of the
trajectories required by Sec. 417.207 and to the trajectory analysis
products that a launch operator must submit to the FAA as required
by Sec. 417.203(e).
(b) Wind standards. A trajectory analysis must incorporate wind
data in accordance with the following:
(1) For each launch, a trajectory analysis must produce ``with-
wind'' launch vehicle trajectories pursuant to paragraph (f)(6) of
this section and do so using composite wind profiles for the month
that the launch will take place or composite wind profiles that are
as severe or more severe than the winds for the month that the
launch will take place.
(2) A composite wind profile used for the trajectory analysis
must have a cumulative percentile frequency that represents wind
conditions that are at least as severe as the worst wind conditions
under which flight would be attempted for purposes of achieving the
launch operator's mission. These worst wind conditions must account
for the launch vehicle's ability to operate normally in the presence
of wind and accommodate any flight safety limit constraints.
(c) Nominal trajectory. A trajectory analysis must produce a
nominal trajectory that describes a launch vehicle's flight path,
position and velocity, where all vehicle aerodynamic parameters are
as expected, all vehicle internal and external systems perform
exactly as planned, and no external perturbing influences other than
atmospheric drag and gravity affect the launch vehicle.
(d) Dispersed trajectories. A trajectory analysis must produce
the following dispersed trajectories and describe the distribution
of a launch vehicle's position and velocity as a function of winds
and performance error parameters in the uprange, downrange, left-
crossrange and right-crossrange directions.
(1) Three-sigma maximum and minimum performance trajectories. A
trajectory analysis must produce a three-sigma maximum performance
trajectory that provides the maximum downrange distance of the
instantaneous impact point for any given time after lift-off. A
trajectory analysis must produce a three-sigma minimum performance
trajectory that provides the minimum downrange distance of the
instantaneous impact point for any given time after lift-off. For
any time after lift-off, the instantaneous impact point dispersion
of a normally performing launch vehicle must lie between the
extremes achieved at that time after lift-off by the three-sigma
maximum and three-sigma minimum performance trajectories. The three-
sigma maximum and minimum performance trajectories must account for
wind and performance error parameter distributions in accordance
with the following:
(i) For each three-sigma maximum and minimum performance
trajectory, the analysis must use composite head wind and composite
tail wind profiles that represent the worst wind conditions under
which a launch would be attempted in accordance with paragraph (b)
of this section.
(ii) Each three-sigma maximum and minimum performance trajectory
must account for all launch vehicle performance error parameters
identified in accordance with paragraph (f)(1) of this section that
have an effect upon instantaneous impact point range.
(2) Three-sigma left and right lateral trajectories. A
trajectory analysis must produce a three-sigma left lateral
trajectory that provides the maximum left crossrange distance of the
instantaneous impact point for any time after lift-off. A trajectory
analysis must produce a three-sigma right lateral trajectory that
provides the maximum right crossrange distance of the instantaneous
impact point for any time after lift-off. For any time after lift-
off, the instantaneous impact point dispersion of a normally
performing launch vehicle must lie between the extremes achieved at
that time after lift-off by the three-sigma left lateral and three-
sigma right lateral performance trajectories. The three-sigma
lateral performance trajectories must account for wind and
performance error parameter distributions in accordance with the
following:
(i) In producing each left and right lateral trajectory, the
analysis must use composite left and composite right lateral-wind
profiles that represent the worst wind conditions under which a
launch would be attempted in accordance with paragraph (b) of this
section.
(ii) The three-sigma left and right lateral trajectories must
account for all launch vehicle performance error parameters
identified in accordance with paragraph (f)(1)

[[Page 49503]]

of this section that have an effect on the lateral deviation of the
instantaneous impact point.
(3) Fuel-exhaustion trajectory. A trajectory analysis must
produce a fuel-exhaustion trajectory for the launch of any launch
vehicle with a final suborbital stage that will terminate thrust
nominally without burning to fuel exhaustion. The analysis must
produce the trajectory that would occur if the planned thrust
termination of the final suborbital stage did not occur. The
analysis must produce a fuel-exhaustion trajectory that extends
either the nominal trajectory taken through fuel exhaustion of the
last suborbital stage or the three-sigma maximum trajectory taken
through fuel exhaustion of the last suborbital stage, whichever
produces instantaneous impact points with the greatest range for any
time after liftoff.
(e) Straight-up trajectory. A trajectory analysis must produce a
straight-up trajectory that begins at the planned time of ignition,
and that simulates a malfunction that causes the launch vehicle to
fly in a vertical or near vertical direction above the launch point.
A straight-up trajectory must last no less than the sum of the
straight-up time determined in accordance with A417.15 plus the
duration of a potential malfunction turn determined in accordance
with A417.9(b)(2).
(f) Analysis process and computations. A trajectory analysis
must produce each three-sigma trajectory required by this appendix
using a six-degree-of-freedom trajectory model and an analysis
method, such as root-sum-square or Monte Carlo, that accounts for
all individual launch vehicle performance error parameters that
contribute to the dispersion of the launch vehicle's instantaneous
impact point.
(1) A trajectory analysis must identify all launch vehicle
performance error parameters and each parameter's distribution to
account for all launch vehicle performance variations and any
external forces that can cause offsets from the nominal trajectory
during normal flight. A trajectory analysis must account for, but
need not be limited to, the following performance error parameters:
(i) Thrust;
(ii) Thrust misalignment;
(iii) Specific impulse;
(iv) Weight;
(v) Variation in firing times of the stages;
(vi) Fuel flow rates;
(vii) Contributions from the guidance, navigation, and control
systems;
(ix) Steering misalignment; and
(x) Winds.
(2) Each three-sigma trajectory must account for the effects of
wind from liftoff through the point in flight where the launch
vehicle attains an altitude where wind no longer affects the launch
vehicle.
(g) Trajectory analysis products. The products of a trajectory
analysis that a launch operator must submit to the FAA as required
by Sec. 417.203(e) must include the following:
(1) Assumptions and procedures. A description of all
assumptions, procedures and models, including the six-degrees-of-
freedom model, used in deriving each trajectory.
(2) Three-sigma launch vehicle performance error parameters. A
description of each three-sigma performance error parameter
accounted for by the trajectory analysis and a description of each
parameter's distribution determined in accordance with paragraph
(f)(1) of this section.
(3) Wind profile. A graph and tabular listing of each wind
profile used in performing the trajectory analysis as required by
paragraph (b)(1) of this section and the worst case winds required
by paragraph (b)(2) of this section. The graph and tabular wind data
must provide wind magnitude and direction as a function of altitude
for the air space regions from the Earth's surface to 100,000 feet
in altitude for the area intersected by the launch vehicle
trajectory. Altitude intervals must not exceed 5000 feet.
(4) Launch azimuth. The azimuthal direction of the trajectory's
``X-axis'' at liftoff measured clockwise in degrees from true north.
(5) Launch point. Identification and location of the proposed
launch point, including its name, geodetic latitude (+N), longitude
(+E), and geodetic height.
(6) Reference ellipsoid. The name of the reference ellipsoid
used by the trajectory analysis to approximate the average curvature
of the Earth and the following information about the model:
(i) Length of semi-major axis,
(ii) Length of semi-minor axis,
(iii) Flattening parameter,
(iv) Eccentricity,
(v) Gravitational parameter,
(vi) Angular velocity of the Earth at the equator, and
(vii) If the reference ellipsoid is not a WGS-84 ellipsoidal
Earth model, the equations that convert the submitted ellipsoid
information to the WGS-84 ellipsoid.
(7) Temporal trajectory items. A launch operator must provide
the following temporal trajectory data for time intervals not in
excess of one second and for the discrete time points that
correspond to each jettison, ignition, burnout, and thrust
termination of each stage. If any stage burn time lasts less than
four seconds, the time intervals must not exceed 0.2 seconds. The
launch operator must provide the temporal trajectory data from
launch up to a point in flight when effective thrust of the final
stage terminates, or to thrust termination of the stage or burn that
places the vehicle in orbit. For an unguided sub-orbital launch
vehicle flown with a flight safety system, the launch operator must
provide these data for each nominal quadrant launcher elevation
angle and payload weight. The launch operator must provide these
data on paper in text format and electronically in ASCII text, space
delimited format. The launch operator must provide an electronic
``readme'' file that identifies the data and their units of measure
in the individual disk files.
(i) Trajectory time-after-liftoff. A launch operator must
provide trajectory time-after-liftoff measured from first motion of
the first thrusting stage of the launch vehicle. The tabulated data
must identify the first motion time as T-0 and as the ``0.0'' time
point on the trajectory.
(ii) Launch vehicle direction cosines. A launch operator must
provide the direction cosines of the roll axis, pitch axis, and yaw
axis of the launch vehicle. The roll axis is a line identical to the
launch vehicle's longitudinal axis with its origin at the nominal
center of gravity positive towards the vehicle nose. The roll plane
is normal to the roll axis at the vehicle's nominal center of
gravity. The yaw axis and the pitch axis are any two orthogonal axes
lying in the roll plane. The launch operator must provide roll,
pitch and yaw axes of right-handed systems so that, when looking
along the roll axis toward the nose, a clockwise rotation around the
roll axis will send the pitch axis toward the yaw axis. The right-
handed system must be oriented so that the yaw axis is positive in
the downrange direction while in the vertical position (roll axis
upward from surface) or positive at an angle of 180 degrees to the
downrange direction. The axis may be related to the vehicle's normal
orientation with respect to the vehicle's trajectory but, once
defined, remain fixed with respect to the vehicle's body. The launch
operator must indicate the positive direction of the yaw axis
chosen. The analysis products must present the direction cosines
using the EFG reference system described in paragraph (g)(7)(iv) of
this section.
(iii) X, Y, Z, XD, YD, ZD trajectory coordinates. A launch
operator must provide the launch vehicle position coordinates (X, Y,
Z) and velocity magnitudes (XD, YD, ZD) referenced to an orthogonal,
Earth-fixed, right-handed coordinate system. The XY-plane must be
tangent to the ellipsoidal Earth at the origin, which must coincide
with the launch point. The positive X-axis must coincide with the
launch azimuth. The positive Z-axis must be directed away from the
ellipsoidal Earth. The Y-axis must be positive to the left looking
downrange.
(iv) E, F, G, ED, FD, GD trajectory coordinates. A launch
operator must provide the launch vehicle position coordinates (E, F,
G) and velocity magnitudes (ED, FD, GD) referenced to an orthogonal,
Earth fixed, Earth centered, right-handed coordinate system. The
origin of the EFG system must be at the center of the reference
ellipsoid. The E and F axes must lie in the plane of the equator and
the G-axis coincides with the rotational axis of the Earth. The E-
axis must be positive through 0 deg. East longitude (Greenwich
Meridian), the F-axis positive through 90 deg. East longitude, and
the G-axis positive through the North Pole. This system must be non-
inertial and rotate with the Earth.
(v) Resultant Earth-fixed velocity. A launch operator must
provide the square root of the sum of the squares of the XD, YD, and
ZD components of the trajectory state vector.
(vi) Path angle of velocity vector. A launch operator must
provide the angle between the local horizontal plane and the
velocity vector measured positive upward from the local horizontal.
The local horizontal must be a plane tangent to the ellipsoidal
Earth at the sub-vehicle point.
(vii) Sub-vehicle point. A launch operator must provide sub-
vehicle point coordinates that include present position geodetic
latitude (+N) and present position longitude (+E). These coordinates
must be at each trajectory time on the surface of the

[[Page 49504]]

ellipsoidal Earth model and located at the intersection of the line
normal to the ellipsoid and passing through the launch vehicle
center of gravity.
(viii) Altitude. A launch operator must provide the distance
from the sub-vehicle point to the launch vehicle's center of
gravity.
(ix) Present position arc-range. A launch operator must provide
the distance measured along the surface of the reference ellipsoid,
from the launch point to the sub-vehicle point.
(x) Total weight. A launch operator must provide the sum of the
inert and propellant weights for each time point on the trajectory.
(xi) Total vacuum thrust. A launch operator must provide the
total vacuum thrust for each time point on the trajectory.
(xii) Instantaneous impact point data. A launch operator must
provide instantaneous impact point geodetic latitude (+N),
instantaneous impact point longitude (+E), instantaneous impact
point arc-range, and time to instantaneous impact. The instantaneous
impact point arc-range must consist of the distance, measured along
the surface of the reference ellipsoid, from the launch point to the
instantaneous impact point. For each point on the trajectory, the
time to instantaneous impact must consist of the vacuum flight time
remaining until impact if all thrust were terminated at the time
point on the trajectory.
(xiii) Normal trajectory distribution. A launch operator must
provide a description of the distribution of the dispersed
trajectories required under (d), such as the elements of covariance
matrices for the launch vehicle position coordinates and velocity
magnitudes.

