Power Reactor Security Requirements

Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.
 [Federal Register: October 26, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 207)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 62663-62712]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26oc06-16]
[[Page 62664]]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73
RIN 3150-AG63
 
Power Reactor Security Requirements

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend 
the current security regulations and add new security requirements 
pertaining to nuclear power reactors. Additionally, this rulemaking 
includes new security requirements for Category I strategic special 
nuclear material (SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced weapons and 
firearms background checks. The proposed rulemaking would: Make 
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission 
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based 
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during 
implementation; fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005; add several new requirements that resulted from insights from 
implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans, 
and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and 
force-on-force exercises; update the regulatory framework in 
preparation for receiving license applications for new reactors; and 
impose requirements to assess and manage site activities that can 
adversely affect safety and security. The proposed safety and security 
requirements would address, in part, a petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-
80) that requests the establishment of regulations governing proposed 
changes to facilities which could adversely affect the protection 
against radiological sabotage.

DATES: Submit comments by January 9, 2007. Submit comments specific to 
the information collection aspects of this rule by November 27, 2006. 
Comments received after the above dates will be considered if it is 
practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to 
comments received after these dates.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include the following number ``RIN 3150-AG63'' in the subject 
line of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or 
in electronic form will be made available for public inspection. 
Because your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or 
contact information, the NRC cautions you against including any 
information in your submission that you do not want to be publicly 
disclosed.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us 
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's 
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions 
about our rulemaking Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; E-mail 
CAG@nrc.gov. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal e-
Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays (telephone 
(301) 415-1966).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
(301) 415-1101.
    You may submit comments on the information collections by the 
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
    Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be 
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738. The PDR reproduction 
contractor will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including 
comments, may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC 
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or 
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by e-mail to PDR@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Richard Rasmussen, Office of 
Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone (301) 415-0610; e-
mail: RAR@nrc.gov or Mr. Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone (301) 415-1462; e-mail: TAR@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Rulemaking Initiation
III. Proposed Regulations
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Guidance
VI. Criminal Penalties
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
VIII. Availability of Documents
IX. Plain Language
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Public Protection Notification
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis

I. Background

    Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC 
conducted a thorough review of security to ensure that nuclear power 
plants and other licensed facilities continued to have effective 
security measures in place given the changing threat environment. 
Through a series of orders, the Commission specified a supplement to 
the Design Basis Threat (DBT), as well as requirements for specific 
training enhancements, access authorization enhancements, security 
officer work hours, and enhancements to defensive strategies, 
mitigative measures, and integrated response. Additionally, in generic 
communications, the Commission specified expectations for enhanced 
notifications to the NRC for certain security events or suspicious 
activities.
    Most of the requirements in this proposed rulemaking are derived 
directly from, or through implementation of, the following four 
security orders:
    ? EA-02-026, ``Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order,'' 
dated February 25, 2002 (March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792).
    ? EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization Order,'' dated January 
7, 2003 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR 1643).
    ? EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification 
Requirements (Training) Order,'' dated April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 
FR 24514), and
    ? EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' dated 
April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517).

[[Page 62665]]

    Nuclear power plant licensees revised their security plans, 
training and qualification plans, and safeguards contingency plans in 
response to these orders. The NRC completed its review and approval of 
all of the revised security plans, training and qualification plans, 
and safeguards contingency plans on October 29, 2004. These plans 
incorporated the enhancements instituted through the orders. While the 
specifics of these changes are Safeguards Information, in general, the 
changes resulted in enhancements such as increased patrols, augmented 
security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, additional 
physical barriers, vehicle checks at greater standoff distances, 
enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, 
augmented security and emergency response training, equipment, and 
communication, and more restrictive site access controls for personnel, 
including expanded, expedited, and more thorough employee background 
checks.
    The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), signed into law on 
August 8, 2005, is another source of some of the proposed requirements 
reflected in this rulemaking. Section 653, for instance, allows the NRC 
to authorize licensees to use, as part of their protective strategies, 
an expanded arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-
automatic assault weapons. Section 653 also requires that all security 
personnel with access to any weapons undergo a background check that 
would include fingerprinting and a check against the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS) database. These provisions of EPAct 2005 would be reflected in 
the newly proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19, and the proposed NRC 
Form 754. Though this rulemaking primarily affects power reactor 
security requirements, to implement the EPAct 2005 provisions 
efficiently, the NRC expanded the rulemaking's scope in newly proposed 
Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19 to include facilities authorized to possess 
formula quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear material, 
i.e., Category I SSNM facilities. Such facilities would include 
production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, fuel 
processing facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities. Additionally, 
Section 651 of the EPAct 2005 requires the NRC to conduct security 
evaluations at selected licensed facilities, including periodic force-
on-force exercises. That provision also requires the NRC to mitigate 
any potential conflict of interest that could influence the results of 
force-on-force exercises. These provisions would be reflected in 
proposed Sec.  73.55.
    Through implementing the security orders, reviewing the revised 
site security plans across the fleet of reactors, conducting the 
enhanced baseline inspection program, and evaluating force-on-force 
exercises, the NRC has identified some additional security measures 
that would provide additional assurance of a licensee's capability to 
protect against the DBT.
    Finally, a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Union of 
Concerned Scientists and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (PRM 50-80), 
requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes 
to facilities which could adversely affect their protection against 
radiological sabotage. This petition was partially granted on November 
17, 2005 (70 FR 69690). The proposed new Sec.  73.58 contains 
requirements to address the remaining issues.
    The proposed amendments to the security requirements for power 
reactors, and for enhanced weapons requirements for power reactor and 
Category I SSNM facilities, would result in changes to the following 
existing sections and appendices in 10 CFR part 73:
    ? 10 CFR 73.2, Definitions.
    ? 10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for physical protection of licensed 
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
    ? 10 CFR 73.56, Personnel access authorization requirements 
for nuclear power plants.
    ? 10 CFR 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events.
    ? 10 CFR 73, Appendix B, General criteria for security personnel.
    ? 10 CFR 73, Appendix C, Licensee safeguards contingency plans.
    ? 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Reportable safeguards events.
    The proposed amendments would also add three new sections to part 73:
    ? Proposed Sec.  73.18, Firearms background checks for armed 
security personnel.
    ? Proposed Sec.  73.19, Authorization for use of enhanced weapons.
    ? Proposed Sec.  73.58, Safety/security interface 
requirements for nuclear power reactors.
    The proposed rule would also add a new NRC Form 754 under the newly 
proposed Sec.  73.18.

EPAct 2005 Weapons Guidelines

    In order to accomplish Sec. 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended (AEA), concerning the transfer, receipt, possession, 
transport, import, and use of enhanced weapons and the requirements for 
firearms background checks, the NRC has engaged with representatives 
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI, and the U.S. Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), to develop 
guidelines required by Sec. 161A.d of the AEA. The provisions of 
Sec.161A. of the AEA take effect upon the issuance of these guidelines 
by the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney General. The 
Commission will publish a separate Federal Register notice on the 
issuance of these guidelines. This proposed rule would not rescind the 
authority of certain NRC licensees, currently possessing automatic 
weapons through alternate processes, to possess such enhanced weapons; 
however, these licensees would be subject to the new firearms 
background check requirements of Sec. 161A. of the AEA. Information on 
new provisions (Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19) that would implement Sec. 
161A. may be found in Section III.

Conforming and Corrective Changes

    Conforming changes to the requirements listed below are proposed in 
order to ensure that cross-referencing between the various security 
regulations in part 73 is preserved, and to avoid revising requirements 
for licensees who are not within the scope of this proposed rule. The 
following requirements contain conforming changes:
    ? Section 50.34, ``Contents of applications; technical 
information'' would be revised to align the application requirements 
with the proposed revisions to appendix C to 10 CFR part 73.
    ? Section 50.54, ``Conditions of licenses'' would be revised 
to conform with the proposed revisions to sections in appendix C to 10 
CFR part 73.
    ? Section 50.72, ``Immediate notification requirements for 
operating nuclear power reactors'' would be revised to state (in 
footnote 1) that immediate notification to the NRC may be required (per 
the proposed Sec.  73.71 requirements) prior to the notification 
requirements under the current Sec.  50.72.
    ? Section 72.212, ``Conditions of general license issued 
under Sec.  72.210'' would be revised to reference the appropriate 
revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec.  73.55.
    ? Section 73.8, ``Information collection requirements: OMB 
approval'' would be revised to add the newly proposed requirements 
(Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, 73.58, and NRC Form 754) to the list of 
sections and forms with Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

[[Page 62666]]

information collection requirements. A corrective revision to Sec.  
73.8 would also be made to reflect OMB approval of existing information 
collection requirements for NRC Form 366 under existing Sec.  73.71.
    ? Section 73.70, ``Records'' would be revised to reference 
the appropriate revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec.  73.55 
regarding the need to retain a record of the registry of visitors.
    Additionally, Sec.  73.81, ``Criminal penalties'' which sets forth 
the sections within part 73 that are not subject to criminal sanctions 
under the AEA, would remain unchanged since willful violations of the 
newly proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be subject to 
criminal sanctions.
    Appendix B and appendix C to part 73 require special treatment in 
this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming changes, the 
current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom this proposed 
rule would not apply. Accordingly, sections I through V of appendix B 
would remain unchanged, and the proposed new language for power 
reactors would be added as section VI. Appendix C would be divided into 
two sections, with Section I maintaining all current requirements, and 
Section II containing all proposed requirements related to power reactors.

II. Rulemaking Initiation

    On July 19, 2004, NRC staff issued a memorandum entitled ``Status 
of Security-Related Rulemaking'' (accession number ML041180532) to 
inform the Commission of plans to close former security-related actions 
and replace them with a comprehensive rulemaking plan to modify 
physical protection requirements for power reactors. This memorandum 
described rulemaking efforts that were suspended by the terrorist 
activities of September 11, 2001, and summarized the security-related 
actions taken following the attack. In response to this memorandum, the 
Commission directed the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff Requirements 
Memorandum (SRM) (COMSECY-04-0047, accession number ML042360548) to 
forego the development of a rulemaking plan, and provide a schedule for 
the completion of security-related rulemakings. The staff provided this 
schedule to the Commission by memorandum dated November 16, 2004 
(accession number ML043060572). Subsequently, the staff revised its 
plans to amend the part 73 security requirements to include a 
requirement for licensees to assess and manage site activities that 
could compromise either safety or security (i.e., the safety/security 
interface requirements). This revision is discussed in a memorandum 
dated July 29, 2005 (accession number ML051800350). Finally, by 
memorandum dated September 29, 2005 (COMSECY-05-0046, accession number 
ML052710167), the staff discussed its plans to incorporate select 
provisions of the EPAct 2005 into the power reactor security 
requirements rulemaking. In COMSECY-05-0046, dated November 1, 2005 
(accession number ML053050439), the Commission approved the staff's 
approach in incorporating the select provisions of EPAct 2005.

III. Proposed Regulations

    This section describes significant provisions of this rulemaking:
    1. EPAct 2005 weapons requirements. The new Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 
73.19 would contain requirements to implement provisions of section 
161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). Section 653 of 
the EPAct amended the AEA by adding section 161A, ``Use of Firearms by 
Security Personnel.'' Section 161A provides new authority to the 
Commission to enhance security at certain NRC licensee and certificate 
holder facilities by authorizing the security personnel of those 
licensees or certificate holders to transfer, receive, possess, 
transport, import, and use an expanded arsenal of weapons, to include: 
Short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and machine guns. In 
addition, section 161A also provides that NRC-designated licensees and 
certificate holders may apply to the NRC for authority to preempt 
local, State, or certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations) 
that prohibits the transfer, receipt, possession, transportation, 
importation, or use of handguns, rifles, shotguns, short-barreled 
shotguns, short-barreled rifles, machine guns, semiautomatic assault 
weapons, ammunition for such guns or weapons, and large capacity 
ammunition feeding devices. Prior to granting either authority, 
however, the Commission must determine that the proposed use of this 
authority is necessary in the discharge of official duties by security 
personnel engaged in protecting: (1) Facilities owned or operated by an 
NRC licensee or certificate holder and designated by the Commission, or 
(2) radioactive material or other property that is owned or possessed 
by an NRC licensee or certificate holder, or that is being transported 
to or from an NRC-regulated facility, if the Commission has determined 
the radioactive material or other property to be of significance to the 
common defense and security or public health and safety. Licensees and 
certificate holders must receive preemption authority before receiving 
NRC approval for enhanced weapons authority. Finally, the NRC may 
consider making preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority 
available to other types of licensees or certificate holders in future 
rulemakings.
    Under the provisions of section 161A.d, section 161A takes effect 
on the date that implementing guidelines are issued by the Commission 
after being approved by the U.S. Attorney General. Following enactment 
of the EPAct 2005, NRC staff began discussions with staffs from the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and its subordinate agencies the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to develop these guidelines. 
Issuance of these guidelines is a prerequisite for the issuance of a 
final rule on Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19, and the conforming changes in 
Sec.  73.2. The proposed language for Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19, and 
the conforming changes in Sec.  73.2, set forth in this proposed rule 
is consistent, to the extent possible, with the discussions between NRC 
and DOJ. However, because NRC and DOJ staffs continue to work to 
resolve the remaining issues, the guidelines have not been finalized as 
of the issuance of this notice. Once the final guidelines are issued, 
the Commission will, if necessary, take the appropriate actions to 
ensure that the language of proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 73.2, 
conforms with the guidelines. The Commission is utilizing this parallel 
approach to provide the most expeditious process for promulgating the 
necessary regulations implementing section 161A; thereby enhancing the 
security (i.e., weapons) capabilities of NRC-licensed facilities, while 
being mindful of our obligations to provide stakeholders an opportunity 
to comment on proposed regulations.
    2. Safety/Security interface requirements. These requirements are 
located in proposed Sec.  73.58. The safety/security requirements are 
intended to explicitly require licensee coordination of potential 
adverse interactions between security activities and other plant 
activities that could compromise either plant security or plant safety. 
The proposed requirements would direct licensees to assess and manage 
these interactions so that neither safety nor security is compromised. 
These proposed requirements address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking 
(PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing 
proposed changes

[[Page 62667]]

to the facilities which could adversely affect the protection against 
radiological sabotage.
    3. EPAct 2005 additional requirements. The EPAct 2005 requirements 
that would be implemented by this proposed rulemaking, in addition to 
the weapons-related additions described previously, consist of new 
requirements to perform force-on-force exercises, and to mitigate 
potential conflicts of interest that could influence the results of 
NRC-conducted force-on-force exercises. These proposed new requirements 
would be included in proposed Sec.  73.55 and appendix C to part 73.
    4. Accelerated notification and revised four-hour reporting 
requirements. This proposed rule contains accelerated security 
notification requirements (i.e., within 15 minutes) in proposed Sec.  
73.71 and appendix G to part 73 for attacks and imminent threats to 
power reactors. The proposed accelerated notification requirements are 
similar to what was provided to the industry in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, 
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based 
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005. The proposed rule also contains two new 
four-hour reporting requirements. The proposed rule would direct 
licensees to report to the NRC information pertaining to suspicious 
activities as described in the proposed requirement. The proposed rule 
would also include a new four-hour reporting requirement for tampering 
events that do not meet the current threshold for one-hour reporting.
    5. Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel requirements. These requirements would be 
incorporated into proposed Sec.  73.55 for licensees who propose to use 
MOX fuel in their reactor(s). These proposed requirements are in lieu 
of unnecessarily rigorous part 73 requirements (e.g., Sec. Sec.  73.45 
and 73.46), which would otherwise apply because of the MOX fuel's low 
plutonium content and the weight and size of the MOX fuel assemblies. 
The proposed MOX fuel security requirements are intended to be 
consistent with the approach implemented at Catawba Nuclear Station 
through the MOX lead test assembly effort.
    6. Cyber-security requirements. This proposed rule would contain 
more detailed programmatic requirements for addressing cyber security 
at power reactors, which build on the requirements imposed by the 
February 2002 order. The proposed cyber-security requirements are 
designed to be consistent with ongoing industry cyber-security efforts.
    7. Mitigating strategies. The proposed rule would require licensees 
to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core 
cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using 
existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that 
can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with 
the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. These 
proposed requirements would be incorporated into the proposed appendix 
C to part 73.
    8. Access authorization enhancements. The proposed changes would 
improve the integration of the access authorization requirements, 
fitness-for-duty requirements, and security program requirements. The 
proposed rule would include an increase in the rigor for some elements 
of the access authorization program including requirements for the 
conduct of psychological assessments, requirements for individuals to 
report arrests to the reviewing official, and requirements to clarify 
the responsibility for the acceptance of shared information. The 
proposed rule would also add requirements to allow NRC inspection of 
licensee information sharing records and requirements that subject 
additional individuals, such as those who have electronic access via 
computer systems or those who administer the access authorization 
program, to the access authorization requirements.
    9. Training and qualification enhancements. The proposed rule 
includes modifications to the training and qualification requirements 
that are based on insights from implementation of the security orders, 
review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced 
baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. These new 
requirements would include additional physical requirements for unarmed 
security personnel to assure that personnel performing these functions 
meet physical requirements commensurate with their duties. Proposed new 
requirements also include a minimum age requirement of 18 years for 
unarmed responders, qualification scores for testing required by the 
training and qualification plan, qualification requirements for 
security trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing 
psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and 
program requirements for on-the-job training.
    10. Security Program Implementation insights. The proposed rule 
would impose new enhancements identified from implementation of the 
security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of 
the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. 
These new requirements would include changes to specifically require 
that the central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm station (SAS) 
have functionally equivalent capabilities such that no single act can 
disable the key functions of both CAS and SAS. The proposed additions 
would also include requirements for new reactor licensees to position 
the SAS within the protected area, add bullet resistance and limit the 
visibility into SAS. Proposed additions also require uninterruptible 
backup power supplies for detection and assessment equipment, ``video-
capture'' capability, and qualification requirements for drill and 
exercise controllers.
    11. Miscellaneous. The proposed rule would eliminate some 
requirements that the staff found to be unnecessary, while still 
providing high assurance that activities involving special nuclear 
material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not 
constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. One 
such requirement to be eliminated provides for guards to escort 
operators of motor vehicles within the protected area if the operators 
are cleared for unescorted access. The proposed rule would also add new 
requirements, including predefined provisions for the suspension of 
safeguards measures for severe weather conditions that could result in 
life-threatening situations for security personnel (e.g., tornadoes, 
floods, and hurricanes), and reduced overly-prescriptive requirements 
through the inclusion of performance-based language to allow 
flexibility in the methods used to accomplish requirements.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

IV.1. New Weapons Requirements

    This proposed rulemaking would implement new weapons requirements 
that stem from the EPAct 2005. This is the only portion of this 
proposed rulemaking that involves facilities other than nuclear power 
reactors. The newly proposed weapons requirements would apply to power 
reactors and facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or 
greater of strategic special nuclear material whose security plans are 
governed by Sec. Sec.  73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. The new requirements 
would be in three different sections and would include the utilization 
of an NRC Form:
    ? Revised proposed Sec.  73.2, ``Definitions''.

[[Page 62668]]

    ? Proposed Sec.  73.18, ``Firearms background checks for 
armed security personnel''.
    ? Proposed Sec.  73.19, ``Authorization for use of enhanced weapons''.
    ? Proposed NRC Form 754, ``Armed Security Personnel 
Background Check''.
    Under proposed Sec.  73.18, after the NRC approves the licensee's 
or certificate holder's application, all security personnel must have a 
satisfactorily completed firearms background check to have access to 
covered weapons. Licensees and certificate holders would be required 
under proposed Sec.  73.19 to notify the NRC that they have 
satisfactorily completed a sufficient number of firearms background 
checks to staff their security organization. The firearms background 
checks required by proposed Sec.  73.18 would be intended to verify 
that armed security personnel are not prohibited from receiving, 
possessing, transporting, or using firearms under Federal or State law. 
A firearms background check would consist of two parts, a check of an 
individual's fingerprints against the FBI's fingerprint system and a 
check of the individual's identity against the FBI's National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The NRC would propose a new 
NRC Form 754 for licensee or certificate holder security personnel to 
submit the necessary information to the NRC for forwarding to the FBI 
to perform the NICS portion of the firearms background check. The 
requirement to satisfactorily complete a firearms background check 
would apply to security personnel either directly employed by the 
licensee or certificate holder or employed by a security contractor to 
the licensee or certificate holder and whose official duties require 
access to covered weapons (i.e., armed security personnel) [see also 
new definitions for covered weapons, enhanced weapons, and standard 
weapons in Sec.  73.2]. Additionally, the requirement for licensees or 
certificate holders to ensure that their security personnel have 
satisfactorily completed a firearms background check would apply to 
licensees and certificate holders who have applied for and received NRC 
approval of preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority. In 
order to simplify the rule language, Sec.  73.18 would only refer to 
applications for preemption authority because preemption authority 
would always be a necessary prerequisite for the receipt of enhanced 
weapons authority.
    The NRC would propose that a licensee or certificate holder may 
begin firearms background checks on armed security personnel after the 
licensee or certificate holder has applied to the NRC for the 
preemption authority section 161A of the AEA. Because the NRC has not 
previously had the authority to require its licensees or certificate 
holders to complete firearms background checks on security personnel, 
in most instances these requirements would be new to licensees and 
uncertainties exist over the amount of time to complete these checks. 
Thus delays in completing the checks (e.g., the time necessary to 
resolve any errors of fact in the FBI's NICS databases) could reduce 
the number of available security officers and create fatigue or minimum 
staffing level issues. Therefore, the NRC envisions working with 
licensees and certificate holders on a case-by-case basis to establish 
the date for NRC approval of an application for preemption authority; 
and thereby ensure that the licensee's or certificate holder's security 
organizations can continue to adequately protect the facility when the 
approval is issued.
    The Commission has not yet determined whether licensees and 
certificate holders may apply for preemption authority alone or 
combined preemption and enhanced-weapons authority prior to issuance of 
a final rule. In anticipation that the Commission does permit 
applications for section 161A authority prior to promulgation of a 
final rule, the proposed rule would include language to support a 
transition to these regulations from requirements imposed by Commission 
orders granting section 161A authority. The proposed rule would not, 
however, require a licensee or certificate holder to repeat a firearms 
background check for security personnel who previously satisfactorily 
completed a firearms background check that was required under 
Commission order. Consequently, this approach would provide both the 
Commission and industry with the maximum flexibility to expeditiously 
implement the security enhancements authorized by section 161A. The 
exception to this requirement would be for security personnel who have 
had a break in employment with the licensee or certificate holder or 
their security contractor, or who have transferred from another 
licensee or certificate holder (who previously completed a firearms 
background check on them). In either case these security personnel 
would be treated as new security personnel and they would be subject to 
a new firearms background check.
    The proposed rule would also provide direction on how security 
personnel who have received an adverse firearms background check (i.e., 
a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response) may: (1) Obtain further 
information from the FBI on the reason for the adverse response, (2) 
appeal a ``denied'' response, or (3) provide additional information to 
resolve a ``delayed'' response. Security personnel would be required to 
apply directly to the FBI for these actions (i.e., the licensee or 
certificate holder may not appeal to the FBI on behalf of the security 
personnel). Only after such personnel have successfully appealed their 
``denied'' response, and have subsequently received a ``proceed'' NICS 
response, would they be permitted access to covered weapons.
    Security personnel who receive a ``denied'' NICS response are 
presumed by ATF to be prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm 
under federal law (see 18 U.S.C. 922) and may not have access to 
covered weapons unless they have successfully appealed the ``denied'' 
NICS response and received a ``proceed'' NICS response. Because of the 
structure of section 161A, the proposed rule would not require 
licensees or certificate holders to remove personnel with a ``denied'' 
response until after the NRC has approved the licensee's or certificate 
holder's application for preemption authority (i.e., licensee's and 
certificate holders would not be subject to the requirements of Sec.  
73.18 until after the NRC's approval of their application for 
preemption authority is issued). However, the NRC's expectation is that 
current licensees or certificate holders who receive a ``denied'' 
response for current security personnel would remove those personnel 
from any security duties requiring possession of firearms to comport 
with applicable Federal law and ATF regulations.
    The NRC would propose to charge the same fee for fingerprints 
submitted for a firearms background check as is currently imposed for 
fingerprints submitted for other NRC-required criminal history checks 
including fingerprints (i.e., an NRC administrative fee plus the FBI's 
processing fee). In addition, the NRC would charge an administrative 
fee for processing the NICS check information; however, no FBI fee 
would be charged for the NICS check.
    The proposed Sec.  73.19 would only apply to power reactor 
licensees and Category I special nuclear material licensees; therefore, 
only these two classes of licensees would be subject to the firearms 
background check provisions of Sec.  73.18. The NRC may, however, 
consider making stand-alone preemption authority or combined enhanced-
weapons authority and preemption authority available to other

[[Page 62669]]

types of licensees or certificate holders in future rulemakings.
    In Sec.  73.19, the NRC would propose requirements for a licensee 
or certificate holder to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or 
to apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption 
authority. Licensees and certificate holders who apply for enhanced-
weapons authority, must also apply for and receive NRC approval of 
preemption authority as a necessary prerequisite to receiving enhanced-
weapons authority. The NRC would propose limiting either authority to 
power reactor licensees and Category I SSNM licensees at this time. The 
NRC may consider applying this authority to other types of licensees, 
certificate holders, radioactive material, or other property (as 
authorized under section 161A) in future rulemakings. Obtaining 
enhanced-weapons authority from the NRC would be a necessary 
prerequisite for a licensee or certificate holder to apply under ATF's 
regulations for a Federal firearms license for these weapons. The NRC 
would propose that licensees and certificate holders who want to apply 
for enhanced-weapons authority must provide the NRC, for prior review 
and approval, a new or revised security plan, training and 
qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan to reflect the use 
of these specific new weapons the licensee or certificate holder 
intends to employ and to provide a safety assessment of the onsite and 
offsite impact of these specific enhanced weapons.
    The proposed rule would also provide direction on acceptable 
training standards for training and qualification on enhanced weapons. 
The NRC would require licensees and certificate holders to complete 
training and qualification of security personnel on any enhanced 
weapons, before these personnel employ those weapons to protect the 
facility. The NRC would also require Commission licensees and 
certificate holders to notify the NRC of any adverse ATF findings 
associated with ATF's inspections, audits, or reviews of their Federal 
firearms license (FFL) (i.e., an FFL held by an NRC licensee or 
certificate holder).
    Finally, the NRC would propose to treat enhanced weapons the same 
as existing weapons for the purpose of ``use'' of these weapons; and 
therefore Sec.  73.19 would cross reference to existing regulation in 
Sec. Sec.  73.55 and 73.46 on the use of weapons by reactor licensees 
and by Category I SSNM licensees ( i.e., the NRC is not proposing 
separate requirements on enhanced weapons versus standard weapons; 
rather, requirements on the use of any weaponry possessed by the 
licensee or certificate holder should be appropriate for the facility).
    To implement the new weapons provisions, three new terms would be 
added to Sec.  73.2: covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard weapon.
    The proposed new weapons requirements and supporting discussion for 
the proposed language are set forth in more detail (including the 
proposed new definitions) in Table 1.

