Hazardous Materials Regulations; Compatibility With the Regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.

[Federal Register: January 26, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 16)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 3631-3696]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26ja04-5]

[[Page 3631]]

Part II

Department of Transportation

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Parts 171, 172, et al.

Hazardous Materials Regulations; Compatibility With the Regulations of
the International Atomic Energy Agency; Final Rule

[[Page 3632]]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177 and 178

[Docket No. RSPA-99-6283 (HM-230)]
RIN 2137-AD40

Hazardous Materials Regulations; Compatibility With the
Regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: In this final rule RSPA is amending requirements in the
Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation
of radioactive materials based on changes contained in the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publication, entitled ``IAEA
Safety Standards Series: Regulations for the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material,'' 1996 Edition, No. TS-R-1. The purpose of this
rulemaking initiative is to harmonize requirements of the HMR with
international standards for radioactive materials as well as to
promulgate other DOT-initiated requirements.

DATES: Effective Date: The effective date of these amendments is
October 1, 2004.
Voluntary Compliance Date: RSPA is authorizing voluntary compliance
with the amendments adopted in this final rule beginning February 25,
2004. However, RSPA may further revise this rule as a result of appeals
it may receive for this rule.
Incorporation by Reference Date: The incorporation by reference of
publications listed in this final rule has been approved by the
Director of the Federal Register as of October 1, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Fred D. Ferate II, Office of
Hazardous Materials Technology, (202) 366-4545, or Charles E. Betts,
Office of Hazardous Materials Standards, (202) 366-8553; RSPA, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC
20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Contents

I. Background
II. Overview of Changes in this Final Rule
A. Summary of Amendments
B. Issue Discussion
Issue 1: Nuclide-Specific Exemption Values
Issue 2: Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
Issue 3: Changes in A₁ and A₂ Values
Issue 4: Communication Changes
Issue 5: Low Specific Activity (LSA) materials and Surface
Contaminated Objects (SCO)
Issue 6: Uranium Hexafluoride (UF₆)
Issue 7: Air Transport Requirements
Issue 8: Fissile Material Package and Transport Requirements
Issue 9: Transitional Requirements
Issue 10: Other Changes
III. Section-By-Section Review
IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
B. Executive Order 13132
C. Executive Order 13175
D. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
H. Environmental Assessment
I. Privacy Act

I. Background

In 1958, at the request of the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations, the IAEA undertook the development of international
regulations for the safe transportation of radioactive materials. The
initial regulations published by the IAEA in 1961 were recommended to
member states as the basis for national regulations and for application
to international transportation. Most nations have since adopted the
IAEA regulations as a basis for regulations governing the
transportation of radioactive materials.
In 1967, after extensive revisions, the IAEA published its
regulations entitled ``Regulations for the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material, Safety Series No. 6.'' In October 1968, DOT
published amendments to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49
CFR Parts 171-180) for radioactive materials which were in substantial
conformance with the 1967 IAEA regulations (Docket HM-2, 33 FR 14918).
Based on work done by participants from member states, including
the U.S., the IAEA issued two major updates of Safety Series No. 6 in
1973 and 1985. On March 10, 1983, the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA, we) published a final rule (Docket HM-169, 48 FR
10218), bringing the HMR requirements relating to the transportation of
radioactive materials into alignment with the 1973 IAEA regulations. On
September 28, 1995, we published a final rule (Docket HM-169A, 60 FR
50291) that revised the radioactive materials requirements in the HMR
to align them with the 1985 revision of Safety Series No. 6. In each
case, we coordinated the HMR revisions with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), which concurrently revised 10 CFR part 71, and in
each case these revisions made the United States radioactive material
transport regulations compatible with those of most other
industrialized nations.
In 1996, the IAEA revised and issued IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. ST-1, (``ST-1''). IAEA subsequently revised ST-1 in June 2000 to
include minor editorial changes and renamed it ``TS-R-1.'' In this
final rule, we use the nomenclature ``TS-R-1'' to refer to the 1996
IAEA ``Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.''
Copies of TS-R-1 may be obtained from the U.S. distributor, Bernan
Associates, 4611-F Assembly Drive, Lanham, MD 20706-4391, telephone
(301) 459-7666.
As in past rulemakings to incorporate updates of the international
regulations into the HMR, we are working in close cooperation with NRC
in the development of this rulemaking. Currently, DOT and NRC jointly
regulate the transportation of radioactive material in the United
States in accordance with a July 2, 1979, Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU; 44 FR 38690). In accordance with this MOU (a copy of which has
been placed in the docket of this rulemaking):
1. DOT regulates both shippers and carriers and has issued:
? £ Packaging requirements;
? £ Communication requirements for:

--Shipping paper contents,
--Package labeling and marking requirements, and
--Vehicle placarding requirements;

[[Page 3633]]

or on DOT issues not in the scope of this rulemaking will not be
addressed in this rule.
On December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72633), we published an advance notice
of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) requesting comments from interested
persons concerning the extent to which differences between the HMR and
the IAEA publication TS-R-1 should be considered in proposing changes
to the HMR. We identified a partial list of TS-R-1 requirements being
considered for incorporation in the HMR. We invited interested persons
to review and comment on any or all of the requirements in TS-R-1 that
differ from current HMR requirements and identify related issues we
should address in the NPRM. In response to the ANPRM, we received
approximately 80 written comments from trade associations, hazardous
materials consulting firms, chemical manufacturers, radiopharmaceutical
manufacturers, shippers and carriers of hazardous materials, and
private citizens.
In addition, we compared TS-R-1 to the previous version of Safety
Series No. 6 to identify changes made in TS-R-1, and then identified
affected sections of the HMR. Based on this comparison and comments
received from the ANPRM, we identified ten issues where increased
compatibility between the HMR and TS-R-1 appears to be desirable.
On February 1, 2000, we published a final rule under Docket HM-215D
(66 FR 8644), in which we adopted the International Maritime Dangerous
Goods (IMDG) Code, 2000 edition, including Amendment 30-00 and the UN
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Eleventh Revised
Edition (1999), both of which authorize the use of TS-R-1. We published
a final rule on June 21, 2001 (66 FR 33315), which provided that TS-R-1
could be used, as an alternative to the HMR, for international
shipments of radioactive materials. Additionally, we retained Safety
Series No. 6 with the same restrictions.
This final rule will address the adoption of TS-R-1 (instead of
Safety Series No. 6) requirements into the HMR for domestic use. On
April 30, 2002, we published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
under Docket HM-230 (67 FR 21328). The major changes to the HMR
proposed in the NPRM included the following:
(1) Adopt the nuclide-specific exemption activity concentrations
and the nuclide-specific exemption consignment activities listed in TS-
R-1 to assure continued consistency between domestic and international
regulations for the basic definition of radioactive material;
(2) Adopt the new proper shipping names and UN identification
numbers, except for those referring to Type C packages, to fissile low
specific activity (LSA) materials or to fissile surface contaminated
objects (SCO);
(3) Require, if customary units are to be used, that the
appropriate quantity and customary units be placed within parentheses
positioned after the original quantity expressed in the International
System of Units (SI units);
(4) Incorporate the TS-R-1 changes for packagings containing more
than 0.1 kg of UF₆;
(5) Authorize the use of the 1993 edition of International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 7195 as an alternative to
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.1, to require
UF₆ packagings to meet the pressure, drop and thermal test
requirements, to prohibit the use of pressure relief devices, and to
certify the packagings in accordance with TS-R-1 requirements;
(6) Accept the IAEA transitional requirements and begin the phase-
out of packages satisfying the 1967 IAEA requirements, including DOT
specification packages; and
(7) Require that manufacture of all Type B specification packages
conforming to Safety Series No. 6 (1967) be prohibited as of the date
of implementation of this rule and that use of these packages be
prohibited two years after implementation of this rule.
Those proposed changes were intended to harmonize requirements of
the HMR with international standards for the transport of radioactive
materials as well as to promulgate other DOT initiated requirements.
More than 150 commenters submitted over 200 comments in response to
the NPRM, including representatives of Federal and state agencies,
manufacturers, shippers, carriers, consultants, electric utilities,
special interest groups, private citizens and trade associations.

II. Overview of Changes in This Final Rule

A. Summary of Amendments

In this final rule, we are amending the HMR to:
? £ Adopt the nuclide-specific exemption activity
concentrations and the nuclide-specific exemption consignment
activities listed in TS-R-1 to assure continued consistency between
domestic and international regulations for the basic definition of
radioactive material;
? £ Provide an exception in the HMR that certain
naturally occurring radioactive materials would not be subject to the
requirements of the HMR so long as their specific activities do not
exceed 10 times the activity concentration exemption values;
? £ Incorporate the TS-R-1 changes in the
A₁ and A₂ values into the HMR;
? £ Adopt the new proper shipping names and UN
identification numbers, except for those referring to Type C packages,
to fissile LSA material and to fissile SCOs;
? £ Require, if customary units are used, that the
appropriate quantity and customary units be placed within parentheses
positioned after the original quantity expressed in the International
System of Units (SI units);
? £ Adopt the use of the Criticality Safety Index
(CSI) to refer to what was formerly the criticality control transport
index, and to restrict the use of the concept of transport index (TI)
to a number derived purely from the maximum radiation level at one
meter from the package;
? £ Require the new fissile label be placed on each
fissile material package, and that the CSI for that package be noted on
the fissile label;
? £ Adopt the requirement that excepted packages be
marked with the UN identification number, that industrial packagings be
marked with the package type, and that Type IP-2 and IP-3 industrial
packages and Type A packages be marked with the international vehicle
registration code of the country of origin of packaging design;
? £ Remove some former requirements which would
become redundant upon adoption of the new proper shipping names, such
as the requirement that the shipping description contain the words
``Radioactive Material'' unless those words are included in the proper
shipping name;
? £ Remove plutonium-238 from the definition of
fissile material. Remove the reference to Pu-238 in the list of fissile
radionuclides for which the weight in grams or kilograms may be listed
instead of or in addition to the activity, in the shipping paper or
radioactive label description of the radioactive contents of a package;
? £ Adopt a definition of contamination, and include
an authority to transport unpackaged LSA material and SCO, and an
authority to use qualified tank containers, freight containers and
metal intermediate bulk containers as industrial packagings, types 2
and 3 (IP-2 and IP-3);
? £ Adopt the new class of LSA-I material,
consisting of radioactive

[[Page 3634]]

material in which the activity is distributed throughout and the
estimated average specific activity does not exceed 30 times the
activity concentration exemption level, and to remove the present
category referring to mill tailings, contaminated earth, concrete,
rubble, other debris, and activated material that is essentially
uniformly distributed, with specific activity not exceeding
10-\6\ A₂/g.
? £ Incorporate the TS-R-1 changes for packagings
containing more than 0.1 kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆);
? £ Require UF₆ packagings to meet the
pressure, drop and thermal test requirements, to prohibit the use of
pressure relief devices, and to certify the packagings in accordance
with TS-R-1 requirements;
? £ Revise Sec. 173.453 to reflect the NRC ``fissile
material exemption provisions,'' to remove the definition of ``fissile
material, controlled shipment,'' and to revise Sec.Sec. 173.457 and
173.459 to remove the references to ``fissile material, controlled
shipment'' and to base requirements for non-exclusive use and exclusive
use shipments of fissile material packages on TS-R-1 package and
conveyance CSI limits;
? £ Accept the IAEA transitional requirements and
begin the phase out of packages satisfying the 1967 IAEA requirements,
including DOT specification packages;
? £ Prohibit the manufacture of all Type B
specification packages conforming to Safety Series No. 6 (1967) as of
the effective date of this rule. The use of these packages would be
allowed for three years after the effective date of this rule; and
? £ Add a requirement that the active material in an
instrument or article intended to be transported in an excepted package
be completely enclosed by the non-active components.

B. Issue Discussion

Issue 1: Nuclide-Specific Exemption Values
Background. In the April 30, 2002 NPRM, we proposed to adopt the
nuclide-specific exemption activity concentrations and the nuclide-
specific exemption consignment activities listed in TS-R-1. The
objective of the proposal was to assure continued consistency between
domestic and international regulations for the basic definition of
Class 7 radioactive material, i.e., of radioactive material which is
deemed hazardous enough to be subject to the HMR.
The new exemption activity values would replace the previous
activity concentration threshold of 70 becquerels per gram (2000
picocuries per gram)(70 Bq/g (2000 pCi/g)) that has long been used to
decide whether a particular radioactive material is regulated by the
HMR (i.e., to decide whether it is ``radioactive for the purposes of
transport'') the proposed exemption values include. This is in contrast
to the previous use of a single threshold defined in terms of an
activity concentration. In addition to nuclide-specific activity
concentration thresholds proposed, nuclide-specific consignment
activity thresholds such that consignments with activities below the
latter thresholds would also not be considered ``radioactive for the
purposes of transport.''
The considerations which led to the establishment of the exemption
values, and the sources from which that information was obtained, are
described in the NPRM. They included calculations carried out during
the development of TS-R-1, involving 20 radionuclides, which represent
radionuclides actually transported, to calculate the activity
concentrations and the consignment activities that would not give an
annual dose to transport workers of more than 0.01 millisievert (1.0
millirem), or 0.01 mSv (1.0 mrem) during a variety of transportation
scenarios. This was done for each of the 20 radionuclides by
determining for each of the approximately 24 scenarios (the number of
scenarios varied somewhat, depending on the physical form of the
radionuclide) the activity concentration and total activity that would
yield an annual dose of 0.01 mSv (1.0 mrem), and then selecting the
lowest of those activity concentrations and the lowest of those
activities as the exemption values for that radionuclide. These
activity concentrations and consignment activities were then compared
with threshold activity concentrations and threshold activities that
had previously been adopted for fixed facilities as a key element in
the ``International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against
Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources,'' Safety
Series No. 115, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1996.
The IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Materials (SAGSTRAM, made up of representatives of a subset
of IAEA member countries) had previously agreed that exemption values
for transport different from those for fixed facilities would be
adopted only if they were different by more than two orders of
magnitude, so that to the extent possible, entities dealing with
radioactive materials would not have to deal with two different sets of
exemption (threshold) values.
The IAEA working groups decided to adopt the exemption values
previously adopted in Safety Series No. 115 for fixed facilities
because the exemption values calculated for the 20 radionuclides using
the transport scenarios did not differ by more than two orders of
magnitude. This finding was true for all radionuclides (except Kr-85, a
noble gas, for which it was argued that because Kr-85 is not
transported in such large containers as used in the scenarios, the
scenarios used were overly conservative). For those radionuclides in
the transport regulations not listed in Safety Series No. 115,
transport exemption values were calculated using the Safety Series No.
115 methodology.
Using the Safety Series No. 115 exemption activity concentrations
and the same transport scenarios, those performing the study calculated
the annual worker dose averaged over the 20 previously examined
radionuclides to be about 0.23 mSv (23 mrem). This compares with an
average annual worker dose of about 0.50 mSv (50 mrem) if the same 20
radionuclides had been transported with an activity concentration of 70
becquerels/gram using the same transport scenarios.
In this final rule we are incorporating in the HMR the TS-R-1
nuclide-specific exemption values to specify when radioactive material
is regulated as Class 7. According to this new definition, a
radioactive material offered for transport is regulated as a Class 7
hazardous material only if both the activity concentration and the
consignment activity are greater than the exemption values determined
for that material.
Discussion. One commenter noted that the nuclide-specific exemption
values, which are more closely dose related than a strictly activity-
based system, are more defensible.
To assist the regulated community in correctly performing these
calculations and for consistency another commenter requested that RSPA
provide example calculations of the use of the various mixture formulas
within the NPRM. To resolve doubts on how to apply the formulas for a
specific scenario, any person may obtain help through one of the
mechanisms described in Sec. 105.20.
One commenter felt that the proposed changes in the exemption
activity concentrations, and particularly the proposed default
exemption values, do not appear to represent risk- or performance-based
approaches and could negatively impact the overall safety of DOE
activities. We believe that the proposed changes in the exemption

[[Page 3635]]

activity concentrations do result in a risk-based approach since the
dose equivalent received by a person is much more directly related to
the risk than is the activity. Adherence to the criterion of limiting
annual worker doses to 0.01 mSv (1.0 mrem) was balanced against the
cost and safety implications of having to deal with two sets of
exemption values, one for fixed facilities and another for transport.
As a result of deciding to use the single set of exemption values
derived for fixed facilities, the calculated dose and therefore the
risk, was reduced by approximately a factor of two.
It is true that the exemption activity concentrations for most of
the more commonly occurring alpha emitters have gone down from 70 Bq/g
to 10 Bq/g or 1 Bq/g. In several of these cases, such as U(nat),
Th(nat), or Ra-226, the number refers to the maximum activity
concentration of the parent nuclide in the decay chain (assumed to be
in secular equilibrium). Taking into account the activity
concentrations of the progeny, the actual activity concentration
thresholds for materials with these radionuclides will be higher.
With respect to the proposed default exemption values, paragraph
406.1 of IAEA Safety Guide TS-G-1.1 (ST-2), Advisory Material for the
IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA,
Vienna, 2002, indicates that the default values are the lowest possible
values within the alpha or beta/gamma subgroups. In the case of the
default activity concentration threshold of 1 x 10-\1\ Bq/g
for alpha emitters and for the case when no relevant data are
available, the only nuclide in TS-R-1 Table I which has an exemption
activity concentration this low is Ac-227. If any person has reason to
believe through process knowledge or other means that Ac-227 is not
present, or if an upper bound can be placed on the fraction of total
activity concentration which may be due to Ac-227, the next lowest
alpha emitter exemption activity concentration of 1 x 10\0\ Bq/g be
used as the default value.
Several commenters recommended that we retain the threshold
activity concentration of 70 Bq/g for domestic shipments. One of these
commenters argued that the proposed change in the activity
concentration exemption values would add significant delays and costs
for Department of Energy waste site remediation efforts. The commenter
cited past shipments of 98 railcars of soil from the DOE Savannah River
Site that were shipped as non-radioactive for purposes of transport
because the specific activity of the soil was less than 70 Bq/g, as
determined by periodic gross alpha and gross beta measurements. The
commenter stated that ``under the proposed regulations, the gross
measurements would not provide sufficient confidence in the
classification and some isotopic analyses [which would then be
required]
would require significant time to complete. Performing
similar removal actions under the proposed regulations will result in
delays and costs for isotopic analysis/confirmation as well as
additional costs associated with shipping the material as Class 7. This
additional time and expense will be incurred with no significant change
in the risk presented by such shipments made in compliance with the
current regulations.''
Just as gross alpha and beta measurements may not be sufficient
with the new exemption values to determine whether the hazardous
materials transport regulations apply, this has also been true in the
past when determining whether the activity concentration was below 70
Bq/g. Gross counting measurements cannot yield the activity present
until the isotopes and types of radiation, as well as the fractions of
the counts caused by each isotope, are known. In cases where one or a
few radionuclides are present, this information may be known through
``process knowledge'' or previous measurements, or both. If there are
multiple isotopes present it is often not possible to determine this
information without doing more lengthy and costly isotopic analyses.
In borderline cases, where some batches of a radioactive material
have specific activities that exceed the exemption values and others do
not, it may be simpler to determine whether any of the material exceeds
the LSA-I limits. If not, the material could be treated conservatively
and shipped as LSA-I. Although the material would now be transported
under the HMR, the existing regulations for domestic shipments of LSA-I
contain relatively modest communication and packaging requirements.
One commenter supported the proposal to adopt the radionuclide-
specific exemption values. The commenter noted that of 2400 intermodal
containers of decommissioning soil and debris shipped over a 38 month
period, all would have had to be shipped as LSA rather than 10% of
them, but that the additional cost would have been minimal.
One commenter objected to the nuclide-specific exemption activity
concentrations because some of them are higher than the previous 70 Bq/
g value. As pointed out in the NPRM, the hazards associated with
radioactive materials are not directly related to their activity or
activity concentration, but rather to the dose that a person in the
vicinity or in contact with them would receive. The new system would,
under the reasonable transport scenarios considered, raise the
calculated dose due to some radionuclides from a small value to a
somewhat larger, but still small value, while lowering the calculated
dose from higher values for other radionuclides. For the 20
representative radionuclides for which detailed calculations were
performed, the average calculated annual dose to workers transporting
these materials at the proposed exemption activity concentration levels
would be reduced from about 0.5 mSv (50 mrem) to about 0.23 mSv (23
mrem), i.e., a reduction in dose of about 50%. Members of the public
who were not actually involved in transporting these materials would
presumably receive much lower doses, if any.
The commenter stated that although the proposed revision cuts the
average modeled dose in half, the dose is still much too high. As
pointed out above, the decision to use the Safety Series No. 115
exemption values instead of ones calculated specifically for transport,
avoided the requirement to use two different sets of exemption values,
one for fixed facilities (at least in the countries where these are
used, for example most of the European countries) and one for
transport. This in itself would likely lead to confusion and more
errors, reducing safety.
We note that present NRC limits for occupational dose and dose to
members of the public due to licensed activities are 50 mSv (5000 mrem)
and 1.0 mSv (100 mrem), respectively. This is in addition to background
radiation to which we are all exposed. The average background dose to a
person living in the United States, according to information in NCRP
Report No. 93, ``Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the
United States,'' published by the U. S. National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements in 1987, is approximately 3.6 mSv (360
mrem), of which about 1.0 mSv (100 mrem) is due to cosmic, terrestrial,
and internal sources of naturally occurring radiation; about 2.0 mSv
(200 mrem) is due to radon; and the remaining 0.6 mSv (60 mrem) is due
mostly to medical procedures, with a small contribution from consumer
products and miscellaneous sources. Thus the average modeled dose of
0.23 mSv (23 mrem) for dose to workers due to transport of the 20
radionuclides

[[Page 3636]]

considered, although not negligible, is small compared to accepted
limits and compared to background doses that we all receive. In
addition, it is expected that doses from these transport activities to
persons not involved in the transport will in almost all cases be much
smaller.
A commenter suggested that doses from accidents have not been
adequately analyzed. The fact that the average dose for the 20
radionuclides considered diminished by a factor of two indicates that
on the average, the proposed exemption values should reduce doses due
to accidents involving radioactive materials transported at the
exemption levels and using the scenarios chosen.
This commenter noted that the proposed revision of exemption values
would create an inconsistency with the present EPA practice of setting
an upper limit of 70 Bq/g on the radioactivity content of waste that
can be accepted at a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-
regulated waste disposal site. EPA has indicated that it has no
national requirement of this type for RCRA Subtitle C facilities, but
that such a requirement is frequently dictated by state regulations for
the acceptance of mixed waste, or included in the site permit
restrictions. The commenter is correct in implying that the proposed
replacement of the 70 Bq/g threshold with the new exemption values, for
the purpose of regulating the transport of radioactive materials, may
result in some waste being sent to the RCRA site in a radioactive
material placarded vehicle. However, where this limit is in use, it was
obviously based on DOT's definition of radioactive material. If the
intent of using this limit is to avoid having the site receive
radioactive waste considered radioactive for purposes of transport,
either the state regulations or the permit requirements would have to
be changed to accommodate the new exemption values.
One commenter supports adoption of the new definition for Class 7
materials. However, the commenter states that the new definition will
pose an unreasonable burden to those industries involved in
environmental restoration, because classifying low activities in
environmental media will be costly and burdensome without benefit. The
commenter hopes that RSPA will weigh the effect of each proposed change
in light of all affected and adopt domestic exceptions as warranted.
As we indicated above, in this final rule we are adopting the TS-R-
1 exemption values to replace the 70 Bq/g criterion for determining
when radioactive material will be regulated as a Class 7 hazardous
material (with one exception: as discussed under Issue 2, we are also
adopting in the HMR the TS-R-1 exception that the Class 7 thresholds
will be 10 times the exemption values for ores and other natural
materials not intended to be used for their radioactive properties).
With respect to this issue and to the others discussed below, we
note that we have reviewed the present regulations, the proposed
changes, and the various comments we have received, with the objective
of achieving a balance between the competing tasks of ensuring safety
and of avoiding imposing unjustified economic burdens on shippers and
carriers of radioactive materials. In some cases we believe that
domestic exceptions are justified, and have, for example, retained the
U.S. practice of only requiring that vehicles carrying category Yellow
III packages, highway route controlled quantities or exclusive use
shipments of LSA/SCO be placarded, as well as the domestic A
₂ value of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) for Mo-99 and A₁
value of 0.1 TBq (2.7 Ci) for Cf-252.
Issue 2: Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
Background. The radioactive material transport regulations are
intended to apply to natural materials or ores that form part of the
nuclear fuel cycle, or that will be processed in order to utilize their
radioactive properties. They do not apply to other natural materials or
ores that may contain small amounts of naturally occurring
radionuclides, when those materials or ores are to be used because of
some other physical or chemical characteristics, provided that their
activity concentration does not exceed 10 times the activity
concentration in the table in Sec. 173.436. The regulations also do not
apply to natural materials and ores containing naturally occurring
radionuclides when these have been subjected to physical or chemical
processing, when the processing was not for the purpose of extracting
radionuclides, again provided that their activity concentration does
not exceed 10 times the activity concentration in the table in Sec.
173.436. Examples of such materials are cement, coal, fertilizers, non-
radioactive metals, gypsum, residues from mining and smelting
processes, etc. In general these materials present a very low
radiological hazard. On the other hand there are ores in nature where
the activity concentration is much higher than the exemption values.
The factor of 10 times the regulatory exemption activity concentration
values was chosen as providing an appropriate balance between
radiological protection concerns and the practical inconvenience of
regulating large quantities of material with low activity
concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides.
In conjunction with the adoption of the nuclide-specific exemption
values, in this final rule we are also incorporating in the HMR an
exception for natural materials and ores containing radioactive
material, in that natural materials and ores will be regulated as Class
7 hazardous material only if both their activity concentrations and
consignment activities are greater than 10 times the corresponding
exemption values.
Discussion. One commenter supports the higher threshold of 10 times
the exemption values for natural materials and ores that contain
naturally occurring radioactive material but are mined for their non-
radioactive components or properties, and states that without an
exemption for low levels of naturally occurring radioactive materials,
application of the Sec. 173.436 exemption values to these materials
would result in unnecessarily regulating enormous amounts of material
not currently regulated, and that regulating these materials would
provide no benefit and increase their costs to the general public.
However, this commenter also states that the intent of using these
materials for their radioactive components should not be a determining
factor in the risk analysis when they are transported in their natural
state, and adds that for whatever purpose the materials are being
transported, they pose the same negligible risk. The commenter states
that it is only when the materials have been processed and the
radioactive components are removed from their natural state that the
radioactive components should be considered, and adds that the tailings
from the removal of naturally occurring radioactive materials should be
included in this group, as well as naturally occurring radioactive
materials that accumulate from the extraction of non-radioactive
minerals.
Another commenter suggests that DOT and NRC determine if the
exemption below 10 times the activity concentration values in the table
in Sec. 173.436 would apply to mill tailings and residual radioactivity
in soils and debris.
Another commenter indicated that the intended use of a material
should not be a factor in how the material should be regulated, and
that regulations for the transport of radioactive material should be
based only on the radiological properties of the material being
shipped.

[[Page 3637]]

Still another commenter urges RSPA to clarify in the preamble to
the final rule that the ``10 times'' (``10x'') exemption for ``natural
materials and ores'' includes tailings, secondary materials and solid
wastes resulting from non-nuclear processing of such ores. This
commenter notes that the need for the shipper to determine the intended
end-use of ores creates an artificial and difficult to enforce barrier
to the transportation of useful materials, particularly since the
eventual end-use is not always known at the time of shipment. In
addition, the commenter is not aware of any other instance where DOT
applies an ``intent'' based test when determining whether a material is
hazardous.
One commenter recommends that the 10x exemption apply to the
domestic transport of unimportant quantities of source material subject
to the 10 CFR 40.13 (licensing) exemption provided that the material
and ores not be processed for recovery of source material content.
Our intention is that use of the exemption between 1 and 10 times
the activity concentration values in the table in Sec. 173.436 be
allowed for ores containing small amounts of activity when these ores
are not intended to be used for their radioactive properties.
Although in most cases it will be obvious why a certain ore is
being mined, we agree that there may be instances where the ``intended
use'' test can be difficult to apply, and that it would be preferable
to minimize this burden on the shipper and carrier. We also agree that
the intended use of an ore containing low levels of naturally occurring
radionuclides does not change the low degree of risk it would present
in transport.
In determining if an ore or other material satisfies the 10x
exemption criterion, one should avoid using an average activity
concentration which masks volumes with much higher specific activities.
We suggest that a reasonable criterion for applying the 10x exemption
is to determine the ``estimated average activity'' of the ore or
material as described in section 4.2.3 of NUREG-1608/RSPA Advisory
Guidance 97-005 for ``distributed throughout.'' For example, if the
material can be divided into 10 or more equal volumes, each no greater
than 0.1 m\3\, and the specific activity differences between all pairs
of volumes do not vary by more than a factor of 10, then one may
average over the specific activities of all the volumes to obtain the
estimated average activity, which may then be compared with 10 times
the exemption activity concentration obtained from the table in Sec.
173.436. If there are individual differences in the volume specific
activities greater than a factor of 10, start with the volume with the
maximum specific activity and average that specific activity with the
next nine values in order of decreasing magnitude. If this average is
no greater than 10 times the activity concentration from the table, the
material qualifies for the 10x exemption.
Issue 3: Changes in A₁ and A₂ Values
Background. A₁ and A₂ values are used in the
international and domestic transportation regulations to specify the
amount of radioactive material that is permitted to be transported in a
particular packaging, and for other purposes. A₁ and
A₂ values for the most commonly transported radionuclides
are listed in Sec. 173.435 of the HMR, and in Appendix A to 10 CFR 71.
A₁ and A₂ values for most of the commonly
transported radionuclides were provided in the 1973 IAEA Safety Series
No. 6, and were based on certain dosimetric models and the assumption
of certain exposure scenarios and pathways. These models and scenarios
were extended and improved in the 1985 Safety Series No. 6, where the
calculation procedure was called the ``Q system.'' This resulted in
changes in the A₁ and A₂ values listed there.
More recent biokinetic data and dosimetric models have been used to
update the Q system and the resulting A₁ and A₂
values in the 1996 TS-R-1. A description of the Q system as applied in
deriving the values adopted in TS-R-1 may be found in Appendix I of the
IAEA publication TS-G-1.1, ``Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material,'' IAEA, Vienna, 2002.
Based on the results from the updated Q system, IAEA has adopted
new A₁ and A₂ values for radionuclides listed in
TS-R-1 (see paragraph 201 and Table 1 of TS-R-1). IAEA adopted these
new values based on calculations that were performed using the latest
dosimetric models recommended by the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) in Publication 60, ``1990
Recommendations of the ICRP.'' A thorough review of the Q system also
included incorporation of data from updated metabolic uptake studies.
In addition, several refinements were introduced in the calculation of
contributions to the effective dose from each of the pathways
considered. The pathways themselves are the same ones considered in the
1985 version of the Q system (i.e., external photon dose; external beta
dose; inhalation dose; skin and ingestion dose from contamination; and
dose from submersion in gaseous radionuclides). The impact of these
analyses is that for each radionuclide a thorough up-to-date
radiological assessment has been performed of potential exposures to an
individual should a Type A transport package of radioactive material be
involved in an accident during transport. The new A₁ and
A₂ values reflect that assessment.
The revised dosimetric models are accepted internationally as more
accurate ways of calculating the doses from individual nuclides, and
this improvement in accuracy and the additional refinements in the
pathways calculations result in various changes to the A₁
and A₂ values.
Discussion. Several commenters to the ANPRM requested retention of
the present A₂ value of 20 Ci for domestic shipments of Mo-
99, citing an increase in the needed number of shipments with
consequent greater radiation exposure to workers and greater costs as
probable consequences of eliminating the present 20 Ci domestic
exception.
Two commenters to the ANPRM objected to the TS-R-1 reduction of the
A₁ value for californium-252 (Cf-252) from its present value
of 0.1 TBq (2.7 Ci) to 0.05 TBq (1.35 Ci), on the basis of very high
costs for disposal of present Type A packages for transporting 0.1 TBq
of special form Cf-252 and possible development of replacement Type B
packages, or of greater radiation exposure to workers because of the
need to double the number of shipments if smaller quantities had to be
shipped to be able to continue to use existing Type A packagings.
However, during analysis of comments to the ANPRM, RSPA and NRC staff
members also learned that the IAEA is proposing, for the 2003 revision
of TS-R-1, to change the A₁ and A₂ values in TS-
R-1 for Cf-252 back to the values currently in the HMR.
Therefore, as proposed in the NPRM, we are adopting the revised
A₁ and A₂ values, with two exceptions. We are
retaining the A₂ value of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) for domestic
shipments of molybdenum-99 and the A₁ value of 0.1 TBq (2.7
Ci) and A₂ value of 0.001 TBq (0.027 Ci) for domestic
shipments of californium-252. Transportation of these isotopes in
accordance with international requirements would be subject to the TS-
R-1 A₁ and A₂ values.
Some radionuclides for which A₁ and A₂ values
are presently listed in Sec. 173.435 and Appendix A of 10 CFR 71 do not
appear in Table I of TS-R-1. These are Ar-42, Au-96, Es-253, Es-254,
Es-254m, Es-255, Fm-255, Fm-257, Ho-163, Ir-193m, Nb-92m, Po-208, Po-
209, Re-183, Te-118, and Tm-168. All except

[[Page 3638]]

the Einsteinium (Es) and Fermium (Fm) isotopes appear in Safety Series
No. 6, 1985 Edition; the latter (Es and Fm) isotopes were appended to
the tables in DOT's and NRC's domestic regulations when these
incorporated the 1985 IAEA regulations. Through an oversight, numerical
A₁ and A₂ values were never entered for Es-255.
The above nuclides were not included in TS-R-1 Table I because of
uncertainties in their decay schemes and/or the biological models used
to determine doses from internal exposures (Dr. K. Eckerman, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory). For this reason, we are removing them from Sec.
173.435. To determine A₁ and A₂ values for these
radionuclides we refer the shipper to Sec. 173.433.
Discussion. Several commenters to the NPRM support the new
A₁ and A₂ values.
One commenter noted that the proposed wording for Sec. 173.433(b)
did not accurately reflect the TS-R-1 requirements, in that the
proposed text did not make it clear that the use of an A₂
value related to the solubility class of the radionuclide, when that
A₂ value is not in the table, still requires the approval of
the Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety and, for
international shipments, multilateral approval. We agree, and have
changed the text of Sec. 173.433(b) to reflect this.
The same commenter noted that the word ``Only'' for alpha emitting
nuclides in Tables 10A and 10B is unnecessarily restrictive, and should
be removed (even though it appears in TS-R-1). We agree, and have
removed it. This commenter also felt that reference to Tables 10A and
10B should be made in Sec.Sec. 173.433(e) and 173.433(f) in the case
that the identity of each nuclide is known, but not all of the
individual activities are known. We disagree because when one applies
the directions given in these two sections, any of the prescribed ways
of determining the appropriate basic radionuclide values--from the
tables in Sec. 173.435 or Sec. 173.436, from Tables 10A or 10B, or by
approval of the AAHMS--is acceptable.
This commenter also asks whether the activity of progeny in
radioactive decay chains should be included in the total activity
required on shipping papers and Radioactive Yellow II and Yellow III
labels. The answer is: The same reasoning that led to the inclusion of
footnote (a) of the table in Sec. 173.435 of the NPRM should govern the
activities to be included on shipping papers and labels. When
A₁ or A₂ values include contributions from
daughter nuclides with half lives less than 10 days, and no daughter
has a half life greater than that of the parent, as referenced in
footnote (a) to the table in Sec. 173.435, the parent and those
daughters are to be treated as a single radionuclide both for the
purpose of using the table to determine the appropriate packaging type,
and for the contribution of that chain to the ``total activity''
required by Sec. 172.203(d) to be included on the shipping paper and by
Sec. 172.403(g) to be included on the Radioactive Yellow II and Yellow
III labels. The reason is that the A₁ and A₂
values assigned to the parents of those chains have been adjusted to
appropriately represent the hazard of all the nuclides in that chain.
This will occasionally lead to a situation where the true activity
contents of the package can be somewhat greater than the ``total''
activity listed on the shipping paper and labels. However, the hazard
of that decay chain will have been correctly taken into account for the
selection of packaging type. The above considerations also imply that
in applying the rules for determining which radionuclides should be
listed on the shipping paper or labels, the stated daughters in these
short half life chains need not be listed, or included in the
application of the 95% formula in Sec. 173.433(f).
This commenter also noted that footnote (a) appears in both tables
in the NPRM, in Sec.Sec. 173.435 and 173.436, even though it only
refers to A₁ and A₂ values. This was an error,
and we have removed that footnote from the table of exemption values in
Sec. 173.436, and reordered the remaining footnotes for that table.
This commenter also requested the inclusion of an MFP (multiple fission
products) entry and an entry for uranium enriched to more than 20% in
the A₁/A₂ table in Sec. 173.435. Multiple fission
products should be dealt with by the methods described in Sec. 173.433.
A request for approval of A₁/A₂ values for
nuclides not in the table should be addressed to the Associate
Administrator, as indicated in Sec. 173.433, with appropriate
justification. In general, it is expected that this determination will
be made following the guidelines of the Q system, as described in
Appendix I to TS-G-1.1.
Issue 4: Communication Changes
Background. In this final rule we are adopting several changes in
the regulations governing hazard communication associated with the
transport of Class 7 (radioactive) materials, as well as revising and
adding to the definitions in subpart I of 49 CFR 173.
Revisions in hazard communication include the following:
1. We are eliminating entries in the Hazardous Materials Table at
Sec. 172.101 presently accompanied by the symbol ``D'' in column (1) of
the Table, and removal of the ``I'' in column (1) for the remaining
Class 7 (radioactive) materials entries.
The ``D'' symbols, as well as the new proper shipping names and UN
identification numbers from TS-R-1 accompanied by the ``I'' symbols,
were introduced for radioactive material entries in the Hazardous
Materials Table in the Final Rule for docket HM-215D (66 FR 33316; June
21, 2001). This was done to permit import and export shipments of
radioactive materials in accordance with the new international air and
sea modal requirements, and to allow shippers to reuse domestically
previous imported packagings marked with the new proper shipping names
and UN numbers.
As a result of the above action, as of the effective date of this
final rule, we will only allow the use of proper shipping names and UN
identification numbers established in TS-R-1 and in the international
modal regulations. Since we are not adopting domestic use of Type C
packages (see Issue 7), we are not incorporating in the HMR proper
shipping names and UN identification numbers found in TS-R-1 for Type C
packages, or for fissile LSA or SCO materials. In addition, we are not
allowing fissile material (above the level considered fissile-excepted)
to be transported domestically as LSA material or SCO.
2. We are adopting a requirement to mark UN identification numbers
on excepted packages, and to mark package type, international vehicle
registration code (the letters USA in the case of the U.S.) on all
industrial and Type A packages, and mark the packaging manufacturer on
Type A packages.
3. We are specifying that customary activity units (curies, or
fractions thereof), if used in shipping paper descriptions or on
radioactive labels, must be enclosed in parentheses following the
required SI units.
4. We are introducing a criticality safety index (CSI) to express
the former criticality control transport index (criticality TI) for
fissile material, and the restriction of the term transport index (TI)
to the former radiation TI, derived exclusively from the maximum
radiation dose rate at one meter from the package. We are also
introducing a fissile label for a package of fissile material, on which
the CSI for that package must be displayed.
The fissile label will make it obvious that the package is carrying
fissile material, and the use of the fissile label in conjunction with
the designation of the CSI will reduce the complexity of

