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Power Reactor Security Requirements [[pp. 62713-62762]]
Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.
[Federal Register: October 26, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 207)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 62713-62762]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26oc06-17]
[[pp. 62713-62762]]
Power Reactor Security Requirements
[[Continued from page 62712]]
[[Page 62713]]
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) Onsite (i)(4)(ii) The alarm This requirement
secondary power supply station functions would retain the
systems for alarm in paragraph (i)(4) current requirement
annunciator equipment * * *. of this section for secondary power
must remain with two
operable from an significant
uninterruptible revisions. First,
backup power supply the phrase
in the event of the ``annunciator
loss of normal equipment'' would
power. be replaced with
the phrase ``alarm
station functions''
to ensure that the
equipment required
by each alarm
station to fulfill
its assigned
functions, are
available and
operational without
interruption due to
a loss of normal
power. Second, the
word
``uninterruptible''
would be added to
clarify the
Commission's view
that the operation
of detection and
assessment
equipment must be
maintained without
interruption, in
the event of a loss
of normal power.
Backup power supply
for non-portable
communication
equipment is
addressed in the
proposed paragraph
(j)(5) of this
section. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement is
prudent and
necessary to
facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(i)(5) Detection. This requirement
Detection would be added for
capabilities must consistency with
be provided by the current Sec.
security 73.55(c)(4) and to
organization provide a
personnel and performance based
intrusion detection requirement for
equipment, and detection equipment
shall be defined in to be capable of
implementing operating under
procedures. known/normal site
Intrusion detection conditions such as
equipment must be heat, wind,
capable of humidity, fog,
operating as cold, snowfall,
intended under the etc. Equipment
conditions failure and
encountered at the abnormal or severe
facility. weather cannot
always be predicted
but compensatory
measures would be
required in
accordance with the
proposed
requirements of
this section to
ensure compliance.
(i)(6) Assessment. This requirement
Assessment would be added for
capabilities must consistency with
be provided by the current Sec.
security 73.55(c)(4) and to
organization provide a
personnel and video performance based
assessment requirement for
equipment, and assessment
shall be described equipment to be
in implementing capable of
procedures. Video operating under
assessment known/normal site
equipment must be conditions such as
capable of heat, wind,
operating as humidity, fog,
intended under the cold, snowfall,
conditions etc. Equipment
encountered at the failure and
facility and must abnormal or severe
provide video weather cannot
images from which always be predicted
accurate and timely but compensatory
assessments can be measures would be
made in response to required in
an alarm accordance with the
annunciation or proposed
other notification requirements of
of unauthorized this section to
activity. ensure compliance.
(i)(7) The licensee This requirement
intrusion detection would be added for
and assessment formatting
system must: purposes.
(i)(7)(i) Ensure This requirement
that the duties and would be added to
responsibilities provide a
assigned to performance based
personnel, the use requirement
of equipment, and relative to the
the implementation design of the
of procedures licensee detection
provides the and assessment
detection and system and to
assessment clarify that this
capabilities system would
necessary to meet include all three
the requirements of components.
paragraph (b) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) The (i)(7)(ii) Ensure This requirement
annunciation of an alarm at that annunciation would be retained
the alarm stations shall of an alarm with minor
indicate the type of alarm indicates the type revision. The
(e.g., intrusion alarms, and location of the phrase ``at the
emergency exit alarm, etc.) alarm. alarm stations''
and location. and the listed
examples would be
deleted because
they would no
longer be needed.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) All alarm (i)(7)(iii) Ensure This requirement
devices including that alarm devices, would be retained
transmission lines to to include with minor revision
annunciators shall be transmission lines for formatting
tamper indicating and self- to annunciators, purposes.
checking. are tamper
indicating and self-
checking.
[[Page 62714]]
(i)(7)(iv) Provide This requirement
visual and audible would be added for
alarm annunciation consistency with
and concurrent the proposed
video assessment requirement for
capability to both equivalent
alarm stations in a capabilities in
manner that ensures both alarm
timely recognition, stations. The
acknowledgment and phrase ``visual and
response by each audible'' would
alarm station provide redundancy
operator in to ensure that each
accordance with alarm would be
written response recognized and
procedures. acknowledged when
received.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) * * * (i)(7)(v) Provide an This requirement
e.g., an automatic automatic would be retained
indication is provided when indication when the with minor revision
failure of the alarm system alarm system or a for formatting
or a component occurs, or component of the purposes.
when the system is on alarm system fails,
standby power. or when the system
is operating on the
backup power supply.
Sec. 73.70(f) A record at (i)(7)(vi) Maintain This requirement
each onsite alarm a record of all would be added for
annunciation location of alarm consistency with
each alarm, false alarm, annunciations, the Sec. 73.70(f).
alarm check, and tamper cause of each The Commission
indication that identifies alarm, and the expects that this
the type of alarm, disposition of each record would be a
location, circuit, date, alarm. commonly maintained
and time. In addition, record in
details of response by electronic form
facility guards and which is generated
watchmen to each alarm, as an automatic
intrusion, or other function of the
incident shall be recorded. intrusion detection
system.
(i)(8) Alarm This header would be
stations. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) All (i)(8)(i) Both alarm This requirement
alarms required pursuant to stations must be would retain the
this part must annunciate continuously current requirement
in a continuously manned staffed by at least Sec. 73.55(e)(1)
central alarm station one trained and for continuously
located within the qualified member of staffed alarm
protected area and in at the security stations and would
least one other organization. be revised to
continuously manned station describe the
* * *. necessary
qualifications that
would be required
of the assigned
individuals.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) The (i)(8)(ii) The This requirement
onsite central alarm interior of the would be retained
station must be located central alarm with minor
within a building in such a station must not be revision. Most
manner that the interior of visible from the significantly, the
the central alarm station perimeter of the phrase ``located
is not visible from the protected area. within a building''
perimeter of the protected would be deleted
area. because it would be
considered
unnecessary.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) This (i)(8)(iii) The This requirement
station must not contain licensee may not would be retained
any operational activities permit any with minor
that would interfere with activities to be revisions to
the execution of the alarm performed within provide a
response function. either alarm performance based
station that would requirement
interfere with an regarding the
alarm station primary duties
operator's ability required to satisfy
to effectively the current
execute assigned requirement
detection, ``execution of the
assessment, alarm response
surveillance, and function.''
communication
duties and
responsibilities.
(i)(8)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
assess and respond consistency with
to all alarms and current
other indications requirements. The
of unauthorized specific
activities in requirements of the
accordance with the current Sec.
approved security 73.55(h)(4) are
plans and retained in detail
implementing in the proposed
procedures. appendix C to part
73.
(i)(8)(v) The This requirement
licensee would be added for
implementing consistency with
procedures must related
ensure that both requirements of
alarm station this proposed
operators are section and to
knowledgeable of ensure that the
all alarm licensee provides a
annunciations, process by which
assessments, and both alarm station
final disposition operators are
of all alarms, to concurrently made
include but not aware of each alarm
limited to a and are
prohibition from knowledgeable of
changing the status how each alarm is
of a detection resolved and that
point or no one alarm
deactivating a station operator
locking or access can manipulate
control device at a alarm station
protected or vital equipment,
area portal, communications, or
without the procedures without
knowledge and the knowledge and
concurrence of the concurrence of the
other alarm station other.
operator.
(i)(9) Surveillance, This header would be
observation, and added for
monitoring. formatting
purposes.
(i)(9)(i) The onsite This requirement
physical protection would be added to
program must provide a
include the performance based
capability for requirement for
surveillance, ensuring
observation, and surveillance,
monitoring in a observation, and
manner that monitoring
provides early capabilities in any
detection and area for which
assessment of these measures are
unauthorized necessary to meet
activities. the requirements of
this proposed
section.
[[Page 62715]]
(i)(9)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide continual provide a
surveillance, performance based
observation, and requirement for
monitoring of all ensuring
areas identified in surveillance,
the approved observation, and
security plans as monitoring
requiring capabilities in any
surveillance, area for which
observation, and these measures are
monitoring to necessary to meet
ensure early the requirements of
detection of this proposed
unauthorized section. The word
activities and to ``continual'' would
ensure the mean regularly
integrity of recurring actions
physical barriers such that
or other components designated areas
of the onsite would be checked at
physical protection intervals
program. sufficient to
ensure the
detection of
unauthorized
activities.
(i)(9)(ii)(A) This requirement
Continual would be added to
surveillance, provide necessary
observation, and qualifying
monitoring requirements for
responsibilities performance of
must be performed observation and
by security monitoring
personnel during activities. The
routine patrols or word ``continual''
by other trained would mean the same
and equipped as used in the
personnel proposed paragraph
designated as a (i)(9)(ii) of this
component of the section.
protective strategy.
(i)(9)(ii)(B) This requirement
Surveillance, would be added to
observation, and provide a
monitoring performance based
requirements may be requirement for
accomplished by ensuring that
direct observation surveillance,
or video technology. observation, and
monitoring
capabilities that
may be met through
the use of video
technology or
direct human
observation.
(i)(9)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide random focus a performance
patrols of all based requirement
accessible areas on the protection
containing target of target set
set equipment. equipment. Target
set equipment would
be addressed in
detail in the
proposed paragraph
(f) of this
section. The term
``random'' provides
flexibility to the
licensee and
requires patrols at
unpredictable times
within
predetermined
intervals to deter
exploitation of
periods between
patrols. The phrase
``accessible
areas'' would
exclude areas such
as locked high
radiation areas or
other such areas
containing a
significant safety
concern that would
preclude the
conduct of the
patrol function.
(i)(9)(iii)(A) Armed This requirement
security patrols would be added to
shall periodically focus on the items
check designated that, because of
areas and shall changes to the
inspect vital area threat environment,
entrances, portals, the Commission has
and external determined would
barriers. require focus by
armed security
patrols. The term
``periodically''
provides
flexibility to the
licensee. The
phrase ``designated
areas'' means any
area identified by
the licensee as
requiring an action
to meet the
proposed
requirements of
this section.
(i)(9)(iii)(B) This requirement
Physical barriers would be added for
must be inspected consistency with
at random intervals the current
to identify requirement Sec.
tampering and 73.55(g)(1) and to
degradation. focus on verifying
the integrity of
physical barriers
to ensure that the
barrier would
perform as
expected. The word
``random'' would
mean that the
required inspection
would be performed
at unpredictable
times to deter
exploitation of
periods between
inspections.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) The (i)(9)(iii)(C) This requirement
licensee may not permit an Security personnel would be added for
individual to act as a shall be trained to consistency with
guard, watchman, armed recognize the current
response person, or other indications of requirement Sec.
member of the security tampering as 73.55(b)(4)(i) to
organization unless the necessary to provide necessary
individual has been perform assigned focus on the threat
trained, equipped, and duties and of tampering and
qualified to perform each responsibilities as the need to ensure
assigned security job duty. they relate to that personnel are
safety and security trained to
systems and recognize it.
equipment.
(i)(9)(iv) This requirement
Unattended openings would be added to
that are not provide a
monitored by performance based
intrusion detection requirement to
equipment must be ensure that
observed by unattended openings
security personnel that cross a
at a frequency that security boundary
would prevent established to meet
exploitation of the proposed
that opening. requirements of
this section would
not be exploited by
the design basis
threat of
radiological
sabotage to include
the use of tools to
enlarge the
opening.
[[Page 62716]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(4) Upon (i)(9)(v) Upon This requirement
detection of abnormal detection of would be retained
presence or activity of unauthorized with minor revision
persons or vehicles * * *, activities, to provide
the licensee security tampering, or other flexibility for the
organization shall * * *. threats, the licensee to
licensee shall determine if all or
initiate actions only part of the
consistent with the protective strategy
approved security capabilities would
plans, the licensee be needed for a
protective specific event. The
strategy, and phrase ``abnormal
implementing presence or
procedures. activity of persons
or vehicles'' would
be replaced with
the phrase
``unauthorized
activities,
tampering, or other
threats'' to
clarify the types
of activities that
would be expected
to warrant a
response by the
licensee.
(i)(10) Video This header would be
technology. added for
formatting
purposes.
(i)(10)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
maintain in consistency with
operable condition the current
all video requirement Sec.
technology used to 73.55(g)(1) and
satisfy the would provide a
monitoring, performance based
observation, requirement for
surveillance, and ensuring video
assessment technology is
requirements of operating and
this section. available when
needed.
(i)(10)(ii) Video This header would be
technology must be: added for
formatting
purposes.
(i)(10)(ii)(A) This requirement
Displayed would be added for
concurrently at consistency with
both alarm stations. the other proposed
requirements for
dual alarm stations
and would focus on
the need for video
technology to be
provided to both
alarm stations at
the same time to
ensure that an
assessment would be
made and a timely
response would be
initiated.
(i)(10)(ii)(B) This requirement
Designed to provide would be added for
concurrent consistency with
observation, the other proposed
monitoring, and requirements for
surveillance of dual alarm stations
designated areas and would focus on
from which an alarm the need for the
annunciation or a same capabilities
notification of to be provided to
unauthorized both to ensure
activity is observation,
received. monitoring, and
surveillance
requirements are
met.
(i)(10)(ii)(C) This requirement
Capable of would be added to
providing a timely provide a
visual display from performance based
which positive requirement for
recognition and video technology
assessment of the which focuses on
detected activity the need for clear
can be made and a visual images from
timely response which accurate and
initiated. timely assessment
can be made in
response to alarm
annunciations.
Sec. 73.55(h)(6) To (i)(10)(ii)(D) Used This requirement
facilitate initial response to supplement and would retain the
to detection of penetration limit the exposure current requirement
* * * preferably by means of security to use video
of closed circuit personnel to technology to limit
television or by other possible attack. the exposure of
suitable means which limit security personnel
exposure of responding while performing
personnel to possible security duties
attack. with minor revision
to add patrols.
(i)(10)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement controls provide a
for personnel performance based
assigned to monitor requirement
video technology to relative to
ensure that controlling
assigned personnel personnel fatigue
maintain the level related to extended
of alertness periods of
required to monitoring video
effectively perform technology. The
the assigned duties Commission has
and determined that
responsibilities. each individual's
alertness is
critical to the
effective use of
video technology
and the licensee
capability to
achieve the
performance
objective of this
proposed section.
Therefore, licensee
work hour controls
should ensure that
assigned personnel
are relieved of
these duties and
assigned other
duties at intervals
sufficient to
ensure the
individual's
ability to
effectively carry
out assigned duties
and
responsibilities.
(i)(11) Illumination This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62717]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(5) Isolation (i)(11)(i) The This requirement
zones and all exterior licensee shall would be retained
areas within the protected ensure that all and revised. Most
area shall be provided with areas of the significantly, this
illumination sufficient for facility, to proposed
the monitoring and include appropriate requirement would
observation requirements of portions of the expand a
paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), owner controlled performance based
and (h)(4) of this section, area, are provided lighting
but * * *. with illumination requirement to all
necessary to areas designated by
satisfy the the licensee as
requirements of having a need for
this section. detection,
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
capabilities in
support of the
protective strategy
and not limit it to
only the isolation
zone and all
exterior areas
within the
protected area.
This requirement
would not require
deterministic
illumination levels
but rather would
require that
illumination levels
be sufficient to
provide the
detection,
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
capabilities
described by the
licensee in the
approved security
plans. This
description would
be required to
consider the
requirements of the
proposed
(i)(11)(ii) and
(iii).
Sec. 73.55(c)(5) Isolation (i)(11)(ii) The This requirement
zones and all exterior licensee shall would be retained
areas within the protected provide a minimum and revised to
area shall be provided with illumination level provide a
illumination * * * not less of 0.2 footcandle performance based
than 0.2 footcandle measured requirement for
measured horizontally at horizontally at illumination. Most
ground level. ground level, in significantly, this
the isolation zones proposed
and all exterior requirement would
areas within the maintain the
protected area, or current 0.2
may augment the footcandle lighting
facility requirement but
illumination would also provide
system, to include flexibility to a
patrols, licensee to provide
responders, and less than the 0.2
video technology footcandle where
with low-light low-light
technology capable technology would be
of meeting the used to maintain
detection, the capability to
assessment, meet the
surveillance, performance level
observation, for detection,
monitoring, and assessment,
response surveillance,
requirements of observation,
this section. monitoring, and
response. The word
``or'' would be
used specifically
to mean that the
licensee need
satisfy only one of
the two options
such that the 0.2
footcandle
requirement must be
met in the
isolation zone and
all exterior areas
within the
protected area
unless low-light
technology is used.
