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Record of Decision on Mode of Transportation and Nevada Rail Corridor for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, NV
Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.
[Federal Register: April 8, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 68)]
[Notices]
[Page 18557-18565]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr08ap04-44]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision on Mode of Transportation and Nevada Rail
Corridor for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, NV
AGENCY: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S.
Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: On July 23, 2002, the President signed into law (Pub. L. 107-
200) a joint resolution of the U.S. House of Representatives and the
U.S. Senate designating the Yucca Mountain site in Nye County, Nevada,
for development as a geologic repository for the disposal of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In the event the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorizes construction of the repository
and receipt and possession of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, the Department of Energy
(Department or DOE) would be responsible for transporting these
materials to the Yucca Mountain Repository as part of its obligations
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Pursuant to the NWPA and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), DOE issued the ``Final
Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the
Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at
Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada'' (DOE/EIS-0250F, February 2002)
(Final EIS). That document analyzed the environmental impacts of the
proposed action of constructing, operating and monitoring, and
eventually closing a geologic repository for the disposal of 70,000
metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, as well as of transporting spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from commercial and DOE
sites to the Yucca Mountain site.
In preparing the Final EIS, DOE initiated public scoping in 1995,
and subsequently issued for public comment a Draft EIS in 1999 and a
Supplement to the Draft EIS in 2000. During the 199-day public comment
period on the Draft EIS, DOE held public hearings in 21
[[Page 18558]]
locations across the country, 10 of which were held throughout the
State of Nevada. An additional hearing was convened in Las Vegas for
members of Native American Tribes in the region. During the 56-day
public comment period on the Supplement to the Draft EIS, DOE held
three public hearings in Nevada. The Department received more than
13,000 comments on the Draft EIS and the Supplement to the Draft EIS;
about 3,600 of these comments addressed transportation related matters.
DOE is now in the process of preparing an application to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking authorization to construct
the repository. In addition, in order to be in a position to transport
waste to the repository should the NRC approve construction and waste
receipt, DOE must proceed with certain decisions relating to the
transportation of this material. In particular, the Department has
decided to select the mostly rail scenario analyzed in the Final EIS as
the transportation mode both on a national basis and in the State of
Nevada. Under the mostly rail scenario, the Department would rely on a
combination of rail, truck and possibly barge to transport to the
repository site at Yucca Mountain up to 70,000 MTHM of spent nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste, with most of the spent nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste being transported by rail. This
will ultimately require construction of a rail line in Nevada to the
repository. In addition, the Department has decided to select the
Caliente rail corridor \1\ in which to examine potential alignments
within which to construct that rail line. Should the Department select
an alignment within that corridor, it will obtain all necessary
regulatory approvals before beginning construction.
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\1\ A corridor is a strip of land, approximately 0.25 miles (400
meters) wide, that encompasses one of several possible routes
through which DOE could build a rail line. An alignment is the
specific location of a rail line in a corridor.
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ADDRESSES: Copies of the Final EIS and this Record of Decision may be
obtained by calling or mailing a request to: Ms. Robin Sweeney, Office
of National Transportation, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management, U.S. Department of Energy, 1551 Hillshire Drive, M/S 011,
Las Vegas, NV 89134, Telephone 1-800-967-3477. The Final EIS, including
the Readers Guide and Summary, is available via the Internet at
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/documents/feis_a/index.htm. 
This Record of Decision is available at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov
under ``What's New''. Questions regarding the Final EIS or this Record of
Decision can be submitted by calling or mailing them to Ms. Robin Sweeney
at the above phone number or address.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information regarding the
DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process contact: Ms. Carol
M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42),
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW., Washington, DC
20585, Telephone 202-586-4600, or leave a message at 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Transportation-Related Decisions
The analyses in the Final EIS provide the bases for the following
three decisions under NEPA related to the establishment of a
transportation program under which the Department would transport spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to a repository at Yucca
Mountain:
1. Outside Nevada, the selection of a national mode of
transportation scenario (mostly rail or mostly legal-weight truck),
2. In Nevada, the selection among transportation mode scenarios
(mostly rail, mostly legal-weight truck, or mostly heavy-haul truck
with an associated intermodal transfer station), and
3. In Nevada, if the mostly rail scenario or mostly heavy-haul
truck scenario were selected, the selection among rail corridor
implementing alternatives, or heavy-haul truck route implementing
alternatives with use of an associated intermodal transfer station.
See Figure 2-5 on page 2-7 of the Final EIS for a graphical
depiction of the different transportation scenarios and implementing
alternatives.
Part I. Record of Decision for Mode of Transportation
Proposed Action and Transportation Mode Scenarios Considered in the
Final EIS
The Final EIS examines a Proposed Action under which DOE would ship
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from 72 commercial
and 5 DOE sites \2\ to the Yucca Mountain Repository. The Final EIS
considers the potential environmental impacts of transporting spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository under a
variety of modes, including legal-weight truck, rail, heavy-haul truck,
and possibly barge. The Final EIS also considers the environmental
impacts of two No-Action Alternatives, one under which spent nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste would remain at the 72 commercial
and five DOE sites under institutional control for at least 10,000
years, and one under which these materials would remain at the 77 sites
in perpetuity, but under institutional control for only 100 years.