IV.2. Section 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed 
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage''

    Proposed Sec.  73.55 contains security program requirements for 
power reactor licensees. The security program requirements in Sec.  
73.55 would apply to all nuclear power plant licensees that hold a 10 
CFR part 50 license and to applicants who are applying for either a 
part 50 license or a part 52 combined license. Paragraph (a) of Sec.  
73.55 would identify the licensees and applicants for which the 
requirements apply, and the need for submitting to NRC (for review and 
approval) a ``Physical Security Plan,'' a ``Training and Qualification 
Plan,'' and a ``Safeguards Contingency Plan.'' Paragraph (b) of Sec.  
73.55 would set forth the performance objectives that govern power 
reactor security programs. The remaining paragraphs of Sec.  73.55 
would implement the detailed requirements for each of the security 
plans, as well as for the various features of physical security.
    This section would be extensively revised in an effort to make 
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission 
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based 
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during 
implementation, fulfill certain provisions of the EPAct of 2005, and 
add several new requirements that resulted from evaluation insights 
from implementation of the security orders, review of site security 
plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program 
and force-on-force exercises. The proposed regulations would require an 
integrated security plan that begins at the owner controlled area 
boundary and would implement defense-in-depth concepts and protective 
strategies based on protecting target sets from the various attributes 
of the design basis threat. Notable additions to the proposed Sec.  
73.55 are summarized below.
Cyber Security Requirements
    The current security regulations do not contain requirements 
related to cyber security. Subsequent to the events of September 11, 
2001, the NRC issued orders to require power reactor licensees to 
implement measures to enhance cyber security. These security measures 
required an assessment of cyber systems and the implementation of 
corrective measures sufficient to provide protection against the cyber 
threats at the time the orders were issued.
    The proposed requirements maintain the intent of the security 
orders by establishing the requirement for a cyber security program to 
protect any system that, if compromised, can adversely impact safety, 
security, or emergency preparedness.
Requirements for CAS and SAS To Have Functionally Equivalent Capabilities 
Such That No Single Act Can Disable the Function of CAS and SAS
    Current regulatory requirements ensure that both CAS and SAS have 
equivalent alarm annunciation and communication capabilities, but do 
not explicitly require equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation, 
and surveillance capabilities. Further, the current requirement of 
Sec.  73.55(e)(1) states ``All alarms required pursuant to this part 
must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located 
within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned 
station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the 
capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an 
alarm.'' The Commission orders added enhanced detection and assessment 
capabilities, but did not require equivalent capabilities for both CAS 
and SAS. The security plans approved by the Commission on October 29, 
2004, varied, due to the performance-based nature of the requirements, 
with respect to how the individual licensees implemented these 
requirements, but all sites were required to provide a CAS and SAS with 
functionally equivalent capabilities to support the implementation of 
the site protective strategy.
    The proposed rule would extend the requirement for no single act to 
remove capabilities to the key functions of the alarm stations and 
would require licensees to implement protective measures such that a 
single act would not disable the intrusion detection, assessment, and 
communications capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. This proposed 
requirement would ensure continuity of response

[[Page 62670]]

operations during a security event by ensuring that the detection, 
assessment, and communications functions required to effectively 
implement the licensee's protective strategy are maintained despite the 
loss of one or the other alarm station. For the purposes of assessing 
the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all 
licensees would require assessments and approximately one third of the 
licensees would choose to implement hardware modifications.
    The NRC has concluded that protecting the alarm stations such that 
a single act does not disable the key functions would provide an 
enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, 
assessment and communications capabilities required to protect the 
facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For 
new reactor licensees, licensed after the publication of this rule, the 
Commission would require CAS and SAS to be designed, constructed, and 
equipped with equivalent standards.
Uninterruptible Power for Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems
    Current regulatory requirements require back-up power for alarm 
annunciation and non-portable communication equipment, but do not 
require this back-up power to be uninterruptible. Although not 
specifically required, many licensees have installed uninterruptible 
power to their security systems for added reliability of these 
electronic systems. However, the Commission had not required 
uninterruptible power for assessment systems. For the purposes of 
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed 
that only a small number of licensees would require hardware 
modifications to meet this proposed requirement.
    Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, 
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded 
that uninterruptible back-up power would provide an enhanced level of 
assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and 
communication capabilities required to protect the facility against the 
design basis threat of radiological sabotage. This new requirement 
would reduce the risk of losing detection, assessment, and 
communication capabilities during a loss of the normal power supply.
``Video-Capture'' Capability
    Current regulatory requirements address the use of closed circuit 
television systems, but do not explicitly require them. Although not 
specifically required, all licensees have adopted the use of video 
surveillance in their site security plans. Many of the licensees have 
adopted advanced video surveillance technology to provide real-time and 
play-back/recorded video images to assist security personnel in 
determining the cause of an alarm annunciation. For the purposes of 
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed 
that a small percentage of licensees would require hardware 
modifications to comply with this proposed requirement for advanced 
video surveillance technology.
    Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, 
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded 
that advanced video technology would provide an enhanced level of 
assurance that a licensee can assess the cause of an alarm annunciation 
and initiate a timely response capable of defending the facility 
against the threat up to and including the design basis threat of 
radiological sabotage. Therefore the proposed rule would require 
advanced video surveillance technology.
    Implementation of Sec.  73.55 is linked principally to the 
application of appendix B to part 73, ``General criteria for security 
personnel,'' and appendix C to part 73, ``Licensee safeguards 
contingency plans,'' both of which would be revised in this proposed 
rulemaking. Proposed changes to these appendices are discussed in 
Sections IV.6 and IV.7 of this document.
    Table 2 sets forth the proposed Sec.  73.55 language as compared to 
the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the 
proposed language including new definitions for security officer and 
target set that would be added to Sec.  73.2. Because Sec.  73.55 would 
be restructured extensively, Table 9 (See Section VIII) provides a 
cross reference to locate individual requirements of the current 
regulation within the proposed regulation.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the impacts and burdens for certain areas of proposed changes 
to Sec.  73.55. Due to the accelerated rulemaking schedule, the NRC 
staff's assessments of impacts to individual licensees as a result of 
the proposed new requirements have not been informed by stakeholder 
insights on potential implementation issues. Consequently, the 
Commission recognizes that its views on the feasability, costs, and 
time necessary to fully implement certain portions of this proposed 
rule (e.g., alarm station, supporting systems, video systems, and cyber 
security issues) by selected licensees may not be fully informed. 
Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this 
proposed rule to address the following questions:
    1. What insights and estimates can stakeholders provide on the 
feasability, costs, and time necessary to implement the proposed rule's 
changes to existing alarm stations, supporting systems, video systems, 
and cyber security?
    2. Are there any actions that should be considered, such as 
authorizing alternative measures, exemptions, extended implementation 
schedules, etc., that would allow the NRC to mitigate any unnecessary 
regulatory burden created by these requirements?

IV.3. Section 73.56, ``Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for 
Nuclear Power Plants''

    This section would continue to apply to all current part 50 
licensees and to all applicants who are applying for a new reactor 
license under parts 50 or 52, but would be extensively revised. 
Proposed Sec.  73.56 would retain the requirement for a licensee to 
determine that an individual is trustworthy and reliable before 
permitting the individual to have unescorted access to nuclear power 
plant protected areas and vital areas. The majority of the revisions in 
proposed Sec.  73.56 reflect several fundamental changes to the NRC's 
approach to access authorization requirements since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the NRC's concern with the threat of 
an active or passive insider who may collude with adversaries to commit 
radiological sabotage. These changes would include: (1) An increase in 
the rigor of some elements of the access authorization program to 
provide increased assurance that individuals who have unescorted access 
authorization are trustworthy and reliable; (2) an elimination of 
temporary unescorted access provisions [prior to the completion of the 
full background check]; (3) an elimination of the provisions that 
permit relaxation of the program when a reactor is in cold shutdown; 
and (4) the addition of a new category of individuals who would be 
subject to Sec.  73.56.
    Proposed Sec.  73.56(b)(ii) would require licensees' access 
authorization programs to cover individuals whose job duties and 
responsibilities permit them to access or use digital computer systems 
that may affect licensees' operational safety and security systems, and 
emergency response capabilities. Historically digital computer systems 
have played a limited role in the operation of nuclear power plants. 
However, the role of computer systems

[[Page 62671]]

at nuclear power plants is increasing, as licensees take advantage of 
computer technology to maximize plant productivity. In general, 
licensees currently exclude from their access authorization programs, 
individuals who may electronically access equipment in the protected 
areas of nuclear power plants to perform their job functions, if their 
duties and responsibilities do not require physical unescorted access 
to the equipment located within protected or vital areas. However, 
because these individuals manage and maintain the networks that connect 
to equipment located within protected or vital areas and are 
responsible for permitting authorized and/or trusted personnel to gain 
electronic access to equipment and systems, they are often granted 
greater electronic privileges than the trusted and authorized 
personnel. With advancements in electronic technology and 
telecommunications, differences in the potential adverse impacts of a 
saboteur's actions through physical access and electronic access are 
lessening. Thus, the proposed rule would require those individuals who 
have authority to electronically access equipment that, if compromised, 
can adversely impact operational safety, security or emergency 
preparedness of the nuclear power plants, to be determined to be 
trustworthy and reliable.
    The proposed revisions to Sec.  73.56 would also address changes in 
the nuclear industry's structure and business practices since this rule 
was originally promulgated. At the time the current Sec.  73.56 was 
developed, personnel transfers between licensees (i.e., leaving the 
employment of one licensee to work for another licensee) with 
interruptions in unescorted access authorization were less common. Most 
licensees operated plants at a single site and maintained an access 
authorization program that applied only to that site. When an 
individual left employment at one site and began working for another 
licensee, the individual was subject to a different access 
authorization program that often had different requirements. Because 
some licensees were reluctant to share information about previous 
employees with the new employer, licensees often did not have access to 
the information the previous licensee had gathered about the individual 
and so were required to gather the necessary information again. The 
additional effort to collect information that another licensee held 
created a burden on both licensees and applicants for unescorted access 
authorization. But, because few individuals transferred, the burden was 
not excessive.
    However, since 1991, the industry has undergone significant 
consolidation and developed new business practices to use its workforce 
more efficiently. Industry efforts to better use staffing resources 
have resulted in the development of a transient workforce that travels 
from site to site as needed, such as roving outage crews. Although the 
industry has always relied on contractors and vendors (C/V) for special 
expertise and staff for outages, the number of transient personnel who 
work solely in the nuclear industry has increased and the length of 
time they are on site has decreased. Because the current regulations 
were written on the basis that the majority of nuclear personnel would 
remain at one site for years, and that licensees would maintain 
independent, site-specific access authorization programs and share 
limited information, the current regulations do not adequately address 
the transfer of personnel between sites.
    In light of the NRC's increased concern with an insider threat 
since September 11, 2001, the increasingly mobile nuclear industry 
workforce has heightened the need for information sharing among 
licensee access authorization programs, including C/V authorization 
programs upon which licensees rely, to ensure that licensees have 
information that is as complete as possible about an individual when 
making an unescorted access authorization decision. To address this 
need, the access authorization orders issued by the NRC to nuclear 
power plant licensees on January 7, 2003, mandated increased sharing of 
information. In addition, proposed Sec.  73.56 would require licensees 
and C/V to collect and share greater amounts of information than under 
the current rule, subject to the protections of individuals' privacy 
that would be specified in proposed Sec.  73.56(m) [Protection of 
information]. As a result, individuals who are subject to this section 
would establish a detailed ``track record'' within the industry that 
would potentially cover their activities over long periods of time and 
would follow them if they change jobs and move to a new position that 
requires them to be granted unescorted access authorization by another 
licensee. The proposed requirement acknowledges the industry initiative 
to develop and utilize a database to ensure accurate information 
sharing between sites. This increased information sharing is necessary 
to provide high assurance that individuals who are granted and maintain 
unescorted access authorization are trustworthy and reliable when 
individuals move between access authorization programs. In addition, 
the increased information sharing would reduce regulatory burden on 
licensees when processing individuals who have had only short breaks 
between periods of unescorted access authorization.
    Another change in the NRC's proposed approach to access 
authorization requirements is the result of a series of public meetings 
that were held with stakeholders during 2001-2004 to discuss potential 
revisions to 10 CFR part, 26, ``Fitness-for-Duty Programs.'' Part 26 
establishes additional steps that the licensees who are subject to 
Sec.  73.56 must take as part of the process of determining whether to 
grant unescorted access authorization to an individual or permit an 
individual to maintain unescorted access authorization. These 
additional requirements focus on aspects of an individual's behavior, 
character, and reputation related to substance abuse. They require the 
licensee and other entities who are subject to part 26 to conduct drug 
and alcohol testing of individuals and an inquiry into the individual's 
past behavior with respect to illegal drug use or consumption of 
alcohol to excess, as part of determining whether the individual may be 
granted unescorted access authorization. However, historically there 
have been some inconsistencies and redundancies between the Sec.  73.56 
access authorization requirements and the related requirements in part 
26. These inconsistencies have led to implementation questions from 
licensees, as well as inconsistencies in how licensees have implemented 
the requirements. The redundancies have, in other cases, imposed an 
unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees.
    During public meetings held to discuss potential changes to part 
26, the stakeholders pointed out ambiguities in the terms used in both 
part 26 and Sec.  73.56, apparent inconsistencies and redundancies in 
the related requirements, and reported many experiences in which the 
ambiguities and lack of specificity and clarity in current Sec.  73.56 
had resulted in unintended consequences. Although these meetings did 
not focus on Sec.  73.56, many of the stakeholders' comments directly 
resulted in some of the proposed changes to Sec.  73.56. (Summaries of 
these meetings, and any comments provided through the Web site, are 
available at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/rulemake?source=
Part26_risk&st=risk.) In response to stakeholder requests, the

[[Page 62672]]

NRC has proposed language changes to improve the clarity and 
specificity of the requirements in proposed Sec.  73.56 and 
substantially reorganized the section to present the requirements 
generally in the order in which they would apply to licensees' access 
authorization processes. The proposed changes are expected to result in 
more uniform implementation of the requirements, and, consequently, 
greater consistency in achieving the goals of Sec.  73.56. Table 3 sets 
forth the proposed Sec.  73.56 language as compared to the current 
language, and discusses the proposed language.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the following two issues:
    1. The Commission requests public comment specific to the 
appropriateness of the framework for the Insider Mitigation Program as 
specified by the proposed 10 CFR 73.55(b)(7)(i) and 73.55(b)(7)(ii). 
The proposed rule specifies that the Insider Mitigation Program include 
elements of the access authorization program, fitness-for-duty program, 
behavioral observation program, and various physical security measures 
for the purpose of providing assurance that insider activities would be 
detected before adverse affects could be realized.
    2. The Commission requests public comment on the feasibility of 
adding a requirement to the proposed rule to require a modified 
escorted visitor access provision which would allow site visits by 
members of the public to limited areas of the facility for the purpose 
of enhancing public education and awareness through informational 
briefings and tours at the facility.

IV.4. Section 73.58 ``Safety/Security Interface Requirements for 
Nuclear Power Reactors''

    The NRC is proposing to add a new requirement to part 73 addressing 
the safety/security interface for nuclear power reactor licensees. The 
need for the proposed new requirement is based upon the NRC's 
experience in reviewing licensees' implementation of a significant 
number of new security requirements since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Licensees have always been required to ensure that 
any changes to safety functions, systems, programs, and activities do 
not have unintended consequences on other facility safety functions, 
systems, programs, and activities. Likewise, licensees have been 
required to ensure that any changes to security functions, systems, 
programs, and activities do not have unintended consequences on other 
facility security functions, systems, programs, and activities. 
However, the Commission has concluded that the pace, number, and 
complexity of these security changes warrant the establishment of a 
more formal program to ensure licensees properly assess the safety/
security interface in implementing these changes.
    On April 28, 2003, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the San 
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace submitted a petition for rulemaking (PRM-
50-80) requesting that, in part, the NRC's regulations establishing 
conditions of licenses and requirements for evaluating proposed 
changes, tests, and experiments for nuclear power plants be amended to 
require licensee evaluation of whether the proposed changes, tests, and 
experiments cause protection against radiological sabotage to be 
decreased and, if so, that the changes, tests, and experiments only be 
conducted with prior NRC approval. In SECY-05-0048, dated March 28, 
2005, the NRC staff recommended that the Commission approve rulemaking 
for the requested action, but did not necessarily endorse the specific 
amendments suggested by the petition. In SECY-05-0048, dated June 28, 
2005, the Commission directed the staff to develop the technical basis 
for such a rule and to incorporate its provisions within the ongoing 
power reactor security requirements rulemaking. This proposed rule 
addresses, in part, the petitioner's request by incorporating proposed 
Sec.  73.58 within this rulemaking.
    The Commission has determined that the proposed safety/security 
interface rule requirements are necessary because the current 
regulations do not specifically require evaluation of the effects of 
plant changes on security or the effects of security changes on plant 
safety. Further, current regulations do not require communication about 
the implementation and timing of changes, which would promote awareness 
of the effects of changing facility conditions and result in 
appropriate assessment and response.
    The NRC is aware of a number of occurrences of adverse safety/
security interactions at nuclear power plants over the years to justify 
consideration of a new rule. Examples of adverse interactions include: 
(1) Inadvertent security barrier breaches while performing maintenance 
activities (e.g., cutting of pipes that provided uncontrolled access to 
vital areas, removing ventilation fans or other equipment from vital 
area boundary walls without taking compensatory measures to prevent 
uncontrolled access into vital areas); (2) Blockage of bullet resisting 
enclosure's (or other defensive firing position's) fields of fire; (3) 
Erection of scaffolding and other equipment without due consideration 
of its impact on the site's applicable physical protection strategy; 
and (4) Staging of temporary equipment within security isolation zones.
    Security could also adversely affect operations because of 
inadequate staffing of security force personnel on backshifts, 
weekends, and holidays, to support operations during emergencies (e.g., 
opening and securing vital area access doors to allow operations 
personnel timely access to safety-related equipment). Also, security 
structures, such as vehicle barriers, delay barriers, rerouted 
isolation zones, or defensive shields could adversely affect plant 
equipment such as valve pits, fire stations, other prepositioned 
emergency equipment, blowout panels, or otherwise interfere with 
operators responding to plant events.
    The NRC considered many factors in developing this proposed new 
requirement. One of the factors considered is that existing change 
processes are focused on specific areas of plant activities, and that 
implementation of these processes is generally well understood by 
licensees. An example is found in Sec.  50.54(p), which provides that a 
reactor licensee may make changes to its safeguards contingency plans 
without Commission approval provided that the changes do not decrease 
the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. Similarly, Sec.  50.65(a)(4) 
provides that a reactor licensee shall assess and manage the increase 
in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. However, 
neither Sec. Sec.  50.54(p) (security) nor 50.65(a)(4) (safety) require 
that an assessment for potential adverse impacts on safety/security 
interface be made before the proposed changes are implemented. The 
proposed Sec.  73.58 would address this gap by requiring that, before 
implementing allowed changes, licensees must assess the changes with 
respect to the safety/security interface and, if potential adverse 
interactions are identified, take appropriate compensatory and/or 
mitigative action before making the changes.
    The proposed rule reflects a performance-based approach and 
language which is sufficiently broad that, in addition to operating 
power reactors, it could be applied to other classes of licensees in 
separate rulemaking(s), if conditions warrant. In addition to the 
requirements in proposed Sec.  73.58, a new definition for

[[Page 62673]]

safety/security interface would be added to Sec.  73.2.
    Table 4 sets forth the proposed Sec.  73.58 language and provides 
the supporting discussion for the proposed language, including a new 
definition for safety/security interface that would be added to Sec.  73.2.

IV.5. Section 73.71 ``Reporting of Safeguards Events''

    The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized the need for the 
capability to respond to coordinated attacks that could pose an 
imminent threat to national infrastructure such as nuclear power 
reactor sites. Prompt licensee notification to the NRC of a security 
event involving an actual or imminent threat would initiate the NRC's 
alerting mechanism for other nuclear facilities in recognition that an 
attack or threat against a single facility may be the prelude to 
attacks or threats against multiple facilities. In either case, timely 
communication of this event to the NRC, and the NRC's communication of 
the threat or attack to other licensees could reduce the adversaries' 
ability to engage in coordinated attacks and would strengthen the 
licensees' response posture. NRC would also initiate notifications to 
the Homeland Security/Federal response networks for an ``Incident of 
National Significance,'' as defined by the National Response Plan (NRP).
    Currently, Sec.  73.71(b)(1) requires power reactor licensees to 
notify the NRC within one hour of discovery, as described in Paragraph 
I of appendix G to 10 CFR part 73, ``Reportable safeguards events.'' In 
addition, Sec.  50.72 establishes reporting requirements for events 
requiring an emergency declaration in accordance with a licensee's 
emergency plan. Licensee notification under Sec.  50.72(a)(3) is 
required only after the threat is assessed, an ``Emergency Class'' is 
declared, and initial notification of appropriate State and local 
agencies are completed first (i.e., not upon discovery). The current 
timing of requirements of this notification would not allow the NRC to 
warn other licensees of a potential threat to their facilities in a 
prompt manner to allow other licensees to change their security posture 
in advance of a threat or potential attack. The Commission has 
previously advised licensees of the need to expedite their initial 
notification to the NRC. The proposed accelerated notification 
requirements are similar to those provided to licensees in NRC Bulletin 
2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-
Based Events,'' dated July 18, 2005.
    The proposed amendments to Sec.  73.71 would add a new expedited 
notification requirement for licensees subject to the provisions of 
Sec.  73.55 to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible 
after the discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the 
facility as described in appendix G to part 73, but not later than 15 
minutes after discovery. The proposed amendments to Sec.  73.71 and 
appendix G to part 73 would also add two additional four-hour 
notification requirements for suspicious events and tampering events 
not otherwise covered under appendix G to part 73. The proposed Sec.  
73.71 would retain the requirement for the licensee to maintain a 
continuous communications channel for one-hour notifications upon 
request of the NRC. The proposed rule would not require a continuous 
communications channel for four-hour notifications, because of the 
lesser degree of urgency of these events. For 15-minute notifications, 
the NRC may request the licensee establish a continuous communications 
channel after the licensee has made any emergency notifications to 
State officials or local law enforcement and if the licensee has taken 
action to stabilize the plant following any transient [associated with 
the 15-minute notification]. In NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated 
July 18, 2005, the NRC had indicated a continuous communications 
channel was not necessary for the new 15-minute notifications. However, 
in developing this proposed rule the Commission has evaluated the need 
to promptly obtain information of an unfolding event versus imposing an 
unreasonable burden on licensees in the midst of a rapidly unfolding 
event and possible plant transient. The Commission considers that the 
proposed regulation would provide a reasonable balance between these 
two objectives. Table 5 sets forth the proposed amendments to Sec.  
73.71 language as compared to the current language, and provides the 
supporting discussion for the proposed language. Table 8 sets forth the 
proposed amendments to the appendix G to part 73 language as compared 
to the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the 
proposed language.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the proposed changes to Sec.  73.71 and appendix G to part 73 
. Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this 
proposed rule to address the following question:
    1. For the types of events covered by the proposed four-hour 
notification requirements in Sec.  73.71 and appendix G to part 73, 
should the notification time interval of all or some of these 
notifications be different (e.g., a 1-hour, 2-hour, 8-hour, 24-hour 
notification)? If so, what notification time interval is appropriate? 
``Notification time interval'' is meant to be the time from when a 
licensee recognizes that an event has occurred or is occurring to the 
time that the licensee reports the event to the NRC.

IV.6. Appendix B to Part 73, ``General Criteria for Security Personnel''

    Appendix B to part 73 provides requirements for the training and 
qualification of security personnel to ensure that security personnel 
can execute their duties. Following the events of September 11, 2001, 
the Commission determined that tactical proficiency and physical 
fitness requirements governing licensees' armed security force 
personnel needed to be enhanced. The proposed amendments to appendix B 
to part 73 make generically applicable security requirements imposed by 
Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission 
during implementation and add several new requirements that resulted 
from evaluation insights from force-on-force exercises.
    Notable additions to the proposed appendix B to part 73 
requirements are summarized as follows:
Additional Physical Requirements and Minimum Age Requirements for 
Unarmed Members of the Security Organization
    Unarmed security personnel perform duties similar to armed security 
personnel, such as detection, assessment, vehicle and personnel escort, 
and vital area controls. The current requirements for unarmed members 
of the security organization state, in part, that these individuals 
shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would affect 
their performance of assigned duties. However, the current rule does 
not require unarmed personnel to pass a physical examination to verify 
that they meet standards for vision, hearing, or some portions of 
psychological qualifications. The proposed rule would include a 
requirement to assure that unarmed security personnel are physically 
capable of performing their assigned duties.
    Additionally, the current rule specifies a minimum age of 21 years old

[[Page 62674]]

for armed security personnel, but does not specify a minimum age 
requirement for unarmed security personnel. The proposed rule would 
require that unarmed members attain the age of 18 prior to assignment 
to establish a minimum age requirement for unarmed members of the 
security organization at a power reactor facility.
    These proposed additional requirements would assure that personnel 
performing security functions, whether armed or unarmed, meet 
appropriate age, vision, hearing and psychological requirements 
commensurate with their assigned security duties.
Qualification Scores for Program Elements Required by the Training and 
Qualification Plan
    The current rule includes daylight qualification scores of 70 
percent for handguns, 80 percent for semiautomatic rifles, 50 percent 
for shotguns and a requirement for night fire familiarization with 
assigned weapons. The April 29, 2003, Training Order imposed new 
requirements for the firearms training and qualification programs at 
power reactor licensees. The Training Order retained the current 
daylight qualification scores of 70 percent for handguns, 80 percent 
for semiautomatic rifles and superceded the daylight qualification 
score of 50 percent for the shotgun. The order did not specify a 
qualification score for the daylight course of fire for the shotgun, 
only an acceptable level of proficiency. The order superceded the 
current rule for night fire familiarization and added courses of fire 
for night fire and tactical training with assigned weapons.
    The proposed rule would retain the qualification scores of the 
existing regulations and add specific qualification scores for the 
daylight course of fire for the shotgun and/or enhanced weapons, the 
night fire qualification for shotguns, handguns, semiautomatic rifles 
and/or enhanced weapons and the tactical course of fire for all 
assigned weapons to remain consistent with the qualification scoring 
methodology contained in the current rule. The scoring methodology for 
the current rule and the proposed rule is consistent with the scoring 
methodology used for firearms programs at the local, State and Federal 
levels and is consistent with approved courses of fire from the law 
enforcement community and recognized national entities.
    The proposed rule would also include a requirement for a 
qualification score of 80 percent for the annual written exam. The 
current rule does not provide a requirement for an annual written exam 
score. Likewise, the April 29, 2003, Training Order that required 
licensees to develop and implement an annual written exam also did not 
specify a qualification score. The Commission has determined that a 
score of 80 percent demonstrates a minimum level of understanding and 
familiarity of the material necessary to adequately perform security-
related tasks. The 80-percent score would be consistent with minimum 
scores commonly utilized throughout the nuclear industry.
Qualification Requirements for Security Trainers, Personnel Assessing 
Psychological Qualifications and Armorer Certifications
    The current rule and the security orders do not specifically 
address the qualification or certification of instructors, or other 
personnel that have assigned duties and responsibilities for implementation 
of training and qualification programs of power reactor licensees.
    The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel that 
have assigned duties and responsibilities for implementation of 
training and qualification programs to ensure these persons are 
qualified and/or certified to make determinations of security personnel 
suitability, working condition of security equipment, and overall 
determinations that security personnel are trained and qualified to 
execute their assigned duties.
On-the-Job Training
    The current rule states in part that each individual who requires 
training to perform assigned security duties shall, prior to 
assignment, be trained to perform these tasks and duties. Each 
individual shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill and ability 
in accordance with specific standards of each task.
    The proposed rule would specify the new requirement that the 
licensee include on-the-job training as part of the training and 
qualification program prior to assigning an individual to an 
unsupervised security position. This requirement is in addition to 
formal and informal classroom training. The on-the-job training program 
would provide the licensee the ability to assess an individual's 
knowledge, skill and ability to effectively carry-out assigned duties, 
in a supervised manner, within the actual work environment, before 
assignment, to an unsupervised position.
    The proposed revision to appendix B of part 73 required special 
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming 
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom 
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, Section I through V of 
appendix B to part 73 would remain unchanged, and the proposed new 
language for power reactors would be added as Section VI.
    Table 6 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix B to part 73 
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language. 
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 10 (See 
Section VIII) provides a cross-reference to locate individual 
requirements of the current regulation within the proposed regulation.

IV.7. Appendix C to Part 73, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans''

    Appendix C to part 73 provides requirements that govern the 
development of safeguards contingency plans. Following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a thorough review of 
security to continue to ensure that nuclear power plants had effective 
security measures in place given the changing threat environment. The 
proposed appendix C would increase the information required in the 
safeguards contingency plans for responses to threats, up to and 
including, design basis threats, as described in Sec.  73.1. Notable 
additions to the proposed appendix C to part 73 requirements are 
summarized below:
Mitigating Strategies
    Current regulations do not include requirements to develop 
mitigating strategies for events beyond the scope of the design basis 
threat. The orders issued after September 11, 2001, included a 
requirement to preplan strategies for coping with such events. The 
proposed appendix C to part 73 would contain this element of the orders 
to require that licensees preplan strategies to respond to and mitigate 
the consequences of potential events, including those that may result 
in the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire.
Qualification Requirements for Drill and Exercise Controllers
    The current rule and the security orders do not specifically 
address the qualification of personnel that are assigned duties and 
responsibilities for implementation of training and qualification 
drills and exercises at power reactor licensees.
    The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel who 
function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure these persons are 
trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills

[[Page 62675]]

and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of the 
licensee security force and must be conducted in a manner that 
demonstrates the licensee's ability to execute the protective strategy 
as described in the site security plans. Additionally, drills and 
exercises must be performed properly to assure they do not negatively 
impact personnel or plant safety.
    The proposed revision to appendix C of part 73 required special 
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming 
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom 
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, appendix C to part 73 
would be divided into two sections, with Section I maintaining all 
current requirements, and Section II containing all proposed 
requirements related to nuclear power reactors.
    Table 7 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix C to part 73 
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language. 
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 11 (See 
Section VIII) is a cross-reference showing where individual 
requirements of the current regulation would be in the proposed regulation.

IV.8. Appendix G to Part 73, ``Reportable Safeguards Events''

    Proposed appendix G to part 73 provides requirements regarding the 
reporting of safeguards events. Proposed appendix G would contain 
changes to support the revised and accelerated reporting requirements 
which would be incorporated into this rulemaking. Proposed appendix G 
to part 73 would also contain revised four-hour reporting requirements 
that would require licensees to report to the NRC information of 
suspicious surveillance activities, attempts at access, or other 
similar information as addressed in Appendix G, section III (a)(1) and 
(2). Following September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance requesting 
that licensees report suspicious activities near their facilities to 
allow assessment by the NRC and other appropriate agencies. The 
proposed new reporting requirement would clarify this expectation to 
assure consistent reporting of this important information. 
Additionally, the proposed rule would contain an additional four-hour 
reporting requirement for tampering events that do not meet the 
threshold for reporting under the current one-hour requirements. The 
proposed reporting requirements for tampering events would allow NRC 
assessment of these events. Table 8 sets forth the proposed amendments 
to appendix G to part 73 and provides the supporting discussion for the 
proposed language.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the following issue:
    1. The Commission requests public comment on the need to establish 
an additional requirement for licensees to establish and maintain 
predetermined communication protocols, such as passwords, with the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to verify the authenticity of 
communications during a security event, to include requirements for 
uniform protocols to verify the authenticity of reports required under 
this proposed rule.