However, the word
``augment'' would
be used to
represent the
Commission's view
that sole use of
low-light
technology is not
authorized as this
approach would be
contrary to defense-
in-depth and could
be susceptible to
single failure
where a counter
technology is
developed or used.
(i)(11)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the clarify the need
approved security for lighting to be
plans how the described in the
lighting approved security
requirements of plans and how the
this section are lighting ``system''
met and, if used, would be used to
the type(s) and achieve the
application of low- performance
light technology objective.
used.
Sec. 73.55(f) (j) Communication This header would be
Communication requirements. requirements. retained. The
current
requirements under
this header are
retained and
reformatted to
individually
address each
current
requirement.
Significant
revisions would be
specifically
identified as each
current requirement
is addressed.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (j)(1) The licensee This requirement
guard, watchman or armed shall establish and would be retained
response individual on duty maintain, with minor
shall be capable of continuous revision. Most
maintaining continuous communication significantly, the
communication with an capability with specific language
individual in each onsite and offsite of the current
continuously manned alarm resources to ensure requirement would
station required by effective command be revised to a
paragraph (e)(1) of this and control during more performance
section * * *. both normal and based requirement.
emergency The word
situations. ``continuous''
would be used to
mean that a
communication
method would be
available and
operating any time
it would be needed
to communicate
information.
[[Page 62718]]
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) * * * who (j)(2) Individuals This requirement
shall be capable of calling assigned to each would be retained
for assistance from other alarm station shall with minor
guards, watchmen, and armed be capable of revision. Most
response personnel and from calling for significantly, in
local law enforcement assistance in order to provide
authorities. accordance with the flexibility and to
approved security capture the
plans, licensee proposed
integrated response requirements of
plan, and licensee appendix C to part
procedures. 73 for an
Integrated Response
Plan, this proposed
requirement
replaces the
specific list of
support entities to
be called with a
performance based
requirement to
follow
predetermined
actions.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (j)(3) Each on-duty This requirement
guard, watchman or armed security officer, would be retained
response individual on duty watchperson, with minor
shall be capable of vehicle escort, and revisions. Most
maintaining continuous armed response significantly, this
communication with an force member shall proposed
individual in each be capable of requirement would
continuously manned alarm maintaining update the titles
station required by continuous used to identify
paragraph (e)(1) of this communication with the listed
section * * *. an individual in positions and would
each alarm station. add ``vehicle
escorts'' for
consistency with
the proposed
paragraph (g)(8) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(f)(3) To (j)(4) The following This requirement
provide the capability of continuous would be retained
continuous communication * communication with minor revision
* * and shall terminate in capabilities must for formatting
each continuously manned terminate in both purposes.
alarm station required by alarm stations
paragraph (e)(1) of this required by this
section. section:
Sec. 73.55(f)(2) The alarm (j)(4)(i) This requirement
stations required by Conventional would be retained
paragraph (e)(1) of this telephone service. with minor
section shall have revision. Most
conventional telephone significantly, the
service for communication phrase ``with the
with the law enforcement law enforcement
authorities as described in authorities as
paragraph (f)(1) of this described in
section. paragraph (f)(1) of
this section''
would be deleted
because site plans
and procedures
would contain
protocols for
contacting support
personnel and
agencies.
Sec. 73.55(f)(3) To (j)(4)(ii) Radio or This requirement
provide the capability of microwave would be retained
continuous communication, transmitted two-way with minor
radio or microwave voice revision. Most
transmitted two-way voice communication, significantly, the
communication, either either directly or phrase ``shall be
directly or through an through an established, in
intermediary, shall be intermediary. addition to
established, in addition to conventional
conventional telephone telephone service,
service, between local law between local law
enforcement authorities and enforcement
the facility and * * *. authorities and the
facility and''
would be deleted
because site plans
and procedures
would contain
protocols for
contacting support
personnel and
agencies.
(j)(4)(iii) A system This requirement
for communication would be added for
with all control consistency with
rooms, on-duty the proposed
operations requirements of
personnel, escorts, this section and to
local, State, and provide a
Federal law performance based
enforcement requirement for
agencies, and all communications
other personnel consistent with the
necessary to proposed Integrated
coordinate both Response Plan
onsite and offsite addressed in the
responses. proposed appendix C
to part 73.
Sec. 73.55(f)(4) Non- (j)(5) Non-portable This requirement
portable communications communications would be retained
equipment controlled by the equipment must with minor
licensee and required by remain operable revision. Most
this section shall remain from independent significantly, the
operable from independent power sources in phrase ``controlled
power sources in the event the event of the by the licensee and
of the loss of normal power. loss of normal required by this
power. section'' would be
deleted because
there would be no
requirement for non-
portable
communications
equipment that is
not under licensee
control or not
required by this
section.
(j)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall identify site would be added to
areas where ensure the
communication could capability to
be interrupted or communicate during
cannot be both normal and
maintained and emergency
shall establish conditions, and to
alternative focus attention on
communication the requirement
measures for these that the licensee
areas in must identify site
implementing areas in which
procedures. communications
could be lost and
account for those
areas in their
procedures.
73.55(h) Response (k) Response This header would be
requirement. requirements. retained.
(k)(1) Personnel and This header would be
equipment. added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62719]]
(k)(1)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
establish and provide a
maintain, at all performance based
times, the minimum requirement for
number of properly determining the
trained and minimum number of
equipped personnel armed responders
required to needed to protect
intercept, the facility
challenge, delay, against the full
and neutralize capability of the
threats up to and design basis
including the threat. The phrase
design basis threat ``to intercept,
of radiological challenge, delay,
sabotage as defined and neutralize
in Sec. 73.1, to threats up to and
prevent significant including the
core damage and design basis threat
spent fuel sabotage. of radiological
sabotage as defined
in Sec. 73.1, to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel
sabotage'' would be
used for
consistency with
the proposed
paragraphs (b)(2)
through (4) of this
section.
(k)(1)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide and provide a
maintain firearms, performance based
ammunition, and requirement to
equipment capable ensure that the
of performing licensee provides
functions weapons that are
commensurate to the capable of
needs of each armed performing the
member of the functions required
security for each armed
organization to individual to
carry out their fulfill their
assigned duties and assigned duties per
responsibilities in the licensee
accordance with the protective
approved security strategy. For
plans, the licensee example, if an
protective individual is
strategy, assigned to a
implementing position for which
procedures, and the the protective
site specific strategy requires
conditions under weapons use at 200
which the firearms, meters, then the
ammunition, and assigned weapon
equipment will be must be capable of
used. that performance as
well as the
individual.
(k)(1)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the ensure that the
approved security licensee provides,
plans, all firearms in the approved
and equipment to be security plans, a
possessed by and description of the
readily available weapons to be used
to, armed personnel and those equipment
to implement the designated as
protective strategy readily available.
and carry out all
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
This description
must include the
general
distribution and
assignment of
firearms,
ammunition, body
armor, and other
equipment used.
(k)(1)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provide a
firearms, performance based
ammunition, and requirement to
equipment required ensure the
by the protective availability and
strategy are in operability of
sufficient supply, equipment needed to
are in working accomplish response
condition, and are goals and
readily available objectives during
for use in postulated events.
accordance with the The term ``readily
licensee protective available'' would
strategy and mean that required
predetermined time firearms and
lines. equipment are
either in the
individuals
possession or at
pre-staged
locations such that
required response
time lines are met.
(k)(1)(v) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provide a
armed members of performance based
the security requirement to
organization are ensure that all
trained in the armed personnel
proper use and meet standard
maintenance of training program
assigned weapons requirements and
and equipment in specific training
accordance with requirements
appendix B to part applicable to the
73. specific weapons
they are assigned,
to include the
maintenance
required for each
to ensure
operability. The
ability for armed
personnel to
trouble-shoot a
problem, such as a
jammed round during
an actual event,
would be considered
a critical function
necessary to
achieve the
performance
objective.
[[Page 62720]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(5) The (k)(2) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall instruct shall instruct each would be retained
every guard and all armed armed response with some revision.
response personnel to person to prevent The term ``guard''
prevent or impede attempted or impede attempted was removed as the
acts of theft or acts of theft or term is no longer
radiological sabotage by radiological used. The phrase
using force sufficient to sabotage by using ``or any other
counter the force directed force sufficient to circumstances as
at him including the use of counter the force authorized by
deadly force when the guard directed at that applicable state
or other armed response person including law'' would be
person has a reasonable the use of deadly added to clarify
belief it is necessary in force when the that applicable
self-defense or in the armed response state law specifies
defense of others. person has a the conditions
reasonable belief under which deadly
that the use of force may be
deadly force is applied. It is
necessary in self- important to note
defense or in the that the use of
defense of others, deadly force should
or any other be a last resort
circumstances as when all other
authorized by lesser measures to
applicable state neutralize the
law. threat have failed.
The conditions
under which deadly
force would be
authorized are
governed by state
laws and nothing in
this proposed rule
should be
interpreted to mean
or require anything
that would
contradict such
state law. The term
``it'' is replaced
with the phrase
``deadly force'' to
more clearly
describe the
action.
(k)(3) The licensee This requirement
shall provide an would be added to
armed response team provide a
consisting of both performance based
armed responders requirement that
and armed security would retain the
officers to carry current requirement
out response for armed
duties, within responders and add
predetermined time a category of armed
lines. security officer to
clarify the
division of types
of armed response
personnel and their
roles.
(k)(3)(i) Armed This header would be
responders. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(i)(A) The This requirement
number of guards, and licensee shall would be retained
armed, trained personnel determine the and revised to
immediately available at minimum number of remove the specific
the facility to fulfill armed responders minimum numbers of
these response requirements necessary to 10, but no less
shall nominally be ten protect against the than 5, to provide
(10), unless specifically design basis threat a performance based
required otherwise on a described in Sec. requirement that
case by case basis by the 73.1(a), subject to meets the proposed
Commission; however, this Commission requirement of
number may not be reduced approval, and shall paragraph (k)(1)(i)
to less than five (5) document this of this section.
guards. number in the This proposed
approved security requirement would
plans. ensure that the
licensee would
provide the
requisite number of
armed responders
needed to carry-out
the protective
strategy, the
effectiveness of
which would be
evaluated through
annual exercises
and triennial
exercises observed
by the Commission.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(i)(B) Armed This requirement
number of guards, and responders shall be would be retained
armed, trained personnel available at all and revised. Most
immediately available at times inside the significantly, this
the facility to fulfill protected area and proposed
these response requirements may not be assigned requirement would
* * *. any other duties or specify the
responsibilities conditions that
that could must be met to
interfere with satisfy the meaning
assigned response of the word
duties. ``available'' as
used.
(k)(3)(ii) Armed This header would be
security officers. added for
formatting
purposes.
(k)(3)(ii)(A) Armed This requirement
security officers would be added to
designated to provide a
strengthen response performance based
capabilities shall requirement for the
be onsite and licensee to
available at all identify a new
times to carry out category of armed
assigned response personnel to be
duties. used to supplement
and support the
armed responders
identified in the
proposed paragraph
(k)(3)(ii)(A) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(ii)(B) The This requirement
number of guards, and minimum number of would be added to
armed, trained personnel armed security require licensees
immediately available at officers must be to document the
the facility to fulfill documented in the number of armed
these response requirements approved security security officers
shall nominally be * * *. plans. to be used.
(k)(3)((iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure that consistency with
training and the current
qualification requirement Sec.
requirements 73.55(b)(4)(ii) for
accurately reflect an approved T&Q
the duties and plan and the
responsibilities to current requirement
be performed. for licensees to
document how these
personnel are to be
trained and
qualified.
[[Page 62721]]
(k)(3)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure that all consistency with
firearms, the current Sec.
ammunition, and 73.55(g)(1) to
equipment needed ensure that all
for completing the firearms and
actions described equipment required
in the approved by each member of
security plans and the armed response
licensee protective team would be
strategy are operable and in the
readily available possession of or
and in working available at pre-
condition. staged locations,
to ensure that each
individual is able
to meet the time
lines specified by
the protective
strategy. This
includes those
equipment
designated as
readily available.
(k)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall describe in would be added to
the approved provide regulatory
security plans, consistency for the
procedures for period of time a
responding to an licensee may not
unplanned incident meet the minimum
that reduces the numbers stated in
number of available the approved plans
armed response team because of illness
members below the or injury to an
minimum number assigned individual
documented by the or individuals
licensee in the while on-duty.
approved security
plans.
(k)(5) Protective This requirement
Strategy. Licensees would be added to
shall develop, provide a
maintain, and performance based
implement a written requirement for the
protective strategy development of a
in accordance with protective strategy
the requirements of that specifies how
this section and the licensee will
appendix C to this utilize onsite and
part. offsite, the
resources to ensure
the performance
objective of how
the proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section is
met.
(k)(6) The licensee This proposed
shall ensure that requirement would
all personnel be added to ensure
authorized that both security
unescorted access and non-security
to the protected organization
area are trained personnel are
and understand trained to
their roles and recognize and
responsibilities respond to hostage
during security and duress
incidents, to situations. This
include hostage and proposed training
duress situations. would also include
the specific
actions to be
performed during
these postulated
security events.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4) Upon (k)(7) Upon receipt This requirement
detection of abnormal of an alarm or would be retained
presence or activity of other indication of and revised for
persons or vehicles within threat, the consistency with
an isolation zone, a licensee shall: the proposed
protected area, material requirements of
access area, or a vital this section.
area; or upon evidence or Reference to the
indication of intrusion specific site areas
into a protected area, a would be deleted
material access area, or a because the
vital area, the licensee performance based
security organization requirements of
shall: this proposed
section would be
applicable to all
facility areas, and
therefore such
reference would not
be needed.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(i) (k)(7)(i) Determine This requirement
Determine whether or not a the existence of a would be retained
threat exists, threat in with minor
accordance with revision.
assessment
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(ii) (k)(7)(ii) Identify This requirement
Assess the extent of the the level of threat would be retained
threat, if any, present through the with minor
use of assessment revision.
methodologies and
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (k)(7)(iii) This requirement
Requiring responding guards Determine the would be retained
or other armed response response necessary with revision for
personnel to interpose to intercept, consistency with
themselves * * *. challenge, delay, the proposed
and neutralize the paragraph (b) of
threat in this section.
accordance with the
requirements of
appendix C to part
73, the Commission-
approved safeguards
contingency plan,
and the licensee
response strategy.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(B) (k)(7)(iv) Notify This requirement
Informing local law offsite support would be retained
enforcement agencies of the agencies such as with revision for
threat and requesting local law consistency with
assistance. enforcement, in the Integrated
accordance with Response Plan.
site procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(2) The (k)(8) Law This requirement
licensee shall establish enforcement would be retained
and document liaison with liaison. The with minor
local law enforcement licensee shall revision. Most
authorities. document and significantly, this
maintain current proposed
agreements with requirement
local, state, and addresses the need
Federal law to identify the
enforcement resources and
agencies, to response times to
include estimated be expected in
response times and order to facilitate
capabilities. planning
development.
[[Page 62722]]
(l) Facilities using This paragraph would
mixed-oxide (MOX) be added to provide
fuel assemblies. In general provisions
addition to the for the onsite
requirements physical protection
described in this of unirradiated
section for mixed oxide (MOX)
protection against fuel assemblies in
radiological recognition of the
sabotage, operating fact that some
commercial nuclear nuclear power
power reactors reactor facilities
licensed under 10 currently have
CFR parts 50 or 52 chosen or may
and using special choose to possess
nuclear material in and utilize this
the form of MOX type of special
fuel assemblies nuclear material at
shall protect their sites.
unirradiated MOX Because weapons
fuel assemblies grade plutonium is
against theft or utilized in the
diversion. fabrication of MOX
fuel assemblies,
the Commission has
determined that a
threat of theft
applies and that it
is prudent and
necessary to apply
certain security
measures for MOX
fuel that are in
addition to those
that are currently
required at other
nuclear power
reactor facilities.