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\2\ Fifty-four additional sites (primarily domestic research
reactors) were expected to ship spent nuclear fuel to two DOE sites
prior to disposal at the repository. DOE plans to consolidate these
materials at the two DOE sites are independent of the decisions
relating to a repository at Yucca Mountain. Shipments from these
sites to DOE sites were analyzed in the ``Programmatic Spent Nuclear
Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs
Environmental Impact Statement'' (PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0202-F; April
1995), and associated Records of Decision (June 1, 1995; 60 FR 28680
and March 8, 1996; 61 FR 9441). The direct impacts of this
consolidation are not included in the analysis of the alternatives
analyzed in the Final EIS for the repository, because they would
occur whether or not DOE proceeds with the repository at Yucca
Mountain. Since the PEIS was published, three research reactors have
closed. As provided for in the Record of Decision (ROD) for the
PEIS, spent nuclear fuel from one reactor was sent to the Savannah
River Site and fuel from another reactor was sent to the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Fuel from
the third reactor, which the ROD for the PEIS anticipated would be
consolidated at INEEL, was sent on an interim basis to the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) site in Lakewood, Colorado (which
also was one of the fifty-four sites analyzed in the PEIS). It is
still ultimately expected to be consolidated at INEEL as provided in
the ROD for the PEIS, whence it will be shipped to the repository.
The fuel that went to USGS is within the amounts analyzed by the
PEIS as going from USGS to INEEL. Moreover, since the change in
interim storage plans does not affect the shipment of fuel to Yucca
Mountain, it does not affect the transportation analysis in the
Final EIS for the repository.
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At the outset, we note that over the past 30 years, more than 2,700
shipments of spent nuclear fuel have been completed, none of which has
resulted in an identified injury caused by the release of radioactive
material. That basic fact provides important context for our
decisionmaking today.
The Final EIS examines various national transportation scenarios
and Nevada transportation implementing alternatives to reflect the
range of potential environmental impacts that could occur. Two national
transportation scenarios, referred to as the ``mostly legal-weight
truck'' scenario and the ``mostly rail'' scenario, and three Nevada
scenarios, referred to as the legal-weight truck scenario, the rail
scenario, and the heavy-haul truck scenario, were evaluated. The three
broad scenarios discussed below represent the combinations of the
scenarios and implementing alternatives as analyzed in the Final EIS.
[[Page 18559]]
Mostly Rail to the Yucca Mountain Repository--Preferred Mode of
Transportation
Under the preferred mode of transportation as analyzed in the Final
EIS (the mostly rail scenario), DOE would ship most of the spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from the 77 sites to the
Yucca Mountain Repository by rail. DOE would construct a rail line in
one of five rail corridors considered in the Final EIS to connect the
repository at Yucca Mountain to an existing main rail line in Nevada.
Under the mostly rail scenario analyzed in the Final EIS,
radioactive materials from certain commercial nuclear sites that do not
have the capability to load rail-shipping casks would be shipped by
legal-weight truck to the repository. For other commercial sites that
have the capability to load rail shipping casks, but do not have rail
access, materials would be shipped either by heavy-haul truck or
possibly barge to a nearby railhead outside Nevada for shipment by rail
to the repository at Yucca Mountain.
Under the mostly rail alternative, about 9,000 to 10,000 train
shipments (assuming one cask per train \3\) of spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste would travel on the nation's rail network
over the anticipated 24-year period (DOE's current plan calls for three
casks per train shipment, about 3,000 to 3,300 total shipments). In
addition, there would be about 1,000 legal-weight truck shipments from
commercial sites that do not have the capability to load rail-shipping
casks to the repository at Yucca Mountain.
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\3\ The final EIS stated that DOE anticipated as many as 5 casks
per train. However, DOE conservatively estimated 1 cask per train
for analytical purposes to ensure that it considered routine and
accident transportation risks that could result from a larger number
of train shipments (9,000 to 10,000).
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Mostly Rail to Nevada With Transfer to Heavy-Haul Truck for Shipment to
the Repository
Under this scenario as analyzed in the Final EIS, DOE would ship
most spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from the 77
sites to Nevada by rail. Rail shipments would terminate in Nevada at an
intermodal transfer station where shipping casks would be transferred
from rail cars to heavy-haul trucks for shipment to the Yucca Mountain
Repository. DOE would construct an intermodal transfer station at one
of three locations analyzed in the Final EIS. One of the five heavy-
haul routes analyzed in the Final EIS would be upgraded to improve
transportation operations, reduce traffic congestion, and enable year-
round shipments to the repository.
Under this scenario, radioactive materials from certain commercial
nuclear sites that do not have the capability to load rail-shipping
casks would be shipped by legal-weight truck directly to the
repository.
Under this alternative, about 9,000 to 10,000 train shipments
(assuming one cask per train) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste would travel on the nation's rail network to Nevada
over the 24-year period. There also would be about 9,000 to 10,000
heavy-haul truck shipments in Nevada from the intermodal transfer
station to the repository. In addition, there would be about 1,000
legal-weight truck shipments from commercial sites that do not have the
capability to load rail-shipping casks to the repository at Yucca
Mountain.