A417.9 Malfunction turn.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a malfunction
turn analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.209. The
requirements of this section apply to the computation of the
malfunction turns and the production of turn data required by
Sec. 417.209 and to the malfunction turn analysis products that a
launch operator must submit to the FAA as required by
Sec. 417.203(e).
(b) Malfunction turn analysis constraints. The following
constraints apply to a malfunction turn analysis:
(1) The analysis must produce malfunction turns that start at a
given malfunction start time. The turn must last no less than 12
seconds. These duration limits apply regardless of whether or not
the vehicle would breakup or tumble before the prescribed duration
of the turn.
(2) A malfunction turn analysis must account for the thrusting
periods of flight along a nominal trajectory beginning at first
motion until thrust termination of the final thrusting stage or
until the launch vehicle achieves orbit, whichever occurs first.
(3) A malfunction turn must consist of a 90-degree turn or a
turn in both the pitch and yaw planes that would produce the largest
deviation from the nominal instantaneous impact point of which the
launch vehicle is capable at any time during the malfunction turn in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) The first malfunction turn must start at liftoff. The
analysis must account for subsequent malfunction turns initiated at
regular nominal trajectory time intervals not to exceed four
seconds.
(5) A malfunction turn analysis must produce malfunction turn
data for time intervals of no less than one second over the duration
of each malfunction turn.
(6) The analysis must assume that the launch vehicle performance
is nominal up to the point of the malfunction that produces the
turn.
(7) A malfunction turn analysis must not account for the effects
of gravity.
(8) A malfunction turn analysis must ensure the tumble turn
envelope curve maintains a positive slope throughout the malfunction
turn duration as illustrated in figure A417.9-1. When calculating
tumble turns for an aerodynamically unstable launch vehicle, in the
high aerodynamic region it often turns out that no matter how small
the initial deflection of the rocket engine, the airframe tumbles
through 180 degrees, or one-half cycle, in less time than the
required turn duration period. In such a case, the analysis must use
a 90-degree turn as the malfunction turn.
(c) Failure modes. A malfunction turn analysis must account for
the significant failure modes that result in a thrust vector offset
from the nominal state. If a malfunction turn at a malfunction start
time can occur as a function of more than one failure mode, the
analysis must account for the failure mode that causes the most
rapid and largest launch vehicle instantaneous impact point
deviation.
(d) Type of malfunction turn. A malfunction turn analysis must
establish the maximum turning capability of a launch vehicle's
velocity vector during each malfunction turn by accounting for a 90-
degree turn to estimate the vehicle's turning capability or by
accounting for trim turns and tumble turns in both the pitch and yaw
planes to establish the vehicle's turning capability. When
establishing the turning capability of a launch vehicle's velocity
vector, the analysis must account for each turn in accordance with
the following:
(1) 90-degree turn. A 90-degree turn must constitute a turn
produced at the malfunction start time by instantaneously re-
directing and maintaining the vehicle's thrust at 90 degrees to the
velocity vector, without regard for how this situation can be
brought about.
(2) Pitch turn. A pitch turn must constitute the angle turned by
the launch vehicle's total velocity vector in the pitch-plane. The
velocity vector's pitch-plane must be the two dimensional surface
that includes the launch vehicle's yaw-axis and the launch vehicle's
roll-axis.
(3) Yaw turn. A yaw turn must constitute the angle turned by the
launch vehicle's total velocity vector in the lateral plane. The
velocity vector's lateral plane must be the two dimensional surface
that includes the launch vehicle's pitch axis and the launch
vehicle's total velocity.
(4) Trim turn. A trim turn must constitute a turn where a launch
vehicle's thrust moment balances the aerodynamic moment while a
constant rotation rate is imparted to the launch vehicle's
longitudinal axis. The analysis must account for a maximum-rate trim
turn made at or near the greatest angle of attack that can be
maintained while the aerodynamic moment is balanced by the thrust
moment, whether the vehicle is stable or unstable.
(5) Tumble turn. A tumble turn must constitute a turn that
results if the launch vehicle's airframe rotates in an uncontrolled
fashion, at an angular rate that is brought about by a thrust vector
offset angle, and if the offset angle is held constant throughout
the turn. The analysis must account for a series of tumble turns,
each turn with a different thrust vector offset angle, that are
plotted on the same graph for each malfunction start time.
(6) Turn envelope. A turn envelope must constitute a curve on a
tumble turn graph that has tangent points to each individual tumble
turn curve computed for each malfunction start time. The curve must
envelope the actual tumble turn curves to predict tumble turn angles
for each area between the calculated turn curves. Figure A417.9-1
depicts a series of tumble turn curves and the tumble turn envelope
curve.
(7) Malfunction turn capabilities. When not using a 90-degree
turn, a malfunction turn analysis must establish the launch vehicle
maximum turning capability in accordance with the following
malfunction turn constraints:
(i) Launch vehicle stable at all angles of attack. If a launch
vehicle is so stable that the maximum thrust moment that the vehicle
could experience cannot produce tumbling, but produces a maximum-
rate trim turn at some angle of attack less than 90 degrees, the
analysis must produce a series of trim turns, including the maximum-
rate trim turn, by varying the initial thrust vector offset at the
beginning of the turn. If the maximum thrust moment results in a
maximum-rate trim turn at some angle of attack greater than 90
degrees, the analysis must produce a series of trim turns for angles
of attack up to and including 90 degrees.
(ii) Launch vehicle aerodynamically unstable at all angles of
attack. If flying a trim turn is not possible even for a period of
only a few seconds, the malfunction turn analysis need only
establish tumble turns. Otherwise, the malfunction turn analysis
must establish a series of trim turns, including the maximum-rate
trim turn, and the family of tumble turns.
(iii) Launch vehicle unstable at low angles of attack but stable
at some higher angles of attack. If large engine deflections result
in tumbling, and small engine deflections do not, the analysis must
produce a series of trim and tumble turns as required by paragraph
(d)(7)(ii) of this section for launch vehicles aerodynamically
unstable at all angles of attack. If both large and small constant
engine deflections result in tumbling, regardless of how small the
deflection might be, the analysis must account for the malfunction
turn capabilities achieved at the stability angle of attack,
assuming no upsetting thrust moment, and must account for the turns
achieved by a tumbling vehicle.
(e) Malfunction turn analysis products. The products of a
malfunction turn analysis that

[[Page 49505]]

a launch operator must submit to the FAA as required by
Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) A description of the assumptions, techniques, and equations
used in deriving the malfunction turns.
(2) A set of sample calculations for at least one flight hazard
area malfunction start time and one downrange malfunction start
time. The sample computation for the downrange malfunction must
start at a time at least 50 seconds after the flight hazard area
malfunction start time or at the time of nominal thrust termination
of the final stage minus the malfunction turn duration.
(3) A launch operator must submit malfunction turn data in
electronic tabular and graphic formats. The graphs must use scale
factors such that the plotting and reading accuracy do not degrade
the accuracy of the data. For each malfunction turn start time, a
graph must use the same time scales for the malfunction velocity
vector turn angle and malfunction velocity magnitude plot pairs. A
launch operator must provide tabular listings of the data used to
generate the graphs in digital ASCII file format. A launch operator
must submit the data items required in this paragraph for each
malfunction start time and for time intervals that do not exceed one
second for the duration of each malfunction turn.
(i) Velocity turn angle graphs. A launch operator must submit a
velocity turn angle graph for each malfunction start time. For each
velocity turn angle graph, the ordinate axis must represent the
total angle turned by the velocity vector, and the abscissa axis
must represent the time duration of the turn and must show
increments not to exceed one second. The series of tumble turns must
include the envelope of all tumble turn curves. The tumble turn
envelope must represent the tumble turn capability for all possible
constant thrust vector offset angles. Each tumble turn curve
selected to define the envelope must appear on the same graph as the
envelope. A launch operator must submit a series of trim turn curves
for representative values of thrust vector offset. The series of
trim turn curves must include the maximum-rate trim turn. Figure
A417.9-1 depicts an example family of tumble turn curves and the
tumble turn velocity vector envelope.
(ii) Velocity magnitude graphs. A launch operator must submit a
velocity magnitude graph for each malfunction start time. For each
malfunction velocity magnitude graph, the ordinate axis must
represent the magnitude of the velocity vector and the abscissa axis
must represent the time duration of the turn. Each graph must show
the abscissa divided into increments not to exceed one second. Each
graph must show the total velocity magnitude plotted as a function
of time starting with the malfunction start time for each thrust
vector offset used to define the corresponding velocity turn-angle
curve. A launch operator must provide a corresponding velocity
magnitude curve for each velocity tumble-turn angle curve and each
velocity trim-turn angle curve. For each individual tumble turn
curve selected to define the tumble turn envelope, the corresponding
velocity magnitude graph must show the individual tumble turn
curve's point of tangency to the envelope. The point of tangency
must consist of the point where the tumble turn envelope is tangent
to an individual tumble turn curve produced with a discrete thrust
vector offset angle. A launch operator must transpose the points of
tangency to the velocity magnitude curves by plotting a point on the
velocity magnitude curve at the same time point where tangency
occurs on the corresponding velocity tumble-turn angle curve. Figure
A417.9-2 depicts an example tumble turn velocity magnitude curve.

[[Page 49506]]
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[[Page 49507]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30JY02.010

(iii) Vehicle orientation. The launch operator must submit
tabular or graphical data for the vehicle orientation in the form of
roll, pitch, and yaw angular orientation of the vehicle longitudinal
axis as a function of time into the turn for each turn initiation
time. Angular orientation of a launch vehicle's longitudinal axis is
illustrated in figures A417.9-3 and A417.9-4.