Therefore, the
requirements
proposed in this
paragraph are
provided to ensure
that these
additional
requirements are
identified and met
by those licensees
who have chosen or
may choose to
utilize MOX fuel.
(l)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall protect the would be added to
unirradiated MOX identify
fuel assemblies applicability of
against theft or this paragraph.
diversion in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section and
the approved
security plans.
(l)(2) Commercial This requirement
nuclear power would be added
reactors using MOX because the
fuel assemblies are Commission has
exempt from the determined that due
requirements of to the low
Sec. Sec. 73.20, plutonium
73.45, and 73.46 concentration,
for the onsite composition of the
physical protection MOX fuel, and
of unirradiated MOX configuration (size
fuel assemblies. and weight) of the
assemblies, the
physical security
protection measures
identified in the
listed regulations
are superceded by
those requirements
addressed in this
proposed section
for unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies
at nuclear power
reactor facilities.
(l)(3) This header would be
Administrative added for
controls. formatting
purposes.
(l)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the ensure that the
approved security licensee describes
plans, the the onsite physical
operational and protection measures
administrative in the approved
controls to be security plans.
implemented for the
receipt,
inspection,
movement, storage,
and protection of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(3)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement the use provide assurance
of tamper- that the
indicating devices unirradiated fuel
for unirradiated assemblies were not
MOX fuel assembly accessed during
transport and shall transport.
verify their use
and integrity
before receipt.
(l)(3)(iii) Upon This requirement
delivery of would be added for
unirradiated MOX formatting
fuel assemblies, purposes.
the licensee shall:
(l)(3)(iii)(A) This requirement
Inspect would be added to
unirradiated MOX ensure that
fuel assemblies for unirradiated MOX
damage. fuel assemblies are
in an acceptable
condition before
use or storage.
(l)(3)(iii)(B) This requirement
Search unirradiated would be added to
MOX fuel assemblies ensure that no
for unauthorized unauthorized
materials. materials were
introduced within
the unirradiated
MOX fuel assembly
during transport.
(l)(3)(iv) The This requirement
licensee may would be added to
conduct the provide a
required inspection performance based
and search requirement that
functions provides
simultaneously. flexibility for
accomplishment of
the proposed
requirements.
(l)(3)(v) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure the proper formatting
placement and purposes.
control of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies as
follows:
[[Page 62723]]
(l)(3)(v)(A) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer, provide deterrence
in addition to the and immediate armed
armed response team response to
required by attempts of theft
paragraphs (h)(4) or tampering. This
and (h)(5) of proposed armed
appendix C to part responder's duty
73, shall be would be solely to
present during the observe and protect
receipt and the unirradiated
inspection of MOX fuel assemblies
unirradiated MOX upon receipt and
fuel assemblies. before storage.
(l)(3)(v)(B) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
store unirradiated reduce the risk of
MOX fuel assemblies theft by providing
only within a spent three delay
fuel pool, located barriers before
within a vital gaining
area, so that unauthorized access
access to the to the MOX fuel
unirradiated MOX assembles while in
fuel assemblies storage.
requires passage
through at least
three physical
barriers.
(l)(3)(vi) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a ensure that a
material control material control
and accountability and accountability
program for the program would be
unirradiated MOX established and
fuel assemblies implemented and
that includes a would focus on
predetermined and recordkeeping which
documented storage describes the
location for each inventory and
unirradiated MOX location of the
fuel assembly. SSNM within the
assemblies.
(l)(3)(vii) Records This requirement
that identify the would be added to
storage locations ensure restricted
of unirradiated MOX access to records
fuel assemblies are which describe or
considered identify the
safeguards location of
information and unirradiated MOX
must be protected fuel assemblies
and stored in within the spent
accordance with fuel pool.
Sec. 73.21.
(l)(4) Physical This header would be
controls. added for
formatting
purposes.
(l)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall lock would be added to
or disable all provide a
equipment and power performance based
supplies to requirement for
equipment required administrative
for the movement controls over
and handling of equipment and power
unirradiated MOX supplies to
fuel assemblies. equipment required
to physically move
the unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies
to ensure that at
least two security
measures must be
disabled before
this equipment
could be used.
(l)(4)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a two- provide an
person line-of- administrative
sight rule whenever control to reduce
control systems or the risk of the
equipment required insider threat and
for the movement or theft.
handling of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies
must be accessed.
(l)(4)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
conduct random provide
patrols of areas surveillance
containing activities for the
unirradiated MOX detection of
fuel assemblies to unauthorized
ensure the activities that
integrity of would pose a threat
barriers and locks, to MOX fuel
deter unauthorized assemblies in
activities, and to addition to any
identify similar
indications of requirements of
tampering. this proposed
section.
(l)(4)(iv) Locks, This requirement
keys, and any other would be added to
access control ensure that the
device used to security
secure equipment organization would
and power sources be responsible for
required for the the administrative
movement of controls over
unirradiated MOX access control
fuel assemblies or devices.
openings to areas
containing
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies
must be controlled
by the security
organization.
(l)(4)(v) Removal of This requirement
locks used to would be added to
secure equipment ensure that both
and power sources the licensee
required for the security and
movement of operations
unirradiated MOX management level
fuel assemblies or personnel would be
openings to areas responsible for the
containing removal of locks
unirradiated MOX securing MOX fuel
fuel assemblies assemblies.
must require
approval by both
the on-duty
security shift
supervisor and the
operations shift
manager.
(l)(4)(v)(A) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer ensure that
shall be present to immediate armed
observe activities response capability
involving the is provided before
movement of accessing equipment
unirradiated MOX used to move
fuel assemblies unirradiated MOX
before the removal fuel assemblies.
of the locks and
providing power to
equipment required
for the movement or
handling of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
[[Page 62724]]
(l)(4)(v)(B) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer ensure that
shall be present at immediate armed
all times until response capability
power is removed is provided during
from equipment and any activity
locks are secured. involving the use
of equipment used
to move
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(4)(v)(C) This requirement
Security officers would be added to
shall be trained ensure that
and knowledgeable assigned security
of authorized and officers possess
unauthorized the capability to
activities immediately
involving recognize, report,
unirradiated MOX and respond to
fuel assemblies. unauthorized
activities
involving
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(5) At least one This requirement
armed security would be added to
officer shall be ensure physical
present and shall protection of
maintain constant unirradiated MOX
surveillance of fuel assemblies
unirradiated MOX when not located
fuel assemblies within an area that
when the assemblies meets the three
are not located in barrier requirement
the spent fuel pool of this proposed
or reactor. rule.
(l)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall maintain at would be added for
all times the consistency with
capability to the proposed
detect, assess, paragraph (b) of
intercept, this section.
challenge, delay,
and neutralize
threats to
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section.
(m) Digital computer This header would be
and communication added for
networks. formatting
purposes.
(m)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall implement a would be to ensure
cyber-security that nuclear power
program that plants are
provides high protected from
assurance that cyber attacks via
computer systems, minimizing the
which if potential attack
compromised would pathway and the
likely adversely consequences
impact safety, arising from a
security, and successful cyber
emergency attack.
preparedness, are
protected from
cyber attacks.
(m)(1)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe the cyber- ensure licensees
security program have a
requirements in the comprehensive
approved security security plan by
plans. integrating cyber-
security into the
overall onsite
physical protection
program. As
licensees take
advantage of
computer technology
to maximize plant
productivity, the
role of computer
systems at nuclear
power plants is
increasing.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that
incorporation of a
cyber-security
program into the
Commission-approved
security plans
would be a prudent
and necessary
security
enhancement.
(m)(1)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
incorporate the ensure that the
cyber-security computer systems
program into the used in onsite
onsite physical physical protection
protection program. systems are
protected from
cyber attacks. With
advancements in
computer
technology, many
systems in nuclear
power plants rely
on computers to
perform their
functions,
including some
security functions.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that the
integration of
security measures
covering these
systems would be a
prudent and
necessary action.
(m)(1)(iii) The This requirement
cyber-security would be added to
program must be ensure licensees
designed to detect actively and
and prevent cyber proactively secure
attacks on their plants from
protected computer cyber attacks. The
systems. Commission has
determined that
because specific
cyber threats and
the people who seek
unauthorized access
to, or use of
computers are
constantly
changing, protected
computer systems
must be protected
against these
attacks and
mitigation measures
implemented.
(m)(2) Cyber- This requirement
security would be added to
assessment. The require licensees
licensee shall to systematically
implement a cyber- determine the
security assessment status of their
program to plant's cyber risks
systematically and identify
assess and manage vulnerabilities
cyber risks. that need to be
mitigated to reduce
risks to acceptable
levels.
(m)(3) Policies, This header would be
requirements, and added for
procedures. formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62725]]
(m)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
apply cyber- create a computer
security security program
requirements and that establishes
policies that specific goals and
identify management assigns
expectations and responsibilities to
requirements for employees to meet
the protection of those goals.
computer systems.
(m)(3)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
develop and ensure the licensee
maintain develops,
implementing implements, and
procedures to enforces, detailed
ensure cyber- guidance documents
security that licensee
requirements and employees would be
policies are required to follow
implemented to meet the stated
effectively. security goals.
(m)(4) Incident This header would be
response and added for
recovery. formatting
purposes.
(m)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a cyber- ensure that each
security incident licensee would be
response and prepared to respond
recovery plan to to computer
minimize the security incidents
adverse impact of a in a manner that
cyber-security ensures that plants
incident on safety, are safe and
security, or secure. A computer
emergency security incident
preparedness could result from a
systems. computer virus,
other malicious
code, or a system
intruder, either an
insider or as a
result of an
external attack and
could adversely
impact the
licensee's ability
to effectively
maintain safety,
security, or
emergency
preparedness.
Without an incident
response and
recovery plan,
licensees would
respond to a
computer security
incident in an ad
hoc manner. However
with an incident
response and
recovery plan,
licensees would
respond to an
incident in a quick
and organized
manner. This would
minimize the
adverse impact
caused by a
computer security
incident.
(m)(4)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
security incident would be added to
response and ensure licensees
recovery plan must have a
be described in the comprehensive
integrated response incident response
plan required by plan by integrating
appendix C to this cyber-security into
part. the overall
security of their
plants. As
licensees take
advantage of
computer technology
to maximize plant
productivity, the
role of computer
systems at nuclear
power plants is
increasing as well
as the possibility
for adverse impact
from a computer
mishap. Therefore,
the Commission has
determined that it
would be a prudent
and necessary
action for
licensees to
develop and
implement a
comprehensive
response plan that
includes a cyber
incident response
and recovery plan.
(m)(4)(iii) The This requirement
cyber-security would be added to
incident response ensure that
and recovery plan licensees acquire
must ensure the the capability to
capability to respond to cyber
respond to cyber- incidents in a
security incidents, manner that
minimize loss and contains and
destruction, repairs damage from
mitigate and incidents, and
correct the prevents future
weaknesses that damage. An incident
were exploited, and handling capability
restore systems and/ provides a way for
or equipment plant personnel to
affected by a cyber- report incidents
security incident. and the appropriate
response and
assistance to be
provided to aid in
recovery.
(m)(5) Protective This requirement
strategies. The would be added to
licensee shall incorporate the
implement defense- approach of delay,
in-depth protective detect, and
strategies to respond. The use of
protect computer multiple and
systems from cyber diverse layers of
attacks, detecting, defense would delay
isolating, and the threat from
neutralizing reaching those
unauthorized systems that, if
activities in a compromised, can
timely manner. adversely impact
safety, security,
or emergency
preparedness of the
nuclear power
plants. This delay
in attack would
allow more time to
detect the attack
and would allow
time to respond.
[[Page 62726]]
(m)(6) Configuration This requirement
and control would be added to
management program. implement
The licensee shall configuration
implement a management to
configuration and ensure that the
control management system in operation
program, to include is the correct
cyber risk version
analysis, to ensure (configuration) of
that modifications the system and that
to computer system any changes to be
designs, access made are reviewed
control measures, for security
configuration, implications.
operational Configuration
integrity, and management can be
management process used to help ensure
do not adversely that changes take
impact facility place in an
safety, security, identifiable and
and emergency controlled
preparedness environment and
systems before that they do not
implementation of unintentionally
those modifications. harm any of the
system's
properties,
including its
security.
(m)(7) Cyber- This header would be
security awareness added for
and training.. formatting
purposes.
(m)(7)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a cyber- ensure licensees
security awareness implement cyber-
and training security awareness
program. and training
programs to ensure
that appropriate
personnel are aware
of cyber-security
requirements and
have the cyber-
security skills and
competencies
necessary to secure
affected plant
systems and
equipment.
(m)(7)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
security awareness would be added to
and training implement a cyber-
program must ensure security awareness
that appropriate and training
plant personnel, program to:
including 1. Improve employee
contractors, are awareness of the
aware of cyber- need to protect
security computer systems;
requirements and 2. Develop employee
that they receive skills and
the training knowledge so
required to computer users can
effectively perform perform their jobs
their assigned more securely; and
duties and 3. Build in-depth
responsibilities. knowledge, as
needed, to design,
implement, or
operate security
programs for
organizations and
systems.
(n) Security program This header would be
reviews and audits. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(A) At (n)(1) The licensee This requirement
intervals not to exceed 12 shall review the would be retained
months or * * *. onsite physical with minor revision
protection program for formatting
at intervals not to purposes.
exceed 12 months,
or
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) As (n)(1)(i) As This requirement
necessary, based on an necessary based would be retained
assessment by the licensee upon assessments or with minor
against performance other performance revision.
indicators * * *. indicators.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) * * (n)(1)(ii) Within 12 This requirement
* as soon as reasonably months after a would be retained
practicable after a change change occurs in and revised. Most
occurs in personnel, personnel, significantly, the
procedures, equipment, or procedures, phrase ``as soon as
facilities that potentially equipment, or reasonably
could adversely affect facilities that practicable'' would
security but no longer than potentially could be deleted and the
12 months after the change. adversely affect current requirement
security. ``12 months'' would
be moved to the
beginning of the
sentence to
eliminate potential
for
misunderstanding
and improve
consistency.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) In (n)(2) As a minimum, This requirement
any case, each element of each element of the would be retained
the security program must onsite physical with minor
be reviewed at least every protection program revision.
24 months. must be reviewed at
least every twenty-
four (24) months.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i) The (n)(2)(i) The onsite This requirement
licensee shall review physical protection would be retained
implementation of the program review must and revised to
security program by be documented and combine two current
individuals who have no performed by requirements. Most
direct responsibility for individuals significantly, the
the security program independent of word ``documented''
either: those personnel would be added for
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The responsible for consistency with
results and recommendations program management the current Sec.
of the security program and any individual 73.55(g)(4)(ii).
review * * * must be who has direct The phrase
documented * * *. responsibility for ``security
implementing the program'' would be
onsite physical replaced with the
protection program. phrase ``program''
for consistency
with use of the
phrase ``onsite
physical protection
program''.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The (n)(2)(ii) Onsite This requirement
security program review physical protection would be retained
must include an audit of program reviews and and revised to
security procedures and audits must provide additional
practices, an evaluation of include, but not be examples. Most
the effectiveness of the limited to, an significantly, the
physical protection system, evaluation of the phrase ``but not be
an audit of the physical effectiveness of limited to'' would
protection system testing the approved be added to clarify
and maintenance program, security plans, that the proposed
and an audit of commitments implementing examples are not
established for response by procedures, all inclusive.
local law enforcement response
authorities. commitments by
local, State, and
Federal law
enforcement
authorities, cyber-
security programs,
safety/security
interface, and the
testing,
maintenance, and
calibration program.