Mostly Legal-Weight Truck to the Yucca Mountain Repository
Under the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, as analyzed in the
Final EIS, DOE would ship most spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste from the 77 sites to the repository by legal-weight
truck. About 53,000 legal-weight trucks carrying these materials would
travel primarily on the nation's interstate highway system during the
24-year period. About 300 shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel would
travel from the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
to Nevada by rail, where the rail casks would be transferred to heavy-
haul trucks for shipment to the repository.
Environmentally Preferable Transportation Mode Alternative
In making this determination, DOE considered human health and
environmental impacts that could occur from shipping spent nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste from the 77 sites to the repository at
Yucca Mountain. DOE also considered the human health and environmental
impacts that could occur from the construction of a rail line and from
any upgrades to existing highways (the heavy-haul truck routes) in Nevada.
The Final EIS indicates that some potential non-radiological
fatalities could occur as a result of traffic accidents during the
transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste
to the repository at Yucca Mountain. The Final EIS indicates that the
highest number of potential traffic fatalities (about five) could occur
under the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, whereas the mostly rail
scenario could result in about three potential traffic fatalities
during the 24-year period of shipping spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste to the repository at Yucca Mountain.
The Final EIS also considers the potential health effects that
could result from radiation exposure to workers during shipping and
from cask loading and unloading, and to the general population along
the transportation routes to the repository. Under the mostly legal-
weight truck scenario, the Final EIS indicates that about 12 worker and
three general public latent cancer fatalities could occur from routine
(incident-free) exposures during the 24-year period of shipping spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository. Under
the mostly rail scenario, about three worker and one general public
latent cancer fatalities could occur during the 24-year period. The
radiation dose to any one individual would be extremely small.
DOE also estimated the potential health effects to the general
public that could result from a severe transportation accident during
shipments to the repository (referred to in the Final EIS as a maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident). The probability that this accident
could occur is extremely unlikely--about three chances in 10 million
per year. If such an accident were to occur in an urban population
setting, less than one latent cancer fatality could be expected under
the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, whereas about five latent
cancer fatalities could be expected under the mostly rail scenario,
primarily because of the greater amounts of radioactive materials that
could be released from a rail cask in such an accident.
In Nevada, construction of a rail line, regardless of the rail
corridor selected, would involve the disturbance of land (and
associated impacts, although low, to natural resources such as
biological and cultural resources) in amounts greater than those
associated with any heavy-haul truck alternative. For example,
construction of a rail line in the shortest rail corridor (Valley
Modified) would result in the disturbance of about 1,240 acres; rail
line construction in the longest corridor (Carlin) would disturb about
4,900 acres. Construction of an intermodal transfer station and the
upgrade of the longest heavy-haul route would result in the disturbance
of about 1,000 acres. Furthermore, the construction of any rail line
would involve various land use conflicts that, for the most part, would
not occur with the limited construction required to improve any of the
heavy-haul truck routes. No land disturbances
[[Page 18560]]
would occur under the legal-weight truck alternative.
The Department also evaluated the risk of sabotage, including
terrorism. For reasons the NRC has carefully explained, this analysis
is most likely not required by NEPA.\4\ It is not possible to predict
whether such acts would occur and, if they did, the nature of such
acts. Moreover, such analysis does not advance the public participation
purpose of NEPA, since there are serious limits on what information can
responsibly be disseminated on these issues without risking disclosure
of information that might be used in planning or carrying out such an
act.\5\ Nevertheless, the Final EIS includes the consequences of a
potentially successful attempt on a cask during shipment via rail or
legal-weight truck. In both instances, a successful attack would result
in the release of contaminants into the environment. The consequences
estimated for a rail shipment would be less than those estimated for a
legal-weight truck shipment, mostly because the thicker shield wall of
the heavier rail cask would tend to mitigate the effects of the
sabotage event when compared to the lighter, legal-weight truck
transportation cask.
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\4\ See Duke Cogema Stone & Webster, 56 N.R.C. 335 (2002);
Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 340 (2002); Duke Energy
Corp., 56 N.R.C. 358 (2002); Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 56
N.R.C. 367 (2002); Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 57 N.R.C. 1
(2003); and Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003),
appeal docketed, No. 03-74628 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003).
\5\ See materials cited in footnote 4
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None of the three transportation scenarios analyzed in the Final
EIS is clearly environmentally preferable. Each would result in some
impact to the environment, and public health and safety, although all
impacts would be small. For example, transporting by either rail or
heavy-haul truck in Nevada would result in some land disturbance,
although the impacts would be greater for rail because more land would
be disturbed during the construction of a rail line than during the
upgrading of existing highways to accommodate heavy-haul trucks.
Radiation exposure to workers and the public from either routine rail
or truck shipments to the repository at Yucca Mountain would be very
small, and the differences among the different modes of transportation
also would be very small. Similarly, accident risks under each
alternative would be very small, and associated differences among
alternatives also very small. The Department does not consider the
differences among modes to be sufficiently distinct to make any of them
clearly environmentally preferable.