IV.9. Conforming and Corrective Changes

    The following conforming changes would also be made: Sec. Sec.  
50.34 and 50.54 (references to the correct paragraphs of revised 
appendix C of part 73), Sec.  50.72 (changes to Sec.  73.71 reports), 
Sec. Sec.  72.212 and 73.70 (references to the correct paragraphs due 
to renumbering of Sec.  73.55), and Sec.  73.8 (adding Sec.  73.18, 
Sec.  73.19, and revised to reflect new NRC form 754 to reflect 
recordkeeping or reporting burden). A corrective change would also be 
made to Sec.  73.8 to reflect an existing recordkeeping or reporting 
burden for NRC Form 366 under Sec.  73.71. However, no changes would be 
made to Sec.  73.81(b) (due to the new Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 
73.58), because willful violations of Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 
73.58 may be subject to criminal penalties.

 Table 1.--Proposed Part 73.18 and 73.19 and Conforming Changes to Part
                                  73.2
      [Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and
    authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced
                                weapons]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Proposed language                      Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec.   73.18 Firearms background checks  This new section would
 for armed security personnel.            implement the firearms
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth      background check requirements
 the requirements for completion of       of new section 161A of the
 firearms background checks on armed      Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
 security personnel at selected NRC-      amended. Section 161A was
 regulated facilities. Firearms           added by section 653 of the
 background checks are intended to        Energy Policy Act of 2005.
 verify that security personnel whose    The proposed rule language in
 duties require access to covered         Sec.  Sec.   73.18 and 73.19,
 weapons are not prohibited from          and conforming changes to Sec.
 receiving, possessing, transporting,       73.2 would be consistent
 importing, or using such weapons under   with the guidelines required
 applicable Federal or State law.         by section 161A.d to implement
 Licensees and certificate holders        the provisions of section
 listed under paragraph (c) of this       161A. Section 161A.d requires
 section who have applied for             the Commission to issue
 preemption authority under Sec.          guidelines, with the approval
 73.19 (i.e., Sec.   73.19 authority),    of the Attorney General, for
 or who have been granted preemption      section 161A to take effect.
 authority by Commission order, are       In parallel and separate from
 subject to the requirements of this      this rulemaking effort,
 section.                                 guidelines are being developed
                                          by staffs from the NRC and the
                                          Department of Justice (DOJ),
                                          [including staffs from the FBI
                                          and ATF].
                                         During development of these
                                          guidelines, the DOJ indicated
                                          that the firearms background
                                          check provisions of section
                                          161A only take effect if a
                                          triggering event occurs. A
                                          triggering event would occur
                                          when a licensee or certificate
                                          holder applies to the NRC to
                                          use the stand-alone preemption
                                          authority or the combined
                                          enhanced-weapons and
                                          preemption authority of
                                          section 161A. Therefore, armed
                                          security personnel of both
                                          current and future licensees
                                          and certificate holders would
                                          not be subject to the firearms
                                          background check provisions of
                                          the proposed Sec.   73.18,
                                          unless their employing
                                          licensee or certificate holder
                                          applies for and receives Sec.
                                           73.19 authority from the NRC.

[[Page 62676]]

Sec.   73.18(b) General Requirements.    Paragraph (b)(1) would require
 (1) Licensees and certificate holders    current and future licensees
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          and certificate holders who
 section who have received NRC approval   have received NRC approval of
 of their application for preemption      their application for
 authority shall ensure that a firearms   preemption authority to ensure
 background check has been                that all security personnel
 satisfactorily completed for all         whose official duties require
 security personnel requiring access to   access to covered weapons
 covered weapons as part of their         satisfactorily complete a
 official security duties prior to        firearms background check. The
 granting access to any covered weapons   firearms background check must
 to those personnel. Security personnel   be satisfactorily completed to
 who have satisfactorily completed a      permit access to covered
 firearms background check, but who       weapons. The Commission
 have had a break in employment with      intends for duties ``requiring
 the licensee, certificate holder, or     access to a covered weapon''
 their security contractor of greater     to include such duties as:
 than one (1) week subsequent to their    Security operations
 most recent firearms background check,   activities; training and
 or who have transferred from a           qualification activities; and
 different licensee or certificate        weapons' maintenance,
 holder (even though the other licensee   handling, accountability,
 or certificate holder satisfactorily     transport, and use activities.
 completed a firearms background check    [See also new definitions for
 on such individuals), are not excepted   covered weapons, enhanced
 from the requirements of this section.   weapons, and standard weapons
                                          in Sec.   73.2 at the end of
                                          Table 1]. A new firearms
                                          background check would be
                                          required for security
                                          personnel who have a break in
                                          employment or who have
                                          transferred from another
                                          licensee or certificate holder
                                          irrespective of whether the
                                          individual previously
                                          satisfactorily completed a
                                          firearms background check
                                          (i.e., such individuals would
                                          be treated as new security
                                          personnel and subject to a new
                                          firearms background check).
Sec.   73.18(b)(2) Security personnel    The NRC staff recognizes that
 who have satisfactorily completed a      the Commission has not yet
 firearms background check pursuant to    made a final decision on
 Commission orders are not subject to a   whether licensees and
 further firearms background check        certificate holders may apply
 under this section, unless these         for preemption authority alone
 personnel have a break in service or     or combined preemption and
 transfer as set forth in paragraph       enhanced-weapons authority
 (b)(1) of this section.                  prior to issuance of a final
                                          rule; however, the proposed
                                          rule would include language to
                                          support a transfer from any
                                          orders associated with such
                                          applications for section 161A
                                          authority to regulations and
                                          thereby provide both the
                                          Commission and industry with
                                          the maximum flexibility to
                                          expeditiously implement the
                                          security enhancements of
                                          section 161A.
                                         Paragraph (b)(2) would exempt
                                          previously checked personnel
                                          from a recheck, except in the
                                          case of a break in service or
                                          transfer [as in paragraph
                                          (b)(1)].
Sec.   73.18(b)(3) A change in the       Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
 licensee, certificate holder, or         that changes in the security
 ownership of a facility, radioactive     contractor or ownership of the
 material, or other property designated   licensee or certificate holder
 under Sec.   73.19, or a change in the   are not triggering events that
 security contractor that provides        require a new firearms
 security personnel responsible for       background check.
 protecting such facilities,             Paragraph (b)(4) would indicate
 radioactive material, or other           that Licensee and certificate
 property, shall not constitute `a        holders may begin submitting
 break in service' or `transfer,' as      their security personnel for
 those terms are used in paragraph        firearms background checks
 (b)(2) of this section.                  after the licensee or
(4) Licensees and certificate holders     certificate holder has applied
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          to the NRC for preemption
 section may begin the application        authority alone or combined
 process for firearms background checks   preemption and enhanced
 under this section for security          weapons authority (i.e., Sec.
 personnel whose duties require access     73.19 authority).
 to covered weapons immediately on       Paragraph (b)(5) would indicate
 application to the NRC for preemption    that firearms background
 authority.                               checks are in addition to
(5) Firearms background checks do not     access authorization or
 replace any other background checks or   security clearance checks that
 criminal history checks required for     security personnel currently
 the licensee's or certificate holder's   undergo under other NRC
 security personnel under this chapter.   regulations (e.g., Sec.  Sec.
                                           11.15, 25.17 or 73.57). The
                                          NRC expects licensees and
                                          certificate holders who become
                                          aware of any new potentially
                                          derogatory information on
                                          current security personnel
                                          (through the completion of a
                                          firearms background check), to
                                          evaluate any such information
                                          for applicability as required
                                          by the licensee's or
                                          certificate holder's access
                                          authorization or security
                                          clearance programs.
Sec.   73.18(c) Applicability. This      Paragraph (c) would define the
 section applies to licensees or          applicability of Sec.   73.18
 certificate holders who have applied     to licensees or certificate
 for or received NRC approval of their    holders who have applied for
 application for Sec.   73.19 authority   or received Commission
 or were issued Commission orders         approval of stand-alone
 requiring firearms background checks.    preemption authority or
                                          combined enhanced-weapons and
                                          preemption authority [see
                                          considerations below for Sec.
                                           73.19(c) on the applicability
                                          of licensee and certificate
                                          holder under this proposed
                                          rule].
                                         Note: portions of this section
                                          would apply to licensee or
                                          certificate holder who has
                                          applied for, but not yet
                                          received preemption authority
                                          (e.g., requirements for
                                          submission of fingerprints) or
                                          those portions that would only
                                          apply to licensees or
                                          certificate holders who have
                                          received NRC approval of their
                                          application (e.g.,
                                          requirements for removal of
                                          security personnel who have
                                          not yet satisfactorily
                                          completed a firearms
                                          background check). This
                                          section would also apply to
                                          power reactor and Category I
                                          SSNM licensees or certificate
                                          holders issued Commission
                                          orders requiring completion of
                                          firearms background checks
                                          [see consideration for
                                          paragraph (b)(2) above].
Sec.   73.18(d) Firearms background      Paragraph (d) would identify
 check requirements. A firearms           the two components of a
 background check for security            firearms background check that
 personnel must include--                 are required by section 161A
(1) A check of the individual's           (i.e., a fingerprint check and
 fingerprints against the Federal         a NICS check).
 Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's)       The NICS was established
 fingerprint system; and                  pursuant to section 103.(b) of
(2) A check of the individual's           the Brady Handgun Violence
 identifying information against the      Prevention Act (Pub. L. 103-
 FBI's National Instant Criminal          159) and is maintained by the
 Background Check System (NICS).          FBI.

[[Page 62677]]

Sec.   73.18(e) Firearms background      Paragraph (e) would indicate
 check submittals.                        the process for submitting to
(1) Licensees and certificate holders     the NRC the two components of
 shall submit to the NRC, in accordance   the firearms background check.
 with Sec.   73.4, for all security       Accomplishment of the NICS
 personnel requiring a firearms           check would be based upon
 background check under this section--    information submitted by the
(i) A set of fingerprints, in             licensee or certificate holder
 accordance with paragraph (n) of this    to the NRC under new NRC Form
 section, and                             754 (see Section VIII of this
(ii) A completed NRC Form 754.            notice for further information
                                          on this NRC Form).
Sec.   73.18(e)(2) Licensees and         Paragraph (e)(2) would
 certificate holders shall retain a       establish the records
 copy of all NRC Forms 754 submitted to   retention requirements for
 the NRC for a period of one (1) year     submitted NRC Forms 754.
 subsequent to the termination of an
 individual's access to covered weapons
 or to the denial of an individual's
 access to covered weapons.
Sec.   73.18(f) NICS portion of a        Paragraph (f) would indicate
 firearms background check. The NRC       that the NRC is forwarding the
 will forward the information contained   information from submitted NRC
 in the submitted NRC Forms 754 to the    Forms 754 to the FBI for
 FBI for evaluation against the NICS.     evaluation against the NICS.
 Upon completion of the NICS check, the   The FBI will return one of the
 FBI will inform the NRC of the results   three results from the NICS
 with one of three responses under 28     check (per the FBI's
 CFR part 25; ``proceed,'' ``denied,''    regulations) and a NICS
 or ``delayed,'' and the associated       transaction number. The NRC
 NICS transaction number. The NRC will    will forward this returned
 forward these results and the            information to the submitting
 associated NICS transaction number to    licensee or certificate holder
 the submitting licensee or certificate   for forwarding to the
 holder. The licensee or certificate      individual security officer.
 holder shall provide these results to    The NICS transaction number is
 the individual who completed the NRC     necessary for any future
 Form 754.                                communications with the FBI on
                                          the NICS check (e.g., an
                                          individual's appeal of a
                                          ``denied'' NICS response).
Sec.   73.18(g) Satisfactory and         Paragraph (g) would set forth
 adverse firearms background checks.      the criteria for a
(1) A satisfactorily completed firearms   satisfactory firearms
 background check means a ``proceed''     background check based upon
 response for the individual from the     the specific NICS response.
 NICS.                                    The fingerprint checks
(2) An adversely completed firearms       mandated by section 161A
 background check means a ``denied'' or   support the accomplishment of
 ``delayed'' response from the NICS.      the NICS check and resolution
                                          of any adverse NICS records;
                                          therefore, the NRC would not
                                          specify a [satisfactory or
                                          adverse]
completion criteria
                                          for the fingerprint portion of
                                          the firearms background check.
Sec.   73.18(h) Removal from access to   Paragraph (h) would require the
 covered weapons. Licensees or            licensee or certificate holder
 certificate holders who have received    to remove personnel who are
 NRC approval of their application for    prohibited from possessing or
 Sec.   73.19 authority shall ensure      receiving firearms from duties
 security personnel are removed from      requiring access to covered
 duties requiring access to covered       weapons. Disqualifying status
 weapons upon the licensee's or           or occurrences are found under
 certificate holder's knowledge of any    the United States Code, Title
 disqualifying status or the occurrence   18, Section 922 and ATF's
 of any disqualifying events under 18     implementing regulations (see
 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and the ATF's      27 CFR 478.32 and 478.11). See
 implementing regulations in 27 CFR       also considerations for Sec.
 part 478.                                73.18(b)(5).
Sec.   73.18(i) [Reserved].............  Paragraph (i) would not be used
                                          to avoid confusion with the
                                          use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec.   73.18(j) Security personnel       Paragraph (j) would require
 responsibilities. Security personnel     security personnel who become
 assigned duties requiring access to      prohibited from possessing or
 covered weapons shall promptly [within   receiving firearms due to a
 three (3) working days]
notify their     disqualifying status or
 employing licensee's or certificate      occurrence of a disqualifying
 holder's security management (whether    event to notify their licensee
 directly employed by the licensee or     or certificate holder within
 certificate holder or employed by a      three (3) days of this fact.
 security contractor to the licensee or  This paragraph would work in
 certificate holder) of the existence     conjunction with the
 of any disqualifying status or upon      requirements of paragraphs
 the occurrence of any disqualifying      (k), (m), and (n) and would
 events listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)     require security personnel to
 or (n), and the ATF's implementing       self report the occurrence of
 regulations in 27 CFR part 478 that      any disqualifying status or
 would prohibit them from possessing or   events.
 receiving a covered weapon.
Sec.   73.18(k) Awareness of             Paragraph (k) would require
 disqualifying events. Licensees and      licensees and certificate
 certificate holders who have received    holders to train security
 NRC approval of Sec.   73.19 authority   personnel on disqualifying
 shall include within their NRC-          status or events to facilitate
 approved security training and           self reporting of such status
 qualification plans instruction on--     or events by security
(1) Disqualifying status or events        personnel under paragraph (j).
 specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and (n),   And to train security
 and ATF's implementing regulations in    personnel on their ongoing
 27 CFR part 478 (including any           responsibility to report
 applicable definitions) identifying      disqualifying status or events
 categories of persons who are            to their licensee or
 prohibited from possessing or            certificate holder.
 receiving any covered weapons; and
(2) The continuing responsibility of
 security personnel assigned duties
 requiring access to covered weapons to
 promptly notify their employing
 licensee or certificate holder of the
 occurrence of any disqualifying
 events.
Sec.   73.18(l) [Reserved].............  Paragraph (l) would not be used
                                          to avoid confusion with the
                                          use of sub-paragraph (1) [see
                                          also paragraph (i) above].

[[Page 62678]]

Sec.   73.18(m) Notification of          Paragraph (m) would require
 removal. Within 72 hours after taking    licensees or certificate
 action to remove security personnel      holders to report instances
 from duties requiring access to          where security personnel (with
 covered weapons, because of the          current access to weapons) are
 existence of any disqualifying status    removed from armed duties
 or the occurrence of any disqualifying   because of the occurrence of
 event--other than due to the prompt      any disqualifying status or
 notification by the security officer     event. The timeliness of this
 under paragraph (j) of this section--    notification would be based
 licensees and certificate holders who    upon the need for appropriate
 have received NRC approval of Sec.       NRC followup of a potential
 73.19 authority shall notify the NRC     criminal violation, rather
 Operations Center of such removal        than the followup necessary
 actions, in accordance with appendix A   for an ongoing security event
 of this part.                            (i.e., the individual no
                                          longer has access to covered
                                          weapons). Appendix A provides
                                          contact information for the
                                          NRC Operations Center.
Sec.   73.18(n) Reporting violations of  Paragraph (n) would indicate
 law. The NRC will promptly report        that if the NRC becomes aware
 suspected violations of Federal law to   of suspected violations of
 the appropriate Federal agency or        criminal law (e.g., a
 suspected violations of State law to     prohibited person actually
 the appropriate State agency.            possessing weapons as a
                                          security officer) it is
                                          obligated to report suspected
                                          violations of Federal or State
                                          law to the appropriate
                                          government agency or agencies.
Sec.   73.18(o) Procedures for           Paragraph (o) would prescribe
 processing of fingerprint checks. (1)    the location, method, and
 Licensees and certificate holders who    requirements for submission of
 have applied for Sec.   73.19            fingerprints to the NRC as
 authority, using an appropriate method   part of a firearms background
 listed in Sec.   73.4, shall submit to   check.
 the NRC's Division of Facilities and    The proposed language would be
 Security one (1) completed, legible      essentially identical to that
 standard fingerprint card (Form FD-      contained to the current
 258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where             fingerprint submission
 practicable, other fingerprint record    requirements under the current
 for each individual requiring a          access authorization
 firearms background check, to the        regulations in Sec.
 NRC's Director, Division of Facilities   73.57(d).
 and Security, Mail Stop T6-E46, ATTN:
 Criminal History Check. Copies of this
 form may be obtained by writing the
 Office of Information Services, U.S.
 Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
 Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling
 (301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to
FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what
 alternative formats, including
 electronic submissions, may be
 practicable are referenced in Sec.
 73.4.
Sec.   73.18(o)(2) Licensees and         See considerations for Sec.
 certificate holders shall indicate on    73.18(o). This provision will
 the fingerprint card or other            permit proper internal routing
 fingerprint record that the purpose      of fingerprints within the
 for this fingerprint check is the        FBI's Criminal Justice
 accomplishment of a firearms             Information Services Division
 background check.                        to support the NICS checks.
Sec.   73.18(o)(3) Licensees and         See considerations for Sec.
 certificate holders shall establish      73.18(o).
 procedures to ensure that the quality
 of the fingerprints taken results in
 minimizing the rejection rate of
 fingerprint cards or records due to
 illegible or incomplete information.
Sec.   73.18(o)(4) The Commission will   See considerations for Sec.
 review fingerprints for firearms         73.18(o).
 background checks for completeness.
 Any Form FD-258 or other fingerprint
 record containing omissions or evident
 errors will be returned to the
 licensee or certificate holder for
 corrections. The fee for processing
 fingerprint checks includes one (1)
 free re-submission if the initial
 submission is returned by the FBI
 because the fingerprint impressions
 cannot be classified. The one (1) free
 re-submission must have the FBI
 Transaction Control Number reflected
 on the re-submission. If additional
 submissions are necessary, they will
 be treated as an initial submittal and
 require a second payment of the
 processing fee. The payment of a new
 processing fee entitles the submitter
 to an additional free re-submittal, if
 necessary. Previously rejected
 submissions may not be included with
 the third submission because the
 submittal will be rejected
 automatically. Licensees and
 certificate holders may wish to
 consider using different methods for
 recording fingerprints for
 resubmissions, if difficulty occurs
 with obtaining a legible set of
 impressions.
Sec.   73.18(o)(5)(i) Fees for the       See considerations for Sec.
 processing of fingerprint checks are     73.18(o).
 due upon application. Licensees and
 certificate holders shall submit
 payment with the application for the
 processing of fingerprints, and
 payment must be made by corporate
 check, certified check, cashier's
 check, money order, or electronic
 payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.''
 a Combined payment for multiple
 applications is acceptable.
(ii) The application fee is the sum of
 the user fee charged by the FBI for
 each fingerprint card or other
 fingerprint record submitted by the
 NRC on behalf of a licensee or
 certificate holder, and an
 administrative processing fee assessed
 by the NRC. The NRC processing fee
 covers administrative costs associated
 with NRC handling of licensee and
 certificate holder fingerprint
 submissions. The Commission publishes
 the amount of the fingerprint check
 application fee on the NRC's public
 Web site.b The Commission will
 directly notify licensees and
 certificate holders who are subject to
 this regulation of any fee changes.

[[Page 62679]]

Footnotes:
a For guidance on making electronic
 payments, contact the NRC's Security
 Branch, Division of Facilities and
 Security, Office of Administration at
 (301) 415-7404.
b For information on the current fee
 amount, refer to the Electronic
 Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html
and select the link
 for the Criminal History Program.
Sec.   73.18(o)(6) The Commission will   See considerations for Sec.
 forward to the submitting licensee or    73.18(o).
 certificate holder all data received
 from the FBI as a result of the
 licensee's or certificate holder's
 application(s) for fingerprint
 background checks, including the FBI's
 fingerprint record.
Sec.   73.18(p) Appeals and correction   Paragraph (p)(1) would indicate
 of erroneous system information.         that individuals who have
(1) Individuals who require a firearms    received a ``denied'' response
 background check under this section      or a ``delayed'' response may
 and who receive a ``denied'' NICS        not be assigned duties
 response or a ``delayed'' NICS           requiring access to covered
 response may not be assigned duties      weapons during their appeal of
 requiring access to covered weapons      the denial or resolution of
 during the pendency of an appeal of      the delay.
 the results of the check or during the  Paragraph (p)(2) would indicate
 pendency of providing and evaluating     that the licensee or
 any necessary additional information     certificate holder will
 to the FBI to resolve the ``delayed''    provide information on the
 response, respectively.                  FBI's appeals process to the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders     denied individual. The NRC and
 shall provide information on the FBI's   FBI are considering creating a
 procedures for appealing a ``denied''    brochure describing the
 response to the denied individual or     appeals process or resolution
 on providing additional information to   process that would be similar
 the FBI to resolve a ``delayed''         to the FBI's current brochure
 response.                                [describing the NICS appeals
(3) An individual who receives a          process]
provided by federal
 ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS           firearms licensees to
 response to a firearms background        individuals receiving a
 check under this section may request     ``denied'' NICS response (see
 the reason for the response from the     example at the FBI's NICS
 FBI. The licensee or certificate         information website at 
 holder shall provide to the individual   http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics/index.htm).
 who has received the ``denied'' or       
 ``delayed'' response the unique NICS    Paragraph (p)(3) would indicate
 transaction number associated with the   that the individual who
 specific firearms background check.      receives a ``denied'' or
(4) These requests for the reason for a   ``delayed'' response must
 ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS           personally make any requests
 response must be made in writing, and    to the FBI on the reason for
 must include the NICS transaction        the NICS response; and the
 number. The request must be sent to      licensee or certificate holder
 the Federal Bureau of Investigation;     may not make such requests
 NICS Section; Appeals Service Team,      upon the individual's behalf.
 Module A-1; PO Box 4278; Clarksburg,    Paragraph (p)(4) would provide
 WV 26302-9922. The FBI will provide      the FBI's address for
 the individual with the reasons for      correspondence. Additionally,
 the ``denied'' response or ``delayed''   in response to the
 response. The FBI will also indicate     individual's request the FBI
 whether additional information or        would provide the person the
 documents are required to support an     reason for the denial or the
 appeal or resolution, for example,       delay to facilitate any
 where there is a claim that the record   appeals or to facilitate
 in question does not pertain to the      providing supplemental
 individual who was denied.               information to resolve a
                                          ``delayed'' response.
Sec.   73.18(p)(5) If the individual     Paragraph (p)(5) would set a
 wishes to challenge the accuracy of      time limit for filing an
 the record upon which the ``denied''     initial appeal of a ``denied''
 or ``delayed'' response is based, or     response or to request
 if the individual wishes to assert       resolution of a ``delayed''
 that his or her rights to possess or     response to encourage timely
 receive a firearm have been restored     resolution of such cases and
 by lawful process, he or she may make    facilitate FBI disposition of
 application first to the FBI. The        interim records. The
 individual shall file an appeal of a     individual filing the appeal
 ``denied'' response or file a request    would be required to set forth
 to resolve a ``delayed'' response        the basis for the appeal and
 within 45 calender days of the date      provide information supporting
 the NRC forwards the results of the      their claim. Copies of records
 firearms background check to the         would be required to be true
 licensee or certificate holder. The      copies (i.e., certified by a
 appeal or request must include           court or other government
 appropriate documentation or record(s)   entity). Because some
 establishing the legal and/or factual    supplemental information may
 basis for the challenge. Any record or   take longer than 45 days to
 document of a court or other             obtain, individuals filling an
 government entity or official            appeal or requesting
 furnished in support of an appeal must   resolution should not delay
 be certified by the court or other       their filing in order to
 government entity or official as a       gather all necessary
 true copy. The individual may            information, but would
 supplement their initial appeal or       indicate that additional
 request--subsequent to the 45 day        supporting information will be
 filing deadline--with additional         forthcoming.
 information as it becomes available,    Paragraph (p)(6) would indicate
 for example, where obtaining a true      that if an individual cannot
 copy of a court transcript may take      resolve a record with the FBI,
 longer than 45 days. The individual      the individual may apply to
 should note in their appeal or request   the originating agency to
 any information or records that are      correct the record and notify
 being obtained, but are not yet          the FBI of those results.
 available.                              The originating agency may
(6) If the individual is notified that    respond to the individual's
 the FBI is unable to resolve the         application by addressing the
 appeal, the individual may then apply    individual's specific reasons
 for correction of the record directly    for the challenge, and by
 to the agency from which the             indicating whether additional
 information forming the basis of the     information or documents are
 denial was originated. If the            required. If the record is
 individual is notified by the            corrected as a result of the
 originating agency, that additional      appeal to the originating
 information or documents are required    agency, the individual may so
 the individual may provide them to the   notify the FBI, which would,
 originating agency. If the record is     in turn, verify the record
 corrected as a result of the appeal to   correction with the
 the originating agency, the individual   originating agency (assuming
 may so notify the FBI and submit         the originating agency has not
 written proof of the correction.         already notified the FBI of
                                          the correction) and take all
                                          necessary steps to correct the
                                          record in the NICS system.

[[Page 62680]]

Sec.   73.18(p)(7) An individual who     Paragraph (p)(7) would indicate
 has satisfactorily appealed a            that an individual who has
 ``denied'' response or resolved a        successfully resolved a
 ``delayed'' response may provide         ``denied'' or ``delayed''
 written consent to the FBI to maintain   response may consent to the
 information about himself or herself     FBI maintaining information
 in a Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) to be   about himself or herself in
 established by the FBI and checked by    the FBI's VAF (i.e., the basis
 the NICS for the purpose of preventing   for the successful
 the erroneous denial or extended delay   resolution). The FBI will
 by the NICS of any future NICS checks.   issue such individuals a VAF
(8) Individuals appealing a ``denied''    number that can be entered on
 response or resolving a ``delayed''      an NRC Form 754 or ATF Form
 response are responsible for providing   4417 to prevent repetition of
 the FBI any additional information the   excessive delays in completing
 FBI requires to resolve the              any future NICS checks (both
 ``delayed'' response.                    for checks as security
                                          personnel and for checks of
                                          individuals engaging in a
                                          firearms transaction as a
                                          private person).
                                         A VAF file would be used only
                                          by the NICS for this purpose.
                                          The FBI would remove all
                                          information in the VAF
                                          pertaining to an individual
                                          upon receipt of a written
                                          request by that individual.
                                          However, the FBI may retain
                                          such information contained in
                                          the VAF as long as needed to
                                          pursue cases of identified
                                          misuse of the system. If the
                                          FBI finds a disqualifying
                                          record on the individual after
                                          his or her entry into the VAF,
                                          the FBI may remove the
                                          individual's information from
                                          the file. Paragraph (p)(8)
                                          would indicate that the
                                          responsibility for providing
                                          any necessary additional
                                          information to the FBI to
                                          appeal the ``denied'' response
                                          or resolve the ``delayed''
                                          rests with the individual, not
                                          with the FBI.
Sec.   73.19 Authorization for           This new section would
 preemption of firearms laws and use of   implement the provisions of
 enhanced weapons.                        new section 161A of the AEA
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth      with respect to preemption
 the requirements for licensees and       authority alone or combined
 certificate holders to obtain NRC        enhanced-weapons authority and
 approval to use the expanded             preemption authority. This
 authorities provided under section       section would permit, but not
 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,   require, selected classes of
 as amended (AEA), in protecting NRC-     licensees and certificate
 designated facilities, radioactive       holders to apply to the NRC
 material, or other property. These       for these authorities.
 authorities include ``preemption        Paragraph (a) would provide the
 authority'' and ``enhanced-weapons       overall purpose and indicate
 authority.''                             that this section applies to
                                          defending NRC-designated
                                          facilities, radioactive
                                          material, or other property.
Sec.   73.19(b) General Requirements.    Paragraph (b) would contain
 Licensees and certificate holders        general requirements and
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          overview of the advantages of
 section may apply to the NRC, in         these two authorities. The
 accordance with the provisions of this   ability of licensees and
 section, to receive stand-alone          certificate holders to apply
 preemption authority or combined         to the NRC for stand-alone
 enhanced weapons authority and           preemption authority or
 preemption authority.                    combined enhanced-weapons
(1) Preemption authority, as provided     authority and preemption
 in section 161A of the AEA, means the    authority would be limited to
 authority of the Commission to permit    the classes of licensees set
 licensees or certificate holders, or     forth in paragraph (c) of this
 the designated security personnel of     section.
 the licensee or certificate holder, to  Licensees and certificate
 transfer, receive, possess, transport,   holders may apply for
 import, or use one (1) or more           preemption authority alone.
 category of standard and enhanced        However, licensees and
 weapons, as defined in Sec.   73.2,      certificate holders who apply
 notwithstanding any local, State, or     for enhanced-weapons authority
 certain Federal firearms laws            would also be required to
 (including regulations).                 apply for preemption
(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as        authority, because of
 provided in section 161A of the AEA,     restrictions on the possession
 means the authority of the Commission    of enhanced weapons require
 to permit licensees or certificate       the preemption of certain
 holders, or the designated security      regulations. The NRC would
 personnel of the licensee or             create this separate, but
 certificate holder, to transfer,         parallel, structure to provide
 receive, possess, transport, import,     licensees with flexibility in
 and use one (1) or more category of      choosing security capabilities
 enhanced weapons, as defined in Sec.     versus security costs.
 73.2, notwithstanding any local,        Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2)
 State, or certain Federal firearms       provide definitions of these
 laws (including regulations).            two authorities.
Sec.   73.19(b)(3) Prior to receiving    Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
 NRC approval of enhanced-weapons         that to receive enhanced-
 authority, the licensee or certificate   weapons authority, a licensee
 holder must have applied for and         or certificate holder must
 received NRC approval for preemption     also have received preemption
 authority, in accordance with this       authority.
 section or under Commission orders.     Paragraph (b)(4) would describe
(4) Prior to granting either authority    the criteria of section 161A
 the NRC must determine that the          the Commission must determine
 proposed use of this authority is        are present for a licensee or
 necessary in the discharge of official   certificate holder to apply to
 duties by security personnel engaged     the NRC for stand-alone
 in protecting--.                         preemption authority or
(i) Facilities owned or operated by a     combined enhanced-weapons
 licensee or certificate holder and       authority and preemption
 designated by the Commission under       authority for other types of
 paragraph (c) of this section, or.       facilities, radioactive
(ii) Radioactive material or other        material, or other property.
 property that is owned or possessed by
 a licensee or certificate holder, or
 that is being transported to or from
 an NRC-regulated facility. Before
 granting such approval, the Commission
 must determined that the radioactive
 material or other property is of
 significance to the common defense and
 security or public health and safety
 and has designated such radioactive
 material or other property under
 paragraph (c) of this section.