[[Page 62727]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(B) (n)(3) The licensee This requirement
Periodically review shall periodically would be retained
physical security plans and review the approved with minor
contingency plans and security plans, the revision. The
procedures to evaluate integrated response phrase ``Integrated
their potential impact on plan, the licensee Response Plan''
plant and personnel safety. protective would be added to
strategy, and emphasize the
licensee importance of this
implementing proposed plan and
procedures to to emphasize its
evaluate their relationship to
effectiveness and other site plans.
potential impact on The term
plant and personnel ``implementing''
safety. procedures would be
added for
consistency with
this proposed
section.
(n)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall periodically would be added to
evaluate the cyber- account for the use
security program of computers and
for effectiveness the need to ensure
and shall update that required
the cyber-security protective measures
program as needed are being met and
to ensure to evaluate the
protection against effects that
changes to internal changes or other
and external technological
threats. advancements would
have on systems
used at nuclear
power plants.
(n)(5) The licensee This requirement
shall conduct would be added to
quarterly drills provide a
and annual force-on- performance based
force exercises in requirement for the
accordance with conduct of force-on-
appendix C to part force drills and
73 and the licensee exercises.
performance
evaluation program.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The (n)(6) The results This requirement
results and recommendations and recommendations would be retained
of the security program of the onsite with minor
review, management's physical protection revision. The
findings on whether the program reviews and phrase ``security
security program is audits, program review''
currently effective, and management's would be replaced
any actions taken as a findings regarding with the phrase''
result of recommendations program onsite physical
from prior program reviews effectiveness, and protection program
must be documented in a any actions taken reviews and
report to the licensee's as a result of audits'' for
plant manager and to recommendations consistency with
corporate management at from prior program the format of the
least one level higher than reviews, must be proposed rule. The
that having responsibility documented in a phrase ``on whether
for the day-to-day plant report to the the security
operation. licensee's plant program is
manager and to currently
corporate effective'' would
management at least be replaced with
one level higher the phrase
than that having ``regarding program
responsibility for effectiveness'' for
day-to-day plant plain language
operation. purposes.
(n)(7) Findings from This requirement
onsite physical would be added to
protection program ensure that
reviews, audits, security
and assessments deficiencies and
must be entered findings would be
into the site tracked through the
corrective action site corrective
program and action program
protected as until corrected,
safeguards and information
information, if regarding specific
applicable. findings would be
protected in
accordance with the
sensitivity and
potential for
exploitation of the
information.
(n)(8) The licensee This requirement
shall make changes would be added to
to the approved provide a
security plans and performance based
implementing requirement for the
procedures as a revision of
result of findings approved security
from security plans where plan
program reviews, changes are
audits, and necessary to
assessments, where account for
necessary to ensure implementation
the effective problems, changes
implementation of to site conditions,
Commission or other problems
regulations and the that adversely
licensee protective affect the licensee
strategy. capability to
effectively
implement
Commission
requirements.
(n)(9) Unless This requirement
otherwise specified would be added to
by the Commission, provide necessary
onsite physical flexibility to
protection program allow licensees to
reviews, audits, conduct audits/
and assessments may reviews within a
be conducted up to specified time
thirty days prior period without
to, but no later changing future
than thirty days scheduled audit/
after the scheduled review dates. This
date without requirement
adverse impact upon provides regulatory
the next scheduled stability and
annual audit date. flexibility to
account for
unforseen
circumstances that
may interfere with
regularly scheduled
dates, such as
forced outages.
Sec. 73.55(g) Testing and (o) Maintenance, This header would be
maintenance. testing, and retained and
calibration. revised to include
``calibration'' of
equipment to ensure
the accuracy of
readings provided
from such
equipment.
(o)(1) The licensee This header would be
shall: added for
formatting
purposes.
(o)(1)(i) Implement This requirement
a maintenance, would be added to
testing and comprehensively
calibration program address all
to ensure that security equipment
security systems in consistent
and equipment are terms. This
tested for proposed
operability and requirement would
performance at clarify the current
predetermined requirement for
intervals, are ensuring that
maintained in security equipment
operable condition, operates and
and are capable of performs as stated
performing their in the approved
intended function security plans.
when needed.
[[Page 62728]]
(o)(1)(ii) Describe This requirement
the maintenance, would be added to
testing and address the
calibration program maintenance,
in the approved testing and
physical security calibration of
plan. Implementing security equipment
procedures must in non-specific
specify operational terms and describe
and technical the types of
details required to documentation and
perform level of detail
maintenance, needed.
testing, and
calibration
activities to
include, but not
limited to, purpose
of activity,
actions to be
taken, acceptance
criteria, the
intervals or
frequency at which
the activity will
be performed, and
compensatory
actions required.
(o)(1)(iii) Document This requirement
problems, failures, would be added for
deficiencies, and consistency with
other findings, to the proposed
include the cause requirement for
of each, and enter addressing findings
each into the site from security
corrective action program reviews and
program. The audits and how
licensee shall specific
protect this information
information as concerning security
safeguards deficiencies and
information, if findings must be
applicable. protected so that
noted deficiencies
could not be
exploited.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (o)(1)(iv) Implement This requirement
licensee shall develop and compensatory would be retained
employ compensatory measures in a with minor
measures including timely manner to revision.
equipment, additional ensure that the
security personnel and effectiveness of
specific procedures to the onsite physical
assure that the protection program
effectiveness of the is not reduced by
security system is not failure or degraded
reduced by failure or other operation of
contingencies affecting the security-related
operation of the security components or
related equipment or equipment.
structures.
Sec. 73.55(g)(2) Each (o)(2) Each This requirement
intrusion alarm shall be intrusion alarm would be retained
tested for performance at must be tested for and revised to
the beginning and end of operability at the correct the use of
any period that it is used beginning and end the phrase ``tested
for security. If the period of any period that for performance'',
of continuous use is longer it is used for as stated in the
than seven days, the security, or if the current Sec.
intrusion alarm shall also period of 73.55(g)(2). The
be tested at least once continuous use testing performed
every seven (7) days. exceeds seven (7) at the beginning
days, the intrusion and end of any
alarm must be period is intended
tested at least to be a ``go, no-
once every seven go'' test or
(7) days. operational test
that is used to
simply indicate
that the equipment
functions in
response to
predetermined
stimuli. A
performance test is
a more elaborate
test that would
test a system
through the entire
range of its
intended function
or stimuli.
Sec. 73.55(g)(2) Each (o)(3) Intrusion This requirement
intrusion alarm shall be detection and would be retained
tested for performance at access control and revised to
the beginning and end of equipment must be correct the
any period that it is used performance tested periodicity of
for security. in accordance with performance testing
the approved stated in the
security plans. current Sec.
73.55(g)(2) and to
add ``access
control equipment''
due to the
widespread use of
access control
technologies and to
focus on the need
to ensure that this
equipment is
functioning as
intended in
response to the
predetermined
stimuli (e.g.,
biometrics). The
phrase ``each
intrusion alarm''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Intrusion
detection and
access control
equipment'' to more
accurately describe
the equipment to be
performance tested.
Sec. 73.55(g)(3) (o)(4) Equipment This proposed
Communications equipment required for requirement would
required for communications communications be retained and
onsite shall be tested for onsite must be revised to correct
performance not less tested for the use of the
frequently than once at the operability not phrase ``tested for
beginning of each security less frequently performance'', as
personnel work shift. than once at the stated in the
beginning of each current Sec.
security personnel 73.55(g)(3). The
work shift. testing performed
at the beginning
and end of any
period is intended
to be a ``go, no-
go'' test or
operational test
that is used to
simply indicate
that the equipment
functions in
response to
predetermined
stimuli.
[[Page 62729]]
Sec. 73.55(g)(3) (o)(5) Communication This requirement
Communications equipment systems between the would be retained
required for communications alarm stations and and revised to
offsite shall be tested for each control room, include both
performance not less than and between the ``onsite'' and
once a day. alarm stations and offsite
offsite support communication
agencies, to equipment
include back-up associated with
communication integrated response
equipment, must be and to correct the
tested for use of the term
operability at ``performance
least once each day. test,'' as stated
in the current Sec.
73.55(g)(3). The
testing performed
at least once each
day is intended to
be a ``go, no-go''
test or operational
test that is used
to simply indicate
that the equipment
functions.
(o)(6) Search This requirement
equipment must be would be added to
tested for ensure that search
operability at equipment is tested
least once each day for operability and
and tested for performance at
performance at intervals that
least once during provide assurance
each seven (7) day that unauthorized
period and before items would be
being placed back detected as
in service after required. This
each repair or proposed
inoperative state. requirement is
added to address
the widespread use
of search equipment
technologies, such
as explosives and
metal detectors,
and x-ray equipment
and to provide a
performance based
requirement that
focuses on the
importance for
accurate
performance of this
equipment.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) All (o)(7) All intrusion This requirement
alarms, communication detection would be retained
equipment, physical equipment, with minor
barriers, and other communication revision. Most
security related devices or equipment, physical significantly, back-
equipment shall be barriers, and other up power supplies
maintained in operable security-related are added to ensure
condition. devices or this critical
equipment, to element is
include back-up maintained in
power supplies must operable condition.
be maintained in
operable condition.
(o)(8) A program for This requirement
testing or would be added to
verifying the account for those
operability of circumstances when
devices or a licensee cannot
equipment located satisfy testing
in hazardous areas requirements due to
must be specified safety hazards or
in the approved radiation
security plans and restrictions. Vital
must define component area
alternate measures portals located
to be taken to within facility
ensure the timely radiological
completion of controlled areas
testing or that are
maintenance when inaccessible due to
the hazardous safety hazards or
condition or established
radiation radiation
restrictions are no restrictions may be
longer applicable. excluded from the
testing
requirements of
this section.
(p) Compensatory This header would be
measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (p)(1) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall develop and shall identify would be retained
employ compensatory measures and with minor
measures * * *. criteria needed to revision. The word
compensate for the ``compensate'' is
loss or reduced used to provide a
performance of performance based
personnel, requirement that
equipment, systems, requires the
and components, identified
that are required compensatory
to meet the measure to be
requirements of ``developed and
this section. employed''.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (p)(2) Compensatory This requirement
licensee shall develop and measures must be would be retained
employ compensatory designed and and revised to
measures including implemented to focus on the
equipment, additional provide a level of Commission's view
security personnel and protection that is that compensatory
specific procedures to equivalent to the measures must
assure that the protection that was provide a level of
effectiveness of the provided by the protection that
security system is not degraded or satisfies the
reduced by failure or other inoperable Commission
contingencies affecting the personnel, requirement which
operation of the security equipment, system, was otherwise
related equipment or or components. satisfied through
structures. use or
implementation of
the failed
component of the
onsite physical
protection program.
(p)(3) Compensatory This requirement
measures must be would be added to
implemented within provide a
specific time lines performance based
necessary to meet requirement for
the requirements timely
stated in paragraph implementation of
(b) of this section compensatory
and described in measures. The
the approved phrase ``within
security plans. specific time lines
necessary to meet
the requirements
stated in paragraph
(b)'' would provide
qualifying details
against which
specific time lines
would be developed.
(q) Suspension of This header would be
safeguards measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
(q)(1) The licensee This requirement
may suspend would be added for
implementation of formatting
affected purposes. The
requirements of phrase
this section under ``implementation of
the following affected
conditions: requirements''
would be used to
ensure the licensee
only suspends those
measures that
cannot be met as a
direct result of
the condition.
[[Page 62730]]
Sec. 73.55(a) In (q)(1)(i) In This requirement
accordance with Sec. Sec. accordance with would be retained
50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of Sec. Sec. with minor
this chapter, the licensee 50.54(x) and revision.
may suspend any safeguards 50.54(y) of this
measures pursuant to Sec. chapter, the
73.55 in an emergency when licensee may
this action is immediately suspend any
needed to protect the safeguards measures
public health and safety pursuant to this
and no action consistent section in an
with license conditions and emergency when this
technical specification action is
that can provide adequate immediately needed
or equivalent protection is to protect the
immediately apparent. public health and
safety and no
action consistent
with license
conditions and
technical
specifications that
can provide
adequate or
equivalent
protection is
immediately
apparent.
Sec. 73.55(a) This This suspension of This requirement
suspension must be approved safeguards measures would be retained
as a minimum by a licensed must be approved as with minor revision
senior operator prior to a minimum by a to report this
taking the action. licensed senior information to the
operator prior to control room. This
taking this action. proposed
requirement is
intended to ensure
that at least one
onsite, licensee
management level
person who is
knowledgeable and
aware of reactor
operations and
reactor status at
the time, is the
individual who
would approve the
suspension and has
the knowledge to
determine and the
authority to direct
appropriate
compensatory
measures to
include, but not
limited to,
modifications to
the licensee
protective strategy
during the
suspension period.
(q)(1)(ii) During This requirement
severe weather when would be added to
the suspension is provide a
immediately needed performance based
to protect requirement that
personnel whose accounts for the
assigned duties and suspension of
responsibilities in safeguards measures
meeting the during severe
requirements of weather conditions
this section would that could result
otherwise in life threatening
constitute a life situations such as
threatening tornadoes, floods,
situation and no hurricanes, etc.,
action consistent for those
with the individuals
requirements of assigned to carry
this section that out certain duties
can provide and
equivalent responsibilities
protection is required by
immediately Commission
apparent. regulations, and
the approved
security plans and
procedures.
Suspension of This requirement
safeguards due to would be added to
severe weather must provide a
be initiated by the requirement for who
security supervisor is authorized to
and approved by a approve suspensions
licensed senior under severe
operator prior to weather conditions.
taking this action.
(q)(2) Suspended This requirement
security measures would be added to
must be provide a
reimplemented as performance based
soon as conditions requirement for
permit. reimplementing
suspended security
measures.
Sec. 73.55(a) The (q)(3) The This requirement
suspension of safeguards suspension of would be retained
measures must be reported safeguards measures with minor revision
in accordance with the must be reported for documenting
provisions of Sec. 73.71. and documented in suspended security
accordance with the measures.
provisions of Sec.
73.71.
Sec. 73.55(a) Reports made (q)(4) Reports made This requirement
under Section Sec. 50.72 under Sec. 50.72 would be retained.
need not be duplicated of this chapter
under Sec. 73.71. need not be
duplicated under
Sec. 73.71.
(r) Records......... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The (r)(1) The This requirement
NRC may inspect, copy, and Commission may would be retained
take away copies of all inspect, copy, with minor
reports and documents retain, and remove revision. The
required to be kept by copies of all phrase ``reports
Commission regulations, records required to and documents''
orders, or applicable be kept by would be replaced
license conditions whether Commission with the word
the reports and documents regulations, ``records'' to
are kept by the licensee or orders, or license account for all
the contractor. conditions whether information
the records are collection
kept by the requirements
licensee or a regardless of
contractor. media, to include
electronic record
keeping systems.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4) These (r)(2) The licensee This requirement
reports must be maintained shall maintain all would be retained
in an auditable form, records required to and revised to
available for inspection, be kept by consolidate
for a period of 3 years. Commission multiple current
regulations, records retention
orders, or license requirements rather
conditions, as a than state the same
record until the requirement
Commission multiple times for
terminates the each record
license for which throughout this
the records were rule. The phrase
developed and shall ``unless otherwise
maintain superceded specified by the
portions of these Commission'' would
records for at be used to address
least three (3) any conflict that
years after the may arise between
record is other records
superseded, unless retention
otherwise specified requirements such
by the Commission. that the more
restrictive
requirement would
take precedence.
[[Page 62731]]
(s) Safety/security This requirement
interface. In would be added to
accordance with the provide specific
requirements of reference to the
Sec. 73.58, the proposed Sec.
licensee shall 73.58 for Safety
develop and and Security
implement a process Interface
to inform and requirements.
coordinate safety
and security
activities to
ensure that these
activities do not
adversely affect
the capabilities of
the security
organization to
satisfy the
requirements of
this section, or
overall plant
safety.