Although the potential impacts of any of the transportation
alternatives would be small, they would be greater than the
transportation-related impacts of the No-Action Alternatives. Overall
however, as analyzed in the Final EIS, the impacts of proceeding with
construction and operation of a repository at Yucca Mountain, including
transportation, would cause relatively small public health impacts
through the period 10,000 years after repository closure and would
cause fewer public health impacts than the No-Action Alternative. For
the No-Action Alternative with institutional controls for 10,000 years,
the potential long-term environmental impacts also would be small, but
significantly greater than the proposed action because the potential
for nonradiological fatalities to workers under this alternative is
significantly greater. Additional information may be found on pages S-
82 through S-88 and Chapters 2 and 7 of the Final EIS. The cost of this
No-Action Alternative is also significantly greater than that of the
proposed action ($42.7 billion to $57.3 billion (in 2001 dollars) for
the proposed action versus $167 billion to $184 billion for the first
300 years of institutional control and $519 million to $572 million per
year thereafter). Additionally, the public health and safety impacts of
the No-Action Alternative without effective institutional control are
significantly greater than the proposed action. Likewise, in the long
run, securing these materials by consolidating them and disposing of
them in a secure, remote location, better protects against terrorist
attack than leaving them at 72 commercial and 5 DOE sites in 35 states
within 75 miles of more than 161 million Americans.\6\ Moreover, for
the reasons expressed by the Secretary and the President in their site
recommendations and by the Congress in passing the joint resolution, it
is in the national interest to move forward with this project.
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\6\ As explained in footnote 2, some additional materials are
currently stored at 50 additional sites (54 at the time of site
recommendation), consisting primarily of research reactors, in four
additional states, but DOE plans to consolidate these materials at
two DOE sites for reasons unrelated to its repository plans.
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In any event, in the Yucca Mountain Development Act, Pub. L. 107-
200, Congress directed DOE to proceed with the development of a license
application for a repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste. DOE believes that this statute and the
NWPA make it incumbent on DOE to proceed with appropriate
transportation planning so the Department will be in a position to
fulfill its responsibility under the NWPA to begin disposal of this
material promptly, should the NRC grant the necessary authorizations
for it to do so.
Transportation-Related Comments on the Final EIS
DOE distributed about 6,200 copies of the Final EIS and has
received written comments on the Final EIS from the White Pine County
Nuclear Waste Project Office, White Pine County Board of County
Commissioners, Board of County Commissioners Lincoln County, Board of
Mineral County Commissioners, and a member of the public. Although
comments were received on a variety of issues, the following summation
addresses only those few comments related to the transportation of
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to a Yucca Mountain
repository.
Commenters stated that DOE should develop specific transportation-
related mitigation measures, and encouraged DOE to do so in a
cooperative manner. Commenters also stated that additional, more
detailed and community-specific transportation analyses are needed for
purposes of mitigation planning, as well as to support DOE in its
transportation decisionmaking, such as the decision on the mode of
transportation. Commenters also encouraged DOE to develop plans for
transportation, such as route selection for shipments of spent nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste, and emergency planning and
response. Commenters also requested clarification of the roles of the
NRC and DOE's transportation services contractors, and whether counties
are eligible for technical assistance and funding under Section 180(c)
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA).
As discussed below in Use of All Practicable Means to Avoid or
Minimize Harm (Parts I and II), DOE has already adopted measures to
avoid or minimize environmental harm that could result from the
transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
Additional potential mitigation measures associated with the
construction of a rail line will be identified during preparation of an
environmental impact statement that considers alternative alignments
within the Caliente corridor for construction of the rail line (see
PART II of this ROD). DOE also will consult with states, Native
American tribes, local governments, utilities, the transportation
industry and other interested parties in a cooperative
[[Page 18561]]
manner to refine the transportation system as it is developed.
Furthermore, DOE must comply with the transportation-related provisions
of the NWPA. Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste will
be shipped to Yucca Mountain in casks that have been certified by the
NRC (Section 180(a)). Prior to these shipments, DOE will comply with
the regulations of the NRC regarding advanced notification of state and
local governments (Section 180(b)).
Transportation Mode Decision
Under the NWPA, the Department is responsible for planning that
will allow for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste in the event the NRC authorizes receipt and
possession of these materials at Yucca Mountain. Accordingly, as the
next step in fulfilling that responsibility, the Department is issuing
this Record of Decision to select a transportation mode. The Department
has decided to select the preferred mode of transportation analyzed in
the Final EIS, the mostly rail scenario, both on a national basis and
in the State of Nevada. Under this decision, the Department would rely
on a combination of rail, truck and possibly barge to transport to the
repository up to 70,000 MTHM of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. Most of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste would be transported by rail. The Department would
use truck transport where necessary, depending on certain factors such
as the timing of the completion of the rail line proposed to be
constructed in Nevada. This could include building an intermodal
capability at a rail line in Nevada to take legal-weight truck casks
from rail cars and transport them the rest of the way to the repository
via highway, should the rail system be unavailable at the time of the
opening of the repository \7\. In addition, since some commercial
utilities are not able to accommodate rail casks, they would ship by
legal-weight truck to the repository. Additionally, the Department
would use heavy-haul truck and possibly barge as needed to ship spent
nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear sites to nearby railheads outside
Nevada for shipment to the repository.