[[Page 3639]]

the system presently in use. These changes will also simplify decisions
as to how many packages can be grouped together, since under the new
system the description of radiation and criticality hazards is
uncoupled, and during transport each hazard can be considered
separately.
5. We are introducing a requirement to mark industrial packagings
with the markings TYPE IP-1, TYPE IP-2 or TYPE IP-3.
6. We are removing some former requirements that have become
redundant upon adoption of the new proper shipping names, such as the
requirement that the shipping description contain the words
``Radioactive Material'' unless those words are included in the proper
shipping name.
7. In accordance with the corresponding change in TS-R-1 (see the
discussion for Issue 8), we have removed the isotope plutonium-238 from
our definition of fissile material in Sec. 173.403, as well as the
reference to it in the list of fissile radionuclides for which the
weight in grams or kilograms may be listed instead of or in addition to
the activity, in the shipping paper or radioactive label description of
the radioactive contents of a package.
8. To improve readability and clarity of the HMR we have moved the
labeling requirements for overpacks from Sec. 173.448 to subpart E of
part 172.
Discussion. Three commenters did not support the requirement to
mark excepted packages and ``empty'' packages with the UN number
preceded by the letters ``UN,'' stating this change will not assist
first responders in communicating a package's hazard and will more
likely than not simply confuse such personnel. The commenters added
they were not aware of any situation where a responder was needlessly
or excessively exposed to a hazard because, despite its limited
quantity, its radioactive nature was not communicated. The commenters
did not think that the extra effort to mark Limited Quantity and Empty
packages will result in enhanced safety since the quantity of material
in these packages has already been determined to be low-risk, and the
extra effort to mark these packages is not rewarded with increased
safety. We agree that the risk associated with the transport of
excepted packages is small; however, in addition to the small benefit
for emergency response involving these packages, the benefits of
following the same practice for domestic and international regulations
in this regard are sufficient to warrant harmonization with TS-R-1.
Two commenters stated that the proposal to modify Sec. 178.350(b)
by removing the wording ``and Radioactive Material'' from the marking
requirement is commendable since this wording is already included in
the proper shipping name that is also provided as a marking on the
package.
One commenter referenced the proposed Sec. 173.427(a)(6)(vi) and
stated the existing Sec. 173.427(a)(6)(vi) requires only the stenciling
of non-bulk packages with the words ``Radioactive-LSA'' or
``Radioactive-SCO'' and ``RQ'' as appropriate. Typically only non-bulk
packages are marked for reportable quantities as per Sec. 172.324. The
proposed paragraph no longer states that only non-bulk packages must be
stenciled. The commenter recommended ensuring that the intention was to
stencil both bulk and non-bulk packages with the words ``Radioactive-
LSA'' or ``Radioactive-SCO'' and ``RQ'' as appropriate. We intend that
the ``Radioactive-LSA'' or ``Radioactive-SCO'', and ``RQ'' markings
when appropriate, be placed on all Class 7 (radioactive) material
packages containing LSA material or SCO, independent of their weight or
capacity.
One commenter addressed concerns regarding the proposed change to
Sec. 173.424 and the burden that will be imposed upon manufacturers,
importers and distributors of consumer products, such as lamps that
contain small quantities of radioactive material, if it is adopted as
contained in the above referenced docket. The proposed change would
modify Sec. 173.424(e) to require the marking ``radioactive'' on each
instrument or article shipped in an excepted package, except for radio-
luminescent timepieces. The commenter stated that as is the case with
radioactive luminescent timepieces, lighting products, such as lamps,
glow-switches or glow bottles that contain small quantities of
radioactive material necessary for their operation, are manufactured or
imported under either an NRC or Agreement State radioactive materials
possession license and distributed (sold) to the general public under
an NRC exempt distribution ``E'' license.
In order for a product to be licensed for exempt distribution, the
manufacturer, importer or distributor must satisfy the NRC that it has
been manufactured and prototype-tested according to specified standards
and that the product meets specified radiation limits, where
applicable. In addition, the manufacturer must develop routine quality
control testing and production lot sampling procedures to the
satisfaction of the agency. According to NRC regulations, a product
licensed for exempt distribution may be used and in most cases disposed
of by the consumer without regard to its radioactive content. The
commenter cited certain other consumer products that will also be
affected by this rule change, such as high intensity discharge (HID)
lamps and other products which contain thorium.
The commenter argued that to require an NRC-exempt lighting product
to be marked as radioactive would be burdensome because ``E'' licensed
lighting products have already been evaluated and licensed for
distribution with any marking approved by the NRC. He stated that, in
most instances the individual item package, rather than the item
itself, is marked with information about the radioactive content; that
the new requirement of Sec. 173.424(e) would either supersede or be in
addition to the NRC approved product marking; and that the new marking
requirement of Sec. 173.424(e) would impose product marking on a large
and decade old segment of HID market even though the NRC has found such
labeling to be unnecessary. The proposed change to Sec. 173.424(e)
would require the product itself to be marked, regardless of size or
design, which in some cases could make a readable ``radioactive''
marking virtually impossible, (e.g., glow switches are sealed glass
tubes that measure approximately 20mm long by 9mm in diameter).
Individual product marking would entail modifications to production
line equipment and possibly even the redesign of certain equipment to
accommodate the marking of small components. Marking a lighting product
as radioactive would send a mixed message to the consumer, as would be
the same marking of a radioactive luminescent timepiece. The NRC has
determined that such a product is safe to use without regard to its
contained radioactivity and yet Sec. 173.424(e), if enacted as
currently written, would require the product to be marked, in the
manner of a warning, that it is ``radioactive''--a marking the NRC has
not deemed necessary.
The commenter also argued that both fluorescent and HID lamps are
typically three to four times more energy efficient than incandescent
lamps. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy
actively promote the conversion to more energy efficient lighting,
which reduces the amount of coal, oil and gas burned in power plants,
as well as the amount of air pollutants including greenhouse gasses
released from power plants. A requirement to label these products as
radioactive is likely to discourage the

[[Page 3640]]

use of these environmentally preferable products. The commenter
proposed to change the wording of the instrument or article marking
exception to: ``* * * (except any device either distributed under a NRC
Exempt Distribution License, pursuant to 10 CFR 32.14 or exempt from
NRC regulation pursuant to 10 CFR 40.13) * * *''
We agree that in some cases the physical size of the instrument or
article that qualifies to be shipped in an excepted package may make it
difficult to comply with the requirement to mark ``RADIOACTIVE'' on
such instrument or article. We also agree that the degree of additional
safety that this measure would provide is small, while the costs to
manufacturers, particularly in the case of items of such small size
that they do not easily accommodate the marking, may be unreasonably
large, without a commensurate increase in safety. Therefore we are not
adopting this proposal. We note, however, that excepted packages of
instruments and articles containing small quantities of radioactive
material must still have the ``RADIOACTIVE'' marking if they are to be
transported under the IAEA Regulations in TS-R-1, the ICAO Technical
Instructions, or the IMDG Code.
A commenter opposed the proposed revision of the requirements
pertaining to the labeling of overpacks in Sec. 172.403. Section
172.403(h)(4) in the NPRM, as did its predecessor Sec. 173.448(g)(iv),
allows the transport index (TI) of a rigid overpack to be determined by
adding the individual indices of the packages inside or by direct
measurement of the radiation level at one meter from the outside
surface. However, Sec. 172.403(h)(5) in the NPRM states that the label
category for an overpack is to be determined by the TI, as determined
according to Sec. 172.403(h)(4), and the highest surface radiation
level on an individual package inside the overpack, ``unless the
overpack has been demonstrated to satisfy the packaging requirements
for the package type appropriate for the totality of its contents.''
The commenter stated that while the purpose of this change is
described by RSPA as a clarification, this will lead to confusion. The
proposed requirements could lead to a situation where an overpack may
require a Yellow-III category label (because of using the highest
surface dose rate on an interior package) yet the measured TI to be
entered on the label for the overpack (e.g. less than 1.0) could
correspond to a Yellow-II or White-I label. Thus this proposed change
could result in the need to use a Yellow III label on the overpack when
a Yellow II label would be sufficient under present requirements,
thereby subjecting the carrier to placarding requirements and
additional carrier requirements.
According to the commenter this would place a hardship on shippers
who would now have to use placarded vehicles and carriers with
Commercial Driver's Licenses (CDLs), yet the Type A packages inside
would not be better protected or safer in any way. Any Type A package
inside an overpack would still be expected to meet the design and
performance requirements on its own, regardless of the type of overpack
used. Therefore, if the shipper chooses not to or cannot use the
sturdier overpack, which would allow him to use the dose rate on the
surface of the overpack to determine the overpack category, more
packages, with potentially higher radiation levels than that of the
overpack, would then be handled by the shipper, carrier and recipient,
resulting in additional radiation exposure to shippers, carriers and
recipients of these packages. The commenter stated that this proposal
should be abandoned.
Another commenter representing a large maritime construction firm
stated that its primary concern is regulations related to
transportation of Class 7 (radioactive) materials associated with
industrial radiography. Radioactive isotopes, primarily iridium-192 and
cobalt-60, are used for soundness inspection of welds and critical
components in the submarine construction industry. The proposed
requirement, to determine the category of Class 7 label on the overpack
based in part on the maximum radiation level on the interior package or
packages, would seriously impact his firm and many other industry users
that normally transport radioactive materials in order to conduct
inspections required by government specifications. Users and small
businesses would be adversely impacted through costs associated with
compliance with the proposed rules, since in many cases both the
overpack and the interior package or packages would now be labeled
Yellow-III, and whether or not the overpack is used, the vehicle would
require a placard. Since DOT regulations require the driver of any
vehicle requiring a placard to possess a CDL and to be a ``Registered
Shipper of Hazardous Materials,'' this would entail additional costs
for the businesses involved, with no additional benefit, or even
increased radiation exposure if the company decided not to use the
overpack. The commenter stated that the proposed requirement would
increase the radiation exposure received by workers incident to the
transportation of radioactive materials required for industrial
radiography as well as other industries, such as those using moisture
density gauges, well logging equipment, alloy identification equipment,
and other radioactive devices, since if the labels on the packages and
also on the overpack are determined by this proposed requirement to be
Radioactive Yellow-III, transporters would now have less incentive to
use an overpack. The proposed requirements would reduce the use of
overpacks and packages would be transported at radiation levels closer
to the maximum limits allowed.
Another commenter expressed concern that radiographers and some
density gauge users, who under present regulations can use an overpack
to reduce the category of label and therefore avoid having to placard
their vehicle, would under the proposed change for determining the
category of an overpack be forced to placard their trucks, and that the
radiographer and gauge users and the general public could be at risk
from terrorist or thieves who would be keenly aware of the presence of
radioactive devices that have been invisible to them in the past by
stalking the hundredfold increase in radioactive placarded vehicles on
the roads. He added that even without the events of 9/11, there have
been many gauge thefts out of the back of vehicles, and that placing a
placard on the back of a vehicle may appear to increase the safety of
the public, but it could increase the risk to the radiographers, gauge
users and the public since the devices are relatively easy to steal.
We have reviewed the consequences of the wording proposed for Sec.
172.403(h)(5) in the NPRM, and we agree with the above commenters. The
requirement to use a sturdier overpack, which could often imply the
need for a Type B packaging, in order to be able to use the overpack
surface dose rate to determine its category for labeling purposes, is
unreasonably restrictive and in many cases impossible to realize.
Therefore, we are removing that restriction in Sec. 172.403(h)(5), and
simply requiring that, by the procedure described in Sec. 172.403(b)
for packages, the category of the overpack be determined using the
maximum dose rate on the surface of the overpack, and the TI for the
overpack determined by one of the methods prescribed in Sec.
172.403(h)(3) for a non-rigid overpack, or in Sec. 172.403(h)(4) for a
rigid overpack.
One commenter agreed with the proposal in Sec. 178.350(b) to remove
the wording ``Radioactive Material'' from the marking requirement on a
DOT

[[Page 3641]]

Specification 7A Type A package, as this wording is already included in
the proper shipping name that must also be marked on the package. This
commenter also agreed with the proposal to retain the ability in
Sec.Sec. 172.203(d) and 172.403(g) to use the customary units of
activity as long as they are placed within parentheses after the
original quantity in SI units. According to this commenter this will
facilitate the ongoing understanding of carriers, end users and
potential emergency responders who are accustomed to seeing the
customary units to describe the contents of radioactive materials
packages.
Two commenters stated that customary units should be required if
the SI system is used. One commenter stated that customary units should
be required and the SI units be optional, but put in parenthesis, if
used. Three commenters supported the proposed changes for Sec.Sec.
172.203(d) and 172.403(g) that would allow continued use of customary
activity units as long as they are placed within parentheses after the
original quantity in SI units. As noted elsewhere, we are requiring
that customary units, if used, be placed after the required SI units,
and be enclosed in parentheses. The present regulations allow the
shipper to use customary units after the required SI units. In this
final rule, we are adding the requirement that these be enclosed in
parentheses.
A commenter stated that some place in the proposed regulations the
format of the criticality safety index should be specified for
appropriate guidance to both shippers and carriers. The following
modification was suggested: The CSI for packages containing fissile
material is determined in accordance with the instructions provided in
10 CFR 71.22, 71.23 and 71.59, and is a number rounded up to the
nearest tenth. It is recognized that the above information is provided
in 10 CFR, but the added phrase specifying the numerical format should
be included in DOT's regulations. We agree, and have inserted that
clarification in our definition of CSI in Sec. 173.403.
One commenter noted that in Sec. 175.702(b)(2), which deals with
the requirements for carriage of packages containing Class 7
(radioactive materials) in a non-exclusive use cargo aircraft only,
when the total transport index for all the packages is greater than
50.0 but does not exceed 200.0, and the criticality safety index for
all of the packages does not exceed 50.0, the proposed section remains
incompatible with IAEA TS-R-1, and in fact it is also incompatible with
IAEA Safety Series No. 6, (1985 Edition as Amended 1990). The proposal
in the NPRM is that the radioactive material packages be in groups not
exceeding 50.0 TI and that each group of 50 TI or less is separated
from all other groups of 50 TI or less by at least 6 meters and from
humans by at least 9 meters.
The commenter noted that the IAEA TS-R-1 Table IX provides for 200
TI on a cargo aircraft. Paragraph 562 of TS-R-1 states that segregation
between the radioactive materials and human occupied space shall be
governed by paragraph 306, which prescribes annual dose limits for the
purpose of calculating segregation distances. Table 7-6 in the 2001-
2002 edition of the ICAO Technical Instructions is calculated on such a
basis for TI's between 50.0 and 200.0. He stated that the fifty TI
grouping should be abolished and the ICAO segregation table should be
adopted. Grouping of packages into 50.0 TI or less involves additional
handling and therefore represents a dosage increase. The 50.0 to 200.0
TI segregation table has been in ICAO and IATA for many years, ever
since the adoption of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 (1985 Edition as Amended
1990), and it is unlikely that most foreign air carriers entering U.S.
airspace are adhering to or are aware of the Sec. 175.702(b)(2)
operational requirement. This comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking.
The only substantive changes introduced in Sec. 175.702 in the NPRM
were the inclusion of reference to a FISSILE label in Sec. 175.702(b),
a restriction to a total CSI of 50 in Sec. 175.702(b), and the
introduction of an upper limit of 200 TI for cargo aircraft only. The
remaining changes were the rearrangement and renumbering of the
previous requirements.
Because we did not propose to adopt the segregation scheme of the
ICAO Technical Instructions in our NPRM, we are unable to introduce
these changes in this final rule. Consideration of the discrepancy
between Sec. 175.702 and the ICAO regulations may be considered in a
future rulemaking.
A commenter stated packages should be labeled ``Danger--Radioactive
Material'' rather than ``fissile.'' Another commenter stated that the
CSI should be included in the shipping description for fissile material
packages and that the fissile label is inadequate and should have more
information because 99.9% of the population doesn't know what that
means. The commenter suggested adding the radiation symbol and the
words ``Very Dangerous, Radioactive. Keep far away from public and
animals. Guard at all times.'' A commenter stated that it is not
evident that there is a benefit in substituting the CSI for the TI and
that, to minimize damages, the maximum amount of information should be
given. The same commenter stated that all packages should be labeled
Dangerous--Radioactive Material and a radiation warning symbol should
be attached to every package. Another commenter supported the proposal
to use the new ``Fissile'' label and the Criticality Safety Index
(CSI), stating that the use of the CSI value will remove a source of
confusion in the old TI values and the resulting enhancement of the
safety of shipments makes the extra efforts necessary to implement this
proposal worthwhile.
We agree that it is important that communications be as clear as
possible, that their impact correspond to the hazard, and at the same
time that the shipper, carrier or first responder not be so overwhelmed
by information that the probability of errors is increased rather than
diminished. For this reason we feel that the uncoupling of the concepts
of TI, which refers to the external radiation hazard, and CSI, which
refers to the criticality hazard, is an important improvement over the
historical TI, which could have resulted from either of these hazards.
Because the two hazards are quite different, the use of one of
various phrases involving the words ``radioactive material'' on a
fissile material package without a Fissile label would actually convey
less information than the presence of the Fissile label on the package.
In addition, it should be noted that all radioactive material packages,
aside from excepted packages and certain LSA and SCO shipments (for
which the markings ``RADIOACTIVE-LSA'' or ``RADIOACTIVE-SCO'' are
substituted), are required to have the proper shipping name marked on
the package, and with the adoption of the TS-R-1 proper shipping names,
all radioactive material proper shipping names start with the words
``Radioactive material.''
A commenter questioned why Type C packages and fissile LSA and SCO
are exempt from proper shipping names and UN ID numbers. We have not
adopted proper shipping names and UN identification numbers for Type C
packages, or for fissile LSA material and SCO, because we have decided
not to recognize these categories in HMR.
A commenter stated that plutonium weight should not replace the
activity but may be added to it in the shipping documents and package
labels. We note that this is in fact what appears in the proposed
language for Sec.Sec. 172.203(d)(3) and 172.403(g)(2), and has been the
case

[[Page 3642]]

previously. The change in these two paragraphs was the removal of
reference to plutonium-238 as a fissile nuclide.
Issue 5: Low Specific Activity (LSA) materials and Surface Contaminated
Objects (SCO)
Background. On September 28, 1995, in a final rule published under
Docket HM-169A (60 FR 50292), we refined the existing Low Specific
Activity (LSA) and Surface Contaminated Object (SCO) regulations by
adopting complementary, but not additional, features of the LSA and SCO
provisions of the IAEA regulations. This approach was considered best
because it offered minimal changes to existing requirements while
facilitating international transport consistent with IAEA regulations.
Shortly after implementing this new regulatory program, we recognized
the shortcomings of not adopting the Safety Series No. 6 definition of
contamination. We are now bringing the HMR into closer harmony with TS-
R-1 by adopting the IAEA definition of contamination.
In accordance with TS-R-1, we have included the phrase ``and other
ores containing radioactive materials intended to be processed for the
use of these radionuclides'' in the category of LSA-I referring to
uranium and thorium ores and concentrates of such ores.
TS-R-1 (paragraph 226) contains a new category of LSA-I material,
consisting of radioactive material, excluding non-excepted fissile
material, in which the activity is distributed throughout and the
estimated average specific activity does not exceed 30 times the
activity concentration exemption values. The purpose of this category
is to allow shipment as LSA-I of very low specific activity materials
containing one or more of a variety of radionuclides. We are adopting
this new category in the definition of LSA-I. A previous LSA-I
category, which specifically included mill tailings, contaminated
earth, concrete, rubble, other debris, and activated material in which
the Class 7 (radioactive) material is essentially uniformly distributed
and the average specific activity does not exceed 10-\1\
A₂/g, has been eliminated. The specific materials, e.g.,
earth, concrete, and rubble, previously listed in the definition may
still be classified as LSA-I, as long as they meet the requirements of
the new definition.
We are also providing an authorization to transport unpackaged LSA-
I and SCO-I by means of qualified tank containers, freight containers
and metal intermediate bulk containers as industrial packagings, types
2 and 3 (IP-2 and IP-3). The authorization to use qualified tank
containers, freight containers and metal intermediate bulk containers
as industrial packagings and the other packaging changes made for LSA
and SCO will greatly simplify the HMR with no increase in risk.
We have eliminated the previous paragraph Sec. 173.427(d), which
excepted LSA material and SCO that conform to the provisions of 10 CFR
20.2005 from all requirements of the HMR for Class 7 (radioactive)
materials, when offered for transportation for disposal or recovery by
means other than aircraft. Such material is 1.85 kBq (0.05 [mu]Ci) or
less of H-3 or C-14 per gram of liquid scintillation counting medium or
of animal tissue. These exceptions are no longer needed since the TS-R-
1 exemption activity concentrations for these materials adopted in this
final rule are 1 x 106 Bq/g (27 [mu]Ci/g) for H-3 and 1 x 10\4\ Bq/g
(0.27 [mu]Ci/g) for C-14; i.e., they are greater than the
concentrations previously excepted. Note, however, that this does not
mean that these materials would be exempt from the provisions of the
HMR relating to other hazard classes.
Incorporating these changes into the HMR greatly simplifies the LSA
and SCO regulations by bringing them into closer harmony with the TS-R-
1. Specifically, the addition of a contamination definition and the
authority to transport unpackaged LSA and SCO better focuses the
regulations on radioactive material that truly poses a hazard to
persons, property, and the environment.
Discussion. Several commenters were concerned that the definitions
and use of the terms LSA and SCO by DOT and NRC are not totally
consistent and encouraged the review of the use of these terms to
ensure compatibility with TS-R-1. We agree. This inconsistency has been
resolved in this and the NRC's final rules.
Two commenters disagreed with the decision to remove the LSA-I
definition of mill tailings, contaminated earth, concrete, rubble or
other debris with average specific activity less than
10-\6\/g, since much of the LSA shipped today is from this
category. The commenter stated that eliminating these categories from
the regulation will cause confusion and shipping delays. The specific
materials mentioned, e.g., earth, concrete, and rubble in the previous
definition may still be classified as LSA-I as long as they meet the
requirements of the new definition. Furthermore, it is believed the
revised activity limits will ultimately reduce confusion and shipping
delays by standardizing with the international community and the
content of TS-R-1. Training on the new requirements should eliminate
any confusion or shipping delays due to the revised definition.
One commenter stated that the actual meaning of ``unpackaged'' as
discussed on 67 FR 21336-21337 and 21358 was unclear. The commenter
noted that we had proposed to allow transport of unpackaged LSA-I and
SCO-I in Sec. 173.427. The commenter correctly interpreted the proposal
to mean that LSA-I and SCO-I material may be shipped unpackaged in
accordance with the proposed modification of Sec. 173.427(c) which
requires for the unpackaged material, other than for ores containing
only naturally occurring radionuclides, that there be no escape of the
contents from the conveyance nor a loss of shielding (Shipment of
unpackaged LSA-I or SCO-I must also be by exclusive use; note however
that unpackaged SCO-I is allowed to be transported non-exclusive use if
the conditions of the modified Sec. 173.427(c)(2) are met.) The
commenter also correctly concluded that an LSA-I or SCO-I shipment no
longer is required to be in a DOT Specification 7A, an industrial
packaging, or a strong tight packaging, as is currently required by
regulation, if the requirements of the modified Sec. 173.427(c) are
met.
One commenter incorrectly assumed that SCO-I material, such as
pipes, can serve as their own packaging. The commenter cited TS-R-1
paragraphs 241 (a)(iii) and 523(c) and supplemental TS-G-1.1 (ST-2)
information. Specifically, it was stated that SCO-I is allowed to have
non-fixed contamination on inaccessible surfaces in excess of the
values specified for accessible surfaces. Therefore, items such as
pipes resulting from the decommissioning of a facility can be prepared
for unpackaged transport in a way to ensure that there is no release of
non-fixed contamination from inaccessible surfaces (for which allowable
contamination levels may exceed the accessible surface non-fixed
contamination limits) into the conveyance by, for example, applying end
caps or plugs at both ends of the pipes. The commenter went on to state
that the same principle applies equally to valves, compressors, tanks,
or other surface contaminated articles which, because the contamination
that renders the article SCO is limited to internal surfaces, may
effectively serve as their own packagings. While the effective end
result is virtually the same, the commenter is mistaken in saying these
items serve as their own packaging. Rather, if they meet the definition
of

[[Page 3643]]

SCO-I material, or suspected non-fixed contamination levels exceed the
accessible surface non-fixed contamination limit, but measures are
taken to ensure radioactive material is not released into the
conveyance by making these surfaces inaccessible, thereby rendering the
material fully compatible with the definition for SCO-I, then the
material may be transported unpackaged in accordance with Sec.
173.427(c).
The commenter also indicated that the LSA-I and SCO-I provisions
addressed in paragraph 540 of TS-R-1 state that, when these materials
are transported according to the provisions of paragraph 523, the
marking ``RADIOACTIVE LSA-I'' or ``RADIOACTIVE SCO-I'' described in
paragraph 540 is optional, and is not mandated by (the IAEA)
regulation. The commenter encouraged DOT to permit similar flexibility
in marking SCO and LSA materials. We interpret this to mean that the
commenter would like to have the freedom to make exclusive use
shipments of LSA-I or SCO-I without such markings.
We believe that, in accordance with past requirements for similar
marking of domestic shipments of LSA or SCO that are required to be
transported exclusive use, such markings serve the useful purpose of
alerting emergency response personnel, Class 7 (radioactive) material
is present in relatively low concentrations. We have therefore decided
to retain this requirement. However, the comment focuses our attention
on the lack of detail in Sec. 173.427 in our proposed rulemaking
concerning transport requirements for unpackaged LSA-I materials and
unpackaged SCO-I. Therefore, in this final rule we have included
wording in Sec. 173.427(a)(4), (a)(6)(iii), and (a)(6)(vi) to indicate
that unpackaged LSA-I and SCO-I are subject to the same transport
controls as packaged LSA material and SCO.
Two commenters stated that the new definition for contamination and
LSA-I will allow radioactive material to enter industrial and consumer
goods. Another commenter stated that the LSA-I definition allowing
exemption of materials having an estimated specific activity up to 30
times the exempt activity concentration should be eliminated because it
fits the definition of volumetrically contaminated material and neither
the NRC nor DOE currently allows for release or recycle of
volumetrically contaminated radioactive materials.
We believe the commenters misinterpreted the proposed Sec. 173.403
definition of LSA-I. No section of the proposed LSA-I definition
provides an exemption, rather the sections provide bounding criteria of
what may be considered LSA-I material.
A commenter stated that all ores, even if not intended to be
processed, should be regulated because in the past certain companies
have contaminated large areas from ores. As stated previously in Issue
2, we will continue to regulate natural materials and ores that are not
intended to be processes for their radioactive content, when their
specific activities are greater than ten times the activity
concentration exemption values in Sec. 173.436. One commenter stated
that external dose rates for LSA and SCO should be required to be less
than 1 mrem/year at 3 meters. We believe this comment is outside the
scope of the rulemaking.
This commenter also stated there should be no exemptions for H-3 or
C-14 in animal tissues. These exceptions have been removed in the final
rule since the TS-R-1 exemption activity concentrations for these
materials adopted in this final rule are 1 x 10\6\ Bq/g (27 [mu]Ci/g)
for H-3 and 1 x 10\4\ Bq/g (0.27 [mu]Ci/g) for C-14 (i.e., they are
greater than the concentrations previously excepted). Note, however,
that this does not mean that these materials would be exempt from the
provisions of the HMR relating to other hazard classes.
Several commenters disagreed with the new rules that would allow
LSA-I and SCO-I to be transported unpackaged, citing the conveyance
could become contaminated. We agree that given the amounts of
radioactive material contained in LSA-I and SCO-I materials there is a
likelihood that cross-contamination of the interior of a conveyance
used for unpackaged transport of these materials, in accordance with
the proposed Sec. 173.427(c), could occur. However, in order to prevent
the spread of contamination to subsequent non-radioactive material
shipments in the same conveyance, it is incumbent upon the carrier of
an exclusive use shipment to ensure that the conveyance is surveyed and
decontaminated, if necessary, in accordance with Sec. 173.443(c), prior
to unrestricted release of the conveyance. The carrier may perform such
measurements, or these may be made by the consignee or other persons,
through appropriate arrangements among the interested parties.
One commenter stated that it is not clear in the definition for
``contamination'' what is meant by the statement ``Non-fixed
(removable) radioactive contamination is not significant if it does not
exceed the limits specified in Sec. 173.443.'' We point out that our
definition of contamination is similar to our definition of radioactive
material, in that the definition designates a threshold value below
which the material in question is not subject to the Class 7 hazardous
materials transport regulations. In that context we agree that the
statement referred to by the commenter is ambiguous and, if ``Non-fixed
(removable) radioactive contamination'' were interpreted as referring
to the physical (non-regulatory) definition of contamination, is
redundant. Hence, we have removed this phrase from the definition of
contamination.
The commenter also requested that the meaning of the terms
``distributed throughout'' and ``estimated average specific activity''
be clarified in the definition for LSA-I, and asked whether these terms
are intended to be applied as discussed in NUREG-1608/RSPA Advisory
Guidance 97-005 for LSA materials. The guidance concerning
``distributed throughout'' and ``essentially uniformly distributed''
would be appropriate as provided in NUREG-1608, ``Categorizing and
Transporting Low Specific Activity Materials and Surface Contaminated
Objects.'' For packages containing at least 0.2 m\3\ of LSA material,
ten or more equal volumes no greater than 0.1 m\3\ each, of objects or
materials that are ``distributed throughout,'' should not vary by more
than a factor of ten. The specific activity among similarly defined
volumes for materials that are ``essentially uniformly distributed''
should not vary by more than a factor of three. It should be noted
that, where the LSA materials contain radionuclides in quantities less
than 1 A₂, this determination may be made either
quantitatively or qualitatively. The ``estimated average specific
activity'' for radioactive material ``distributed throughout'' would be
an arithmetic average specific activity of material where the range of
specific activities does not vary by more than a factor of ten.
Issue 6: Uranium Hexafluoride (UF₆)
Background. Uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) packaging and
transportation is regulated under both NRC and DOT requirements. The
HMR contain provisions that govern many aspects of UF₆
packaging and shipment preparation. The NRC regulates fissile materials
and Type B packaging designs for all materials. Since UF₆
may be a fissile material, it may also be regulated by the NRC.

[[Page 3644]]

TS-R-1 contains detailed requirements for UF₆ packagings
designed for more than 0.1 kg UF₆. First, TS-R-1 requires
the use of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
Standard 7195, ``Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF₆) for
Transport,'' instead of the ANSI N14.1 standard, previously referenced
in DOT's regulations, with the condition that approval by all countries
involved in the shipment is obtained (i.e., multilateral approval
(Paragraph 629)). Second, TS-R-1 requires that all packages containing
more than 0.1 kg UF₆ meet the ``normal conditions of
transport'' drop test, a minimum internal pressure test and the
hypothetical accident condition thermal test (Paragraph 630). However,
TS-R-1 does allow a national competent authority to waive certain
design requirements, including the thermal test for packages designed
to contain greater than 9,000 kg UF₆, provided that
multilateral approval is obtained. Third, TS-R-1 prohibits use of
packages utilizing pressure relief devices (Paragraph 631). Fourth, TS-
R-1 includes a new exception for UF₆ packages, regarding the
evaluation of a single package.
This new exception (Paragraph 677(b)) allows UF₆
packages to be evaluated without considering the in-leakage of water
into the containment system if the packages satisfy certain specified
conditions. Under these conditions, a single fissile UF₆
package does not have to be shown to be subcritical under the
assumption that there is water inside the containment system. This
provision only applies when there is no contact between the valve and
any other component of the cylinder under hypothetical accident tests
and the valve remains leak-tight following the thermal test, and when
there is a high degree of quality control in the manufacture,
maintenance, and repair of packagings coupled with tests to demonstrate
closure of each package before each shipment. In addition, competent
authority package design certificates are also required for
international shipments of uranium hexafluoride (paragraph 828).
Commenters to the December 28, 1999 ANPRM asked for the following
information to be included in the HMR: (1) Clarification of the
requirements for new cylinders, cleaned cylinders, and cylinders
containing residual amounts of UF₆ (heel cylinders); (2)
additional details regarding approval provisions; and (3) transitional
or grandfathering provisions. We agreed with the need for additional
information and included the requested guidance in the proposed and
final rule. Furthermore, we recommend that shippers and carriers of
UF₆ consult with IAEA Safety Guide TS-G-1.1, ``Advisory
Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Material,'' for further clarification.
In this final rule we have incorporated the TS-R-1 changes for
packagings containing more than 0.1 kg of UF₆. We have
required that the packagings meet the pressure, drop and thermal test
requirements found in paragraph 630. We have prohibited the use of
pressure relief devices and provided designated packaging certification
identification marks in accordance with IAEA TS-R-1 paragraph 828. We
have not incorporated our proposal from the NPRM to allow uranium
hexafluoride to be packaged and transported in accordance with ISO
7195. The reason is that the 1993 revision of ISO 7195 referenced in
TS-R-1 is inconsistent with the ANSI N14.1 requirements, and there has
been a delay in publishing a new revision which harmonizes the two
standards.
Discussion. Two commenters supported RSPA's position to make only
minimal changes to the regulation of uranium hexafluoride. While the
commenters did not support the inclusion of industry consensus
standards in regulations, they did support RSPA's recognition of the
compatibility of ISO 7195 with ANSI N14.1.
One commenter disagreed that the thermal test should be required
for domestic shipments of cylinders containing natural or depleted
UF₆ given how extremely unlikely it would be for these
cylinders to encounter thermal conditions similar to those of the
hypothetical accident conditions and the safety basis for imposing such
a requirement is questionable. The commenter referenced USEC's study
``Probabilistic Safety Evaluation of 48-inch Loaded Depleted and
Natural UF₆ Cylinders Involved in the ST-1 Regulatory
Fire.'' The commenter noted the study of North American shipments of
the 48-inch cylinders showed the expected frequency of occurrence of
the regulatory fire resulting in cylinder rupture was extremely low,
ranging from 1,800 to 29,000 years, depending on the mode of shipment.
Another commenter stated that large quantities of depleted
UF₆ (about 60,000 Type 48G packages filled with
UF₆ tails) are presently in storage. Furthermore, the DOE
issued the ``Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for
Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted
Uranium Hexafluoride'' on April 23, 1999. The document considered the
environmental impacts, benefits, costs, and institutional and
programmatic needs associated with the management and use of
approximately 700,000 metric tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride. In
the Record of Decision for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted
Uranium Hexafluoride, a decision has been made to convert the depleted
UF₆ inventory to depleted uranium oxide for use, storage and
disposal, as necessary. Approximately 4,700 cylinders of depleted
UF₆ at one facility will need to be transported to a
conversion facility. The commenter noted that if the proposed
requirements for thermal protection are incorporated into the HMR for
the depleted uranium hexafluoride cylinders, costs for overpacking and
transporting these cylinders will increase substantially without any
demonstrated additional safety benefit. The commenter recommended that
the current HMR requirements for cylinders of depleted UF₆
be retained for domestic transportation for a period of five years.
Although the predicted frequency of occurrence of a fire resulting
in a cylinder rupture is arguably low, when considering the potential
increase in societal risks resulting from transport accidents involving
fire and the long-term benefits ensuing from international radioactive
material transport harmonization resulting from requiring thermal tests
for packages designed to contain UF₆, we believe
requirements for the thermal tests for domestic shipments are
necessary.
One commenter stated the proposed revisions to modify the packaging
requirements for uranium hexafluoride would relax the current
requirement that a fissile material package must be designed, or the
contents limited, so that a single package would be critically safe if
water were to leak into the containment vessel. The commenter suggests
the proposed regulations would provide an exception whereby a single
fissile UF₆ package does not have to be shown to be
subcritical under the assumption that there is water inside the
containment system as long as certain conditions are met. The commenter
concluded that given the potential serious consequences of a
criticality accident, this proposed revision should not be considered
or adopted in the absence of better justification and analysis. We
disagree. Although this new section of the IAEA regulations (Paragraph
677(b)) allows UF₆ packages to be evaluated without
considering the in-leakage of water into the containment system if the
packages satisfy certain specified conditions

[[Page 3645]]

described above in the Discussion section, this is not a relaxation of
previous regulatory requirements, rather, it is an enumeration of
existing regulatory agency practices.
Issue 7: Air Transport Requirements
Background. TS-R-1 has introduced two new concepts for the air
transport of radioactive material: the Type C package (paragraphs 230,
667-670, 730, 734-737) and Low Dispersible Material (LDM). Type C
packages are designed to withstand severe accident conditions
associated with air transport without loss of containment or
significant increase in external radiation levels. The LDM is a
material exception to these new air transport standards that is granted
based on a material's limited radiation hazard and low dispersibility.
If qualified as LDM, material in quantities that would otherwise
require a Type C package could continue to be transported by aircraft
in a Type B package. U.S. regulations do not contain a Type C package
or LDM category, but do have specific requirements for the air
transport of plutonium (10 CFR 71.64 and 71.74). These specific NRC
requirements for air transport of plutonium will continue to apply.
The Type C requirements apply to all radionuclides packaged for air
transport that contain a total activity value above 3,000 A₁
or 100,000 A₂, whichever is less, for special form material,
or above 3,000 A₂ for all other radioactive material. Below
these thresholds, Type B packages may be used in air transport. The
Type C package performance requirements are significantly more
stringent than those for Type B packages. For example, a 90-meter per
second (m/s) impact test is required instead of the 9-meter drop test.
A 60-minute fire test is required instead of the 30-minute for Type B
packages. These stringent tests are expected to result in package
designs that will survive more severe aircraft accidents than Type B
package designs.
The LDM specification was added in TS-R-1 to account for
radioactive materials (package contents) that have inherently limited
dispersibility, solubility, and radiation levels. The test requirements
for LDM to demonstrate limited dispersibility, and leachability are a
subset of the Type C package requirements (90-m/s impact and 60-minute
thermal test) with an added solubility test, and must be performed on
the material without packaging. The LDM must also have an external
radiation level below 10 mSv/h (1 rem/hr) at 3 meters. Specific
acceptance criteria are established for evaluating the performance of
the material during and after the tests (less than 100 A₂ in
gaseous or particulate form of less than 100 micrometer aerodynamic
equivalent diameter and less than 100 A₂ in solution). These
stringent performance and acceptance requirements are intended to
ensure that these materials can continue to be transported safely in
Type B packages aboard aircraft. LDM must be certified as such by the
Competent Authority (Paragraphs 803, 804, 828, 830).
In 1996, the NRC communicated to the IAEA that the NRC did not
oppose the IAEA adoption of the newly created Type C packaging
standards (letter dated May 31, 1996, from James M. Taylor, EDO, NRC,
to A. Bishop, President, Atomic Energy Control Board, Ottawa, Canada).
However, Mr. Taylor stated in the letter that, to be consistent with
United States law, any plutonium air transport to, within or over the
United States will be subject to the more rigorous U.S. packaging
standards.
A commenter to our 1999 ANPRM asserted that the testing criteria
for Type C packages are inadequate. For example, the commenter
questioned the rigorousness of the testing described in TS-R-1,
indicating that the minimum acceptable impact speed should be increased
to at least 129 m/s, as was mandated by Congress. Several commenters
stated that it is unclear what the differences are between a Type B and
Type C package and that the definitions should be clarified. Several
commenters supported the addition of the term LDM and recommended its
incorporation into the HMR. Finally, one commenter suggested that the
new concept of LDM was introduced to offset the problems encountered in
developing a Type C package. The commenter further asserted that the
nuclear industry would attempt to certify reprocessed fuel known as MOX
as LDM. The commenter believed there are significant safety
implications regarding the movement of these substances via
transportation by air and very strongly opposed any adoption of
requirements in this area.
According to the DOT and NRC MOU, the NRC has responsibility for
matters concerning packagings for fissile and greater-than-Type-A
quantities of radioactive material. The NRC is not adopting the
concepts of Type C packages or LDM at this time. In accordance with the
NRC position, RSPA is not adopting the IAEA standards for Type C
packaging or LDM in this final rule.
Discussion. All commenters supported the proposal not to adopt the
IAEA standards for Type C packaging or Low Dispersible Material.
Therefore, as proposed in the NPRM, we are not adopting the IAEA
standard for Type C packaging or LDM.
Issue 8: Fissile Material Package and Transport Requirements
Background. Under the MOU between DOT and NRC, the NRC establishes
the packaging requirements for the transport of fissile radioactive
material, including excepted fissile material (i.e., fissile material
which may be transported as if it were non-fissile Class 7
(radioactive) material). In February 1997, the NRC published an
emergency final rule (62 FR 5913, February 10, 1997) to amend 10 CFR 71
with respect to the regulations for shipping small quantities of
fissile material. This rule was issued in response to a regulatory
defect in the fissile material exemption regulations in Sec. 71.53 of
10 CFR identified by an NRC licensee.
Based on the public comments on the emergency final rule, the NRC
contracted with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to perform a
thorough analysis of the possible hazards involved and to provide
recommendations. In July 1998, the NRC published ORNL's conclusions as
NUREG/CR-5342, entitled ``Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile-
Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses Within 10 CFR Part
71.'' Based on the research and recommendations of this report, the NRC
in its NPRM to harmonize 10 CFR 71 with TS-R-1, proposed several
changes to its requirements for fissile exemptions, which were
reiterated in Sec. 173.453 of our NPRM. As a result of comments
received by the NRC to the proposed wording in its NPRM, it has made
several modifications in its final rule, and we have adopted those
changes in this final rule. For further information the reader is
directed to the NRC's discussion of Issue 16 in its final rule.
In its NPRM, the NRC also proposed the introduction of a Type B(DP)
package, to be certified for use and used both to transport and to
store spent nuclear fuel. Such a package would be issued an NRC
Certificate of Compliance approving the design of a spent fuel (fissile
material) transportation package, in accordance with the requirements
of subpart I of 10 CFR 71, and an NRC Certificate of Compliance
approving the design of a spent fuel storage cask, in accordance with
the requirements of subpart L of 10 CFR 72. To maintain consistency
between the NRC and DOT's regulations, we proposed wording in subpart I
of 49 CFR 173, in our NPRM in which the concept of a