(t) Alternative This header would be
measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(a) The (t)(1) The This requirement
Commission may authorize an Commission may would be retained
applicant or licensee to authorize an and revised to
provide measures for applicant or provide a
protection against licensee to provide performance based
radiological sabotage other a measure for requirement for
than those required by this protection against alternative
section if the applicant or radiological measures that focus
licensee demonstrates that sabotage other than attention on the
the measures have the same one required by Commission's view
high assurance objective as this section if the that an alternative
specified in this paragraph applicant or measure is an
and that the overall level licensee unanalyzed
of system performance demonstrates that: substitute for a
provides protection against (i) The measure specific Commission
radiological sabotage meets the same requirement of this
equivalent to that which performance proposed section
would be provided by objective and and therefore, must
Paragraphs (b) through (h) requirements as be individually and
of this section and meets specified in knowingly reviewed
the general performance paragraph (b) of and approved by the
requirements of this this section, and. Commission before
section. (ii) The proposed implementation to
alternative measure ensure consistency
provides protection with these proposed
against Commission
radiological regulations. The
sabotage or theft Commission has
of unirradiated MOX determined that the
fuel assemblies, requirements
equivalent to that described in this
which would be proposed section
provided by the have been carefully
specific analyzed by the
requirement for Commission and
which it would therefore, an
substitute. alternative measure
to a proposed
requirement of this
section must also
be carefully
analyzed through
the process
addressed in 10 CFR
50.90 before
implementation.
Specifically, the
language used by
this proposed
requirement
addresses
alternative
measures
``individually''
rather than
collectively to
clarify that each
proposed
alternative measure
is unique by itself
and must be
analyzed as such.
In addition, the
phrase ``have the
same high assurance
objective'' is
replaced with the
phrase ``meets the
same performance
objective and
requirements as
specified in
paragraph (b) of
this section''.
The proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section
retains the same
``high assurance
objective''
referred to by the
current requirement
and incorporates by
reference the
performance based
requirements of
this proposed
section that
facilitate licensee
achievement of the
intended high
assurance
objective.
Sec. 73.55(c)(9)(i) For (t)(2) The licensee This requirement
licensees who choose to shall submit each would be retained
propose alternative proposed and revised to
measures as provided for in alternative measure expand the
10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), the to the Commission application of the
proposal must be submitted for review and current provision
in accordance with 10 CFR approval in for alternative
50.90 and include the accordance with measures to all
analysis and justification Sec. Sec. 50.4 proposed
for the proposed and 50.90 of this requirements of
alternatives. chapter before this section and
implementation. would provide the
process by which
alternative
measures would be
submitted for
Commission review
and approval.
Sec. 73.55(c)(8)(ii) (t)(3) The licensee This requirement
Propose alternative shall submit a would be retained
measures, in addition to technical basis for and revised to
the measures established in each proposed expand the
accordance with 10 CFR alternative application of the
73.55(c)(7), describe the measure, to include current provision
level of protection that any analysis or for alternative
these measures would assessment measures to all
provide against a land conducted in proposed
vehicle bomb, and compare support of a requirements of
the costs of the determination that this section and to
alternative measures with the proposed provide a
the costs of measures alternative measure description of the
necessary to fully meet the provides a level of detailed
design goals and criteria. protection that is information needed
at least equal to to support the
that which would technical basis for
otherwise be a request for
provided by the Commission approval
specific of an alternative
requirement of this measure.
section.
[[Page 62732]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(8)(ii) The (t)(4) Alternative This requirement
Commission will approve the vehicle barrier would be retained
proposed alternative systems. In the with minor
measures if they provide case of alternative revision. The
substantial protection vehicle barrier phrase ``The
against a land vehicle systems required by Commission will
bomb, and it is determined Sec. 73.55(e)(8), approve the
by an analysis, using the the licensee shall proposed
essential elements of 10 demonstrate that: alternative
CFR 50.109, that the costs (i) The alternative measures'' would be
of fully meeting the design measure provides deleted because
goals and criteria are not substantial approval would be
justified by the added protection against based on NRC
protection that would be a vehicle bomb, and. review. The
provided. (ii) Based on proposed language
comparison of the clearly stipulates
costs of the that alternative
alternative measures will be
measures to the reviewed by the
costs of meeting staff and approval
the Commission's would be contingent
requirements using upon the
the essential justification
elements of 10 CFR provided by the
50.109, the costs licensee to include
of fully meeting an analysis that
the Commission's examines the costs
requirements are and benefits of the
not justified by alternative measure
the protection that consistent with 10
would be provided. CFR 50.109.
Sec. 73.55 This requirement
Definitions. would be added to
clarify the use of
the listed terms
used in this
proposed rule.
Security Officer This definition
means a uniformed would be added to
individual, either clarify what is
armed with a meant by the term
covered weapon or ``Security
unarmed, whose Officer'' as used
primary duty is the in this document.
protection of a
facility, of
radioactive
material, or of
other property
against theft or
diversion or
against
radiological
sabotage.
Target Set means the This definition
combination of would be added to
equipment or clarify what is
operator actions meant by the term
which, if all are ``Target Set'' as
prevented from used in this
performing their document.
intended safety
function or
prevented from
being accomplished,
would likely result
in significant core
damage (e.g., non-
incipient, non-
localized fuel
melting, and/or
core disruption)
barring
extraordinary
action by plant
operators. A target
set with respect to
spent fuel sabotage
is draining the
spent fuel pool
leaving the spent
fuel uncovered for
a period of time,
allowing spent fuel
heat-up and the
associated
potential for
release of fission
products.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.--Proposed Part 73 Section 73.56
[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 73.56(a) General..... (a) Introduction.... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes. This
proposed Sec.
73.56(a) would
amend and
reorganize current
Sec. 73.56(a)
[General]. The
current Sec.
73.56(a) required
licensees to
develop and
implement access
authorization (AA)
programs. The
proposed Sec.
73.56(a) would
update these
requirements. The
title of this
paragraph would be
revised to more
accurately capture
the topics
addressed in the
proposed Sec.
73.56(a), which
would include a
description of the
NRC-regulated
entities who would
be subject to the
section and the
methods by which
the NRC intends
that licensees
would implement the
amended AA
programs. These
proposed changes to
the language and
organization of
current Sec.
73.56(a) would be
made to enhance the
clarity of the
requirements in
this section, for
the reasons
discussed in
Section IV.
[[Page 62733]]
Sec. 73.56(a) General. (1) (a)(1) By [date--180 This requirement
Each licensee who is days--after the would be added to
authorized on April 25, effective date of discuss the types
1991, to operate a nuclear the final rule of Commission
power reactor pursuant to published in the licensees to whom
Sec. Sec. 50.21(b) or Federal Register], the proposed
50.22 of this chapter shall each nuclear power requirements of
comply with the reactor licensee, this section would
requirements of this licensed under 10 apply and the
section. By April 27, 1992, CFR part 50, shall schedule for
the required access incorporate the submitting the
authorization program must revised amended access
be incorporated into the requirements of authorization
site Physical Security Plan this section program. The
as provided for by 10 CFR through amendments Commission intends
50.54(p)(2) and to its Commission- to delete the
implemented. By April 27, approved access current language,
1992, each licensee shall authorization because it applies
certify to the NRC that it program and shall only to a past rule
has implemented an access submit the amended change that is
authorization program that program to the completed. The
meets the requirements of Commission for proposed
this part. review and approval. requirements of
this section would
be applicable to
decommissioned/ing
reactors unless
otherwise approved
by the Commission.
This proposed
requirement would
add a requirement
for Commission
review and approval
of the amended
access
authorization
program to ensure
that access
authorization
programs meet the
objective of
providing high
assurance that
individuals who are
subject to the
requirements of
this section are
trustworthy and
reliable, and do
not constitute an
unreasonable risk
to public health
and safety or the
common defense and
security, including
the potential to
commit radiological
sabotage.
(a)(2) The amended This requirement
program must be would be added to
submitted as provide a reference
specified in Sec. to the current Sec.
50.4 and must 50.4(b)(4) which
describe how the describes
revised procedural details
requirements of relative to the
this section will proposed security
be implemented by plan submission
the licensee, to requirement.
include a proposed
implementation
schedule.
(a)(3) The licensee This requirement
shall implement the would be added to
existing approved clarify that the
access licensee must
authorization continue to
program and implement the
associated current Commission-
Commission orders approved security
until Commission plans until the
approval of the Commission approves
amended program, the amended plans.
unless otherwise The phrase ``unless
authorized by the otherwise
Commission. authorized by the
Commission'' would
provide flexibility
to account for
unanticipated
situations that may
affect the
licensee's ability
to comply with this
proposed
requirement.
(a)(4) The licensee This requirement
is responsible to would be added to
the Commission for clarify that the
maintaining the licensee is
authorization responsible for
program in meeting Commission
accordance with regulations and the
Commission approved security
regulations and plans. The phrase
related Commission- ``through the
directed orders implementation of
through the the approved
implementation of program and site
the approved implementing
program and site procedures'' would
implementing be added to
procedures. describe the
relationship
between Commission
regulations, the
approved
authorization
program, and
implementing
procedures. The
Commission views
the approved
security plans as
the mechanism
through which the
licensee implements
Commission
requirements.
[[Page 62734]]
Sec. 73.56(a)(2) Each (a)(5) Applicants This requirement
applicant for a license to for an operating would be added to
operate a nuclear power license under the describe the
reactor pursuant to Sec. provisions of part proposed
Sec. 50.21(b) or 50.22 of 50 of this chapter, requirements for
this chapter, whose or holders of a applicants and to
application was submitted combined license specify that the
prior to April 25, 1991, under the proposed
shall either by April 27, provisions of part requirements of
1992, or the date of 52 of this chapter, this section must
receipt of the operating shall satisfy the be met upon receipt
license, whichever is requirements of of an operating
later, incorporate the this section upon license or upon
required access receipt of an notice of the
authorization program into operating license Commission's
the site Physical Security or upon notice of finding under Sec.
Plan and implement it. the Commission's 52.103(g) of this
Sec. 73.56(a)(3) Each finding under Sec. chapter. This
applicant for a license to 52.103(g) of this proposed
operate a nuclear power chapter. requirement would
reactor pursuant to Sec. retain the meaning
Sec. 50.21(b) or 50.22 of of the current Sec.
this chapter and each 73.56(a)(3),
applicant for a combined which requires
construction permit and applicants for a
operating license pursuant license to operate
to part 52 of this chapter, a nuclear power
whose application is plant to
submitted after April 25, incorporate an
1991, shall include the access
required access authorization
authorization program as program in their
part of its Physical Physical Security
Security Plan. The Plan and implement
applicant, upon receipt of the approved access
an operating license or authorization
upon receipt of operating program when
authorization, shall approval to begin
implement the required operating is
access authorization received. This
program as part of its site proposed
Physical Security Plan.. requirement would
also add a
requirement for
Commission review
and approval of an
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan incorporating
the requirements of
this proposed
section for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(a)(1). The
Commission intends
to delete the
current Sec.
73.56(a)(2) because
there are no
remaining
applicants for an
operating license
under Sec. Sec.
50.21(b) or 50.22
of this chapter who
have not
implemented an AA
program under the
current
requirements.
Therefore, the
current paragraph
is no longer
necessary.
The proposed
paragraph would
retain the current
requirement for
licensees and
applicants to
implement access
authorization
programs upon
receipt of an
operating license
or operating
authorization,
respectively, and
add a requirement
for these entities
to maintain their
access
authorization
programs. The
requirement to
maintain AA
programs would be
added to convey
more accurately
that Sec. 73.56
includes
requirements for
maintaining AA
programs, in
addition to
requirements for
implementing them.
Sec. 73.56(a)(4) The (a)(6) Contractors Proposed Sec.
licensee may accept part of and vendors (C/Vs) 73.56(a)(6) would
an access authorization who implement amend current Sec.
program used by its authorization 73.56(a)(4), which
contractors, vendors, or programs or program permits licensees
other affected elements shall to accept a C/V
organizations and develop, implement, authorization
substitute, supplement, or and maintain program to meet the
duplicate any portion of authorization standards of this
the program as necessary to programs or program section. The
meet the requirements of elements that meet proposed paragraph
this section. In any case, the requirements of would retain the
the licensee is responsible this section, to current permission
for granting, denying, or the extent that the for licensees to
revoking unescorted access licensees and accept C/V
authorization to any applicants authorization
contractor, vendor, or specified in programs, in full
other affected organization paragraphs (a)(1) or in part, but
employee. and (a)(5) of this would also add C/Vs
section rely upon to the list of
those C/V entities who are
authorization subject to proposed
programs or program Sec. 73.56 in
elements to meet order to convey
the requirements of more clearly that C/
this section. In Vs may be directly
any case, only a subject to NRC
licensee or inspection and
applicant shall enforcement actions
grant or permit an than the current
individual to rule language
maintain unescorted implies.
access to nuclear
power plant
protected and vital
areas.
[[Page 62735]]
This change is
necessary to
clarify the
applicability of
the rule's
requirements to a C/
V's authorization
program because
several
requirements in the
current section
could be
interpreted as
implying that a C/V
is accountable to
the licensee but
not to the NRC,
should significant
weaknesses be
identified in the C/
V's authorization
program upon which
one or more
licensees rely.
However, this
interpretation
would be incorrect.
Therefore, proposed
Sec. 73.56(a)(6)
would include C/V
authorization
programs and
program elements
upon which
licensees and
applicants rely
within the scope of
this section to
convey more
accurately that
these C/Vs are
directly
accountable to the
NRC for meeting the
applicable
requirements of
Sec. 73.56. This
clarification is
also necessary to
maintain the
internal
consistency of the
proposed rule
because some
provisions of the
proposed section
apply only to C/Vs,
including, but not
limited to, the
second sentence of
proposed Sec.
73.56(n)(7). The
proposed paragraph
would also retain
the intent of the
current requirement
that only licensees
and applicants have
the authority to
grant or permit an
individual to
maintain unescorted
access to nuclear
power plant
protected and vital
areas.
The phrases,
``program
elements'' and ``to
the extent that * *
*,'' would replace
the second sentence
of current Sec.
73.56(a)(4), which
permits licensees
to accept part of
an authorization
program used by its
contractors,
vendors, or other
affected
organizations and
substitute,
supplement, or
duplicate any
portion of the
program as
necessary to meet
the requirements of
this section. The
proposed change
would retain the
meaning of the
current provision,
but would clarify
the intent of the
provision in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees. The
phrase, ``program
elements,'' would
replace ``part of
an access
authorization
program,'' to more
clearly convey that
the parts of an
authorization
program to which
this provision
refers are the
program elements
that are required
under current and
proposed Sec.
73.56, including a
background
investigation;
psychological
assessment;
behavioral
observation; a
review procedure
for adverse
determinations
regarding an
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability;
audits; the
protection of
information; and
retaining and
sharing records.
[[Page 62736]]
The phrase, ``to the
extent that the
licensees and
applicants rely
upon C/V
authorization
programs or program
elements,'' would
be used in proposed
Sec. 73.56(a)(6)
to clarify that C/
Vs need only meet
the requirements of
this section for
those authorization
program elements
upon which
licensees and
applicants who are
subject to this
section rely. This
change would be
made to address two
issues. First, ``to
the extent that''
would be used to
indicate that C/Vs
need not implement
every element of an
AA program in order
for licensees to
rely on the program
elements that a C/V
does implement in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section. For
example, if a C/V
conducts background
investigations upon
which licensees
rely in making
unescorted access
authorization
determinations, the
background
investigations must
meet the
requirements of
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(i) [or
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)]. However,
the C/V need not
also perform
psychological
assessments or any
other services for
licensees in order
for licensees to
rely on the
background
investigations that
the C/V performs.
Second, the phrase,
``to the extent
that,'' would also
indicate that any
elements of an
authorization
program that a C/V
implements that are
not relied upon by
licensees need not
meet the
requirements of
this section.