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\7\ In March 2004, DOE issued a Supplement Analysis and
determined, in accordance with 10 CFR 1021.314, that this rail/
legal-weight truck scenario would not constitute a substantial
change to the proposal previously analyzed in the Final EIS or
significant new circumstances or information relevant to
environmental concerns, as discussed in 40 CFR 1502.9(c)(1).
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Basis for Transportation Mode Decision
As we explain below, the Department has concluded that it should
use mostly rail nationwide and in Nevada based, in large part, on the
analyses of the Final EIS. The Department also considered the
preferences for rail transportation expressed by the State of Nevada
and other factors described below.
The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the potential
radiation doses to workers and the general public from rail, truck or
barge transportation would be very small, and that the differences in
resulting potential impacts from such exposures among the different
modes of transportation also would be very small. Nevertheless, using
mostly rail tends to minimize the potential environmental impacts that
could occur. The decision to rely primarily on the nation's rail system
to ship these materials would result in fewer shipments than would
occur if legal-weight trucks were the primary mode of transportation.
This in turn would result in fewer trucks on public highways. The lower
number of rail shipments as compared to truck shipments is estimated to
result in fewer potential traffic fatalities and, under routine
conditions, slightly fewer latent cancer fatalities to workers and the
general public relative to mostly legal-weight truck shipments.
In reaching its decision, DOE also considered the number of
commercial nuclear sites having, or expected to have, the capability to
handle rail casks, the distances to suitable railheads near the
commercial nuclear sites, and historical experience using rail to ship
spent nuclear fuel and other large reactor-related components. The
Department found that the preponderance of commercial sites have the
capability and experience to ship to nearby railheads.
The Department also considered preferences expressed by the State
of Nevada in its comments on the Draft EIS. In these comments, the
state indicated that DOE should plan its transportation system to
maximize the use of rail.
The Department also considered irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources and cumulative impacts in making its decision.
There would be an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources, such as land, electric power, fossil fuels and construction
materials, associated with the construction of a rail line in Nevada,
although this commitment of resources would not significantly diminish
these resources, either nationwide or in Nevada. DOE also recognizes
that for all alternatives involving transportation of spent nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste, there could be cumulative
impacts from past, present and reasonably foreseeable future activities
involving transportation of other radioactive materials. Based on the
analyses in the Final EIS, DOE does not expect that any cumulative
impacts would be significant over the duration of shipping spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository.
Based on these various considerations, DOE concludes that shipping
by mostly rail, both nationally and in the State of Nevada, would be
preferable to shipping by mostly truck or using heavy-haul trucks in
Nevada.
Use of All Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Harm--Transportation
Mode
The shipment of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is highly
regulated and subject to the utmost scrutiny. DOE carefully follows the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC transportation rules now and
will follow or exceed any others that may be established in the future
whether by the Congress or by DOT or NRC. DOE also will consult with
states, Native American tribes, local governments, utilities, the
transportation industry and other interested parties in a cooperative
manner to refine the transportation system as it is developed.
Measures DOE will implement to avoid or minimize harm include the
following \8\: prior to the shipment of spent nuclear fuel, the shipper
or carrier must select routes and prepare a written plan listing origin
and destination of the shipment, scheduled route, all planned stops,
estimated time of departure and arrival, and emergency telephone
numbers; advance notice must be provided to State and local governments
prior to shipping irradiated reactor fuel through their states; anyone
involved in the preparation or transport of radioactive materials will
be required to have proper training; carriers must be provided with
shipping papers containing emergency information, including contacts
and telephone numbers, readily available during transport for
inspection by appropriate officials; clearly identifiable markings,
labels, and placards of hazardous contents must be provided; and all
spent nuclear fuel and high-level
[[Page 18562]]
radioactive waste shipments would be in the most rugged casks (Type B,
which range from small containers of sealed radioactive sources to
heavily shielded steel casks that sometimes weigh as much as 150 tons).
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\8\ Application of these measures to national security
activities may, in some respects, be subject to section 7 of the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. section 10106.
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The NRC has promulgated rules (10 CFR 73.37) and interim
compensatory measures (March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792) specifically aimed at
protecting the public from harm that could result from sabotage of
spent nuclear fuel casks. These security rules are designed to minimize
the possibility of sabotage and facilitate recovery of spent nuclear
fuel shipments that could come under the control of unauthorized
persons. The use of armed escorts for all shipments; safeguarding the
detailed shipping schedule information, monitoring of shipments through
satellite tracking and a communication center with 24-hour staffing;
and coordinating logistics with state and local law enforcement
agencies all contribute to shipment security. Additionally, the cask
safety features that provide containment, shielding, and thermal
protection provide protection against sabotage. The Department and
other agencies continue to examine the protections built into their
physical security and safeguards systems for transportation shipments.
DOE is now developing its transportation security plan and its
design basis threat for transportation. The transportation security
plan will be developed in cooperation with other Federal agencies,
including the NRC, DOT, and the Department of Homeland Security. The
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is exploring the use of
armed Federal agents as escorts for all shipments and other operational
techniques employed by the National Nuclear Security Administration's
Office of Secure Transportation as well as the design of special
security cars for rail transport, to further mitigate the potential
threat of a terrorist act. In addition to its domestic efforts, the
Department is a member of the International Working Group on Sabotage
for Transport and Storage Casks, which is investigating the
consequences of a potential act of sabotage and is exploring
opportunities to enhance the physical protection of casks. As a result
of the above efforts, DOE will modify its methods and systems as
appropriate between now and the time shipments start.