[[Page 3646]]

Type B(DP) was introduced. As a result of comments received by the NRC
to the proposed wording in its NPRM, it has decided to withdraw
reference to a Type B(DP) package in its final rule. Consequently, we
have revised the text in this final rule to remove references to a Type
B(DP) package.
As a result of the publication of our ANPRM, several commenters
asserted that the TS-R-1 requirements for conducting criticality
analyses for fissile materials being shipped by air required
clarification. The commenters stated that a guidance note should be
issued and included in TS-R-2 (now referred to as TS-G-1.1) when
published and the HMR should reflect this clarification. Although we
have no authority to make unilateral changes in IAEA documents, we
stated we would analyze problems in performing criticality analyses for
the shipment of fissile materials by air as they arise, in coordination
with the NRC, and the possibility of issuing a guidance document would
be considered if it appeared to be an appropriate means to address any
problems encountered.
Other commenters stated DOT should provide clear guidance regarding
the requirements for obtaining U.S. Competent Authority Certificates
for air transport of fissile materials prior to formal harmonization of
TS-R-1 and the HMR. However, the NRC and DOT did not propose to adopt
TS-R-1 provisions for Type C packages or Low Dispersible Radioactive
Material (LDRM). The practical consequence of this is that RSPA's
Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, as U.S. Competent Authority, does
not intend to issue Certificates of Competent Authority for Type C
packages or LDRM. Other Certificates of Competent Authority for the
international transport of fissile materials by air will be issued in
accordance with Sec.Sec. 173.471 and 173.473.
Accordingly, in this rulemaking we are: (1) Adopting the NRC
fissile material exemption provisions in Sec. 173.453; (2) removing the
definition for ``fissile material, controlled shipment,''; (3) revising
Sec.Sec. 173.457 and 173.459 to remove the references to ``fissile
material, controlled shipment''; and (4) establishing requirements for
non-exclusive use and exclusive use shipments of fissile material
packages based on TS-R-1 package and conveyance CSI limits, since we
feel that this will considerably simplify the transport of fissile
material packages, while maintaining appropriate criticality
safeguards.
Discussion. We received four comments concerning fissile material
package and transport requirements regarding the fissile material
exceptions in the proposed Sec. 173.453. In accordance with the MOU, we
ensured that the comments had been addressed by the NRC review and we
have incorportated the revised NRC language for fissile material
exceptions into Sec. 173.543 in this final rule. It should be noted
that the final rule concerning fissile material exceptions applies to
domestic situations only. International transport concerning fissile
material exceptions will also need to comply with the requirements of
the International Civil Aviation Organization's Technical Instructions
(ICAO), the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) or
Canadian regulations, as applicable.
A commenter stated that the wording of proposed Sec. 173.417(c) is
confusing as it is presently written since the 1A2 steel drum/Type A
combination packaging is not a Type B packaging and then suggested that
``Type B packaging'' be changed to ``packaging for fissile material.''
We agree and the change has been incorporated into this final rule.
Issue 9: Transitional Requirements
Background. Transitional requirements typically authorize: (1)
Continued use of existing package designs and packagings already
fabricated, although some additional requirements may be imposed; (2)
completion of packagings that are in the process of being fabricated or
that may be fabricated within a given time period after the regulatory
change; and (3) limited modifications to package designs and packagings
without the need to demonstrate full compliance with the revised
regulations, provided that the modifications do not significantly
affect the safety of the package.
Each transition from one edition of the IAEA regulations to another
(and the corresponding revisions of the NRC and DOT regulations)
included transitional provisions. The transitional provisions in TS-R-
1, the latest version, are found in paragraphs 815-818 of that
document. Although provisions for continued use of packages and special
form sources previously approved in accordance with the 1973 and 1985
editions of the IAEA regulations remain virtually unchanged, TS-R-1
does not provide transitional provisions for packages approved under
the 1967 edition of the IAEA regulations.
The TS-R-1 transitional provisions will have several impacts. The
primary impact is that under TS-R-1 provisions, Safety Series No. 6
(1967) approved packagings will no longer be authorized. The second
impact is that fabrication of packagings designed and approved under
Safety Series No. 6 1985 (As Amended 1990) must be completed by a
specified date.
In TS-R-1, packages approved for use based on Safety Series No. 6
(1973/1973A revisions) will continue to be authorized for use and can
continue to be used through their design life, provided they meet the
following conditions: (1) Multilateral approval is obtained, as
applicable; (2) TS-R-1 quality assurance requirements are adhered to;
(3) TS-R-1 A₁ and A₂ activity values are used;
and, (4) if applicable, approval for air transport of fissile
radioactive material is obtained. While existing packagings are still
authorized, no new packagings may be fabricated to this design
standard. Should a safety issue associated with the package be
identified, this packaging will need to meet all of the applicable
requirements of TS-R-1. In summary, a packaging designed to Safety
Series No. 6 (1973/1973A) may continue to be used.
In similar fashion, TS-R-1 states that those packages approved for
use based on Safety Series No. 6 (1985/1985A revisions) may continue to
be used, provided the packaging meets the following conditions: (1) TS-
R-1 quality assurance requirements, (2) TS-R-1 A₁ and
A₂ activity values, and, (3) if applicable, approval for air
transport of fissile radioactive material. After December 31, 2003, use
of these packages may continue under multilateral approval if
applicable. Should a safety issue associated with the package be
identified, the packaging will need to meet all of the applicable
requirements of TS-R-1. Additionally, use of this packaging will end on
December 31, 2006. Beginning January 1, 2007, all packages shipped
internationally will be required to meet TS-R-1 packaging approval
requirements.
The NRC has stated in its final rule that it believes that packages
approved under the 1967 edition of Safety Series No. 6 lack the
enhanced safety features that have been incorporated in the packages
approved under later revisions of the regulations. NRC cites the fact
that more recent packages are required to be more leakage resistant,
and that all packages presently approved by the NRC must satisfy the
pertinent quality assurance requirements described in subpart H of 10
CFR 71. A more complete list of enhancements to package safety
requirements since the 1967 IAEA regulations is found in the NRC NPRM
(67 FR 21406), and includes: (1) The introduction of the

[[Page 3647]]

A1/A2 system; (2) standards for defining acceptable containment system
performance; (3) the immersion test for Type A fissile material
packages; (4) maximum normal operating pressure; (5) the definition of
appropriate test parameters for evaluation of the package under normal
and accident condition tests; and (6) quality assurance requirements
for the design, fabrication, and use of Type B packages. NRC has also
noted that the elimination of packages approved against the 1967 IAEA
regulations first became public knowledge in 1996, with the IAEA's
publication of ST-1 (later renamed TS-R-1). The NRC is therefore
phasing out all of its package design certificates based on the 1967
IAEA Regulations.
In its analysis, NRC considered that designs for 1967-based
packages would fall into one of five categories: (1) Package designs
that may meet current safety standards with no modifications but have
until now not been submitted to the NRC for review against these
standards; (2) package designs that can be shown to meet current safety
standards after relatively minor design changes; (3) spent fuel casks
certified to the 1967 standards, for which stringent quality assurance
requirements for design and fabrication did apply; (4) package designs
that cannot be shown to meet current safety standards; and (5) packages
for which the safety performance of the package design under the
current safety standards is not known. NRC believes that it is
appropriate to phase out use of designs that fall into the last two
categories.
DOT Specification 6L, 6M, 20WC and 21WC packages are packages that
have not been shown to satisfy packaging requirements of the 1973,
1985, or 1996 IAEA radioactive material transport regulations. In
accordance with the decision by the NRC to phase out packages approved
against the 1967 IAEA Regulations, and recognizing that under the MOU
between the two agencies that NRC has cognizance over domestic use of
Type B and fissile material packages, we proposed in our NPRM that as
of the effective date of this final rule no new manufacture of packages
of these types be allowed, and that all use of these packages cease as
of two years following the effective date of this final rule.
In this final rule, to provide more time for affected parties to
adjust to the new requirements and in consultation with the NRC, we
have doubled the transition period to four years from the effective
date of the rule, and have set the effective date to be nine months
after publication of this final rule in the Federal Register. Thus,
from the date of publication of this final rule, affected parties will
have approximately five years to establish appropriate packaging
alternatives.
It has been known since the publication of IAEA's ST-1 in 1996 that
packages designed in accordance with the 1967 IAEA regulations would no
longer be allowed for international transport. Moreover, NRC made clear
that it was considering adopting this restriction for domestic
transport. Thus, by the end of the five year period affected parties
will have had approximately 12 years to adapt to the domestic
elimination of these packages.
Discussion. Commenters to the NPRM generally stated that some type
of transitional arrangements should be provided in the HMR to clarify
how packages manufactured under earlier versions of Safety Series 6
will be phased out, and how and if these packages may be re-validated.
One commenter suggested that we should provide a transition period
prior to the full adoption of TS-R-1 that would provide shippers and
carriers the flexibility to make shipments of radioactive materials
under the current HMR requirements (equivalent to Safety Series 6) or
under TS-R-1. Several commenters stated that for domestic shipments, we
should provide a one-year transition period for complete implementation
of the TS-R-1 regulations. Other commenters suggested that we
incorporate the following statement into the HMR: ``Packages that have
been prepared for transport prior to (five-year effective date) may be
offered for transport provided that the labeling, marking, and
placarding provisions of the regulations in effect at time of shipment
are complied with.''
We agree that shippers and carriers will need time to adjust to the
changes in the regulations introduced in this final rule, and that
there should be a sufficiently long transition period for affected
shippers to adapt to the removal of the DOT Specification packages.
Accordingly, as we mentioned earlier, for most of the new requirements
we are delaying the effective date of this rule to one year after its
publication in the Federal Register. In addition, for reasons discussed
below and in Section D, ``Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order
13272, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures,'' we are
substantially lengthening the transition period before use of the DOT
Specification packages is prohibited, from the two years originally
proposed to four years after the effective date of this final rule.
Thus, the regulated community will essentially have five years from the
date of publication of this final rule before all use of the DOT
Specification packages must cease, unless they have been shown to
satisfy current performance requirements and are certified by the NRC.
A commenter supported the overall intent of the proposed
modifications. As the number of international shipments increases, a
common set of regulations will enhance the safety of these shipments.
However, the commenter stated that DOT and NRC regulations should also
provide allowance for domestic shipments that are unique to the United
States. One example is the grandfathering of shipping packages. The
commenter suggests that packages manufactured to the 1967 safety
standard should be allowed to continue in domestic service, unless a
safety problem is identified. The commenter stated that it is a small
business and has estimated that replacing the two-year old DOT
Specification 6L packages currently in use with newly-designed packages
will cost about $500,000.
Two commenters reiterated how important the grandfathering issue
pertaining to previously approved packages is to the future success of
their organization as well as other small businesses that routinely
transport Type B quantities of radioactive materials domestically. The
commenters questioned why some packages with proven safety records
would be phased out for domestic shipments in as little as two years
after the final rule is issued. They noted that significant resources
have been invested in transportation packages designed specifically for
certain applications, and these packages will no longer be authorized
for use should the regulations change as proposed. The commenters did
not support the IAEA grandfathering provision for packages designed in
accordance with the 1967 standard when such package(s) are limited to
domestic-only shipments.
A primary concern of the commenter was with regard to transporting
iridium-192, which is used for industrial radiography, and which is an
integral part of the oil and gas pipeline industry, commercial and
military aircraft safety maintenance programs, and ship construction
and repair. The commenter stated that his company is the only domestic
commercial source of this radioisotope for industry. The commenter
cited extensive shipping experience using the GE-8500 transport
container, without incident, for the past 23 years and stated that if
the proposed regulations are adopted, none of these containers will be
available for use and

[[Page 3648]]

there are no other containers available in the world that meet the
proposed new requirements for domestic use within the United States.
The commenter estimated that the cost of replacing these transport
containers with ones meeting the proposed regulations, and having these
packages reviewed and accepted by the NRC, would be at over a million
dollars; and disregarding cost, it is unlikely the NRC would approve
any new containers before the implementation date. Therefore, adoption
of the new regulations would eliminate the company's ability to provide
a domestic supply of critical radioisotope for both commercial and
military applications and would dictate that only foreign companies
could import this material.
A second concern expressed by the commenter was that the proposed
rules would essentially remove from service any and all containers that
could be used to transport isotopes from the Department of Energy's
Advanced Test Reactor for medical or industrial use, and that in order
to use this rare domestic reactor source for isotope production a new
transportation package would have to be constructed that would meet the
Safety Series 6, 1985 criteria. The commenter further stated that the
time and cost associated with the design, manufacture, testing, and
approval of such a container would likely exceed the financial ability
of the commenter's company.
The commenter recommended currently approved DOT specification
packages (such as welded special form sources inside a Type A package,
within a 20WC overpack) should continue to be approved for domestic
shipments. The commenter stated that the cost associated with phasing
out transportation packages that have been in use safely for decades
cannot be justified solely on the basis of harmonizing the regulations
with the IAEA Transportation Safety Standards (TS-R-1). The commenter
further recommended that DOT accept Competent Authority Certificates
for foreign made Type B packages without requiring revalidation by a
U.S. Competent Authority. The commenter stated that the basis for this
suggestion is that revalidation by the U.S. of foreign made (Type B(U))
packages for which another country has already issued a Competent
Authority Certificate in accordance with TS-R-1 is a redundancy that
provides no additional benefit.
We disagree. For safety reasons it has long been NRC and DOT policy
that revalidations of foreign package design approvals should be made
for import and export, or for domestic use of such packages, only after
we have assured ourselves that the packages do in fact meet our safety
standards.
Another commenter focused on the proposal to eliminate the
manufacture and use of all packages manufactured to IAEA 1967 Safety
Series No. 6 requirements used for shipment of Type B quantities of
special form radioactive material, two years after the effective date
of the regulation. Specifically, the commenter referenced DOT Type 7A
packages fitted with a metal jacket and contained in a DOT
Specification 20WC overpack, and overpacks manufactured pursuant to NRC
Certificate of Compliance (CoC) 6280. The commenter stated that after
these packages are prohibited the only means of certifying new
transportation packages (either new designs or recertifications of 1967
designs) would be via new Certificates of Compliance issued by the NRC,
and there are reasons why the proposal should not be incorporated into
regulation. The supporting rationale for the commenter's position can
be described under five broad headings; these are discussed in detail
below: (1) Increased costs; (2) safeguard/security issues; (3) safety
record of 1967 Specification packages; (4) unnecessary harmonization;
(5) transition period.
(1) Increased costs: The commenter stated that if the proposal is
applied to domestic shipments, it is likely to have far different
effects than those intended including unacceptably high costs for many
small but important business entities, thus either substantially
weakening firms or literally driving them out of business with no ready
successors. The commenter suggested that there is also a potential for
substantial delay in approving new designs or recertifying existing
designs. The commenter's organization typically makes approximately 200
shipments per year for its operations and does not own any other
overpacks suitable for its shipments. The commenter stated that there
are between 100 and 200 20WC Specification containers in use in the
United States today, in addition to the 15 owned and used by the
commenter, and there are probably between 25 and 50 active NRC-approved
1967 containers in service, in addition to the two owned by the
commenter's organization. If these estimates are accurate, the
commenter asserts that the overall effect of implementation of the
proposal to eliminate use of packages designed to the 1967 IAEA
standards would be on the order of 10 to 15 times that projected by the
commenter's organization alone.
The commenter stated that it manufactures some 1000 devices and
ships them in either NRC CoC or DOT Specification containers built to
the 1967 standards in current use throughout the United States, and it
is certain that under the proposed regulations at least two CoCs would
have to be obtained, either to requalify existing containers or to
construct new ones meeting the TS-R-1 requirements. The commenter
asserts that it is also possible that as many as a dozen or more CoCs
would have to be obtained, depending on the NRC's licensing
flexibility.
The commenter estimated that for each required CoC, it will cost at
least $500,000 and take upwards of two years to design, test and obtain
regulatory approval from the NRC for the corresponding new or
requalified package. Thus, the commenter provided the following cost
estimates: (1) Redesign/reapproval would range between $1 million and
$6 million for the commenter's organization; (2) new overpack
construction would cost about $50,000 each, with anticipated total
costs of between $600,000 and $750,000; (3) the value of existing
overpacks, with a per-unit depreciated value of about $30,000 apiece,
would be lost, for a total of approximately $500,000. Therefore, the
commenter estimated its overall cost of compliance to be $2-8 million.
The commenter concluded that given this cost estimate compared to the
commenter's organization's annual revenues and net worth, to proceed
would be a sufficiently questionable economic decision that the company
would, instead, probably close its doors and go out of business.
Upon consulting with the NRC, we believe that the estimated costs
for certifying existing packagings or new designs against current
requirements will be far less than the commenter estimated, on the
order of $40,000 to $390,000 for each package design, or an estimated
$120,000 to $1.17 million total (if complete redesigns consolidate
content requirements to three designs). Individual packaging rework or
full construction costs are further estimated at $200 to $50,000 each.
The commenter also stated that if the devices they service cannot
be legally shipped, the value of these devices will be largely or
totally lost from the time they need to be re-sourced or refurbished.
At an average cost of approximately $50,000 per unit, this would mean
an aggregate cost on the order of $50 million, distributed among
several hundred customers. Since we believe a cost-effective solution
will be

[[Page 3649]]

readily achievable, the value of the devices will not be lost, so we
feel that this cost estimate is moot.
The commenter also stated that the organization's devices, which
were built to be shipped in DOT Specification packages, contained
source shielding and housing containers that were built under Quality
Assurance standards that were not governed by the NRC's QA program in
10 CFR Part 71, Sec.Sec. 71.101-71.135. As a result, the documentation
or ``QA Paper'' for these devices may not conform to NRC QA
requirements even though actual design, procurement and construction
standards may have been identical or equivalent to NRC standards.
Therefore, the commenter stated, it would not be possible to document
the ``pedigree'' of such components as the shielding and the housing of
these devices, which are integral to the device but technically part of
the ``packaging'' as defined in NRC and DOT regulations (10 CFR 71.4
and Sec. 173.403). Therefore, unless the NRC either amends or relaxes
its interpretation of its QA requirements, the commenter suggests it
likely that NRC will not accept packages initially designed and
manufactured to DOT specifications. In that event, according to the
commenter, the cost of compliance would rise dramatically, as one of
three scenarios would follow:
a. Transportation containers weighing upwards of 60,000 pounds
would have to be designed that could transport existing devices without
taking any credit for the radioactive shielding or structural housing
surrounding the source, which would require special highway
authorizations and increase costs. The commenter estimated that
designing, licensing and constructing such a container, with dedicated
tractor and specially designed trailer, would cost upwards of
$2,250,000. The cost of succeeding containers, each with its own
trailer, would approach $1,000,000 apiece. Shipping costs for these
containers would also be an order of magnitude higher than those for
current devices ($35,000-$40,000 vs. $3000 per trip now). Even then,
the transportation rig would be unable to access numerous locations
that can now be reached, thus running the risk that some sources would
be stranded. Therefore, this alternative, while technically feasible,
is physically cumbersome and sufficiently more costly than current
shipping modes that many existing customers would be tempted to buy and
ship new devices rather than have existing ones re-sourced or hauled
away for decommissioning.
b. Sources could be transferred at the customer's site from the
existing device to a specially designed ``transportation container,''
using a portable hot cell transported to the customer's site. This
option has not been fully cost estimated because it appears to have
almost insuperable obstacles. First, most of the devices are fabricated
with welded end-caps, in order to prevent tampering by unauthorized
persons. As a result, removing the source is a difficult, potentially
high-exposure process when conducted in the field. Second, setting up a
hot cell is an unavoidably expensive business--on the order of $300,000
per installation. Even if devices were designed with screw-on end caps
(and some are) and special shipping containers were designed to operate
with them--thus substantially lessening the labor and radioactive
exposure associated with a transfer--it would still be necessary to set
up a portable hot cell. This alternative is prohibitively expensive
except in extreme conditions. It is also inconsistent with the as low
as reasonable achievable (ALARA) goal of minimizing occupational
exposures to radiation.
c. Existing sources in existing devices manufactured to DOT
specifications would become unshippable in existing packages, and their
value would be lost as of the time their sources next need to be
removed. There are nearly 1,000 of these devices in service throughout
the U.S., so the cost to customers, at an average value of $50,000,
would be $50 million. The commenter regarded this scenario as the most
likely, since the cost of the other two scenarios is likely to deter
market entrants.
As a result, the commenter stated that the actual total numbers of
20WC overpacks and the devices shipped in them are on the order of 10
to 15 times its own. In that event, the commenter stated that the
industry-wide economic costs projected can be extrapolated as follows:

Cost of design, testing and licensing of new designs: $10,000,000 to
$90,000,000
Costs of construction of new overpacks: $6,250,000 to $12,500,000
Loss of value of existing overpacks: $5,000,000 to $10,000,000
Loss of value of existing devices: $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000.

Finally, the commenter stated that numerous participants in this
market sector are small entities within the meaning of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 9 601 et seq., and the draft Regulatory
Analysis does not account for this fact. The commenter stated that both
the NRC and DOT have mis-assessed the impact of their proposals on
small entities protected by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. In any
event, the commenter suggests that the NRC's characterization of
nuclear power plant operators as the typical type of entity affected by
the proposal under discussion is incomplete. In addition, the commenter
states that affected entities include hospitals, research facilities,
blood banks, colleges and the like, numerous of which fall within the
size or income categories of small entities.
We do not agree. We find it implausible, given activity levels that
are currently routinely transported in legal weight vehicles, that
these devices will require overweight vehicle transport. Therefore, we
discount this cost estimate. We agree that the option of setting up
satellite hot cells to perform refurbishment may not be a cost-
effective viable option; however we do not rule out the possibility
free market initiatives could make this a desired alternative. We do
not believe there will be a loss of value to devices currently in use,
since packages that conform to current safety standards will be found
to replace those being phased out.
We note that the fact that a packaging may lack complete QA
documentation, although ``the actual design, procurement and
construction standards may have been identical or equivalent to NRC
standards,'' is an important reason for upgrading the packaging, or for
replacing it with a packaging that can be shown to satisfy current
safety requirements. Only when and if it can be shown that the design,
procurement and construction standards were in fact equivalent to
current requirements can we have confidence that such is the case.
Assuming conservatively that on the order of 10 to 20 new package
designs for the 20WC would need to be approved by the NRC, that from 50
to 100 replacements for the 20WC packagings would need to be
manufactured, using typical cost estimates from the NRC of $300,000 to
$390,000 for design, testing, and licensing, manufacturing costs of
$50,000 per manufactured package, and the commenter's estimate of
$30,000 per package for depreciation costs, we believe that a
conservative estimate of the industry-wide cost can be projected as
follows:

Cost of design, testing and licensing of new designs: $3,000,000 to
$7,800,000
Costs of construction of new overpacks: $2,500,000 to $5,000,000
Loss of value of existing overpacks: $1,500,000 to $3,000,000

[[Page 3650]]

Estimated total cost to industry: $7,000,000 to 15,800,000.
Therefore, we conclude that the realistic costs are relatively modest
and we believe the commenter has overestimated total industry-wide
costs resulting from the proposal by almost two orders of magnitude.
With respect to the assertion by the commenter that numerous
participants in this market sector are small entities, we received only
three comments regarding the economic cost of removing the 1967
Specification Packages from service. In addition, NRC staff found that
only 15 of 127 NRC licensed quality assurance programs belong to small
entities, and that of these, only 2 or 3 would be appreciably affected
by the elimination of the 1967 based packages. They concluded from
these data that this requirement would not cause a significant economic
impact for a substantial number of small entities.
(2) Safeguard/security issues: The commenter stated that at some
point in time every device containing a radioactive source needs either
a fresh source, refurbishment, or retirement. The commenter also stated
the proposal would make devices and sources now shipped in currently
approved packages not legally transportable in any currently licensed
container, thus creating hundreds of sites with thousands of orphan
sources that could no longer be used, could not be shipped for orderly
disposition, and would have to be maintained and safeguarded
indefinitely. For instance, one obsolete type of device distributed
under the aegis of the former AEC is known to be located in at least
five high schools and 28 colleges or universities around the country,
awaiting shipment for decommissioning. According to the commenter,
under the proposed regulations these would then be orphaned. Therefore,
the commenter asserts that facility managements, in coordination with
state governments (in Agreement States) or the NRC, must then store
them safely, indefinitely, keeping them physically secure, protecting
personnel against radiological hazards, and guarding against security
hazards, such as theft by terrorists.
To make matters worse, the commenter suggests that as long as these
devices are unable to be shipped, no entity possessing them can conduct
a final radiation survey and terminate its license. Every such licensee
must remain indefinitely on NRC or Agreement State rolls. In the
meantime, the commenter asserts that any closure of any facility
containing such a device, or any sale or other transfer or conversion,
becomes virtually impossible since the current licensee must either
remain on the license for the device or transfer it to another
qualified potential licensee. This not only greatly complicates normal
real estate transactions but basically freezes any facility in its
current use and ownership indefinitely. The commenter raised the
possibility that one collateral effect of the pending proposal may be
that it constitutes a major federal action significantly affecting the
human environment, thereby requiring a full-blown Environmental Impact
Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4331
et seq.
We do not agree, especially given an effective five-year transition
period from publication of the final rule, that the loss of
authorization to use 1967 Specification packages could result in
thousands of sources becoming orphaned. For example, a situation exists
where non-licensees find themselves to be in possession of radioactive
sources that they did not seek to possess, at hundreds of sites. Even
with no transition time, the sources will not immediately become
orphaned.
Additionally, we believe that five years will provide a sufficient
transition period, in the near future, as an interim transport
methodology for those devices that require refurbishment, repair,
relocation etc., or if the licensee is undergoing a license termination
evolution, while the concurrent process of designing, constructing, and
approving packages, in accordance with current safety standards will
allow sufficient time for an orderly phase out of the 1967
Specification packages.
(3) Safety record of 1967 Specification packages: The commenter
stated that the packages designed and built to 1967 specifications and
properly maintained have an excellent safety record, and that neither
agency alleges any safety problem with their design, which was
subjected to 30-foot drop, fire and immersion tests by Sandia
Laboratory in 1968. The commenter added that both the NRC and DOT
concede in their rulemaking notices that their proposal to eliminate
1967 Specification containers from domestic use does not rest on a
health-and-safety foundation and that current container regulations
provide adequate safety.
The commenter is correct in stating the packages were subjected to
drop, fire, and immersion tests. However, concerning the 1967
Specification packages, since there is often no quality assurance
program element, inadequate testing to international contemporary
consensus standards, and no stand-alone safety analyses report, the
packages, unless recertified to current standards, need to be
recognized as being outdated and obsolete.
We also agree there is no current safety issue that would require
the immediate elimination of the 1967 Specification packages. However
we believe there will be an increase in the level of safety resulting
from adopting the proposed regulations, and this increased level of
safety is provided at a reasonable cost. Therefore, we are adopting the
proposed elimination of the DOT Specification packagings, with a
modified implementation time of four years from the effective date of
this rule, after a one year period between publication of the final
rule in the Federal Register and the effective date.
(4) Unnecessary harmonization: The commenter stated that neither
the NRC nor DOT has advanced a substantial argument, other than
consistency with IAEA requirements (which are not binding under U.S.
law), for compelling the elimination of these containers from continued
use in U.S. domestic commerce. The commenter added it is useful to
incorporate technical advances in equipment into regulations, but not
sensible to require costly change with respect to adequate existing
equipment absent significant offsetting safety or other statutory-
policy justifications. The commenter also stated that IAEA
requirements, or regulations, are not self-implementing inasmuch as
they do not bind the United States, or any member State, unless
ratified or accepted by that State's government. Indeed, IAEA
recognizes in TS-R-1 that national-level departures from its provisions
may be ``necessary for solely domestic purposes'' and DOT is only
obligated to ensure only that U.S. domestic regulations are
``consistent with'' international standards, and then only ``to the
extent practicable.'' Finally, the commenter stated there is neither a
tangible safety benefit to be achieved nor a definable risk to be
avoided from the proposed elimination of 1967 Specification packages as
applied to domestic shipment of Type B quantities of special form
radioactive materials.
We agree that the IAEA regulations are not binding in the U.S.,
unless adopted, and have implemented exceptions when deemed necessary.
Since the old packages will be replaced by packages that will have
shown to conform to current safety standards, we believe elimination of
the 1967 specification packages will increase the level of
transportation safety.
(5) Transition period: The commenter urged the rulemaking be
modified so as to permit the indefinite continued use of

[[Page 3651]]

properly maintained existing packages built to 1967 IAEA Safety Series
No. 6 Specifications for the shipment of Type B quantities of special
form radioactive material within the United States. However, the
commenter stated any ``sunset'' deadline on use of any package design
being phased out under this proposal should permit its continued use
pending ultimate decision by the NRC on either re-certification of the
existing design or approval of a new design.
The commenter suggests that if a specific ``sunset'' date is
chosen, it should be significantly longer than the ones proposed by
either the NRC or DOT, which should agree on a common ``sunset'' date.
Due to the time necessary to design, fabricate, test and gain NRC
review of a new CoC design, the commenter asserts that the two-year
transition period proposed by DOT would cause a shipping hiatus even if
costs were not an issue.
We agree. Due to the reasons cited earlier, and after consultation
with the NRC, we are providing a nine month window from publication of
this final rule in the Federal Register to the effective date when it
becomes obligatory, and a four year transition period from the
effective date before use of the DOT specification packages is no
longer allowed. The total transition period from the publication of the
final rule to the date when these packages may no longer be used will
be approximately five years. This will increase the level of
transportation safety at an acceptable cost, provide a reasonable, low-
impact solution taking all concerns into consideration, and allow a
sufficiently long transition period for introduction of replacement
packages.
This five-year transition period is in addition to the time that it
can reasonably be assumed that it became general industry knowledge
that the use of these packagings would be eliminated domestically. The
IAEA ``Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material''
have provided a basis for U.S. radioactive material transport
regulations for decades. Paragraph 713 of the 1985 Edition (As Amended
1990) of Safety Series No. 6 stated ``Packagings manufactured to a
design approved by the competent authority under the provisions of the
1967 Edition of these Regulations may continue to be used, subject to
multilateral approval.''
The 1996 Edition of the IAEA regulations (TS-R-1) completely
eliminated any transitional arrangements for the use of packagings
manufactured to a design meeting the requirements of the 1967 Edition
of the IAEA regulations. As a consequence of this change, DOT notified
all registered users of the Certificate of Competent Authority USA/
5800/B for the use of the DOT Specification 20WC packaging for import
and export, including this commenter, that the 1996 IAEA regulations
had removed the transitional approval provisions for Type B packages
constructed in accordance with the 1967 Edition of the IAEA
regulations, and that therefore, users of DOT Specification 20WC
packaging would be required to show that their package meets the
performance criteria of the 1996 regulations or it would have to be
transported under a Special Arrangement when used for import or export.
This notification was made via written memoranda sent on each of
four different occasions, in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. These
memoranda further stated that no Special Arrangements were envisioned
after January 1, 2001, since the advent of this requirement would by
that time have already been public knowledge for several years.
Consequently, for those users who also used this packaging for
international shipments, these notifications, along with an effective
five-year transition period from the publication of this final rule,
will have provided an effective transition period of more than a decade
for elimination of the 20WC packaging.
Another commenter stated that DOT and NRC must recognize that while
IAEA standards generally have good technical bases, they are consensus
standards that do not necessarily consider the risk-informed,
performance-based aspects of regulations that we have developed in the
United States. Therefore, this commenter suggests that while most of
the IAEA standards should be incorporated into U.S. regulations, the
unique aspects of the U.S. regulations need to be considered. The
commenter agrees that the IAEA standards are appropriate for
international shipments, but believes that DOT and NRC regulations
should also provide allowance for domestic-only applications. This
would include for example, a grandfathering provision.
We believe that this rulemaking process is the appropriate forum
that takes into consideration the risk-informed, performance-based
aspects the commenter referenced, and that balances individual concerns
with the overall lack of clarity in the ability of these packages to
meet current safety standards. Therefore as discussed earlier, we have
decided to allow a transition period of four years from the effective
date of the rule, which is in turn set to nine months after publication
of the final rule in the Federal Register. This will result in an
effective five-year transition period from the date of the final rule
publication in the Federal Register.
Two commenters stated that the discontinuation of DOT specification
packages two years after the effective date of this rule has the
potential to impact the timely remediation and closure of U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) sites and the DOE has an excellent safety
record using DOT specification packages. Additionally, since
significant volumes of material (9,000 packages) are presently prepared
in specification packages, the commenter states that repackaging would
be time consuming, very costly and would increase the risk to workers
whenever it is required. Since it may take two to four years to
complete the design, construction, and certification processes to
replace these packages, the commenters asserted that the continued use
of these packages for five years after the effective date of the rule
would allow the DOE to complete many of its shipping campaigns without
initiating design, certification and production of new packagings, or
to do so in an orderly manner.
We agree. We believe that the two-year time frame was insufficient.
We have therefore, changed the transition period to four years from the
effective date of the rule, with a nine month effective date from final
rule publication in the Federal Register. This will allow an effective
five-year transition period from the date the rule is published in the
Federal Register, which would only require a slight acceleration of
remediation campaign activities.
Three commenters were concerned the separate DOT and NRC rulemaking
proposals had different effective implementation dates and they
encouraged DOT to work with the NRC to ensure a common effective date.
We agree. We have reached consensus with the NRC to implement a four-
year transition time, beginning at the effective date of the
rulemakings, with a nine month effective date from final rule
publication in the Federal Register. This change has been included
throughout this final rule as appropriate.
Two commenters supported the proposal to accept the IAEA
transitional requirements including the phase out of Type B
specification packages and the termination of authorization of Safety
Series 6 (1967) packages. The commenters stated that Specification
packages and Safety Series 6 (1967) packages have not been designed and

[[Page 3652]]

constructed according to standards where their continued use would be
consistent with the intent of the regulations. We agree, as discussed
above.
Two commenters stated that an issue that is overlooked in the
transition to a new regulation is the fact that recurrent training is
only required once every three years. Therefore, many organizations
only send their personnel to be ``DOT Trained'' every three years. It
may therefore take three years for the shippers to recognize that there
have been major changes in the regulation. The commenters recommended
that serious consideration be given to reducing the time for recurrent
training to one year or incorporating a three-year transition period
into the proposal, consistent with these training requirements.
We do not agree. The HMR (Sec. 172.702(b)) states * * * ``a hazmat
employee who performs any function subject to the requirements of this
subchapter may not perform that function unless instructed in the
requirements of this subchapter that apply to that function.'' Our
position regarding all HMR changes is that if a new regulation is
adopted, or an existing regulation is changed, that relates to the
function performed by a hazmat employee, that hazmat employee must be
instructed in those new or revised function specific requirements
without regard to the timing of the three year training cycle (Docket
HM-222B, 61 FR 27169).
A commenter stated that during the transition phase when DOT
Specification packagings would still be authorized for use, the
proposed rule does not appear to specify the proper shipping name that
would apply for fissile material shipped in a DOT specification
packaging and the final rule should make clear what name should be used
during transition phase.
We agree. We consider that during the transition period, when a
non-fissile or fissile-excepted Type B quantity is transported
domestically in a 1967 DOT Specification package or in an NRC-approved
B( ) package, the proper shipping name and UN number ``Radioactive
material, Type B(U) package'' and ``UN2916'' may be used. Similarly,
during the transition period when a fissile Type B quantity is
transported in a 1967 DOT Specification package or in an NRC-approved
B( )F package, ``Radioactive material, Type B(U) package, fissile'' and
``UN3328'' may be used.
Issue 10: Other Changes
Background. We are requiring in Sec. 173.424 that the active
material in an instrument or article intended to be transported in an
excepted package be completely enclosed by the non-active components.
This is a requirement which appears in paragraph 517(c) of TS-R-1, and
is a change from the wording in Safety Series No. 6. It is intended to
enhance the safety of shipments of instruments or articles in excepted
packages by making it explicit that the radioactive contents in such an
instrument or article must be completely enclosed by the non-
radioactive material of which the instrument or article is constructed
in order to prevent release of the active contents under normal
conditions of transport.
Discussion. A commenter noted that the term ``completely enclosed''
is not defined in the NPRM. The commenter asked for clarification
regarding the exception provided in Sec. 173.424 regarding items that
are ``completely enclosed'' by non-radioactive components. The
commenter specifically asked whether items like smoke detectors, which
by necessity must have openings for smoke to enter the active volume,
would qualify for this exception. The commenter went on to explain that
smoke alarms contain a small amount of radioactive material, Americium-
241, which is embedded in a gold foil matrix within an ionization
chamber, and that the thin gold-americium foil is sandwiched between a
thicker silver backing and a palladium laminate. The laminate is thick
enough to completely retain the radioactive material, but thin enough
to allow the alpha particles to pass.
The commenter requested that RSPA clarify in the final rule that an
instrument is not required to provide an air-tight enclosure for the
radiation source in order to be considered ``completely enclosed.''
Rather, where the radioactive material is enclosed in or forms a
component part of an instrument or other manufactured article where an
added degree of protection is provided against escape of material in
the event of an accident, such instrument or article should qualify for
the exception in Sec. 173.424.
We agree that the intent of the requirement in Sec. 173.424 is not
to exclude items such as Americium-241 smoke detectors, and the
requirement that the active material be completely enclosed by non-
active components is met, in the case of a smoke detector or a similar
device, by the combination of the thin laminate and the positioning of
the active element within the outer case, even though that case is not
air-tight.
In addition to the above comment, we received numerous comments
that did not lend themselves to categorization in one of the other nine
issues. Therefore, we have elected to discuss these comments here.
One commenter provided a petition signed by several thousand people
that called for the United States President, Vice President, Congress
and all Federal, state and international regulators and legislative
bodies to recapture, stop and prevent release/clearance recycling of
radioactive wastes and materials into consumer products and the
environment. The petition further supported regulation and isolation of
radioactive wastes from nuclear power and weapons and also opposed the
use of radioactive materials and wastes in consumer products and
building materials including, but not limited to metals, concrete,
plastics, glass, paper, wood, soil, and equipment.
The commenter's petition called on the NRC to reverse its efforts
and expenditures to release radioactive wastes, to initiate a policy
requiring regulatory control and isolation of all radioactive wastes,
and demanded the recall of radioactive material and wastes that have
been released into the marketplace. The petition also called on DOE to
halt all releases of radioactive wastes and materials into the
marketplace, to recapture that which has been released, and revocation
of the Radioactive Recycle 2000 policy immediately. We acknowledge
receipt of the comment; however the comment is not within the scope of
this rulemaking.
A commenter stated the proposed rule is too confusing and
complicated. We disagree. Although the regulating of radioactive
materials involves a degree of technical complexity, particularly
because of the need to determine quantities in terms of activity limits
and potential exposures, we believe the requirements adopted in this
final rule are capable of being understood and complied with. One
reason we are allowing an implementation time of one year from
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register is to allow
adequate time for preparation and training for persons responsible for
complying with these requirements.
Several commenters stated that over-reliance is placed on
unchallenged information of the International Commission on Radiation
Protection (ICRP), outdated and incomplete models, lack of information
on 350 radionuclides, and a biased scientific opinion on radiation
health effects. We