For example, if the
same C/V in the
previous example
also offers
psychological
assessment
services, in
addition to
conducting
background
investigations for
licensees, but no
licensees or
applicants who are
subject to this
section rely on
those psychological
assessment services
to make unescorted
access
authorization
decisions, then the
C/V need not meet
the requirements of
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(ii) [or
proposed Sec.
73.56(e)]
for
conducting those
psychological
assessments. These
proposed changes to
the terms used in
current Sec.
73.56(a)(4) would
be made for
increased clarity
in the language of
the rule.
(b) Individuals who A new Sec.
are subject to an 73.56(b)
authorization [Individuals who
program. are subject to an
(b)(1) The following AA program]
would
individuals shall specify the
be subject to an individuals who
authorization must be subject to
program:. an AA program,
based on their job
duties and
responsibilities.
Current Sec.
73.56 requires only
that individuals
who have unescorted
access to protected
and vital areas
shall be subject to
an AA program. The
proposed rule would
add several
categories of
individuals who
would be subject to
the proposed AA
program, for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
each paragraph that
addresses the
additional
categories of
individuals who
would be covered.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(b) would be
added for clarity
in the organization
of the proposed
section by grouping
together in one
list the
individuals who
would be subject to
the proposed
regulations.
[[Page 62737]]
Sec. 73.56(b) General (b)(1)(i) Any Proposed Sec.
performance objective and individual to whom 73.56(b)(1)(i)
requirements. (1) The a licensee or would retain the
licensee shall establish applicant grants current requirement
and maintain an access unescorted access that any individual
authorization program to nuclear power who has unescorted
granting individuals plant protected and access to nuclear
unescorted access to vital areas. power plant
protected and vital areas * protected and vital
* *. areas shall be
subject to an AA
program that meets
the requirements of
this section. The
current requirement
is embedded in the
first sentence of
current Sec.
73.56(b) [General
performance
objective and
requirements]. The
proposed paragraph
would list this
category of
individuals
separately for
organizational
clarity in the
rule.
(b)(1)(ii) Any A new Sec.
individual whose 73.56(b)(1)(ii)
assigned duties and would require that
responsibilities individuals who are
permit the assigned duties and
individual to take responsibilities
actions by that permit them to
electronic means, take actions by
either onsite or electronic means
remotely, that that could
could adversely adversely impact a
impact a licensee's licensee's or
or applicant's applicant's
operational safety, operational safety,
security, or security, or
emergency response emergency response
capabilities; and capabilities would
be subject to an AA
program.
The proposed
provision would be
consistent with the
intent of current
Sec. 73.56, which
is to ensure that
anyone who has
unescorted access
to equipment that
is important to the
operational safety
and security of
plant operations
must be trustworthy
and reliable. As
discussed in
Section IV.3,
because of the
increased use of
digital systems and
advanced
communications
technologies in
nuclear power
plants, the current
regulations, which
focus on
individuals who
have physical
access to equipment
within protected
and vital areas, do
not provide
adequate assurance
of the
trustworthiness and
reliability of
persons whose job
duties and
responsibilities
permit them to take
actions through
electronic means
that can affect
operational safety,
security, and
emergency response
capabilities, but
who, because of
advances in
electronic
communications, may
not require
physical access to
protected and vital
areas. For example,
some licensees have
installed systems
that permit
engineers or
information
technology
technicians to take
actions from remote
locations that may
affect the
operability of
safety-related
components, or
affect the
functionality of
operating systems.
Because the
potential impact of
actions taken
through electronic
means may be as
serious as actions
taken by an
individual who is
physically present
within a protected
or vital area, the
NRC has determined
that subjecting
this additional
category of
individuals to the
AA program is
necessary.
[[Page 62738]]
(b)(1)(iii) Any Proposed Sec.
individual who has 73.56(b)(1)(iii)
responsibilities would require that
for implementing a certain individuals
licensee's or who are members of
applicant's the licensee's or
protective applicant's
strategy, security
including, but not organization shall
limited to, armed be subject to an AA
security force program, based on
officers, alarm their
station operators, responsibilities
and tactical for implementing a
response team licensee's
leaders; and protective
strategy. Current
Sec. 73.55
requires that any
armed members of
the security
organization must
be subject to an AA
program, but the
proposed rule would
also list them here
for clarity and
completeness in the
requirements of
this section. The
proposed paragraph
would also include
any individual who
has
responsibilities
for implementing
the licensee's
protective
strategy, which may
include individuals
who are not armed.
In practice, the
NRC is not aware of
any licensees,
applicants, or C/Vs
who do not subject
this broader
category of
individuals to an
AA program.
However, the
proposed rule would
specify that these
individuals shall
be subject to an AA
program because of
their critical
responsibilities
with respect to
plant security and,
therefore, the need
for high assurance
that they are
trustworthy and
reliable.
(b)(1)(iv) The Proposed Sec.
licensee's, 73.56(b)(1)(iv)
applicant's, or C/ would introduce a
V's reviewing new term,
official. ``reviewing
official,'' to Sec.
73.56 to refer to
an individual who
is designated by a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to be responsible
for reviewing and
evaluating
information about
persons who are
applying for
unescorted access
authorization and
determining whether
to grant, deny,
maintain, or
unfavorably
terminate
unescorted access
authorization. The
proposed paragraph
would require
reviewing officials
to be subject to
the AA program
because of the key
role these
individuals play in
providing high
assurance that
persons who are
granted unescorted
access to protected
areas and
electronic access
to operational
safety, security,
or emergency
response systems
within protected or
vital areas are
trustworthy and
reliable.
In addition,
reviewing
officials' actions
affect the
confidence that the
public, management,
the NRC, and
individuals who are
subject to the AA
program have in the
integrity of the
program and the
accuracy and
reliability of the
authorization
decisions that are
made under the
program. Therefore,
the NRC believes
that reviewing
officials must meet
the highest
standards for
trustworthiness and
reliability,
including the
requirements of an
AA program.
[[Page 62739]]
(b)(2) At the Proposed Sec.
licensee's, 73.56(b)(2) would
applicant's, or C/ recognize the long-
V's discretion, standing industry
other individuals practice, which has
who are designated been endorsed by
in access the NRC, of
authorization subjecting
program procedures additional
may be subject to individuals to
an authorization authorization
program that meets requirements during
the requirements of periods when those
this section. individuals do not
require and have
not been granted
unescorted access
to protected or
vital areas. For
example, some C/Vs,
whose personnel may
be called upon by a
licensee to work at
a licensee's site
under contract,
implement full
authorization
programs to cover
those personnel.
Similarly, some
licensees require
employees who are
normally stationed
at their corporate
headquarters to be
subject to an
authorization
program, for such
access, is referred
to as having
``unescorted
access'' (UA).
The proposed
paragraph would be
added to give
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs who implement
authorization
programs that meet
the requirements of
this part the
authority to do so
under the proposed
rule.
Sec. 73.56(b) General (c) General Proposed Sec.
performance objective and performance 73.56(c) would
requirements. (1) The objective. Access retain the meaning
licensee shall establish authorization of the current
and maintain an access programs must program performance
authorization program provide high objective, which is
granting individuals assurance that the embedded in current
unescorted access to individuals who are Sec. 73.56(b),
protected and vital areas specified in but would separate
with the objective of paragraph (b)(1) of it from the
providing high assurance this section, and, requirement in the
that individuals granted if applicable, current paragraph
unescorted access are (b)(2) of this for licensees to
trustworthy and reliable, section are establish and
and do not constitute an trustworthy and maintain an AA
unreasonable risk to the reliable, such that program. The
health and safety of the they do not requirement to
public including a constitute an establish and
potential to commit unreasonable risk maintain AA
radiological sabotage. to public health programs would be
and safety or the moved to proposed
common defense and Sec. 73.56(a),
security, including where it would be
the potential to imposed on each
commit radiological entity who would be
sabotage. subject to the
section, for
organizational
clarity. The
performance
objective would be
revised to add
cross-references to
the categories of
individuals who
must be subject to
an authorization
program, as
specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(b), because
the proposed rule
would require that
certain
individuals, in
addition to those
who have unescorted
physical access to
protected and vital
areas of a nuclear
power plant, would
be subject to the
AA program, as
discussed with
respect to Sec.
73.56(b).
In addition, the
phrase, ``common
defense and
security,'' would
be added to the
proposed paragraph
to convey the
purpose of
authorization
programs more
specifically, which
would include
protection of the
public from the
potential insider
activities defined
in current Sec.
73.1(a)(1)(B) and
(a)(2)(B).
[[Page 62740]]
Sec. 73.56(2) Except as (d) Background Proposed Sec.
provided for in paragraphs investigation. In 73.56(d) would
(c) and (d) of this order to grant amend current Sec.
section, the unescorted unescorted access 73.56(b)(2)(i),
access authorization authorization to an which requires
program must include the individual, the authorization
following: (i) A background licensees, programs to include
investigation designed to applicants and C/Vs a background
identify past actions which specified in investigation and
are indicative of an paragraph (a) of describes the
individual's future this section shall aspects of an
reliability within a ensure that the individual's
protected or vital area of individual has been background to be
a nuclear power reactor. As subject to a investigated.
a minimum, the background background Proposed Sec.
investigation must verify investigation. The 73.56(d) would
an individual's * * *. background retain the
investigation must requirements of the
include, but is not current paragraph,
limited to, the but increase the
following elements: level of detail
with which they are
specified in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees and in
order to increase
consistency among
authorization
programs, as
discussed in
Section IV.3.
Because the
requirements in the
proposed rule would
be more detailed,
the current
paragraph would be
restructured and
subdivided to
present
requirements for
each element of the
background
investigation in a
separate paragraph.
This change would
be made for
increased clarity
in the organization
of the rule. The
cross-references to
paragraphs (c) and
(d) in the current
provision would be
deleted because
they would no
longer apply in the
reorganized
section.
The proposed
provision would use
the phrase,
``ensure that the
individual has been
subject to a
background
investigation,''
because completion
of every element of
a background
investigation may
not be required
each time an
individual applies
for UAA. As
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.46(h)(1)
and (h)(2), the
proposed rule would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs, in order to
meet the
requirements of
this section, to
accept and rely on
certain background
investigation
elements,
psychological
assessments, and
behavioral
observation
training conducted
by other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs who are subject
this section. This
permission would
reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden
by eliminating
redundancies in
authorization
program elements
that cover the same
subject matter and
periods of time.
However, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
paragraphs (h) and
(i)(1) of this
section, the
proposed rule would
establish time
limits on the
permission to
accept and rely on
authorization
program elements to
which the
individual was
previously subject,
based upon how far
in the past the
background
investigation
element,
psychological
assessment, and
behavioral
observation
training was
conducted.
These time limits
are discussed in
more detail with
respect to the
specific provisions
in the proposed
rule that address
them.
[[Page 62741]]
(d)(1) Informed Proposed Sec.
consent. The 73.56(d)(1) would
licensees, require the
applicants, and C/ entities who are
Vs specified in subject to this
paragraph (a) of section to obtain
this section may written consent
not initiate any from any individual
element of a who is applying for
background UAA before the
investigation licensee,
without the applicant, or C/V
knowledge and initiates any
written consent of element of the
the subject background
individual. investigation that
Licensees, is required in this
applicants, and C/ section. The
Vs shall inform the practice of
individual of his obtaining the
or her right to individual's
review information written consent for
collected to assure the background
its accuracy and investigation has
provide the been endorsed by
individual with an the NRC and
opportunity to incorporated into
correct any licensees' Physical
inaccurate or Security Plans
incomplete since Sec. 73.56
information that is was first
developed by promulgated. It is
licensees, necessary to
applicants, and C/ protect the privacy
Vs about the rights of
individual. individuals who are
applying for UAA.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to inform the
individual of his
or her right to
review information
that is developed
by the licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to verify its
accuracy, and have
the opportunity to
correct any
misinformation.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6) would
further require the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to ensure that any
necessary
corrections are
made to information
about the
individual that has
been recorded in
the information-
sharing mechanism
that would be
required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), as
discussed with
respect to that
paragraph. These
are also industry
practices that have
been endorsed by
the NRC and
incorporated into
licensees' Physical
Security Plans.
Permitting the
individual to
review and have the
opportunity to
correct personal
information that is
collected about him
or her is necessary
to maintain
individuals'
confidence in the
fairness of
authorization
programs by
protecting
individuals from
possible adverse
employment actions
that may result
from an inability
to gain unescorted
access to protected
areas, based upon
incorrect
information.
Requiring the
entities who are
subject to this
section to correct
information
contained in the
information-sharing
mechanism, as would
be required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), is
necessary to
maintain the
integrity of the
personal
information shared
among the entities
who would be
subject to the
proposed section,
and the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
[[Page 62742]]
(d)(1)(i) The Proposed Sec.
subject individual 73.56(d)(1)(i)
may withdraw his or would specify that
her consent at any an individual who
time. The licensee, has given his or
applicant or C/V to her written consent
whom the individual for a background
has applied for investigation under
unescorted access proposed Sec.
authorization shall 73.56(d)(1) may
inform the withdraw that
individual that-- consent at any
(A) Withdrawal of time. However,
his or her consent because a
will withdraw the background
individual's investigation is
current application one of the
for access requirements for
authorization under granting UAA, and
the licensee's, because the
applicant's or C/ background
V's authorization investigation
program; and. cannot be completed
(B) Other licensees, without the subject
applicants and C/Vs individual's
will have access to consent, proposed
information Sec.
documenting the 73.56(d)(1)(i)(A)
withdrawal through would specify that
the information- the licensee,
sharing mechanism applicant, or C/V
required under to whom the
paragraph (o)(6) of individual has
this section.. applied for UAA
must inform the
individual who has
withdrawn consent
that withdrawal of
consent will
terminate the
individual's
current application
for UAA. In
addition, the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would be required
by proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(i)(B)
to notify the
individual that
other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs will have access
to information
documenting the
withdrawal through
the information-
sharing mechanism
required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6). That
proposed paragraph
would require that
information
specified in the
licensee's or
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan about
individuals who
have applied for
UAA, must be
recorded and
retained in a
database that is
administered as an
information-sharing
mechanism by
licensees and
applicants subject
to Sec. 73.56.
(d)(1)(ii) If an Proposed Sec.
individual 73.56(d)(1)(ii)
withdraws his or would establish
her consent, the several
licensees, requirements
applicants and C/Vs related to a
specified in withdrawal of
paragraph (a) of consent by an
this section may individual who has
not initiate any applied for UAA.
elements of the The proposed
background paragraph would
investigation that require the
were not in entities who are
progress at the subject to this
time the individual section to document
withdrew his or her the individual's
consent, but shall withdrawal of
complete any consent, and
background complete and
investigation document any
elements that are elements of the
in progress at the background
time consent is investigation that
withdrawn. In the had been initiated
information-sharing before the time at
mechanism required which an individual
under paragraph withdraws his or
(o)(6) of this her consent, and
section, the would prohibit the
licensee, initiation of any
applicant, or C/V element that was
shall record the not in progress.
individual's For example, if a
application for licensee had
unescorted access submitted a request
authorization; his to a credit history
or her withdrawal reporting agency
of consent for the before an
background individual withdrew
investigation; the his or her consent,
reason given by the the proposed
individual for the paragraph would
withdrawal, if any; require the
and any pertinent licensee to
information document the credit
collected from the history information
background that is obtained
investigation about the
elements that were individual, even if
completed. the licensee
receives the credit
history report
after the date on
which the
individual withdrew
his or her consent.
However, if the
licensee had not
yet requested
information about
the individual's
military service
history at the time
the individual
withdraws consent,
the proposed
provision would
prohibit the
licensee from
initiating a
request for
military service
history
information. There
are many reasons
that an individual
may withdraw his or
her consent for the
background
investigation.
[[Page 62743]]
In most instances,
the reason that an
individual
withdraws his or
her consent is
legitimate, such as
a change in the
individual's work
assignment.