[[Page 49508]]
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[[Page 49509]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30JY02.012

(iv) Onset conditions. A launch operator must provide launch
vehicle state information for each malfunction start time. This
state data must include the launch vehicle thrust, weight, velocity
magnitude and pad-centered topocentric X, Y, Z, XD, YD, ZD state
vector.
(v) Breakup information. A launch operator must specify whether
its launch vehicle will remain intact throughout each malfunction
turn. If the launch vehicle will breakup during a turn, the launch
operator must identify the time for launch vehicle breakup on each
velocity magnitude graph. The launch operator must show the time
into the turn at which vehicle breakup would occur as either a
specific value or a probability distribution for time until breakup.
(vi) Inflection point. A launch operator must identify the
inflection point on each tumble turn envelope curve and maximum rate
trim turn curve for each malfunction start time as illustrated in
figure A417.9-1. The inflection point marks the point in time during
the turn where the slope of the curve stops increasing and begins to
decrease or, in other words, the point were the concavity of the
curve changes from concave up to concave down. The inflection point
on a malfunction turn curve must identify the time in the
malfunction turn that the launch vehicle body achieves a 90-degree
rotation from the nominal position. On a tumble turn curve the
inflection point must represent the start of the launch vehicle
tumble.

A417.11 Debris.

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a debris
analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.211. The
requirements of this section apply to the debris data required by
Sec. 417.211 and the debris analysis products that a launch operator
must submit to the FAA as required by Sec. 417.203(e).
(b) Debris analysis constraints. A debris analysis must produce
the debris model described in paragraph (c) of this section. The
analysis must account for all launch vehicle debris fragments,
individually or in groupings of fragments called classes. The
characteristics of each debris fragment represented by a class must
be similar enough to the characteristics of all the other debris
fragments represented by that class that all the debris fragments of
the class can be described by a single set of characteristics.
Paragraph (c)(10) of this section applies when establishing a debris
class. A debris model must describe the physical, aerodynamic, and
harmful characteristics of each debris fragment either individually
or as a member of a class. A debris model must consist of lists of
individual debris or debris classes for each cause of breakup and
any planned jettison of debris, launch vehicle components, or
payload. A debris analysis must account for:
(1) Launch vehicle breakup caused by the activation of any
flight termination system. The analysis must account for:
(i) The effects of debris produced when flight termination
system activation destroys an intact malfunctioning vehicle.
(ii) Spontaneous breakup of the launch vehicle, if the breakup
is assisted by the action of any inadvertent separation destruct
system.
(iii) The effects of debris produced by the activation of any
flight termination system after inadvertent breakup of the launch
vehicle.
(2) Debris due to any malfunction where forces on the launch
vehicle may exceed the launch vehicle's structural integrity limits.
(3) The immediate post-breakup or jettison environment of the
launch vehicle debris, and any change in debris characteristics over
time from launch vehicle breakup or jettison until debris impact.
(4) The impact overpressure, fragmentation, and secondary debris
effects of any confined or unconfined solid propellant chunks and
fueled components containing either liquid or solid propellants that
could survive to impact, as a function of vehicle malfunction time.
(5) The effects of impact of the intact vehicle as a function of
failure time. The intact impact debris analysis must identify the
trinitrotoluene (TNT) yield of impact explosions, and the numbers of
fragments projected from all such explosions, including non-launch
vehicle ejecta and the blast overpressure radius. The analysis must
use a model for TNT yield of impact explosion that accounts for the
propellant weight at impact, the impact speed, the orientation of
the propellant, and the impacted surface material.

[[Page 49510]]

(c) Debris model. A debris analysis must produce a model of the
debris resulting from planned jettison and from unplanned breakup of
a launch vehicle for use as input to other analyses, such as
establishing flight safety limits and hazard areas and performing
debris risk, toxic, and blast analyses. A launch operator's debris
model must satisfy the following:
(1) Debris fragments. A debris model must provide the debris
fragment data required by this section for the launch vehicle flight
from the planned ignition time until the launch vehicle achieves
orbital velocity for an orbital launch. For a sub-orbital launch,
the debris model must provide the debris fragment data required by
this section for the launch vehicle flight from the planned ignition
time until thrust termination of the last thrusting stage. A debris
model must provide debris fragment data for the number of time
periods sufficient to meet the requirements for smooth and
continuous contours used to define hazard areas as required by
A417.23.
(2) Inert fragments. A debris model must identify all inert
fragments that are not volatile and that do not burn or explode
under normal and malfunction conditions. A debris model must
identify inert fragments for each breakup time during flight
corresponding to a critical event when the fragment catalog is
significantly changed by the event. Critical events include staging,
payload fairing jettison, and other normal hardware jettison
activities.
(3) Explosive and non-explosive propellant fragments. A debris
model must identify all propellant fragments that are explosive or
non-explosive upon impact. The debris model must describe each
propellant fragment as a function of time, from the time of breakup
through ballistic free-fall to impact. The debris model must
describe the characteristics of each fragment, including its origin
on the launch vehicle, representative dimensions and weight at the
time of breakup and at the time of impact. For those fragments
identified as un-contained or contained propellant fragments,
whether explosive or non-explosive, the debris model must identify
whether or not burning occurs during free fall, and provide the
consumption rate during free fall. The debris model must identify:
(i) Solid propellant that is exposed directly to the atmosphere
and that burns but does not explode upon impact as ``un-contained
non-explosive solid propellant.''
(ii) Solid or liquid propellant that is enclosed in a container,
such as a motor case or pressure vessel, and that burns but does not
explode upon impact as ``contained non-explosive propellant.''
(iii) Solid or liquid propellant that is enclosed in a
container, such as a motor case or pressure vessel, and that
explodes upon impact as ``contained explosive propellant fragment.''
(iv) Solid propellant that is exposed directly to the atmosphere
and that explodes upon impact as ``un-contained explosive solid
propellant fragment.''
(4) Other non-inert debris fragments. In addition to the
explosive and flammable fragments required by paragraph (c)(3) of
this section, a debris model must identify any other non-inert
debris fragments, such as toxic or radioactive fragments, that
present any other hazards to the public.
(5) Fragment weight. At each modeled breakup time, the
individual fragment weights must approximately add up to the sum
total weight of inert material in the vehicle and the weight of
contained liquid propellants and solid propellants that are not
consumed in the initial breakup or conflagration.
(6) Fragment imparted velocity. A debris model must identify the
maximum velocity imparted to each fragment due to potential
explosion or pressure rupture. When accounting for imparted
velocity, a debris model must:
(i) Use a Maxwellian distribution with the specified maximum
value equal to the 97th percentile; or
(ii) If a debris model does not use a Maxwellian velocity
distribution, the analysis products must identify the distribution,
and must state whether or not the specified maximum value is a fixed
value with no uncertainty.
(7) Fragment projected area. A debris model must include the
axial, transverse, and mean tumbling areas of each fragment. If the
fragment may stabilize under normal or malfunction conditions, the
debris model must also provide the projected area normal to the drag
force.
(8) Fragment ballistic coefficient. A debris model must include
the axial, transverse, and tumble orientation ballistic coefficient
for each fragment's projected area as required by paragraph (c)(7)
of this section.
(9) Debris fragment count. A debris model must include the total
number of each type of fragment required by paragraphs (c)(2),
(c)(3), and (c)(4) of this section and created by a malfunction.
(10) Fragment classes. A debris model must categorize
malfunction debris fragments into classes where the characteristics
of the mean fragment in each class conservatively represent every
fragment in the class. The model must define fragment classes for
fragments whose characteristics are similar enough to be described
and treated by a single average set of characteristics. A debris
class must categorize debris by each of the following
characteristics, and may include any other useful characteristics:
(i) The type of fragment, defined by paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3),
and (c)(4) of this section. All fragments within a class must be the
same type, such as inert or explosive.
(ii) Debris subsonic ballistic coefficient
([beta]sub). The difference between the smallest
log10([beta]sub) value and the largest
log10([beta]sub) value in a class must not
exceed 0.5, except for fragments with [beta]sub less than
or equal to three. Fragments with [beta]sub less than or
equal to three may be grouped within a class.
(iii) Breakup-imparted velocity ([Delta]V). A debris model must
categorize fragments as a function of the range of [Delta]V for the
fragments within a class and the class's median subsonic ballistic
coefficient. For each class, the debris model must keep the ratio of
the maximum breakup-imparted velocity ([Delta]Vmax) to
minimum breakup-imparted velocity ([Delta]Vmin) within
the following bound:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30JY02.013

Where: [beta]'sub is the median subsonic ballistic
coefficient for the fragments in a class.
(d) Debris analysis products. The products of a debris analysis
that a launch operator must submit to the FAA as required by
Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) Debris model. The launch operator's debris model that
satisfies the requirements of this section.
(2) Fragment description. A description of the fragments
contained in the launch operator's debris model. The description
must identify the fragment as a launch vehicle part or component,
describe its shape, representative dimensions, and may include
drawings of the fragment.
(3) Intact impact TNT yield. For an intact impact of a launch
vehicle, for each failure time, a launch operator must identify the
TNT yield of each impact explosion and blast overpressure hazard
radius.
(4) Fragment class data. The class name, the range of values for
each parameter used to categorize fragments within a fragment class,
and the number of fragments in any fragment class established in
accordance with paragraph (c)(10) of this section.
(5) Ballistic coefficient. The mean ballistic coefficient
([beta]) and plus and minus three-sigma values of the [beta] for
each fragment class. A launch operator must provide graphs of the
coefficient of drag (Cd) as a function of Mach number for
the nominal and three-sigma [beta] variations for each fragment
shape. The launch operator must label each graph with the shape
represented by the curve and reference area used to develop the
curve. A launch operator must provide a Cd vs. Mach curve
for any axial, transverse, and tumble orientations for any fragment
that will not stabilize during free-fall conditions. For any
fragment that may stabilize during free-fall, a launch operator must
provide Cd vs. Mach curves for the stability angle of
attack. If the angle of attack where the fragment stabilizes is
other than zero degrees, a launch operator must provide both the
coefficient of lift (CL) vs. Mach number and the
Cd vs. Mach number curves. The launch operator must
provide the equations for each Cd vs. Mach curve.
(6) Pre-flight propellant weight. The initial preflight weight
of solid and liquid propellant for each launch vehicle component
that contains solid or liquid propellant.
(7) Normal propellant consumption. The nominal and plus and
minus three-sigma solid and liquid propellant consumption rate, and
pre-malfunction consumption rate for each component that contains
solid or liquid propellant.
(8) Fragment weight. The mean and plus and minus three-sigma
weight of each fragment or fragment class.
(9) Projected area. The mean and plus and minus three-sigma
axial, transverse, and tumbling areas for each fragment or fragment
class. This information is not required for those fragment classes
classified as burning propellant classes under (e)(17) of this
section.

[[Page 49511]]

(10) Imparted velocities. The maximum incremental velocity
imparted to each fragment class created by flight termination system
activation, or explosive or overpressure loads at breakup. The
launch operator must identify the velocity distribution as
Maxwellian or must define the distribution, including whether or not
the specified maximum value is a fixed value with no uncertainty.
(11) Fragment type. The fragment type for each fragment
established in accordance with paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4)
of this section.
(12) Origin. The part of the launch vehicle from which each
fragment originated.
(13) Burning propellant classes. The propellant consumption rate
for those fragments that burn during free-fall.
(14) Contained propellant fragments, explosive or non-explosive.
For contained propellant fragments, whether explosive or non-
explosive, a launch operator must provide the initial weight of
contained propellant and the consumption rate during free-fall. The
initial weight of the propellant in a contained propellant fragment
is the weight of the propellant before any of the propellant is
consumed by normal vehicle operation or failure of the launch
vehicle.
(15) Solid propellant fragment snuff-out pressure. The ambient
pressure and the pressure at the surface of a solid propellant
fragment, in pounds per square inch, required to sustain a solid
propellant fragment's combustion during free-fall.
(16) Other non-inert debris fragments. For each non-inert debris
fragment identified in accordance with paragraph (c)(4) of this
section, a launch operator must describe the diffusion, dispersion,
deposition, radiation, or other hazard exposure characteristics used
to determine the effective casualty area required by paragraph
(c)(9) of this section.
(17) Residual thrust dispersion. For each thrusting or non-
thrusting stage having residual thrust capability following a launch
vehicle malfunction, a launch operator must provide either the total
residual impulse imparted or the full-residual thrust in foot-pounds
as a function of breakup time. For any stage not capable of thrust
after a launch vehicle malfunction, a launch operator must provide
the conditions under which the stage is no longer capable of thrust.
For each stage that can be ignited as a result of a launch vehicle
malfunction on a lower stage, a launch operator must identify the
effects and duration of the potential thrust, and the maximum
deviation of the instantaneous impact point which can be brought
about by the thrust. A launch operator must provide the explosion
effects of all remaining fuels, pressurized tanks, and remaining
stages, particularly with respect to ignition or detonation of upper
stages if the flight termination system is activated during the
burning period of a lower stage.