[[Page 3653]]

disagree. We believe the ICRP offers a quality and reasonably
comprehensive perspective on radiation protection standards. However,
during the rulemaking process we do evaluate alternative information
and opinions, when submitted to us, which provide reasoned arguments.
Two commenters stated that all the proposals should be withdrawn
and that we should adopt public recommendations that improve safety and
security and take into account the growth of future radioactive
shipments. We disagree. We believe that the proposed rulemaking will
improve public safety and is based on projected levels of
transportation activities, and that to restart the rulemaking issue
would be a public disservice.
Several commenters were opposed to harmonization promulgated by the
United Nations and the IAEA. They stated that the international
standards-setting process is not democratic, the documents are not
freely available, and the deliberations and negotiations are not
accessible. The commenters questioned if this process meets the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, the Sunshine Act, the Administrative Procedure
Act, and the Open Meetings Act. One commenter requested we put
interested parties on notice of impending IAEA rulemaking, and receive
comments for its consideration as a participant in IAEA's rulemaking
process, because neglecting the interests of U.S. stakeholders in the
IAEA rulemaking process leaves DOT open to criticism for ill-informed
rulemaking that is more in the nature of a legislative fiat from IAEA
than a product of the democratic process.
Another commenter stated that although IAEA standards generally
have good technical bases, they are consensus standards that do not
necessarily consider the risk-informed, performance-based aspects of
domestic regulations. Therefore, while most of the IAEA standards
should be incorporated into U.S. regulations, the unique aspects of the
U.S. regulations need to be considered; the IAEA standards are
appropriate for international shipments, but DOT and NRC regulations
should also provide allowance for domestic-only applications.
We disagree. We believe that although international agencies, such
as the IAEA are not subject to the aforementioned acts, conducting the
rulemaking process in accordance with 49 CFR 106, to consider
incorporation of their recommendations into U.S. regulations, provides
the necessary forum to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. 553). Furthermore, the rulemaking process provides a methodology
to deviate from IAEA regulations domestically, where appropriate.
Several commenters generally supported the overall intent of the
proposed modifications since a uniform set of requirements for the
movement of nuclear materials worldwide is in the public interest for
the safe transport of these materials. However, the commenters
expressed a concern regarding the slowness of the governmental
rulemaking actions. Global businesses are required to comply with the
regulations of many countries and many international organizations as
well as those of the U.S. during these transitional times, and are
therefore forced to operate to two regulatory systems, one for domestic
and one for international shipments. This situation places complex
demands on management systems, procedures, personnel and training, and
for this reason, the commenters stated that the transition to
international standards needs to be streamlined so that this impact is
minimized more so than is currently the case.
One commenter noted the IAEA two-year cycle is needlessly frequent,
resulting in demands on the resources of both the competent authorities
and the regulated community to adapt to changes that are unwarranted as
they provide little value to a segment of transportation that, based on
its track record, requires no improvement. We disagree. We believe the
application of the IAEA two-year revision cycle will actually result in
a more timely revision process due to the fact that revisions will
typically focus on far fewer issues than has been the case with the
ten-year revision cycle; the historically lengthy IAEA revision process
can cause several significant issues to accumulate, which can compound
problems due to simultaneous implementation of new regulations covering
several topics.
A commenter recommended that there be a three-year phase-in for
implementation of the changes in this final rule, because of costs
involved in ordering supplies in quantity, and to allow time for IP
containers to be modified to meet the communication changes. We are
aware that changes in the regulations may require the investment of
time, money and effort. We believe that a three year transition time is
too long for the implementation of most of the changes. However, in
order to allow more time to make these changes we are including in this
final rule a transition time of nine months from the date of
publication before mandatory compliance will be required.
Several commenters stated that the term ``consignment'' should be
clarified because in transportation in commerce the term is often
considered to mean a package or group of packages offered by a
consignor for transport to a single consignee and multiple consignments
may be offered to a carrier simultaneously. One commenter questioned if
the RSPA usage of ``consignment'' meant all the packages listed on a
single manifest/bill of lading, offered by a single consignor at one
time (even if the packages are destined for multiple consignees), or
loaded onto a conveyance at a single location. Another commenter
suggested the definition of ``consignment'' presented in ICAO 2001-2002
Section 3.1 and in IATA 2002 Appendix A is a much more workable
definition, where consignment means one or more packages of dangerous
goods accepted by an operator from one shipper at one time and at one
address, receipted for in one lot and moving to one consignee at one
destination address.
Another commenter stated that ``consignment'' bears the connotation
of all packages in a shipment. The commenter also stated that the
inclusion of ``load of radioactive material'' needs to be better
defined, because operations often require the shipment of bulk
quantities of radioactive materials (e.g., soil with residual
radioactivity). The commenter questioned if the purpose of this
statement is to limit the definition of a consignment to one bulk
railcar (e.g., gondola), each railcar being one consignment, as opposed
to eight or more bulk railcars comprising one consignment. The
commenter suggested the proposed rule is also not clear as to whether a
rail car with several bulk containers (e.g., 4-6 rail cars) would be
defined as a single consignment or if each bulk container would be a
``load.'' The commenter recommended that the definition of
``consignment'' be clarified to address shipments of bulk containers
(e.g., gondolas, intermodals) by rail and other transport vehicles. The
definition should account for the difference in hazards from shipping a
group of radioactive material packages in an aircraft to shipping
several bulk containers on a single railcar and a number of gondolas of
radioactive material in a single train. We agree. The definition can be
clarified and we have provided a modified definition in the final rule.
A commenter disagreed with the proposed definition of ``Quality
Assurance'' and suggested the wording should specify the use of health
physicists, radiation safety officers, nuclear engineers, NRC and DOT

[[Page 3654]]

personnel, as well as up to date radiation detectors. We disagree. We
believe the definition is adequate and should be brief, since it
provides a formal meaning to the subject phrase, recognizing the
definition alone is not intended to set forth the comprehensive
elements of a quality assurance program.
One commenter was concerned that in some instances, the proposed
DOT rules do not incorporate some important aspects of the TS-R-1
standard. A specific case is the determination of transport index (TI)
in paragraph 526-527 of TS-R-1. By not including the multiplication
factor for large dimension loads, the proposed rule maintains an
incompatibility with the IAEA standard.
The commenter is correct in noting we have not included the subject
IAEA guidance pertaining to transport index multiplication factors for
large dimension loads in the U.S. regulations. There are also several
other domestic variations from IAEA regulations, such as communications
involving Low Specific Activity shipments and the rules for placarding
White-I and Yellow-II shipments. These variations from the IAEA
regulations generally result from more than one factor, such as cost/
benefit analysis, risk-informed rulemaking, and stakeholder comments.
We do intend, however, to continue to analyze whether the IAEA
multiplication factor for large dimension loads should be made a U. S.
requirement.
A commenter stated that, in the NPRM, Sec. 173.415(d) updates the
requirements reference to the new IAEA standards. However, Sec.
173.415(d) continues to include as a requirement that, in order for
foreign-made Type A packaging to be used for domestic or export
shipments, the packaging must have first been ``used for the import of
Class 7 * * * materials.'' Given that the purpose of this NPRM is to
``harmonize requirements of the HMR with international standards,''
retaining this import requirement seems to run counter to this purpose
in that TS-R-1 does not have a similar requirement. The commenter
requested that the requirement that the packaging first be used for the
import of radioactive material be deleted, preferably for both domestic
and export shipments, but at least for export shipments.
We agree that the wording in Sec. 173.415(d) requiring that a
foreign package that meets the IAEA standards for a Type A package be
required to have first been used for the importation of radioactive
materials before it can subsequently be used for domestic and export
shipments of Class 7 (radioactive) materials, is not necessary.
Therefore, in this final rule we have eliminated the requirement that
the packaging must have first been used for import of radioactive
material.
A commenter stated that DOT should take this opportunity to clarify
the intent and understanding of the requirements of Sec. 173.443(a)(1)
and (2) by defining what is meant by ``wipe efficiency.'' The use of
word ``efficiency'' has been the source of confusion and
misunderstanding for years in the application of Sec. 173.443 in
operations to demonstrate compliance. The proposed wording provides a
better explanation of the regulatory requirements but could be improved
if ``efficiency,'' taken to be 0.10, is defined as the fraction of
removable contamination that is taken up by a wipe and counted as a
sample, not as the efficiency of the counting instrument used to
measure the amount of activity on the wipe. The commenter stated that
making this distinction between wipe efficiency and counting efficiency
will eliminate the potential confusion. We agree that clarification of
the term ``wipe efficiency'' may be beneficial and we have inserted a
parenthetical definition in the subject subparagraph.
We also received numerous other comments that are outside the scope
of our proposed rulemaking, and therefore were not considered in this
final rule. For example, commenters stated that (1) all radioactive
shipments should be on dedicated vehicles or trains; (2) all drivers
should be trained on radiation hazards and security measures; (3) there
should always be a second person in the cab of the vehicle during
radioactive material transport; (4) radioactive material transport
should always be escorted, both in front and in back of the transport
vehicle; (5) radioactive material placards should read ``Keep Back,
Radioactive Material Transport''; (6) a DOT and NRC inspector should
check every fissile material package/shipping cask as it comes into
each state; (7) no air or water shipment of spent fuel should be
allowed; (8) the use of commercial airlines or airports for any
radioactive shipments should not be allowed; (9) packages subjected to
a crush test should be able to withstand being run over by a freight
train or tank; (10) radioactive material should not be on the same
conveyance as animals, fish, birds, or members of the public; (11)
DOT's segregation distances cause unsatisfactory exposures to crews and
passengers; (12) criticized DOT's issuance of an exemption for uranyl
nitrate; (13) depleted uranium should be more regulated; (14) all
packages should be double packed, not just strong, tight; (15) most
radioactive material shippers, handlers and emergency responders need
more training, personnel, and equipment; (16) excepted packages should
not be allowed if they are designed only to prevent release of active
contents under normal conditions of transport, due to the possibility
of surprise terrorist attacks, which are not a normal condition of
transport; (17) DOT allows casks to reach staggering contamination
levels by the time it reaches its destination, therefore en route
decontaminations should be performed during transport; (18) fissile
material packages should not be mixed with other packages; (19)
transport vehicles should be equipped with side rails which cause
detonation of any terrorist launched explosive prior to coming in
contact with radioactive material packages; (20) women of childbearing
age should not be allowed to work around any radiation source.

III. Section-by-Section Review

Part 171

Section 171.7
In the table of material incorporated by reference, we are removing
the references to the DOE Uranium Hexafluoride Good Practices manual,
the 1985 IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Material, Safety Series No. 6 and two ISO standard entries. We are
revising the reference to the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport
of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1, 1996 Edition and we are adding
three new entries consisting of references to two ISO standards and a
United States Enrichment Corporation Good Handling Practices for
Uranium Hexafluoride.
Section 171.11
On June 21, 2001, in a final rule, published under Docket HM-215D
[66 FR 33336], we added paragraphs to Sec.Sec. 171.11 and 171.12 to
clarify that only the current definition of radioactive material
applies (i.e., 70 Bq/g (0.002 microcurie/g)) when transporting a Class
7 (radioactive) material domestically. In addition, we maintained the
current provisions in Sec.Sec. 171.11 and 171.12, including the values
for Type A packaging contents. Therefore, in Sec. 171.11, we are
removing paragraph (d)(6)(vi) that limits the Class 7 (radioactive)
material to the current definition in Sec. 173.403. As a result,
offerors of radioactive material shipments by air will no longer have
to satisfy either of two different definitions of Class 7 (radioactive)
material, since

[[Page 3655]]

now both the HMR and the ICAO Technical Instructions will both use the
TS-R-1 definition. To clarify that the exceptions described in Sec.
173.422 apply to instruments or articles containing natural uranium or
thorium, and empty packagings, as well as limited quantities of
radioactive material, we are also changing the phrase ``limited
quantities'' in Sec. 171.11(d)(6)(iii) and (iv) to ``excepted
packages.''
Section 171.12
In Sec. 171.12, we are revising paragraphs (d) introductory text
and (d)(4) to remove the reference to Safety Series No. 6, 1985 edition
and replace it with TS-R-1, 1996 edition. In addition, we are removing
paragraph (d)(7) that limits the Class 7 (radioactive) material
definition to the current definition in Sec. 173.403. This again will
result in the use of the TS-R-1 definition of Class 7 (radioactive)
material for both domestic and international shipments.

Part 172

Section 172.101
In the Hazardous Materials Table, we are revising the radioactive
material (Class 7) entries consistent with new entries introduced in
the UN Recommendations and IAEA's ``Regulations for the Safe Transport
of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1.'' In addition, we are removing
those radioactive material entries that currently allow for domestic
shipment only.
Section 172.203
In paragraph (d) we are removing two requirements that would become
redundant upon adoption of the new proper shipping names, the previous
requirement that the words ``Radioactive Material'' be entered on the
shipping paper unless already contained in the proper shipping name,
and the previous requirement that for a shipment of low specific
activity material or surface contaminated objects, the appropriate
group notation of LSA-I, LSA-II, LSA-II, SCO-I, or SCO-II be entered in
the shipping description. In addition, we are requiring that customary
units, if used, be enclosed in parentheses. Because the isotope
plutonium-238 has been removed from the definition of fissile material,
we are removing plutonium-238 from the list of fissile radionuclides
for which the weight in grams or kilograms may be listed instead of or
in addition to the activity. We are requiring that the criticality
safety index be included in the shipping description for fissile
material packages, and we are moving to a separate paragraph the
requirement that the words ``Highway route controlled quantity'' be
included in the shipping description for a package containing a highway
route controlled quantity of Class 7 (radioactive) materials.
Section 172.310
We are revising paragraph (b) to require industrial packagings to
be marked ``Type IP-1,'' ``Type IP-2,'' or ``Type IP-3,'' as
appropriate. In addition, we are revising paragraph (c) to remove the
reference to Type B package designs, and to bring the wording into
closer correspondence to that in TS-R-1. We are also redesignating
paragraphs (c) and (d) as (d) and (e), and adding a new paragraph (c)
to require the outside of a Type IP-2, Type IP-3 or Type A packaging to
be marked with the international vehicle registration code of the
country of origin of design.
Section 172.400
For fissile material packages, TS-R-1 (paragraph 218) introduced
the concept of a CSI to replace the ``TI for criticality control
purposes,'' and decoupled it from the determination of the TI for such
a package. The CSI must be displayed on packages of fissile material
(paragraphs 544 and 545) using a new ``FISSILE'' label. The redefined
TI is determined in the same way as the ``TI for radiation control
purposes'' and continues to be displayed on the traditional
``radioactive material'' label. Therefore, we are revising the table in
Sec. 172.400 to add the new ``FISSILE'' label.
Section 172.402
Paragraph (d) is being revised to require each package containing
fissile material, other than fissile excepted, to bear the new FISSILE
label. (See discussion under Sec. 172.400 above.)
Section 172.403
We are adding a new paragraph (e) to require each FISSILE label to
be completed with the CSI. (See discussion under Sec. 172.400 above.)
In paragraph (g)(1), for LSA-I material, we are authorizing the entry
of ``LSA-I'' on RADIOACTIVE YELLOW II and YELLOW III labels as an
alternative to listing the radionuclides contained in the material.
Paragraph (g)(2) is revised to require that customary units, if used,
be enclosed in parentheses. Because the isotope plutonium-238 has been
removed from the definition of fissile material, we are also revising
paragraph (g)(2) to remove plutonium-238 from the list of fissile
radionuclides for which the weight in grams or kilograms may be listed
instead of or in addition to the activity.
For convenience to the reader, we are adding a new paragraph (h) to
incorporate the requirements presently in Sec. 173.448(g) pertaining to
the labeling of overpacks.
Section 172.441
We are adding a new Sec. 172.441 to identify the specification
requirements for the new ``FISSILE'' label. (See discussion under Sec.
172.400 above.)

Part 173

Section 173.401
We are revising paragraph (b)(2) to more accurately and succinctly
reflect the present contents of paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3). We are
adding a new paragraph (b)(3) to except from the HMR such items as
thoriated metallic engine parts, depleted uranium counterweights,
tritium exit signs, and similar items containing radioactive material
which are an integral part of, and are routinely used in the normal
operation of a transport vehicle. In addition, we are adding a new
paragraph (b)(4) to expand upon those areas when the HMR would not
apply by excepting from the HMR, under specific conditions Class 7
(radioactive) material in natural material and ores containing
naturally occurring radionuclides, respectively. The new paragraph
(b)(4) is intended to except from the HMR the majority of shipments of
ores and materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides, but
that are to be used to produce materials whose benefits lie in their
non-radiological qualities (such as coal, gypsum, phosphates, non-
radioactive metals, etc.). The upper limit of 10 times the activity
concentration or consignment activity thresholds assures that worker
and public doses will remain small from these unregulated materials,
while the exemption permits their continued use in commerce without
making that use economically unfeasible.
Section 173.403
We are revising this section by removing the definitions for ``Non-
fixed radioactive contamination,'' and ``Fissile material, controlled
shipment,'' and revising the definitions for ``A₁,''
``A₂,'' ``Containment system,'' ``Exclusive use,'' ``Fissile
material,'' ``Low Specific Activity (LSA) material,'' ``Low toxicity
alpha emitters,'' ``Maximum normal operating pressure,'' ``Multilateral
approval,'' ``Package,'' ``Radioactive contents,'' ``Radioactive

[[Page 3656]]

material,'' ``Special form Class 7 (radioactive) material,'' ``Surface
Contaminated Object (SCO),'' ``Transport Index (T)(I),'' ``Unilateral
approval,'' ``Unirradiated uranium,'' and ``Uranium--natural, depleted,
or enriched.'' New definitions for ``Consignment,'' ``Contamination,''
``Criticality Safety Index (CSI),'' ``Deuterium,'' ``Exemption value,''
``Fissile material package,'' ``Fixed radioactive contamination,''
``Graphite,'' and ``Quality assurance'' are added.
The following definitions are removed:
Non-fixed radioactive contamination. We are removing this
definition but its essential elements will be added to the definition
of ``contamination'' for clarity. (See discussion under the definition
for contamination below.)
Fissile material, controlled shipment. We are removing this
definition as part of the revision of Sec.Sec. 173.457 and 173.459 of
this subchapter, in order to simplify the requirements for transporting
fissile material.
The following definitions are revised:
A₁. We are revising this definition for clarity.
A₂. We are revising this definition for clarity.
Containment system. We are revising this definition to be
consistent with the NRC.
Exclusive use. We are revising this definition to clarify that a
vehicle survey is required under certain circumstances after use.
Fissile material. We are revising this definition for consistency
with TS-R-1 and to include uranium-233, uranium-235, plutonium-239,
plutonium-241, or any combination of these radionuclides. We are
removing Plutonium-238 from the definition of ``fissile material,''
because plutonium-238 is only fissionable, not fissile. It refers only
to the fissile radionuclides themselves and does not include the non-
fissile material containing these fissile radionuclides.
Low Specific Activity (LSA) material. We are revising the
definition of LSA-I to allow shipments of very low specific activity
materials containing one or more of a variety of radionuclides, and to
remove the present category which refers to mill tailings, contaminated
earth, concrete, rubble, other debris, and activated material in which
Class 7 (radioactive) material is essentially uniformly distributed and
the average specific activity does not exceed 10-\6\
A₂/g.
Low toxicity alpha emitters. We are revising this definition for
consistency with TS-R-1 and primarily includes physical and chemical
concentrates in addition to natural uranium, depleted uranium, natural
thorium, uranium-235, uranium-238, thorium-228 and thorium-230 when
contained in ores; or alpha emitters with a half-life of less than 10
days.
Maximum normal operating pressure. We are revising this definition
to align the HMR with the wording in TS-R-1 and 10 CFR 71.4.
Multilateral approval. We are revising this definition for clarity
by adding the word ``design.'' The Competent Authority approval for a
package is actually for the package design.
Package. We are revising this definition for clarity. The
definitions of each package type in Sec. 173.403 include the
requirements they must satisfy if their contents are not fissile.
Therefore, we are including the caveat that if the contents are
fissile, additional requirements must be satisfied. In addition, the
definitions of types of packages are rearranged, to put the package
types in an order more closely reflecting their increased capability to
retain the contents under normal, as well as hypothetical accidental,
conditions of transportation.
Radioactive contents. We are revising this definition to be
consistent with TS-R-1.
Radioactive material. We are revising this definition to be
consistent with TS-R-1. Currently, we use a specific activity threshold
of 70 Bq/g (0.002 microcurie/g) for defining a material as radioactive
for transportation purposes. The HMR applies to all radioactive
materials with specific activities above this value. Therefore,
radioactive materials with specific activities equal to or below this
value are not regulated. The 70 Bq/g specific activity value is applied
collectively for all radionuclides present in a material; i.e., if a
chain of radionuclides is present, the sum of the activities of all
radionuclides in the chain is to be compared with 70 Bq/g. During the
development of TS-R-1, it was recognized that there is no technical
justification for the use of a single activity-based exemption (70 Bq/
g) value for all radionuclides. As a result, it was concluded that a
more rigorous technical approach would be to base radionuclide
exemptions on a uniform dose basis, rather than a uniform specific
activity (also known as activity concentration) basis. (Please refer to
a more detailed discussion of this in Section II of this final rule
under Issue No. 1.)
Special form Class 7 (radioactive) material. We are revising this
definition to be consistent with TS-R-1.
Surface Contaminated Object (SCO). We are revising this definition
for clarity.
Transport Index. We are revising this definition to be consistent
with TS-R-1. This is the number which is used to provide control over
radiation exposure and is assigned to a package, overpack or freight
container, or to unpackaged LSA-I or SCO-I.
Unilateral approval. We are revising this definition by adding the
word ``design.'' The Competent Authority approval for a package is
actually for the package design.
Unirradiated uranium. We are revising this definition to be
consistent with TS-R-1.
Uranium--natural, depleted, or enriched. We are revising this
definition for clarity. Minor word and number changes, in addition to
clarifying that ``natural uranium'' does not refer to ores, and that
all unirradiated uranium contains a small amount of uranium-234.
We are adding the following definitions:
Consignment. We are adding this definition to clarify to what total
quantity of radioactive material the consignment activity exemption
values are to be applied.
Contamination. We are adding this definition for consistency with
TS-R-1. The definition includes the definitions for ``fixed radioactive
contamination'' and ``non-fixed radioactive contamination.'' The
quantitative definition of contamination is in Safety Series No. 6,
1985 Edition (As Amended 1990) as well as TS-R-1. It was inadvertently
omitted in the previous harmonization rulemaking (HM-169A, September
28, 1995). The consequence would be that non-radioactive materials with
radioactive substances on the surface in levels below those listed in
the definition for contamination would not be considered radioactive
for purposes of transportation.
Criticality Safety Index (CSI). This definition is added to be
consistent with TS-R-1. The introduction of the CSI is intended to
simplify the representation on labels, and on shipping papers of a
package's criticality hazard and its radiation hazard by using separate
numbers to describe the two. Currently, the TI serves a dual role, in
that for fissile packages a TI is determined for the radiation hazard,
another for the criticality hazard, and then the final TI assigned to
the packages is the greater of the two. The introduction of the CSI
permits the use of the TI exclusively for describing the radiation
hazard. This reduces the uncertainty inherent in not knowing whether
the TI value is

[[Page 3657]]

because of one hazard or the other, and should aid shippers, carriers,
and emergency responders in understanding the hazards associated with a
radioactive materials package.
Deuterium. This definition is added due to the occurrence of the
term in the revised language for fissile excepted material in Sec.
173.453.
Exemption value. This definition is added to clarify that the
phrase refers to the activity concentration or consignment activity
thresholds above which a material would be considered sufficiently
radioactive to be subject to the HMR, and to distinguish it from a DOT
exemption, defined in Sec. 171.8.
Fissile material package. This definition is added to clarify that
Type AF package, Type BF package, Type B(U)F package, Type B(M)F
package, or fissile material package means a fissile material packaging
together with its fissile material contents.
Fixed radioactive contamination. This definition is added to be
consistent with TS-R-1. (See discussion under the definition for
``contamination'' above.)
Graphite. This definition is added due to the occurrence of the
term in the revised language for fissile excepted material in Sec.
173.453.
Quality assurance (QA). This definition is added to be consistent
with TS-R-1. We currently require evidence of a QA program for issuing
Certificates of Competent Authority, but do not define it, except to
indicate that a NRC approved program is acceptable, or also that
adhering to Sec.Sec. 173.474 and 173.475 is acceptable for export of
DOT Specification packages. Therefore, the introduction of the TS-R-1
definition will clarify what we mean by a QA program, and call
attention to the fact that this is something we associate with
radioactive material transport.
Section 173.411
We are revising paragraph (b)(5)(ii) to correct the reference to
the ISO Standard 1496. As described in the 1985 Edition of Safety
Series No. 6 and in TS-R-1, the reference should be to Part 1, Cargo
Containers, instead of Part 3, Tank Containers.
Section 173.415
We are removing an outdated transition statement in paragraph (a),
removing Type B (i.e., any Type B packaging which does not meet 1973 or
later NRC or IAEA performance requirements) as an authorized Type A
packaging in paragraph (c), and changing the IAEA reference from Safety
Series No. 6 to TS-R-1 for Type A packagings of foreign origin in
paragraph (d).
Section 173.416
In paragraphs (a) and (b) we are removing Type B (i.e., any Type B
packaging which does not meet 1973 or later NRC or IAEA performance
requirements) as an authorized Type B packaging. We are deleting
paragraphs (d), (e) and (f), and revising paragraph (c) to discontinue
the use of DOT Specification 6M, 20WC and 21WC as authorized Type B
packagings, and to specify that 4 years after the effective date of the
final rule, these DOT Specification packages may no longer be used.
Section 173.417
We are removing paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(6), (b)(1) and
(b)(2) to discontinue the use of DOT Specification 6L, 6M and 1A2 as
authorized fissile materials packagings. We are also adding a new
paragraph (c) to specify that 4 years after the effective date of the
final rule, these packages may no longer be used. Tables 2, 4, and 5
are removed. Tables 3 and 6 are redesignated as Tables 2 and 3,
respectively. Paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(7) and (a)(8) are
redesignated as (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), (a)(1)(iii), (a)(2) and (a)(3),
respectively, and (b)(3), (b)(4), and (b)(5) as (b)(1) through (b)(3).
In the new paragraphs (a)(1)(iii) and (b)(2) the references to Safety
Series No. 6 have been changed to No. TS-R-1. The new paragraph (a)(2)
is revised to include the greater than 0.1 kg of uranium hexafluoride
provision. Type B packagings are removed from the new paragraphs
(a)(1)(ii), (a)(1)(iii), (b)(1) and (b)(2).
Section 173.420
We are revising Sec. 173.420 to introduce new performance packaging
requirements for packagings containing more than 0.1 kg of
UF₆.
Section 173.421
We are revising paragraph (a) to indicate that an excepted package
of a limited quantity of Class 7 (radioactive) material is not excepted
from all marking requirements.
Section 173.422
Consistent with the new marking provisions for excepted packages
containing radioactive materials in TS-R-1, we are eliminating the
requirement in Sec. 173.422(a) for a certification statement for such
packages. In addition, we are adding the requirement that excepted
packages be marked with the UN identification number, and removing the
reference to Sec. 173.423, since Sec. 173.422 deals with Class 7
(radioactive) material classed as Class 7, while Sec. 173.423 refers
only to multiple hazard limited quantity Class 7 (radioactive)
materials, which by Sec. 173.2a(a) are classed in terms of the other
hazard or hazards.
Section 173.424
We are revising Sec. 173.424 to indicate that an excepted package
containing a radioactive instrument or article is not excepted from all
marking requirements. In addition, we are requiring that the active
material in an instrument or article containing radioactive material be
completely enclosed by the non-active components.
Section 173.425
We are revising all references to ``table 7'' to read ``table 4'',
this is due to the combining and deleting of several tables in subpart
I.
Section 173.426
We are revising Sec. 173.426 to indicate that excepted packages of
articles containing natural uranium or thorium are not excepted from
all marking requirements.
Section 173.427
We are revising Sec. 173.427 to clarify: (1) LSA/SCO transportation
and packaging requirements; (2) that fissile LSA is prohibited; i.e.,
that material containing fissile radionuclides may be classified as LSA
only if it satisfies one of the sets of conditions in Sec. 173.453 to
be considered fissile-excepted material; and (3) exclusive use
requirements and provisions. In addition, we are also revising this
section to authorize the transportation of unpackaged LSA-I and SCO-I
material, and removing the present exception for LSA material and SCO
conforming to the provisions specified in 10 CFR 20.2005.
Section 173.428
We are revising Sec. 173.428 to include a requirement for marking
an empty package with the UN identification number. We are
redesignating paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) as (d), (e) and (f). In
addition, we are adding a new paragraph (c) to require that the outer
surface of any uranium or thorium component of a radioactive materials
package intended to be shipped as an empty package be covered by an
inactive sheath. This is a safety improvement, and makes this
requirement consistent with that in TS-R-1 for the transport of empty
radioactive material packages.

[[Page 3658]]

Section 173.431
We are revising paragraph (b) to remove the reference to a Type B
package.
Section 173.433
We are revising Sec. 173.433 to reference the nuclide-specific
exemption values, and clarify how these may be calculated for mixtures.
We are also revising the wording to reflect more closely the wording in
TS-R-1, and to incorporate the TS-R-1 expression for determining the
limits on activities of radionuclides which may be transported in a
Type A package when some of the material is in special form and some in
normal form.
Section 173.435
We are replacing the present ``Table of A₁ and
A₂ values for radionuclides,'' with accompanying footnotes,
with the A₁ and A₂ values and accompanying
footnotes from Table I of TS-R-1. The exception to allow the domestic
transport of up to 20 Ci of Mo-99 in a Type A package is retained. In
addition, the Safety Series No. 6 values of A₁ and
A₂ is retained for Cf-252.
Section 173.436
In accordance with our adoption of the nuclide-specific exemption
values found in TS-R-1, we are adding a new Sec. 173.436 to contain a
table entitled ``Exempt material activity concentrations and exempt
consignment activity limits for radionuclides.'' This table, along with
accompanying footnotes, is taken from Table I of TS-R-1.
Section 173.441
The title is revised to include exclusive use provisions. Paragraph
(d) is redesignated paragraph (e). A new paragraph (d) is added in
order to assemble in one location the total TI restrictions for non-
exclusive use and exclusive use shipments of Class 7 (radioactive)
materials.
Section 173.443
We are revising Table 11, in Sec. 173.443 to list the true non-
fixed contamination limits for the outer surfaces of packages. In
addition, we are revising paragraph (a)(1) to indicate that in
calculating the contamination level from the activity measured on the
wipe, the true wipe efficiency must be used or a default efficiency of
0.10 may be assumed.
Section 173.447
We are revising Sec. 173.447 to reflect the introduction of
additional transportation controls based on the criticality safety
index for fissile material packages.
Section 173.448
We are revising Sec. A173.448 to remove the requirements in Sec.
173.448(g)(1) for the labeling of overpacks and relocate them to Sec.
172.403(h). Relocating the requirements for the labeling of overpacks
to Sec. 172.403(h) is more logical and should aid the reader.
Section 173.453
We are revising Sec. 173.453 to be consistent with the new fissile
material exceptions included in NRC rulemaking.
Section 173.457
We are simplifying the requirements for transporting fissile
material packages by incorporating in Sec. 173.457 the TS-R-1 concept
of CSI and TS-R-1 CSI limits, and by eliminating the concept of
``fissile material, controlled shipment,'' which was originally
developed to control transport of Fissile Class III materials, under a
now obsolete scheme for classifying fissile material packages. Because
all fissile material transport is now limited by the total CSI which
may be carried on a conveyance, this concept is no longer needed.
Section 173.459
We are revising Sec. 173.459(a) to replace the reference to the
criticality control transport index with the criticality safety index.
With the elimination of the concept of ``fissile material, controlled
shipment'' and the inclusion of the total TI limits in Sec. 173.441 and
total CSI limits in Sec. 173.457, we are removing Sec. 173.459(b) and
(c), that refer to circumstances under which a shipment would become a
fissile material, controlled shipment. Because the total CSI conveyance
limits provide adequate safeguards against criticality, these
paragraphs are no longer needed.
Section 173.645
We are revising all references to ``table 12'' to read ``table
10'', this is due to the combining and deleting of several tables in
subpart I.
Section 173.469
We are revising the reference for the alternate leak test methods
in paragraph (a)(4)(ii) from ISO/TR 4826-1979(E) to ISO 9978-1992(E).
For clarity, we are revising the requirements in paragraph (c)
pertaining to the application of leaching assessment methods. To allow
for the substitution of the Class 4 impact test from ISO 2919-1980(E)
for the basic impact and percussion tests, we are revising paragraph
(d)(1) to include the TS-R-1 restriction that the sealed capsule and
contents have a mass less than 200g.
Section 173.471
We are revising the introductory text to remove Type B as a sub-
class of NRC approved packages, since the NRC no longer issues
certificates for this sub-class.
Section 173.473
We are revising the introductory text to clarify the types of
foreign-made packages that would require certification, and to change
the reference to Safety Series No. 6 to that for No. TS-R-1.
Section 173.476
We are revising paragraph (c)(4) to specify what the required
quality assurance program should cover. In addition, we are adding a
new paragraph (c)(5) to require that a description of any planned pre-
shipment actions for use in the consignment of special form radioactive
material be included in an application for a U.S. Competent Authority
Certificate for Special Form Material. The former is in Safety Series
No. 6, 1985 Edition, but never included in the HMR; the latter is new
to TS-R-1.
Section 173.477
We are adding a new Sec. 173.477 to define the approval
requirements for packagings containing more than 0.1 kg of
UF₆.

Part 174

Section 174.700
We are revising Sec. 174.700(b) to reflect the fact that the upper
TI limit of 50 refers to both the total TI and the total CSI for non-
exclusive use shipments. In addition, we are adding a new paragraph (d)
to emphasize that the appropriate transport restrictions for fissile
material packages apply to transport by rail. In addition, existing
paragraphs (d) through (f) are redesignated (e) through (g).

Part 175

Section 175.700
We are revising paragraph (a) by adding a requirement to limit the
CSI to a maximum of 3.0 for a fissile material package transported in a
passenger carrying aircraft; this is necessary because under TS-R-1 the
historical limitation of 3.0 TI on a passenger carrying aircraft would
only limit the radiation hazard and not the criticality hazard. In
addition, we are adding a new paragraph (e) to ensure that any package,
overpack or consignment having a criticality safety index greater than
50 shipped by air must be transported under exclusive use.

[[Page 3659]]

Section 175.702
We are revising paragraph (b) to include the requirements for cargo
aircraft only, based on the separate TS-R-1 limits on total transport
index and total criticality safety index.
Section 175.703
We are revising paragraph (b) to reference the new location for the
requirements on overpacks. Paragraph (c) is revised to replace the
reference to fissile material, controlled shipment with general
requirements for shipments of fissile material by air. Paragraph (e) is
revised to indicate that packages with radiation levels higher than
those allowed by these regulations may be transported by air under
special arrangements approved by the Associate Administrator.

Part 176

Section 176.700
We are removing paragraph (c) due to the elimination of the term
``fissile material, controlled shipment. Paragraphs (d) and (e) are
being redesignated (c) and (d) respectively. In addition, the
requirement that groups of radioactive material packages containing
fissile material be separated by at least 6 m (20 feet) from all other
such groups is being moved to Sec. 176.704.
Section 176.704
We are revising Sec. 176.704 including the section title to reflect
the introduction of additional transportation controls based on the
criticality safety index for fissile material packages, and the
decoupling of package controls according to transport indices and
criticality safety indices. We are also replacing Table III with Table
IIIA to list ``Transport Index Limits'' and Table IIIB for the
``Criticality Safety Index Limits.'' In addition, we are adding to this
section the requirement that groups of radioactive material packages
containing fissile material be separated by at least 6 m (20 feet) from
all other such groups (see discussion under Sec. 176.700).
Section 176.708
We are revising Sec. 176.708 to provide more detailed dose rate
guidance pertaining to an alternate method for determining segregation
distances, in accordance with the requirements of the latest IMDG Code.
We are also restricting the use of this alternate method to the case of
exclusive use shipments, for which Sec. 176.704(f) requires a radiation
protection program approved by the competent authority of the flag
state of the vessel.

Part 177

Section 177.842
In Sec. 177.842, paragraph (f) is revised to remove the reference
to fissile material, controlled shipments, and in paragraph (g), a
reference to transport index for fissile material packages is being
replaced by one to criticality safety index.

Part 178

Section 178.350
In Sec. 178.350, paragraph (b) is being revised to remove the
wording ``and Radioactive Material'' from the marking requirement. It
is duplicative since all proper shipping names include the words
``Radioactive Material.'' In addition, we are adding a new paragraph
(c) to note that each package must comply with the marking requirement
of Sec. 178.3(a)(2) and that each DOT specification packaging must be
marked with the name and address or symbol of the manufacturer.
Section 178.352
As a result of our discontinued use of DOT Specification 6L metal
packagings as an authorized fissile material packaging, we are removing
in its entirety Sec. 178.352.
Section 178.354
As a result of our discontinued use of DOT Specification 6M metal
packagings as an authorized Type B and fissile material packaging, we
are removing in its entirety Sec. 178.354.
Section 178.362
As a result of our discontinued use of DOT Specification 20WC
wooden protective jacket as an authorized Type B packaging, we are
removing in its entirety Sec. 178.362.
Section 178.364
As a result of our discontinued use of DOT Specification 21WC
wooden-steel protective overpack as an authorized Type B packaging, we
are removing in its entirety Sec. 178.364.

IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This final rule is not considered a significant regulatory action
under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, was not
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. The final rule is not
considered a significant rule under the Regulatory Policies and
Procedures of the Department of Transportation [44 FR 11034].
In consideration of the changes in this rule, we looked to and
reviewed the ``Regulatory Analysis of Major Revision of 10 CFR Part
71'' NUREG/CR-6713, dated March 2001 prepared for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in support of its related final rule. A
copy of that document is available for review in this docket (RSPA-99-
6283).
Potential benefits identified in this final rule include enhanced
safety resulting from the consistency of domestic and international
requirements for transportation of radioactive materials. In addition,
the amendments should permit continued access to foreign markets by
domestic shippers of radiopharmaceuticals and other radioactive
materials.
The NUREG/CR-6713 analysis of regulatory amendments concerning
revisions to packaging standards, including the phased elimination of
certain DOT specification packagings (e.g., DOT 6L, 6M, 20WC and 21WC)
in favor of NRC approved packagings indicates that none of the
evaluated changes (individually or collectively) are expected to result
in significant economic impacts to NRC licensees. We believe the same
holds true for all other shippers, e.g., contractors performing work in
support of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
One area that has the greatest potential for substantially
increased costs to shippers of radioactive materials concerns large
stocks of depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) stored in
currently authorized packagings at three different locations. If it is
eventually determined that this material should be moved off-site to
one or more conversion facilities, it is likely that the current
packagings will not meet the new standards. In that case the existing
packages likely will be required to be overpacked in order to meet the
standard for a hypothetical fire test. That action could result in a
one-time cost of $9 million to $13 million to design overpacks,
purchase overpacks, and purchase additional trailers with the proper
tie-down locations. However, because the likely number and location of
UF₆ conversion facilities is purely speculative at this
time, these potential costs were not a significant factor in our
determination to adopt higher standards for presently on-going
shipments of UF₆. As appropriate, we could subsequently
revisit the issue of packaging standards for existing packages of
depleted UF₆ in a separate rulemaking docket.