In compliance with section 180(c) of the NWPA, DOE will provide
technical assistance and funds to states for training public safety
officials of appropriate units of local government and Native American
tribes through whose jurisdictions the Department plans to ship spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The training of public
safety officials will cover procedures required for safe routine
transportation of these materials and for dealing with emergency
response situations.
Pursuant to the NWPA, spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste will be transported in casks certified by the NRC. The NRC
regulates and certifies the design, manufacture, testing and use of
these casks. Additionally, the NWPA requires that DOE comply with NRC
regulations regarding advance notification of State and local
governments prior to transportation of spent nuclear fuel or high-level
radioactive waste.
At this stage in the decision-making, the Department believes it
has incorporated all practicable mitigation measures. The Department
will continue to identify and evaluate potential mitigation measures as
the transportation system develops and as a result of the lessons
learned from the shipping of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste.
Part II. Record of Decision for Nevada Rail Corridor
Background
As noted above, the mostly rail scenario assumes that DOE will
ultimately construct a rail line in Nevada to ship spent nuclear fuel
and high-level radioactive waste to the repository. To implement that
scenario, DOE therefore needs to select among alternative rail
corridors within which to study possible alignments in which it will
pursue construction of a rail line that would connect the repository at
Yucca Mountain to an existing main rail line in Nevada in the event the
NRC authorizes construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain. In the
Final EIS, DOE analyzed five potential rail corridors--Caliente,
Carlin, Caliente-Chalk Mountain, Jean and Valley Modified--for this
potential rail line. Additional descriptive information, including
variations associated with each corridor, may be found in section
2.1.3.3 and Appendix J, section J.3.1.2, of the Final EIS. The Final
EIS did not specify a corridor preference, but in December 2003, DOE
announced its preference for the Caliente corridor (Notice of Preferred
Nevada Rail Corridor; 68 FR 74951; December 29, 2003.
Proposed Action and Nevada Rail Corridors Considered in the Final EIS
A. Caliente Rail Corridor--Preferred Alternative
The Caliente corridor originates at an existing siding to the
mainline railroad near Caliente, Nevada. The corridor extends in a
westerly direction to the northwest corner of the Nevada Test and
Training Range (previously known as Nellis Air Force Range), before
turning south-southeast to the repository at Yucca Mountain. The
corridor ranges between 318 miles (512 kilometers) and 344 miles (553
kilometers), depending on the variations to the corridor considered in
the Final EIS. Construction of a rail line within the Caliente corridor
would take about 46 months. The total life-cycle cost for construction
and operation of the rail line is estimated to be $880 million (2001
dollars).
B. Carlin Rail Corridor
The Carlin corridor originates at the mainline railroad near
Beowawe in north central Nevada. The Carlin and Caliente corridors
converge near the northwest boundary of the Nevada Test and Training
Range. Past this point, they are identical. The Carlin corridor ranges
between 319 miles (513 kilometers) and 338 miles (544 kilometers) long,
depending on the variations to the corridor. Construction of a rail
line within the Carlin corridor would take about 46 months. The total
life-cycle cost for construction and operation of the rail line is
estimated to be $821 million (2001 dollars).
C. Caliente-Chalk Mountain Rail Corridor
The Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor is identical to the Caliente
corridor until it approaches the northern boundary of the Nevada Test
and Training Range. At that point the Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor
turns south through the Nevada Test and Training Range and the Nevada
Test Site to the Yucca Mountain site. Depending on the variations, the
corridor is between 214 miles (344 kilometers) and 242 miles (382
kilometers) long from the tie-in at the mainline near Caliente to the
Yucca Mountain site. Construction of a rail line within the Caliente-
Chalk Mountain corridor would take about 43 months. The total life-
cycle cost for construction and operation of the rail line is estimated
to be $622 million (2001 dollars). The Department designated the
Caliente-Chalk Mountain alternative as non-preferred in the Final EIS
due to national security concerns raised by the U.S. Air Force.
[[Page 18563]]
D. Jean Rail Corridor
The Jean corridor originates at the existing mainline railroad near
Jean, Nevada. The corridor ranges between 112 miles (181 kilometers)
and 127 miles (204 kilometers) long from the tie-in with the mainline
to the Yucca Mountain site. Construction of a rail line within the Jean
corridor would take about 43 months. The total life-cycle cost for
construction and operation of the rail line is estimated to be $462
million (2001 dollars).
E. Valley Modified Rail Corridor
The Valley Modified corridor originates at an existing rail siding
off the mainline railroad northeast of Las Vegas. Depending on the
variations, the corridor is between 98 miles (157 kilometers) and 101
miles (163 kilometers) long from the tie-in with the mainline to the
Yucca Mountain site. Construction of a rail line within the Valley
Modified corridor would take about 40 months. The total life-cycle cost
for construction and operation of the rail line is estimated to be $283
million (2001 dollars).
Environmentally Preferable Rail Corridor Alternative
DOE considered human health and environmental impacts that could
occur from the construction of a rail line, as well as from shipping
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in Nevada.