A417.13 Flight Safety Limits

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a flight
safety limits analysis that satisfies the requirements of
Sec. 417.213. The requirements of this section apply to the
computation of the flight safety limits and identifying the location
of populated or other protected areas as required by Sec. 417.213
and to the analysis products that the launch operator must submit to
the FAA as required by Sec. 417.203(e).
(b) Flight safety limits constraints. The analysis must
establish flight safety limits in accordance with the following:
(1) Flight safety limits must account for potential malfunction
of a launch vehicle during the time from launch vehicle first motion
through flight until the no longer terminate time determined as
required by A417.19.
(2) For a flight termination at any time during launch vehicle
flight, the flight safety limits must:
(i) Represent no less than the extent of the debris impact
dispersion for all debris fragments with a ballistic coefficient
greater than or equal to three; and
(ii) Ensure that the debris impact area on the Earth's surface
that is bounded by the debris impact dispersion in the uprange,
downrange and crossrange directions does not extend to any populated
or other protected area.
(3) Each debris impact area determined by a flight safety limits
analysis must be offset in a direction away from populated or other
protected areas. The size of the offset must account for all
parameters that may contribute to the impact dispersion. The
parameters must include:
(i) Launch vehicle malfunction turn capabilities.
(ii) Effective casualty area produced in accordance with
A417.25(b)(8).
(iii) All delays in the identification of a launch vehicle
malfunction.
(iv) Malfunction imparted velocities, including any velocity
imparted to vehicle fragments by breakup.
(v) Wind effects on the malfunctioning vehicle and falling
debris.
(vi) Residual thrust remaining after flight termination.
(vii) Launch vehicle guidance and performance errors.
(viii) Lift and drag forces on the malfunctioning vehicle and
falling debris including variations in drag predictions of fragments
and debris.
(ix) All hardware and software delays during implementation of
flight termination.
(x) All debris impact location uncertainties caused by
conditions prior to, and after, activation of the flight termination
system.
(xi) Any other impact dispersion parameters peculiar to the
launch vehicle.
(xii) All uncertainty due to map errors and launch vehicle
tracking errors.
(c) Risk management. The requirements for public risk management
of Sec. 417.205(a) apply to a flight safety limits analysis. When
employing risk assessment, the analysis must establish flight safety
limits that satisfy paragraph (b) of this section, account for the
products of the debris risk analysis performed in accordance with
A417.25, and ensure that any risk to the public satisfies the public
risk criteria of Sec. 417.107(b) of this part. When employing hazard
isolation, the analysis must establish flight safety limits in
accordance with the following:
(1) The flight safety limits must account for the maximum
deviation impact locations for the most wind sensitive debris
fragment with a minimum of 11 ft-lbs of kinetic energy at impact.
(2) The maximum deviation impact location of the debris
identified in (c)(1) of this section for each trajectory time must
account for the three-sigma impact location for the maximum
deviation flight, and the launch day wind conditions that produce
the maximum ballistic wind for that debris.
(3) The maximum deviation flight must account for the
instantaneous impact point, of the debris identified in (c)(1) at
breakup, that is closest to a protected area and the maximum
ballistic wind directed from the breakup point toward that protected
area.
(d) Flight safety limits analysis products. The products of a
flight safety limits analysis that a launch operator must submit to
the FAA as required by Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) A description of each method used to develop and implement
the flight safety limits. The description must include equations and
example computations used in the flight safety limits analysis.
(2) A description of how each analysis method meets the analysis
requirements and constraints of this section, including how the
method produces a worst case scenario for each impact dispersion
area.
(3) A description of how the results of the analysis are used to
protect populated and other protected areas.
(4) A graphic depiction or series of depictions of the flight
safety limits, the launch point, all launch site boundaries,
surrounding geographic area, all protected area boundaries, and the
nominal and three-sigma launch vehicle instantaneous impact point
ground traces from liftoff to orbital insertion or the end of
flight. Each depiction must have labeled geodetic latitude and
longitude lines. Each depiction must show the flight safety limits
at trajectory time intervals sufficient to depict the mission
success margin between the flight safety limits and the protected
areas. The launch vehicle trajectory instantaneous impact points
must be plotted with sufficient frequency to provide a conformal
representation of the launch vehicle's instantaneous impact point
ground trace curvature.
(5) A tabular description of the flight safety limits, including
the geodetic latitude and longitude for any flight safety limit. The
table must contain quantitative values that define flight safety
limits. The quantitative values must be rounded to the number of
significant digits that can be determined from the uncertainty of
the measurement device used to determine the flight safety limits
and must be limited to a maximum of six decimal places.
(6) A map error table of direction and scale distortions as a
function of distance from the point of tangency from a parallel of
true scale and true direction or from a meridian of true scale and
true direction. A launch operator must provide a table of tracking
error as a function of downrange distance from the launch point for
each tracking station used to make flight safety control decisions.
A launch operator must submit a description of the method, showing
equations and sample

[[Page 49512]]

calculations, used to determine the tracking error. The table must
contain the map and tracking error data points within 100 nautical
miles of the reference point at an interval of one data point every
10 nautical miles, including the reference point. The table must
contain map and tracking error data points beyond 100 nautical miles
from the reference point at an interval of one data point every 100
nautical miles out to a distance that includes all populated or
other areas protected by the flight safety limits.
(7) A launch operator must provide the equations used for
geodetic datum conversions and one sample calculation for converting
the geodetic latitude and longitude coordinates between the datum
ellipsoids used. A launch operator must provide any equations used
for range and bearing computations between geodetic coordinates and
one sample calculation.

A417.15 Straight-Up Time

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a straight-up
time analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.215. The
requirements of this section apply to the computation of straight-up
time as required by Sec. 417.215 and to the analysis products that
the launch operator must submit to the FAA as required by
Sec. 417.203(e). The analysis must establish a straight-up time as
the latest time-after-liftoff, assuming a launch vehicle
malfunctioned and flew in a vertical or near vertical direction
above the launch point, at which activation of the launch vehicle's
flight termination system or breakup of the launch vehicle would not
cause hazardous debris or critical overpressure to affect any
populated or other protected area.
(b) Straight-up time constraints. A straight-up-time analysis
must account for the following:
(1) Launch vehicle trajectory. The analysis must use the
straight-up trajectory determined in accordance with A417.7(e).
(2) Sources of debris impact dispersion of A417.13(b)(3)(iii)
through (xii)
(b) Straight-up time analysis products. The products of a
straight-up-time analysis that a launch operator must submit to the
FAA as required by Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) The straight-up-time.
(2) A description of the methodology used to determine straight-
up time.

A417.17 No-Longer Terminate Gate

(a) General. The flight safety analysis for a launch that
involves flight over a populated or other protected area must
include a no-longer terminate gate analysis that satisfies the
requirements of Sec. 417.217. The requirements of this section apply
to determining a gate as required by Sec. 417.217 and the analysis
products that the launch operator must submit to the FAA as required
by Sec. 417.203(e). The analysis must determine the portion,
referred to as a gate, of a flight safety limit, through which a
launch vehicle's tracking representation will be allowed to proceed
without flight termination.
(b) No-longer-terminate gate analysis constraints. The following
analysis constraints apply to a gate analysis.
(1) For each gate in a flight safety limit, the criteria used
for determining whether to allow passage through the gate or to
terminate flight at the gate must use all the same launch vehicle
flight status parameters as the criteria used for determining
whether to terminate flight at a flight safety limit. For example,
if the flight safety limits are a function of instantaneous impact
point location, the criteria for determining whether to allow
passage through a gate in the flight safety limit must also be a
function of instantaneous impact point location. Likewise, if the
flight safety limits are a function of drag impact point, the gate
criteria must also be a function of drag impact point.
(2) When establishing a gate in a flight safety limit, the
analysis must ensure that the launch vehicle flight satisfies the
public risk criteria of Sec. 417.107(b).
(3) For each established gate, the analysis must account for:
(i) All launch vehicle tracking and map errors.
(ii) All launch vehicle plus and minus three-sigma trajectory
limits.
(iii) All debris impact dispersions.
(4) The width of a gate must restrict a launch vehicle's normal
trajectory ground trace.
(c) No-longer-terminate gate analysis products. The products of
a gate analysis that a launch operator must submit to the FAA as
required by Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) A description of the methodology used to establish each
gate.
(2) A description of the tracking representation.
(3) A tabular description of the input data.
(4) Example analysis computations performed to determine a gate.
If a launch involves more than one gate and the same methodology is
used to determine each gate, the launch operator need only submit
the computations for one of the gates.
(5) A graphic depiction of each gate. A launch operator must
provide a depiction or depictions showing flight safety limits,
protected area outlines, nominal and 3-sigma left and right
trajectory ground traces, protected area overflight regions, and
predicted impact dispersion about the three-sigma trajectories
within the gate. Each depiction must show latitude and longitude
grid lines, gate latitude and longitude labels, and the map scale.