[[Page 62681]]

Sec.   73.19(c) Applicability. (1) The   Paragraph (c)(1) would limit
 following classes of licensees or        the types of licensees who
 certificate holders may apply for        could apply for stand-alone
 stand-alone preemption authority--       preemption authority alone to
(i) Power reactor facilities; and         two classes of NRC-regulated
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a   facilities--power reactor
 formula quantity or greater of           facilities and fuel cycle
 strategic special nuclear material       facilities authorized to
 with security plans subject to Sec.      possess Category I quantities
 Sec.   73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.          of SSNM. Such SSNM fuel cycle
(2) The following classes of licensees    facilities would include:
 or certificate holders may apply for     production facilities, spent
 combined enhanced-weapons authority      fuel reprocessing facilities,
 and preemption authority--               fuel fabrication facilities,
(i) Power reactor facilities; and         and uranium enrichment
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a   facilities. However, they
 formula quantity or greater of           would not include hot cell
 strategic special nuclear material       facilities, independent spent
 with security plans subject to Sec.      fuel storage installations,
 Sec.   73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.          monitored retrievable storage
                                          installations, geologic
                                          repository operations areas,
                                          non-power reactors, byproduct
                                          material facilities, and the
                                          transportation of spent fuel,
                                          high level waste, and special
                                          nuclear material.
                                         Paragraph (c)(2) would also
                                          limit the types of licensees
                                          who could apply for combined
                                          enhanced-weapons authority and
                                          preemption authority to these
                                          same two classes of licensed
                                          facilities.
                                         The Commission is proposing
                                          under this rulemaking to limit
                                          the range of facilities,
                                          radioactive material, or other
                                          property [for which these
                                          authorities are appropriate]
                                          to power reactor facilities
                                          and fuel cycle facilities
                                          authorized to possess Category
                                          I quantities of strategic
                                          special nuclear material. The
                                          Commission would take this
                                          approach to be consistent with
                                          the scope of this rulemaking.
                                          The Commission may consider
                                          other types of facilities,
                                          radioactive material, or other
                                          property as appropriate for
                                          these authorities in future
                                          rulemakings. Additionally, the
                                          Commission would use the
                                          parallel structure in
                                          paragraph (c) to facilitate
                                          future rulemakings.
                                          Specifically, the Commission
                                          recognizes that enhanced-
                                          weapons authority may not be
                                          appropriate for all present
                                          and future classes of
                                          licensees with armed security
                                          programs; whereas the
                                          applicability of preemption
                                          authority to all present and
                                          future classes of licensees
                                          with armed security programs
                                          may be much broader.
Sec.   73.19(c)(3) With respect to the   Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
 possession and use of firearms by all    that the provisions of this
 other NRC licensees or certificate       section do not supersede
 holders, the Commission's requirements   existing Commission
 in effect before [effective date of      regulations or orders for non-
 final rule]
remain applicable, except    power reactor and non-Category
 to the extent those requirements are     I SSNM licensees, unless
 modified by Commission order or          specifically indicated.
 regulations applicable to such
 licensees and certificate holders.
Sec.   73.19(d) Authorization for stand- Paragraph (d)(1) would describe
 alone preemption of firearms laws. (1)   the process for a licensee or
 Licensees and certificate holders        certificate holder to apply
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          for preemption authority. This
 section may apply to the NRC for the     would be a voluntary action.
 preemption authority described in        Based upon the Commission's
 paragraph (b)(1) of this section.        conclusion that the classes of
 Licensees and certificate holders        facilities listed under
 seeking such authority shall submit an   paragraph (c) are appropriate
 application to the NRC in writing, in    for the use of such preemption
 accordance with Sec.   73.4, and         authority, no additional
 indicate that the licensee or            documentation or supporting
 certificate holder is requesting         information would be required
 preemption authority under section       by a licensee or certificate
 161A of the AEA.                         holder to apply for preemption
(2) Licensees and certificate holders     authority other than the
 who have applied for preemption          licensee or certificate holder
 authority under this section may begin   is included within the list of
 firearms background checks under Sec.    licenses and certificate
  73.18 for their armed security          holders in paragraph (c).
 personnel.                              Paragraph (d)(2) would permit
(3) Licensees and certificate holders     licensees and certificate
 who have applied for preemption          holders who have applied for
 authority under this section and who     preemption authority to begin
 have satisfactorily completed firearms   submitting their security
 background checks for a sufficient       personnel for firearms
 number of security personnel (to         background checks under Sec.
 implement their security plan while      73.18.
 meeting security personnel fatigue      Paragraph (c)(3) would require
 requirements of this chapter or          licensees and certificate
 Commission order) shall notify the       holders who applied for
 NRC, in accordance with Sec.   73.4,     preemption authority to
 of their readiness to receive NRC        subsequently notify the NRC of
 approval of preemption authority and     their readiness to fully
 implement all the provisions of Sec.     implement Sec.   73.18 without
 73.18.                                   adverse impact on the security
                                          organization (i.e., the
                                          provisions in Sec.   73.18
                                          requiring removal from armed
                                          duties of personnel with a
                                          ``denied'' or ``delayed''
                                          response would not adversely
                                          affect the licensee's or
                                          certificate holder's security
                                          organization).
Sec.   73.19(d)(4) Based upon the        Paragraph (d)(4) would indicate
 licensee's or certificate holder's       that the NRC will rely upon
 readiness notification and any           the licensee's or certificate
 discussions with the licensee or         holder's determination that
 certificate holder, the NRC will         sufficient numbers of its
 document in writing to the licensee or   security personnel have
 certificate holder that the Commission   satisfactorily passed the
 has approved or disapproved the          firearms background check to
 licensee's or certificate holder's       fully implement the provisions
 application for preemption authority.    of Sec.   73.18. The NRC would
                                          document in writing its
                                          approval or disapproval of the
                                          licensee's or certificate
                                          holder's application for
                                          preemption authority. The NRC
                                          may also rely upon discussions
                                          with the licensee or
                                          certificate holder to reach a
                                          conclusion.

[[Page 62682]]

Sec.   73.19(e) Authorization for use    Paragraph (e)(1) would describe
 of enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees and   the process for a licensee or
 certificate holders listed in            certificate holder to apply
 paragraph (c)(2) of this section may     for combined enhanced-weapons
 apply to the NRC for enhanced-weapons    authority and preemption
 authority described in paragraph         authority. A licensee or
 (a)(2) of this section. Licensees and    certificate holder would be
 certificate holders applying for         permitted to apply for
 enhanced-weapons authority shall have    preemption authority in
 also applied for preemption authority.   conjunction with an
 Licensees and certificate holders may    application for enhanced-
 make these applications concurrently.    weapons authority, or the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders     licensee or certificate holder
 seeking enhanced-weapons authority       may apply for preemption
 shall submit an application to the       authority first. Only the
 NRC, in accordance with Sec.   73.4,     classes of licensees and
 indicating that the licensee or          certificate holders listed
 certificate holder is requesting         under paragraph (c)(2) would
 enhanced-weapons authority under         be permitted to apply for
 section 161A of the AEA. Licensees and   combined enhanced-weapons
 certificate holders shall also include   authority and preemption
 with their application--.                authority.
(i) The additional information required  Paragraph (e)(2) would require
 by paragraph (f) of this section;.       a licensee or certificate
(ii) The date they applied to the NRC     holder to include specific
 for preemption authority (if not         information with their
 concurrent with the application for      application as set forth in
 enhanced weapons authority); and.        Sec.   73.19(f). The licensee
(iii) If applicable, the date when the    or certificate holder would
 licensee or certificate holder           also be required to include
 received NRC approval of their           information on the date they
 application for preemption authority     applied for, and/or received
 under this section or via Commission     NRC approval of their
 order..                                  application for preemption
                                          authority under Sec.   73.19,
                                          or under Commission order
                                          prior to the effective date of
                                          a final rule.
Sec.   73.19(e)(3) The NRC will          Paragraph (e)(3) would indicate
 document in writing to the licensee or   that the NRC would document in
 certificate holder that the Commission   writing the approval or
 has approved or disapproved the          disapproval of an application
 licensee's or certificate holder's       for combined enhanced-weapons
 application for enhanced-weapons         authority and preemption
 authority. The NRC must approve, or      authority. The NRC's approval
 have previously approved, a licensee's   would also indicate the total
 or certificate holder's application      numbers, types, and calibers
 for preemption authority under           of enhanced weapons that are
 paragraph (d) of this section, or via    approved for a specific
 Commission order, to approve the         licensee or certificate
 application for enhanced weapons         holder.
 authority.
Sec.   73.19(e)(4) Licensees and         Paragraph (e)(4) would indicate
 certificate holders who have applied     that after the licensee or
 to the NRC for and received enhanced-    certificate holder has
 weapons authority shall then apply to    received NRC approval of its
 the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,     application to use enhanced
 Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for a     weapons, it must then apply to
 federal firearms license (FFL) and       ATF to obtain a FFL and also
 also register under the National         register under the NFA to
 Firearms Act (NFA) in accordance with    obtain these weapons. Because
 ATF regulations under 27 CFR parts 478   ATF has indicated it would
 and 479 to obtain the enhanced           rely upon the NRC's technical
 weapons. Licensees and certificate       evaluation [on whether the
 holders shall include a copy of the      specific weapons listed in the
 NRC's written approval with their NFA    NRC's approval are appropriate
 registration application.                for the licensee or
                                          certificate holder]
in
                                          processing the licensee's or
                                          certificate holder's NFA
                                          registration application,
                                          licensees and certificate
                                          holders would include a copy
                                          of the NRC's approval with
                                          their NFA registration
                                          application.
                                         This paragraph would require
                                          licensees to obtain a FFL in
                                          addition to registering under
                                          the NFA. Based upon
                                          conversations with ATF, the
                                          NRC understands that while
                                          ATF's regulations do not
                                          mandate that persons who
                                          obtain NFA weapons also have
                                          an FFL, NRC licensees and
                                          certificate holders desiring
                                          to obtain enhanced weapons
                                          would benefit from status an
                                          ATF FFL. Advantages would
                                          include reduced time to
                                          process requests to transfer
                                          NFA weapons to or from the
                                          licensee or certificate holder
                                          (e.g., initial receipt,
                                          repair, or disposition),
                                          simplification of the ATF's
                                          review of an NFA registration
                                          application, and elimination
                                          of transfer taxes for NFA-
                                          weapons transactions. The NRC
                                          also understands that status
                                          as an FFL would create
                                          obligations for such
                                          licensee's and certificate
                                          holders. Obligations would
                                          include payment of an annual
                                          special occupational tax,
                                          additional recordkeeping
                                          requirements, and a
                                          requirement to permit ATF
                                          inspectors access to the
                                          licensee's or certificate
                                          holder's facilities possessing
                                          enhanced weapons to inspect
                                          ATF-licensed weapons and
                                          corresponding records.
Sec.   73.19(f) Application for          Paragraph (f)(1) would describe
 enhanced-weapons authority additional    the additional information a
 information. (1) Licensees and           licensee or certificate holder
 certificate holders applying to the      would be required to submit
 Commission for enhanced-weapons          along with their application
 authority under paragraph (e) of this    for preemption and enhanced-
 section shall also submit to the NRC     weapons authority. This
 for prior review and written approval    information would be submitted
 new, or revised, physical security       to the NRC for prior review
 plans, security personnel training and   and approval and would
 qualification plans, safeguards          describe and address the
 contingency plans, and safety            specific weapons to be
 assessments incorporating the use of     employed. In addition to
 the specific enhanced weapons the        addressing the enhanced
 licensee or certificate holder intends   weapons in the security,
 to use. These plans and assessments      training and qualification,
 must be specific to the facility,        and safeguards contingency
 radioactive material, or other           plans, a licensee or
 property being protected.                certificate holder would also
                                          provide a safety assessment on
                                          the use of the specific
                                          enhanced weapons to be
                                          employed. Licensees and
                                          certificate holders who apply
                                          for authority alone under
                                          paragraph (d) would not be
                                          subject to the requirements of
                                          paragraph (f).

[[Page 62683]]

Sec.   73.19(f)(2) In addition to other  Paragraph (e)(2) would describe
 requirements set forth in this part,     specific information the
 these plans and assessments must--       license or certificate holder
(i) For the physical security plan,       would include in the plans and
 identify the specific types or models,   assessments accompanying the
 calibers, and numbers of enhanced        application for enhanced-
 weapons to be used;                      weapons authority. The
(ii) For the training and qualification   paragraph would also describe
 plan, address the training and           the scope of the safety
 qualification requirements to use        assessments and would require
 these specific enhanced weapons; and     evaluation of both onsite and
(iii) For the safeguards contingency      offsite impacts from the use
 plan, address how these enhanced and     of the specific enhanced
 any standard weapons will be employed    weapons to be employed. The
 by the licensee's or certificate         safety assessment would be
 holder's security personnel in meeting   required to only address the
 the NRC-required protective strategy,    enhanced weapons the license
 including tactical approaches and        or certificate holder intends
 maneuvers.                               to employ.
Sec.   73.19(f)(2)(iv) For the safety    See considerations for Sec.
 assessment--                             73.19(f)(2).
(A) Assess any potential safety impact
 on the facility, radioactive material,
 or other property from the use of
 these enhanced weapons;
(B) Assess any potential safety impact
 on public or private facilities,
 public or private property, or on
 members of the public in areas outside
 of the site boundary from the use of
 these enhanced weapons; and
(C) Assess any potential safety impact
 on public or private facilities,
 public or private property, or on
 members of the public from the use of
 these enhanced weapons at training
 facilities intended for proficiency
 demonstration and qualification
 purposes.
Sec.   73.19(f)(3) The licensee's or     Paragraph (f)(3) would specify
 certificate holder's training and        acceptable standards for the
 qualification plan on possessing,        licensee or certificate holder
 storing, maintaining, qualifying on,     to use in creating a training
 and using enhanced weapons must          and qualification plan for
 include information from applicable      enhanced weapons. This
 firearms standards developed by          paragraph would not create any
 nationally-recognized firearms           new requirements for training
 organizations or standard setting        standards for standard
 bodies or standards developed by         weapons.
 Federal agencies, such as: the U.S.     Paragraph (f)(4) would require
 Department of Homeland Security's        the submission of revised
 Federal Law Enforcement Training         plans for prior NRC review and
 Center, the U.S. Department of           approval, irrespective of
 Energy's National Training Center, and   whether the licensee or
 the U.S. Department of Defense.          certificate holder concludes
(4) Licensees or certificate holders      that the use of these enhanced
 shall submit any new or revised plans    weapons would not cause ``a
 and assessments for prior NRC review     decrease in security
 and written approval notwithstanding     effectiveness'' under the
 the provisions of Sec.  Sec.             applicable NRC regulation.
 50.54(p), 70.32(e), and 76.60 of this
 chapter which otherwise permit a
 license or certificate holder to make
 changes to such plans ``that would not
 decrease their effectiveness'' without
 prior NRC review.
Sec.   73.19(g) Completion of training   Paragraph (g) would require
 and qualification prior to use of        licensees and certificate
 enhanced weapons.                        holders to ensure security
Licensees and certificate holders who     personnel are trained and
 have applied for and received enhanced-  qualified on the use and
 weapons authority under paragraph (e)    employment of enhanced weapons
 of this section shall ensure security    before the licensee or
 personnel complete required firearms     certificate holder deploys
 training and qualification in            these enhanced weapons to
 accordance with the licensee's or        defend the facility,
 certificate holder's NRC-approved        radioactive material, or other
 training and qualification plan. Such    property.
 training must be completed prior to     Documentation of completion of
 security personnel's use of enhanced     this training would be
 weapons to protect NRC-designated        consistent with the licensee's
 facilities, radioactive material, or     or certificate holder's
 other property and must be documented    approved training and
 in accordance with the requirements of   qualification plan.
 the licensee's or certificate holder's
 training and qualification plan.
Sec.   73.19(h) Use of enhanced          Paragraph (h) would indicate
 weapons. Requirements regarding the      that Sec.   73.19 does not
 use of enhanced weapons by security      supercede requirements on the
 personnel in the performance of their    use of weapons under the power
 official duties are contained in Sec.    reactor and Category I fuel
 Sec.   73.46 and 73.55 and in            cycle facility security
 appendices B and C of this part, as      regulations found in Part 73.
 applicable.
Sec.   73.19(i) [Reserved].............  Paragraph (i) would not be used
                                          to avoid confusion with the
                                          use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec.   73.19(j) Notification of adverse  Paragraph (j) would require NRC
 ATF findings or notices. NRC licensees   licensees or certificate
 and certificate holders with an ATF      holders to notify NRC, should
 federal firearms license (FFL) and/or    the licensee or certificate
 enhanced weapons shall notify the NRC,   holder receive any adverse
 in accordance with Sec.   73.4, of       findings based upon an ATF
 instances involving any adverse ATF      inspection, audit, or review
 findings or ATF notices related to       of the enhanced weapons
 their FFL or such weapons.               possessed by the licensee or
                                          certificate holder under an
                                          ATF FFL. This would allow the
                                          NRC to appropriately respond
                                          to any public or media
                                          inquiries associated with such
                                          findings in a timely manner.
Sec.   73.2 Definitions................  Three new definitions would be
                                          added to this section as
                                          conforming changes supporting
                                          the new Sec.  Sec.   73.18 and
                                          73.19 that would include:
                                          covered weapon, enhanced
                                          weapon, and standard weapon.
                                          The NRC would use these three
                                          terms to envelope the weapons,
                                          ammunition, and devices listed
                                          under section 161A of the AEA.

[[Page 62684]]

                                         Other new definitions that
                                          would be added as conforming
                                          changes to this section in
                                          support of other regulations
                                          (e.g., safety/security
                                          interface and target set) are
                                          discussed in other tables in
                                          this proposed rule.
Covered weapon means any handgun,        A definition for covered weapon
 rifle, shotgun, short-barreled           would be used as an overall
 shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-     term to encompass the firearms
 automatic assault weapon, machinegun,    (weapons), ammunition, and
 ammunition for any such gun or weapon,   devices listed in section
 or large capacity ammunition feeding     161A. The meanings of the
 device as specified under section 161A   specific terms for the
 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as     firearms, ammunition, or
 amended. As used here, the terms         devices encompassed within
 ``handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-        this definition would have the
 barreled shotgun, short-barreled         same meaning for those terms
 rifle, semi-automatic assault weapon,    as is those found under Title
 machinegun, ammunition, or large         18 of the United States Code,
 capacity ammunition feeding device''     Section 921(a) [18 U.S.C.
 have the same meaning as set forth for   921(a)].
 those terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a).
 Covered weapons include both enhanced
 weapons and standard weapons. However,
 enhanced weapons do not include
 standard weapons.
Enhanced weapon means any short-         Definitions for enhanced weapon
 barreled shotgun, short-barreled         and standard weapon would be
 rifle, or machinegun. Enhanced weapons   added to support the differing
 do not include destructive devices,      scope of these new sections.
 including explosives or weapons          The relationship between
 greater than 50 caliber (i.e., weapons   covered weapon, enhanced
 with a bore greater than 1.27 cm [0.5    weapon, and standard weapon
 in]
diameter).                           would be explained.
Standard weapon means any handgun,       Also, the definition for
 rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic assault   enhanced weapons would not
 weapon, or a large capacity ammunition   include destructive devices as
 feeding device.                          defined under ATF's
                                          regulations, since the NRC's
                                          authority under section 161A
                                          of the AEA does not permit
                                          licensees or certificate
                                          holders to possess destructive
                                          devices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                     Table 2.--Part 73 Section 73.55
 [Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear
              power reactors against radiological sabotage]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Current language          Proposed language      Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements for physical     Requirements for      This title would be
 protection of licensed        physical protection   retained.
 activities in nuclear power   of licensed
 reactors against              activities in
 radiological sabotage.        nuclear power
                               reactors against
                               radiological
                               sabotage.
                              (a) Introduction....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55 By December 2,   (a)(1) By [date--180  This requirement
 1986, each licensee, as       days--after the       would be added to
 appropriate, shall submit     effective date of     discuss the types
 proposed amendments to its    the final rule        of Commission
 security plan which define    published in the      licensees to whom
 how the amended               Federal Register],    the proposed
 requirements of Paragraphs    each nuclear power    requirements of
 (a), (d)(7), (d)(9), and      reactor licensee,     this section would
 (e)(1) will be met.           licensed under 10     apply and the
                               CFR part 50, shall    schedule for
                               incorporate the       submitting the
                               revised               amended security
                               requirements of       plans. The
                               this section          Commission intends
                               through amendments    to delete the
                               to its Commission-    current language,
                               approved Physical     because it applies
                               Security Plan,        only to a past rule
                               Training and          change that is
                               Qualification Plan,   completed. The
                               and Safeguards        proposed
                               Contingency Plan,     requirements of
                               referred to           this section would
                               collectively as       be applicable to
                               ``approved security   decommissioned/ing
                               plans,'' and shall    reactors unless
                               submit the amended    otherwise exempted.
                               security plans to
                               the Commission for
                               review and approval.
Sec.   73.55 Each submittal   (a)(2) The amended    This requirement
 must include a proposed       security plans must   would be added to
 implementation schedule for   be submitted as       provide a reference
 Commission approval.          specified in Sec.     to the current Sec.
                               50.4 of this            50.4(b)(4) which
                               chapter and must      describes
                               describe how the      procedural details
                               revised               relative to the
                               requirements of       proposed security
                               this section will     plan submission
                               be implemented by     requirement.
                               the licensee, to
                               include a proposed
                               implementation
                               schedule.
Sec.   73.55 The amended      (a)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 safeguards requirements of    shall implement the   would be added to
 these paragraphs must be      existing approved     clarify that the
 implemented by the licensee   security plans and    licensee must
 within 180 days after         associated            continue to
 Commission approval of the    Commission orders     implement the
 proposed security plan in     until Commission      current Commission-
 accordance with the           approval of the       approved security
 approved schedule.            amended security      plans until the
                               plans, unless         Commission approves
                               otherwise             the amended plans.
                               authorized by the     The phrase ``unless
                               Commission.           otherwise
                                                     authorized by the
                                                     Commission'' would
                                                     provide flexibility
                                                     to account for
                                                     unanticipated
                                                     situations that may
                                                     affect the
                                                     licensee's ability
                                                     to comply with this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement.

[[Page 62685]]

Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(i) The     (a)(4) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee is responsible to    is responsible for    would retain the
 the Commission for            maintaining the       current requirement
 maintaining safeguards in     onsite physical       that the licensee
 accordance with Commission    protection program    is responsible for
 regulations and the           in accordance with    meeting Commission
 licensee's security plan.     Commission            regulations and the
                               regulations and       approved security
                               related Commission-   plans. The phrase
                               directed orders       ``through the
                               through the           implementation of
                               implementation of     the approved
                               the approved          security plans and
                               security plans and    site implementing
                               site implementing     procedures'' would
                               procedures.           be added to
                                                     describe the
                                                     relationship
                                                     between Commission
                                                     regulations, the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans, and
                                                     implementing
                                                     procedures. The
                                                     word ``safeguards''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``physical
                                                     protection
                                                     program'' to more
                                                     accurately focus
                                                     this requirement to
                                                     the security
                                                     program rather than
                                                     the broad
                                                     ``safeguards''
                                                     which includes
                                                     safety.
                                                    The Commission views
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans as
                                                     the mechanism
                                                     through which the
                                                     licensee meets
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements
                                                     through
                                                     implementation,
                                                     therefore, the
                                                     licensee is
                                                     responsible to the
                                                     Commission for this
                                                     performance.
                              (a)(5) Applicants     This requirement
                               for an operating      would be added to
                               license under the     describe the
                               provisions of part    proposed
                               50 of this chapter,   requirements for
                               or holders of a       applicants and to
                               combined license      specify that these
                               under the             proposed
                               provisions of part    requirements must
                               52 of this chapter,   be met before an
                               shall satisfy the     applicant's receipt
                               requirements of       of special nuclear
                               this section before   material in the
                               the receipt of        form of fuel
                               special nuclear       assemblies.
                               material in the
                               form of fuel
                               assemblies.
                              (a)(6) For licenses   This requirement
                               issued after          would be added to
                               [effective date of    describe the
                               this rule],           Commission
                               licensees shall       expectations for
                               design, construct,    new reactors. Based
                               and equip the         on changes to the
                               central alarm         threat environment
                               station and           the Commission has
                               secondary alarm       determined that the
                               station to            functions required
                               equivalent            to be performed by
                               standards.            the central alarm
                                                     station are a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     capability to
                                                     satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                                                    Therefore, to ensure
                                                     that these critical
                                                     capabilities are
                                                     maintained, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be a prudent and
                                                     necessary measure
                                                     to ensure the
                                                     licensee's ability
                                                     to summon
                                                     assistance or
                                                     otherwise respond
                                                     to an alarm as is
                                                     currently required
                                                     by Sec.
                                                     73.55(e)(1) and
                                                     therefore satisfy
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (a)(6)(i) Licensees   This requirement
                               shall apply the       would be added for
                               requirements for      consistency with
                               the central alarm     and clarification
                               station listed in     of the proposed
                               paragraphs            requirement of
                               (e)(6)(v),            paragraph (a)(6) of
                               (e)(7)(iii), and      this section. The
                               (i)(8)(ii) of this    Commission has
                               section to the        determined that
                               secondary alarm       these construction
                               station as well as    standards that were
                               the central alarm     previously applied
                               station.              to only the central
                                                     alarm station
                                                     should also be
                                                     built into the
                                                     secondary alarm
                                                     station for new
                                                     reactor licensees.
                              (a)(6)(ii) Licensees  This requirement
                               shall comply with     would be added for
                               the requirements of   consistency with
                               paragraph (i)(4) of   and clarification
                               this section such     of the proposed
                               that both alarm       requirement of
                               stations are          paragraph (i)(4) of
                               provided with         this section and to
                               equivalent            clarify that for
                               capabilities for      new reactors, both
                               detection,            the central and
                               assessment,           secondary alarm
                               monitoring,           stations must be
                               observation,          provided
                               surveillance, and     ``equivalent
                               communications.       capabilities'' and
                                                     not simply
                                                     equivalent
                                                     ``functional''
                                                     capabilities as is
                                                     stated in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (i)(4) of this
                                                     section. The
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     these capabilities
                                                     must be equivalent
                                                     for new reactors to
                                                     ensure that the
                                                     secondary alarm
                                                     station is
                                                     redundant to the
                                                     central alarm
                                                     station.