Construction of a rail line, regardless of the rail corridor
selected, would involve the disturbance of land and associated impacts,
although low, to natural resources such as biological and cultural
resources. For example, construction of a rail line in the Valley
Modified corridor (shortest) would result in the disturbance of about
1,240 acres; rail line construction in the Carlin corridor (longest)
would disturb about 4,900 acres.
Construction of any rail line in Nevada also would conflict with
existing land uses. Depending on the variations considered, privately-
owned lands occur on less than one percent of the lands analyzed under
the Caliente (ranges from 222 to 618 acres), Caliente-Chalk Mountain
(ranges from 198 to 272 acres) and Valley Modified (ranges from 0 to 44
acres) corridors, but up to about five and seven percent of the lands
analyzed under the Jean (ranges from 32 to 865 acres) and Carlin
(ranges from 1,804 to 3,756 acres) corridors, respectively. The
Caliente and Carlin corridors cross Timbisha-Shoshone trust lands, and
a relatively short distance on the Nevada Test and Training Range,
although variations are available that would avoid these lands. The
Caliente corridor crosses two wilderness study areas, and the Valley
Modified corridor passes through the Desert National Wildlife Range,
although variations may be available to avoid these lands. The
Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor crosses land dedicated to testing and
training activities of the U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense on
the Nevada Test and Training Range; no variations are available that
would avoid the Range under this corridor alternative.
Under any rail corridor alternative, water would be used for
compaction of the rail bed and dust suppression, and by workers during
construction. Water consumption would vary, primarily because of the
length of the corridor, ranging from 320 acre-feet for the Valley
Modified corridor to 710 acre-feet for the Caliente corridor.
During the 24-year shipping period, assuming standard nationwide
rail routing practices, the incident-free (routine) collective dose to
members of the public from the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste by rail would result in less than one
latent cancer fatality regardless of which corridor is selected. The
difference in impacts among the corridors is minimal. Similarly, less
than one latent cancer fatality would occur in the exposed worker
population, and that is not affected by the Nevada corridor selection.
DOE also estimated the potential health effects to the general
public that could result from a severe transportation accident during
shipments to the repository (referred to in the Final EIS as a maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident). If such an accident were to occur in
a rural population setting, the collective radiological dose to members
of the public would result in less than one latent cancer fatality. The
probability that this accident could occur is extremely unlikely--about
2 chances in 1 million per year.
The environmental impacts identified in the Final EIS do not
provide a clear basis for discriminating among alternative rail
corridors in Nevada. Each of these alternatives would result in some
impact to the environment and public health and safety. Construction of
a rail line within any rail corridor would involve certain land use
conflicts, and land disturbance with attendant impacts (although small,
the impacts tend to increase with increasing corridor length).
Radiation exposure to workers and the public in Nevada would be small,
and the differences among the rail corridor alternatives also would be
very small.
For these reasons, DOE does not consider the differences among the
corridor alternatives to be sufficient to make any of them clearly
environmentally preferable.
Finally, although the potential impacts of any of the five
potential rail corridors would be small, they would be greater than the
potential transportation-related impacts of the No-Action Alternatives.
Nevertheless, as explained above, the impacts of proceeding with
construction and operation of a repository at Yucca Mountain, including
transportation, are relatively small and less than either of the No-
Action Alternative scenarios. Part I (of this ROD) provides further
comparison of the proposed action and the No-Action Alternative
scenarios. In any event, given DOE's responsibilities under the Yucca
Mountain Development Act and the NWPA, DOE believes it is obligated to
proceed with appropriate transportation planning, including, given its
selection of the mostly rail scenario in Nevada, the selection of a
corridor in which to study possible alignments for the Nevada rail
line, in preference to either No-Action Alternative scenario.
Comments on Preferred Rail Corridor
DOE noticed its preference for the Caliente corridor in the Federal
Register (December 29, 2003; 68 FR 74951). The Carlin corridor was
identified as a secondary preference. The Department has received
comments on the preference announcement. Concerns expressed in these
comments included the need for a comprehensive programmatic EIS
covering all aspects of nuclear waste transportation to Yucca Mountain,
avoidance of all major population centers with transportation routes,
and provision of documentation supporting the preference decision.
Other comments addressed the need for adequate opportunities for public
participation and comment on the corridor preference announcement,
including a request for cooperating agency status for any future rail
alignment EIS. Selection of a corridor preference prior to having a
mode of transportation decision was raised as a concern. In addition,
there was confusion regarding the designation of the Carlin corridor as
a secondary preference and its relationship to the upcoming rail
alignment EIS process. Furthermore, commenters indicated that a rail
line in the Caliente corridor would have significant negative impacts
on cultural, socioeconomic, and wildlife resources, as well as a
massive modern
[[Page 18564]]
sculpture project. Others raised the potential for impacts to ranchers
living in proximity to the proposed Caliente corridor, including
questions regarding the design and operation of a rail line and the
nature of measures that could mitigate resulting adverse impacts.
Finally, several commenters thanked DOE for announcing its corridor
preference, recognizing the challenges and opportunities and associated
need to coordinate closely as DOE proceeds with transportation
planning.