A417.19 Data Loss Flight Time and No Longer Terminate Time

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a data loss
flight time analysis that satisfies the requirements of
Sec. 417.219. The requirements of this section apply to the
computation of data loss flight times and the no longer terminate
time required by Sec. 417.219, and to the analysis products that the
launch operator must submit to the FAA as required by
Sec. 417.203(e).
(b) No longer terminate time. The analysis must establish a no
longer terminate time for a launch in accordance with the following:
(1) For a suborbital launch, the analysis must determine a no
longer terminate time as the time after liftoff that a launch
vehicle's hazardous debris impact dispersion can no longer reach any
protected area.
(2) For an orbital launch where the launch vehicle's
instantaneous impact point does not overfly a protected area prior
to reaching orbit, the analysis must establish the no-longer
terminate time as the time after liftoff that the launch vehicle's
hazardous debris impact dispersion can no longer reach any protected
area or orbital insertion, whichever occurs first.
(3) For an orbital launch where a gate permits overflight of a
protected area and where orbital insertion occurs after reaching the
gate, the analysis must determine the no longer terminate time as
the time after liftoff when the time for the launch vehicle's
instantaneous impact point to reach the gate is less than the time
for the instantaneous impact point to reach any flight safety limit.
(4) The analysis must account for a malfunction that causes the
launch vehicle to proceed from its position at the trajectory time
being evaluated toward the closest flight safety limit and protected
area.
(5) The analysis must account for the launch vehicle thrust
vector that produces the highest instantaneous impact point range-
rate that the vehicle is capable of producing at the trajectory time
being evaluated.
(c) Data loss flight times. For each launch vehicle trajectory
time, from the predicted earliest launch vehicle tracking
acquisition time until the no longer terminate time, the analysis
must determine the data loss flight time in accordance with the
following:
(1) The analysis must determine each data loss flight time as
the minimum thrusting time for a launch vehicle to move from a
normal trajectory position to a position where a flight termination
would cause the malfunction debris impact dispersion to reach any
protected area.
(2) A data loss flight time analysis must account for a
malfunction that causes the launch vehicle to proceed from its
position at the trajectory time being evaluated toward the closest
flight safety limit and protected area.
(3) The analysis must account for the launch vehicle thrust
vector that produces the highest instantaneous impact point range-
rate that the vehicle is capable of producing at the trajectory time
being evaluated.
(4) Each data loss flight time must account for the system
delays at the time of flight.
(5) The analysis must determine a data loss flight time for time
increments that do not exceed one second along the launch vehicle
nominal trajectory.
(d) Products. The products of a data loss flight time and no
longer terminate time analysis that a launch operator must submit as
required by Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) A launch operator must describe the methodology used in its
analysis, and identify all assumptions, techniques, input data, and
equations used. A launch operator must submit calculations performed
for one data loss flight time in the launch area and one data loss
flight time that is no less than 50 seconds later in the downrange
area.
(2) A launch operator must submit a graphical description or
depictions of the flight safety limits, the launch point, the launch
site boundaries, the surrounding geographic area, any protected
areas, the no longer terminate time within any applicable scale
requirements, latitude and longitude grid lines, and launch vehicle
nominal and

[[Page 49513]]

three-sigma instantaneous impact point ground traces from liftoff
through orbital insertion for an orbital launch, and through final
impact for a suborbital launch. Each graph must show any launch
vehicle trajectory instantaneous impact points plotted with
sufficient frequency to provide a conformal estimate of the launch
vehicle's instantaneous impact point ground trace curvature. A
launch operator must provide labeled latitude and longitude lines
and the map scale on the depiction.
(3) A launch operator must provide a tabular description of each
data loss flight time. The tabular description must include the
malfunction start time and the geodetic latitude (positive north of
the equator) and longitude (positive east of the Greenwich Meridian)
coordinates of the intersection of the launch vehicle instantaneous
impact point trajectory with the flight safety limit. The table must
identify the first data lost flight time and no longer terminate
time. The tabular description must include data loss flight times
for trajectory time increments not to exceed one second.

A417.21 Time Delay

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a time delay
analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.221. The
requirements of this section apply to the computation of time delays
associated with a flight safety system and other launch vehicle
systems and operations as required by Sec. 417.221 and to the
analysis products that the launch operator must submit to the FAA as
required by Sec. 417.203(e).
(b) Time delay analysis constraints. The analysis must account
for all significant causes of time delay between the violation of a
flight termination rule and the time when a flight safety system is
capable of terminating flight in accordance with the following:
(1) The analysis must account for decision and reaction times,
including variation in human response time, for flight safety
official and other personnel that are part of a launch operator's
flight safety system as defined by subpart D of this part.
(2) The analyses must determine the time delay inherent in any
data, from any source, used by a flight safety official for making
flight termination decisions.
(3) A time delay analysis must account for all significant
causes of time delay, including data flow rates and reaction times,
for hardware and software, including, but not limited to the
following:
(i) Tracking system. A time delay analysis must account for time
delays between the launch vehicle's current location and last known
location and that are associated with the hardware and software that
make up the launch vehicle tracking system, whether or not it is
located on the launch vehicle, such as transmitters, receivers,
decoders, encoders, modulators, circuitry and any encryption and
decryption of data.
(ii) Display systems. A time delay analysis must account for
delays associated with hardware and software that make up any
display system used by a flight safety official to aid in making
flight control decisions. A time delay analysis must also account
for any manual operations requirements, tracking source selection,
tracking data processing, flight safety limit computations, inherent
display delays, meteorological data processing, automated or manual
system configuration control, automated or manual process control,
automated or manual mission discrete control, and automated or
manual failover decision control.
(iii) Flight termination system and command control system. A
time delay analysis must account for delays and response times
associated with flight termination system and command control system
hardware and software, such as transmitters, decoders, encoders,
modulators, relays and shutdown, arming and destruct devices,
circuitry and any encryption and decryption of data.
(iv) Software specific time delays. A delay analysis must
account for delays associated with any correlation of data performed
by software, such as timing and sequencing; data filtering delays
such as error correction, smoothing, editing, or tracking source
selection; data transformation delays; and computation cycle time.
(4) A time delay analysis must determine the time delay plus and
minus three-sigma values relative to the mean time delay.
(5) For use in any risk analysis, a time delay analysis must
determine time delay distributions that account for the variance of
time delays for potential launch vehicle failures, including but not
limited to, the range of malfunction turn characteristics and the
time of flight when the malfunction occurs.
(c) Time delay analysis products. The products of a time delay
analysis that a launch operator must submit as required by
Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) A description of the methodology used to produce the time
delay analysis.
(2) A schematic drawing that maps the flight safety official's
data flow time delays from the start of a launch vehicle malfunction
through the final commanded flight termination on the launch
vehicle, including the flight safety official's decision and
reaction time. The drawings must indicate major systems, subsystems,
major software functions, and data routing.
(3) A tabular listing of each time delay source and its
individual mean and plus and minus three-sigma contribution to the
overall time delay. The table must provide all time delay values in
milliseconds.
(4) The mean delay time and the plus and minus three-sigma
values of the delay time relative to the mean value.

A417.23 Flight Hazard Areas

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a flight
hazard area analysis that satisfies the requirements of
Sec. 417.223. The requirements of this section apply to the
determination of flight hazard areas for orbital and ballistic
launch vehicles that use a flight termination system to protect the
public as required by Sec. 417.223 and to the analysis products that
the launch operator must submit to the FAA as required by
Sec. 417.203(e). Requirements that apply to determining flight
hazard areas for unguided suborbital rockets that use a wind
weighting safety system are contained in appendix C of this part.
(b) Launch site flight hazard area. A flight hazard area
analysis must establish a launch site flight hazard area that
encompasses the launch point and:
(i) If the flight safety analysis employs hazard isolation to
establish flight safety limits in accordance with A417.13(c), the
launch site flight hazard area must encompass the flight safety
limits.
(ii) If the flight safety analysis does not employ hazard
isolation to establish the flight safety limits, the launch site
flight hazard area must encompass all hazard areas established in
accordance with paragraphs (d) through (j) of this section. Figure
A417.23-1 illustrates a launch site flight hazard area for a coastal
launch site. Figure A417.23-2 illustrates a launch site flight
hazard area for an inland launch site.
(c) Flight corridor. For regions outside the flight hazard area,
the analysis must define a flight corridor that extends downrange
from a flight hazard area as illustrated by figure A417.23-3. The
flight safety limits established in accordance with A417.13 must
bound the flight corridor. The flight corridor must include any land
overflight permitted by a gate established in accordance with
A417.17. A five-sigma cross range trajectory dispersion about the
nominal launch vehicle trajectory must bound any land overflight
area. A flight corridor must extend for all downrange positions from
the flight hazard area to the no longer terminate time determined in
accordance with A417.19.
(d) Debris impact hazard area. The analysis must establish a
debris impact hazard area that accounts for the effects of impacting
debris resulting from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle
flight, except for toxic effects, and accounts for potential impact
locations of all debris fragments. The analysis must establish a
debris hazard area in accordance with the following:
(1) An individual casualty contour that defines where the risk
to an individual would exceed an expected casualty (EC)
criteria of 1x10^-6 if one person were assumed to be in
the open and inside the contour during launch vehicle flight must
bound a debris hazard area. The analysis must produce an individual
casualty contour in accordance with the following:
(i) The analysis must account for the location of a hypothetical
person, and must vary the location of the person to determine when
the risk would exceed the Ec criteria of
1x10^-6. The analysis must count a person as a casualty
when the person's location is subjected to any inert debris impact
with a mean expected kinetic energy greater than or equal to 11 ft-
lbs or a peak incident overpressure equal to or greater than one psi
due to explosive debris impact. The analysis must determine the peak
incident overpressure using the Kingery-Bulmash relationship,
without regard to sheltering, reflections, or atmospheric effects.
(ii) The analysis must account for person locations that are no
more than 1000 feet apart in the downrange direction and no more
than 1000 feet apart in the crossrange direction to produce an
individual casualty contour. For each person location, the

[[Page 49514]]

analysis must sum the probabilities of casualty over all flight
times for all debris groups.
(iii) An individual casualty contour must consist of curves that
are smooth and continuous. To accomplish this, the analysis must
vary the time interval between the trajectory times assessed so that
each location of a debris impact point is less than one-half sigma
of the downrange dispersion distance.
(2) The input for determining a debris impact hazard area must
account for the results of the trajectory analysis required by
A417.7, the malfunction turn analysis required by A417.9, and the
debris analysis required by A417.11 to define the impact locations
of each class of debris established by the debris analysis, and the
time delay analysis required by A417.21.
(3) The analysis must account for the extent of the impact
debris dispersions for each debris class produced by normal and
malfunctioning launch vehicle flight at each trajectory time. The
analysis must also account for how the vehicle breaks up, either by
the flight termination system or by aerodynamic forces, if the
different breakup may result in a different probability of existence
for each debris class. A debris impact hazard area must account for
each impacting debris fragment classified in accordance with
A417.11(c).
(4) The analysis must account for launch vehicle flight that
exceeds a flight safety limit. The analysis must also account for
trajectory conditions that maximize the mean debris impact distance
during the flight safety system delay time determined in accordance
with A417.21 and account for a debris model that is representative
of a flight termination or aerodynamic breakup. For each launch
vehicle breakup event, the analysis must account for trajectory and
breakup dispersions, variations in debris class characteristics, and
debris dispersion due to any wind condition under which a launch
would be attempted.
(5) The analysis must account for the probability of failure of
each launch vehicle stage and the probability of existence of each
debris class. The analysis must account for the probability of
occurrence of each type of launch vehicle failure. The analysis must
account for vehicle failure probabilities that vary depending on the
time of flight.
(6) In addition to failure debris, the analysis must account for
nominal jettisoned body debris impacts and the corresponding debris
impact dispersions. The analysis must use a probability of
occurrence of 1.0 for the planned debris fragments produced by
normal separation events during flight.
(e) Near-launch-point blast hazard area. A flight hazard area
analysis must define a blast overpressure hazard area as a circle
extending from the launch point with a radius equal to the 1.0-psi
overpressure distance produced by the equivalent TNT weight of the
explosive capability of the vehicle. In addition, the analysis must
establish a minimum near-pad blast hazard area to provide protection
from hazardous fragments potentially propelled by an explosion. The
analysis must account for the maximum possible total solid and
liquid propellant explosive potential of the launch vehicle and any
payload. The analysis must define a blast overpressure hazard area
using the following equations:

Rop = 45 [middot] (NEW)^1/3
Where:
Rop is the over pressure distance in feet.
NEW = WE [middot] C (pounds).
WE is the weight of the explosive in pounds.
C is the TNT equivalency coefficient of the propellant being
evaluated. A launch operator must identify the TNT equivalency of
each propellant on its launch vehicle including any payload. TNT
equivalency data for common liquid propellants is provided in tables
A417-1. Table A417-2 provides factors for converting gallons of
specified liquid propellants to pounds.