[[Page 3660]]

B. Executive Order 13132

This rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 (``Federalism''). This rule
preempts State, local and Indian tribe requirements but does not adopt
any regulation that has direct effects on the States, the relationship
between the national government and the States, or the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
Therefore, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive Order
13132 do not apply.
The Federal hazardous material transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 5101-
5127, contains an express preemption provision (49 U.S.C. 5125(b)) that
preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements on certain covered
subjects. Covered subjects are:
(i) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous
material;
(ii) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and
placarding of hazardous material;
(iii) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents
related to hazardous material and requirements related to the number,
contents, and placement of those documents;
(iv) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the
unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; or
(v) The design, manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintenance,
reconditioning, repairing, or testing of a packaging or container
represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in
transporting hazardous material.
This rule concerns the classification, packaging, marking,
labeling, and handling of hazardous material, among other covered
subjects and preempts any State, local, or Indian tribe requirements
not meeting the ``substantively the same'' standard. This rule is
necessary to incorporate changes already adopted in international
standards. If the amendments adopted in this final rule were not made,
U.S. companies, including numerous small entities competing in foreign
markets, will be at an economic disadvantage. These companies would be
forced to comply with a dual system of regulation. The amendments are
intended to avoid this result.
Federal hazardous materials transportation law provides at Sec.
5125(b)(2) that, if the Secretary of Transportation issues a regulation
concerning any of the covered subjects, the Secretary must determine
and publish in the Federal Register the effective date of Federal
preemption. The effective date may not be earlier than the 90th day
following the date of issuance of the final rule and not later than two
years after the date of issuance. The effective date of Federal
preemption of this final rule is October 1, 2004.

C. Executive Order 13175

This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles
and criteria contained in Executive Order 13175 (``Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). Because this final rule
does not have tribal implications, does not impose substantial direct
compliance costs, and is required by statute, the funding and
consultation requirements of Executive Order 13175 do not apply.

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires an
agency to review regulations to assess their impact on small entities
unless the agency determines that a rule is not expected to have a
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. We have
determined that, while the requirements in this final rule apply to a
substantial number of small entities, there will not be a significant
economic impact on those small entities.
Need for the final rule. In 1958, at the request of the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) undertook the development of international
regulations for the safe transportation of radioactive materials. The
initial regulations published by IAEA in 1961 were recommended to
member states as the basis for national regulations and for application
to international transportation. Most nations have since adopted the
IAEA regulations as a basis for regulations governing the
transportation of radioactive materials. In 1964, 1967, 1973, and 1985,
IAEA published extensive revisions of these regulations, and again in
1996 as ``Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. ST-1.'' The most recent revision, made
in 2000, involved a few minor changes and a redesignation as
``Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1'' (ST-1, Revised).
In October 1968, DOT published amendments to the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) for radioactive
materials which were in substantial conformance with the 1967 IAEA
regulations (Docket HM-2, 33 FR 14918). RSPA updated the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR) in 1983 to incorporate the 1973 IAEA
revision and in 1995 to incorporate the 1983 IAEA revision. RSPA has
not updated the HMR to incorporate the most recent revisions to the
IAEA standards. The final rule we are issuing under Docket No. HM-230
will incorporate the 1996 and 2000 IAEA revisions to its radioactive
materials transportation standards, known as ``TS-R-1.''
The continually increasing amount of radioactive materials
transported in international commerce warrants the harmonization of
domestic and international transportation requirements to the greatest
extent possible. Harmonization serves to facilitate international
transportation while assuring the protection of people, property, and
the environment. Shippers and carriers are able to train their hazmat
employees in a single set of requirements for packaging, communication
of hazards, handling, stowage, and the like, thereby minimizing the
possibility of improperly transporting a shipment of radioactive
materials because of differences in national regulations. Similarly,
many shippers find that consistency in regulations for the
transportation of radioactive materials aids their understanding of
what is required, thereby permitting them to more easily comply with
these safety regulations when shipping radioactive materials in
international commerce.
Description of Actions. In this final rule, we are amending the HMR
to:

--Adopt the nuclide-specific exemption activity concentrations and the
nuclide-specific exemption consignment activities listed in TS-R-1 to
assure continued consistency between domestic and international
regulations for the basic definition of radioactive material;
--Provide an exception in the HMR that certain naturally occurring
radioactive materials would not be subject to the requirements of the
HMR so long as their specific activities do not exceed 10 times the
activity concentration exemption values;
--Incorporate the TS-R-1 changes in the A1 and A2 values into the HMR;
--Adopt the new proper shipping names and UN identification numbers,
except for those referring to Type C packages, to fissile LSA material
and to fissile SCOs;
--Require, if customary units are used, that the appropriate quantity
and customary units be placed within

[[Page 3661]]

parentheses positioned after the original quantity expressed in the
International System of Units (SI units);
--Adopt the use of the Criticality Safety Index (CSI) to refer to what
was formerly the criticality control transport index, and to restrict
the use of the concept of transport index (TI) to a number derived
purely from the maximum radiation level at one meter from the package;
--Require the new fissile label be placed on each fissile material
package, and that the CSI for that package be noted on the fissile
label;
--Adopt the requirement that excepted packages be marked with the UN
identification number, that industrial packagings be marked with the
package type, and that Type IP-2 and IP-3 industrial packages and Type
A packages be marked with the international vehicle registration code
of the country of origin of packaging design;
--Remove some former requirements that would become redundant upon
adoption of the new proper shipping names, such as the requirement that
the shipping description contain the words ``Radioactive Material''
unless those words are included in the proper shipping name;
--Remove plutonium-238 (Pu-238) from the definition of fissile material
and remove the reference to Pu-238 in the list of fissile radionuclides
for which the weight in grams or kilograms may be listed instead of or
in addition to the activity, in the shipping paper or radioactive label
description of the radioactive contents of a package;
--Adopt a definition of contamination, and include an authority to
transport unpackaged LSA material and SCO, and an authority to use
qualified tank containers, freight containers and metal intermediate
bulk containers as industrial packagings, types 2 and 3 (IP-2 and IP-
3);
--Adopt the new class of LSA-I material, consisting of radioactive
material in which the activity is distributed throughout and the
estimated average specific activity does not exceed 30 times the
activity concentration exemption level, and to remove the present
category referring to mill tailings, contaminated earth, concrete,
rubble, other debris, and activated material that is essentially
uniformly distributed, with specific activity not exceeding
10-6 A₂/g;
--Incorporate the TS-R-1 changes for packagings containing more than
0.1 kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆);
--Require UF₆ packagings to meet the pressure, drop and
thermal test requirements, to prohibit the use of pressure relief
devices, and to certify the packagings in accordance with TS-R-1
requirements;
--Revise Sec. 173.453 to reflect the NRC ``fissile material exemption
provisions,'' to remove the definition of ``fissile material,
controlled shipment,'' and to revise Sec.Sec. 173.457 and 173.459 to
remove the references to ``fissile material, controlled shipment'' and
to base requirements for non-exclusive use and exclusive use shipments
of fissile material packages on TS-R-1 package and conveyance CSI
limits;
--Accept the IAEA transitional requirements and begin the phase out of
packages satisfying the 1967 IAEA requirements, including DOT
specification packages;
--Prohibit the manufacture of all Type B specification packages
conforming to Safety Series No. 6 (1967) as of the effective date of
this rule, while allowing continued use of these packages for three
years after the effective date of this rule; and
--Add a requirement that the active material in an instrument or
article intended to be transported in an excepted package be completely
enclosed by the non-active components.

Identification of potentially affected small entities. Businesses
likely to be affected by the final rule are those that ship or
transport radioactive materials such as radiopharmaceuticals;
radioisotopes; radiography devices; research and industrial sources,
including gauges containing radioactive materials for measuring levels,
thickness, and density; waste contaminated with low levels of
radioactivity from industrial, medical, and electricity-generating
facilities; and new and used nuclear power plant fuel.
There are 103 licensed nuclear power plants in the United States;
these 103 plants are operated by 41 companies. In addition, there are
750 shippers and carriers registered with RSPA in accordance with 49
CFR Part 107 who say that they ship or transport large quantities of
radioactive materials in a single package. There are also many
thousands more persons who ship or transport smaller amounts of
radioactive material. About 3 million packages of radioactive materials
are shipped each year; the vast majority are radiopharmaceuticals and
radioisotopes used in medical applications.
Unless alternative definitions have been established by the agency
in consultation with the Small Business Administration (SBA), the
definition of ``small business'' has the same meaning as under the
Small Business Act (the Act). Since no such special definition has been
established, we employ the thresholds published by SBA for industries
subject to the HMR under the Act the 41 companies operating licensed
nuclear power plants in the United States are not small businesses
because the electric output of each company exceeds the 4-million-
megawatts-per-year threshold established by SBA. Of the 750 shippers
and carriers registered with RSPA under 49 CFR Part 107, approximately
71 percent ``self-identify'' as small businesses using the SBA
criteria. NRC indicates that 15 companies (12%) of the 127 quality
assurance programs licensed in accordance with NRC requirements, are
small entities. Based on data compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau in
1977, we believe that approximately 90 percent of firms that ship or
transport smaller amounts of radioactive materials are small
businesses.
We believe that most revisions to the HMR adopted in this final
rule will result in an overall net benefit as measured by increased
transportation efficiencies, reduced compliance costs, and decreases in
exposure risks for transportation workers and the general public. See
``Regulatory Analysis of Major Revision of 10 CFR Part 71'' prepared by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and included in the HM-230 rulemaking
docket for a detailed discussion of the costs and benefits of the
specific provisions of the final rule.
The greatest impact on small entities that ship or transport
radioactive materials concerns the revised requirements for hazard
communication--reformatting shipping papers and package markings to
reflect revised hazardous materials descriptions and proper shipping
names, marking the ``UN'' number on excepted packages of Class 7
materials, and a new labeling requirement to communicate the
criticality safety index of packages containing fissile materials.
These amendments will necessitate modifications to the business
procedures of both shippers and carriers and will require retraining of
employees, but are not expected to adversely affect on core business
operations. Moreover, these revisions will improve the accuracy of the
shipping descriptions applicable to specific radioactive materials,
providing for a more accurate and complete indication of the hazards
related to a specific shipment. Overall, these revisions will result in
improved hazard communication, thereby enabling transportation workers
and emergency

[[Page 3662]]

response personnel to quickly and efficiently identify hazards and
mitigate potential risks to the public and the environment.
Several commenters to the notice of proposed rulemaking published
April 30, 2002 suggest that, for one segment of the industry, the
potential impacts of the proposed regulatory changes on small
businesses could be significant. These commenters are concerned about
the proposals in the NPRM that would eliminate the use of all
packagings designed to IAEA standards in effect prior to 1973,
including packages built to current DOT specifications for which no NRC
approval is now required, in favor of packagings designed and
constructed in accordance with the more recent IAEA standards and
approved under new Certificates of Compliance issued by NRC.
The TS-R-1 standard on which this final rule is based includes
provisions for the continued use of packages and special form sources
previously approved in accordance with the 1973 and 1985 editions of
the IAEA regulations. However, TS-R-1 does not provide transitional
provisions for packages approved under the 1967 edition of the IAEA
regulations. NRC has stated that packages approved under the 1967
edition lack the safety enhancements that were incorporated into later
editions of the IAEA standards; for example, packages must now be made
more leak resistant and must conform to applicable NRC quality
assurance requirements. NRC staff believe that the designs for 1967-
based packages will fall into one of five categories: (1) Package
designs that may meet current safety standards with no modifications
but have until now not been submitted to the NRC for review against
these standards; (2) package designs that can be shown to meet current
safety standards after relatively minor design changes; (3) spent fuel
casks certified to the 1967 standards, for which stringent quality
assurance requirements for design and fabrication did apply; (4)
package designs that cannot be shown to meet current safety standards;
and (5) packages for which the safety performance of the package design
under the current safety standards is not known. NRC staff believe that
it is appropriate to phase out use of designs that fall into the last
two categories.
DOT Specification 6L, 6M, 20WC and 21WC packages are packages that
have not been shown to satisfy packaging requirements of the 1973,
1985, or 1996 IAEA radioactive material transport regulations. In
accordance with the decision by the NRC to phase out packages approved
against the 1967 IAEA Regulations, and recognizing that under the
Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies the NRC has
cognizance over domestic use of Type B and fissile material packages,
we proposed in our NPRM that as of the effective date of this final
rule no new manufacture of packages of these types be allowed, and that
all use of these packages cease as of two years following the effective
date of this final rule.
Among the specific packagings at issue are those used to transport
special form Type B shipments of radioactive material. They are used
for equipment, such as calibrators and irradiators, that contain Type B
quantities of cobalt-60 or cesium-137 sources. This equipment is used
by nuclear power plants, universities, hospitals and blood banks, and
in private and government research facilities. Most of the packagings
used to transport the equipment are designed to qualify under DOT
regulations as Type 7A packages, which, when fitted with a metal jacket
and placed in a DOT Specification 20WC overpack, are authorized for the
transportation of Type B shipments of radioactive materials in special
form. Other types of packagings that would be eliminated include
containers used to transport iridium-192 and nuclear isotopes for
medical or industrial use. Commenters note that these packagings have
an excellent safety history.
The commenters state that the proposed prohibition on the use of
these 20WC containers would require companies to apply to NRC to
requalify existing containers to the new IAEA standards or construct
new containers that meet the IAEA standards. One commenter suggests
that he would incur costs of at least $500,000 to obtain regulatory
approval from NRC for each requalified or newly constructed 20WC
packaging and that his costs for replacing currently authorized 20WC
packagings could total from $2 million to $8 million. This commenter
also asserts that total industry costs to upgrade or replace 20WC
packagings could exceed $100 million. Another commenter who ships
iridium-192 using a DOT specification packaging states that his costs
of compliance with the new regulations will be well over $1 million. A
third commenter estimates that replacing the DOT specification packages
currently in use with newly-designed and NRC-approved packagings will
cost around $500,000. Two of these commenters state that the costs of
replacing or requalifying currently authorized DOT specification
packagings could well exceed their companies' financial capabilities.
NRC estimates of the potential costs associated with obtaining
regulatory approvals are significantly less than the costs suggested by
commenters. For package designs that may meet current safety standards
without design modifications, the cost of obtaining NRC certification
against the TS-R-1 standards would range from $30,000 to $70,000 per
design. For package designs that may need minor design changes to meet
current safety standards, the cost of obtaining NRC certification
against the TS-R-1 standards would range from $40,000 to $190,000 per
design. To replace packagings that cannot be shown to meet the TS-R-1
standards, the cost to design, construct, and obtain NRC approval for
the new designs would range from $350,000 to $440,000 per new design.
It is possible to gain NRC approval for a Type B packaging with a
range of contents and/or a range of dimensions, so long as the
applicant demonstrates that the ``worst case'' configuration(s) will
satisfy the performance requirements. On this basis, if, as one
commenter suggests, there are currently between 50 to 100 20WCs
containers in use, it seems reasonable to assume that no more than 10
to 20 replacement packages (packages that would have to be designed
from scratch, tested, evaluated, reviewed and approved by the NRC)
would need to be approved by NRC to transport the types of shipments
made in 20WCs today.
Assuming conservatively, therefore, that on the order of 10 to 20
new package designs for the 20WC would need to be approved by the NRC,
that from 50 to 100 replacements for the 20WC packagings would need to
be manufactured, using typical cost estimates from the NRC of $300,000
to $390,000 for design, testing, and licensing, manufacturing costs of
$50,000 per manufactured package, and a commenter's estimate of $30,000
per package for depreciation costs, we believe that a conservative
estimate of the industry-wide cost can be projected as follows:

Over the long term, the benefits of an internationally-harmonized
regulatory system will exceed the costs associated with implementing
the system. Uniform

[[Page 3663]]

regulations facilitate compliance and thus enhance overall safety--
companies and their employees must know and understand a single set of
regulatory requirements rather than multiple requirements applicable to
multiple jurisdictions. Carriers are able to train their employees in a
single set of requirements for the classification, packaging,
communication of hazards, handling, stowage, and the like, thereby
minimizing the possibility of improperly transporting a shipment of
hazardous materials because of differences in national regulations.
Similarly, many shippers find that consistency in regulations for the
transportation of hazardous materials aids their understanding of what
is required, thereby permitting them to more easily comply with these
safety regulations. The continually increasing amount of hazardous
materials transported in international commerce warrants the
harmonization of domestic and international transportation requirements
to the greatest extent possible. Harmonization serves to facilitate
international transportation while assuring the protection of people,
property, and the environment.
Commenters recommend that the final rule provide for a
``substantially'' longer transition time than the two-year phase-out
period proposed in the April 30, 2002 NPRM. We note in this regard that
in 1996, IAEA first published that 1967 packagings would be
discontinued from use. Thus, persons using such packagings have been on
notice since 1996 that new packagings would be required. Nonetheless,
we agree with commenters that those companies that may incur increased
compliance costs as a result of the elimination of currently authorized
packagings for the transportation of certain radioactive materials
should be provided with more time to plan for and transition to the new
system. Therefore, in this final rule, we are permitting continued use
of currently authorized DOT specification 6L, 6M, 20WC, and 21WC
packagings for a period of 4 years after the effective date of the
final rule; since the effective date of this final rule is October 1,
2004, the industry will actually have a 5-year period to transition to
the new packaging system. The 5-year transition period will provide
companies with sufficient time to plan and implement the changes in an
orderly and deliberate fashion and will help to minimize the costs that
will be incurred as a result of the transition. Based on a 5-year
transition period and using the cost estimates detailed above, we
estimate that total industry costs to develop and obtain approval for
packagings to replace the 1967 packagings currently in use will range
from $1,400,000 to $3,160,000 per year (undiscounted).
As noted above, of the 127 quality assurance programs registerd
with NRC, 15, or 12 percent, are small entities. NRC expects that of
these 15 small entities, only 2 or 3 will be adversely affected by the
requirements in this final rule applicable to 1967 packagings, based on
the nature of the companies' businesses and day-to-day operations.
Moreover, our April 30, 2002 NPRM noted that our preliminary assessment
of the impact of the IAEA revisions on small business was subject to
modification depending on comments received and encouraged commenters
to address the potential economic impacts of the proposals. Out of a
total of about 150 comments, we received only three comments from
persons identifying themselves as small businesses.
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. This final rule includes
no new reporting or recordkeeping requirements.
Related Federal rules and regulations. As in past rulemakings to
incorporate updates of the international regulations into the HMR, we
are working in close cooperation with NRC in the development of this
rulemaking. Currently, DOT and NRC jointly regulate the transportation
of radioactive material in the United States in accordance with a July
2, 1979 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU; 44 FR 38690). In accordance
with this MOU:
1. DOT regulates both shippers and carriers and has issued:
? £ Packaging requirements;
? £ Communication requirements for:

--Shipping paper contents,
--Package labeling and marking requirements, and
--Vehicle placarding requirements;

? £ Training and emergency response requirements;
and
? £ Highway routing requirements.
2. NRC requires its licensees to satisfy requirements to protect
public health and safety and to assure the common defense and security,
and:
? £ Certifies Type B and fissile material package
designs and approves package quality assurance programs for its
licensees;
? £ Provides technical support to DOT and works with
DOT to ensure consistency with respect to the transportation of
radioactive materials; and
? £ Conducts inspections of licensees in accordance
with DOT requirements.
This rulemaking is being coordinated by RSPA with NRC to ensure
that consistent regulatory standards are maintained for radioactive
material transportation regulations, and to ensure coordinated
publication of rules by both agencies.
Alternate proposals for small businesses. The Regulatory
Flexibility Act directs agencies to establish exceptions and differing
compliance standards small businesses, where it is possible to do so
and still meet the objectives of applicable regulatory statutes. In the
case of radioactive materials transportation, it is not possible to
establish exceptions or differing standards and still accomplish the
objectives of Federal hazmat law.
This final rule was developed under the assumption that small
businesses make up the overwhelming majority of entities that will be
subject to its provisions, particularly regarding the phase-out of
currently authorized DOT specification packagings for the
transportation of certain types of radioactive material. Thus, we
considered how to minimize expected compliance costs as we developed
this final rule. As an accommodation to small businesses, the final
rule permits continued use of currently authorized DOT specification
packagings for a period of 4 years following the final rule's effective
date, or effectively 5 years from the date of publication of this final
rule. This extended transition period will provide companies with
sufficient time to plan and implement the changes in an orderly and
deliberate fashion and will help to minimize the costs that will be
incurred as a result of the transition.
Conclusion. In consideration of the fact that a limited number of
small entities will be affected by the provisions of this final rule
and on the basis of the analysis of regulatory amendments prepared by
NRC in support of its associated final rule, I hereby certify that,
while this final rule applies to a substantial number of small
entities, there will not be a significant economic impact on those
small entities.
This final rule has been developed in accordance with Executive
Order 13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency
Rulemaking'') and DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act to ensure that potential impacts of
draft rules on small entities are properly considered.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

RSPA has a current information collection approval under OMB No.
2137-0510, Radioactive (RAM) Transportation Requirements, with

[[Page 3664]]

15,270 burden hours and $139,895.60 annual cost for burden. This final
rule identifies information collection that RSPA submitted to OMB for
approval based on requirements in the proposed rule. OMB approved the
information collection on April 24, 2003. The approved information
collection and recordkeeping burden is as follows:
OMB No.: 2137-0510.
Number of Respondents: 3,817.
Total Annual Responses: 21,519.
Total Annual Burden Hours: 15,270.
Total Annual Burden Cost: $139,895.60.
Requests for a copy of the information collection should be
directed to Deborah Boothe, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards
(DHM-10), Research and Special Programs Administration, Room 8102, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001, Telephone (202) 366-
8553.

F. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)

A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
April and October of each year. The RIN number contained in the heading
of this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.

G. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

This final rule does not impose unfunded mandates under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of
$100 million or more to either State, local or tribal governments, in
the aggregate, or to the private sector, and is the least burdensome
alternative that achieves the objective of the rule.

H. Environmental Assessment

The NRC prepared an environmental assessment entitled:
``Environmental Assessment (EA) of Major Revision to Packaging and
Transportation of Radioactive Material Regulations'', Final Report,
March 2002, on its proposed rule which addresses issues also raised in
this rulemaking. On the basis of this EA, we find that there are no
significant environmental impacts associated with this final rule. A
copy of the environmental assessment prepared by the NRC is available
for review in the docket.

I. Privacy Act

Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any written
communications and comments received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70;
Pages 19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 171

Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Imports, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.

49 CFR Part 172

Education, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Labeling, Markings, Packaging and containers, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 173

Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference,
Packaging and containers, Radioactive materials, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Uranium.

49 CFR Part 174

Hazardous materials transportation, Radioactive materials, Railroad
safety.

49 CFR Part 175

Air carriers, Hazardous materials transportation, Radioactive
materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 176

Hazardous materials transportation, Maritime carriers, Radioactive
materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 177

Hazardous materials transportation, Motor carriers, Radioactive
materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

49 CFR Part 178

Hazardous materials transportation, Motor vehicle safety, Packaging
and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

0
In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter C is
amended to read as follows:

PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 171 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR 1.53.

0
2. In Sec. 171.7, in paragraph (a)(3), the table is amended as follows:
0
a. Under the entry ``Department of Energy (USDOE),'' the entry for
``USDOE, ORO 651-Uranium Hexafluoride; A Manual of Good Practices,
Revision 6, 1991 edition'' is removed;
0
b. Under the entry ``International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),'' the
entries ``IAEA, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Material Safety Series No. 6, 1985 Edition (As Amended 1990); Including
1985 Edition (Supplemented 1986 and 1988)'' and ``IAEA, Regulations for
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1, 1996 Edition''
are removed and a new entry ``IAEA, Regulations for the Safe Transport
of Radioactive Material, 1996 Edition (Revised), No. TS-R-1 (ST-1,
Revised)'' is added in alphabetical order;
0
c. Under the entry ``International Organization for Standardization,''
the entries for ``ISO/TR 4826-1979(E)-Sealed radioactive sources--Leak
test methods'' and ``ISO 1496-3-1995(E)--Series 1 Freight Containers--
Specification and Testing--Part 3: Tank Containers for Liquid, Gases
and Pressurized Dry Bulk'' are removed and two new entries ``ISO 1496-
1: 1990(E)--Series 1 freight containers--Specification and testing,
Part 1: General cargo containers'' and ``ISO 9978:1992(E)--Radiation
protection--Sealed radioactive sources--Leakage test methods, February
15, 1992, First Edition'' are added in alpha-numeric order; and
0
d. A new entry for ``United States Enrichment Corporation, Inc. (USEC)
is added in appropriate alpha-numeric order.
The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec. 171.7 Reference material.

(a) Matter incorporated by reference-- * * *
(3) Table of material incorporated by reference. * * *

[[Page 3665]]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source and name of material 9 CFR reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * * * *
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
* * *
IAEA, Regulations for the Safe 171.12, 173.415, 173.416,
Transport of Radioactive Material, 173.417, 173.473
1996 Edition (Revised), No. TS-R-1
(ST-1, Revised)......................

* * * * * * *
International Organization for
Standardization * * *

* * * * * * *
ISO 1496--1: 1990(E)--Series 1 freight 173.411
containers--Specification and
testing, Part 1: General cargo
containers. Fifth Edition, (August
15, 1990)............................

* * * * * * *
ISO 9978:1992(E)--Radiation protection- 173.469
-Sealed radioactive sources--Leakage
test methods. First Edition,
(February 15, 1992)..................

* * * * * * *
United States Enrichment Corporation, Inc.
(USEC):
USEC Inc., 6903 Rockledge Drive,
Bethesda, MD 20817...................
USEC-651--Good Handling Practices for 173.417
Uranium Hexafluoride, Revision 8,
January 1999.........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

0
3. In Sec. 171.11, paragraph (d)(6)(vi) is removed and paragraphs
(d)(6)(iii) and (d)(6)(iv) are revised to read as follows:

Sec. 171.11 Use of ICAO Technical Instructions.

* * * * *
(d) * * *
(6) * * *
(iii) Except for excepted packages of Class 7 (radioactive)
materials, the provisions of Sec.Sec. 172.204(c)(4), 173.448(e), (f)
and (g)(3) of this subchapter apply.
(iv) Excepted packages of radioactive materials must meet the
provisions of Sec.Sec. 173.421, 173.424, 173.426 or 173.428 of this
subchapter, as appropriate.
* * * * *

0
4. In Sec. 171.12, paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 171.12 Import and export shipments.

* * * * *
(d) Use of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations
for Class 7 (radioactive) materials. Class 7 (radioactive) materials
being imported into or exported from the United States, or passing
through the United States in the course of being shipped between places
outside the United States, may be offered and accepted for
transportation when packaged, marked, labeled, and otherwise prepared
for shipment in accordance with IAEA ``Regulations for the Safe
Transport of Radioactive Material,'' No. TS-R-1 1996 edition (IBR, see
Sec. 171.7), if--
(1) Highway route controlled quantities (see Sec. 173.403 of this
subchapter) are shipped in accordance with Sec.Sec. 172.203(d)(4),
172.507 and 173.22(c) of this subchapter;
(2) For fissile materials and Type B packages, the competent
authority certification and any necessary revalidation is obtained from
the appropriate competent authorities as specified in Sec.Sec. 173.471,
173.472 and 173.473 of this subchapter and all requirements of the
certificates and revalidations are met;
(3) Type A package contents are limited in accordance with Sec.
173.431 of this subchapter;
(4) The country of origin for the shipment has adopted, No. TS-R-1
of the IAEA ``Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Material,'' 1996 edition;
(5) The requirements of Sec. 173.448 are fulfilled, when
applicable; and
(6) Shipments comply with the requirements for emergency response
information prescribed in subpart G of part 172 of this subchapter.
* * * * *

PART 172--HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, AND
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

0
5. The authority citation for part 172 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR 1.53.

0
6. In Sec. 172.101, the Hazardous Materials Table is amended by
removing and revising, in appropriate alphabetical sequence, the
following entries to read as follows:

Sec. 172.101 Purpose and use of hazardous materials table.

* * * * *

[[Page 3666]]

Sec. 172.101 Hazardous Materials Table
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazardous (8) Packaging (Sec. 173. * * *) (9) Quantity limitations (10) Vessel stowage
materials Hazard Special -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Symbols descriptions and class or Identification PG Label provisions (Sec. Cargo
proper shipping division Nos. codes 172.102) Exceptions Non-bulk Bulk Passenger aircraft Location Other
names aircraft/rail only
(1) (2).............. (3) (4) (5) (6)....... (7).............. (8A)....... (8B)....... (8C)....... (9A)............ (9B)....... (10A) (10B)
-------------

* * * * * * *
[REVISE:]
Radioactive 7 UN2909 ..... None...... ................. 422, 426... 422, 426... 422, 426... ................ ........... A ...........
material,
excepted package-
-articles
manufactured
from natural
uranium or
depleted uranium
or natural
thorium.

* * * * * * *
Radioactive 7 UN2908 ..... Empty..... ................. 422, 428... 422, 428... 422, 428... ................ ........... A ...........
material,
excepted package-
-empty packaging.

* * * * * * *
Radioactive 7 UN2911 ..... None...... ................. 422, 424... 422, 424... ........... ................ ........... A ...........
material,
excepted package-
-instruments or
articles.

* * * * * * *
Radioactive 7 UN2912 ..... 7......... A56, T5, TP4, W7. 421, 422, 427........ 427........ ................ ........... A 95, 129
material, low 428.
specific
activity (LSA-I)
non fissile or
fissile-excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN3321 ..... 7......... A56, T5, TP4, W7. 421, 422, 427........ 427........ ................ ........... A 95, 129
material, low 428.
specific
activity (LSA-
II) non fissile
or fissile-
excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN3322 ..... 7......... A56, T5, TP4, W7. 421, 422, 427........ 427........ ................ ........... A 95, 129
material, low 428.
specific
activity (LSA-
III) non fissile
or fissile
excepted.

* * * * * * *
Radioactive 7 UN2913 ..... 7......... A56.............. 421, 422, 427........ 427........ ................ ........... A 95
material, 428.
surface
contaminated
objects (SCO-I
or SCO-II) non
fissile or
fissile-excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN2919 ..... 7......... A56, 139......... ........... ........... ........... ................ ........... A 95, 105
material,
transported
under special
arrangement, non
fissile or
fissile excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN331 ..... 7......... A56,139.......... ........... ........... ........... ................ ........... A 95,105
material,
transported
under special
arrangement,
fissile.
Radioactive 7 UN3327 ..... 7......... A56, W7, W8...... 453........ 417........ 417........ ................ ........... A 95, 105,
material, Type A 131
package, fissile
non-specdial
form.
Radioactive 7 UN2915 ..... 7......... A56, W7, W8...... ........... 415........ 415........ ................ ........... A 95, 130
material, Type A
package non-
special form,
non fissile or
fissile-excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN3332 ..... 7......... A56, W7, W8...... ........... 415, 476... 415, 476... ................ ........... A 95
material, Type A
package, special
form non fissile
or fissile-
excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN3333 ..... 7......... A56, W7, W8...... 453........ 417, 476... 417, 476... ................ ........... A 95, 105
material, Type A
package, special
form, fissile.
Radioactive 7 UN3329 ..... 7......... A56.............. 453........ 417........ 417........ ................ ........... A 95, 105
material, Type
B(M) package,
fissile.
Radioactive 7 UN2917 ..... 7......... A56.............. ........... 416........ 416........ ................ ........... A 95, 105
material, Type
B(M) package non
fissile or
fissile-excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN3328 ..... 7......... A56.............. 453........ 417........ 417........ ................ ........... A 95, 105
material, Type
B(U) package,
fissile.
Radioactive 7 UN2916 ..... 7......... A56.............. ........... 416........ 416........ ................ ........... A 95, 105
material, Type
B(U) package non
fissile or
fissile-excepted.
Radioactive 7 UN2978 ..... 7, 8...... ................. 423........ 420, 427... 420, 427... ................ ........... A 95, 132
material,
uranium
hexafluoride non
fissile or
fissile-excepted.

* * * * * * *
[REMOVE:]
D........... Radioactive 7 UN2910 ..... None...... ................. 422, 426... 422, 426... 422, 426... ................ ........... A ...........
material,
excepted package-
-articles
manufactured
from natural or
depleted uranium
or natural
thorium.
D........... Radioactive 7 UN2910 ..... empty..... ................. 428........ 428........ 428........ ................ ........... A ...........
material,
excepted package-
-empty package
or empty
packaging.

[[Page 3667]]

D........... Radioactive 7 UN2910 ..... None...... ................. 422, 424... 422, 424... 422, 424... ................ ........... A ...........
material,
excepted package-
-instruments or
articles.
D........... Radioactive 7 UN2918 ..... 7......... A56.............. 453........ 417........ 417........ ................ ........... A 95, 105
material,
fissile, n.o.s.
D........... Radioactive 7 UN2912 ..... 7......... A56, T5, TP4..... 421, 428... 427........ 427........ ................ ........... A 95, 129
material, low
specific
activity, n.o.s.
or Radioactive
material, LSA,
n.o.s..
D........... Radioactive 7 UN2982 ..... 7......... A56.............. 421, 428... 415, 416... 415, 416... ................ ........... A 95
material, n.o.s.
D........... Radioactive 7 UN2974 ..... 7......... A56.............. 421, 424... 415, 416... 415, 416... ................ ........... A 95
material,
special form,
n.o.s.
D........... Radioactive 7 UN2913 ..... 7......... A56.............. 421, 424, 427........ 427........ ................ ........... A 95
material, 426.
surface
contaminated
object or
Radioactive
material SCO.
D........... Thorium metal, 7 UN2975 ..... 7, 4.2.... A56.............. None....... 418........ None....... ................ ........... D 95
pyrophoric.
D........... Thorium nitrate, 7 UN2976 ..... 7, 5.1.... ................. None....... 419........ None....... Forbidden....... 15 kg...... A 95
solid.
D........... Uranium 7 UN2978 ..... 7, 8...... ................. 423........ 420, 427... 420, 427... ................ ........... A 95, 132
hexafluoride,
fissile excepted
or non-fissile.
D........... Uranium 7 UN2977 ..... 7, 8...... ................. 453........ 417, 420... 417, 420... ................ ........... A 95, 132
hexafluoride,
fissile (with
more than 1
percent U-235).
D........... Uranium metal, 7 UN2979 ..... 7, 4.2.... A56.............. None....... 418........ None....... ................ ........... D 95
pyrophoric.
D........... Uranyl nitrate 7 UN2980 ..... 7, 8...... ................. 421, 427... 415, 416, 415, 416, ................ ........... D 95
hexahydrate 417. 417.
solution.
D........... Uranyl nitrate, 7 UN2981 ..... 7, 5.1.... ................. None....... 419........ None....... Forbidden....... 15 kg...... A 95
solid.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 3668]]

0
7. In Sec. 172.203, paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 172.203 Additional description requirements.

* * * * *
(d) Radioactive material. The description for a shipment of a Class
7 (radioactive) material must include the following additional entries
as appropriate:
(1) The name of each radionuclide in the Class 7 (radioactive)
material that is listed in Sec. 173.435 of this subchapter. For
mixtures of radionuclides, the radionuclides that must be shown must be
determined in accordance with Sec. 173.433(f) of this subchapter.
Abbreviations, e.g., ``99Mo,'' are authorized.
(2) A description of the physical and chemical form of the
material, if the material is not in special form (generic chemical
description is acceptable for chemical form).
(3) The activity contained in each package of the shipment in terms
of the appropriate SI units (e.g., Becquerels (Bq), Terabecquerels
(TBq), etc.). The activity may also be stated in appropriate customary
units (Curies (Ci), milliCuries (mCi), microCuries (uCi), etc.) in
parentheses following the SI units. Abbreviations are authorized.
Except for plutonium-239 and plutonium-241, the weight in grams or
kilograms of fissile radionuclides may be inserted instead of activity
units. For plutonium-239 and plutonium-241, the weight in grams of
fissile radionuclides may be inserted in addition to the activity
units.
(4) The category of label applied to each package in the shipment.
For example: ``RADIOACTIVE WHITE-I.''
(5) The transport index assigned to each package in the shipment
bearing RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-II OR RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-III labels.
(6) For a package containing fissile Class 7 (radioactive)
material:
(i) The words ``Fissile Excepted'' if the package is excepted
pursuant to Sec. 173.453 of this subchapter; or otherwise
(ii) The criticality safety index for that package.
(7) For a package approved by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
or U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a notation of the package
identification marking as prescribed in the applicable DOE or NRC
approval (see Sec. 173.471 of the subchapter).
(8) For an export shipment or a shipment in a foreign made package,
a notation of the package identification marking as prescribed in the
applicable International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Certificate of
Competent Authority which has been issued for the package (see Sec.
173.473 of the subchapter).
(9) For a shipment required by this subchapter to be consigned as
exclusive use:
(i) An indication that the shipment is consigned as exclusive use;
or
(ii) If all the descriptions on the shipping paper are consigned as
exclusive use, then the statement ``Exclusive Use Shipment'' may be
entered only once on the shipping paper in a clearly visible location.
(10) For the shipment of a package containing a highway route
controlled quantity of Class 7 (radioactive) materials (see Sec.
173.403 of this subchapter) the words ``Highway route controlled
quantity'' or ``HRCQ'' must be entered in association with the basic
description.
* * * * *

0
8. Section 172.310 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 172.310 Class 7 (radioactive) materials.

In addition to any other markings required by this subpart, each
package containing Class 7 (radioactive) materials must be marked as
follows:
(a) Each package with a gross mass greater than 50 kg (110 lb) must
have its gross mass including the unit of measurement (which may be
abbreviated) marked on the outside of the package.
(b) Each industrial, Type A, Type B(U), or Type B(M) package must
be legibly and durably marked on the outside of the packaging, in
letters at least 13 mm (0.5 in) high, with the words ``TYPE IP-1,''
``TYPE IP-2,'' ``TYPE IP-3,'' ``TYPE A,'' ``TYPE B(U)'' or ``TYPE
B(M),'' as appropriate. A package which does not conform to Type IP-1,
Type IP-2, Type IP-3, Type A, Type B(U) or Type B(M) requirements may
not be so marked.
(c) Each package which conforms to an IP-1, IP-2, IP-3 or a Type A
package design must be legibly and durably marked on the outside of the
packaging with the international vehicle registration code of the
country of origin of the design. The international vehicle registration
code for packages designed by a United States company or agency is the
symbol ``USA.''
(d) Each package which conforms to a Type B(U) or Type B(M) package
design must have the outside of the outermost receptacle, which is
resistant to the effects of fire and water, plainly marked by
embossing, stamping or other means resistant to the effects of fire and
water with a radiation symbol that conforms to the requirements of
Appendix B of this part.
(e) Each Type B(U), Type B(M) or fissile material package destined
for export shipment must also be marked ``USA'' in conjunction with the
specification marking, or other package certificate identification.
(See Sec.Sec. 173.471, 173.472, and 173.473 of this subchapter.)

0
9. In Sec. 172.400, in paragraph (b), the table is amended by adding
immediately after the entry for `` 7 RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-III'', the
following entry to read as follows:

Sec. 172.400 General labeling requirements.

* * * * *
(b) * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Label design
Hazard class or division Label name or section
reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * * * *
7 (fissile radioactive material; FISSILE............ 172.441
see Sec. 172.402).

* * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

0
10. In Sec. 172.402, paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 172.402 Additional labeling requirements.