However, in some
instances, the NRC
is aware that
individuals have
withdrawn consent
for the background
investigation in
order to attempt to
prevent the
discovery of
adverse information
or the sharing of
adverse information
already discovered
about the
individual by the
licensee with other
licensees. If the
licensee were to
stop all
information
gathering at the
time at which the
individual withdrew
his or her consent,
the likelihood that
the adverse
information would
be discovered would
be reduced. As a
result, the
individual could be
afforded an
opportunity to
create a risk to
public health and
safety and the
common defense and
security by having
physical access to
a protected or
vital area, and
most importantly,
be in a position to
observe the
licensee's security
posture by
obtaining access to
a licensee facility
under escort,
because a rigorous
background
investigation is
not required for
individuals who
``visit'' a nuclear
power plant under
escort.
Similarly, if
information that
had been requested
by the licensee,
such as a criminal
history report
under proposed Sec.
73.57
[Requirements for
criminal history
checks of
individuals granted
unescorted access
to a nuclear power
facility or access
to safeguards
information by
power reactor
licensees]
of this
chapter or the
credit history
report under
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(5), was
received by the
licensee after the
time the individual
withdrew consent
and contained
adverse
information, but
that adverse
information was not
documented in the
information-sharing
mechanism required
under proposed
paragraph (o)(6) of
this section, the
individual also
could be
inappropriately
permitted to visit
under escort the
same or another
site because the
adverse information
would not be
available for
review. Therefore,
the proposed
provisions would be
necessary to
maintain the
effectiveness of AA
programs in
protecting public
health and safety
and the common
defense and
security by
ensuring that all
available
information about
individuals who
have applied for
UAA is documented
and shared, while
also protecting the
privacy rights of
individuals by
initiating no
further elements of
the background
investigation when
an individual
withdraws his or
her consent.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to create a
record, accessible
to other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs, of the fact
that an individual
withdrew his or her
consent to the
background
investigation and
the reason for the
withdrawal. This
record would need
to be created in
the information-
sharing mechanism
required by
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), in
order for
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to carry out the
notice requirement
in proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(i)(B).
[[Page 62744]]
Sec. 73.56(4) Failure by (d)(1)(iii) The
an individual to report any licensees,
previous suspension, applicants, and C/
revocation, or denial of Vs specified in
unescorted access to paragraph (a) of
nuclear power reactors is this section shall
considered sufficient cause inform, in writing,
for denial of unescorted any individual who
access authorization. is applying for
unescorted access
authorization that
the following
actions related to
providing and
sharing the
personal
information under
this section are
sufficient cause
for denial or
unfavorable
termination of
unescorted access
authorization:
(A) Refusal to
provide written
consent for the
background
investigation;.
(B) Refusal to
provide or the
falsification of
any personal
history information
required under this
section, including
the failure to
report any previous
denial or
unfavorable
termination of
unescorted access
authorization;
Proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(iii)
would replace
current Sec.
73.56(b)(4). The
proposed paragraph
would retain the
intent of the
current provision
in proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), but
would add other
actions related to
providing and
sharing personal
information that
would be sufficient
cause for a
reviewing official
to deny or
unfavorably
terminate an
individual's UAA.
Proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(B) of
this section would
add falsification
of any personal
history information
as a sufficient
reason to deny or
unfavorably
terminate UAA in
order to deter
falsification
attempts..
(C) Refusal to Proposed paragraph
provide written (d)(1)(iii)(D) of
consent for the this section would
sharing of personal add failure to
information with comply with the
other licensees, arrest-reporting
applicants, or C/Vs requirements of
required under proposed paragraph
paragraph (d)(4)(v) (g) of this section
of this section; as a sufficient
and reason to deny or
(D) Failure to unfavorably
report any arrests terminate UAA in
or formal actions order to deter
specified in individuals from
paragraph (g) of delaying or failing
this section.. to report such
incidents. The
additional actions
that would be
sufficient cause
for denial or
unfavorable
termination would
include: refusing
to provide written
consent for the
background
investigation that
would be required
under proposed
paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(A) of
this section;
refusing to provide
personal history
information
required under
paragraph (d)(2) of
this section, in
proposed
(d)(1)(iii)(B); and
refusing to provide
written consent for
the individual's
personal
information to be
shared among the
entities who would
be subject to this
section that would
be required under
paragraph (d)(4)(v)
of this section, in
proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(C).
[[Page 62745]]
The proposed rule
would specify these
requirements for
the disclosure and
sharing of personal
information because
implementation of
the AA programs
required under this
section requires
individuals to
disclose and permit
the sharing of such
personal
information,
subject to the
protections of such
information that
would be provided
in proposed Sec.
73.56(m). The
proposed paragraph
would also require
the entities who
are subject to this
section to inform
individuals of the
potential
consequences of
these actions so
that individuals
understand the
requirements to
which they are
subject and,
therefore, would be
more likely to
comply with them.
The proposed
paragraph would
delete the terms,
``suspension'' and
``revocation,'' and
replace them with
the term,
``unfavorable
termination.''
Historically, there
have been some
inconsistencies
between Sec.
73.56 access
authorization
requirements and
related
requirements in 10
CFR part 26 that
have led to
implementation
questions from
licensees, as well
as inconsistencies
in how the
licensees have
implemented the
requirements.
During the public
meetings discussed
in Section IV.3,
the stakeholders
provided examples
of ambiguities in
the terms used in
Sec. 73.56 and
how these
ambiguities and
lack of clarity in
Sec. 73.56 had
resulted in
unintended
consequences.
Therefore, to
address stakeholder
requests for
clarity and
consistently
describe the
actions of denying
UAA to an
individual and
terminating an
individual's UAA
for cause in
proposed Sec.
73.56, only the
terms, ``deny or
denial'' and
``unfavorably
terminate or
unfavorable
termination,''
would be used in
the proposed
paragraph and
throughout the
proposed section.
(d)(2) Personal Proposed Sec.
history disclosure. 73.56(d)(2) would
(i) Any individual require an
who is applying for individual who is
unescorted access applying for UAA to
authorization shall provide the
disclose the personal
personal history information that is
information that is required under the
required by the licensee's,
licensee's, applicant's, or C/
applicant's, or C/ V's authorization
V's authorization program, and any
program and any information that
information that may be necessary
may be necessary for the reviewing
for the reviewing official to
official to make a evaluate the
determination of individual's
the individual's trustworthiness and
trustworthiness and reliability. The
reliability.. proposed provision
would be added to
impose a
requirement on
individuals to
divulge personal
information in
order to be granted
UAA, in response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
[[Page 62746]]
The proposed
paragraph would not
specify the nature
of the information
that individuals
may be required to
disclose because
the information may
vary widely,
depending upon a
number of factors,
including, but not
limited to, whether
or not the
individual has
previously held
UAA; the length of
time that has
elapsed since his
or her last period
of UAA was
terminated; the job
duties and
responsibilities
that the individual
would perform for
which UAA is
required; and
whether any adverse
information about
the individual is
disclosed or
discovered as a
result of the
background
investigation,
psychological
assessment, or the
suitable inquiry
and drug and
alcohol testing
required under part
26 of this chapter.
Although the amount
and nature of
information to be
disclosed would
vary depending on
the factors
described,
individuals
applying for UAA
would be required
to disclose some
personal history
information each
time he or she
applies for UAA, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
[Granting
unescorted access
authorization].
(d)(2)(ii) Proposed Sec.
Licensees, 73.56(d)(2)(ii)
applicants, and C/ would prohibit a
Vs may not require licensee,
an individual to applicant, or C/V
disclose an from requiring an
administrative individual to
withdrawal of report an
unescorted access administrative
authorization under withdrawal of UAA
the requirements of that may be
paragraphs (g), required under
(h)(7), or proposed Sec.
(i)(1)(v) of this 73.56(g), (h)(7),
section, if the or (i)(1)(v),
individual's except if the
unescorted access information
authorization was developed or
not subsequently discovered about
denied or the individual
terminated during the period
unfavorably by a of the
licensee, administrative
applicant, or C/V. withdrawal resulted
in a denial or
unfavorable
termination of the
individual's UAA.
The proposed
paragraph would
ensure that a
temporary
administrative
withdrawal of an
individual's UAA,
caused by an
administrative
delay in completing
an evaluation of
any formal legal
action, or any
portion of a
background
investigation, re-
investigation, or
psychological
assessment or re-
assessment that is
not under the
individual's
control, would not
be treated as an
unfavorable
termination, except
if the reviewing
official determines
that the delayed
information
requires denial or
unfavorable
termination of the
individual's UAA.
This proposed
provision would be
necessary to
maintain the
public's and
individuals'
confidence in the
fairness of AA
programs by
protecting
individuals from
possible adverse
employment actions
that may be based
upon administrative
delays for which
they are not
responsible.
[[Page 62747]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(3) Verification Proposed Sec.
true identity, and develop of true identity. 73.56(d)(3) would
information concerning an Licensees, expand on the
individual's employment applicants, and C/ portion of current
history, education history, Vs shall verify the Sec.
credit history, criminal true identity of an 73.56(b)(2)(i) that
history, military service, individual who is requires licensees
and verify an individual's applying for to verify an
character and reputation. unescorted access individual's true
authorization in identity. The
order to ensure proposed paragraph
that the applicant would require the
is the person that entities who are
he or she has subject to this
claimed to be. At a section, at a
minimum, licensees, minimum, to
applicants, and C/ validate the social
Vs shall validate security number, or
the social security in the case of
number that the foreign nationals,
individual has the alien
provided, and, in registration
the case of foreign number, that the
nationals, the individual has
alien registration provided to the
number that the licensee, applicant
individual or C/V. The term,
provides. In ``validation,''
addition, would be used in
licensees, the proposed
applicants, and C/ paragraph to
Vs shall also indicate that
determine whether licensees,
the results of the applicants and C/Vs
fingerprinting would be required
required under Sec. to take steps to
73.21 confirm the access information
individual's in addition to that
claimed identity, provided by the
if such results are individual from
available. other reliable
sources to ensure
that the personal
identifying
information the
individual has
provided to the
licensee is
authentic. This
validation could be
achieved through a
variety of means,
including, but not
limited to,
accessing
information from
databases that are
maintained by the
Federal Government,
or evaluating an
accumulation of
information, such
as comparing the
social security
number the
individual provided
to the social
security number(s)
included in a
credit history
report and
information
obtained from other
sources.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require using
the information
obtained from
fingerprinting
individuals, as
required under
proposed Sec.
73.21, to confirm
an individual's
identity, if that
information is
available. The
proposed
requirement
clarifies the NRC's
intent with respect
to this portion of
the background
investigation.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4) Employment Proposed Sec.
and develop information history evaluation. 73.56(d)(4) would
concerning an individual's Licensees, amend the portion
employment history * * *. applicants, and C/ of current Sec.
Vs shall ensure 73.56(b)(2)(i) that
that an employment requires licensees
history evaluation to develop
has been completed, information
by questioning the concerning an
individual's individual's
present and former employment history,
employers, and by education history,
determining the and military
activities of service. This
individuals while paragraph would be
unemployed. added in response
to many
implementation
questions about
these requirements
from licensees.
Because the
proposed paragraph
would add several
clarifications of
the current
requirements, it
would be subdivided
to present each
requirement
separately for
organizational
clarity in the
rule. Considered
together, the
requirements of
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4) would
clarify the NRC's
intent that periods
of unemployment,
education, and
military service
must be evaluated
only if the
individual claims
them instead of
typical civilian
employment.
[[Page 62748]]
Proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4) would
require licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to demonstrate a
best effort to
complete the
employment history
evaluation. The
term, ``best
effort,'' would be
added to clarify
the requirements
and increase
consistency between
Sec. 73.56 and
related
requirements in 10
CFR 26.27(a). The
best effort
criterion
recognizes
licensees',
applicants', and C/
Vs' status as
commercial entities
with no legal
authority to
require the release
of the information
from other private
employers and
educational
institutions.
Because of privacy
and potential
litigation
concerns, some
private employers
and educational
institutions may be
unable or unwilling
to release
qualitative
information about a
former employee or
student. Therefore,
the best effort
criterion would
first require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to seek
employment
information from
the primary source
(e.g. a company,
private employer,
or educational
institution that
the applicant has
listed on his or
her employment
history), but
recognizes that it
may not be
forthcoming. In
this case a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would be required
to seek information
from an alternate,
secondary source
when the
information from
the primary source
is unavailable.
The proposed
provision would use
the phrase,
``ensure that the
employment history
evaluation has been
completed,''
because a licensee,
applicant, or C/V
may not be required
to conduct an
employment history
evaluation for
every individual
who applies for
UAA. As discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(3) and
(h)(4), the
proposed rule would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to accept and
rely on elements of
the background
investigations,
psychological
assessments, and
behavioral
observation
training conducted
by other entities
who are subject to
this section to
meet the
requirements of
this section.
Therefore, the need
for and extent of
the employment
history evaluation
would vary,
depending upon how
much recent
information was
available to the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
from any previous
periods during
which the
individual may have
held UAA. In the
case of individuals
whose UAA has been
interrupted for 30
or fewer days,
proposed Sec.
73.56(h) would not
require an
employment history
evaluation for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
that paragraph.
[[Page 62749]]
However, proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
would establish
time limits on the
permission to
accept and rely on
AA program elements
to which the
individual was
previously subject,
based upon how far
in the past the
background
investigation,
psychological
assessment, and
behavioral
observation
training elements
were completed.
These time limits
are discussed in
more detail with
respect to the
specific provisions
in the proposed
rule that address
them. The proposed
provision would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to determine the
activities of
individuals during
periods in which
the individual was
unemployed. The
proposed rule would
add this
requirement to make
certain that,
during the periods
that individuals
claim to have been
unemployed, (1)
they were not
engaged in
activities that may
reflect adversely
on their
trustworthiness and
reliability, such
as confinement for
periods of
incarceration or in-
patient drug or
alcohol treatment,
or (2) they
intentionally
failed to disclose
periods of
employment that
were ended
unfavorably.
(d)(4)(i) For the A new Sec.
claimed employment 73.56(d)(4)(i)
period, the would specify the
employment history purpose of the
evaluation must employment history
ascertain the evaluation, which
reason for would be to
termination, ascertain
eligibility for information about
rehire, and other the individual's
information that trustworthiness and
could reflect on reliability, and
the individual's the types of
trustworthiness and information that
reliability. the licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would seek from
employers regarding
an individual who
is applying for
UAA. The proposed
paragraph would
require the
entities who are
subject to this
section to
ascertain,
consistent with the
``best effort''
criterion
established in
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), the
reason that the
individual's
employment was
terminated, his or
her eligibility for
rehire, and other
information that
could reflect on
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
term,
``ascertain,''
would be used in
the proposed
paragraph because
it is consistent
with the
terminology used by
the industry to
refer to the
actions taken with
respect to
conducting the
employment history
evaluation and
would, therefore,
improve the clarity
of this requirement
for those who must
implement it.
In addition, there
may be instances in
which it is
unnecessary for a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to conduct the
employment history
evaluation, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(d)(4),
because proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(2)
would permit the
entities who
implement
authorization
programs to rely on
employment history
evaluations
conducted by other
entities who are
subject to this
section. In such
cases, the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official would not
review information
that was developed
under his or her AA
program, but would
ascertain the
subject
individual's
employment history
by reviewing
information that
had been collected
by others. The
proposed
requirement would
be added in
response to
implementation
questions that have
arisen about the
employment history
check that is
required in current
Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(i).
[[Page 62750]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4)(ii) If the Proposed Sec.
the background claimed employment 73.56(d)(4)(ii)
investigation must * * * was military would amend the
develop information service, the portion of current
concerning an individual's licensee, Sec. 73.56(2)(i)
* * * military service * * applicant, or C/V that requires
*. who is conducting licensees to
the employment develop information
history evaluation about an
shall request a individual's
characterization of military service.
service, reason for The proposed
separation, and any paragraph would
disciplinary clarify the NRC's
actions that could intent that
affect a verification and
trustworthiness and characterization of
reliability the individual's
determination. military service
would be required
only if the
individual claims
military service as
employment within
the periods during
which the
individual would be
required to
disclose his or her
employment history,
as specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h) [Granting
unescorted access
authorization].