(f) Other hazards. A flight hazard area analysis must identify
any additional hazards, such as radioactive material, that may exist
on the launch vehicle or payload. For each such hazard, the analysis
must determine a hazard area that encompasses any debris impact
point and its dispersion and includes an additional hazard radius
that accounts for potential casualty due to the additional hazard.
Analysis requirements for toxic release and far field blast
overpressure are provided in Sec. 417.27 and A417.29, respectively.
(g) Ship-hit contours. A flight hazard area analysis must
establish ship hazard areas, referred to as ship-hit contours, to
ensure that the probability of hitting a ship satisfies the
collective probability threshold of 1x10^-5 required by
Sec. 417.107(b) and to determine the area that may need to be
surveyed on the day of launch. The analysis must determine the need
to survey the ship hazard areas in accordance with paragraph (h) of
this section. When paragraph (h) requires surveillance, a launch
operator must not initiate flight while the number of ships within
any ship-hit contour is greater than or equal to the number of ships
for which the contour was established. The flight hazard area must
encompass all ship-hit contours. The analysis must establish the
ship-hit contours in accordance with the following:
(1) A ship-hit contour must account for the size of the largest
ship that could be located in the flight hazard area. The analysis
must demonstrate that the ship size used represents the largest ship
that could be present in the flight hazard area or, if the ship size
is unknown, the analysis must use a ship size of 120,000 square
feet. Additional contours may be established for smaller vessels if
necessary to facilitate surveillance of the flight hazard area while
ensuring that the 1x10^-5 hit criteria is satisfied.
(2) The analysis must determine ship-hit contours for one to 10
ships in increments of one ship. For each given number of ships, the
associated ship-hit contour must bound an area around the nominal
instantaneous impact point trace where, if the given number of ships
were located on the contour, the collective probability of impacting
any ship would be less than or equal to the 1x10^-5 ship-
hit criteria.
(3) Each ship-hit contour must account for all debris as
determined in accordance with A417.11. Each contour must account for
each mean debris impact point and the extent of the impact
dispersion for each simulated launch vehicle failure for increasing
trajectory times, starting at liftoff. Each debris impact dispersion
must account for the variance in winds, the aerodynamic properties
of the debris and the variance in velocity of the debris resulting
from vehicle breakup, the malfunction turn capabilities of the
launch vehicle, and guidance and performance errors. The analysis
must also account for the type of vehicle breakup, either by the
flight termination system or by aerodynamic forces that may result
in different debris characteristics.
(4) Each ship-hit contour must account for any inert debris
impact with mean expected kinetic energy at impact greater than or
equal to 11 ft-lbs and peak incident overpressure of greater than or
equal to 1.0 psi due to any explosive debris impact. A ship-hit
contour must consists of curves that are smooth and continuous. To
accomplish this, the analysis must vary the time interval, between
the trajectory times assessed such that the distance between each
debris impact point location for each time assessed is less than
one-half sigma of the downrange dispersion distance.
(5) Each ship-hit contour must account for each nominal staging
event and potential launch vehicle failure that may result in
vehicle breakup in the flight hazard area. Each contour must account
for the probability of failure of each launch vehicle stage and the
probability of existence of each debris class. The analysis must
account for each launch vehicle failure as a function of probability
of occurrence. The analysis must account for each launch vehicle
failure probability as a function of flight time. The analysis must
account for all potential debris created by flight termination and
aerodynamic breakup and the probability of occurrence of each. Each
contour must account for breakup through aerodynamic breakup or a
flight termination action and the different debris that would result
from each type of breakup. The analysis must account for any planned
debris impact, such as a stage or payload fairing impact and a
probability of existence equal to the probability of success for the
planned debris impact.
(h) Ship surveillance in the launch site flight hazard area. The
launch site flight hazard area need not be surveyed for ships during
the launch countdown if the analysis demonstrates, using statistical
ship density data, that the total probability of a ship impact
occurring is less than or equal to 1x10^-5. The analysis
must establish whether a launch operator must conduct ship
surveillance in the launch site flight hazard area for a launch in
accordance with the following:
(1) The analysis must determine ship density for the launch site
flight hazard area based on accurate statistical data. The ship
density for the launch site flight hazard area must account for
factors that affect the ship density, such as time of day. The
analysis must use statistical ship density for the launch site
flight hazard area multiplied by a safety factor of 10 unless the
analysis includes a clear and convincing demonstration of the
accuracy of the ship

[[Page 49515]]

density data, and accounts for the associated ship density error in
the collective ship-hit probability analysis.
(2) The analysis must establish the expected number of ships
inside the 10-ship contour determined in accordance with paragraph
(g) of this section, by determining the total water surface area
within the 10-ship contour and multiplying this area by the ship
density determined in accordance with paragraph (h)(1) of this
section. If the resulting number of ships is less than 10, the
launch operator need not perform ship surveillance in the flight
hazard area. If the resulting number of ships is equal to or greater
than 10, the launch operator must perform ship surveillance in the
flight hazard area as required by Sec. 417.121(f).
(i) Ship hazard area for notice to mariners. Regardless of
whether ship surveillance is required in accordance with paragraph
(h) of this section, the launch operator must provide the ship-hit
contour for 10 ships determined in accordance with paragraph (e) of
this section as a notice to mariners as required by Sec. 417.121(e).
(j) Launch site flight hazard area aircraft-hit contour. A
flight hazards area analysis must determine an aircraft-hit contour
to be surveyed on the day of launch to ensure that the probability
of hitting an aircraft satisfies the individual probability
threshold of 1x10^-8 as required by Sec. 417.107(b) for
the flight hazard area around the launch point. The launch site
flight hazard area must contain an aircraft-hit contour that extends
for altitudes from zero to 60,000 feet. The analysis must determine
an aircraft-hit contour in accordance with the following:
(1) An aircraft-hit contour must bound an area around the
nominal instantaneous impact point trace where, if an aircraft were
located on the contour, the individual probability of impacting the
aircraft would be less than or equal to 1x10^-8.
(2) The analysis must account for the dimension of the largest
aircraft operated in the vicinity of the launch or, if unknown, the
dimensions of a Boeing 747 aircraft.
(3) The analysis must account for all debris as determined under
A417.11. An aircraft-hit contour must account for aircraft velocity
and debris with kinetic energy relative to the aircraft greater than
or equal to 11 ft-lbs.
(4) The analysis must account for each nominal staging event and
potential vehicle failure that may result in vehicle breakup. The
analysis must account for each vehicle failure as a function of
probability of occurrence and as a function of time.
(5) The analysis must account for all debris for both flight
termination and for aerodynamic breakup and the probability of
occurrence of the debris. The analysis must account for each mean
debris impact point and the extent of the debris impact dispersion.
(k) Flight corridor ship hazard areas. Within a flight corridor
but outside of a launch site flight hazard area, the analysis must
determine a ship hazard area for each planned debris impact for the
issuance of notices to mariners. Each ship hazard area must consist
of an area centered on a planned impact point and must be defined by
the larger of the three-sigma impact dispersion ellipse or an
ellipse with the same semi-major and semi-minor axis ratio as the
impact dispersion, where, if a ship were located on the boundary of
the ellipse, the probability of hitting the ship would be less than
or equal to 1x10^-5. The analysis must establish each
flight corridor ship hazard area in accordance with C417.5(h) and
C417.5(i) of appendix C, which apply to both orbital and suborbital
launch. The analysis must demonstrate whether surveillance of a ship
hazard area must take place as required by C417.5(g) of appendix C
of this part.
(l) Flight corridor aircraft hazard areas. Within a flight
corridor but outside of a launch site flight hazard area, the
analysis must establish an aircraft hazard area for each planned
debris impact for the issuance of notices to airmen in accordance
with Sec. 417.121(e). Each aircraft hazard area must encompass an
air space region, from an altitude of 60,000 feet to impact on the
Earth's surface, that contains the larger of the three-sigma drag
impact dispersion or an ellipse with the same semi-major and semi-
minor axis ratio as the impact dispersion, where, if an aircraft
were located on the boundary of the ellipse, the probability of
hitting the aircraft would be less than or equal to
1x10^-8. The flight safety analysis must determine flight
corridor aircraft hazard areas for both orbital and suborbital
launch using the methodology contained in paragraph C417.5(f) of
appendix C of this part.
(m) Flight hazard area analysis products. The products of a
flight hazard area analysis that a launch operator must submit to
the FAA in accordance with Sec. 417.203(e) must include, but need
not be limited to:
(1) A chart that depicts the launch site flight hazard area,
including its size and location.
(2) A chart that depicts each hazard area required by this
section.
(3) A description of each hazard for which analysis was
performed; the methodology used to compute each hazard area; and the
debris classes for aerodynamic breakup of the launch vehicle and for
flight termination. For each debris class, the launch operator must
identify the number of debris fragments, the variation in ballistic
coefficient, and the standard deviation of the debris dispersion.
(4) A chart that depicts each of the ship-hit contours, the
individual casualty contour, and the aircraft-hit contour.
(5) A chart that depicts the flight corridor, including any
regions of land overflight.
(6) A description of the aircraft hazard area for each planned
debris impact inside the flight corridor, the information to be
published in a Notice to Airmen, and all information required as
part of any agreement with the FAA ATC office having jurisdiction
over the airspace through which flight will take place.
(7) A description of any ship hazard area for each planned
debris impact inside the flight corridor and all information
required in a Notice to Mariners.
(8) A description of the methodology used for determining each
hazard area.
(9) A description of the hazard area operational controls and
procedures to be implemented for flight.

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Table A417-1, Liquid Propellant Explosive Equivalents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Propellant combinations TNT equivalents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LO2/LH2................................ The larger of 8W^2/3 or 14% of
W.
Where W is the weight of LO2/
LH2.
LO2/LH2 + LO2/RP-1..................... Sum of (20% for LO2/RP-1) the
larger of 8W^2/3 or 14% of W.
Where W is the weight of LO2/
LH2.
LO2/RP-1............................... 20% of W up to 500,000 pounds +
10% of W over 500,000 pounds.
Where W is the weight of LO2/RP-
1.
N2O4/N2H4 (or UDMH or UDMH/N2H4 10% of W.
Mixture). Where W is the weight of the
propellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table A417-2, Propellant Hazard and Compatibility Groupings and Factors to be Used When Converting Gallons of
Propellant into Pounds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compatibility
Propellant Hazard group group Pounds/gallon deg.F
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hydrogen Peroxide................................ II A 11.6 68
Hydrazine........................................ III C 8.4 68
Liquid Hydrogen.................................. III C 0.59 -423
Liquid Oxygen.................................... II A 9.5 -297
Nitrogen Tetroxide............................... I A 12.1 68
RP-1............................................. I C 6.8 68
UDMH............................................. III C 6.6 68
UDHM/Hydrazine................................... III C 7.5 68
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A417.25 Debris Risk

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a debris risk
analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.225. The
requirements of this section apply to the computation of the average
number of casualties (EC) to the collective members of the public
exposed to inert and explosive debris hazards from the proposed
flight of a launch vehicle as required by Sec. 417.225 and to the
analysis products that the launch operator must submit to the FAA as
required by Sec. 417.203(e).
(b) Debris risk analysis constraints. The following constraints
apply to a debris risk analysis:
(1) A debris risk analysis must use the methodologies and
equations of appendix B of this part.
(2) A debris risk analysis must account for the following
populations:
(i) The overflight of populations located inside any flight
safety limits.