Comments calling for DOE to prepare a programmatic transportation
EIS and the need to avoid all major Nevada population centers with
transportation routes were addressed in the response to comments in the
Final EIS. DOE believes a programmatic EIS to be unnecessary as its
Final EIS provides the environmental impact information necessary to
make certain broad transportation-related decisions (as described above
in Transportation-Related Decisions).
With regard to avoiding population centers, the analyses of the
Final EIS illustrate that potential public health and safety impacts
would be so low for individuals who lived and worked along any route
that individual impacts would not be discernible, even if the
corresponding doses could be measured.
Although some commenters stated that DOE's intent in identifying
the Carlin corridor as a secondary preference was unclear, the decision
to select the Caliente corridor also represents DOE's intent to no
longer consider the Carlin corridor for development of a rail line.
This decision and the basis for not selecting the Carlin corridor are
discussed below in Rail Corridor Decision and Basis for Rail Corridor
Decision.
The remaining concerns and issues regarding potential environmental
impacts associated with the development of a rail line, potential
mitigation measures, and opportunities for public involvement and
project participation will be addressed during the future preparation
of a rail alignment EIS. As part of developing this documentation, DOE
will identify and adopt measures to avoid or minimize environmental
harm that could result from the construction and operation of a rail
line within the Caliente corridor.
Rail Corridor Decision
In Part I of this Record of Decision, the Department selected, both
on a national basis and in the State of Nevada, the mostly rail
scenario. That decision is premised on the assumption that DOE will
ultimately construct a rail line to connect the repository site to an
existing rail line in the State of Nevada. To that end, the Department
has decided to select the preferred rail corridor alternative, the
Caliente corridor, in which to evaluate alignments for a rail line.
Basis for Rail Corridor Decision
The Department decided to evaluate alignments within the Caliente
corridor for possible construction of a rail line based, in large part,
on the analyses of the Final EIS. The Department, however, also
considered other factors discussed below, such as potential for
construction delay, direct and indirect costs of each alternative, and
comments received from the public.
The Department considered irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources and cumulative impacts in making its decision.
There would be an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources, such as electric power, fossil fuels, construction
materials, and water associated with the construction of a rail line in
Nevada, although this commitment of resources would not significantly
diminish the resources in question in Nevada. DOE recognizes that for
all rail corridors there could be cumulative impacts from past, present
and reasonably foreseeable future activities.
The Department considered potential land use conflicts and their
potential to affect adversely construction of a rail line, as analyzed
in the Final EIS in making this decision. If the Department were to
select the Valley Modified rail corridor there may be conflicts with
the Desert National Wildlife Range and local community plans for
development in the greater Las Vegas metropolitan area. If the
Department were to select the Caliente-Chalk Mountain corridor there
would be conflicts with U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense
testing and training activities directly related to national security
interests on the Nevada Test and Training Range. If the Department were
to select the Jean corridor it may require crossing relatively greater
amounts of private land, and would pose greater potential land use
conflicts because of its proximity to the greater Las Vegas
metropolitan area. If the Department were to select the Carlin corridor
it would also require crossing relatively greater amounts of private
land. Moreover, little infrastructure, such as roads and electric
power, is available over long segments, which would tend to make
logistics during construction as well as emergency response
capabilities more challenging. Overall, the Caliente rail corridor
appears to have the fewest land use or other conflicts that could lead
to substantial delays in acquiring the necessary land and rights-of-
way, or in beginning construction.
DOE also considered concerns expressed by the public in Nevada. In
these comments, the public stated that DOE should avoid rail corridors
in the Las Vegas Valley.
The Department also considered the direct costs of constructing and
operating a rail line, and the indirect costs resulting from potential
delays in the availability of the rail line. The Jean and Valley
Modified corridors are the shortest and have the lowest estimated
construction costs. The Carlin and Caliente corridors are the longest
and on the basis of construction cost alone would be more expensive to
develop. However, delays in the construction of the rail line because
of land use or other conflicts and the resulting inability to accept
large amounts of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste
transported by a railroad to the repository in a timely manner could
add to both the liability costs for delayed acceptance of commercial
spent nuclear fuel and the costs of continued storage of DOE wastes.
Based on all of the above, DOE concludes that the Caliente corridor
is preferable to the other corridors it evaluated as a potential
corridor in which to construct a rail line. Therefore, DOE has decided
to select the Caliente corridor as the one within which to evaluate
possible alignments for the rail line connecting the repository to an
existing main rail line in Nevada.
Use of All Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Harm--Rail Corridor
In the Final EIS, DOE identified transportation-related measures
that would be implemented, and other measures that would require
further consideration and refinement before adoption to avoid or
minimize environmental harm. As described in Part I, this decision
adopts all practicable measures to avoid or minimize adverse
environmental impact that could result from the transportation of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive wastes to a repository at Yucca
Mountain appropriate at this stage of decision-making. Construction of
a rail line will be consistent with applicable Federal, state and
Native American tribal requirements. In addition to these measures,
other potential mitigation measures associated with the construction of
a rail line will be identified and evaluated during preparation of
future NEPA documentation.
[[Page 18565]]
Issued in Washington, DC April 2, 2004.
Margaret S. Y. Chu,
Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
[FR Doc. 04-7949 Filed 4-7-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P