[[Page 62686]]

Sec.   73.55(a) General       (b) General           This header would be
 performance objective and     performance           retained. The
 requirements.                 objective and         proposed
                               requirements.         requirements of
                                                     this section are
                                                     intended to
                                                     represent the
                                                     general outline for
                                                     a physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     that would provide
                                                     an acceptable level
                                                     of protection if
                                                     effectively
                                                     implemented. The
                                                     proposed actions,
                                                     standards,
                                                     criteria, and
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section are
                                                     intended to be
                                                     bounded by the
                                                     description of the
                                                     design basis threat
                                                     identified by the
                                                     Commission in Sec.
                                                      73.1.
Sec.   73.55(a) The licensee  (b)(1) The licensee   This requirement
 shall establish and           shall establish and   would retain the
 maintain an onsite physical   maintain a physical   current performance
 protection system and         protection program,   objective of Sec.
 security organization which   to include a          73.55(a) with two
 will have as its objective    security              minor changes.
 to provide high assurance     organization which    First, the phrase
 that activities involving     will have as its      ``an onsite
 special nuclear material      objective to          physical protection
 are not inimical to the       provide high          system'' would be
 common defense and security   assurance that        replaced with the
 and do not constitute an      activities            phrase ``a physical
 unreasonable risk to the      involving special     protection
 public health and safety.     nuclear material      program'' to more
                               are not inimical to   clearly state the
                               the common defense    Commission's view
                               and security and do   that the physical
                               not constitute an     protection system
                               unreasonable risk     elements described
                               to the public         in this proposed
                               health and safety.    rule combine to
                                                     make the licensee
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program. Second,
                                                     the word ``and''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``to include a'' to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the security
                                                     organization is not
                                                     considered to be
                                                     independent of the
                                                     licensee physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     but rather, is a
                                                     component of that
                                                     program.
Sec.   73.55(a) The physical  (b)(2) The physical   This requirement
 protection system shall be    protection program    would contain a
 designed to protect against   must be designed to   substantial
 the design basis threat of    detect, assess,       revision to provide
 radiological sabotage as      intercept,            a more detailed and
 stated in Sec.   73.1(a).     challenge, delay,     performance based
Sec.   73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)     and neutralize        requirement for the
 Requiring responding guards   threats up to and     design of the
 or other armed response       including the         licensee physical
 personnel to interpose        design basis threat   protection program.
 themselves * * *..            of radiological       Most significantly,
                               sabotage as stated    the word
                               in Sec.   73.1(a),    ``interpose'' would
                               at all times.         be replaced with
                                                     the words ``detect,
                                                     assess, intercept,
                                                     challenge, delay,
                                                     and neutralize''.
                                                     The current
                                                     requirement of Sec.

                                                     73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)
                                                     requires the
                                                     licensee to
                                                     ``interpose'' for
                                                     the purpose of
                                                     preventing
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage, however,
                                                     the definition of
                                                     ``radiological
                                                     sabotage'' stated
                                                     in Sec.   73.2 does
                                                     not contain a
                                                     performance based
                                                     element by which
                                                     the Commission can
                                                     measure this
                                                     capability and
                                                     therefore, this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     provide the six
                                                     performance based
                                                     elements or
                                                     capabilities
                                                     ``detect, assess,
                                                     intercept,
                                                     challenge, delay,
                                                     and neutralize.''
                                                     The first element,
                                                     ``detect'', would
                                                     be provided through
                                                     the use of
                                                     detection
                                                     equipment, patrols,
                                                     access controls,
                                                     and other program
                                                     elements required
                                                     by this proposed
                                                     rule and would
                                                     provide
                                                     notification to the
                                                     licensee that a
                                                     potential threat is
                                                     present and where
                                                     the threat is
                                                     located.

[[Page 62687]]

                                                    The second element,
                                                     ``assess'', would
                                                     provide a mechanism
                                                     through which the
                                                     licensee would
                                                     identify the nature
                                                     of the threat
                                                     detected. This
                                                     would be
                                                     accomplished
                                                     through the use of
                                                     video equipment,
                                                     patrols, and other
                                                     program elements
                                                     that would be
                                                     required by this
                                                     proposed rule and
                                                     would provide the
                                                     licensee with
                                                     information about
                                                     the threat upon
                                                     which the licensee
                                                     would determine how
                                                     to respond. The
                                                     third, fourth, and
                                                     fifth elements
                                                     would comprise the
                                                     component actions
                                                     of response and
                                                     would be provided
                                                     by personnel
                                                     trained and
                                                     equipped in
                                                     accordance with a
                                                     response strategy.
                                                     The third element
                                                     ``intercept'' would
                                                     be the act of
                                                     placing a person at
                                                     an intersecting
                                                     defensive position
                                                     directly in the
                                                     path of advancement
                                                     taken by the
                                                     threat, and between
                                                     the threat and the
                                                     protected target or
                                                     target set element.
                                                     The fourth element
                                                     ``challenge'' would
                                                     be to verbally or
                                                     physically confront
                                                     the threat to
                                                     impede, halt, or
                                                     otherwise interact
                                                     with the threat
                                                     with the intent of
                                                     preventing further
                                                     advancement of the
                                                     threat towards the
                                                     protected target or
                                                     target set element.
                                                    The fifth element
                                                     ``delay'' would be
                                                     to take necessary
                                                     actions to counter
                                                     any attempt by the
                                                     threat to advance
                                                     towards the
                                                     protected target or
                                                     target set element.
                                                     The sixth element
                                                     ``neutralize''
                                                     would be to place
                                                     the threat in a
                                                     condition from
                                                     which the threat no
                                                     longer has the
                                                     potential to, or
                                                     capability of,
                                                     doing harm to the
                                                     protected item. The
                                                     Commission does not
                                                     intend to suggest
                                                     that the action,
                                                     ``neutralize'',
                                                     would require the
                                                     application of
                                                     ``deadly force'' in
                                                     all instances. The
                                                     phrase ``threat of
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage'' would be
                                                     replaced with the
                                                     phrase ``threats up
                                                     to and including
                                                     the design basis
                                                     threat of
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage'' to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     must provide
                                                     protection against
                                                     any element of the
                                                     design basis
                                                     threat, to include
                                                     those that do not
                                                     rise to the full
                                                     capability of the
                                                     design basis
                                                     threat.

[[Page 62688]]

Sec.   73.55(a) To achieve    (b)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 this general performance      physical protection   would retain and
 objective, the onsite         program must be       revise two current
 physical protection system    designed and          requirements to
 and security organization     implemented to        provide a
 must include, but not         satisfy the           performance based
 necessarily be limited to,    requirements of       requirement for the
 the capabilities to meet      this section and      design of the
 the specific requirements     ensure that no        physical protection
 contained in paragraphs (b)   single act, as        program. The first
 through (h) of this section.  bounded by the        significant
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) * * * so    design basis          revision would
 that a single act cannot      threat, can disable   expand the current
 remove the capability of      the personnel,        requirement for
 calling for assistance or     equipment, or         alarm stations to
 otherwise responding to an    systems necessary     be protected
 alarm..                       to prevent            against a single
                               significant core      act, and would
                               damage and spent      require that the
                               fuel sabotage.        licensee physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     be designed to
                                                     ensure that a
                                                     single act can not
                                                     disable the
                                                     personnel,
                                                     equipment, or
                                                     systems necessary
                                                     to prevent
                                                     significant core
                                                     damage and spent
                                                     fuel sabotage which
                                                     would result in the
                                                     loss of the
                                                     capability to
                                                     prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     is that because of
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     it is necessary to
                                                     emphasize the
                                                     ``remove the
                                                     capability''
                                                     requirement of the
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.55(e)(1) such
                                                     that the single act
                                                     protection
                                                     requirement would
                                                     apply to personnel,
                                                     equipment, and
                                                     systems required to
                                                     perform specific
                                                     functions that if
                                                     disabled would
                                                     remove the licensee
                                                     capability to
                                                     prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     second significant
                                                     revision would
                                                     provide a
                                                     measurable and
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement against
                                                     which the
                                                     Commission would
                                                     measure the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     the licensee's
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program to prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage.
                                                    The Commission's
                                                     view is that the
                                                     goal of the
                                                     licensee's physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     must include an
                                                     acceptable safety
                                                     margin to assure
                                                     that the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of public
                                                     health and safety
                                                     is met. This safety
                                                     margin would be
                                                     established by
                                                     designing and
                                                     implementing a
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program that
                                                     protects against
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage by
                                                     preventing
                                                     significant core
                                                     damage and spent
                                                     fuel sabotage which
                                                     describes the
                                                     undesirable
                                                     consequences that
                                                     could result from
                                                     the destruction of
                                                     a target set or all
                                                     elements of a
                                                     target set and
                                                     would be a
                                                     precursor to
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     is that significant
                                                     damage to the core
                                                     or sabotage to
                                                     spent fuel would
                                                     result in a
                                                     condition in which
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective of ``High
                                                     Assurance'' could
                                                     no longer be
                                                     provided and
                                                     therefore,
                                                     prevention of
                                                     significant core
                                                     damage and spent
                                                     fuel sabotage are a
                                                     measurable
                                                     performance
                                                     criteria against
                                                     which the
                                                     Commission would
                                                     evaluate the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program.

[[Page 62689]]

                                                    The phrase ``as
                                                     bounded by the
                                                     design basis
                                                     threat'' would be
                                                     used to clarify the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     must ensure that
                                                     the physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     is designed to
                                                     protect against the
                                                     design basis threat
                                                     and all other
                                                     threats that do not
                                                     rise to the level
                                                     of the design basis
                                                     threat. The phrase
                                                     ``the capabilities
                                                     to meet the
                                                     specific
                                                     requirements
                                                     contained in
                                                     paragraphs (b)
                                                     through (h) of this
                                                     section'' would be
                                                     replaced by the
                                                     phase ``implemented
                                                     to satisfy the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section'' to
                                                     account for the
                                                     reformatting of
                                                     this proposed rule
                                                     and to describe the
                                                     Commission view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     is responsible to
                                                     implement
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements
                                                     through the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans and
                                                     procedures.
                              (b)(4) The physical   This requirement
                               protection program    would be added to
                               must include          apply defense-in-
                               diverse and           depth concepts as
                               redundant             part of the
                               equipment, systems,   physical protection
                               technology,           program to ensure
                               programs,             the capability to
                               supporting            meet the
                               processes, and        performance
                               implementing          objective of the
                               procedures.           proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(1) of this
                                                     section is
                                                     maintained in the
                                                     changing threat
                                                     environment. The
                                                     terms ``diverse and
                                                     redundant'' are
                                                     intended to
                                                     describe defense-in-
                                                     depth in a
                                                     performance based
                                                     manner and would be
                                                     a critical element
                                                     for meeting the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement for
                                                     protection against
                                                     a single act
                                                     described in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(3) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon    (b)(5) Upon the       This requirement
 the request of an             request of an         would retain the
 authorized representative     authorized            current requirement
 of the Commission, the        representative of     for demonstration
 licensee shall demonstrate    the Commission, the   and would contain
 the ability of the physical   licensee shall        minor revisions to
 security personnel to carry   demonstrate the       apply this
 out their assigned duties     ability to meet       requirement to the
 and responsibilities.         Commission            licensee's ability
                               requirements          to implement the
                               through the           physical protection
                               implementation of     program and not be
                               the physical          limited to only the
                               protection program,   ability of security
                               including the         personnel to carry
                               ability of armed      out their duties.
                               and unarmed           This proposed
                               personnel to          requirement would
                               perform assigned      clarify the
                               duties and            Commission's view
                               responsibilities      that the licensee
                               required by the       must also
                               approved security     demonstrate the
                               plans and licensee    effectiveness of
                               procedures.           plans, procedures,
                                                     and equipment to
                                                     accomplish their
                                                     intended function
                                                     within the physical
                                                     protection program.
                              (b)(6) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall establish and   would be added to
                               maintain a written    specify that this
                               performance           performance
                               evaluation program    evaluation program
                               in accordance with    would be the
                               appendix B and        mechanism by which
                               appendix C to this    the licensee would
                               part, to              demonstrate the
                               demonstrate and       capabilities
                               assess the            described by the
                               effectiveness of      performance based
                               armed responders      requirements of the
                               and armed security    proposed paragraphs
                               officers to perform   (b)(2) through (4)
                               their assigned        of this section.
                               duties and            The phrase ``target
                               responsibilities to   sets'' would be
                               protect target sets   used consistent
                               described in          with the proposed
                               paragraph (f) of      (b)(3) of this
                               this section and      section to describe
                               appendix C to this    the combination of
                               part, through         equipment and
                               implementation of     operator actions
                               the licensee          which, if all are
                               protective strategy.  prevented from
                                                     performing their
                                                     intended safety
                                                     function or
                                                     prevented from
                                                     being accomplished,
                                                     would likely result
                                                     in significant core
                                                     damage (e.g., non-
                                                     incipient, non-
                                                     localized fuel
                                                     melting, and/or
                                                     core disruption)
                                                     barring
                                                     extraordinary
                                                     action by plant
                                                     operators.
                                                    A target set with
                                                     respect to spent
                                                     fuel sabotage is
                                                     draining the spent
                                                     fuel pool leaving
                                                     the spent fuel
                                                     uncovered for a
                                                     period of time,
                                                     allowing spent fuel
                                                     heat up and the
                                                     associated
                                                     potential for
                                                     release of fission
                                                     products.

[[Page 62690]]

Sec.   73.55(d)(7) The        (b)(7) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee shall:               shall establish,      would be retained
(i) Establish an access        maintain, and         and revised to
 authorization system * * *.   follow an access      require the
                               authorization         licensee to provide
                               program in            an Access
                               accordance with       Authorization
                               Sec.   73.56.         Program.
                              (b)(7)(i) In          This proposed
                               addition to the       requirement would
                               access                be added to
                               authorization         establish the
                               program required      insider mitigation
                               above, and the        program (IMP). The
                               fitness-for-duty      licensee's IMP
                               program required in   should integrate
                               part 26 of this       specific elements
                               chapter, each         of the licensee AA
                               licensee shall        and FFD programs to
                               develop, implement,   focus those
                               and maintain an       elements on
                               insider mitigation    identifying
                               program.              potential insider
                                                     threats and denying
                                                     the opportunity for
                                                     an insider to gain
                                                     or retain access at
                                                     an NRC licensed
                                                     facility.
                              (b)(7)(ii) The        This proposed
                               insider mitigation    requirement would
                               program must be       be added to provide
                               designed to oversee   a performance based
                               and monitor the       requirement for the
                               initial and           design and content
                               continuing            of the IMP. The
                               trustworthiness and   Commission has
                               reliability of        concluded that, by
                               individuals granted   itself, the initial
                               or retaining          determination of
                               unescorted access     trustworthiness and
                               authorization to a    reliability is not
                               protected or vital    adequate to
                               area and implement    minimize the
                               defense-in-depth      potential
                               methodologies to      opportunity for an
                               minimize the          insider to gain or
                               potential for an      retain access, and
                               insider to            that only through
                               adversely affect,     continual re-
                               either directly or    evaluation of the
                               indirectly, the       information
                               licensee capability   obtained through
                               to prevent            these processes can
                               significant core      the licensee
                               damage or spent       provide the level
                               fuel sabotage.        of assurance
                                                     necessary. The
                                                     Commission has also
                                                     determined that
                                                     defense-in-depth
                                                     would be provided
                                                     through the
                                                     integration of
                                                     physical protection
                                                     measures with
                                                     access
                                                     authorization and
                                                     fitness-for-duty
                                                     program elements,
                                                     to ensure the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to identify and
                                                     mitigate the
                                                     potential
                                                     activities of an
                                                     insider, such as,
                                                     but not limited to,
                                                     tampering. The
                                                     Commission does not
                                                     intend that a
                                                     licensee would
                                                     limit the IMP to
                                                     any one or more
                                                     elements, but
                                                     rather that the
                                                     licensee would
                                                     identify and add
                                                     additional elements
                                                     as necessary to
                                                     ensure the site's
                                                     IMP satisfies the
                                                     performance
                                                     requirements
                                                     specified by the
                                                     Commission.
                                                    The Commission has
                                                     determined that no
                                                     one element of the
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program, access
                                                     authorization
                                                     program, or fitness-
                                                     for-duty program
                                                     would, by itself,
                                                     provide the level
                                                     of protection
                                                     against the insider
                                                     necessary to meet
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) and therefore,
                                                     the effective
                                                     integration of
                                                     these three
                                                     programs is a
                                                     necessary
                                                     requirement to
                                                     achieve defense-in-
                                                     depth against the
                                                     potential insider.
                              (b)(8) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall ensure that     would be added to
                               its corrective        provide a
                               action program        performance based
                               assures that          requirement to
                               failures,             ensure that the
                               malfunctions,         licensee implements
                               deficiencies,         and completes the
                               deviations,           required corrective
                               defective equipment   actions in a timely
                               and nonconformances   manner and that
                               in security program   actions would be
                               components,           taken to correct
                               functions, or         the cause of the
                               personnel are         problem to ensure
                               promptly identified   that the problem
                               and corrected.        would not be
                               Measures shall        repeated.
                               ensure that the
                               cause of any of
                               these conditions is
                               determined and that
                               corrective action
                               is taken to
                               preclude repetition.
                              (c) Security plans..  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (c)(1) Licensee       This requirement
                               security plans.       would be added to
                               Licensee security     describe the
                               plans must            purpose of the
                               implement             licensee Physical
                               Commission            Security Plan,
                               requirements and      Training and
                               must describe:        Qualification Plan,
                                                     and Safeguards
                                                     Contingency Plan in
                                                     a performance based
                                                     requirement and to
                                                     introduce the
                                                     general types of
                                                     information to be
                                                     discussed.

[[Page 62691]]

                              (c)(1)(i) How the     This requirement
                               physical protection   would be added to
                               program will          describe the
                               prevent significant   performance based
                               core damage and       requirement to be
                               spent fuel sabotage   met by the physical
                               through the           protection program
                               establishment and     and the basic
                               maintenance of a      elements of the
                               security              system that must be
                               organization, the     described in the
                               use of security       security plans.
                               equipment and
                               technology, the
                               training and
                               qualification of
                               security personnel,
                               and the
                               implementation of
                               predetermined
                               response plans and
                               strategies; and
                              (c)(1)(ii) Site-      This requirement
                               specific conditions   would be added to
                               that affect           reflect the
                               implementation of     Commission's view
                               Commission            that licensees must
                               requirements.         focus attention on
                                                     site-specific
                                                     conditions in the
                                                     development and
                                                     implementation of
                                                     site plans,
                                                     procedures,
                                                     processes, response
                                                     strategies, and
                                                     ultimately, the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(1) of this
                                                     section.
                              (c)(2) Protection of  This requirement
                               security plans. The   would be added to
                               licensee shall        emphasize the
                               protect the           requirements for
                               approved security     the protection of
                               plans and other       safeguards
                               related safeguards    information in
                               information against   accordance with the
                               unauthorized          requirements of
                               disclosure in         Sec.   73.21.
                               accordance with the
                               requirements of
                               Sec.   73.21.
                              (c)(3) Physical       This header would be
                               security plan.        added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (c)(3)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               establish,            specify the
                               maintain, and         requirement for a
                               implement a           physical security
                               Commission-approved   plan.
                               physical security
                               plan that describes
                               how the performance
                               objective and
                               requirements set
                               forth in this
                               section will be
                               implemented.
                              (c)(3)(ii) The        This requirement
                               physical security     would be added to
                               plan must describe    describe the
                               the facility          general content of
                               location and          the physical
                               layout, the           security plan and
                               security              specify the general
                               organization and      types of
                               structure, duties     information to be
                               and                   addressed. Because
                               responsibilities of   the specifics of
                               personnel, defense-   defense-in-depth
                               in-depth              required by the
                               implementation that   proposed Sec.
                               describes             73.55(b)(4) would
                               components,           vary from site-to-
                               equipment and         site, the terms
                               technology used.      ``components,''
                                                     ``equipment'' and
                                                     ``technology''
                                                     would be used to
                                                     provide
                                                     flexibility.
                              (c)(4) Training and   This header would be
                               qualification plan.   added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(ii) Each   (c)(4)(i) The         This requirement
 licensee shall establish,     licensee shall        would retain and
 maintain, and follow an NRC-  establish,            separate two
 approved training and         maintain, and         current
 qualifications plan * * *.    follow a Commission-  requirements of
                               approved training     Sec.
                               and qualification     73.55(b)(4)(ii).
                               plan that describes   This proposed
                               how the criteria      requirement would
                               set forth in          require the
                               appendix B            licensee to provide
                               ``General Criteria    a training and
                               for Security          qualification plan.
                               Personnel,'' to
                               this part will be
                               implemented.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(ii) * * *  (c)(4)(ii) The        This requirement
 outlining the processes by    training and          would retain the
 which guards, watchmen,       qualification plan    requirement for the
 armed response persons, and   must describe the     licensee to outline
 other members of the          process by which      the processes in
 security organization will    armed and unarmed     this plan with
 be selected, trained,         security personnel,   minor revisions.
 equipped, tested, and         watchpersons, and     The phrase
 qualified to ensure that      other members of      ``guards, watchmen,
 these individuals meet the    the security          armed response
 requirements of this          organization will     persons'' would be
 paragraph.                    be selected,          replaced by the
                               trained, equipped,    phrase ``armed and
                               tested, qualified,    unarmed security
                               and re-qualified to   personnel,
                               ensure that these     watchpersons'' to
                               individuals possess   generically
                               and maintain the      identify all
                               knowledge, skills,    members of the
                               and abilities         security
                               required to carry     organization. The
                               out their assigned    Commission does not
                               duties and            intend that
                               responsibilities      administrative
                               effectively.          staff be included
                                                     except as these
                                                     personnel would be
                                                     used to perform
                                                     duties required to
                                                     detect, assess,
                                                     intercept,
                                                     challenge, delay,
                                                     and neutralize a
                                                     threat, to include
                                                     compensatory
                                                     measures used to
                                                     maintain these
                                                     capabilities in the
                                                     event of a failed
                                                     component.

[[Page 62692]]

                                                    The phrase ``meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this paragraph''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     by the phrase
                                                     ``possess the
                                                     knowledge, skills,
                                                     and abilities
                                                     required to
                                                     effectively carry
                                                     out their assigned
                                                     duties and
                                                     responsibilities''
                                                     to clarify that the
                                                     focus of this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be to ensure these
                                                     individuals possess
                                                     these capabilities.
                              (c)(5) Safeguards     This header would be
                               contingency plan.     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(h)(1)            (c)(5)(i) The         This requirement
 Safeguards contingency        licensee shall        would retain the
 plans must be in accordance   establish,            current requirement
 with the criteria in          maintain, and         of Sec.
 appendix C to this part,      implement a           73.55(h)(1) to
 ``Licensee Safeguards         Commission-approved   provide a
 Contingency Plans''.          safeguards            safeguards
                               contingency plan      contingency plan
                               that describes how    with minor
                               the criteria set      revisions. Most
                               forth in section II   significantly, the
                               of appendix C,        reference to
                               ``Licensee            appendix C to part
                               Safeguards            73 would be revised
                               Contingency           to reflect the
                               Plans,'' to this      reformatting of the
                               part will be          proposed appendix C
                               implemented.          to part 73 which
                                                     would have a
                                                     section II that
                                                     applies only to
                                                     power reactors.
                              (c)(5)(ii) The        This requirement
                               safeguards            would be added to
                               contingency plan      generally describe
                               must describe         the content of the
                               predetermined         Safeguards
                               actions, plans, and   Contingency Plan.
                               strategies designed
                               to intercept,
                               challenge, delay,
                               and neutralize
                               threats up to and
                               including the
                               design basis threat
                               of radiological
                               sabotage.
                              (c)(6) Implementing   This header would be
                               procedures.           added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3)(i)         (c)(6)(i) The         This requirement
 Written security procedures   licensee shall        would retain the
 that document the structure   establish,            requirement for
 of the security               maintain, and         written security
 organization and detail the   implement written     procedures with
 duties of guards, watchmen,   procedures that       minor revisions.
 and other individuals         document the          The phrase ``and
 responsible for security.     structure of the      implement
                               security              Commission
                               organization,         requirements
                               detail the specific   through the
                               duties and            approved security
                               responsibilities of   plans'' would be
                               each position, and    added to clarify
                               implement             the requirement
                               Commission            that the licensee
                               requirements          implements
                               through the           Commission
                               approved security     requirements
                               plans.                through procedures
                                                     as well as the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans.
                              (c)(6)(ii)            This requirement
                               Implementing          would be added to
                               procedures need not   address the current
                               be submitted to the   and proposed
                               Commission for        procedural details
                               prior approval, but   for implementing
                               are subject to        procedures.
                               inspection by the
                               Commission.
                              (c)(6)(iii)           This requirement
                               Implementing          would be added to
                               procedures must       describe the
                               detail the specific   content of
                               actions to be taken   implementing
                               and decisions to be   procedures to
                               made by each          clarify the current
                               position of the       requirement
                               security              ``detail the duties
                               organization to       of guards,
                               implement the         watchmen, and other
                               approved security     individuals
                               plans.                responsible for
                                                     security.''
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) The        (c)(6)(iv) The        This requirement
 licensee shall have a         licensee shall:       would be retained
 management system to                                and would separate
 provide for * * *.                                  the two current
                                                     requirements of
                                                     Sec.   73.55(b)(3)
                                                     with minor
                                                     revisions. The
                                                     phrase ``management
                                                     system'' would be
                                                     replaced with the
                                                     word ``process.''
                                                     The current
                                                     requirement to have
                                                     a management system
                                                     would be addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.55(d)(2).
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) * * * the  (c)(6)(iv)(A)         This requirement
 development, revision,        Develop, maintain,    would retain the
 implementation, and           enforce, review,      requirement to
 enforcement of security       and revise security   develop, revise,
 procedures.                   implementing          implement, and
                               procedures.           enforce security
                                                     procedures. The
                                                     words ``maintenance
                                                     and review'' would
                                                     be added to clarify
                                                     these tasks as
                                                     necessary
                                                     functions. The word
                                                     ``implementation''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because
                                                     implementation is
                                                     addressed in the
                                                     proposed paragraphs
                                                     (c)(6)(i) through
                                                     (iii) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3)(ii)        (c)(6)(iv)(B)         This requirement
 Provision for written         Provide a process     would retain the
 approval of these             for the written       current requirement
 procedures and any            approval of           for written
 revisions to the procedures   implementing          approval with minor
 by the individual with        procedures and        revisions.
 overall responsibility for    revisions by the
 the security functions.       individual with
                               overall
                               responsibility for
                               the security
                               functions.

[[Page 62693]]

                              (c)(6)(iv)(C) Ensure  This requirement
                               that changes made     would be added to
                               to implementing       ensure that the
                               procedures do not     licensee process
                               decrease the          for making changes
                               effectiveness of      to implementing
                               any procedure to      procedures includes
                               implement and         a process to ensure
                               satisfy Commission    that changes do not
                               requirements.         result in a
                                                     reduction of
                                                     effectiveness or
                                                     result in a
                                                     conflict with other
                                                     site procedures.
                              (c)(7) Plan           This requirement
                               revisions. The        would be added to
                               licensee shall        outline the three
                               revise approved       methodologies for
                               security plans as     making changes to
                               necessary to ensure   the Commission-
                               the effective         approved security
                               implementation of     plans and clarify
                               Commission            that the licensee
                               regulations and the   would make
                               licensee's            necessary plan
                               protective            changes to account
                               strategy.             for changes to site
                               Commission approval   specific conditions
                               of revisions made     and lessons learned
                               pursuant to this      from implementing
                               paragraph is not      the approved
                               required, provided    security plans.
                               that revisions meet
                               the requirements of
                               Sec.   50.54(p) of
                               this chapter.
                               Changes that are
                               beyond the scope
                               allowed per Sec.
                               50.54(p) of this
                               chapter shall be
                               submitted as
                               required by Sec.
                               Sec.   50.90 of
                               this chapter or
                               Sec.   73.5.
Sec.   73.55(b) Physical      (d) Security          This header would be
 Security Organization.        organization.         retained with a
                                                     minor revision.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1) The        (d)(1) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee shall establish a    shall establish and   would retain the
 security organization,        maintain a security   current requirement
 including guards, to          organization          for a security
 protect his facility          designed, staffed,    organization to
 against radiological          trained, and          protect against
 sabotage.                     equipped to provide   radiological
                               early detection,      sabotage. This
                               assessment, and       proposed
                               response to           requirement would
                               unauthorized          be revised to
                               activities within     describe a more
                               any area of the       performance based
                               facility.             requirement
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     proposed paragraphs
                                                     (b)(2) through (4)
                                                     of this section.
                                                    The phrase
                                                     ``including guards,
                                                     to protect his
                                                     facility against
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage'' would be
                                                     replaced with the
                                                     phrase ``designed,
                                                     staffed, trained,
                                                     and equipped to
                                                     provide early
                                                     detection,
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     response to
                                                     unauthorized
                                                     activities'' to
                                                     describe those
                                                     elements of the
                                                     security
                                                     organization needed
                                                     to provide the
                                                     capabilities
                                                     described in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b). The phrase
                                                     ``within any area
                                                     of the facility''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission's
                                                     expectation that
                                                     the licensee must
                                                     implement measures
                                                     consistent with
                                                     site security
                                                     assessments and the
                                                     licensee response
                                                     strategy, to
                                                     facilitate the
                                                     identification of a
                                                     threat before an
                                                     attempt to
                                                     penetrate the
                                                     protected area
                                                     would be made.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) The        (d)(2) The security   This requirement
 system shall include:         organization must     would be retained
                               include:              with minor
                                                     revisions. The word
                                                     ``system'' would be
                                                     replaced by the
                                                     phrase ``security
                                                     organization.''
                                                     Although, the
                                                     security ``system''
                                                     would include the
                                                     security
                                                     organization, this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement focuses
                                                     only on the
                                                     security
                                                     organization.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) The        (d)(2)(i) A           This requirement
 licensee shall have a         management system     would retain the
 management system * * *.      that provides         requirement for a
                               oversight of the      management system
                               onsite physical       with minor
                               protection program.   revisions. Most
                                                     significantly this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     not limit the
                                                     licensee management
                                                     system to only
                                                     provide for the
                                                     development,
                                                     revision,
                                                     implementation, and
                                                     enforcement of
                                                     security procedures
                                                     which are addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph
                                                     (c)(6)(iv) of this
                                                     section. The
                                                     Commission
                                                     expectation would
                                                     be that the
                                                     licensee management
                                                     system oversees all
                                                     aspects of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     to ensure the
                                                     effective
                                                     implementation of
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements
                                                     through the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans and
                                                     implementing
                                                     procedures.