[[Page 49518]]

(ii) All populations located within five-sigma left and right
crossrange of a nominal trajectory instantaneous impact point ground
trace and within five-sigma of each planned nominal debris impact.
(iii) Any planned overflight of the public within any gate
overflight areas.
(iv) Any populations outside the flight safety limits identified
in accordance with paragraph (b)(10) of this section.
(3) A debris risk analysis must account for both inert and
explosive debris hazards produced from any impacting debris caused
by normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight. The analysis
must account for the debris classes determined by the debris
analysis required by A417.11. A debris risk analysis must account
for any inert debris impact with mean expected kinetic energy at
impact greater than or equal to 11 ft-lb and peak incident
overpressure of greater than or equal to 1.0 psi due to any
explosive debris impact. The analysis must account for all debris
hazards as a function of flight time.
(4) A debris risk analysis must account for debris impact points
and dispersion for each class of debris in accordance with the
following:
(i) A debris risk analysis must account for drag corrected
impact points and dispersions for each class of impacting debris
resulting from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight as a
function of trajectory time from lift-off through orbital insertion,
including each planned impact, for an orbital launch, and through
final impact for a suborbital launch.
(ii) The dispersion for each debris class must account for the
position and velocity state vector dispersions at breakup, the
variance produced by breakup imparted velocities, the variance
produced by winds, the variance produced by aerodynamic properties
for each debris class, and any other dispersion variances.
(iii) A debris risk analysis must account for the survivability
of debris fragments that are subject to reentry aerodynamic forces
or heating. A debris class may be eliminated from the debris risk
analysis if the launch operator demonstrates that the debris will
not survive to impact.
(5) A debris risk analysis must account for launch vehicle
failure probability. The following constraints apply:
(i) For a launch vehicle with fewer than 15 flights, a launch
operator must use a launch vehicle failure probability of 0.31.
(ii) For a launch vehicle with at least 15 flights, but fewer
than 30 flights, a launch operator must use a launch vehicle failure
probability of 0.10 or the empirical failure probability, whichever
is greater.
(iii) For a launch vehicle with 30 or more flights, a launch
operator must use the empirical failure probability determined from
the actual flight history.
(iv) For a launch vehicle with a previously established failure
probability that undergoes a modification to a stage, and the
modification could affect the reliability of that stage, the launch
operator must apply the previously established failure probability
to all unmodified stages and the failure probability requirements of
paragraphs (b)(5)(i) through (b)(5)(iii) of this section to the
modified stage.
(6) A debris risk analysis must account for the dwell time of
the instantaneous impact point ground trace over each populated or
protected area being evaluated.
(7) A debris risk analysis must account for the three-sigma
instantaneous impact point trajectory variations in left-crossrange,
right-crossrange, uprange, and downrange as a function of trajectory
time, due to launch vehicle performance variations as determined by
the trajectory analysis performed in accordance with A417.7.
(8) A debris risk analysis must account for the effective
casualty area as a function of launch vehicle flight time for all
impacting debris generated from a catastrophic launch vehicle
malfunction event or a planned impact event. The effective casualty
area must account for both payload and vehicle systems and
subsystems debris. The effective casualty area must account for all
debris fragments determined as part of a launch operator's debris
analysis in accordance with A417.11. The effective casualty area for
each explosive debris fragment must account for a 1.0-psi blast
overpressure radius and the projected debris effects for all
potentially explosive debris. The effective casualty area for each
inert debris fragment must:
(i) Account for bounce, skip, slide, and splatter effects; or
(ii) Equal seven times the maximum projected area of the
fragment.
(9) A debris risk analysis must account for current population
density data obtained from a current population database for the
region being evaluated or by estimating the current population using
exponential population growth rate equations applied to the most
current historical data available. The population model must define
population centers that are similar enough to be described and
treated as a single average set of characteristics without degrading
the accuracy of the debris risk estimate.
(10) For a launch vehicle that uses a flight safety system, a
debris risk analysis must account for the collective risk to any
populations outside the flight safety limits in the area surrounding
the launch site during flight, including people who will be at any
public launch viewing area during flight. For such populations, in
addition to the constraints listed in paragraphs (b)(1) through
(b)(9) of this section, a launch operator's debris risk analysis
must account for the following:
(i) The probability of a launch vehicle failure that would
result in debris impact in protected areas outside the flight safety
limits.
(ii) The failure rate of the launch operator's flight safety
system. A flight safety system failure rate of 0.002 may be used if
the flight safety system complies with the flight safety system
requirements of subpart D of this part. For an alternate flight
safety system approved in accordance with Sec. 417.107(a)(3), the
launch operator must demonstrate the validity of the probability of
failure through the licensing process.
(iii) Current population density data and population projections
for the day and time of flight for the areas outside the flight
safety limits.
(c) Debris risk analysis products. The products of a debris risk
analysis that a launch operator must submit to the FAA as required
by Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) A debris risk analysis report that provides the analysis
input data, probabilistic risk determination methods, sample
computations, and text or graphical charts that characterize the
public risk to geographical areas for each launch.
(2) Geographic data showing:
(i) The launch vehicle nominal, five-sigma left-crossrange and
five-sigma right-crossrange instantaneous impact point ground
traces;
(ii) All exclusion zones relative to the instantaneous impact
point ground traces; and
(iii) All populated areas included in the debris risk analysis.
(3) A discussion of each launch vehicle failure scenario
accounted for in the analysis and the probability of occurrence,
which may vary with flight time, for each failure scenario. This
information must include failure scenarios where a launch vehicle:
(i) Flies within normal limits until some malfunction causes
spontaneous breakup or results in a commanded flight termination;
(ii) Experiences malfunction turns; and
(iii) Flight safety system fails to function.
(4) A population model applicable to the launch overflight
regions that contains the following: region identification, location
of the center of each population center by geodetic latitude and
longitude, total area, number of persons in each population center,
and a description of the shelter characteristics within the
population center.
(5) A description of the launch vehicle, including general
information concerning the nature and purpose of the launch and an
overview of the launch vehicle, including a scaled diagram of the
general arrangement and dimensions of the vehicle. A launch
operator's debris risk analysis products may reference other
documentation submitted to the FAA containing this information. The
launch operator must identify any changes in the launch vehicle
description from that submitted during the licensing process in
accordance with Sec. 415.109(e). The description must include:
(i) Weights and dimensions of each stage.
(ii) Weights and dimensions of any booster motors attached.
(iii) The types of fuel used in each stage and booster.
(iv) Weights and dimensions of all interstage adapters and
skirts.
(v) Payload dimensions, materials, construction, any payload
fuel; payload fairing construction, materials, and dimensions; and
any non-inert components or materials that add to the effective
casualty area of the debris, such as radioactive or toxic materials
or high-pressure vessels.
(6) A typical sequence of events showing times of ignition,
cutoff, burnout, and jettison of each stage, firing of any ullage
rockets, and starting and ending times of coast periods and control
modes.
(7) The following information for each launch vehicle motor:
(i) Propellant type and composition;
(ii) Vacuum thrust profile;
(iii) Propellant weight and total motor weight as a function of
time;

[[Page 49519]]

(iv) A description of each nozzle and steering mechanism;
(v) For solid rocket motors, internal pressure and average
propellant thickness, or borehole radius, as a function of time;
(vi) Maximum impact point deviations as a function of failure
time during destruct system delays. Burn rate as a function of
ambient pressure;
(vii) A discussion of whether a commanded destruct could ignite
a non-thrusting motor, and if so, under what conditions; and
(viii) Nozzle exit and entrance areas.
(8) The launch vehicle's launch and failure history, including a
summary of past vehicle performance. For a new vehicle with little
or no flight history, a launch operator must provide data on similar
vehicles that include:
(i) Identification of the launches that have occurred;
(ii) Launch date, location, and direction of each launch;
(iii) The number of launches that performed normally;
(iv) Behavior and impact location of each abnormal experience;
(v) The time, altitude, and nature of each malfunction; and
(vi) Descriptions of corrective actions taken, including changes
in vehicle design, flight termination, and guidance and control
hardware and software.
(9) The values of probability of impact (PI) and
expected casualty (EC) for each populated area.

A417.27 Toxic Release Hazard Analysis

A flight safety analysis must include a toxic release hazard
analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.227. A launch
operator's toxic release hazard analysis must satisfy the
methodology requirements contained in appendix I of part 417. A
launch operator must submit the analysis products identified in
appendix I as required by Sec. 417.203(e).

A417.29 Far Field Blast Overpressure Effects

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a far field
blast overpressure effects hazard analysis that satisfies the
requirements of Sec. 417.229. The requirements of this section apply
to the computation of far field blast overpressure effects from the
proposed flight of a launch vehicle as required by Sec. 417.229 and
to the analysis products that the launch operator must submit to the
FAA as required by Sec. 417.203(e). The analysis must account for
distant focus overpressure and any overpressure enhancement to
establish the potential for broken windows due to peak incident
overpressures below 1.0 psi and related casualties due to falling or
projected glass shards. The analysis must employ either paragraph
(b) of this section or the risk analysis of paragraph (c) of this
section.
(b) Far field blast overpressure hazard analysis. Unless an
analysis satisfies the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section
a far field blast overpressure hazard analysis must satisfy the
following:
(1) Explosive yield factors. The analysis must use explosive
yield factor curves for each type or class of solid or liquid
propellant used by the launch vehicle. Each explosive yield factor
curve must be based on the most accurate explosive yield data for
the corresponding type or class of solid or liquid propellant based
on empirical data or computational modeling.
(2) Establish the maximum credible explosive yield. The analysis
must establish the maximum credible explosive yield resulting from
normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight. The explosive yield
must account for impact mass and velocity of impact on the Earth's
surface. The analysis must account for explosive yield expressed as
a TNT equivalent for peak overpressure.
(3) Characterize the population exposed to the hazard. The
analysis must demonstrate whether any population centers are
vulnerable to a distant focus overpressure hazard using the
methodology provided by section 6.3.2.4 of the American National
Standard Institute's ANSI S2.20-1983, ``Estimating Air Blast
Characteristics for Single Point Explosions in Air with a Guide to
Evaluation of Atmospheric Propagation and Effects'' and in
accordance with the following:
(i) For the purposes of this analysis, a population center must
include any area outside the launch site and not under the launch
operator's control that contains an exposed site. An exposed site
includes any structure that may be occupied by human beings, and
that has at least one window, but does not include automobiles,
airplanes, and waterborne vessels. The analysis must account for the
most recent census information on each population center. The
analysis must treat any exposed site for which no census information
is available, or the census information indicates a population equal
to or less than four persons, as a `single residence.'
(ii) The analysis must identify the distance between the
location of the maximum credible impact explosion and the location
of each population center potentially exposed. Unless the location
of the potential explosion site is limited to a defined region, the
analysis must account for the distance between the potential
explosion site and a population center as the minimum distance
between any point within the region contained by the flight safety
limits and the nearest exposed site within the population center.
(iii) The analysis must account for weather conditions optimized
for a distant focus overpressure hazard and use an atmospheric blast
``focus factor'' (F) of 5.
(iv) The analysis must determine, using the methodology of
section 6.3.2.4 of ANSI S2.20-1983, for each a population center,
whether the maximum credible explosive yield of a launch meets,
exceeds or is less than the ``no damage yield limit,'' of the
population center. If the maximum credible explosive yield is less
than the ``no damage yield limit'' for all exposed sites, the
remaining requirements of this section do not apply. If the maximum
credible explosive yield meets or exceeds the ``no damage yield
limit'' for a population center then that population center is
vulnerable to far field blast overpressure from the launch and the
requirements of paragraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) of this section apply.
(4) Estimate the quantity of broken windows. The analysis must
use a focus factor of 5 and the methods provided by ANSI S2.20-1983
to estimate the number of potential broken windows within each
population center determined to be vulnerable to the distant focus
overpressure hazard in accordance with paragraph (b)(3) of this
section.
(5) Determine and implement measures necessary to prevent
distant focus overpressure from breaking windows. For each
population center that is vulnerable to far field blast overpressure
from a launch, the analysis must identify mitigation measures to
protect the public from serious injury from broken windows and the
flight commit criteria of Sec. 417.113(b) needed to enforce the
mitigation measures. A launch operator's mitigation measures must
include one or more of the following:
(i) Apply a minimum 4-millimeter thick anti-shatter film to all
exposed sites where the maximum credible yield exceeds the ``no
damage yield limit.''
(ii) Evacuate the exposed public to a location that is not
vulnerable to the distant focus overpressure hazard at least two
hours prior to the planned flight time.
(iii) If, in accordance with paragraph (b)(4) of this section,
the analysis predicts that less than 20 windows will break, advise
the public of the potential for glass breakage.
(c) Far field blast overpressure risk analysis. If a launch
operator does not employ paragraph (b) of this section to perform a
far field overpressure hazard analysis, the launch operator must
conduct a risk analysis that demonstrates that the launch will be
conducted in accordance with the public risk criteria of
Sec. 417.107(b).
(d) Far field blast overpressure effect products. The products
of a far field blast overpressure analysis that a launch operator
must submit to the FAA as required by Sec. 417.203(e) must include:
(1) A description of the methodology used to produce the far
field blast overpressure analysis results, a tabular description of
the analysis input data, and a description of any far field blast
overpressure mitigation measures implemented.
(2) For any far field blast overpressure risk analysis, an
example set of the analysis computations.
(3) The values for the maximum credible explosive yield as a
function of time of flight.
(4) The distance between the potential explosion location and
any population center vulnerable to the far field blast overpressure
hazard. For each population center, the launch operator must
identify the exposed populations by location and number of people.
(5) Any mitigation measures established to protect the public
from far field blast overpressure hazards and any flight commit
criteria established to ensure the mitigation measures are enforced.