* * * * *
(d) Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials. Except as otherwise provided
in this paragraph, each package containing a Class 7 material that also
meets the definition of one or more additional hazard classes must be
labeled as a

[[Page 3669]]

Class 7 material as required by Sec. 172.403 and for each additional
hazard.
(1) For a package containing a Class 7 material that also meets the
definition of one or more additional hazard classes, whether or not the
material satisfies Sec. 173.4(a)(1)(iv) of this subchapter, a
subsidiary label is not required on the package if the material
conforms to the remaining criteria in Sec. 173.4 of this subchapter.
(2) Each package or overpack containing fissile material, other
than fissile-excepted material (see Sec. 173.453 of this subchapter)
must bear two FISSILE labels, affixed to opposite sides of the package
or overpack, which conforms to the figure shown in Sec. 172.441; such
labels, where applicable, must be affixed adjacent to the labels for
radioactive materials.
* * * * *

0
11. In Sec. 172.403, a new paragraph (e) is added, paragraph (g) is
amended by revising paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), and a new
paragraph (h) is added to read as follows:

Sec. 172.403 Class 7 (radioactive) materials.

* * * * *
(e) FISSILE label. For packages required in Sec. 172.402 to bear a
FISSILE label, each such label must be completed with the criticality
safety index (CSI) assigned in the NRC or DOE package design approval,
or in the certificate of approval for special arrangement or the
certificate of approval for the package design issued by the Competent
Authority for import and export shipments. For overpacks and freight
containers required in Sec. 172.402 to bear a FISSILE label, the CSI on
the label must be the sum of the CSIs for all of the packages contained
in the overpack or freight container.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(1) Contents. Except for LSA-I material, the names of the
radionuclides as taken from the listing of radionuclides in Sec.
173.435 of this subchapter (symbols which conform to established
radiation protection terminology are authorized, i.e., 99Mo,
60Co, etc.). For mixtures of radionuclides, with
consideration of space available on the label, the radionuclides that
must be shown must be determined in accordance with Sec. 173.433(f) of
this subchapter. For LSA-I material, the term ``LSA-I'' may be used in
place of the names of the radionuclides.
(2) Activity. The activity in the package must be expressed in
appropriate SI units (e.g., Becquerels (Bq), Terabecquerels (TBq),
etc.). The activity may also be stated in appropriate customary units
(Curies (Ci), milliCuries (mCi), microCuries (uCi), etc.) in
parentheses following the SI units. Abbreviations are authorized.
Except for plutonium-239 and plutonium-241, the weight in grams or
kilograms of fissile radionuclides may be inserted instead of activity
units. For plutonium-239 and plutonium-241, the weight in grams of
fissile radionuclides may be inserted in addition to the activity
units.
(3) Transport index. (see Sec. 173.403 of this subchapter.)
(h) When one or more packages of Class 7 (radioactive) material are
placed within an overpack, the overpack must be labeled as prescribed
in this section, except as follows:
(1) The ``contents'' entry on the label may state ``mixed'' in
place of the names of the radionuclides unless each inside package
contains the same radionuclide(s).
(2) The ``activity'' entry on the label must be determined by
adding together the number of becquerels of the Class 7 (radioactive)
materials packages contained therein.
(3) For an overpack, the transport index (TI) must be determined by
adding together the transport indices of the Class 7 (radioactive)
materials packages contained therein, except that for a rigid overpack,
the transport index (TI) may alternatively be determined by direct
measurement as prescribed in Sec. 173.403 of this subchapter under the
definition for ``transport index,'' taken by the person initially
offering the packages contained within the overpack for shipment.
(4) The category of Class 7 label for the overpack must be
determined from the table in Sec. 172.403(c) using the TI derived
according to paragraph (c)(3) or (c)(4) of this section, and the
maximum surface radiation level on the surface of the overpack.
(5) The category of the Class 7 label of the overpack, and not that
of any of the packages contained therein, must be used in accordance
with Table 1 of Sec. 172.504(e) to determine when the transport vehicle
must be placarded.
(6) For fissile material, the criticality safety index which must
be entered on the overpack FISSILE label is the sum of the criticality
safety indices of the individual packages in the overpack, as stated in
the certificate of approval for the package design issued by the NRC or
the U.S. Competent Authority.

0
12. A new Sec. 172.441 is added to read as follow:

Sec. 172.441 FISSILE label.

(a) Except for size and color, the FISSILE label must be as
follows:

[[Page 3670]]

[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.000

(b) In addition to complying with Sec. 172.407, the background
color on the FISSILE label must be white.

PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND
PACKAGINGS

0
13. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127, 44701; 49 CFR 1.53.

0
14. In Sec. 173.401, paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) are revised and a new
paragraph (b)(4) is added to read as follows:

Sec. 173.401 Scope.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) Class 7 (radioactive) materials that have been implanted or
incorporated into, and are still in, a person or live animal for
diagnosis or treatment.
(3) Class 7 (radioactive) material that is an integral part of the
means of transport.
(4) Natural material and ores containing naturally occurring
radionuclides which are not intended to be processed for use of these
radionuclides, provided the activity concentration of the material does
not exceed 10 times the values specified in Sec. 173.436.

0
15. Section 173.403 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.403 Definitions.

For purposes of this subpart--
A₁ means the maximum activity of special form Class 7
(radioactive) material permitted in a Type A package. This value is
either listed in Sec. 173.435 or may be derived in accordance with the
procedures prescribed in Sec. 173.433.
A₂ means the maximum activity of Class 7 (radioactive)
material, other than special form material, LSA material, and SCO,
permitted in a Type A package. This value is either listed in Sec.
173.435 or may be derived in accordance with the procedures prescribed
in Sec. 173.433.
Class 7 (radioactive) material See the definition of Radioactive
material in this section.
Closed transport vehicle means a transport vehicle or conveyance
equipped with a securely attached exterior enclosure that during normal
transportation restricts the access of unauthorized persons to the
cargo space containing the Class 7 (radioactive) materials. The
enclosure may be either temporary or permanent, and in the case of
packaged materials may be of the ``see-through'' type, and must limit
access from top, sides, and bottom.
Consignment means a package or group of packages or load of
radioactive material offered by a person for transport in the same
shipment.
Containment system means the assembly of components of the
packaging intended to retain the Class 7 (radioactive) material during
transport.
Contamination means the presence of a radioactive substance on a
surface in quantities in excess of 0.4 Bq/cm2 for

[[Page 3671]]

beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters or 0.04 Bq/
cm2 for all other alpha emitters. Contamination exists in
two phases.
(1) Fixed radioactive contamination means radioactive contamination
that cannot be removed from a surface during normal conditions of
transport.
(2) Non-fixed radioactive contamination means radioactive
contamination that can be removed from a surface during normal
conditions of transport.
Conveyance means:
(1) For transport by public highway or rail: any transport vehicle
or large freight container;
(2) For transport by water: any vessel, or any hold, compartment,
or defined deck area of a vessel including any transport vehicle on
board the vessel; and
(3) For transport by aircraft, any aircraft.
Criticality Safety Index (CSI) means a number (rounded up to the
next tenth) which is used to provide control over the accumulation of
packages, overpacks or freight containers containing fissile material.
The CSI for packages containing fissile material is determined in
accordance with the instructions provided in 10 CFR 71.22, 71.23, and
71.59. The CSI for an overpack, freight container, or consignment
containing fissile material packages is the arithmetic sum of the
criticality safety indices of all the fissile material packages
contained within the overpack, freight container, or consignment.
Design means the description of a special form Class 7
(radioactive) material, a package, packaging, or LSA-III, that enables
those items to be fully identified. The description may include
specifications, engineering drawings, reports showing compliance with
regulatory requirements, and other relevant documentation.
Deuterium means, for the purposes of Sec. 173.453, deuterium and
any deuterium compound, including heavy water, in which the ratio of
deuterium atoms to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000.
Exclusive use means sole use by a single consignor of a conveyance
for which all initial, intermediate, and final loading and unloading
are carried out in accordance with the direction of the consignor or
consignee. The consignor and the carrier must ensure that any loading
or unloading is performed by personnel having radiological training and
resources appropriate for safe handling of the consignment. The
consignor must provide to the initial carrier specific written
instructions for maintenance of exclusive use shipment controls,
including the vehicle survey requirement of Sec. 173.443 (c) as
applicable, and include these instructions with the shipping paper
information provided to the carrier by the consignor.
Exemption value means either an exempt material activity
concentration or an exempt consignment activity limit listed in the
table in Sec. 173.436, or determined according to the procedures
described in Sec. 173.433, and used to determine whether a given
physically radioactive material is sufficiently radioactive to be
subject to the HMR (see definition of radioactive material). An
exemption value is different from an exemption, as defined in Sec.
171.8 of this subchapter.
Fissile material means plutonium239,
plutonium241, uranium233, uranium235,
or any combination of these radionuclides. This term does not apply to
material containing fissile nuclides, unirradiated natural uranium and
unirradiated depleted uranium, or to natural uranium or depleted
uranium that has been irradiated in thermal reactors only.
Freight container means a reusable container having a volume of
1.81 cubic meters (64 cubic feet) or more, designed and constructed to
permit it being lifted with its contents intact and intended primarily
for containment of packages in unit form during transportation. A
``small freight container'' is one which has either one outer dimension
less than 1.5 m (4.9 feet) or an internal volume of not more than 3.0
cubic meters (106 cubic feet). All other freight containers are
designated as ``large freight containers.''
Graphite means, for the purposes of Sec. 173.453, graphite with a
boron equivalent content less than 5 parts per million and density
greater than 1.5 grams per cubic centimeter.
Highway route controlled quantity means a quantity within a single
package which exceeds:
(1) 3,000 times the A₁ value of the radionuclides as
specified in Sec. 173.435 for special form Class 7 (radioactive)
material;
(2) 3,000 times the A₂ value of the radionuclides as
specified in Sec. 173.435 for normal form Class 7 (radioactive)
material; or
(3) 1,000 TBq (27,000 Ci), whichever is least.
Limited quantity of Class 7 (radioactive) material means a quantity
of Class 7 (radioactive) material not exceeding the material's package
limits specified in Sec. 173.425 and conforming with requirements
specified in Sec. 173.421.
Low Specific Activity (LSA) material means Class 7 (radioactive)
with limited specific activity which satisfies the descriptions and
limits set forth below. Shielding materials surrounding the LSA
material may not be considered in determining the estimated average
specific activity of the package contents. LSA material must be in of
three groups:
(1) LSA-I:
(i) Uranium and thorium ores, concentrates of uranium and thorium
ores, and other ores containing naturally occurring radionuclides which
are intended to be processed for the use of these radionuclides; or
(ii) Solid unirradiated natural uranium or depleted uranium or
natural thorium or their solid or liquid compounds or mixtures; or
(iii) Radioactive material other than fissile material, for which
the A₂ value is unlimited; or
(iv) Other radioactive material, excluding fissile material in
quantities not excepted under Sec. 173.453, in which the activity is
distributed throughout and the estimated average specific activity does
not exceed 30 times the values for activity concentration specified in
Sec. 173.436, or 30 times the default values listed in Table 10B of
Sec. 173.433.
(2) LSA-II:
(i) Water with tritium concentration up to 0.8 TBq/L (20.0 Ci/L);
or
(ii) Other radioactive material in which the activity is
distributed throughout and the average specific activity does not
exceed 10-\4\ A₂/g for solids and gases, and
10-\5\ A₂/g for liquids.
(3) LSA-III. Solids (e.g., consolidated wastes, activated
materials), excluding powders, that meet the requirements of Sec.
173.468 and in which:
(i) The radioactive material is distributed throughout a solid or a
collection of solid objects, or is essentially uniformly distributed in
a solid compact binding agent (such as concrete, bitumen, ceramic,
etc.);
(ii) The radioactive material is relatively insoluble, or it is
intrinsically contained in a relatively insoluble material, so that,
even under loss of packaging, the loss of Class 7 (radioactive)
material per package by leaching when placed in water for seven days
would not exceed 0.1 A₂; and
(iii) The estimated average specific activity of the solid,
excluding any shielding material, does not exceed 2 x 10-3
A₂/g.
Low toxicity alpha emitters means natural uranium; depleted
uranium; natural thorium; uranium-235 or uranium-238; thorium-232;
thorium-228 and thorium-230 when contained in

[[Page 3672]]

ores or physical and chemical concentrates; and alpha emitters with a
half-life of less than 10 days.
Maximum normal operating pressure means the maximum gauge pressure
that would develop in a containment system during a period of one year,
in the absence of venting or cooling, under the heat conditions
specified in 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1).
Multilateral approval means approval of a package design or
shipment by the relevant Competent Authority of the country of origin
and of each country through or into which the package or shipment is to
be transported. This definition does not include approval from a
country over which Class 7 (radioactive) materials are carried in
aircraft, if there is no scheduled stop in that country.
Natural thorium means thorium with the naturally occurring
distribution of thorium isotopes (essentially 100 percent by weight of
thorium-232).
Normal form Class 7 (radioactive) material means Class 7
(radioactive) which has not been demonstrated to qualify as ``special
form Class 7 (radioactive) material.''
Package means the packaging together with its radioactive contents
as presented for transport.
(1) ``Excepted package'' means a packaging together with its
excepted Class 7 (radioactive) materials as specified in Sec.Sec.
173.421-173.426 and 173.428.
(2) ``Industrial package'' means a packaging that, together with
its low specific activity (LSA) material or surface contaminated object
(SCO) contents, meets the requirements of Sec.Sec. 173.410 and 173.411.
Industrial packages are categorized in Sec. 173.411 as either:
(i) ``Industrial package Type 1 (IP-1)'';
(ii) ``Industrial package Type 2 (IP-2)''; or
(iii) ``Industrial package Type 3 (IP-3)''.
(3) ``Type A package'' means a packaging that, together with its
radioactive contents limited to A₁ or A₂ as
appropriate, meets the requirements of Sec.Sec. 173.410 and 173.412 and
is designed to retain the integrity of containment and shielding
required by this part under normal conditions of transport as
demonstrated by the tests set forth in Sec. 173.465 or Sec. 173.466, as
appropriate. A Type A package does not require Competent Authority
approval.
(4) ``Type B package'' means a packaging designed to transport
greater than an A₁ or A₂ quantity of radioactive
material that, together with its radioactive contents, is designed to
retain the integrity of containment and shielding required by this part
when subjected to the normal conditions of transport and hypothetical
accident test conditions set forth in 10 CFR part 71.
(i) ``Type B(U) package'' means a Type B packaging that, together
with its radioactive contents, for international shipments requires
unilateral approval only of the package design and of any stowage
provisions that may be necessary for heat dissipation.
(ii) ``Type B(M) package'' means a Type B packaging, together with
its radioactive contents, that for international shipments requires
multilateral approval of the package design, and may require approval
of the conditions of shipment. Type B(M) packages are those Type B
package designs which have a maximum normal operating pressure of more
than 700 kPa/cm2 (100 lb/in2) gauge or a relief
device which would allow the release of Class 7 (radioactive) material
to the environment under the hypothetical accident conditions specified
in 10 CFR part 71.
(5) ``Fissile material package'' means a packaging, together with
its fissile material contents, which meets the requirements for fissile
material packages described in subpart E of 10 CFR 71. A fissile
material package may be a Type AF package, a Type B(U)F package, or a
Type B(M)F package.
Packaging means, for Class 7 (radioactive) materials, the assembly
of components necessary to ensure compliance with the packaging
requirements of this subpart. It may consist of one or more
receptacles, absorbent materials, spacing structures, thermal
insulation, radiation shielding, service equipment for filling,
emptying, venting and pressure relief, and devices for cooling or
absorbing mechanical shocks. The conveyance, tie-down system, and
auxiliary equipment may sometimes be designated as part of the
packaging.
Quality assurance means a systematic program of controls and
inspections applied by each person involved in the transport of
radioactive material which provides confidence that a standard of
safety prescribed in this subchapter is achieved in practice.
Radiation level means the radiation dose-equivalent rate expressed
in millisievert(s) per hour or mSv/h (millirems(s) per hour or mrem/h).
Neutron flux densities may be converted into radiation levels according
to Table 1:

Table 1.--Neutron Fluence Rates To Be Regarded as Equivalent to a
Radiation Level of 0.01 MSV/H (1 MREM/H)1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flux density
equivalent to
0.01 mSv/h (1
mrem/h)
Energy of neutron neutrons per
square
centimeter per
second (n/cm2/
s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thermal (2.510E-8) MeV.................................. 272.0
1 keV................................................... 272.0
10 keV.................................................. 281.0
100 keV................................................. 47.0
500 keV................................................. 11.0
1 MeV................................................... 7.5
5 MeV................................................... 6.4
10 MeV.................................................. 6.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Flux densities equivalent for energies between those listed in this
table may be obtained by linear interpolation.

Radioactive contents means a Class 7 (radioactive) material,
together with any contaminated or activated solids, liquids and gases
within the packaging.
Radioactive instrument or article means any manufactured instrument
or article such as an instrument such as an instrument, clock,
electronic tube or apparatus, or similar instrument or article having
Class 7 (radioactive) material in gaseous or non-dispersible solid form
as a component part.
Radioactive material means any material containing radionuclides
where both the activity concentration and the total activity in the
consignment exceed the values specified in the table in Sec. 173.436 or
values derived according to the instructions in Sec. 173.433.
Special form Class 7 (radioactive) material means either an
indispersible solid radioactive material or a sealed capsule containing
radioactive material which satisfies the following conditions:
(1) It is either a single solid piece or a sealed capsule
containing radioactive material that can be opened only by destroying
the capsule;
(2) The piece or capsule has at least one dimension not less than 5
mm (0.2 in); and
(3) It satisfies the test requirements of Sec. 173.469. Special
form encapsulations designed in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 173.389(g) in effect on June 30, 1983 (see 49 CFR part 173,
revised as of October 1, 1982), and constructed prior to July 1, 1985
and special form encapsulations designed in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 173.403 in effect on March 31, 1996 (see 49 CFR
part 173, revised as of October 1, 1995), and constructed prior to
April 1, 1997, may continue to be used. Any other special form

[[Page 3673]]

encapsulation must meet the requirements of this paragraph (3).
Specific activity of a radionuclide means the activity of the
radionuclide per unit mass of that nuclide. The specific activity of a
material in which the radionuclide is essentially uniformly distributed
is the activity per unit mass of the material.
Surface Contaminated Object (SCO) means a solid object which is not
itself radioactive but which has radioactive material distributed on
its surface. SCO exists in two phases:
(1) SCO-I: A solid object on which:
(i) The non-fixed contamination on the accessible surface averaged
over 300 cm\2\ (or the area of the surface if less than 300 cm\2\) does
not exceed 4 Bq/cm\2\ (10-\4\ microcurie/cm\2\ ) for beta
and gamma and low toxicity alpha emitters, or 0.4 Bq/cm\2\
(10-\5\ microcurie/cm\2\) for all other alpha emitters;
(ii) The fixed contamination on the accessible surface averaged
over 300 cm\2\ (or the area of the surface if less than 300 cm\2\) does
not exceed 4 x 104 Bq/cm\2\ (1.0 microcurie/cm\2\) for beta
and gamma and low toxicity alpha emitters, or 4 x 10\3\ Bq/cm\2\ (0.1
microcurie/cm\2\) for all other alpha emitters; and
(iii) The non-fixed contamination plus the fixed contamination on
the inaccessible surface averaged over 300 cm\2\ (or the area of the
surface if less than 300 cm\2\) does not exceed 4 x 10\4\ Bq/cm\2\ (1
microcurie/cm\2\) for beta and gamma and low toxicity alpha emitters,
or 4 x 10\3\ Bq/cm\2\ (0.1 microcurie/cm\2\) for all other alpha
emitters.
(2) SCO-II: A solid object on which the limits for SCO-I are
exceeded and on which:
(i) The non-fixed contamination on the accessible surface averaged
over 300 cm\2\ (or the area of the surface if less than 300 cm\2\) does
not exceed 400 Bq/cm\2\ (10-\2\ microcurie/cm\2\) for beta
and gamma and low toxicity alpha emitters, or 40 Bq/cm\2\
(10-\3\ microcurie/cm\2\) for all other alpha emitters;
(ii) The fixed contamination on the accessible surface averaged
over 300 cm\2\ (or the area of the surface if less than 300 cm\2\) does
not exceed 8 x 10\5\ Bq/cm\2\ (20 microcurie/cm\2\) for beta and gamma
and low toxicity alpha emitters, or 8 x 10\4\ Bq/cm\2\ (2 microcuries/
cm\2\) for all other alpha emitters; and
(iii) The non-fixed contamination plus the fixed contamination on
the inaccessible surface averaged over 300 cm\2\ (or the area of the
surface if less than 300 cm\2\) does not exceed 8 x 10\5\ Bq/cm\2\ (20
microcuries/cm\2\) for beta and gamma and low toxicity alpha emitters,
or 8 x 10\4\ Bq/cm\2\ (2 microcuries/cm\2\) for all other alpha
emitters.
Transport index (TI) means the dimensionless number (rounded up to
the next tenth) placed on the label of a package, to designate the
degree of control to be exercised by the carrier during transportation.
The transport index is determined by multiplying the maximum radiation
level in millisieverts (mSv) per hour at 1 m (3.3 ft) from the external
surface of the package by 100 (equivalent to the maximum radiation
level in millirem per hour at 1 m (3.3 ft)).
Type A quantity means a quantity of Class 7 (radioactive) material,
the aggregate radioactivity which does not exceed A₁ for
special form Class 7 (radioactive) material of A₂ for normal
form Class 7 (radioactive) material, where A₁ and
A₂ values are given in Sec.173.435 or are determined in
accordance with Sec.173.433.
Type B quantity means a quantity of material greater than a Type A
quantity.
Unilateral approval means approval of a package design solely by
the Competent Authority of the country of origin of the design.
Unirradiated thorium means thorium containing not more than
10-\7\ grams uranium-233 per gram of thorium-232.
Unirradiated uranium means uranium containing not more than 2 x
10\3\ Bq of plutonium per gram of uranium-235, not more than 9 x 10\6\
Bq of fission products per gram of uranium-235 and not more than 5 x
10-\3\ g of uranium-236 per gram of uranium-235.
Uranium--natural, depleted or enriched means the following:
(1)(i) ``Natural uranium'' means chemically separated uranium
containing the naturally occurring distribution of uranium isotopes
(approximately 99.28% uranium-238 and 0.72% uranium-235 by mass).
(ii) ``Depleted uranium'' means uranium containing a lesser mass
percentage of uranium-235 than in natural uranium.
(iii) ``Enriched uranium'' means uranium containing a greater mass
percentage of uranium-235 than 0.72%.
(2) In all cases listed in this definition, a very small mass
percentage of uranium-234 is present.

0
16. In Sec.173.411, paragraph (b)(5)(ii) is revised to read as follows:

Sec.173.411 Industrial packagings.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) * * *
(ii) Be designed to conform to the standards prescribed in ISO
1496-1: 1990(E) ``Series 1 Freight Containers--Specification and
testing--Part 1: General cargo containers,'' excluding dimensions and
ratings (IBR, see Sec.171.7 of this subchapter);
* * * * *

0
17. In Sec. 173.415, paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) are revised to read as
follows:

Sec. 173.415 Authorized Type A packages.

* * * * *
(a) DOT Specification 7A (see Sec. 178.350 of this subchapter) Type
A general packaging. Each offeror of a Specification 7A package must
maintain on file for at least one year after the latest shipment, and
shall provide to DOT on request, complete documentation of tests and an
engineering evaluation or comparative data showing that the
construction methods, packaging design, and materials of construction
comply with that specification.
* * * * *
(c) Any Type B(U) or Type B(M) packaging authorized pursuant to
Sec. 173.416.
(d) Any foreign-made packaging that meets the standards in ``IAEA
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material No. TS-R-1''
(IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter) and bears the marking ``Type
A''. Such packagings may be subsequently used for domestic and export
shipments of Class 7 (radioactive) materials provided the offeror
obtains the applicable documentation of tests and engineering
evaluations and maintains the documentation on file in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section. These packagings must conform with
requirements of the country of origin (as indicated by the packaging
marking) and the IAEA regulations applicable to Type A packagings.

0
18. Section 173.416 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.416 Authorized Type B packages.

Each of the following packages is authorized for shipment of
quantities exceeding A₁ or A₂, as appropriate:
(a) Any Type B(U) or Type B(M) packaging that meets the applicable
requirements of 10 CFR part 71 and that has been approved by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission may be shipped pursuant to Sec. 173.471.
(b) Any Type B(U) or B(M) packaging that meets the applicable
requirements in ``IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1'' (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this
subchapter) and for which the foreign Competent Authority Certificate
has been revalidated by DOT pursuant to Sec. 173.473. These packagings
are authorized only for export and import shipments.

[[Page 3674]]

(c) Continued use of an existing Type B packaging constructed to
DOT Specification 6M, 20WC, or 21WC is authorized until October 1, 2008
if it conforms in all aspects to the requirements of this subchapter in
effect on October 1, 2003.

0
19. Section 173.417 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.417 Authorized fissile materials packages.

(a) Except as provided in Sec. 173.453, fissile materials
containing not more than A₁ or A₂ as appropriate,
must be packaged in one of the following packagings:
(1)(i) Any packaging listed in Sec. 173.415, limited to the Class 7
(radioactive) materials specified in 10 CFR part 71, subpart C;
(ii) Any Type AF, Type B(U)F, or Type B(M)F packaging that meets
the applicable standards for fissile material packages in 10 CFR part
71; or
(iii) Any Type AF, Type B(U)F, or Type B(M)F packaging that meets
the applicable requirements for fissile material packages in Section VI
of the International Atomic Energy Agency ``Regulations for the Safe
Transport of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1 (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of
this subchapter),'' and for which the foreign Competent Authority
certificate has been revalidated by the U.S. Competent Authority, in
accordance with Sec. 173.473. These packages are authorized only for
export and import shipments.
(2) A residual ``heel'' of enriched solid uranium hexafluoride may
be transported without a protective overpack in any metal cylinder that
meets both the requirements of Sec. 173.415 and Sec. 178.350 of this
subchapter for Specification 7A Type A packaging, and the requirements
of Sec. 173.420 for packagings containing greater than 0.1 kg of
uranium hexafluoride. Any such shipment must be made in accordance with
Table 2, as follows:

Table 2.--Allowable Content of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6 ``Heels'' in a Specification 7A Cylinder
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum cylinder diameter Cylinder volume Maximum Maximum ``Heel'' weight per cylinder
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- uranium 235-----------------------------------------------------
enrichment UF6 Uranium-235
Centimeters Inches Liters Cubic feet (weight) ----------------------------------------------------
percent kg lb kg lb
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12.7.......................................... 5 8.8 0.311 100.0 0.045 0.1 0.031 0.07
20.3.......................................... 8 39.0 1.359 12.5 0.227 0.5 0.019 0.04
30.5.......................................... 12 68.0 2.410 5.0 0.454 1.0 0.015 0.03
76.0.......................................... 30 725.0 25.64 5.0 11.3 25.0 0.383 0.84
122.0......................................... 48 3,084.0 \1\ 108.9 4.5 22.7 50.0 0.690 1.52
122.0......................................... 48 4,041.0 \2\ 142.7 4.5 22.7 50.0 0.690 1.52
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 10 ton.
\2\ 14 ton.

(3) DOT Specification 20PF-1, 20PF-2, or 20PF-3 (see Sec. 178.356
of this subchapter), or Specification 21PF-1A, 21PF-1B, or 21PF-2 (see
Sec. 178.358 of this subchapter) phenolic-foam insulated overpack with
snug fittings inner metal cylinders, meeting all requirements of
Sec.Sec. 173.24, 173.410, 173.412, and 173.420 and the following:
(i) Handling procedures and packaging criteria must be in
accordance with United States Enrichment Corporation Report No. USEC-
651 or ANSI N14.1 (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter); and
(ii) Quantities of uranium hexafluoride are authorized as shown in
Table 3 of this section, with each package assigned a minimum
criticality safety index as also shown.
(b) Fissile Class 7 (radioactive) materials with radioactive
content exceeding A₁ or A₂ must be packaged in
one of the following packagings:
(1) Type B(U), or Type B(M) packaging that meets the standards for
packaging of fissile materials in 10 CFR part 71, and is approved by
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and used in accordance with Sec.
173.471;
(2) Type B(U) or Type B(M) packaging that also meets the applicable
requirements for fissile material packaging in Section VI of the
International Atomic Energy Agency ``Regulations for the Safe Transport
of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1,'' and for which the foreign
Competent Authority certificate has been revalidated by the U.S.
Competent Authority in accordance with Sec. 173.473. These packagings
are authorized only for import and export shipments; or
(3) DOT Specifications 20PF-1, 20PF-2, or 20PF-3 (see Sec. 178.356
of this subchapter), for DOT Specifications 21PF-1A or 21PF-1B (see
Sec. 178.356 of this subchapter) phenolic-foam insulated overpack with
snug fitting inner metal cylinders, meeting all requirements of
Sec.Sec. 173.24, 173.410, and 173.412, and the following:
(i) Handling procedures and packaging criteria must be in
accordance with United States Enrichment Corporation Report No. USEC-
651 or ANSI N14.1; and
(ii) Quantities of uranium hexafluoride are authorized as shown in
Table 3, with each package assigned a minimum criticality safety index
as also shown:

Table 3.--Authorized Quantities of Uranium Hexafluoride
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum inner cyclinder Maximum weight of UF6 contents Maximum U-235
diameter -------------------------------- enrichment Minimum
Protective overpack specification number -------------------------------- (weight/ criticality
Centimeters Inches Kilograms Pounds percent) safety index
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20PF-1.................................................. 12.7 5 25 55 100.0 0.1
20PF-2.................................................. 20.3 8 116 255 12.5 0.4
20PF-3.................................................. 30.5 12 209 460 5.0 1.1
21PF-1A \1\ or 21PF-1B \1\.............................. \2\76.0 \2\30 2,250 4,950 5.0 5.0
21PF-1A\1\ or 21PF-1B\1\................................ \3\76.0 \3\30 2,282 5,020 5.0 5.0

[[Page 3675]]

21PF-2\1\............................................... \2\76.0 \2\30 2,250 4,950 5.0 5.0
21PF-2\1\............................................... \3\76.0 \3\30 2,282 5,020 5.0 5.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For 76 cm (30 in) cylinders, the maximum H/U atomic ratio is 0.088.
\2\ Model 30A inner cylinder (reference USEC-651).
\3\ Model 30B inner cylinder (reference USEC-651).

(c) Continued use of an existing fissile material packaging
constructed to DOT Specification 6L, 6M, or 1A2, is authorized until
October 1, 2008 if it conforms in all respects to the requirements of
this subchapter in effect on October 1, 2003.
0
20. Section 173.420 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.420 Uranium hexafluoride (fissile, fissile excepted and non-
fissile).

(a) In addition to any other applicable requirements of this
subchapter, quantities greater than 0.1 kg of fissile, fissile excepted
or non-fissile uranium hexafluoride must be offered for transportation
as follows:
(1) Before initial filling and during periodic inspection and test,
packagings must be cleaned in accordance with American National
Standard N14.1 (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter).
(2) Packagings must be designed, fabricated, inspected, tested and
marked in accordance with--
(i) American National Standard N14.1 in effect at the time the
packaging was manufactured;
(ii) Specifications for Class DOT-106A multi-unit tank car tanks
(see Sec.Sec. 179.300 and 179.301 of this subchapter);
(iii) Section VIII of the ASME Code (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this
subchapter), provided the packaging--
(A) Was manufactured on or before June 30, 1987;
(B) Conforms to the edition of the ASME Code in effect at the time
the packaging was manufactured;
(C) Is used within its original design limitations; and
(D) Has shell and head thicknesses that have not decreased below
the minimum value specified in the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum
thickness;
Packaging model millimeters
(inches)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1S, 2S............................................... 1.58 (0.062)
5A, 5B, 8A........................................... 3.17 (0.125)
12A, 12B............................................. 4.76 (0.187)
30B.................................................. 7.93 (0.312)
48A, F, X, and Y..................................... 12.70 (0.500)
48T, O, OM, OM Allied, HX, H, and G.................. 6.35 (0.250)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(3) Each package shall be designed so that it will:
(i) withstand a hydraulic test at an internal pressure of at least
1.4 MPa (200 psi) without leakage;
(ii) withstand the test specified in Sec. 173.465(c) without loss
or dispersal of the uranium hexafluoride; and
(iii) withstand the test specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4) without
rupture of the containment system.
(4) Uranium hexafluoride must be in solid form.
(5) The volume of solid uranium hexafluoride, except solid depleted
uranium hexafluoride, at 20£C (68£ F) may
not exceed 61% of the certified volumetric capacity of the packaging.
The volume of solid depleted uranium hexafluoride at 20£
C (68£ F) may not exceed 62% of the certified volumetric
capacity of the packaging.
(6) The pressure in the package at 20£ C
(68£ F) must be less than 101.3 kPa (14.8 psig).
(b) Each packaging for uranium hexafluoride must be periodically
inspected, tested, marked and otherwise conform with the American
National Standard N14.1.
(c) Each repair to a packaging for uranium hexafluoride must be
performed in accordance with the American National Standard N14.1.
(d) Non-fissile uranium hexafluoride, in quantities of less than
0.1 kg, may be shipped in packaging that meets Sec.Sec. 173.24,
173.24a, and 173.410.

0
21. In Sec. 173.421, paragraph (a) introductory text is revised to read
as follows:

Sec. 173.421 Excepted packages for limited quantities of Class 7
(radioactive) materials.

(a) A Class 7 (radioactive) material with an activity per package
which does not exceed the limited quantity package limits specified in
Table 4 in Sec. 173.425, and its packaging, are excepted from
requirements in this subchapter for specification packaging, labeling,
marking (except for the UN identification number marking requirement
described in Sec. 173.422(a)), and if not a hazardous substance or
hazardous waste, shipping papers, and the requirements of this subpart
if:
* * * * *

0
22. Section 173.422 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.422 Additional requirements for excepted packages containing
Class 7 (radioactive) materials.

An excepted package of Class 7 (radioactive) material that is
prepared for shipment under the provisions of Sec. 173.421, Sec.
173.424, Sec. 173.426, or Sec. 173.428 is not subject to any additional
requirements of this subchapter, except for the following:
(a) The outside of each package must be marked with the four digit
UN identification number for the material preceded by the letters UN,
as shown in column (4) of the Hazardous Materials Table in Sec. 172.101
of this subchapter;
(b) Sections 171.15 and 171.16 of this subchapter, pertaining to
the reporting of incidents;
(c) Sections 174.750, 175.700(b), and 176.710 of this subchapter
(depending on the mode of transportation), pertaining to the reporting
of decontamination;
(d) The training requirements of subpart H of part 172 of this
subchapter; and
(e) For materials that meet the definition of a hazardous substance
or a hazardous waste, the shipping paper requirements of subpart C of
part 172 of this subchapter.

0
23. Section 173.424 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.424 Excepted packages for radioactive instruments and
articles.

A radioactive instrument or article and its packaging are excepted
from requirements in this subchapter for specification packaging,
labeling, marking (except for the UN identification number marking
requirement described in Sec. 173.422(a)), and if not a hazardous
substance or

[[Page 3676]]

hazardous waste, shipping papers and the requirements of this subpart
if:
(a) Each package meets the general design requirements of Sec.
173.410;
(b) The activity of the instrument or article does not exceed the
relevant limit listed in Table 4 in Sec. 173.425;
(c) The total activity per package does not exceed the relevant
limit listed in Table 4 in Sec. 173.425;
(d) The radiation level at 10 cm (4 in) from any point on the
external surface of any unpackaged instrument or article does not
exceed 0.1 mSv/hour (10 mrem/hour);
(e) The active material is completely enclosed by non-active
components (a device performing the sole function of containing
radioactive material shall not be considered to be an instrument or
manufactured article);
(f) The radiation level at any point on the external surface of a
package bearing the article or instrument does not exceed 0.005 mSv/
hour (0.5 mrem/hour), or, for exclusive use domestic shipments, 0.02
mSv/hour (2 mrem/hour);
(g) The nonfixed (removable) radioactive surface contamination on
the external surface of the package does not exceed the limits
specified in Sec. 173.443(a);
(h) Except as provided in Sec. 173.426, the package does not
contain more than 15 g of uranium-235; and
(i) The package is otherwise prepared for shipment as specified in
Sec. 173.422.

Sec. 173.425 [Amended]

0
24. In Sec. 173.425:
0
a. In the introductory text, ``table 7'' is revised to read ``Table
4''.
b. In the table heading the wording ``TABLE 7'' is revised to read
``TABLE 4''.

0
25. In Sec. 173.426, the introductory text is revised to read as
follows:

Sec. 173.426 Excepted packages for articles containing natural uranium
or thorium.

A manufactured article in which the sole Class 7 (radioactive)
material content is natural uranium, unirradiated depleted uranium or
natural thorium, and its packaging, are excepted from the requirements
in this subchapter for specification packaging, labeling, marking
(except for the UN identification number marking requirement described
in Sec. 173.422(a)), and if not a hazardous substance or hazardous
waste, shipping papers and the requirements of this subpart if:
* * * * *

0
26. Section 173.427 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.427 Transport requirements for low specific activity (LSA)
Class 7 (radioactive) materials and surface contaminated objects (SCO).

(a) In addition to other applicable requirements specified in this
subchapter, LSA materials and SCO, unless excepted by paragraph (c) or
(d) of this section, must be packaged in accordance with paragraph (b)
of this section and, unless excepted by paragraph (d) of this section,
must be transported in accordance with the following conditions:
(1) The external dose rate may not exceed an external radiation
level of 10 mSv/h (1 rem/h) at 3 m from the unshielded material;
(2) The quantity of LSA and SCO material in any single conveyance
may not exceed the limits specified in Table 5;
(3) LSA material and SCO that are or contain fissile material must
conform to the applicable requirements of Sec. 173.453;
(4) Packaged and unpackaged Class 7 (radioactive) materials must
conform to the contamination control limits specified in Sec. 173.443;
(5) External radiation levels may not exceed those specified in
Sec. 173.441; and
(6) For LSA material and SCO consigned as exclusive use:
(i) Shipments shall be loaded by the consignor and unloaded by the
consignee from the conveyance or freight container in which originally
loaded;
(ii) There may be no loose radioactive material in the conveyance;
however, when the conveyance is the packaging, there may not be any
leakage of radioactive material from the conveyance;
(iii) Packaged and unpackaged Class 7 (radioactive) materials must
be braced so as to prevent shifting of lading under conditions normally
incident to transportation;
(iv) Specific instructions for maintenance of exclusive use
shipment controls shall be provided by the offeror to the carrier. Such
instructions must be included with the shipping paper information;
(v) Except for shipments of unconcentrated uranium or thorium ores,
the transport vehicle must be placarded in accordance with subpart F of
part 172 of this subchapter;
(vi) For domestic transportation only, packaged and unpackaged
Class 7 (radioactive) materials containing less than an A₂
quantity are excepted from the marking and labeling requirements of
this subchapter. However, the exterior of each package or unpackaged
Class 7 (radioactive) materials must be stenciled or otherwise marked
``RADIOACTIVE--LSA'' or ``RADIOACTIVE--SCO'', as appropriate, and
packages or unpackaged Class 7 (radioactive) materials that contain a
hazardous substance must be stenciled or otherwise marked with the
letters ``RQ'' in association with the description in this paragraph
(a)(6)(vi); and
(vii) Transportation by aircraft is prohibited except when
transported in an industrial package in accordance with Table 6 of this
section, or in an authorized Type A or Type B package.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, LSA
material and SCO must be packaged as follows:
(1) In an industrial package (IP-1, IP-2 or IP-3; Sec. 173.411),
subject to the limitations of Table 6;
(2) In a DOT Specification 7A (Sec. 178.350 of this subchapter)
Type A package;
(3) In any Type B, B(U), or B(M) packaging authorized pursuant to
Sec. 173.416;
(4) For domestic, exclusive use transport of less than an
A₂ quantity only, in a packaging which meets the
requirements of Sec.Sec. 173.24, 173.24a, and 173.410; or
(5) For exclusive use transport of liquid LSA-I only, in either:
(i) Specification 103CW, 111A60W7 (Sec.Sec. 179.200, 179.201,
179.202 of this subchapter) tank cars. Bottom openings in tanks are
prohibited; or
(ii) Specification MC 310, MC 311, MC 312, MC 331 or DOT 412 (Sec.
178.348 or Sec. 178.337 of this subchapter) cargo tank motor vehicles.
Bottom outlets are not authorized. Trailer-on-flat-car service is not
authorized.
(c) LSA material and SCO in groups LSA-I and SCO-I may be
transported unpackaged under the following conditions:
(1) All unpackaged material, other than ores containing only
naturally occurring radionuclides, shall be transported in such a
manner that under normal conditions of transport there will be no
escape of the radioactive contents from the conveyance nor will there
be any loss of shielding;
(2) Each conveyance must be under exclusive use, except when only
transporting SCO-I on which the contamination on the accessible and the
inaccessible surfaces is not greater than 4.0 Bq/cm2 for
beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters and 0.4 Bq/
cm2 for all other alpha emitters; and
(3) For SCO-I where it is suspected that non-fixed contamination
exists on inaccessible surfaces in excess of the values specified in
paragraph (c)(2) of this section, measures shall be taken to

[[Page 3677]]

ensure that the radioactive material is not released into the
conveyance or to the environment.
(d) LSA and SCO that exceed the packaging limits in this section
must be packaged in accordance with 10 CFR part 71.
(e) Tables 5 and 6 are as follows:

Table 5.--Conveyance Activity Limits for LSA Material and SCO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nature of material Activity limit for conveyances
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. LSA-I................................ No limit.
2. LSA-II and LSA-III; non-Combustible No limit.
solids.
3. LSA-II and LSA-III; Combustible 100 A2
solids and all liquids and gases.
4. SCO.................................. 100 A2
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 6.--Industrial Package Integrity Requirements for LSA Material and
SCO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Industrial packaging type
------------------------------------
Contents Exclusive use Non exclusive
shipment use shipment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. LSA-I:
Solid.......................... IP-1 IP-1
Liquid......................... IP-1 IP-2
2. LSA-II:
Solid.......................... IP-2 IP-2
Liquid and gas................. IP-2 IP-3
3. LSA-III: IP-2 IP-3
SCO-I.......................... IP-1 IP-1
SCO-II......................... IP-2 IP-2
------------------------------------------------------------------------

0
27. In Sec. 173.428, the introductory text is revised, paragraphs (c),
(d) and (e) are redesignated as paragraphs (d), (e) and (f)
respectively, and a new paragraph (c) is added to read as follows:

Sec. 173.428 Empty Class 7 (radioactive) materials packaging.