[[Page 62694]]

Sec.   73.55(b)(2) At least   (d)(2)(ii) At least   This requirement
 one full time member of the   one member, onsite    would be retained
 security organization who     and available at      with minor
 has the authority to direct   all times, who has    revisions. The
 the physical protection       the authority to      phrase ``who is
 activities of the security    direct the            assigned no other
 organization shall be         activities of the     duties which would
 onsite at all times.          security              interfere with''
                               organization and      would be added to
                               who is assigned no    ensure that the
                               other duties that     designated
                               would interfere       individual would
                               with this             not be assigned any
                               individual's          duties that would
                               ability to perform    prevent or
                               these duties in       interfere with the
                               accordance with the   ability to direct
                               approved security     these activities
                               plans and licensee    when needed.
                               protective strategy.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(i) The     (d)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee may not permit an    may not permit any    would be retained
 individual to act as a        individual to act     with minor
 guard, watchman, armed        as a member of the    revisions.
 response person, or other     security
 member of the security        organization unless
 organization unless the       the individual has
 individual has been           been trained,
 trained, equipped, and        equipped, and
 qualified to perform each     qualified to
 assigned security job duty    perform assigned
 in accordance with appendix   duties and
 B, ``General Criteria for     responsibilities in
 Security Personnel,'' to      accordance with the
 this part.                    requirements of
                               appendix B to part
                               73 and the
                               Commission-approved
                               training and
                               qualification plan.
                              (d)(4) The licensee   This requirement
                               may not assign an     would be added to
                               individual to any     clarify the
                               position involving    prerequisite
                               detection,            qualifications for
                               assessment, or        assignment to any
                               response to           position involving
                               unauthorized          a function upon
                               activities unless     which detection,
                               that individual has   assessment, or
                               satisfied the         response
                               requirements of       capabilities
                               Sec.   73.56.         depend.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1) If a       (d)(5) If a           This requirement
 contract guard force is       contracted security   would be retained
 utilized for site security,   force is used to      with minor
 the licensee's written        implement the         revision. The
 agreement with the            onsite physical       phrase ``utilized
 contractor that must be       protection program,   for site security''
 retained by the licensee as   the licensee's        would be replaced
 a record for the duration     written agreement     with the phrase
 of the contract will          with the contractor   ``used to implement
 clearly show that:            must be retained by   the onsite physical
                               the licensee as a     protection
                               record for the        program'' to focus
                               duration of the       on the
                               contract and must     implementation of
                               clearly state the     the onsite physical
                               following             protection program.
                               conditions:
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(i) The     (d)(5)(i) The         This requirement
 licensee is responsible to    licensee is           would be retained
 the Commission for            responsible for       with minor
 maintaining safeguards in     maintaining the       revisions. Most
 accordance with Commission    onsite physical       significantly, the
 regulations and the           protection program    word ``safeguards''
 licensee's security plan.     in accordance with    would be replaced
                               Commission orders,    with the phrase''
                               Commission            onsite physical
                               regulations, and      protection
                               the approved          program'' to more
                               security plans.       accurately describe
                                                     the focus of this
                                                     requirement.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(ii) The    (d)(5)(ii) The        This requirement
 NRC may inspect, copy, and    Commission may        would be retained
 take away copies of all       inspect, copy,        with minor
 reports and documents         retain, and remove    revisions.
 required to be kept by        all reports and
 Commission regulations,       documents required
 orders, or applicable         to be kept by
 license conditions whether    Commission
 the reports and documents     regulations,
 are kept by the licensee or   orders, or
 the contractor.               applicable license
                               conditions whether
                               the reports and
                               documents are kept
                               by the licensee or
                               the contractor.
                              (d)(5)(iii) An        This requirement
                               individual may not    would be added for
                               be assigned to any    consistency with
                               position involving    the proposed
                               detection,            requirements of the
                               assessment, or        proposed paragraph
                               response to           (d)(4) of this
                               unauthorized          section. This
                               activities unless     proposed
                               that individual has   requirement would
                               satisfied the         be stipulated in a
                               requirements of       contract because it
                               Sec.   73.56.         relates to a
                                                     function of the
                                                     contract.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(iv) The    (d)(5)(iv) An         This requirement
 contractor will not assign    individual may not    would retain and
 any personnel to the site     be assigned duties    combine two current
 who have not first been       and                   requirements of
 made aware of these           responsibilities      Sec.
 responsibilities.             required to           73.55(b)(1)(iv) and
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(i) The      implement the         Sec.
 licensee may not permit an    approved security     73.55(b)(4)(i) with
 individual to act as a        plans or licensee     minor revisions
 guard, watchman, armed        protective strategy   necessary for
 response person, or other     unless that           consistency with
 member of the security        individual has been   the proposed rule.
 organization unless the       properly trained,
 individual has been           equipped, and
 trained, equipped, and        qualified to
 qualified to perform each     perform their
 assigned security job duty    assigned duties and
 in accordance with appendix   responsibilities in
 B * * *..                     accordance with
                               appendix B to part
                               73 and the
                               Commission-approved
                               training and
                               qualification plan.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(iii) The   (d)(5)(v) Upon the    This requirement
 requirement in paragraph      request of an         would be retained
 (b)(4) of this section that   authorized            to describe the
 the licensee demonstrate      representative of     current requirement
 the ability of physical       the Commission, the   for demonstration
 security personnel to         contractor security   by contract
 perform their assigned        employees shall       security personnel.
 duties and responsibilities   demonstrate the       The language of
 includes demonstration of     ability to perform    this current
 the ability of the            their assigned        requirement would
 contractor's physical         duties and            be deleted and
 security personnel to         responsibilities      replaced by the
 perform their assigned        effectively.          proposed language
 duties and responsibilities                         of the proposed
 in carrying out the                                 Sec.   73.55(b)(5).
 provisions of the Security
 Plan and these regulations,
 and * * *.

[[Page 62695]]

                              (d)(5)(vi) Any        This requirement
                               license for           would be added to
                               possession and        implement
                               ownership of          applicable portions
                               enhanced weapons      of the EPAct 2005,
                               will reside with      and to require any
                               the licensee.         security force
                                                     contract to include
                                                     a statement that
                                                     would ensure that
                                                     all licenses
                                                     relative to
                                                     firearms and
                                                     enhanced weapons
                                                     reside with the
                                                     licensee, not the
                                                     contractor.
Sec.   73.55(c) Physical      (e) Physical          This requirement
 barriers.                     barriers. Based       would be added to
                               upon the licensee's   provide a
                               protective            performance based
                               strategy, analyses,   requirement for
                               and site conditions   determining the use
                               that affect the use   and placement of
                               and placement of      physical barriers
                               physical barriers,    required for
                               the licensee shall    protection of
                               install and           personnel,
                               maintain physical     equipment, and
                               barriers that are     systems, the
                               designed and          failure of which
                               constructed as        could directly or
                               necessary to deter,   indirectly endanger
                               delay, and prevent    public health and
                               the introduction of   safety.
                               unauthorized
                               personnel,
                               vehicles, or
                               materials into
                               areas for which
                               access must be
                               controlled or
                               restricted.
                                                    The phrase ``Based
                                                     upon the licensee
                                                     protective
                                                     strategy, analyses,
                                                     and site specific
                                                     conditions'', would
                                                     be used to ensure
                                                     that licensees
                                                     consider protective
                                                     strategy
                                                     requirements and
                                                     needs, as well as
                                                     any analyses
                                                     conducted by the
                                                     licensee or
                                                     required by the
                                                     Commission to
                                                     determine the
                                                     effects the design
                                                     basis threat could
                                                     have on personnel,
                                                     equipment, and
                                                     systems, and any
                                                     site specific
                                                     condition that
                                                     could have an
                                                     impact on the
                                                     capability to
                                                     prevent significant
                                                     core damage and
                                                     spent fuel
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     Commission
                                                     considers these
                                                     factors to be
                                                     necessary
                                                     considerations when
                                                     determining the
                                                     appropriate use and
                                                     placement of
                                                     barriers in any
                                                     area.
                              (e)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall describe in     would be added to
                               the approved          provide a mechanism
                               security plans, the   by which the
                               design,               licensee would
                               construction, and     confirm information
                               function of           regarding the use,
                               physical barriers     placement, and
                               and barrier systems   construction of
                               used and shall        barriers to include
                               ensure that each      the intended
                               barrier and barrier   function of
                               system is designed    specific barriers
                               and constructed to    as they relate to
                               satisfy the stated    satisfying the
                               function of the       proposed
                               barrier and barrier   requirements of
                               system.               this section.
Sec.   73.55(c)(9)(iii)       (e)(2) The licensee   This requirement
 Protect as Safeguards         shall retain in       would retain and
 Information, information      accordance with       combine the current
 required by the Commission    Sec.   73.70, all     requirements of
 pursuant to Sec.              analyses,             Sec.
 73.55(c)(8) and (9).          comparisons, and      73.55(c)(9)(iii)
Sec.   73.55(c)(9)(iv)         descriptions of the   and (9)(iv) with
 Retain, in accordance with    physical barriers     minor revisions.
 Sec.   73.70, all             and barrier systems
 comparisons and analyses      used to satisfy the
 prepared pursuant to Sec.     requirements of
 73.55(c)(7) and (8)..         this section, and
                               shall protect these
                               records as
                               safeguards
                               information in
                               accordance with the
                               requirements of
                               Sec.   73.21.
                              (e)(3) Physical       This header would be
                               barriers must:        added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (e)(3)(i) Clearly     This requirement
                               delineate the         would be added to
                               boundaries of the     provide a
                               area(s) for which     performance based
                               the physical          requirement for the
                               barrier provides      use of barriers.
                               protection or a
                               function, such as
                               protected and vital
                               area boundaries and
                               stand-off distance.
Sec.   73.55(c)(8) Each       (e)(3)(ii) Be         This requirement
 licensee shall compare the    designed and          would be added to
 vehicle control measures      constructed to        apply the current
 established in accordance     protect against the   requirement of Sec.
 with Sec.   73.55(c)(7) to    design basis threat     73.55(c)(8) to
 the Commission's design       commensurate to the   compare vehicle
 goals (i.e., to protect       required function     control measures
 equipment, systems,           of each barrier and   against Commission
 devices, or material, the     in support of the     design goals, to
 failure of which could        licensee protective   all barriers, such
 directly or indirectly        strategy.             as but not limited
 endanger public health and                          to, channeling
 safety by exposure to                               barriers, delay
 radiation) and criteria for                         barriers, and
 protection against a land                           bullet resisting
 vehicle bomb.                                       enclosures, and not
                                                     limit this
                                                     comparison to only
                                                     vehicle barriers.
                                                     The Commission's
                                                     view is that the
                                                     physical
                                                     construction,
                                                     materials, and
                                                     design of any
                                                     barrier must be
                                                     sufficient to
                                                     perform the
                                                     intended function
                                                     and therefore, the
                                                     licensee must meet
                                                     these standards.

[[Page 62696]]

                              (e)(3)(iii) Provide   This requirement
                               visual deterrence,    would be added to
                               delay, and support    provide a
                               access control        performance based
                               measures.             requirement for
                                                     physical barriers.
                                                     Because of changes
                                                     to the threat
                                                     environment the
                                                     Commission believes
                                                     emphasis on the use
                                                     of physical
                                                     barriers would be
                                                     appropriate.
                              (e)(3)(iv) Support    This requirement
                               effective             would be added to
                               implementation of     provide a
                               the licensee's        performance based
                               protective strategy.  requirement for
                                                     physical barriers.
                                                     Because of changes
                                                     to the threat
                                                     environment the use
                                                     of physical
                                                     barriers within the
                                                     licensee protective
                                                     strategy would be
                                                     considered
                                                     essential.
                              (e)(4) Owner          This requirement
                               controlled area.      would be added to
                               The licensee shall    provide a
                               establish and         performance based
                               maintain physical     requirement to
                               barriers in the       provide enhanced
                               owner controlled      protection outside
                               area to deter,        the protected area
                               delay, or prevent     relative to
                               unauthorized          detecting and
                               access, facilitate    delaying a threat
                               the early detection   before reaching any
                               of unauthorized       area from which the
                               activities, and       threat could
                               control approach      disable the
                               routes to the         personnel,
                               facility.             equipment, or
                                                     systems required to
                                                     meet the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements
                                                     described in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (e)(5) Isolation      This header would be
                               zone.                 added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(c)(3) Isolation  (e)(5)(i) An          This requirement
 zones shall be maintained     isolation zone must   would retain the
 in outdoor areas adjacent     be maintained in      current requirement
 to the physical barrier at    outdoor areas         for an isolation
 the perimeter of the          adjacent to the       zone.
 protected area * * *.         protected area
                               perimeter barrier.
                               The isolation zone
                               shall be:
Sec.   73.55(c)(3) Isolation  (e)(5)(i)(A)          This requirement
 zones * * * and shall be of   Designed and of       would retain and
 sufficient size to permit     sufficient size to    revise the current
 observation of the            permit unobstructed   requirement for
 activities of people on       observation and       isolation zone
 either side of that barrier   assessment of         design to provide
 in the event of its           activities on         observation. Most
 penetration.                  either side of the    significantly, the
                               protected area        words ``designed''
                               barrier.              and
                                                     ``unobstructed''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     provide a more
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement. The
                                                     phrase ``of
                                                     people'' would be
                                                     deleted to focus
                                                     the proposed
                                                     requirement on
                                                     ``activities''.
Sec.   73.55(c)(4) Detection  (e)(5)(i)(B)          This requirement
 of penetration or attempted   Equipped with         would be retained
 penetration of the            intrusion detection   and revised to
 protected area or the         equipment capable     require intrusion
 isolation zone adjacent to    of detecting both     detection equipment
 the protected area barrier    attempted and         within an isolation
 shall assure that adequate    actual penetration    zone and provide a
 response by the security      of the protected      performance based
 organization can be           area perimeter        requirement for
 initiated.                    barrier and           that equipment. The
                               assessment            phrase ``shall
                               equipment capable     assure that
                               of facilitating       adequate response
                               timely evaluation     by the security
                               of the detected       organization can be
                               unauthorized          initiated'' would
                               activities before     be moved from this
                               completed             proposed
                               penetration of the    requirement to the
                               protected area        proposed Sec.
                               perimeter barrier.    73.55(i)(9)(v).
                              (e)(5)(ii)            This requirement
                               Assessment            would be added to
                               equipment in the      provide a
                               isolation zone must   performance based
                               provide real-time     requirement for
                               and play-back/        assessment
                               recorded video        equipment utilized
                               images in a manner    for the isolation
                               that allows timely    zone. The
                               evaluation of the     Commission has
                               detected              determined that
                               unauthorized          based on changes to
                               activities before     threat environment
                               and after each        the use of
                               alarm annunciation.   technology that
                                                     allows for the
                                                     assessment of
                                                     activities before
                                                     and after an alarm
                                                     annunciation is
                                                     necessary to
                                                     facilitate a
                                                     determination of
                                                     the level of
                                                     response needed to
                                                     satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section. The
                                                     Commission believes
                                                     the application of
                                                     this commonly used
                                                     technology would be
                                                     an appropriate use
                                                     of technological
                                                     advancements that
                                                     would effectively
                                                     enhance licensee
                                                     capabilities to
                                                     achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.

[[Page 62697]]

Sec.   73.55(c)(3) If         (e)(5)(iii) Parking   This requirement
 parking facilities are        facilities, storage   would be retained
 provided for employees or     areas, or other       and revised to
 visitors, they shall be       obstructions that     provide a
 located outside the           could provide         performance based
 isolation zone and exterior   concealment or        requirement for the
 to the protected area         otherwise interfere   areas outside the
 barrier.                      with the licensee's   isolation zone.
                               capability to meet    Most significantly,
                               the requirements of   the phrase
                               paragraphs            ``storage areas, or
                               (e)(5)(i)(A) and      other obstructions
                               (B) of this           which could provide
                               section, must be      concealment or
                               located outside of    otherwise
                               the isolation zone.   interfere'' would
                                                     be added to ensure
                                                     that areas inside,
                                                     outside, and
                                                     adjacent to the
                                                     protected area
                                                     barrier would be
                                                     maintained clear of
                                                     obstructions to
                                                     ensure observation
                                                     and assessment
                                                     capabilities.
                              (e)(6) Protected      This header would be
                               area.                 added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (e)(6)(i) The         This requirement
                               protected area        would be added to
                               perimeter must be     provide a
                               protected by          performance based
                               physical barriers     requirement for
                               designed and          physical barriers
                               constructed to meet   and penetrations
                               Commission            though the
                               requirements and      protected area
                               all penetrations      barrier to be
                               through this          secured to prevent
                               barrier must be       and detect
                               secured in a manner   attempted or actual
                               that prevents or      exploitation of the
                               delays, and detects   penetration. The
                               the exploitation of   Commission's view
                               any penetration.      is that
                                                     penetrations must
                                                     be secured equal to
                                                     the strength of the
                                                     barrier of which it
                                                     is a part and that
                                                     attempts to exploit
                                                     a penetration must
                                                     be detected and
                                                     response initiated.
Sec.   73.55(c)(2) The        (e)(6)(ii) The        This requirement
 physical barriers at the      protected area        would be retained
 perimeter of the protected    perimeter physical    with minor
 area shall be separated       barriers must be      revision. The
 from any other barrier        separated from any    phrase ``unless
 designated as a physical      other barrier         otherwise
 barrier for a vital area      designated as a       identified in the
 within the protected area.    vital area physical   approved physical
                               barrier, unless       security plan''
                               otherwise             would be added to
                               identified in the     provide flexibility
                               approved physical     for an alternate
                               security plan.        methodology to be
                                                     described in the
                                                     Commission-approved
                                                     security plans.
Sec.   73.55(e)(3) All        (e)(6)(iii) All       This requirement
 emergency exits in each       emergency exits in    would retain and
 protected area and each       the protected area    separate the two
 vital area shall be alarmed.  must be secured by    current
                               locking devices       requirements with
                               that allow exit       minor revision. The
                               only and alarmed.     phrase ``secured by
                                                     locking devices
                                                     which allow exit
                                                     only'' would be
                                                     added to provide a
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement
                                                     relative to the
                                                     function of locking
                                                     devices with
                                                     emergency exit
                                                     design to prevent
                                                     entry. Vital areas
                                                     would be addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     Sec.
                                                     73.55(e)(8)(vii).
                              (e)(6)(iv) Where      This requirement
                               building walls,       would be added to
                               roofs, or             provide a
                               penetrations          performance based
                               comprise a portion    requirement for
                               of the protected      instances where
                               area perimeter        this site condition
                               barrier, an           would exist.
                               isolation zone is
                               not necessary,
                               provided that the
                               detection,
                               assessment,
                               observation,
                               monitoring, and
                               surveillance
                               requirements of
                               this section are
                               met, appropriately
                               designed and
                               constructed
                               barriers are
                               installed, and the
                               area is described
                               in the approved
                               security plans.
Sec.   73.55(c)(6) The        (e)(6)(v) The         This requirement
 walls, doors, ceiling,        reactor control       would retain the
 floor, and any windows in     room, the central     locations
 the walls and in the doors    alarm station, and    identified in the
 of the reactor control room   the location within   current Sec.
 shall be bullet-resisting.    which the last        73.55(c)(6),
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The         access control        (d)(1), and (e)(1).
 individual responsible for    function for access   Specific reference
 the last access control       to the protected      to walls, doors,
 function (controlling         area is performed,    ceiling, floor, and
 admission to the protected    must be bullet-       any windows in the
 area) must be isolated        resisting.            walls, doors,
 within a bullet-resisting                           ceiling, and floor
 structure as described in                           would be deleted to
 Paragraph (c)(6) of this                            clarify that all
 section to assure his or                            construction
 her ability to respond or                           features would be
 summon assistance.                                  required to meet
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) The                               the bullet
 onsite central alarm                                resisting
 station must be considered                          requirement, and
 a vital area and its walls,                         therefore remove
 doors, ceiling, floor, and                          the potential for
 any windows in the walls                            confusion where a
 and in the doors must be                            structural feature
 bullet-resisting..                                  such as sky-lights
                                                     would not be
                                                     listed. The
                                                     Commission does not
                                                     intend to suggest
                                                     that penetrations,
                                                     such as heating/
                                                     cooling ducts be
                                                     made bullet-
                                                     resistant, but
                                                     rather that the
                                                     licensee implement
                                                     appropriate
                                                     measures to prevent
                                                     the exploitation of
                                                     such features in a
                                                     manner consistent
                                                     with the intent of
                                                     the bullet-
                                                     resisting
                                                     requirement to
                                                     ensure the required
                                                     functions performed
                                                     in these locations
                                                     are protected and
                                                     maintained.

[[Page 62698]]

                              (e)(6)(vi) All        This requirement
                               exterior areas        would be added to
                               within the            provide a
                               protected area must   performance based
                               be periodically       requirement for
                               checked to detect     monitoring exterior
                               and deter             areas of the
                               unauthorized          protected area to
                               activities,           facilitate
                               personnel,            achievement of the
                               vehicles, and         requirements
                               materials.            described by the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b).
                              (e)(7) Vital areas..  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(c)(1) The        (e)(7)(i) Vital       This requirement
 licensee shall locate vital   equipment must be     would be retained
 equipment only within a       located only within   with minor
 vital area, which in turn,    vital areas, which    revision. The
 shall be located within a     in turn must be       phrase ``of
 protected area such that      located within        sufficient strength
 access to vital equipment     protected areas so    to meet the
 requires passage through at   that access to        performance
 least two physical barriers   vital equipment       requirements of
 of sufficient strength to     requires passage      paragraph (a) of
 meet the performance          through at least      this section''
 requirements of paragraph     two physical          would be replaced
 (a) of this section.          barriers designed     with the phrase
                               and constructed to    ``designed and
                               perform the           constructed to
                               required function,    perform the
                               except as otherwise   required function''
                               approved by the       for consistency
                               Commission in         with the proposed
                               accordance with       requirements for
                               paragraph (f)(2) of   physical barriers
                               this section.         discussed
                                                     throughout this
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(e). The
                                                     phrase ``except as
                                                     otherwise approved
                                                     by the Commission
                                                     in accordance with
                                                     paragraph (f)(2) of
                                                     this section''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     account for the
                                                     condition addressed
                                                     by paragraph
                                                     (f)(2).
Sec.   73.55(c)(1) More than  (e)(7)(ii) More than  This requirement
 one vital area may be         one vital area may    would be retained.
 located within a single       be located within a
 protected area.               single protected
                               area.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) The        (e)(7)(iii) The       This requirement
 onsite central alarm          reactor control       would retain and
 station must be considered    room, the spent       combine two current
 a vital area and * * *.       fuel pool,            requirements from
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) Onsite      secondary power       10 CFR 73.55(e)(1),
 secondary power supply        supply systems for    for protecting
 systems for alarm             intrusion detection   these areas
 annunciator equipment and     and assessment        equivalent to a
 non-portable communications   equipment, non-       vital area. The
 equipment as required in      portable              Commission added
 paragraph (f) of this         communications        the ``spent fuel
 section must be located       equipment, and the    pool'' to emphasize
 within vital areas..          central alarm         the Commission view
                               station, must be      that because of
                               provided protection   changes to the
                               equivalent to vital   threat environment
                               equipment located     the spent fuel pool
                               within a vital area.  must also be
                                                     provided this
                                                     protection. The
                                                     phrase ``alarm
                                                     annunciator'' would
                                                     be replaced with
                                                     ``intrusion
                                                     detection and
                                                     assessment'' to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     application of this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement to
                                                     intrusion detection
                                                     sensors and video
                                                     assessment
                                                     equipment as well
                                                     as the alarm
                                                     annunciation
                                                     equipment.
                              (e)(7)(iv) Vital      This requirement
                               equipment that is     would be added to
                               undergoing            provide a
                               maintenance or is     performance based
                               out of service, or    requirement
                               any other change to   consistent with the
                               site conditions       proposed Sec.
                               that could            73.58 Safety/
                               adversely affect      Security Program.
                               plant safety or
                               security, must be
                               identified in
                               accordance with
                               Sec.   73.58, and
                               adjustments must be
                               made to the site
                               protective
                               strategy, site
                               procedures, and
                               approved security
                               plans, as necessary.
Sec.   73.55(e)(3) All        (e)(7)(v) The         This requirement
 emergency exits in each       licensee shall        would retain and
 protected area and each       protect all vital     combine two current
 vital area shall be alarmed.  areas, vital area     requirements 10 CFR
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock     access portals, and   73.55(e)(3) and
 and protect by an activated   vital area            (d)(7)(D) with
 intrusion alarm system all    emergency exits       minor revision for
 unoccupied vital areas..      with intrusion        formatting
                               detection equipment   purposes. The
                               and locking           phrase ``Emergency
                               devices. Emergency    exit locking
                               exit locking          devices shall be
                               devices shall be      designed to permit
                               designed to permit    exit only'' would
                               exit only.            be added to provide
                                                     a performance based
                                                     requirement to
                                                     describe the
                                                     function to be
                                                     provided by
                                                     emergency exit
                                                     locking devices.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock    (e)(7)(vi)            This requirement
 and protect by an activated   Unoccupied vital      would retain the
 intrusion alarm system all    areas must be         current requirement
 unoccupied vital areas.       locked.               to lock unoccupied
                                                     vital areas with
                                                     minor revision for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes. The
                                                     current requirement
                                                     to alarm all vital
                                                     areas would be
                                                     moved to the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (e)(7)(v) of this
                                                     section.
                              (e)(8) Vehicle        This header would be
                               barrier system. The   added for
                               licensee must:        formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62699]]

Sec.   73.55(c)(7) Vehicle    (e)(8)(i) Prevent     This requirement
 control measures, including   unauthorized          would be retained
 vehicle barrier systems,      vehicle access or     and revised to
 must be established to        proximity to any      provide a
 protect against use of a      area from which any   requirement for
 land vehicle, as specified    vehicle, its          protection against
 by the Commission, as a       personnel, or its     any vehicle within
 means of transportation to    contents could        the context of the
 gain unauthorized proximity   disable the           design basis threat
 to vital areas.               personnel,            described in Sec.
                               equipment, or         73.1. Because of
                               systems necessary     changes to the
                               to meet the           threat environment,
                               performance           the meaning of the
                               objective and         word ``proximity''
                               requirements          remains the same
                               described in          but is applied to
                               paragraph (b) of      include all
                               this section.         locations from
                                                     which the design
                                                     basis threat could
                                                     disable the
                                                     personnel,
                                                     equipment, or
                                                     systems required to
                                                     prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage.
                              (e)(8)(ii) Limit and  This requirement
                               control all vehicle   would be added to
                               approach routes.      provide a
                                                     requirement for
                                                     limiting and
                                                     controlling vehicle
                                                     access routes to
                                                     the site for the
                                                     purpose of
                                                     protecting the
                                                     facility against
                                                     vehicle bomb
                                                     attacks and the use
                                                     of vehicles as a
                                                     means of
                                                     transporting
                                                     personnel and
                                                     materials that
                                                     would be considered
                                                     a threat. Because
                                                     of changes to the
                                                     threat environment
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     control of all
                                                     vehicle approach
                                                     routes is a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the onsite physical
                                                     protection program.
                              (e)(8)(iii) Design    This requirement
                               and install a         would be added to
                               vehicle barrier       require the
                               system, to include    licensee to
                               passive and active    determine the
                               barriers, at a        potential effects a
                               stand-off distance    vehicle bomb could
                               adequate to protect   have on the
                               personnel,            facility and to
                               equipment, and        establish a barrier
                               systems against the   system at a stand-
                               design basis threat.  off distance
                                                     sufficient to
                                                     protect personnel,
                                                     equipment and
                                                     systems. Because of
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission
                                                     views stand-off
                                                     distances to be a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     and which require
                                                     continuing analysis
                                                     and evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness.
                              (e)(8)(iv) Deter,     This requirement
                               detect, delay, or     would be added to
                               prevent vehicle use   ensure the licensee
                               as a means of         maintains the
                               transporting          capability to
                               unauthorized          deter, detect,
                               personnel or          delay, or prevent
                               materials to gain     unauthorized access
                               unauthorized access   beyond a vehicle
                               beyond a vehicle      barrier system.
                               barrier system,       Because of changes
                               gain proximity to a   to the threat
                               protected area or     environment, the
                               vital area, or        Commission views
                               otherwise penetrate   the vehicle threat
                               the protected area    to be a critical
                               perimeter.            element of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     that requires
                                                     continual analysis
                                                     and evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     include vehicles
                                                     that do not reach
                                                     the full capability
                                                     of the design basis
                                                     threat.
                              (e)(8)(v)             This requirement
                               Periodically check    would be added
                               the operation of      consistent with the
                               active vehicle        current requirement
                               barriers and          of Sec.
                               provide a secondary   73.55(g)(1) and
                               power source or a     would apply to the
                               means of mechanical   operation of active
                               or manual             vehicle barriers
                               operation, in the     within time lines
                               event of a power      required to prevent
                               failure to ensure     unauthorized
                               that the active       vehicle access,
                               barrier can be        despite the loss of
                               placed in the         the primary power
                               denial position       source. The term
                               within the time       ``periodically''
                               line required to      would be intended
                               prevent               to allow the
                               unauthorized          licensees to
                               vehicle access        establish checks at
                               beyond the required   a frequency
                               standoff distance.    necessary to ensure
                                                     active barriers
                                                     remain effective
                                                     for both denial and
                                                     non-denial
                                                     operation.
                              (e)(8)(vi) Provide    This requirement
                               surveillance and      would be added to
                               observation of        provide a
                               vehicle barriers      requirement for the
                               and barrier systems   licensee to monitor
                               to detect             the integrity of
                               unauthorized          barriers to verify
                               activities and to     availability when
                               ensure the            needed and to
                               integrity of each     prevent or detect
                               vehicle barrier and   tampering. Because
                               barrier system.       of changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission
                                                     views the vehicle
                                                     bomb consideration
                                                     to be a critical
                                                     element of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     which requires
                                                     continuing analysis
                                                     and evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness.