A417.31 Collision Avoidance

(a) General. A flight safety analysis must include a collision
avoidance analysis that satisfies the requirements of Sec. 417.231.
The

[[Page 49520]]

requirements of this section apply to the process of obtaining a
collision avoidance assessment from United States Space Command as
required by Sec. 417.231 and to the analysis products that the
launch operator must submit to the FAA as required by
Sec. 417.203(e). United States Space Command refers to a collision
avoidance analysis for a space launch as a conjunction on launch
assessment.
(b) Analysis constraints. A launch operator must satisfy the
following when obtaining and implementing the results of a collision
avoidance analysis:
(1) A launch operator must provide United States Space Command
with the launch window and trajectory data needed to perform a
conjunction on launch assessment for a launch as required by
paragraph (c) of this section, at least 15 days before the first
attempt at flight. The FAA will identify a launch operator to United
States Space Command as part of issuing a license and provide a
launch operator with current United States Space Command contact
information.
(2) A launch operator must obtain a conjunction on launch
assessment performed by United States Space Command 6 hours before
the beginning of a launch window.
(3) A launch operator may use a conjunction on launch assessment
for 12 hours from the time that United States Space Command
determines the state vectors of the habitable orbiting objects. If a
launch operator needs an updated conjunction on launch assessment
due to a launch delay, the launch operator must submit the request
to United States Space Command at least 12 hours prior to the
beginning of the new launch window.
(4) For every 90 minutes, or portion of 90 minutes, that pass
between the time United States Space Command last determined the
state vectors of the orbiting objects, a launch operator must expand
each wait in a launch window by subtracting 15 seconds from the
start of the wait in the launch window and adding 15 seconds to the
end of the wait in the launch window. A launch operator must
incorporate all the resulting waits in the launch window into its
flight commit criteria established as required by Sec. 417.113.
(c) Information required. A launch operator must prepare a
conjunction on launch assessment worksheet for each launch using a
standardized format that contains the input data required by this
paragraph. A launch operator must submit the input data to United
States Space Command for the purposes of completing a conjunction on
launch assessment. A launch operator must submit the input data to
the FAA as part of the license application process in accordance
with Sec. 415.115.
(1) Launch information. A launch operator must submit the
following launch information:
(i) Mission name. A mnemonic given to the launch vehicle/payload
combination identifying the launch mission from all others.
(ii) Segment number. A segment is defined as a launch vehicle
stage or payload after the thrusting portion of its flight has
ended. This includes the jettison or deployment of any stage or
payload. A launch operator must provide a separate worksheet for
each segment. For each segment, a launch operator must determine the
``vector at injection'' as defined by paragraph (c)(5) of this
section. The data must present each segment number as a sequence
number relative to the total number of segments for a launch, such
as ``1 of 5.''
(iii) Launch window. The launch window opening and closing times
in Greenwich Mean Time (referred to as ZULU time) and the Julian
dates for each scheduled launch attempt.
(2) Point of contact. The person or office within a launch
operator's organization that collects, analyzes, and distributes
conjunction on launch assessment results.
(3) Conjunction on launch assessment analysis results
transmission medium. A launch operator must identify the
transmission medium, such as voice, FAX, or e-mail, for receiving
results from United States Space Command.
(4) Requestor launch operator needs. A launch operator must
indicate the types of analysis output formats required for
establishing flight commit criteria for a launch:
(i) Waits. All the times within the launch window during which
flight must not be initiated.
(ii) Windows. All the times within an overall launch window
during which flight may be initiated.
(5) Vector at injection. A launch operator must identify the
vector at injection for each segment. ``Vector at injection''
identifies the position and velocity of all orbital or suborbital
segments after the thrust for a segment has ended.
(i) Epoch. The epoch time, in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), of the
expected launch vehicle liftoff time.
(ii) Position and velocity. The position coordinates in the EFG
coordinate system measured in kilometers and the EFG components
measured in kilometers per second, of each launch vehicle stage or
payload after any burnout, jettison, or deployment.
(6) Time of powered flight. The elapsed time in seconds, from
liftoff to arrival at the launch vehicle vector at injection. The
input data must include the time of powered flight for each stage or
jettisoned component measured from liftoff.
(7) Time span for launch window file (LWF). A launch operator
must provide the following information regarding its launch window:
(i) Launch window. The launch window measured in minutes from
the initial proposed liftoff time.
(ii) Time of powered flight. The time provided in accordance
with paragraph (c)(6) of this section measured in minutes rounded up
to the nearest integer minute.
(iii) Screen duration. The time duration, after all thrusting
periods of flight have ended, that a conjunction on launch
assessment must screen for potential conjunctions with habitable
orbital objects. Screen duration is measured in minutes and must be
greater than or equal to 100 minutes for an orbital launch.
(iv) Extra pad. An additional period of time for conjunction on
launch assessment screening to ensure the entire first orbit is
screened for potential conjunctions with habitable orbital objects.
This time must be 10 minutes unless otherwise specified by United
States Space Command.
(v) Total. The summation total of the time spans provided in
accordance with paragraphs (c)(7)(i) through (c)(7)(iv) expressed in
minutes.
(8) Screening. A launch operator must select spherical or
ellipsoidal screening as defined in this paragraph for determining
any conjunction. The default must be the spherical screening method
using an avoidance radius of 200 kilometers for habitable orbiting
objects. If the launch operator requests screening for any
uninhabitable objects, the default must be the spherical screening
method using a miss-distance of 25 kilometers.
(i) Spherical screening. Spherical screening utilizes an impact
exclusion sphere centered on each orbiting object's center-of-mass
to determine any conjunction. A launch operator must specify the
avoidance radius for habitable objects and for any uninhabitable
objects if the launch operator elects to perform the analysis for
uninhabitable objects.
(ii) Ellipsoidal screening. Ellipsoidal screening utilizes an
impact exclusion ellipsoid of revolution centered on the orbiting
object's center-of-mass to determine any conjunction. A launch
operator must provide input in the UVW coordinate system in
kilometers. The launch operator must provide delta-U measured in the
radial-track direction, delta -V measured in the in-track direction,
and delta -W measured in the cross-track direction.
(9) Orbiting objects to evaluate. A launch operator must
identify the orbiting objects to be included in the analysis.
(10) Deliverable schedule/need dates. A launch operator must
identify the times before flight, referred to as ``L-times,'' for
which the launch operator requests a conjunction on launch
assessment.
(d) Collision avoidance assessment products. A launch operator
must submit its conjunction on launch assessment products as
required by Sec. 417.203(e) and must include the input data required
by paragraph (c) of this section. A launch operator must incorporate
the result of the conjunction on launch assessment into its flight
commit criteria established in accordance with Sec. 417.113.

A417.33 Unguided Suborbital Rocket Flown With a Wind Weighting
Safety System

For launch of an unguided suborbital rocket flown with a wind
weighting safety system, the flight safety analysis must satisfy the
requirements of Sec. 417.233. The analysis for an unguided
suborbital rocket flown with a wind weighting safety system must
incorporate the methodologies for trajectory analysis, flight hazard
area analysis, and wind weighting analysis contained in appendix C
of this part. The analysis must also include a debris risk analysis
performed in accordance with A417.25 and appendix B of this part and
a collision avoidance analysis performed in accordance with A417.31.

[[Page 49521]]

28. In B417.1 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64050, revise
``Sec. 417.227'' to read ``Sec. 417.225'' each place it appears.
29. In B417.3 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64050, revise
``Sec. 417.227(b)(5)'' to read ``Sec. 417.225''.
30. In B417.5(b)(1) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64051,
revise ``Sec. 417.205'' to read ``Sec. 417.207 and A417.7''.
31. In B417.5(b)(2) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64051,
revise ``Sec. 417.227(b)(6)'' to read ``A417.25''.
32. In B417.5(b)(3) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64051,
revise ``Sec. 417.209'' to read ``Sec. 417.211 and A417.11''.
33. In B417.5(c) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64051,
revise ``Sec. 417.205(c)'' to read ``Sec. 417.207 and A417.7''.
34. In B417.7(a) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64052,
revise ``Sec. 417.227(b)(11)'' to read ``Sec. 417.225 and A417.25''.
35. In B417.9(a) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64056,
revise ``Sec. 417.227'' to read ``A417.25''.
36. In C417.1 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64057, revise
``Sec. 417.235'' to read ``Sec. 7.233''.
37. In C417.3(g) introductory text as proposed to be revised at
65 FR 64059, revise ``Sec. 417.235(g)'' to read ``A417.203(e)''.
38. In C417.5(a) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64059,
revise ``Sec. 417.235(c)'' to read ``Sec. 417.233''.
39. In C417.5(j) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64062,
revise ``Sec. 417.235(c)'' to read ``Sec. 417.203(e)''.
40. In C417.7(d) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64063,
revise ``Sec. 417.235(g)'' to read ``Sec. 417.203(e)''.
41. In D417.13(b) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64067,
revise ``Sec. 417.223(b)(3)'' to read ``Sec. 417.221 and A417.21''.
42. In D417.19(a) as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64068,
revise ``Sec. 417.221(c)'' to read ``Sec. 417.219 and A417.19''.
43. In I417.1 as proposed to be revised at 65 FR 64116, revise
``Sec. 417.229''to read ``Sec. 417.227''.
44. In I417.5(e) introductory text as proposed to be revised at
65 FR 64119, revise ``Sec. 417.203(c)'' to read ``Sec. 417.203(e)''.

Issued in Washington, DC on July 15, 2002.
Patricia G. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.

[FR Doc. 02-18340 Filed 7-29-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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