A packaging which previously contained Class 7 (radioactive)
materials and has been emptied of contents as far as practical, is
excepted from the shipping paper and marking (except for the UN
identification number marking requirement described in Sec. 173.422(a))
requirements of this subchapter, provided that--
* * * * *
(c) The outer surface of any uranium or thorium in its structure is
covered with an inactive sheath made of metal or some other substantial
material;
* * * * *

0
28. In Sec. 173.431, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.431 Activity limits for Type A and Type B packages.

* * * * *
(b) The limits on activity contained in a Type B(U) or Type B(M)
package are those prescribed in Sec.Sec. 173.416 and 173.417, or in the
applicable approval certificate under Sec.Sec. 173.471, 173.472 or
173.473.

0
29. Section 173.433 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.433 Requirements for determining basic radionuclide values,
and for the listing of radionuclides on shipping papers and labels.

(a) For individual radionuclides listed in the table in Sec.
173.435 and Sec. 173.436:
(1) A₁ and A₂ values are given in the table
in Sec. 173.435; and
(2) Activity concentration exemption values and consignment
activity exemption values are given in the table in Sec. 173.436.
(b) For individual radionuclides which are not listed in the tables
in Sec. 173.435 or Sec. 173.436:
(1) the radionuclide values in Tables 7 or 8 of this section may be
used; or
(2) other basic radionuclide values may be used provided they are
first approved by the Associate Administrator or, for international
transport, multilateral approval is obtained from the pertinent
Competent Authorities.
(c) In calculating A₁ or A₂ values for a
radionuclide not listed in the table in Sec. 173.435:
(1) Where the chemical form of each radionuclide is known, it is
permissible to use the A₂ value related to its solubility
class as recommended by the International Commission on Radiological
Protection, if the chemical forms under both normal and accident
conditions of transport are taken into consideration.
(2) A single radioactive decay chain in which the radionuclides are
present in their naturally-occurring proportions, and in which no
daughter nuclide has a half life either longer than 10 days or longer
than that of the parent nuclide, will be considered as a single
radionuclide, and the activity to be taken into account and the
A₁ or A₂ value to be applied will be those
corresponding to the parent nuclide of that chain. Otherwise, the
parent and daughter nuclides will be considered as a mixture of
different nuclides.
(d) Mixtures of radionuclides whose identities and respective
activities are known must conform to the following conditions:
(1) For special form Class 7 (radioactive) material, the activity
which may be transported in a Type A package must satisfy:
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.001

Where:

B(i) is the activity of radionuclide i in special form; and
A₁ (i) is the A₁ value for radionuclide i.
(2) For normal form Class 7 (radioactive) material, the activity
which may be transported in a Type A package must satisfy:
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.002

Where:

C(j) is the activity of radionuclide j in normal form; and
A₂(j) is the A₂ value for radionuclide j.

(3) If the package contains both special and normal form Class 7
(radioactive) material, the activity which may be transported in a Type
A package must satisfy:
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.003

Where:

The symbols are defined as in paragraphs (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this
section.

(4) Alternatively, the A₁ value for a mixture of special
form material may be determined as follows:
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.004

Where:

f(i) is the fraction of activity for radionuclide i in the mixture; and
A₁(i) is the appropriate A₁ value for
radionuclide i.

(5) Alternatively, the A₂ value for mixtures of normal
form material may be determined as follows:
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.005

Where:

f(i) is the fraction of activity for normal form radionuclide i in the
mixture; and
A₂(i) is the appropriate A₂ value for
radionuclide i.

(6) The exempt activity concentration for mixtures of nuclides may
be determined as follows:

[[Page 3678]]

[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.006

Where:

f(i) is the fraction of activity concentration of nuclide i in the
mixture; and
[A]
(i) is the activity concentration for exempt material containing
nuclide i.

(7) The activity limit for an exempt consignment for mixtures of
nuclides may be determined as follows:
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.007

Where:

f(i) is the fraction of activity of nuclide i in the mixture; and
A(i) is the activity limit for exempt consignments for nuclide i.

(e) When the identity of each nuclide is known but the individual
activities of some of the radionuclides are not known, the
radionuclides may be grouped and the lowest A₁ or
A₂ value, as appropriate, for the radionuclides in each
group may be used in applying the formulas in paragraphs (d)(1) through
(d)(5) of this section. Groups may be based on the total alpha activity
and the total beta/gamma activity when these are known, using the
lowest A₁ or A₂ values for the alpha emitters or
beta/gamma emitters, respectively.
(f) When the identity of each nuclide is known but the individual
activities of some of the radionuclides are not known, the
radionuclides may be grouped and the lowest [A]
(activity concentration
for exempt material) or A (activity limit for exempt consignment)
value, as appropriate, for the radionuclides in each group may be used
in applying the formulas in paragraphs (d)(6) and (d)(7) of this
section. Groups may be based on the total alpha activity and the total
beta/gamma activity when these are known, using the lowest [A]
or A
values for the alpha emitters or beta/gamma emitters, respectively.
(g) Shipping papers and labeling. For mixtures of radionuclides,
the radionuclides (n) that must be shown on shipping papers and labels
in accordance with Sec.Sec. 172.203 and 172.403 of this subchapter,
respectively, must be determined on the basis of the following formula:
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED]
TR26JA04.008

Where:

n + m represents all the radionuclides in the mixture;
m are the radionuclides that do not need to be considered;
a_(i) is the activity of radionuclide i in the mixture; and
A_(i) is the A₁ or A₂ value, as
appropriate for radionuclide i.

(h) Tables 7 and 8 are as follows:

Table 7.--General Values for A1 and A2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A1 A2
Radioactive contents ---------------------------------------------------------------
(TBq) (Ci) (TBq) (Ci)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Only beta or gamma emitting nuclides are 1 x 10-1 2.7 x 100 2 x 10-2 5.4 x 10-1
known to be present............................
2. Only alpha emitting nuclides are known to be 2 x 10-1 5.4 x 100 9 x 10-5 2.4 x 10-3
present........................................
3. No relevant data are available............... 1 x 10-3 2.7 x 10-2 9 x 10-5 2.4 x 10-3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 8.--General Exemption Values
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity concentration for Activity limits for exempt
exempt material consignments
Radioactive contents ---------------------------------------------------------------
(Bq/g) (Ci/g) (Bq) Ci)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Only beta or gamma emitting nuclides are 1 x 101 2.7 x 10-10 1 x 104 2.7 x 10-7
known to be present............................
2. Only alpha emitting nuclides are known to be 1 x 10-1 2.7 x 10-12 1 x 103 2.7 x 10-8
present........................................
3. No relevant data are available............... 1 x 10-1 2.7 x 10-12 1 x 103 2.7 x 10-8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

0
30. Section 173.435 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.435 Table of A₁ and A₂ values for
radionuclides.

The table of A₁ and A₂ values for
radionuclides is as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific activity
Symbol of radionuclide Element and atomic A1 (TBq) A1 (Ci) A2 (TBq) A2 (Ci) --------------------------------------------
number (TBq/g) (Ci/g)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ac-225 (a)....................... Actinium (89)....... 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 6.0x10-3 1.6x10-1 2.1x103 5.8x104

[[Page 3679]]

Ac-227 (a)....................... .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 9.0x10-5 2.4x10-3 2.7 7.2x101
Ac-228........................... .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 8.4x104 2.2x106
Ag-105........................... Silver (47)......... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 1.1x103 3.0x104
Ag-108m (a)...................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 9.7x10-1 2.6x101
Ag-110m (a)...................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.8x102 4.7x103
Ag-111........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 5.8x103 1.6x105
Al-26............................ Aluminum (13)....... 1.0x10-1 2.7 1.0x10-1 2.7 7.0x10-4 1.9x10-2
Am-241........................... Americium (95)...... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 1.3x10-1 3.4
Am-242m (a)...................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 3.6x10-1 1.0x101
Am-243 (a)....................... .................... 5.0 1.4x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 7.4x10-3 2.0x10-1
Ar-37............................ Argon (18).......... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.7x103 9.9x104
Ar-39............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x101 5.4x102 1.3 3.4x101
Ar-41............................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 1.5x106 4.2x107
As-72............................ Arsenic (33)........ 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 6.2x104 1.7x106
As-73............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 8.2x102 2.2x104
As-74............................ .................... 1.0 2.7x101 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 3.7x103 9.9x104
As-76............................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 5.8x104 1.6x106
As-77............................ .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 3.9x104 1.0x106
At-211 (a)....................... Astatine (85)....... 2.0x101 5.4x102 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 7.6x104 2.1x106
Au-193........................... Gold (79)........... 7.0 1.9x102 2.0 5.4x101 3.4x104 9.2x105
Au-194........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 1.5x104 4.1x105
Au-195........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 6.0 1.6x102 1.4x102 3.7x103
Au-198........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 9.0x103 2.4x105
Au-199........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 7.7x103 2.1x105
Ba-131 (a)....................... Barium (56)......... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 3.1x103 8.4x104
Ba-133........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 9.4 2.6x102
Ba-133m.......................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.2x104 6.1x105
Ba-140 (a)....................... .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 3.0x10-1 8.1 2.7x103 7.3x104
Be-7............................. Beryllium (4)....... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x101 5.4x102 1.3x104 3.5x105
Be-10............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 8.3x10-4 2.2x10-2
Bi-205........................... Bismuth (83)........ 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 1.5x10-3 4.2x104
Bi-206........................... .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.8x103 1.0x105
Bi-207........................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 1.9 5.2x101
Bi-210........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 4.6x103 1.2x105
Bi-210m (a)...................... .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 2.1x10-5 5.7x10-4
Bi-212 (a)....................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 5.4x105 1.5x107
Bk-247........................... Berkelium (97)...... 8.0 2.2x102 8.0x10-4 2.2x10-2 3.8x10-2 1.0
Bk-249 (a)....................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0x10-1 8.1 6.1x101 1.6x103
Br-76............................ Bromine (35)........ 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 9.4x104 2.5x106
Br-77............................ .................... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 2.6x104 7.1x105
Br-82............................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x104 1.1x106
C-11............................. Carbon (6).......... 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.1x107 8.4x108
C-14............................. .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0 8.1x101 1.6x10-1 4.5
Ca-41............................ Calcium (20)........ Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 3.1x10-3 8.5x10-2
Ca-45............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0 2.7x101 6.6x102 1.8x104
Ca-47 (a)........................ .................... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0x10-1 8.1 2.3x104 6.1x105
Cd-109........................... Cadmium (48)........ 3.0x101 8.1x102 2.0 5.4x101 9.6x101 2.6x103
Cd-113m.......................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 8.3 2.2x102
Cd-115 (a)....................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.9x104 5.1x105
Cd-115m.......................... .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 9.4x102 2.5x104
Ce-139........................... Cerium (58)......... 7.0 1.9x102 2.0 5.4x101 2.5x102 6.8x103
Ce-141........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.1x103 2.8x104
Ce-143........................... .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.5x104 6.6x105
Ce-144 (a)....................... .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 1.2x102 3.2x103
Cf-248........................... Californium (98).... 4.0x101 1.1x103 6.0x10-3 1.6x10-1 5.8x101 1.6x103
Cf-249........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 8.0x10-4 2.2x10-2 1.5x10-1 4.1
Cf-250........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x10-3 5.4x10-2 4.0 1.1x102
Cf-251........................... .................... 7.0 1.9x102 7.0x10-4 1.9x10-2 5.9x10-2 1.6
Cf-252 (h)....................... .................... 5.0x10-2 1.4 3.0x10-3 8.1x10-2 2.0x101 5.4x102
Cf-253 (a)....................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x10-2 1.1 1.1x103 2.9x104
Cf-254........................... .................... 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 3.1x102 8.5x103
Cl-36............................ Chlorine (17)....... 1.0x101 2.7x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.2x10-3 3.3x10-2
Cl-38............................ .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 4.9x106 1.3x108
Cm-240........................... Curium (96)......... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 7.5x102 2.0x104
Cm-241........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 1.0 2.7x101 6.1x102 1.7x104
Cm-242........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0x10-2 2.7x10-1 1.2x102 3.3x103
Cm-243........................... .................... 9.0 2.4x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 1.9x10-3 5.2x101
Cm-244........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x10-3 5.4x10-2 3.0 8.1x101
Cm-245........................... .................... 9.0 2.4x102 9.0x10-4 2.4x10-2 6.4x10-3 1.7x10-1
Cm-246........................... .................... 9.0 2.4x102 9.0x10-4 2.4x10-2 1.1x10-2 3.1x10-1
Cm-247 (a)....................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 3.4x10-6 9.3x10-5
Cm-248........................... .................... 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 3.0x10-4 8.1x10-3 1.6x10-5 4.2x10-3

[[Page 3680]]

Co-55............................ Cobalt (27)......... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 1.1x105 3.1x106
Co-56............................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 1.1x103 3.0x104
Co-57............................ .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 3.1x102 8.4x103
Co-58............................ .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 1.2x103 3.2x104
Co-58m........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.2x105 5.9x106
Co-60............................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.2x101 1.1x103
Cr-51............................ Chromium (24)....... 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.4x103 9.2x104
Cs-129........................... Cesium (55)......... 4.0 1.1x102 4.0 1.1x102 2.8x104 7.6x105
Cs-131........................... .................... 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.8x103 1.0x105
Cs-132........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 5.7x103 1.5x105
Cs-134........................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 4.8x101 1.3x103
Cs-134m.......................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.0x105 8.0x106
Cs-135........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0 2.7x101 4.3x10-5 1.2x10-3
Cs-136........................... .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 2.7x103 7.3x104
Cs-137 (a)....................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.2 8.7x101
Cu-64............................ Copper (29)......... 6.0 1.6x102 1.0 2.7x101 1.4x105 3.9x106
Cu-67............................ .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 2.8x104 7.6x105
Dy-159........................... Dysprosium (66)..... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.1x102 5.7x103
Dy-165........................... .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.0x105 8.2x106
Dy-166 (a)....................... .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 3.0x10-1 8.1 8.6x103 2.3x105
Er-169........................... Erbium (68)......... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0 2.7x101 3.1x103 8.3x104
Er-171........................... .................... 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 9.0x104 2.4x106
Eu-147........................... Europium (63)....... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 1.4x103 3.7x104
Eu-148........................... .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 6.0x102 1.6x104
Eu-149........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x101 5.4x102 3.5x102 9.4x103
Eu-150 (short lived)............. .................... 2.0 5.4x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 6.1x104 1.6x106
Eu-150 (long lived).............. .................... 7 x 10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 6.1x104 1.6x106
Eu-152........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 6.5 1.8x102
Eu-152m.......................... .................... 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 8.2x104 2.2x106
Eu-154........................... .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 9.8 2.6x102
Eu-155........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 3.0 8.1x101 1.8x101 4.9x102
Eu-156........................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 2.0x103 5.5x104
F-18............................. Fluorine (9)........ 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.5x106 9.5x107
Fe-52 (a)........................ Iron (26)........... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 2.7x105 7.3x106
Fe-55............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 8.8x101 2.4x103
Fe-59............................ .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 1.8x103 5.0x104
Fe-60 (a)........................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x10-1 5.4 7.4x10-4 2.0x10-2
Ga-67............................ Gallium (31)........ 7.0 1.9x102 3.0 8.1x101 2.2x104 6.0x105
Ga-68............................ .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 1.5x106 4.1x107
Ga-72............................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.1x105 3.1x106
Gd-146 (a)....................... Gadolinium (64)..... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 6.9x102 1.9x104
Gd-148........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x10-3 5.4x10-2 1.2 3.2x101
Gd-153........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 9.0 2.4x102 1.3x102 3.5x103
Gd-159........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.9x104 1.1x106
Ge-68 (a)........................ Germanium (32)...... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 2.6x102 7.1x103
Ge-71............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 5.8x103 1.6x105
Ge-77............................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 1.3x105 3.6x106
Hf-172 (a)....................... Hafnium (72)........ 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 4.1x101 1.1x103
Hf-175........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 3.9x102 1.1x104
Hf-181........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 6.3x102 1.7x104
Hf-182........................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 8.1x10-6 2.2x10-4
Hg-194 (a)....................... Mercury (80)........ 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 1.3x10-1 3.5
Hg-195m (a)...................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 1.5x104 4.0x105
Hg-197........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 9.2x103 2.5x105
Hg-197m.......................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 2.5x104 6.7x105
Hg-203........................... .................... 5.0 1.4x102 1.0 2.7x101 5.1x102 1.4x104
Ho-166........................... Holmium (67)........ 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 2.6x104 7.0x105
Ho-166m.......................... .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 6.6x10-2 1.8
I-123............................ Iodine (53)......... 6.0 1.6x102 3.0 8.1x101 7.1x104 1.9x106
I-124............................ .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 9.3x103 2.5x105
I-125............................ .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 3.0 8.1x101 6.4x102 1.7x104
I-126............................ .................... 2.0 5.4x101 1.0 2.7x101 2.9x103 8.0x104
I-129............................ .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 6.5x10-6 1.8x10-4
I-131............................ .................... 3.0 8.1x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 4.6x103 1.2x105
I-132............................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 3.8x105 1.0x107
I-133............................ .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 4.2x104 1.1x106
I-134............................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 9.9x105 2.7x107
I-135 (a)........................ .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.3x105 3.5x106
In-111........................... Indium (49)......... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 1.5x104 4.2x105
In-113m.......................... .................... 4.0 1.1x102 2.0 5.4x101 6.2x105 1.7x107

[[Page 3681]]

In-114m (a)...................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 8.6x102 2.3x104
In-115m.......................... .................... 7.0 1.9x102 1.0 2.7x101 2.2x105 6.1x106
Ir-189 (a)....................... Iridium (77)........ 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.9x103 5.2x104
Ir-190........................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 2.3x103 6.2x104
Ir-192 (c)....................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.4x102 9.2x103
Ir-194........................... .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.1x104 8.4x105
K-40............................. Potassium (19)...... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 2.4x10-7 6.4x10-6
K-42............................. .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.2x105 6.0x106
K-43............................. .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.2x105 3.3x106
Kr-81............................ Krypton (36)........ 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 7.8x10-4 2.1x10-2
Kr-85............................ .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.5x101 3.9x102
Kr-85m........................... .................... 8.0 2.2x102 3.0 8.1x101 3.0x105 8.2x106
Kr-87............................ .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 1.0x106 2.8x107
La-137........................... Lanthanum (57)...... 3.0x101 8.1x102 6.0 1.6x102 1.6x10-3 4.4x10-2
La-140........................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 2.1x104 5.6x105
Lu-172........................... Lutetium (71)....... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 4.2x103 1.1x105
Lu-173........................... .................... 8.0 2.2x102 8.0 2.2x102 5.6x101 1.5x103
Lu-174........................... .................... 9.0 2.4x102 9.0 2.4x102 2.3x101 6.2x102
Lu-174m.......................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 2.0x102 5.3x103
Lu-177........................... .................... 3.0x101 8.1x102 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 4.1x103 1.1x105
Mg-28 (a)........................ Magnesium (12)...... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 2.0x105 5.4x106
Mn-52............................ Manganese (25)...... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 1.6x104 4.4x105
Mn-53............................ .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 6.8x10-5 1.8x10-3
Mn-54............................ .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 2.9x102 7.7x103
Mn-56............................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 8.0x105 2.2x107
Mo-93............................ Molybdenum (42)..... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x101 5.4x102 4.1x10-2 1.1
Mo-99 (a) (i).................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.8x104 4.8x105
N-13............................. Nitrogen (7)........ 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 5.4x107 1.5x109
Na-22............................ Sodium (11)......... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 2.3x102 6.3x103
Na-24............................ .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 3.2x105 8.7x106
Nb-93m........................... Niobium (41)........ 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0x101 8.1x102 8.8 2.4x102
Nb-94............................ .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 6.9x10-3 1.9x10-1
Nb-95............................ .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 1.5x103 3.9x104
Nb-97............................ .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 9.9x105 2.7x107
Nd-147........................... Neodymium (60)...... 6.0 1.6x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.0x103 8.1x104
Nd-149........................... .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 4.5x105 1.2x107
Ni-59............................ Nickel (28)......... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 3.0x10-3 8.0x10-2
Ni-63............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0x101 8.1x102 2.1 5.7x101
Ni-65............................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 7.1x105 1.9x107
Np-235........................... Neptunium (93)...... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 5.2x101 1.4x103
Np-236 (short-lived)............. .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0 5.4x101 4.7x10-4 1.3x10-2
Np-236 (long-lived).............. .................... 9.0x100 2.4x102 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 4.7x10-4 1.3x10-2
Np-237........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x10-3 5.4x10-2 2.6x10-5 7.1x10-4
Np-239........................... .................... 7.0 1.9x102 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 8.6x103 2.3x105
Os-185........................... Osmium (76)......... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 2.8x102 7.5x103
Os-191........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 2.0 5.4x101 1.6x103 4.4x104
Os-191m.......................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0x101 8.1x102 4.6x104 1.3x106
Os-193........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.0x104 5.3x105
Os-194 (a)....................... .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 1.1x101 3.1x102
P-32............................. Phosphorus (15)..... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 1.1x104 2.9x105
P-33............................. .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0 2.7x101 5.8x103 1.6x105
Pa-230 (a)....................... Protactinium (91)... 2.0 5.4x101 7.0x10-2 1.9 1.2x103 3.3x104
Pa-231........................... .................... 4.0 1.1x102 4.0x10-4 1.1x10-2 1.7x10-3 4.7x10-2
Pa-233........................... .................... 5.0 1.4x102 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.7x102 2.1x104
Pb-201........................... Lead (82)........... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 6.2x104 1.7x106
Pb-202........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x101 5.4x102 1.2x10-4 3.4x10-3
Pb-203........................... .................... 4.0 1.1x102 3.0 8.1x101 1.1x104 3.0x105
Pb-205........................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 4.5x10-6 1.2x10-4
Pb-210 (a)....................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 5.0x10-2 1.4 2.8 7.6x101
Pb-212 (a)....................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 2.0x10-1 5.4 5.1x104 1.4x106
Pd-103 (a)....................... Palladium (46)...... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.8x103 7.5x104
Pd-107........................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 1.9x10-5 5.1x10-4
Pd-109........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 7.9x104 2.1x106
Pm-143........................... Promethium (61)..... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 1.3x102 3.4x103
Pm-144........................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 9.2x101 2.5x103
Pm-145........................... .................... 3.0x101 8.1x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 5.2 1.4x102
Pm-147........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0 5.4x101 3.4x101 9.3x102
Pm-148m (a)...................... .................... 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 7.9x102 2.1x104
Pm-149........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.5x104 4.0x105
Pm-151........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.7x104 7.3x105

[[Page 3682]]

Po-210........................... Polonium (84)....... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 1.7x102 4.5x103
Pr-142........................... Praseodymium (59)... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.3x104 1.2x106
Pr-143........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.5x103 6.7x104
Pt-188 (a)....................... Platinum (78)....... 1.0 2.7x101 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 2.5x103 6.8x104
Pt-191........................... .................... 4.0 1.1x102 3.0 8.1x101 8.7x103 2.4x105
Pt-193........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.4 3.7x101
Pt-193m.......................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.8x103 1.6x105
Pt-195m.......................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 6.2x103 1.7x105
Pt-197........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.2x104 8.7x105
Pt-197m.......................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.7x105 1.0x107
Pu-236........................... Plutonium (94)...... 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.0x10-3 8.1x10-2 2.0x101 5.3x102
Pu-237........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 2.0x101 5.4x102 4.5x102 1.2x104
Pu-238........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 6.3x10-1 1.7x101
Pu-239........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 2.3x10-3 6.2x10-2
Pu-240........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 8.4x10-3 2.3x10-1
Pu-241 (a)....................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 6.0x10-2 1.6 3.8 1.0x102
Pu-242........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 1.5x10-4 3.9x10-3
Pu-244 (a)....................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 6.7x10-7 1.8x10-5
Ra-223 (a)....................... Radium (88)......... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 7.0x10-3 1.9x10-1 1.9x103 5.1x104
Ra-224 (a)....................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 5.9x103 1.6x105
Ra-225 (a)....................... .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 4.0x10-3 1.1x10-1 1.5x103 3.9x104
Ra-226 (a)....................... .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 3.0x10-3 8.1x10-2 3.7x10-2 1.0
Ra-228 (a)....................... .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 1.0x101 2.7x102
Rb-81............................ Rubidium (37)....... 2.0 5.4x101 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 3.1x105 8.4x106
Rb-83 (a)........................ .................... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 6.8x102 1.8x104
Rb-84............................ .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 1.8x103 4.7x104
Rb-86............................ .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 3.0x103 8.1x104
Rb-87............................ .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 3.2x10-9 8.6x10-8
Rb(nat).......................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 6.7x106 1.8x108
Re-184........................... Rhenium (75)........ 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 6.9x102 1.9x104
Re-184m.......................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 1.0 2.7x101 1.6x102 4.3x103
Re-186........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.9x103 1.9x105
Re-187........................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 1.4x10-9 3.8x10-8
Re-188........................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 3.6x104 9.8x105
Re-189 (a)....................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.5x104 6.8x105
Re(nat).......................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 0.0 2.4x10-8
Rh-99............................ Rhodium (45)........ 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 3.0x103 8.2x104
Rh-101........................... .................... 4.0 1.1x102 3.0 8.1x101 4.1x101 1.1x103
Rh-102........................... .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 4.5x101 1.2x103
Rh-102m.......................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 2.3x102 6.2x103
Rh-103m.......................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.2x106 3.3x107
Rh-105........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 3.1x104 8.4x105
Rn-222 (a)....................... Radon (86).......... 3.0x10-1 8.1 4.0x10-3 1.1x10-1 5.7x103 1.5x105
Ru-97............................ Ruthenium (44)...... 5.0 1.4x102 5.0 1.4x102 1.7x104 4.6x105
Ru-103 (a)....................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 1.2x103 3.2x104
Ru-105........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.5x105 6.7x106
Ru-106 (a)....................... .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 1.2x102 3.3x103
S-35............................. Sulphur (16)........ 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0 8.1x101 1.6x103 4.3x104
Sb-122........................... Antimony (51)....... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.5x104 4.0x105
Sb-124........................... .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.5x102 1.7x104
Sb-125........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 1.0 2.7x101 3.9x101 1.0x103
Sb-126........................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 3.1x103 8.4x104
Sc-44............................ Scandium (21)....... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 6.7x105 1.8x107
Sc-46............................ .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 1.3x103 3.4x104
Sc-47............................ .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 3.1x104 8.3x105
Sc-48............................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 5.5x104 1.5x106
Se-75............................ Selenium (34)....... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 5.4x102 1.5x104
Se-79............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0 5.4x101 2.6x10-3 7.0x10-2
Si-31............................ Silicon (14)........ 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.4x106 3.9x107
Si-32............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 3.9 1.1x102
Sm-145........................... Samarium (62)....... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 9.8x101 2.6x103
Sm-147........................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 8.5x10-1 2.3x10-8
Sm-151........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0x101 2.7x102 9.7x10-1 2.6x101
Sm-153........................... .................... 9.0 2.4x102 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.6x104 4.4x105
Sn-113 (a)....................... Tin (50)............ 4.0 1.1x102 2.0 5.4x101 3.7x102 1.0x104
Sn-117m.......................... .................... 7.0 1.9x102 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 3.0x103 8.2x104
Sn-119m.......................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0x101 8.1x102 1.4x102 3.7x103
Sn-121m (a)...................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 2.0 5.4x101
Sn-123........................... .................... 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 3.0x102 8.2x103
Sn-125........................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x103 1.1x105
Sn-126 (a)....................... .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.0x10-3 2.8x10-2
Sr-82 (a)........................ Strontium (38)...... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.3x103 6.2x104

[[Page 3683]]

Sr-85............................ .................... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 8.8x102 2.4x104
Sr-85m........................... .................... 5.0 1.4x102 5.0 1.4x102 1.2x106 3.3x107
Sr-87m........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 4.8x105 1.3x107
Sr-89............................ .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.1x103 2.9x104
Sr-90 (a)........................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 5.1 1.4x102
Sr-91 (a)........................ .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 1.3x105 3.6x106
Sr-92 (a)........................ .................... 1.0 2.7x101 3.0x10-1 8.1 4.7x105 1.3x107
T(H-3)........................... Tritium (1)......... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.6x102 9.7x103
Ta-178 (long-lived).............. Tantalum (73)....... 1.0 2.7x101 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 4.2x106 1.1x108
Ta-179........................... .................... 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.0x101 8.1x102 4.1x101 1.1x103
Ta-182........................... .................... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 2.3x102 6.2x103
Tb-157........................... Terbium (65)........ 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 5.6x10-1 1.5x101
Tb-158........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 5.6x10-1 1.5x101
Tb-160........................... .................... 1.0 2.7x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 4.2x102 1.1x104
Tc-95m (a)....................... Technetium (43)..... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 8.3x102 2.2x104
Tc-96............................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.2x104 3.2x105
Tc-96m (a)....................... .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.4x106 3.8x107
Tc-97............................ .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 5.2x10-5 1.4x10-3
Tc-97m........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0 2.7x101 5.6x102 1.5x104
Tc-98............................ .................... 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 3.2x10-5 8.7x10-4
Tc-99............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.3x10-4 1.7x10-2
Tc-99m........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 4.0 1.1x102 1.9x105 5.3x106
Te-121........................... Tellurium (52)...... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 2.4x103 6.4x104
Te-121m.......................... .................... 5.0 1.4x102 3.0 8.1x101 2.6x102 7.0x103
Te-123m.......................... .................... 8.0 2.2x102 1.0 2.7x101 3.3x102 8.9x103
Te-125m.......................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.7x102 1.8x104
Te-127........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 9.8x104 2.6x106
Te-127m (a)...................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 3.5x102 9.4x103
Te-129........................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 7.7x105 2.1x107
Te-129m (a)...................... .................... 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.1x103 3.0x104
Te-131m (a)...................... .................... 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 3.0x104 8.0x105
Te-132 (a)....................... .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 1.1x104 8.0x105
Th-227........................... Thorium (90)........ 1.0x101 2.7x102 5.0x10-3 1.4x10-1 1.1x103 3.1x104
Th-228 (a)....................... .................... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 3.0x101 8.2x102
Th-229........................... .................... 5.0 1.4x102 5.0x10-4 1.4x10-2 7.9x10-3 2.1x10-1
Th-230........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 7.6x10-4 2.1x10-2
Th-231........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 2.0x104 5.3x105
Th-232........................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 4.0x10-9 1.1x10-7
Th-234 (a)....................... .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 8.6x102 2.3x104
Th(nat).......................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 8.1x10-9 2.2x10-7
Ti-44 (a)........................ Titanium (22)....... 5.0x10-1 1.4x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 6.4 1.7x102
Tl-200........................... Thallium (81)....... 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 2.2x104 6.0x105
Tl-201........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 4.0 1.1x102 7.9x103 2.1x105
Tl-202........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 2.0x103 5.3x104
Tl-204........................... .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 1.7x101 4.6x102
Tm-167........................... Thulium (69)........ 7.0 1.9x102 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 3.1x103 8.5x104
Tm-170........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.2x102 6.0x103
Tm-171........................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103
U-230 (fast lung absorption) Uranium (92)........ 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0x10-1 2.7 1.0x103 2.7x104
(a)(d).
U-230 (medium lung absorption) .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x10-3 1.1x10-1 1.0x103 2.7x104
(a)(e).
U-230 (slow lung absorption) .................... 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.0x10-3 8.1x10-2 1.0x103 2.7x104
(a)(f).
U-232 (fast lung absorption) (d). .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 1.0x10-2 2.7x10-1 8.3x10-1 2.2x101
U-232 (medium lung absorption) .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 7.0x10-3 1.9x10-1 8.3x10-1 2.2x101
(e).
U-232 (slow lung absorption) (f). .................... 1.0x101 2.7x102 1.0x10-3 2.7x10-2 8.3x10-1 2.2x101
U-233 (fast lung absorption) (d). .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 9.0x10-2 2.4 3.6x10-4 9.7x10-3
U-233 (medium lung absorption) .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 3.6x10-4 9.7x10-3
(e).

[[Page 3684]]

U-233 (slow lung absorption) (f). .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 6.0x10-3 1.6x10-1 3.6x10-4 9.7x10-3
U-234 (fast lung absorption) (d). .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 9.0x10-2 2.4 2.3x10-4 6.2x10-3
U-234 (medium lung absorption) .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 2.3x10-4 6.2x10-3
(e).
U-234 (slow lung absorption) (f). .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 6.0x10-3 1.6x10-1 2.3x10-4 6.2x10-3
U-235 (all lung absorption types) .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 8.0x10-8 2.2x10-6
(a),(d),(e),(f).
U-236 (fast lung absorption) (d). .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 2.4x10-6 6.5x10-5
U-236 (medium lung absorption) .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 2.0x10-2 5.4x10-1 2.4x10-6 6.5x10-5
(e).
U-236 (slow lung absorption) (f). .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 6.0x10-3 1.6x10-1 2.4x10-6 6.5x10-5
U-238 (all lung absorption types) .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 1.2x10-8 3.4x10-7
(d),(e),(f).
U (nat).......................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 2.6x10-8 7.1x10-7
U (enriched to 20% or less)(g)... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited see Sec. 173.434 see Sec. 173.434
U (dep).......................... .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited see Sec. 173.434 see Sec. 173.434
V-48............................. Vanadium (23)....... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 6.3x103 1.7x105
V-49............................. .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.0x102 8.1x103
W-178 (a)........................ Tungsten (74)....... 9.0 2.4x102 5.0 1.4x102 1.3x103 3.4x104
W-181............................ .................... 3.0x101 8.1x102 3.0x101 8.1x102 2.2x102 6.0x103
W-185............................ .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 3.5x102 9.4x103
W-187............................ .................... 2.0 5.4x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 2.6x104 7.0x105
W-188 (a)........................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.7x102 1.0x104
Xe-122 (a)....................... Xenon (54).......... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.8x104 1.3x106
Xe-123........................... .................... 2.0 5.4x101 7.0x10-1 1.9x101 4.4x105 1.2x107
Xe-127........................... .................... 4.0 1.1x102 2.0 5.4x101 1.0x103 2.8x104
Xe-131m.......................... .................... 4.0x101 1.1x103 4.0x101 1.1x103 3.1x103 8.4x104
Xe-133........................... .................... 2.0x101 5.4x102 1.0x101 2.7x102 6.9x103 1.9x105
Xe-135........................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 2.0 5.4x101 9.5x104 2.6x106
Y-87 (a)......................... Yttrium (39)........ 1.0 2.7x101 1.0 2.7x101 1.7x104 4.5x105
Y-88............................. .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 5.2x102 1.4x104
Y-90............................. .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 2.0x104 5.4x105
Y-91............................. .................... 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 9.1x102 2.5x104
Y-91m............................ .................... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 1.5x106 4.2x107
Y-92............................. .................... 2.0x10-1 5.4 2.0x10-1 5.4 3.6x105 9.6x106
Y-93............................. .................... 3.0x10-1 8.1 3.0x10-1 8.1 1.2x105 3.3x106
Yb-169........................... Ytterbium (70)...... 4.0 1.1x102 1.0 2.7x101 8.9x102 2.4x104
Yb-175........................... .................... 3.0x101 8.1x102 9.0x10-1 2.4x101 6.6x103 1.8x105
Zn-65............................ Zinc (30)........... 2.0 5.4x101 2.0 5.4x101 3.0x102 8.2x103
Zn-69............................ .................... 3.0 8.1x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.8x106 4.9x107
Zn-69m (a)....................... .................... 3.0 8.1x101 6.0x10-1 1.6x101 1.2x105 3.3x106
Zr-88............................ Zirconium (40)...... 3.0 8.1x101 3.0 8.1x101 6.6x102 1.8x104
Zr-93............................ .................... Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 9.3x10-5 2.5x10-3
Zr-95 (a)........................ .................... 2.0 5.4x101 8.0x10-1 2.2x101 7.9x102 2.1x104
Zr-97 (a)........................ .................... 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 4.0x10-1 1.1x101 7.1x104 1.9x106
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a A1 and/or A2 values include contributions from daughter nuclides with half-lives less than 10 days.
b [Reserved]
c The quantity may be determined from a measurement of the rate of decay or a measurement of the radiation level at a prescribed distance from the source.
d These values apply only to compounds of uranium that take the chemical form of UF6, UO2F2 and UO2(NO3)2 in both normal and accident conditions of transport.
e These values apply only to compounds of uranium that take the chemical form of UO3, UF4, UCl4 and hexavalent compounds in both normal and accident conditions of transport.
f These values apply to all compounds of uranium other than those specified in notes (d) and (e) of this table.
g These values apply to unirradiated uranium only.
h A1 = 0.1 TBq (2.7 Ci) and A2 = 0.001 TBq (0.027 Ci) for Cf-252 for domestic use.
i A2 = 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) for Mo-99 for domestic use.

[[Page 3685]]

0
31. A new Sec. 173.436 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 173.436 Exempt material activity concentrations and exempt
consignment activity limits for radionuclides.