[[Page 62700]]

                              (e)(9) Waterways....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (e)(9)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               control waterway      provide a
                               approach routes or    requirement for
                               proximity to any      controlling
                               area from which a     waterway approach
                               waterborne vehicle,   routes consistent
                               its personnel, or     with the
                               its contents could    requirement of the
                               disable the           proposed paragraph
                               personnel,            (e)(9)(ii) of this
                               equipment, or         section. Because of
                               systems necessary     changes to the
                               to meet the           threat environment,
                               performance           the Commission
                               objective and         views waterway
                               requirements          approach routes and
                               described in          control measures to
                               paragraph (b) of      be a critical
                               this section.         element of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     and one that
                                                     requires continual
                                                     analysis and
                                                     evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness.
                              (e)(9)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               delineate areas       provide a
                               from which a          requirement for
                               waterborne vehicle    notifying
                               must be restricted    unauthorized
                               and install           individuals that
                               waterborne vehicle    access is not
                               control measures,     permitted, and the
                               where applicable.     installation of
                                                     barriers where
                                                     appropriate.
                              (e)(9)(iii) The       This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               monitor waterway      provide a
                               approaches and        requirement for
                               adjacent areas to     monitoring waterway
                               ensure early          approaches
                               detection,            consistent with
                               assessment, and       other monitoring
                               response to           and surveillance
                               unauthorized          requirements of
                               activity or           this proposed
                               proximity, and to     section.
                               ensure the
                               integrity of
                               installed
                               waterborne vehicle
                               control measures.
                              (e)(9)(iv) Where      This requirement
                               necessary to meet     would be added to
                               the requirements of   provide a
                               this section,         requirement to
                               licensees shall       coordinate where
                               coordinate with       necessary with
                               local, State, and     other agencies
                               Federal agencies      having
                               having jurisdiction   jurisdictional
                               over waterway         authority over
                               approaches.           waterways to ensure
                                                     that the proposed
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section would
                                                     be met.
                              (e)(10) Unattended    This requirement
                               openings in any       would be added to
                               barrier established   provide a
                               to meet the           requirement for all
                               requirements of       openings in any
                               this section that     OCA, PA, or VA
                               are 620 cm\2\ (96.1   barrier to ensure
                               in\2\) or greater     that the intended
                               in total area and     function of the
                               have a smallest       barrier is met. The
                               dimension of 15 cm    phrase ``consistent
                               (5.9 in) or           with the intended
                               greater, must be      function of each
                               secured and           barrier'' would
                               monitored at a        describe the
                               frequency that        criteria for making
                               would prevent         a determination to
                               exploitation of the   secure or monitor
                               opening consistent    openings of this
                               with the intended     size where the
                               function of each      intended function
                               barrier.              of the barrier
                                                     would be
                                                     compromised if the
                                                     opening is not
                                                     secured or
                                                     monitored. The size
                                                     of the opening
                                                     described is a
                                                     commonly accepted
                                                     standard throughout
                                                     the security
                                                     profession for
                                                     application to any
                                                     security program
                                                     and one that
                                                     represents an
                                                     opening large
                                                     enough for a person
                                                     to exploit.
                                                    Therefore, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     openings meeting
                                                     the stated criteria
                                                     require measures to
                                                     prevent
                                                     exploitation.
                              (f) Target sets.....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (f)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall document in     would be added to
                               site procedures the   provide a
                               process used to       performance based
                               develop and           requirement for the
                               identify target       licensee to
                               sets, to include      document how each
                               analyses and          target set was
                               methodologies used    developed to
                               to determine and      facilitate review
                               group the target      of the licensee
                               set equipment or      methodology by the
                               elements.             Commission. The
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     because of changes
                                                     to the threat
                                                     environment the
                                                     identification and
                                                     protection of all
                                                     target sets would
                                                     be a critical
                                                     component for the
                                                     development and
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective strategy
                                                     and the capability
                                                     of the licensee to
                                                     prevent significant
                                                     core damage and
                                                     spent fuel
                                                     sabotage,
                                                     therefore,
                                                     providing
                                                     protection against
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage and
                                                     satisfying the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements stated
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph (b) of
                                                     this section.

[[Page 62701]]

                              (f)(2) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall consider the    would be added to
                               effects that cyber    ensure cyber
                               attacks may have      attacks associated
                               upon individual       with advancements
                               equipment or          in the area of
                               elements of each      automated computer
                               target set or         technology are
                               grouping.             considered and the
                                                     affects that such
                                                     attacks may have on
                                                     the integrity of
                                                     individual target
                                                     set equipment and
                                                     elements is
                                                     accounted for in
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective
                                                     strategy.
                              (f)(3) Target set     This requirement
                               equipment or          would be added to
                               elements that are     provide a
                               not contained         performance based
                               within a protected    requirement to
                               or vital area must    identify and
                               be explicitly         account for this
                               identified in the     condition in the
                               approved security     approved security
                               plans and             plans, if it exists
                               protective measures   at a site.
                               for such equipment
                               or elements must be
                               addressed by the
                               licensee's
                               protective strategy
                               in accordance with
                               appendix C to this
                               part.
                              (f)(4) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall implement a     would be added to
                               program for the       require the
                               oversight of plant    licensee to
                               equipment and         establish and
                               systems documented    implement a program
                               as part of the        that focuses on
                               licensee protective   ensuring that
                               strategy to ensure    certain plant
                               that changes to the   equipment and
                               configuration of      systems are
                               the identified        periodically
                               equipment and         checked to ensure
                               systems do not        that unauthorized
                               compromise the        configuration
                               licensee's            changes or
                               capability to         tampering would be
                               prevent significant   identified and an
                               core damage and       appropriate
                               spent fuel sabotage.  response initiated.
                                                     Based on changes to
                                                     the threat
                                                     environment, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined this
                                                     would be an
                                                     appropriate
                                                     enhancement to the
                                                     licensee onsite
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program.
                              (g) Access control..  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (g)(1) The licensee   This header would be
                               shall:                added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (g)(1)(i) Control     This requirement
 licensee shall control all    all points of         would be retained
 points of personnel and       personnel, vehicle,   and revised with
 vehicle access into a         and material access   minor revisions.
 protected area.               into any area, or     Most significantly,
                               beyond any physical   the phrase ``a
                               barrier or barrier    protected area''
                               system, established   would be replaced
                               to meet the           by the phrase ``any
                               requirements of       area, or beyond any
                               this section.         physical barrier or
                                                     barrier system,
                                                     established to meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this section'' to
                                                     clarify that the
                                                     focus of this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     not be limited to
                                                     only protected area
                                                     access but would
                                                     apply to any area
                                                     for which access
                                                     must be controlled
                                                     to meet
                                                     complimentary
                                                     requirements
                                                     addressed in this
                                                     proposed rule. In
                                                     addition, the word
                                                     ``material'' would
                                                     be added to
                                                     emphasize that the
                                                     control of material
                                                     into these areas
                                                     would also be a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     to facilitate
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(i)(B)      (g)(1)(ii) Control    This requirement
 Positively control, in        all points of         would be retained
 accordance with the access    personnel and         with minor
 list established pursuant     vehicle access into   revisions.
 to paragraph (d)(7)(i) of     vital areas in
 this section, all points of   accordance with
 personnel and vehicle         access
 access to vital areas.        authorization lists.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(i) * * *   (g)(1)(iii) During    This requirement
 limit unescorted access to    non-emergency         would be retained
 vital areas during            conditions, limit     and revised with
 nonemergency conditions to    unescorted access     minor revisions.
 individuals who require       to the protected      Most significantly,
 access in order to perform    area and vital        the phrase
 their duties. To achieve      areas to only those   ``protected area''
 this, the licensee shall:     individuals who       would be added to
                               require unescorted    emphasize that the
                               access to perform     same ``assigned
                               assigned duties and   duties and
                               responsibilities.     responsibilities''
                                                     criteria apply to
                                                     both vital and
                                                     protected areas.

[[Page 62702]]

                              (g)(1)(iv) Monitor    This requirement
                               and ensure the        would be added to
                               integrity of access   provide a
                               control systems.      requirement for
                                                     ensuring the
                                                     integrity of the
                                                     access control
                                                     system and prevent
                                                     its unauthorized
                                                     bypass. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     emphasis would be
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that the integrity
                                                     of the access
                                                     control system is
                                                     maintained through
                                                     oversight and that
                                                     attempts to
                                                     circumvent or
                                                     bypass the
                                                     established process
                                                     will be detected
                                                     and access denied.
                              (g)(1)(v) Provide     This requirement
                               supervision and       would be added to
                               control over the      provide a
                               badging process to    requirement for
                               prevent               ensuring the
                               unauthorized bypass   integrity of the
                               of access control     access control
                               equipment located     process. Based on
                               at or outside of      changes to the
                               the protected area.   threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     specific emphasis
                                                     on access control
                                                     equipment outside
                                                     the protected area
                                                     would be necessary
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     integrity of the
                                                     access control
                                                     system is
                                                     maintained for
                                                     those process
                                                     elements that are
                                                     not contained
                                                     within the
                                                     protected area.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (g)(1)(vi) Isolate    This requirement
 individual responsible for    the individual        would be retained
 the last access control       responsible for the   and revised with
 function (controlling         last access control   minor revisions.
 admission to the protected    function              Most significantly,
 area) must be isolated        (controlling          the phrase ``as
 within a bullet-resisting     admission to the      described in
 structure as described in     protected area)       paragraph (c)(6) of
 paragraph (c)(6) of this      within a bullet-      this section''
 section to assure his or      resisting structure   would be deleted
 her ability to respond or     to assure the         because the
 to summon assistance.         ability to respond    specific criteria
                               or to summon          for bullet-
                               assistance in         resisting would no
                               response to           longer be addressed
                               unauthorized          in the referenced
                               activities.           paragraph. Specific
                                                     criteria would be
                                                     addressed in
                                                     standards published
                                                     by the Underwriters
                                                     Laboratory (UL).
                              (g)(1)(vii) In        This requirement
                               response to           would be added to
                               specific threat and   require two
                               security              specific actions to
                               information,          be taken by the
                               implement a two-      licensee where
                               person (line-of-      credible threat
                               sight) rule for all   information is
                               personnel in vital    provided. This
                               areas so that no      proposed
                               one individual is     requirement would
                               permitted             first require that
                               unescorted access     the two-person rule
                               to vital areas.       be implemented, and
                               Under these           second, that
                               conditions the        measures be
                               licensee shall        implemented to
                               implement measures    verify that the two-
                               to verify that the    person rule is met
                               two person rule has   when access to a
                               been met when a       vital area is
                               vital area is         gained. This
                               accessed.             proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     include those areas
                                                     identified in the
                                                     proposed (e)(8)(iv)
                                                     of this section to
                                                     be protected as
                                                     vital areas. Based
                                                     on changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     necessary to
                                                     facilitate licensee
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (g)(2) In accordance  This requirement
                               with the approved     would be added to
                               security plans and    specify the basic
                               before granting       functions that must
                               unescorted access     be satisfied to
                               through an access     meet the current
                               control point, the    and proposed
                               licensee shall:       requirements for
                                                     controlling access
                                                     into any area for
                                                     which access
                                                     controls are
                                                     implemented.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1)            (g)(2)(i) Confirm     This requirement
 Identification * * * of all   the identity of       would retain the
 individuals unless            individuals.          current requirement
 otherwise provided herein                           with minor
 must be made and * * *.                             revisions for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) * * *      (g)(2)(ii) Verify     This requirement
 authorization must be         the authorization     would retain the
 checked at these points.      for access of         current requirement
                               individuals,          with minor
                               vehicles, and         revisions for
                               materials.            formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) * * *      (g)(2)(iii) Search    This requirement
 search of all individuals     individuals,          would retain the
 unless otherwise provided     vehicles, packages,   current requirement
 herein must be made and * *   deliveries, and       with minor
 *.                            materials in          revisions for
                               accordance with       formatting
                               paragraph (h) of      purposes.
                               this section.

[[Page 62703]]

                              (g)(2)(iv) Confirm,   This requirement
                               in accordance with    would be added to
                               industry shared       describe an
                               lists and             acceptable
                               databases, that       information sharing
                               individuals have      mechanism used by
                               not been denied       licensees to share
                               access to another     information about
                               licensed facility.    visitors and
                                                     employees who have
                                                     requested either
                                                     escorted or
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to at least one
                                                     site. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be a prudent
                                                     enhancement to the
                                                     licensee
                                                     capabilities.
                              (g)(3) Access         This header would be
                               control points must   added for
                               be:                   formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (g)(3)(i) Equipped    This requirement
                               with locking          would be added to
                               devices, intrusion    describe the types
                               detection             of equipment
                               equipment, and        determined to be
                               monitoring,           acceptable to
                               observation, and      satisfy the desired
                               surveillance          level of
                               equipment, as         performance
                               appropriate.          intended by the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section. The
                                                     phrase ``as
                                                     appropriate'' would
                                                     be used to provide
                                                     the flexibility
                                                     needed to provide
                                                     only that equipment
                                                     that is required to
                                                     accomplish the
                                                     desired function of
                                                     the specific access
                                                     control point.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (g)(3)(ii) Located    This requirement
 licensee shall control all    outside or            would be added to
 points of personnel and       concurrent with,      clarify the
 vehicle access into a         the physical          location of access
 protected area.               barrier system        control points to
                               through which it      ensure personnel
                               controls access.      and vehicles do not
                                                     gain access beyond
                                                     a barrier (i.e.,
                                                     stand-off distance)
                                                     before being
                                                     searched.
                              (g)(4) Emergency      This header would be
                               conditions.           added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(ii)        (g)(4)(i) The         This requirement
 Design the access             licensee shall        would be retained
 authorization system to       design the access     with minor
 accommodate the potential     control system to     revision. Most
 need for rapid ingress or     accommodate the       significantly, the
 egress of individuals         potential need for    phrase ``access
 during emergency conditions   rapid ingress or      authorization
 or situations that could      egress of             system'' would be
 lead to emergency             authorized            replaced with the
 conditions. To help assure    individuals during    phrase ``access
 this, the licensee shall:     emergency             control system'' to
                               conditions or         clarify that the
                               situations that       focus of this
                               could lead to         proposed
                               emergency             requirement is on
                               conditions.           controlling access
                                                     during emergency
                                                     conditions. The
                                                     need for rapid
                                                     ingress and egress
                                                     is a physical
                                                     action and would
                                                     more appropriately
                                                     be addressed
                                                     through access
                                                     controls.
                                                    Also, the phrase
                                                     ``authorized
                                                     individuals'' would
                                                     be added to
                                                     indicate that
                                                     access
                                                     authorization
                                                     requirements are
                                                     satisfied by the
                                                     individual in
                                                     advance of the need
                                                     for access. In
                                                     addition, the
                                                     phrase ``To help
                                                     assure this, the
                                                     licensee shall:''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because it would no
                                                     longer be needed.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(ii)(A)     (g)(4)(ii) Under      This requirement
 Ensure prompt access to       emergency             would be retained
 vital equipment.              conditions, the       and revised to add
                               licensee shall        a performance based
                               implement             requirement that
                               procedures to         the licensee
                               ensure that:          develop and
                              (g)(4)(ii)(A)          maintain a process
                               Authorized            by which prompt
                               emergency personnel   access to vital
                               are provided prompt   equipment is
                               access to affected    assured while at
                               areas and             the same time
                               equipment..           ensuring the
                              (g)(4)(ii)(B)          detection of
                               Attempted or actual   unauthorized entry,
                               unauthorized entry    and that this
                               to vital equipment    process would be
                               is detected..         implemented in a
                              (g)(4)(ii)(C) The      manner that is
                               capability to         consistent with the
                               prevent significant   proposed
                               core damage and       requirements of
                               spent fuel sabotage   this section and
                               is maintained..       ensures the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.

[[Page 62704]]

                              (g)(4)(iii) The       This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               ensure that           provide a
                               restrictions for      performance based
                               site access and       requirement for
                               egress during         coordination of
                               emergency             security access
                               conditions are        controls during
                               coordinated with      emergencies with
                               responses by          the access needs of
                               offsite emergency     emergency response
                               support agencies      personnel. This
                               identified in the     proposed
                               site emergency        requirement is
                               plans.                intended to provide
                                                     the necessary level
                                                     of flexibility to
                                                     the licensee to
                                                     ensure access by
                                                     appropriate
                                                     personnel while
                                                     maintaining the
                                                     necessary security
                                                     posture for
                                                     controlling access
                                                     to areas where
                                                     dangerous
                                                     conditions exist,
                                                     such as violent
                                                     conflict involving
                                                     weapons.
                              (g)(5) Vehicles.....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) The        (g)(5)(i) The         This requirement
 licensee shall exercise       licensee shall        would be retained
 positive control over all     exercise control      and revised to
 such designated vehicles to   over all vehicles     apply to all
 assure that they are used     while inside the      vehicles and not be
 only by authorized persons    protected area and    limited to only
 and for authorized purposes.  vital areas to        designated
                               ensure they are       vehicles. Most
                               used only by          significantly, the
                               authorized persons    phrase ``all such
                               and for authorized    designated
                               purposes.             vehicles'' would be
                                                     deleted to remove
                                                     this limitation and
                                                     clarify that the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement applies
                                                     to any vehicle
                                                     granted access. The
                                                     word ``positive''
                                                     would be deleted to
                                                     remove
                                                     uncertainties
                                                     regarding the
                                                     meaning of this
                                                     word.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) All        (g)(5)(ii) Vehicles   This requirement
 vehicles, except designated   inside the            would be retained
 licensee vehicles,            protected area or     and would contain a
 requiring entry into the      vital areas must be   significant
 protected area shall be       operated by an        revision to relieve
 escorted by a member of the   individual            the licensee from
 security organization while   authorized            the current
 within the protected area,    unescorted access     requirement to
 and * * *.                    to the area, or       escort a vehicle
                               must be escorted by   operated by an
                               an individual         individual who
                               trained, qualified,   otherwise has
                               and equipped to       unescorted access
                               perform vehicle       and relief from the
                               escort duties,        requirement that a
                               while inside the      member of the
                               area.                 security
                                                     organization must
                                                     escort vehicles.
                                                     The phrase
                                                     ``escorted by a
                                                     member of the
                                                     security
                                                     organization''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``operated by an
                                                     individual
                                                     authorized
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to the area, or
                                                     must be escorted
                                                     while inside the
                                                     area'' to allow
                                                     personnel
                                                     authorized
                                                     unescorted access,
                                                     to operate the
                                                     vehicle without
                                                     escort and to allow
                                                     a vehicle to be
                                                     escorted by an
                                                     individual other
                                                     than a member of
                                                     the security
                                                     organization if the
                                                     operator is not
                                                     authorized
                                                     unescorted access.
                                                     Training and
                                                     qualification
                                                     requirements for
                                                     escorts would be
                                                     addressed in the
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(g)(7) and
                                                     (g)(8).
Sec.   73.55(d)(4)            (g)(5)(iii) Vehicles  This requirement
 Designated licensee           inside the            would be retained
 vehicles shall be limited     protected area must   and revised. Most
 in their use to onsite        be limited to plant   significantly, the
 plant functions and shall     functions or          phrase ``Designated
 remain in the protected       emergencies, and      licensee'' would be
 area except for               must be disabled      deleted to broaden
 operational, maintenance,     when not in use.      the scope of this
 repair security and                                 proposed
 emergency purposes.                                 requirement to all
                                                     vehicles. Also, the
                                                     phrase ``shall
                                                     remain in the
                                                     protected area
                                                     except for
                                                     operational,
                                                     maintenance, repair
                                                     security and
                                                     emergency
                                                     purposes'' would be
                                                     deleted because it
                                                     would no longer be
                                                     needed. The word
                                                     ``disabled'' would
                                                     be added to specify
                                                     that when not in
                                                     use all vehicles
                                                     must be rendered
                                                     non-operational
                                                     such that the
                                                     vehicle would not
                                                     be in a ready-to-
                                                     use configuration.
                              (g)(5)(iv) Vehicles   This requirement
                               transporting          would be added to
                               hazardous materials   ensure the control
                               inside the            of hazardous
                               protected area must   material
                               be escorted by an     deliveries. The
                               armed member of the   Commission has
                               security              determined that the
                               organization.         level of control
                                                     described by this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary to
                                                     satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (g)(6) Access         This header would be
                               control devices.      added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62705]]

Sec.   73.55(d)(5) A          (g)(6)(i)             This requirement
 numbered picture badge        Identification        would be retained
 identification system shall   badges. The           and revised with
 be used for all individuals   licensee shall        minor revisions.
 who are authorized access     implement a           Most significantly,
 to protected areas without    numbered photo        the phrase ``and
 escort.                       identification        vital areas'' is
                               badge/key-card        added to provide
                               system for all        necessary focus
                               individuals           that badges apply
                               authorized            to both the
                               unescorted access     protected area and
                               to the protected      vital areas. Access
                               area and vital        to the protected
                               areas.                area does not
                                                     include access to a
                                                     vital area except
                                                     as required to
                                                     perform duties.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(ii)        (g)(6)(i)(A)          This requirement
 Badges may be removed from    Identification        would be retained
 the protected area when       badges may be         and revised with
 measures are in place to      removed from the      minor revisions.
 confirm the true identity     protected area only   Most significantly,
 and authorization for         when measures are     the phrase ``upon
 access of the badge holder    in place to confirm   entry to the
 upon entry to the protected   the true identity     protected area''
 area.                         and authorization     would be replaced
                               for unescorted        with the phrase
                               access of the badge   ``before allowing
                               holder before         unescorted access
                               allowing unescorted   to the protected
                               access to the         area'' to clarify
                               protected area.       that the
                                                     performance to be
                                                     achieved would be
                                                     to confirm and
                                                     verify access
                                                     authorization
                                                     before granting
                                                     access to any
                                                     individual.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(ii)        (g)(6)(i)(B) Except   This requirement
 Badges shall be displayed     where operational     would retain the
 by all individuals while      safety concerns       current requirement
 inside the protected area.    require otherwise,    to display badges
                               identification        at all times and
                               badges must be        would be revised to
                               clearly displayed     address the
                               by all individuals    exception to this
                               while inside the      proposed
                               protected area and    requirement. The
                               vital areas.          phrase ``Except
                                                     where operational
                                                     safety concerns
                                                     require
                                                     otherwise,'' would
                                                     be added to account
                                                     for considerations
                                                     such as
                                                     radiological
                                                     control
                                                     requirements or
                                                     foreign material
                                                     exclusion
                                                     requirements, that
                                                     may preclude this
                                                     requirement. In
                                                     addition, the word
                                                     ``clearly'' would
                                                     be added to
                                                     describe the
                                                     expected
                                                     performance that
                                                     badges would be
                                                     visible to provide
                                                     an indication of
                                                     authorization to be
                                                     in the area.
                              (g)(6)(i)(C) The      This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               maintain a record,    account for
                               to include the name   technological
                               and areas to which    advancements
                               unescorted access     commonly associated
                               is granted, of all    with electronically
                               individuals to whom   based badging
                               photo                 systems used by
                               identification        licensees. The
                               badge/key-cards       Commission has
                               have been issued.     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary because
                                                     such a record would
                                                     be automatically
                                                     made as a standard
                                                     function and intent
                                                     of this type of
                                                     system. In
                                                     addition, badging
                                                     systems commonly
                                                     used by licensees
                                                     include the ability
                                                     to program remote
                                                     card-readers which
                                                     are designed to
                                                     grant or deny
                                                     access to specific
                                                     areas based upon
                                                     the information
                                                     electronically
                                                     associated with
                                                     specific badges/key-
                                                     cards. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     not specify the
                                                     media in which this
                                                     record must be
                                                     maintained to allow
                                                     for electronic
                                                     storage.
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) All keys,  (g)(6)(ii) Keys,      This requirement
 locks, combinations, and      locks,                would be retained
 related access control        combinations, and     and revised with
 devices used to control       passwords. All        minor revisions.
 access to protected areas     keys, locks,          Most significantly,
 and vital areas must be       combinations,         the word
 controlled to reduce the      passwords, and        ``passwords'' would
 probability of compromise.    related access        be added to account
                               control devices       for technological
                               used to control       advancements
                               access to protected   associated with the
                               areas, vital areas,   use of computers.
                               security systems,     The phrase
                               and safeguards        ``security systems,
                               information must be   and safeguards
                               controlled and        information'' would
                               accounted for to      be added to
                               reduce the            emphasize the need
                               probability of        to control access
                               compromise. The       to these items. The
                               licensee shall:       phrase ``and
                                                     accounted for''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     confirm possession
                                                     by the individual
                                                     to whom the access
                                                     control device has
                                                     been issued.

[[Page 62706]]

Sec.   73.55(d)(8) The        (g)(6)(ii)(A) Issue   This requirement
 licensee shall issue keys,    access control        would be retained
 locks, combinations, and      devices only to       and revised with
 other access control          individuals who       minor revisions.
 devices to protected areas    require unescorted    Most significantly,
 and vital areas only to       access to perform     the phrase
 persons granted unescorted    official duties and   ``protected areas
 facility access.              responsibilities.     and vital areas''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``to perform
                                                     official duties and
                                                     responsibilities''
                                                     to account for
                                                     access control
                                                     devices to items or
                                                     systems that may be
                                                     located outside of
                                                     protected and vital
                                                     areas, such as to
                                                     computer systems
                                                     and safeguards
                                                     information storage
                                                     cabinets. The
                                                     phrase ``keys,
                                                     locks,
                                                     combinations, and
                                                     other access
                                                     control devices''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     by the phrase
                                                     ``access control
                                                     devices'' to
                                                     generically
                                                     describe these
                                                     items and account
                                                     for other
                                                     technological
                                                     advancements that
                                                     may occur in the
                                                     future.
                              (g)(6)(ii)(B)         This requirement
                               Maintain a record,    would be added to
                               to include name and   facilitate
                               affiliation, of all   achievement of the
                               individuals to whom   current requirement
                               access control        to control access
                               devices have been     control devices to
                               issued, and           reduce the
                               implement a process   probability of
                               to account for        compromise. The use
                               access control        of key control logs
                               devices at least      and annual
                               annually.             inventories is a
                                                     commonly used
                                                     mechanism for any
                                                     security system and
                                                     therefore, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement is a
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary
                                                     enhancement to
                                                     facilitate the
                                                     licensee's
                                                     capability to
                                                     achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) Whenever   (g)(6)(ii)(C)         This requirement
 there is evidence or          Implement             would be retained
 suspicion that any key,       compensatory          and revised to
 lock, combination, or         measures upon         provide a
 related access control        discovery or          performance based
 device may have been          suspicion that any    requirement for
 compromised, it must be       access control        compensatory
 changed or rotated.           device may have       measures taken in
                               been compromised.     response to
                               Compensatory          compromise. Most
                               measures must         significantly, the
                               remain in effect      phrase ``it must be
                               until the             changed or
                               compromise is         rotated'' would be
                               corrected.            captured in the
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(g)(6)(ii) (D)
                                                     and (E). The phrase
                                                     ``Compensatory
                                                     Measures must
                                                     remain in effect
                                                     until the
                                                     compromise is
                                                     corrected'' would
                                                     be added to provide
                                                     focus specific to
                                                     when compensatory
                                                     measures would no
                                                     longer apply.
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) Whenever   (g)(6)(ii)(D)         This requirement
 there is evidence or          Retrieve, change,     would be retained
 suspicion that any key,       rotate, deactivate,   and revised with
 lock, combination, or         or otherwise          minor revisions.
 related access control        disable access        Most significantly,
 devices may have been         control devices       the words
 compromised, it must be       that have been, or    ``retrieve'',
 changed or rotated.           may have been         ``deactivate'', and
                               compromised.          ``disable'' would
                                                     be added to ensure
                                                     focus is provided
                                                     on these actions
                                                     relative to
                                                     ensuring control of
                                                     access control
                                                     devices and to
                                                     account for
                                                     electronic devices.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(C)         (g)(6)(ii)(E)         This requirement
 Revoke, in the case of an     Retrieve, change,     would retain and
 individual's involuntary      rotate, deactivate,   combine two current
 termination for cause, the    or otherwise          requirements to
 individual's unescorted       disable all access    specify the actions
 facility access and           control devices       required to control
 retrieve his or her           issued to             access control
 identification badge and      individuals who no    devices issued to
 other entry devices, as       longer require        personnel who no
 applicable, prior to or       unescorted access     longer possess a
 simultaneously with           to the areas for      need for access.
 notifying this individual     which the devices     The Commission has
 of his or her termination.    were designed.        determined that the
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) Whenever                          cause for
 an individual's unescorted                          revocation of
 access is revoked due to                            unescorted access
 his or her lack of                                  authorization does
 trustworthiness,                                    not effect the
 reliability, or inadequate                          actions needed to
 work performance, keys,                             reduce the
 locks, combinations, and                            probability of
 related access control                              compromise.
 devices to which that                               Therefore, the same
 person had access must be                           actions are
 changed or rotated.                                 necessary whether
                                                     access is revoked
                                                     under favorable or
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     conditions.
                                                     Whenever an
                                                     individual no
                                                     longer requires
                                                     access to an area
                                                     the access control
                                                     devices issued to
                                                     that individual
                                                     would be retrieved,
                                                     changed, rotated,
                                                     deactivated, or
                                                     otherwise disabled
                                                     to provide high
                                                     assurance that the
                                                     individual would
                                                     not continue to
                                                     have access to the
                                                     item or location.
                              (g)(7) Visitors.....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62707]]

Sec.   73.55(d)(6)            (g)(7)(i) The         This requirement
 Individuals not authorized    licensee may permit   would retain the
 by the licensee to enter      escorted access to    current requirement
 protected areas without       the protected area    to provide escorted
 escort shall be escorted by   to individuals who    access with minor
 a watchman or other           do not have           revisions. This
 individual designated by      unescorted access     proposed
 the licensee while in a       authorization in      requirement would
 protected area and shall be   accordance with the   address visitor
 badged to indicate that an    requirements of       access and would
 escort is required.           Sec.   73.56 and      specify that anyone
                               part 26 of this       who has not
                               chapter. The          satisfied the
                               licensee shall:       requirements of
                                                     Sec.   73.56 and
                                                     part 26 of this
                                                     chapter would be
                                                     considered to be a
                                                     visitor. The
                                                     current requirement
                                                     for escorts would
                                                     be addressed in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(g)(8).
                              (g)(7)(i)(A)          This requirement
                               Implement             would be added to
                               procedures for        require
                               processing,           implementing
                               escorting, and        procedures that
                               controlling           describe how
                               visitors.             visitors would be
                                                     processed,
                                                     escorted, and
                                                     controlled.
                              (g)(7)(i)(B) Confirm  This requirement
                               the identity of       would be added to
                               each visitor          require the
                               through physical      verification of the
                               presentation of a     true identity of
                               recognized            non-employee
                               identification card   individuals through
                               issued by a local,    the presentation of
                               State, or Federal     photographic
                               Government agency     government issued
                               that includes a       identification
                               photo or contains     (i.e., driver's
                               physical              license) which
                               characteristics of    provides physical
                               the individual        characteristics
                               requesting escorted   that can be
                               access.               compared to the
                                                     holder. The word
                                                     ``recognized''
                                                     would be used to
                                                     provide flexibility
                                                     for other types of
                                                     identification that
                                                     may be issued by
                                                     local, State or
                                                     Federal
                                                     Governments.
Sec.   73.55(d)(6) In         (g)(7)(i)(C)          This requirement
 addition, the licensee        Maintain a visitor    would be retained
 shall require that each       control register in   with minor
 individual register his or    which all visitors    revision.
 her name, date, time,         shall register
 purpose of visit,             their name, date,
 employment affiliation,       time, purpose of
 citizenship, and name of      visit, employment
 the individual to be          affiliation,
 visited.                      citizenship, and
                               name of the
                               individual to be
                               visited before
                               being escorted into
                               any protected or
                               vital area.
Sec.   73.55(d)(6)            (g)(7)(i)(D) Issue a  This requirement
 Individuals not authorized    visitor badge to      would be retained
 by the licensee to enter      all visitors that     with minor revision
 protected areas without       clearly indicates     for formatting
 escort shall * * * be         that an escort is     purposes. Most
 badged to indicate that an    required.             significantly, the
 escort is required.                                 word ``clearly''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     focus on display of
                                                     the badge in a
                                                     manner that easily
                                                     identifies the
                                                     individual as
                                                     requiring an
                                                     escort.
Sec.   73.55(d)(6)            (g)(7)(i)(E) Escort   This requirement
 Individuals not authorized    all visitors, at      would retain the
 by the licensee to enter      all times, while      requirement for
 protected areas without       inside the            escort with minor
 escort shall be escorted by   protected area and    revision for
 a watchman or other           vital areas.          formatting
 individual designated by                            purposes. Most
 the licensee while in a                             significantly, the
 protected area and * * *.                           requirement for who
                                                     performs these
                                                     escort duties is
                                                     moved to the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (g)(8) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i) An      (g)(7)(ii)            This requirement
 individual not employed by    Individuals not       would be retained
 the licensee but who          employed by the       with minor
 requires frequent and         licensee but who      revisions. Most
 extended access to            require frequent      significantly, the
 protected and vital areas     and extended          phrase ``shall
 may be authorized access to   unescorted access     satisfy the access
 such areas without escort     to the protected      authorization
 provided that he receives a   area and vital        requirements of
 picture badge upon entrance   areas shall satisfy   Sec.   73.56 and
 into the protected area       the access            part 26 of this
 which must be returned upon   authorization         chapter'' would be
 exit from the protected       requirements of       added to clarify
 area and which indicates:     Sec.   73.56 and      the requirement
                               part 26 of this       that these
                               chapter and shall     individual's
                               be issued a non-      satisfy the same
                               employee photo        background check
                               identification        requirements and
                               badge that is         Behavior
                               easily                Observation Program
                               distinguished from    participation that
                               other                 would be applied to
                               identification        any other licensee
                               badges before being   employee for
                               allowed unescorted    unescorted access
                               access to the         authorization. In
                               protected area. Non-  addition, the
                               employee photo        phrase ``which must
                               identification        be returned upon
                               badges must           exit from the
                               indicate:             protected area''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because removal of
                                                     badges from the
                                                     protected area
                                                     would be addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph
                                                     (g)(6)(i)(A).
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i)(A) Non- (g)(7)(ii)(A) Non-    This requirement
 employee, no escort           employee, no escort   would be retained
 required;                     required.             with minor revision
                                                     for formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i)(B)      (g)(7)(ii)(B) Areas   This requirement
 Areas to which access is      to which access is    would be retained
 authorized; and               authorized.           with minor revision
                                                     for formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i)(c) The  (g)(7)(ii)(C) The     This requirement
 period for which access has   period for which      would be retained
 been authorized.              access is             with minor revision
                               authorized.           for formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (g)(7)(ii)(D) The     This requirement
                               individual's          would be added to
                               employer.             facilitate
                                                     identification of
                                                     this type of non-
                                                     employee and the
                                                     type of activities
                                                     this individual
                                                     should be
                                                     performing.

[[Page 62708]]

                              (g)(7)(ii)(E) A       This requirement
                               means to determine    would be added for
                               the individual's      emergency planning
                               emergency plan        purposes.
                               assembly area.
                              (g)(8) Escorts. The   This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               ensure that all       provided
                               escorts are trained   performance based
                               in accordance with    requirements for
                               appendix B to this    satisfying the
                               part, the approved    escort requirements
                               training and          of this proposed
                               qualification plan,   rule and would
                               and licensee          provide regulatory
                               policies and          stability through
                               procedures.           the consistent
                                                     application of
                                                     visitor controls at
                                                     all sites. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     emphasis on the
                                                     identification and
                                                     control of visitors
                                                     is a prudent and
                                                     necessary
                                                     enhancement to
                                                     facilitate licensee
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance basis
                                                     of the proposed
                                                     paragraph (b)(1) of
                                                     this section.
                              (g)(8)(i) Escorts     This requirement
                               shall be authorized   would be added to
                               unescorted access     establish a basic
                               to all areas in       qualification
                               which they will       criteria for
                               perform escort        individuals
                               duties.               performing escort
                                                     duties. Individuals
                                                     not authorized
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to an area must be
                                                     escorted and
                                                     therefore, would
                                                     not be qualified to
                                                     perform escort
                                                     duties in that
                                                     area.
                              (g)(8)(ii)            This requirement
                               Individuals           would be added to
                               assigned to escort    establish a basic
                               visitors shall be     qualification
                               provided a means of   criteria for
                               timely                individuals
                               communication with    performing escort
                               both alarm stations   duties. The phrase
                               in a manner that      ``timely
                               ensures the ability   communication''
                               to summon             would mean the
                               assistance when       ability to call for
                               needed.               assistance before
                                                     that ability can be
                                                     taken away.
                              (g)(8)(iii)           This requirement
                               Individuals           would be added to
                               assigned to vehicle   establish a basic
                               escort duties shall   qualification
                               be provided a means   criteria for
                               of continuous         individuals
                               communication with    performing escort
                               both alarm stations   duties. The word
                               to ensure the         ``continuous
                               ability to summon     communication''
                               assistance when       would mean
                               needed.               possession of a
                                                     direct line of
                                                     communication for
                                                     immediate
                                                     notification, such
                                                     as a radio.
                              (g)(8)(iv) Escorts    This requirement
                               shall be              would be added to
                               knowledgeable of      establish a basic
                               those activities      qualification
                               that are authorized   criteria for
                               to be performed       individuals
                               within the areas      performing escort
                               for which they are    duties. The primary
                               assigned to perform   responsibility of
                               escort duties and     an escort would be
                               must also be          the identification
                               knowledgeable of      and reporting of
                               those activities      unauthorized
                               that are authorized   activities,
                               to be performed by    therefore, to
                               any individual for    perform escort
                               which the escort is   duties the
                               assigned              individual must
                               responsibility.       possess this
                                                     knowledge in order
                                                     to be an effective
                                                     escort and
                                                     recognize an event
                                                     involving an
                                                     unauthorized
                                                     activity.
                              (g)(8)(v) Visitor to  This requirement
                               escort ratios shall   would be added to
                               be limited to 10 to   establish a basic
                               1 in the protected    restriction to
                               area and 5 to 1 in    ensure that
                               vital areas,          individuals
                               provided that the     performing escort
                               necessary             duties are able to
                               observation and       maintain control
                               control               over the personnel
                               requirements of       being escorted. The
                               this section can be   phrase ``provided
                               maintained by the     that the necessary
                               assigned escort       observation and
                               over all visitor      control
                               activities.           requirements of
                                                     this section can be
                                                     maintained'' would
                                                     provide flexibility
                                                     for the licensee to
                                                     reduce the
                                                     specified ratios to
                                                     facilitate
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b).
                              (h) Search programs.  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(2) At the     (h)(1) At each        This requirement
 point of personnel and        designated access     would be retained
 vehicle access into a         control point into    with minor
 protected area, all hand-     the owner             revisions. Most
 carried packages shall be     controlled area and   significantly, the
 searched for devices such     protected area, the   phrase ``for
 as firearms, explosives,      licensee shall        devices such as
 and incendiary devices, or    search individuals,   firearms,
 other items which could be    vehicles, packages,   explosives, and
 used for radiological         deliveries, and       incendiary devices,
 sabotage.                     materials in          or other items
                               accordance with the   which could be used
                               requirements of       for radiological
                               this section and      sabotage'' would be
                               the approved          replaced with the
                               security plans,       phrase ``in
                               before granting       accordance with the
                               access.               requirements of
                                                     this section and
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans'' to
                                                     provide language
                                                     that would make
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement
                                                     generically
                                                     applicable to all
                                                     searches.

[[Page 62709]]

Sec.   73.55(d)(2) At the     (h)(1)(i) The         This requirement
 point of personnel and        objective of the      would be retained
 vehicle access into a         search program must   and revised to
 protected area, all hand-     be to deter,          focus this proposed
 carried packages shall be     detect, and prevent   requirement on the
 searched for devices such     the introduction of   objective of the
 as firearms, explosives,      unauthorized          search program for
 and incendiary devices, or    firearms,             all areas and not
 other items which could be    explosives,           limit the search
 used for radiological         incendiary devices,   function to only
 sabotage.                     or other              protected and vital
                               unauthorized          areas. The
                               materials and         Commission has
                               devices into          determined that
                               designated areas in   because of changes
                               which the             to the threat
                               unauthorized items    environment, the
                               could be used to      focus of protective
                               disable personnel,    measures must be to
                               equipment, and        protect any area
                               systems necessary     from which the
                               to meet the           licensee capability
                               performance           to meet the
                               objective and         performance
                               requirements of       objective and
                               paragraph (b) of      requirements of the
                               this section.         proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this section
                                                     could be disabled
                                                     or destroyed.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (h)(1)(ii) The        This requirement
 search function for           search requirements   would be retained
 detection of firearms,        for unauthorized      with minor
 explosives, and incendiary    firearms,             revisions. The
 devices must be               explosives,           phrase ``or other
 accomplished through the      incendiary devices,   unauthorized
 use of both firearms and      or other              materials and
 explosive detection           unauthorized          devices'' would be
 equipment capable of          materials and         added to account
 detecting those devices.      devices must be       for future
                               accomplished          technological
                               through the use of    advancements. The
                               equipment capable     phrase ``and
                               of detecting these    through visual and
                               unauthorized items    hands-on physical
                               and through visual    searches'' would be
                               and hands-on          added to ensure
                               physical searches,    these aspects of
                               as needed to ensure   the search process
                               all items are         are considered and
                               identified before     applied when
                               granting access.      needed.
                              (h)(1)(iii) Only      This requirement
                               trained and           would be added for
                               qualified members     consistency with
                               of the security       the current Sec.
                               organization, and     73.55(b)(4)(i), and
                               other trained and     clarification for
                               qualified personnel   ``observation'' of
                               designated by the     search activities
                               licensee, shall       by personnel. The
                               perform search        phrase ``other
                               activities or be      trained and
                               assigned duties and   qualified personnel
                               responsibilities      designated by the
                               required to satisfy   licensee'' would be
                               observation           used to account for
                               requirements for      non-security
                               the search            personnel who would
                               activities.           be assigned search
                                                     duties relative to
                                                     supply or warehouse
                                                     functions or other
                                                     types of bulk
                                                     shipments.
                              (h)(2) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall establish and   would be added for
                               implement written     consistency with
                               search procedures     the current Sec.
                               for all access        73.55(b)(3)(i).
                               control points
                               before granting
                               access to any
                               individual,
                               vehicle, package,
                               delivery, or
                               material.
                              (h)(2)(i) Search      This requirement
                               procedures must       would be added for
                               ensure that items     consistency with
                               possessed by an       the current Sec.
                               individual, or        73.55(d)(1)
                               contained within a    relative to the use
                               vehicle or package,   of search equipment
                               must be clearly       and to specify a
                               identified as not     requirement for the
                               being a prohibited    licensee to
                               item before           identify items that
                               granting access       may be obscured
                               beyond the access     from observation by
                               control point for     equipment such as X-
                               which the search is   ray equipment. This
                               conducted.            requirement would
                                                     ensure that human
                                                     interaction with
                                                     search equipment is
                                                     effective and that
                                                     assigned personnel
                                                     are aware of all
                                                     items observed or
                                                     are not identified
                                                     by search
                                                     equipment.
                              (h)(2)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added for
                               visually and          consistency with
                               physically hand       the current Sec.
                               search all            73.55(d)(1),
                               individuals,          relative to the
                               vehicles, and         purpose of the
                               packages containing   search function to
                               items that cannot     identify items that
                               be or are not         may be obscured
                               clearly identified    from observation by
                               by search equipment.  equipment such as X-
                                                     ray equipment. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement intends
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     licensee take
                                                     appropriate actions
                                                     to ensure all items
                                                     granted access to
                                                     the PA would be
                                                     identified before
                                                     granting access.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) Whenever   (h)(3) Whenever       This requirement
 firearms or explosives        search equipment is   would be retained
 detection equipment at a      out of service or     with minor
 portal is out of service or   is not operating      revisions. The
 not operating                 satisfactorily,       phrase ``firearms
 satisfactorily, the           trained and           or explosives
 licensee shall conduct a      qualified members     detection equipment
 physical pat-down search of   of the security       at a portal'' would
 all persons who would         organization shall    be replaced with
 otherwise have been subject   conduct a hands-on    the phrase ``search
 to equipment searches.        physical search of    equipment `` to
                               all individuals,      generically
                               vehicles, packages,   describe this
                               deliveries, and       equipment. The
                               materials that        phrase ``a physical
                               would otherwise       pat-down search''
                               have been subject     would be replaced
                               to equipment          with the phrase ``a
                               searches.             hands-on physical
                                                     search'' to update
                                                     the language
                                                     commonly used to
                                                     describe this
                                                     activity.

[[Page 62710]]

Sec.   73.55(d)(1) When the   (h)(4) When an        This requirement
 licensee has cause to         attempt to            would be retained
 suspect that an individual    introduce             with minor
 is attempting to introduce    unauthorized items    revisions to
 firearms, explosives, or      has occurred or is    provide additional
 incendiary devices into       suspected, the        performance based
 protected areas, the          licensee shall        requirements
 licensee shall conduct a      implement actions     relative to
 physical pat-down search of   to ensure that the    achieving the
 that individual.              suspect               desired results.
                               individuals,
                               vehicles, packages,
                               deliveries, and
                               materials are
                               denied access and
                               shall perform a
                               visual and hands-on
                               physical search to
                               determine the
                               absence or
                               existence of a
                               threat.
                              (h)(5) Vehicle        This requirement
                               search procedures     would be added to
                               must be performed     provide a
                               by at least two (2)   performance based
                               properly trained      requirement for
                               and equipped          performing vehicle
                               security personnel,   searches. This
                               at least one of       proposed
                               whom is positioned    requirement would
                               to observe the        ensure that
                               search process and    unauthorized
                               provide a timely      activities would be
                               response to           identified and a
                               unauthorized          timely response
                               activities if         would be initiated
                               necessary.            at a vehicle search
                                                     area, to include an
                                                     armed response.
                                                     Based on changes to
                                                     the threat
                                                     environment, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this requirement
                                                     would facilitate
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) Vehicle    (h)(6) Vehicle areas  This requirement
 areas to be searched shall    to be searched must   would be retained
 include the cab, engine       include, but are      with minor
 compartment, undercarriage,   not limited to, the   revisions.
 and cargo area.               cab, engine
                               compartment,
                               undercarriage, and
                               cargo area.
                              (h)(7) Vehicle        This requirement
                               search checkpoints    would be added to
                               must be equipped      provide additional
                               with video            performance based
                               surveillance          requirements
                               equipment that must   relative to
                               be monitored by an    achieving the
                               individual capable    desired results for
                               of initiating and     vehicle searches at
                               directing a timely    any location
                               response to           designated for the
                               unauthorized          performance of
                               activity.             vehicle searches.
                                                     To satisfy this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement, the
                                                     individual assigned
                                                     to monitor search
                                                     activities need not
                                                     be located in the
                                                     CAS or SAS, but
                                                     rather may be
                                                     located in any
                                                     position from which
                                                     the monitoring and
                                                     notification
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section could
                                                     be assured.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) * * *      (h)(8) Exceptions to  This requirement
 except bona fide Federal,     the search            would retain,
 State, and local law          requirements of       combine, and revise
 enforcement personnel on      this section must     two current
 official duty to these        be submitted to the   requirements Sec.
 equipment searches upon       Commission for        73.55(d)(1) and (4)
 entry into a protected area.  prior review and      to generically
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) * * *       approval and must     account for those
 except under emergency        be identified in      instances where
 conditions, shall be          the approved          search requirements
 searched for items which      security plans.       would not be met
 could be used for sabotage                          before granting
 purposes prior to entry                             access beyond a
 into the protected area.                            physical barrier.
                                                     This proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     require that the
                                                     licensee specify in
                                                     the approved plans
                                                     the specific
                                                     circumstances under
                                                     which search
                                                     requirements would
                                                     not be satisfied.
Sec.   73.55(d)(3) * * *      (h)(8)(i) Vehicles    This requirement
 except those Commission       and items that may    would be retained
 approved delivery and         be excepted from      and revised. Most
 inspection activities         the search            significantly, this
 specifically designated by    requirements of       requirement would
 the licensee to be carried    this section must     be revised to
 out within vital or           be escorted by an     ensure that
 protected areas for reasons   armed individual      vehicles and items
 of safety, security or        who is trained and    excepted from
 operational necessity.        equipped to observe   search requirements
                               offloading and        before entry into
                               perform search        the protected area
                               activities at the     are escorted by an
                               final destination     armed individual
                               within the            and searched when
                               protected area.       offloaded to
                                                     provide assurance
                                                     that unauthorized
                                                     personnel and items
                                                     would be detected
                                                     and reported.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) * * * to   (h)(8)(ii) To the     This requirement
 the extent practicable,       extent practicable,   would be retained
 shall be off loaded in the    items excepted from   with minor
 protected area at a           search must be off    revision.
 specific designated           loaded only at
 materials receiving area      specified receiving
 that is not adjacent to a     areas that are not
 vital area.                   adjacent to a vital
                               area.
                              (h)(8)(iii) The       This requirement
                               excepted items must   would be added to
                               be searched at the    provide a
                               receiving area and    performance based
                               opened at the final   requirement that
                               destination by an     would ensure that
                               individual familiar   the proposed
                               with the items.       requirement for
                                                     search is met at
                                                     the receiving area.
                              Sec.   73.55(i)       This header would be
                               Detection and         added for
                               assessment systems..  formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62711]]

                              (i)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall establish and   would be added for
                               maintain an           consistency with
                               intrusion detection   the current
                               and assessment        requirement of 10
                               system that must      CFR 73.55(e)(1) and
                               provide, at all       the proposed Sec.
                               times, the            73.55(b)(2) through
                               capability for        (4). The phrase
                               early detection and   ``intrusion
                               assessment of         detection and
                               unauthorized          assessment system''
                               persons and           would be intended
                               activities.           to describe all
                                                     components (i.e.,
                                                     personnel,
                                                     procedures, and
                                                     equipment)
                                                     designated by the
                                                     licensee as
                                                     performing a
                                                     function(s)
                                                     required to detect
                                                     or assess
                                                     unauthorized
                                                     activities in any
                                                     area to which
                                                     access must be
                                                     controlled to meet
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements. The
                                                     term ``system''
                                                     refers to how these
                                                     components interact
                                                     to satisfy
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement does
                                                     not mandate
                                                     specific intrusion
                                                     detection equipment
                                                     for any specific
                                                     area, but rather
                                                     requires that the
                                                     system provide
                                                     detection and
                                                     assessment
                                                     capabilities that
                                                     meet Commission
                                                     requirements. The
                                                     phrase ``at all
                                                     times'' is used to
                                                     describe the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     must have in place
                                                     and operational a
                                                     mechanism by which
                                                     all threats will be
                                                     detected and an
                                                     appropriate
                                                     response initiated,
                                                     at any time.
                                                    The Commission does
                                                     not mean to suggest
                                                     that a failure of
                                                     any component of a
                                                     system would
                                                     constitute an
                                                     automatic non-
                                                     compliance with
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement
                                                     provided the
                                                     failure is
                                                     identified and
                                                     compensatory
                                                     measures are
                                                     implemented within
                                                     a time frame
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     time lines
                                                     necessary to
                                                     prevent
                                                     exploitation of the
                                                     failure, beginning
                                                     at the time of the
                                                     failure.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) All        (i)(2) Intrusion      This requirement
 alarms required pursuant to   detection equipment   would be retained
 this part must annunciate     must annunciate,      with three
 in a continuously manned      and video             significant
 central alarm station         assessment            revisions. The most
 located within the            equipment images      significant
 protected area and in at      shall display,        revision would be
 least one other               concurrently in at    the deletion of the
 continuously manned station   least two             current language
 not necessarily onsite, so    continuously          that describes
 that a single act cannot      staffed onsite        where the secondary
 remove the capability of      alarm stations, at    alarm station may
 calling for assistance or     least one of which    be located. Because
 otherwise responding to an    must be protected     of changes to the
 alarm.                        in accordance with    threat environment
                               the requirements of   the Commission has
                               paragraphs            determined that to
                               (e)(6)(v),            ensure the
                               (e)(7)(iii), and      functions required
                               (i)(8)(ii) of this    to be performed by
                               section.              the central alarm
                                                     are maintained,
                                                     both alarm stations
                                                     must be located
                                                     onsite. As all
                                                     current licensees
                                                     have their
                                                     secondary alarm
                                                     station onsite, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     deletion of the
                                                     ``not necessarily
                                                     onsite'' provision,
                                                     would have no
                                                     impact.
                                                    The second
                                                     significant
                                                     revision is the
                                                     addition of the
                                                     word
                                                     ``concurrently'' to
                                                     provide a
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement that
                                                     focuses on the need
                                                     to ensure that both
                                                     alarm station
                                                     operators are
                                                     notified of a
                                                     potential threat,
                                                     are capable of
                                                     making a timely and
                                                     independent
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     have equal
                                                     capabilities to
                                                     ensure that a
                                                     timely response is
                                                     made. This proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be necessary for
                                                     consistency with
                                                     the current
                                                     requirement to
                                                     protect against a
                                                     single act. The
                                                     third significant
                                                     revision would be
                                                     the addition of the
                                                     phrase ``and video
                                                     assessment
                                                     equipment images
                                                     shall display'' to
                                                     add a performance
                                                     based requirement
                                                     that focuses on the
                                                     relationship
                                                     between detection
                                                     and assessment.

[[Page 62712]]

                              (i)(3) The            This requirement
                               licensee's            would be added to
                               intrusion detection   provide performance
                               system must be        based requirements
                               designed to ensure    consistent with the
                               that both alarm       current Sec.
                               station operators:    73.55(e)(1), and
                              (i)(3)(i) Are          the proposed
                               concurrently          requirements of
                               notified of the       this proposed
                               alarm annunciation.   section. The
                              (i)(3)(ii) Are         proposed
                               capable of making a   requirement for
                               timely assessment     dual knowledge and
                               of the cause of       dual capability
                               each alarm            within both alarm
                               annunciation.         stations provides a
                              (i)(3)(iii) Possess    defense-in-depth
                               the capability to     component
                               initiate a timely     consistent with the
                               response in           proposed
                               accordance with the   requirement for
                               approved security     protection against
                               plans, licensee       a single act.
                               protective
                               strategy, and
                               implementing
                               procedures.
                                                    Based on changes to
                                                     the threat
                                                     environment the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement is a
                                                     prudent
                                                     clarification of
                                                     current
                                                     requirements
                                                     necessary to
                                                     facilitate the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(1) of this
                                                     section.
                              (i)(4) Both alarm     This requirement
                               stations must be      would be added for
                               equipped with         consistency with
                               equivalent            the current Sec.
                               capabilities for      73.55(e)(1) and the
                               detection and         proposed
                               communication, and    requirements for
                               must be equipped      defense-in-depth
                               with functionally     and protection
                               equivalent            against a single
                               assessment,           act. The word
                               monitoring,           ``equivalent''
                               observation, and      would require the
                               surveillance          licensee to provide
                               capabilities to       both alarm stations
                               support the           with detection and
                               effective             communication
                               implementation of     equipment that
                               the approved          ensures each alarm
                               security plans and    station operator is
                               the licensee          knowledgeable of an
                               protective strategy   alarm annunciation
                               in the event that     at each alarm point
                               either alarm          and zone, and can
                               station is disabled.  communicate the
                                                     initiation of an
                                                     appropriate
                                                     response to include
                                                     the disposition of
                                                     each alarm. The
                                                     phrase
                                                     ``functionally
                                                     equivalent'' would
                                                     require that both
                                                     alarm stations be
                                                     equally equipped to
                                                     perform those
                                                     assessment,
                                                     surveillance,
                                                     observation, and
                                                     monitoring
                                                     functions needed to
                                                     support the
                                                     effective
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective
                                                     strategy.
                                                    This proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission
                                                     expectation that
                                                     those video
                                                     technologies and
                                                     capabilities used
                                                     to support the
                                                     effective
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans and
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective strategy
                                                     are equally
                                                     available for use
                                                     by both alarm
                                                     station operators
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     functions of
                                                     detection,
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     communications can
                                                     be effectively
                                                     maintained and
                                                     utilized in the
                                                     event that one or
                                                     the other alarm
                                                     station is
                                                     disabled. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement is a
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary
                                                     clarification of
                                                     current
                                                     requirements and
                                                     Commission Orders
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this section
                                                     are met.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) * * * so   (i)(4)(i) The         This requirement
 that a single act cannot      licensee shall        would be retained
 remove the capability of      ensure that a         and revised to
 calling for assistance or     single act cannot     provide additional
 otherwise responding to an    remove the            clarification
 alarm.                        capability of both    regarding the
                               alarm stations to     critical functions
                               detect and assess     determined
                               unauthorized          essential and which
                               activities, respond   must be maintained
                               to an alarm, summon   to carry out an
                               offsite assistance,   effective response
                               implement the         to threats
                               protective            consistent with the
                               strategy, provide     proposed
                               command and           performance
                               control, or           objective and
                               otherwise prevent     requirements of
                               significant core      paragraph (b) of
                               damage and spent      this section.
                               fuel sabotage.

[[Continued on page 62713]]
Notices For
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
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1999
1998
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1996
1995
1994
Power Reactor Security Requirements

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