The Table of Exempt material activity concentrations and exempt
consignment activity limits for radionuclides is as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activity concentration Activity concentration Activity limit for Activity limit for
Symbol of radionuclide Element and atomic for exempt material for exempt material exempt consignment exempt consignment
number (Bq/g) (Ci/g) (Bq) (Ci)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ac-225............................ Actinium (89)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Ac-227............................ ..................... 1.0x10-1 2.7x10-12 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Ac-228............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ag-105............................ Silver (47).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ag-108m (b)....................... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ag-110m........................... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ag-111............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Al-26............................. Aluminum (13)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Am-241............................ Americium (95)....... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Am-242m (b)....................... ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Am-243 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Ar-37............................. Argon (18)........... 1.0x106 2.7x10-5 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Ar-39............................. ..................... 1.0x107 2.7x10-4 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Ar-41............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
As-72............................. Arsenic (33)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
As-73............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
As-74............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
As-76............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
As-77............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
At-211............................ Astatine (85)........ 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Au-193............................ Gold (79)............ 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Au-194............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Au-195............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Au-198............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Au-199............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ba-131............................ Barium (56).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ba-133............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ba-133m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ba-140 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Be-7.............................. Beryllium (4)........ 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Be-10............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Bi-205............................ Bismuth (83)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Bi-206............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Bi-207............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Bi-210............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Bi-210m........................... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Bi-212 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Bk-247............................ Berkelium (97)....... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Bk-249............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Br-76............................. Bromine (35)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Br-77............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Br-82............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
C-11.............................. Carbon (6)........... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
C-14.............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Ca-41............................. Calcium (20)......... 1.0x105 2.7x10-6 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Ca-45............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Ca-47............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cd-109............................ Cadmium (48)......... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cd-113m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cd-115............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cd-115m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ce-139............................ Cerium (58).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ce-141............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Ce-143............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ce-144 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cf-248............................ Californium (98)..... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cf-249............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Cf-250............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cf-251............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Cf-252............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cf-253............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cf-254............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Cl-36............................. Chlorine (17)........ 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cl-38............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6

[[Page 3686]]

Cm-240............................ Curium (96).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cm-241............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cm-242............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cm-243............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cm-244............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cm-245............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Cm-246............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Cm-247............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cm-248............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Co-55............................. Cobalt (27).......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Co-56............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Co-57............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Co-58............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Co-58m............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Co-60............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cr-51............................. Chromium (24)........ 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Cs-129............................ Cesium (55).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cs-131............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cs-132............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cs-134............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cs-134m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cs-135............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Cs-136............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Cs-137 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Cu-64............................. Copper (29).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Cu-67............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Dy-159............................ Dysprosium (66)...... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Dy-165............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Dy-166............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Er-169............................ Erbium (68).......... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Er-171............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-147............................ Europium (63)........ 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-148............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-149............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Eu-150 (short lived).............. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-150 (long lived)............... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-152............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-152m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-154............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Eu-155............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Eu-156............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
F-18.............................. Fluorine (9)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Fe-52............................. Iron (26)............ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Fe-55............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Fe-59............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Fe-60............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ga-67............................. Gallium (31)......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ga-68............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ga-72............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Gd-146............................ Gadolinium (64)...... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Gd-148............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Gd-153............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Gd-159............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ge-68............................. Germanium (32)....... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ge-71............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Ge-77............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Hf-172............................ Hafnium (72)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Hf-175............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Hf-181............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Hf-182............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Hg-194............................ Mercury (80)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Hg-195m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Hg-197............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Hg-197m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Hg-203............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ho-166............................ Holmium (67)......... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ho-166m........................... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
I-123............................. Iodine (53).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
I-124............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
I-125............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5

[[Page 3687]]

I-126............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
I-129............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
I-131............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
I-132............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
I-133............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
I-134............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
I-135............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
In-111............................ Indium (49).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
In-113m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
In-114m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
In-115m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ir-189............................ Iridium (77)......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Ir-190............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ir-192............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Ir-194............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
K-40.............................. Potassium (19)....... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
K-42.............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
K-43.............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Kr-81............................. Krypton (36)......... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Kr-85............................. ..................... 1.0x105 2.7x10-6 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Kr-85m............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x1010 2.7x10-1
Kr-87............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
La-137............................ Lanthanum (57)....... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
La-140............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Lu-172............................ Lutetium (71)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Lu-173............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Lu-174............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Lu-174m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Lu-177............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Mg-28............................. Magnesium (12)....... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Mn-52............................. Manganese (25)....... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Mn-53............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
Mn-54............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Mn-56............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Mo-93............................. Molybdenum (42)...... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Mo-99............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
N-13.............................. Nitrogen (7)......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
Na-22............................. Sodium (11).......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Na-24............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Nb-93m............................ Niobium (41)......... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Nb-94............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Nb-95............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Nb-97............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Nd-147............................ Neodymium (60)....... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Nd-149............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ni-59............................. Nickel (28).......... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Ni-63............................. ..................... 1.0x105 2.7x10-6 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Ni-65............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Np-235............................ Neptunium (93)....... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Np-236 (short-lived).............. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Np-236 (long-lived)............... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Np-237 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Np-239............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Os-185............................ Osmium (76).......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Os-191............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Os-191m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Os-193............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Os-194............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
P-32.............................. Phosphorus (15)...... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
P-33.............................. ..................... 1.0x105 2.7x10-6 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Pa-230............................ Protactinium (91).... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pa-231............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Pa-233............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Pb-201............................ Lead (82)............ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pb-202............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pb-203............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pb-205............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Pb-210 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Pb-212 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Pd-103............................ Palladium (46)....... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x108 2.7x10-3

[[Page 3688]]

Pd-107............................ ..................... 1.0x105 2.7x10-6 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Pd-109............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pm-143............................ Promethium (61)...... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pm-144............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pm-145............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Pm-147............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Pm-148m........................... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pm-149............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pm-151............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Po-210............................ Polonium (84)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Pr-142............................ Praseodymium (59).... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Pr-143............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pt-188............................ Platinum (78)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pt-191............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pt-193............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Pt-193m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Pt-195m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pt-197............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pt-197m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Pu-236............................ Plutonium (94)....... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Pu-237............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Pu-238............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Pu-239............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Pu-240............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Pu-241............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Pu-242............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Pu-244............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Ra-223 (b)........................ Radium (88).......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ra-224 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ra-225............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Ra-226 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Ra-228 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Rb-81............................. Rubidium (37)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Rb-83............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Rb-84............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Rb-86............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Rb-87............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Rb(nat)........................... ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Re-184............................ Rhenium (75)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Re-184m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Re-186............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Re-187............................ ..................... 1.0x106 2.7x10-5 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
Re-188............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Re-189............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Re(nat)........................... ..................... 1.0x106 2.7x10-5 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
Rh-99............................. Rhodium (45)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Rh-101............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Rh-102............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Rh-102m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Rh-103m........................... ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Rh-105............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Rn-222 (b)........................ Radon (86)........... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Ru-97............................. Ruthenium (44)....... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Ru-103............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ru-105............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ru-106 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
S-35.............................. Sulphur (16)......... 1.0x105 2.7x10-6 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Sb-122............................ Antimony (51)........ 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Sb-124............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sb-125............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sb-126............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Sc-44............................. Scandium (21)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Sc-46............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sc-47............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sc-48............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Se-75............................. Selenium (34)........ 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Se-79............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Si-31............................. Silicon (14)......... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Si-32............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sm-145............................ Samarium (62)........ 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4

[[Page 3689]]

Sm-147............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Sm-151............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Sm-153............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sn-113............................ Tin (50)............. 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Sn-117m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sn-119m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Sn-121m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Sn-123............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sn-125............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Sn-126............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Sr-82............................. Strontium (38)....... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Sr-85............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sr-85m............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Sr-87m............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sr-89............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Sr-90 (b)......................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Sr-91............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Sr-92............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
T(H-3)............................ Tritium (1).......... 1.0x106 2.7x10-5 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
Ta-178 (long-lived)............... Tantalum (73)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Ta-179............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Ta-182............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Tb-157............................ Terbium (65)......... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Tb-158............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tb-160............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tc-95m............................ Technetium (43)...... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tc-96............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tc-96m............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Tc-97............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
Tc-97m............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Tc-98............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tc-99............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Tc-99m............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Te-121............................ Tellurium (52)....... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Te-121m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Te-123m........................... ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Te-125m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Te-127............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Te-127m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Te-129............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Te-129m........................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Te-131m........................... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Te-132............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Th-227............................ Thorium (90)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Th-228 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Th-229 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Th-230............................ ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Th-231............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Th-232............................ ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Th-234 (b)........................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Th (nat) (b)...................... ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
Ti-44............................. Titanium (22)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Tl-200............................ Thallium (81)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tl-201............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tl-202............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tl-204............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Tm-167............................ Thulium (69)......... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tm-170............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Tm-171............................ ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x108 2.7x10-3
U-230 (fast lung absorption) Uranium (92)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
(b),(d).
U-230 (medium lung absorption) (e) ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
U-230 (slow lung absorption) (f).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
U-232 (fast lung absorption) ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
(b),(d).
U-232 (medium lung absorption) (e) ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
U-232 (slow lung absorption) (f).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7

[[Page 3690]]

U-233 (fast lung absorption) (d).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
U-233 (medium lung absorption) (e) ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
U-233 (slow lung absorption) (f).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
U-234 (fast lung absorption) (d).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
U-234 (medium lung absorption) (e) ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
U-234 (slow lung absorption) (f).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
U-235 (all lung absorption types) ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
(b),(d),(e),(f).
U-236 (fast lung absorption) (d).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
U-236 (medium lung absorption) (e) ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
U-236 (slow lung absorption) (f).. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
U-238 (all lung absorption types) ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
(b),(d),(e),(f).
U (nat) (b)....................... ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
U (enriched to 20% or less)(g).... ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
U (dep)........................... ..................... 1.0 2.7x10-11 1.0x103 2.7x10-8
V-48.............................. Vanadium (23)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
V-49.............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
W-178............................. Tungsten (74)........ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
W-181............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
W-185............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
W-187............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
W-188............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Xe-122............................ Xenon (54)........... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
Xe-123............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x109 2.7x10-2
Xe-127............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Xe-131m........................... ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Xe-133............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x104 2.7x10-7
Xe-135............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x1010 2.7x10-1
Y-87.............................. Yttrium (39)......... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Y-88.............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Y-90.............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Y-91.............................. ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Y-91m............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Y-92.............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Y-93.............................. ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
Yb-169............................ Ytterbium (70)....... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Yb-175............................ ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Zn-65............................. Zinc (30)............ 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Zn-69............................. ..................... 1.0x104 2.7x10-7 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Zn-69m............................ ..................... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Zr-88............................. Zirconium (40)....... 1.0x102 2.7x10-9 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Zr-93 (b)......................... ..................... 1.0x103 2.7x10-8 1.0x107 2.7x10-4
Zr-95............................. ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x106 2.7x10-5
Zr-97 (b)......................... ..................... 1.0x101 2.7x10-10 1.0x105 2.7x10-6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a [Reserved]
b Parent nuclides and their progeny included in secular equilibrium are listed in the following:
Sr-90 Y-90
Zr-93 Nb-93m
Zr-97 Nb-97
Ru-106 Rh-106
Cs-137 Ba-137m
Ce-134 La-134
Ce-144 Pr-144
Ba-140 La-140
Bi-212 Tl-208 (0.36), Po-212 (0.64)
Pb-210 Bi-210, Po-210
Pb-212 Bi-212, Tl-208 (0.36), Po-212 (0.64)
Rn-220 Po-216
Rn-222 Po-218, Pb-214, Bi-214, Po-214
Ra-223 Rn-219, Po-215, Pb-211, Bi-211, Tl-207

[[Page 3691]]

Ra-224 Rn-220, Po-216, Pb-212, Bi-212, Tl-208(0.36), Po-212 (0.64)
Ra-226 Rn-222, Po-218, Pb-214, Bi-214, Po-214, Pb-210, Bi-210, Po-210
Ra-228 Ac-228
Th-226 Ra-222, Rn-218, Po-214
Th-228 Ra-224, Rn-220, Po-216, Pb-212, Bi-212, Tl-208 (0.36), Po-212 (0.64)
Th-229 Ra-225, Ac-225, Fr-221, At-217, Bi-213, Po-213, Pb-209
Th-nat Ra-228, Ac-228, Th-228, Ra-224, Rn-220, Po-216, Pb-212, Bi-212, Tl-208 (0.36), Po-212 (0.64)
Th-234 Pa-234m
U-230 Th-226, Ra-222, Rn-218, Po-214
U-232 Th-228, Ra-224, Rn-220, Po-216, Pb-212, Bi-212, Tl-208 (0.36), Po-212 (0.64)
U-235 Th-231
U-238 Th-234, Pa-234m
U-nat Th-234, Pa-234m, U-234, Th-230, Ra-226, Rn-222, Po-218, Pb-214, Bi-214, Po-214, Pb-210, Bi-210, Po-210
U-240 Np-240m
Np-237 Pa-233
Am-242m Am-242
Am-243 Np-239
c [Reserved]
d These values apply only to compounds of uranium that take the chemical form of UF6, UO2F2 and UO2(NO3)2 in both normal and accident conditions of
transport.
e These values apply only to compounds of uranium that take the chemical form of UO3, UF4, UCl4 and hexavalent compounds in both normal and accident
conditions of transport.
f These values apply to all compounds of uranium other than those specified in notes (d) and (e) of this table.
g These values apply to unirradiated uranium only.

0
32. In Sec. 173.441, the section title is revised, paragraph (d) is
redesignated as paragraph (e) and revised and a new paragraph (d) is
added to read as follows:

Sec. 173.441 Radiation level limitations and exclusive use provisions.

* * * * *
(d) Conveyance limits on the sum of package transport indices are
as follows:
(1) Except for shipments by cargo aircraft only or by seagoing
vessel, the sum of transport indices for a non-exclusive use shipment
may not exceed 50.
(2) Where a consignment is transported under exclusive use, there
is no limit on the sum of the transport indices aboard a single
conveyance. The conditions of paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4) and (c)
must be met.
(3) Provisions for shipments of Class 7 (radioactive) materials by
air are described in Sec.Sec. 175.700-175.705 of this subchapter.
(4) Provisions for shipment of Class 7 (radioactive) materials by
vessel are described in Sec.Sec. 176.700-176.720 of this subchapter.
(e) A package exceeding the maximum surface radiation level or
maximum transport index prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section may
not be transported by aircraft.

0
33. In Sec. 173.443, paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) are revised to read
as follows:

Sec. 173.443 Contamination control.

(a) * * *
(1) Wiping an area of 300 cm\2\ of the surface concerned with an
absorbent material, using moderate pressure, and measuring the activity
on the wiping material. Sufficient measurements must be taken in the
most appropriate locations to yield a representative assessment of the
non-fixed contamination levels. The amount of radioactivity measured on
any single wiping material, divided by the surface area wiped and
divided by the efficiency of the wipe procedure (the fraction of
removable contamination transferred from the surface to the absorbent
material), may not exceed the limits set forth in Table 9 at any time
during transport. For this purpose the actual wipe efficiency may be
used, or the wipe efficiency may be assumed to be 0.10; or
(2) Alternatively, the level of non-fixed radioactive contamination
may be determined by using other methods of equal or greater
efficiency.
Table 9 is as follows:

Table 9.--Non-Fixed External Radioactive Contamination Limits for
Packages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum permissible
limits
Contaminant --------------------------
Bq/cm2 uCi/cm2 dpm/cm2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity 4 10-4 220
alpha emitters..............................
2. All other alpha emitting radionuclides.... 0.4 10-5 22
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

0
34. In Sec. 173.447, paragraphs (a) and (b) are revised to read as
follows:

Sec. 173.447 Storage during transportation--general requirements.

* * * * *
(a) The number of packages and overpacks bearing FISSILE labels
stored in any one storage area, such as a transit area, terminal
building, storeroom, waterfront pier, or assembly yard, must be limited
so that the total sum of the criticality safety indices in any
individual group of such packages and overpacks does not exceed 50.
Groups of such packages and overpacks must be stored so as to maintain
a spacing of at least 6 m (20 feet) from all other groups of such
packages and overpacks.
(b) Storage requirements for Class 7 (radioactive) material
transported in vessels are described in subpart M of part 176 of this
subchapter.

0
35. Section 173.448 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.448 General transportation requirements.

(a) Each shipment of Class 7 (radioactive) materials must be
secured to prevent shifting during normal transportation conditions.
(b) Except as provided in Sec.Sec. 174.81, 176.83, and 177.848 of
this subchapter, or as otherwise required by the Competent Authority in
the applicable certificate, a package or overpack of Class 7
(radioactive) materials may be carried among packaged general cargo
without special stowage provisions, if--
(1) The heat output in watts does not exceed 0.1 times the minimum
package dimension in centimeters; or
(2) The average surface heat flux of the package or overpack does
not exceed 15 watts per square meter and the immediately surrounding
cargo is not in sacks or bags or otherwise in a form that would
seriously impede air circulation for heat removal.
(c) Packages or overpacks bearing labels prescribed in Sec. 172.403
of this subchapter may not be carried in compartments occupied by
passengers, except in those compartments exclusively reserved for
couriers accompanying those packages.
(d) Mixing of different kinds of packages that include fissile
packages is

[[Page 3692]]

authorized only in accordance with Sec. 173.459.
(e) No person shall offer for transportation or transport aboard a
passenger-carrying aircraft any single package or overpack with a
transport index greater than 3.0.
(f) No person shall offer for transportation or transport aboard a
passenger-carrying aircraft any Class 7 (radioactive) material unless
that material is intended for use in, or incident to, research, medical
diagnosis or treatment.
(g) If an overpack is used to consolidate individual packages or to
enclose a single package of Class 7 (radioactive) materials, the
package(s) must comply with the packaging, marking, and labeling
requirements of this subchapter, and:
(1) The overpack must be labeled as prescribed in Sec. 172.403(h)
of this subchapter;
(2) The overpack must be marked as prescribed in subpart D of part
172 of this subchapter and Sec. 173.25(a); and
(3) The transport index of the overpack may not exceed 3.0 for
passenger-carrying aircraft shipments, or 10.0 for cargo-aircraft
shipments.

0
36. Section 173.453 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.453 Fissile materials--exceptions.

Fissile materials meeting the requirements of at least one of the
paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section are excepted from the
requirements of this subpart for fissile materials, including the
requirements of Sec.Sec. 173.457 and 173.459, but are subject to all
other requirements of this subpart, except as noted.
(a) An individual package containing 2 grams or less of fissile
material.
(b) An individual or bulk packaging containing 15 grams or less of
fissile material provided the package has at least 200 grams of solid
nonfissile material for every gram of fissile material. Lead,
beryllium, graphite, and hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium may
be present in the package but must not be included in determining the
required mass for solid nonfissile material.
(c) Low concentrations of solid fissile material commingled with
solid nonfissile material, provide that:
(1) There is at least 2000 grams of nonfissile material for every
gram of fissile material, and
(2) There is no more than 180 grams of fissile material distributed
within 360 kg of contiguous nonfissile material. Lead, beryllium,
graphite, and hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium may be present
in the package but must not be included in determining the required
mass of solid nonfissile material.
(d) Uranium enriched in uranium-235 to a maximum of 1 percent by
weight, and with total plutonium and uranium-233 content of up to 1
percent of the mass of uranium-235, provided that the mass of any
beryllium, graphite, and hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium
constitute less than 5 percent of the uranium mass.
(e) Liquid solutions of uranyl nitrate enriched in uranium-235 to a
maximum of 2 percent by mass, with a total plutonium and uranium-233
content not exceeding 0.002 percent of the mass of uranium, and with a
minimum nitrogen to uranium atomic ratio (N/U) of 2. The material must
be contained in at least a DOT Type A package.
(f) Packages containing, individually, a total plutonium mass of
not more than 1000 grams, of which not more than 20 percent by mass may
consist of plutonium-239, plutonium-241, or any combination of these
radionuclides.

0
37. Section 173.457 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.457 Transportation of fissile material packages--specific
requirements.

(a) Packages containing fissile radioactive material which are not
excepted under Sec. 173.453 must be assigned by the offeror, in
accordance with their definitions in Sec. 173.403, a criticality safety
index (CSI) and a transport index (TI).
(b) Fissile material packages and conveyances transporting fissile
material packages must satisfy the radiation level restrictions of Sec.
173.441.
(c) Except for consignments under exclusive use, the CSI of any
package or overpack may not exceed 50. A fissile material package with
CSI greater than 50 must be transported by exclusive use.
(d) For non-exclusive use shipments of fissile material packages,
except on vessels, the total sum of CSI's in a freight container or on
a conveyance may not exceed 50.
(e) For exclusive use shipments of fissile material packages,
except on vessels, the total sum of CSI's in a freight container or on
a conveyance may not exceed 100.
(f) Exclusive use shipments of fissile material packages must
satisfy the radiation level and administrative requirements of Sec.
173.441(b).
(g) The number of packages, overpacks and freight containers
containing fissile material stored in transit in any one storage area
must be so limited that the total sum of the CSI's in any group of
packages, overpacks or freight containers does not exceed 50. Groups of
packages shall be stored so as to maintain a spacing of a least 6 m (20
ft) between the closest surfaces of any two groups.
(h) Provisions for shipment by vessel of Class 7 (radioactive)
material packages, including fissile material packages by vessel are
described in Sec.Sec. 176.700-176.720 of this subchapter.

0
38. Section 173.459 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.459 Mixing of fissile material packages with non-fissile or
fissile-excepted material packages.

Mixing of fissile material packages with other types of Class 7
(radioactive) materials in any conveyance or storage location is
authorized only if the TI of any single package does not exceed 10, the
CSI of any single package does not exceed 50, and the provisions of
Sec.Sec. 173.441 and 173.457 are satisfied.

Sec. 173.465 [Amended]

0
39. In Sec. 173.465:
0
a. In paragraph (c)(1) the wording ``Table 12'' is revised to read
``Table 10'' each place it appears.
0
b. In the table heading the wording ``TABLE 12'' is revised to read
``TABLE 10''.

0
40. In Sec. 173.469, paragraphs (a)(4)(ii), (c)(1)(i), (c)(1)(iv),
(c)(2)(i), (c)(2)(iv), and (d)(1) are revised to read as follows:

Sec. 173.469 Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials.

(a) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) A specimen that comprises or simulates Class 7 (radioactive)
material contained in a sealed capsule need not be subjected to the
leaching assessment specified in paragraph (c) of this section provided
it is alternatively subjected to any of the volumetric leakage
assessment tests prescribed in the International Organization for
Standardization document ISO 9978-1992(E): ``Radiation protection--
Sealed radioactive sources--Leakage test methods'' (IBR, see Sec. 171.7
of this subchapter).
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) The specimen shall be immersed for seven days in water at
ambient temperature. The volume of water to be used in the test shall
be sufficient to ensure that at the end of the seven day test period
the free volume of the unabsorbed and unreacted water remaining shall
be at least 10% of the volume of the solid test sample itself. The
water shall have an initial pH of 6-

[[Page 3693]]

8 and a maximum conductivity of 1 mS/m (10 micromho/cm) at
20£C (68£F).
* * * * *
(iv) The specimen shall then be kept for at least seven days in
still air at not less than 30£C (86£F) and
relative humidity not less than 90%.
* * * * *
(2) * * *
(i) The specimen shall be immersed in water at ambient temperature.
The water shall have an initial pH of 6-8 and a maximum conductivity of
1 mS/m (10 micromho/cm) at 20£C (68£F).
* * * * *
(iv) The specimen shall then be kept for at least seven days in
still air at not less than 30£C (86£F) and
relative humidity not less than 90%.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) The impact test and the percussion test of this section
provided that the mass of the special form radioactive material is less
than 200 g and it is alternatively subjected to the Class 4 impact test
prescribed in ISO 2919, ``Sealed Radioactive Sources--Classification''
(IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this subchapter); and
* * * * *

0
41. In Sec. 173.471, the introductory text is revised to read as
follows:

Sec. 173.471 Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
approved packages.

In addition to the applicable requirements of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other requirements of this subchapter,
any offeror of a Type B(U), Type B(M), or fissile material package that
has been approved by the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR part 71 must
also comply with the following requirements:
* * * * *

0
42. In Sec. 173.473, the introductory text is revised to read as
follows:

Sec. 173.473 Requirements for foreign-made packages.

In addition to other applicable requirements of this subchapter,
each offeror of a foreign-made Type B(U), Type B(M), Type C, Type CF,
Type H(U), Type H(M), or fissile material package for which a Competent
Authority Certificate is required by IAEA's ``Regulations for the Safe
Transport of Radioactive Material, No. TS-R-1, '' (IBR, see Sec. 171.7
of this subchapter) shall also comply with the following requirements:
* * * * *

0
43. In Sec. 173.476, ``; and'' at the end of paragraph (c)(3) is
removed and a semi-colon is added in its place, paragraph (c)(4) is
revised and a new paragraph (c)(5) is added to read as follows:

Sec. 173.476 Approval of special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials.

* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) For the original request for a Competent Authority Certificate,
evidence of a quality assurance program based on international,
national or other standards, for the design, manufacture, testing,
documentation, use, maintenance and inspection, as appropriate, of all
special form material offered for transport by the requester; and
(5) A description of any proposed pre-shipment actions, such as
leak testing, for use in the consignment of special form radioactive
material for transport.
* * * * *

0
44. A new Sec. 173.477 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 173.477 Approval of packagings containing greater than 0.1 kg of
non-fissile or fissile-excepted uranium hexafluoride.

(a) Each offeror of a package containing more than 0.1 kg of
uranium hexafluoride must maintain on file for at least one year after
the latest shipment, and provide to the Associate Administrator on
request, a complete safety analysis, including documentation of any
tests, demonstrating that the package meets the requirements of Sec.
173.420. An IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority issued for the
design of the packaging containing greater than 0.1 kg of non-fissile
or fissile-excepted uranium hexafluoride may be used to satisfy this
requirement.
(b) Prior to the first export shipment of a package containing
greater than 0.1 kg of uranium hexafluoride from the United States,
each offeror shall obtain a U.S. Competent Authority Certificate for
the packaging design. For packagings manufactured outside the United
States, each offeror shall comply with Sec. 173.473.
(c) Each request for a U.S. Competent Authority Certificate as
required by the IAEA regulations must be submitted in writing, in
triplicate, by mail or other delivery service to the Associate
Administrator. Alternatively, the request with any attached supporting
documentation submitted in an appropriate format may be sent by
facsimile (fax) to (202) 366-3753 or (202) 366-3650, or by electronic
mail (e-mail) to ramcert@rspa.dot.gov. Each request is considered in
the order in which it is received. To allow sufficient time for
consideration, requests must be received at least 90 days before the
requested effective date. Each request for a U.S. Competent Authority
Certificate must include the following information:
(1) A safety analysis report which, at a minimum, provides a
detailed description of the packaging and contents; a description of
the manufacturing process used for the packaging; and details of the
tests conducted and copy of their results, evidence based on
calculative methods to show that the package is able to pass the tests,
or other evidence that the package complies with Sec. 173.420; and
(2) For the original request for a Competent Authority Certificate,
evidence of a quality assurance program.

PART 174--CARRIAGE BY RAIL

0
45. The authority citation for part 174 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR 1.53.

0
46. In Sec. 174.700, paragraph (b) is revised, paragraphs (d) through
(f) are redesignated as paragraphs (e) through (g), respectively, and a
new paragraph (d) is added to read as follows:

Sec. 174.700 Special handling requirements for Class 7 (radioactive)
materials.

* * * * *
(b) The number of packages of Class 7 (radioactive) materials that
may be transported by rail car or stored at any single location is
limited to a total transport index and a total criticality safety index
(as defined in Sec. 173.403 of this subchapter) of not more than 50
each. This provision does not apply to exclusive use shipments as
described in Sec.Sec. 173.403, 173.427, 173.441, and 173.457 of this
subchapter.
* * * * *
(d) Each shipment of fissile material packages must conform to
requirements of Sec.Sec. 173.457 and 173.459.
* * * * *

PART 175--CARRIAGE BY AIRCRAFT

0
47. The authority citation for part 175 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR 1.53.

0
48. In Sec. 175.700, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 175.700 Special limitations and requirements for Class 7
(radioactive) materials.

(a) In addition to other requirements, no person may transport in a
passenger-carrying aircraft any package required to be labeled in
accordance with Sec. 172.403

[[Page 3694]]

of this subchapter with a RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-II, RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-III
or FISSILE label unless:
(1) For a package required to be labeled RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-III,
the transport index does not exceed 3.0;
(2) For a package required to carry a FISSILE label, the
criticality safety index does not exceed 3.0;
(3) The package is carried on the floor of the cargo compartment,
or freight container;
(4) The package is carried in the aircraft in accordance with
Sec.Sec. 175.701 and 175.703;
(5) The total sum of transport indices of all packages in the
aircraft does not exceed 50; and
(6) The total sum of criticality safety indices of all packages in
the aircraft does not exceed 50.
* * * * *

0
49. In Sec. 175.702, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 175.702 Requirements for carriage of packages containing Class 7
(radioactive) materials in a cargo aircraft only.

* * * * *
(b) No person may transport in a cargo aircraft only any package
required by Sec. 172.403 of this subchapter to be labeled RADIOACTIVE
YELLOW-II or RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-III or FISSILE unless:
(1) The total transport index for all of the packages does not
exceed 50.0, the total criticality safety index for all of the packages
does not exceed 50.0, and the package is carried in accordance with
Sec. 175.701(a); or
(2) The total transport index for all of the packages is greater
than 50.0 but does not exceed 200.0, the total criticality safety index
for all of the packages does not exceed 100.0. Any package, overpack or
consignment having a criticality safety index greater than 50 must be
transported under exclusive use; and:
(i) The transport index for any group of packages does not exceed
50.0;
(ii) Each group of packages is separated from every other group in
the aircraft by not less than 6 m (20 feet), measured from the outer
surface of each group; and
(iii) The separation distance between the surfaces of the Class 7
(radioactive) materials packages, overpacks or freight containers and
any space occupied by--
(A) Humans is at least 9 m (30 feet); and
(B) Live animals is at least 0.5 m (20 inches) for journeys not
exceeding 24 hours and at least 1.0 m (39 inches) for journeys longer
than 24 hours.

0
50. In Sec. 175.703, paragraphs (b), (c), and (e) are revised to read
as follows:

Sec. 175.703 Other special requirements for the acceptance and
carriage of packages containing Class 7 (radioactive) materials.

* * * * *
(b) No person may accept for carriage in an aircraft packages of
Class 7 (radioactive) materials, other than limited quantities,
contained in an overpack unless they have been prepared for shipment in
accordance with Sec. 172.403(h) of this subchapter.
(c) Each shipment of fissile material packages must conform to the
requirements of Sec.Sec. 173.457 and 173.459 of this subchapter.
* * * * *
(e) Packages with radiation levels at the package surface or a
transport index in excess of the limits specified in Sec. 173.441(a) of
this subchapter may not be transported by aircraft except under special
arrangements approved by the Associate Administrator.

PART 176--CARRIAGE BY VESSEL

0
51. The authority citation for part 176 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR 1.53.

Sec. 176.700 [Amended]

0
52. In Sec. 176.700, paragraph (c) is removed, and paragraphs (d) and
(e) are redesignated as paragraphs (c) and (d), respectively.

0
53. Section 176.704 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 176.704 Requirements relating to transport indices and
criticality safety indices.

(a) The sum of the transport indices (TI's) for all packages of
Class 7 (radioactive) materials on board a vessel may not exceed the
limits specified in Table IIIA of this section.
(b) For freight containers containing packages and overpacks of
Class 7 (radioactive) materials, the radiation level may not exceed 2
mSv per hour (200 mrem per hour) at any point on the outside surface
and 0.1 mSv per hour (10 mrem per hour) at 2 m (6.6 ft) from the
outside surface of the freight container.
(c) The limitations specified in Table IIIA of this section do not
apply to consignments of LSA-I material.
(d) The sum of the criticality safety indices (CSI's) for all
packages and overpacks of fissile Class 7 (radioactive) materials on
board a vessel may not exceed the limits specified in Table IIIB of
this section.
(e) Each group of fissile Class 7 (radioactive) material packages
and overpacks, containing a sum of CSIs no greater than 50 for a non-
exclusive use shipment, or no greater than 100 for an exclusive use
shipment, must be separated from all other groups containing fissile
material packages and overpacks by a distance of at least 6 m (20 ft)
at all times.
(f) The limitations specified in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this
section do not apply when the entire vessel is reserved or chartered
for use by a single offeror under exclusive use conditions if--
(1) The number of packages of fissile Class 7 (radioactive)
material satisfies the individual package CSI limits of Sec. 173.457 of
this subchapter, except that the total sums of CSI's in the last column
of Table IIIB of this section, including table note (d) apply;
(2) A radiation protection program for the shipment has been
established and approved by the competent authority of the flag state
of the vessel and, when requested, by the competent authority at each
port of call;
(3) Stowage arrangements have been predetermined for the whole
voyage, including any consignments to be loaded at ports of call;
(4) The loading, transport and unloading are to be supervised by
persons qualified in the transport of radioactive material; and
(5) The entire shipment operation is approved by the Associate
Administrator in advance.
(g) Table IIIA is as follows:

[[Page 3695]]

Table IIIA.--TI Limits for Freight Containers and Conveyances
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Limit on total sum of transport indices in a single freight container
or aboard a conveyance
Type of freight container or conveyance ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Not under exclusive use Under exclusive use
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Freight container--small.............. 50................................... N/A.
II. Freight container--large............. 50................................... No limit.
III. Vessel: a b
1. Hold, compartment or defined deck
area:
i. Packages, overpacks, small 50................................... No limit.
freight containers.
ii. Large freight containers..... 200.................................. No limit.
2. Total vessel:
i. Packages, overpacks, small 200.................................. No limit.
freight containers.
ii. Large freight containers..... No limit............................. No limit.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
a For vessels, the requirements in both 1 and 2 must be fulfilled.
b Packages or overpacks transported in or on a vehicle which are offered for transport in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 173.441(b) of this subchapter may be transported by vessels provided that they are not
removed from the vehicle at any time while on board the vessel.

(h) Table IIIB is as follows:

Table IIIB.--CSI Limits for Freight Containers and Conveyances
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Limit on total sum of criticality safety indices in a single freight
container or aboard a conveyance
Type of freight container or conveyance ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Not under exclusive use Under exclusive use
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Freight container--small.............. 50................................... N/A.
II. Freight container--large............. 50................................... 100.
III. Vessel: a b
1. Hold, compartment or defined deck
area:
i. Packages, overpacks, small 50................................... 100.
freight containers.
ii. Large freight containers..... 50................................... 100.
2. Total vessel:
i. Packages, overpacks, small 200 c................................ 200 d.
freight containers.
ii. Large freight containers..... No limit c........................... No limit d.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
a For vessels, the requirements in both 1 and 2 must be fulfilled.
b Packages or overpacks transported in or on a vehicle which are offered for transport in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 173.441(b) of this subchapter may be transported by vessels provided that they are not
removed from the vehicle at any time while on board the vessel. In that case, the entries under the heading
``under exclusive use'' apply.
c The consignment must be handled and stowed such that the total sum of CSIs in any group does not exceed 50,
and such that each group is handled and stowed so that the groups are separated from each other by at least 6
m (20 ft).
d The consignment must be handled and stowed such that the total sum of CSIs in any group does not exceed 100,
and such that each group is handled and stowed so that the groups are separated from each other by at least 6
m (20 ft). The intervening space between groups may be occupied by other cargo.

0
54. In Sec. 176.708 the section title, paragraphs (a) through (e), and
footnote 6 to Table IV are revised to read as follows:

Sec. 176.708 Segregation distances.

(a) Table IV lists minimum separation distances between radioactive
materials and spaces regularly occupied by crew members or passengers,
or between radioactive materials and undeveloped photographic film. It
expresses the separation distances as a function of the sum of the TIs
of all packages in a single consignment, in the case of 0 or 3 feet of
intervening cargo of unit density for persons, and 0, 3, or 6 feet of
intervening cargo of unit density for undeveloped film. Cargo of unit
density is stowed cargo with a density of 1 long ton (2240 lbs.) per 36
cubic feet. Separation distances may be interpolated from the table
where appropriate.
(b) Table IV is to be used to determine the separation distance for
undeveloped film.
(c) Category YELLOW-II or YELLOW-III packages or overpacks must not
be transported in spaces occupied by passengers, except those
exclusively reserved for couriers specially authorized to accompany
such packages or overpacks.
(d) The separation distances for crew members and passengers may be
determined by one of two methods:
(1) By using Table IV to determine the minimum distances between
the radioactive material packages and regularly occupied spaces or
living quarters; or
(2) For one or more consignments of Class 7 (radioactive) material
to be loaded on board a vessel under the exclusive use conditions
described in Sec. 176.704(f), by demonstration through direct
measurement, made and documented by a suitably qualified person, that
for the indicated exposure times the dose rate in regularly occupied
spaces or living quarters is less than--
(i) For the crew: 7.0 [mu]Sv/h (0.70 mrem/h) up to 700 hours in a
year, or

[[Page 3696]]

1.8 [mu]Sv/h (0.18 mrem/h) up to 2750 hours in a year; and
(ii) For the passengers: 1.8 [mu]Sv/h (0.18 mrem/h) up to 550 hours
in a year, taking into account any relocation of cargo during the
voyage.
(e) Any departure from the segregation provisions should be
approved by the competent authority of the flag state of the ship and,
when requested, by the competent authority at each port of call.
* * * * *

Table IV
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:
* * * * *
(6) The figures below the double line of the table shall be used in
those cases where the appropriate provisions of this class permit the
sum of the transport indices to exceed 200.

* * * * *

PART 177--CARRIAGE BY PUBLIC HIGHWAY

0
55. The authority citation for part 177 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR 1.53.

0
56. In Sec. 177.842, paragraphs (f) and (g) are revised to read as
follows:

Sec. 177.842 Class 7 (radioactive) material.

* * * * *
(f) The number of packages of fissile Class 7 (radioactive)
material in any non-exclusive use transport vehicle must be limited so
that the sum of the criticality safety indices (CSIs) does not exceed
50. In loading and storage areas, fissile material packages must be
grouped so that the sum of CSIs in any one group is not greater than
50; there may be more than one group of fissile material packages in a
loading or storage area, so long as each group is at least 6 m (20
feet) away from all other such groups. All pertinent requirements of
Sec.Sec. 173.457 and 173.459 apply.
(g) For shipments transported under exclusive use conditions the
radiation dose rate may not exceed 0.02 mSv per hour (2 mrem per hour)
in any position normally occupied in the motor vehicle. For shipments
transported as exclusive use under the provisions of Sec. 173.441(b) of
this subchapter for packages with external radiation levels in excess
of 2 mSv (200 mrem per hour) at the package surface, the motor vehicle
must meet the requirements of a closed transport vehicle (see Sec.
173.403 of this subchapter). The sum of criticality safety indices
(CSIs) for packages containing fissile material may not exceed 100 in
an exclusive use vehicle.

PART 178--SPECIFICATIONS FOR PACKAGINGS

0
57. The authority citation for part 178 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127; 49 CFR 1.53.

0
58. In Sec. 178.350, paragraph (b) is revised and a new paragraph (c)
is added to read as follows:

Sec. 178.350 Specification 7A; general packaging, Type A.

* * * * *
(b) Each Specification 7A packaging must be marked on the outside
``USA DOT 7A Type A.''
(c) Each Specification 7A packaging must comply with the marking
requirements of Sec. 178.3.

Sec.Sec. 178.352 and 178.352-1--178.352-6 [Removed]

0
59. Sections 178.352 and 178.352-1 through 178.352-6 are removed.

Sec.Sec. 178.354 and 178.354-1--178.354-5 [Removed]

0
60. Sections 178.354 and 178.354-1 through 178.354-5 are removed.

Sec.Sec. 178.362 and 178.362-1--178.362-7 [Removed]

0
61. Sections 178.362 and 178.362-1 through 178.362-7 are removed.

Sec.Sec. 178.364 and 178.364-1--178.364-6 [Removed]

0
62. Sections 178.364 and 178.364-1 through 178.364-6 are removed.

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 9, 2003 under authority
delegated in 49 CFR part 1.
Samuel G. Bonasso,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 04-67 Filed 1-23-04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-60-P

Notices For
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994

Hazardous Materials Regulations; Compatibility With the Regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Local Navigation