This clarification
would respond to
implementation
questions from
licensees and
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4)(iii) Periods Proposed Sec.
and develop information of self-employment 73.56(d)(4)(iii)
concerning an individual's or unemployment may would be added at
* * * education history, * be verified by any the request of
* *. reasonable method. stakeholders at the
If education is public meetings
claimed in lieu of discussed in
employment, the Section IV.3 to
licensee, clarify the NRC's
applicant, or C/V intent with respect
shall request to periods of self-
information that employment,
could reflect on unemployment, or
the individual's education, if the
trustworthiness and individual claims
reliability and, at such activities
a minimum, verify within the periods
that the individual during which the
was actively individual would be
participating in required to
the educational disclose his or her
process during the employment history,
claimed period. as specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h).
The proposed
paragraph would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to use any
reasonable means,
consistent with the
``best effort''
criterion discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), to
verify the
individual's
activities during
claimed periods of
self-employment and
unemployment.
Reasonable means to
verify the
individual's
activities may
include, but would
not be limited to,
a review of
business or tax
records documenting
the individual's
self-employment,
copies of
unemployment
compensation
checks, or
interviews with
business associates
or acquaintances.
To verify education
in lieu of
employment, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
entities who are
subject to this
section to request
information from
the claimed
educational
institution that
could reflect on
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability.
However, for
reasons that are
similar to those
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(d)(4),
the NRC recognizes
that it may be
difficult to obtain
information from an
educational
institution about
the individual's
behavior while a
student. Therefore,
the proposed
paragraph would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to verify, at a
minimum, that the
applicant was
attending and
actively
participating in
school during the
claimed period(s).
[[Page 62751]]
(d)(4)(iv) If a Proposed Sec.
company, previous 73.56(d)(4)(iv)
employer, or would further
educational clarify the NRC's
institution to whom intent with respect
the licensee, to the actions that
applicant, or C/V licensees,
has directed a applicants, and C/
request for Vs would take to
information refuses meet the best
to provide effort criterion in
information or proposed Sec.
indicates an 73.56(d)(4), in
inability or response to many
unwillingness to implementation
provide information questions received
within 3 business from licensees. The
days of the proposed paragraph
request, the would address
licensee, circumstances in
applicant, or C/V which a primary
shall document this source of
refusal, inability, information refuses
or unwillingness in to provide
the licensee's, employment
applicant's, or C/ information or
V's record of the indicates an
investigation, and inability or
obtain a unwillingness to
confirmation of provide it within 3
employment or days of the
educational request. Licensees
enrollment and and other entities
attendance from at would be required
least one alternate to document that
source, with the request for
questions answered information was
to the best of the directed to the
alternate source's primary source and
ability. This the nature of the
alternate source response (i.e., a
may not have been refusal, inability,
previously used by or unwillingness).
the licensee, If a licensee,
applicant, or C/V applicant, or C/V
to obtain encounters such
information about circumstances, the
the individual's proposed paragraph
character and would require the
reputation. If the licensee,
licensee, applicant, permit,
applicant, or C/V or C/V to seek
uses an alternate employment history
source because information from an
employment alternate source,
information is not to the extent of
forthcoming within the alternate
3 business days of source's ability to
the request, the provide the
licensee, information. An
applicant, or C/V alternate source
need not delay may include, but
granting unescorted would not be
access limited to, a co-
authorization to worker or
wait for any supervisor at the
employer response, same company who
but shall evaluate had personal
and document the knowledge of the
response if it is applicant, if such
received. an individual could
be located.
However, the
proposed rule would
prohibit the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
from using the
alternate source of
employment
information to meet
the requirements in
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(6) for a
character
reference, in order
to ensure that the
scope of the
background
investigation is
sufficiently broad
to provide high
assurance that
individuals who are
granted UAA are
trustworthy and
reliable. The
proposed paragraph
would permit
licensees and other
entities to grant
UAA, if warranted,
when a response has
been obtained from
an alternate
source, without
waiting more than 3
days after the
request for
information was
directed to a
primary source. The
3-day period would
be established
because industry
and NRC experience
in implementing
current Sec.
73.56 has shown
that if an employer
or educational
institution intends
to respond to the
request for
information, the
response will be
forthcoming within
this period.
Therefore, there is
no added benefit to
public health and
safety or the
common defense and
security in
requiring
licensees,
applicants, or C/Vs
to wait longer than
3 days before
implementing the
alternative methods
of meeting the
employment history
evaluation
requirements that
would be permitted
in the proposed
paragraph.
[[Page 62752]]
However, should the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
receive an employer
response to the
request for
information after
the 3-day period,
the proposed
paragraph would
require that the
implications of the
information must be
evaluated with
respect to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability and the
information
documented, so that
it is available to
other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs. These changes
would be made to
reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden
while maintaining
high assurance that
individuals who are
subject to an AA
program are
trustworthy and
reliable.
(d)(4)(v) When any Proposed Sec.
licensee, 73.56(d)(v) would
applicant, or C/V require licensees,
specified in applicants, and C/
paragraph (a) of Vs who are subject
this section is to this section to
legitimately share employment
seeking the history information
information that they have
required for an collected, if
unescorted access contacted by
authorization another licensee,
decision under this applicant, or C/V
section and has who has a release
obtained a signed signed by the
release from the individual who is
subject individual applying for UAA
authorizing the that would permit
disclosure of such the sharing of that
information, a information. This
licensee, proposed provision
applicant, or C/V would amend the
who is subject to requirement to
this section shall release employment
disclose whether history information
the subject in current Sec.
individual's 73.56(f)(2) and
unescorted access would be consistent
authorization was with related
denied or requirements in 10
terminated CFR part 26. The
unfavorably. The proposed provision
licensee, would also clarify
applicant, or C/V that the
who receives the information must
request for also be released to
information shall C/Vs who have
make available the authorization to
information upon programs when the C/
which the denial or V has obtained the
unfavorable required signed
termination of release from the
unescorted access applicant. This
authorization was proposed
based. clarification is
necessary because
some licensees have
misinterpreted
current Sec.
73.56(f)(2) as
prohibiting the
release of
employment history
information to C/Vs
who administer
authorization
programs under this
section. These
requirements are
necessary to ensure
that adequate
information to
serve as a basis
for UAA decisions
can be obtained by
a licensee,
applicant, or C/V.
(d)(4)(vi) In Proposed Sec.
conducting an 73.56(d)(4)(vi)
employment history would permit
evaluation, the licensees,
licensee, applicants, and C/
applicant, or C/V Vs to use
may obtain electronic means of
information and obtaining the
documents by employment history
electronic means, information to
including, but not increase the
limited to, efficiency with
telephone, which licensees,
facsimile, or applicants, and C/V
email. The could obtain the
licensee, employment history
applicant, or C/V information. The
shall make a record proposed paragraph
of the contents of would be added in
the telephone call response to
and shall retain stakeholder
that record, and requests at the
any documents or public meetings
files obtained discussed in
electronically, in Section IV.3, and
accordance with would be consistent
paragraph (o) of with related
this section. requirements in 10
CFR part 26. The
proposed paragraph
would also add a
cross-reference to
the applicable
records retention
requirement in
proposed Sec.
73.56(o) [Records]
to ensure that
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs are aware of the
applicability of
these requirements
to the employment
history information
obtained
electronically.
[[Page 62753]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(5) Credit Proposed Sec.
and develop information history evaluation. 73.56(d)(5) would
concerning an individual's The licensees, retain the
* * * credit history, * * *. applicants, and C/ requirement for a
Vs specified in credit history
paragraph (a) of evaluation that is
this section shall embedded in current
ensure that the Sec.
full credit history 73.56(b)(2)(i) and
of any individual provide more
who is applying for detailed
unescorted access requirements, in
authorization has response to
been evaluated. A stakeholder
full credit history requests at the
evaluation must public meetings
include, but would discussed in
not be limited to, Section IV.3. The
an inquiry to proposed paragraph
detect potential would require the
fraud or misuse of credit history
social security evaluation to
numbers or other include an inquiry
financial to detect any past
identifiers, and a instances of fraud
review and or misuse of social
evaluation of all security numbers or
of the information other financial
that is provided by identifiers. This
a national credit- requirement would
reporting agency be added because
about the most credit-
individual's credit reporting agencies
history. require a specific
request for this
information before
they report it, and
the NRC has
determined that
instances of fraud
or misuse of
financial
identifiers, such
as social security
numbers or the
names that an
individual has
used, may provide
important
information about
an individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed paragraph
would also require
the entities who
are subject to this
section to review
all of the
information that is
provided by the
national credit-
reporting agency,
as part of the
background
investigation
process.
The proposed
paragraph would use
the term, ``full''
to convey that
there is no time
limit on the number
of years of credit
history information
that the reviewing
official would
consider or other
limitations on
using information
contained in the
credit history
report to assist in
determining the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. In the
past, licensees' AA
program procedures
limited the number
of years of the
individual's credit
history that
reviewing officials
were required to
consider in
determining an
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. As a
result, some
reviewing officials
may not have
considered credit
history information
for several years,
even if the
reporting agency
provided it. As a
result, individuals
who were subject to
different
authorization
programs were
evaluated
inconsistently.
Furthermore, credit
history reporting
agencies also
provide employment
data that can be
compared to the
information
disclosed by the
applicant for UAA
to validate the
individual's
disclosure.
However, some AA
program procedures
did not require the
reviewing official
to make this
comparison.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
reviewing official
to consider the
``full'' credit
history report, in
order to strengthen
the effectiveness
of the credit
history evaluation
element of AA
programs and
increase the
consistency with
which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would conduct
the credit history
evaluation.
[[Page 62754]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(6) Character and Proposed Sec.
and develop information reputation. The 73.56(d)(6) would
concerning an individual's licensees, expand on the
* * * character and applicants, and C/ requirement in
reputation. Vs specified in current Sec.
paragraph (a) of 73.56(b)(2)(i) for
this section shall licensees to verify
ascertain the an individual's
character and character and
reputation of an reputation. The
individual who has proposed provision
applied for would require the
unescorted access entities who
authorization by implement AA
conducting programs to develop
reference checks. information about
Reference checks an individual's
may not be trustworthiness and
conducted with any reliability by
person who is known contacting and
to be a close interviewing
member of the associates of the
individual's individual who
family, including would have
but not limited to, knowledge of his or
the individual's her character and
spouse, parents, reputation, but who
siblings, or would not be a
children, or any member of the
individual who individual's
resides in the immediate family or
individual's reside in his or
permanent her household.
household. The Family and
reference checks household members
must focus on the would be excluded
individual's because these
reputation for individuals are
trustworthiness and typically reluctant
reliability. to reveal any
adverse
information, if it
exists. The term,
``ascertain,''
would replace
``verify,'' in the
proposed paragraph
because it is
consistent with the
terminology used by
the industry to
refer to the
actions taken with
respect to
determining an
individual's
character and
reputation and
would, therefore,
improve the clarity
of this requirement
for those who must
implement it.
In addition, there
would be instances
in which it is
unnecessary for a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to conduct the
character and
reputation
evaluation because
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(4) would
permit the entities
who implement AA
programs to rely on
the background
investigations
conducted by other
entities who are
subject to this
section. In such
cases, the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official would not
review information
that was collected
under his or her AA
program, but would
ascertain the
subject
individual's
character and
reputation by
reviewing
information that
had been collected
by others. The last
sentence of the
proposed paragraph
would clarify that
the scope of the
reference checks
would be limited to
developing
information that
would be useful to
the reviewing
official in
determining the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability for the
UAA decision. This
requirement would
be added in
response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3 for
increased clarity
and specificity in
the regulation's
requirements.
[[Page 62755]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(7) Criminal Proposed Sec.
and develop information history review. The 73.56(d)(7) would
concerning an individual's licensee's, amend the
* * * criminal history * * applicant's, or C/ requirement in
*. V's reviewing current Sec.
official shall 73.56(b)(2)(i) for
evaluate the entire licensees to
criminal history develop information
record of an about an
individual who is individual's
applying for criminal history.
unescorted access The proposed
authorization to provision would
assist in eliminate the
determining whether current requirement
the individual has to develop criminal
a record of history information
criminal activity because proposed
that may adversely Sec. 73.57
impact his or her [Requirements for
trustworthiness and criminal history
reliability. The checks of
criminal history individuals granted
record must be unescorted access
obtained in to a nuclear power
accordance with the facility or access
requirements of to Safeguards
Sec. 73.57. Information by
power reactor
licensees]
would
establish the
methods by which
criminal history
information about
individuals who are
applying for UAA
would be obtained
and it is
unnecessary to
repeat those
requirements in
this section. The
proposed paragraph
would require the
reviewing official
to review the
individual's entire
criminal history
record. This
requirement would
be necessary
because, in the
past, some
licensees limited
the criminal
history review to
the individual's
history over the
past 5 or fewer
years, but did not
consider criminal
history information
from earlier years,
even if the
reporting agency
provided it.
However, the NRC
has determined that
a review of all of
the criminal
history information
that is provided in
a criminal history
record provides
higher assurance
that any instances
or patterns of
lawlessness are
considered when
determining whether
an individual is
trustworthy and
reliable.
Therefore, the
proposed rule would
incorporate this
requirement in
order to strengthen
the effectiveness
of AA programs.
Sec. 73.56(d) Requirements Deleted............. Current Sec.
during cold shutdown. (1) 73.56(d)
The licensee may grant [Requirements
unescorted access during during cold
cold shutdown to an shutdown]
would be
individual who does not eliminated from the
possess an access proposed rule.
authorization granted in Because of an
accordance with paragraph increased concern
(b) of this section with a potential
provided the licensee insider threat, as
develops and incorporates discussed in
into its Physical Security Section IV.3, the
Plan measures to be taken NRC has determined
to ensure that the that the relaxation
functional capability of of UAA requirements
equipment in areas for permitted in the
which the access current provision
authorization requirement does not meet the
has been relaxed has not Commission's
been impaired by relaxation objective of
of that requirement. (2) providing high
Prior to incorporating such assurance that
measures into its Physical individuals who
Security Plan the licensee have unescorted
shall submit those plan access to protected
changes to the NRC for areas in nuclear
review and approval power plants are
pursuant to Sec. 50.90. trustworthy and
(3) Any provisions in reliable.
licensees' security plans Therefore, the
that allow for relaxation current permission
of access authorization to grant unescorted
requirements during cold access to an
shutdown are superseded by individual without
this rule. Provisions in meeting all of the
licensees' Physical requirements of
Security Plans on April 25, proposed Sec.
1991 that provide for 73.56 would be
devitalization (that is, a eliminated from the
change from vital to proposed rule.
protected area status) Licensees and
during cold shutdown are applicants would
not affected. continue to be
permitted to seek
an exemption from
the requirements of
proposed Sec.
73.56 under current
Sec. 73.5
[Specific
exemptions].
[[Page 62756]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(ii) A (e) Psychological Proposed Sec.
psychological assessment assessment. In 73.56(e) would
designed to evaluate the order to assist in amend current Sec.
possible impact of any determining an 73.56(b)(2)(ii),
noted psychological individual's which requires AA
characteristics which may trustworthiness and programs to include
have a bearing on reliability, the a psychological
trustworthiness and licensees, assessment, by
reliability. applicants, and C/ adding several
Vs specified in requirements to the
paragraph (a) of current rule.
this section shall Because the
ensure that a requirements in the
psychological proposed rule would
assessment has been be more detailed,
completed of the the current
individual who is paragraph would be
applying for restructured and
unescorted access subdivided to
authorization. The present the new
psychological requirements in
assessment must be separate
designed to paragraphs. This
evaluate the change would be
possible adverse made for increased
impact of any noted clarity in the
psychological organization of the
characteristics on rule. The proposed
the individual's paragraph would
trustworthiness and retain the current
reliability. requirement for the
psychological
assessment to be
designed to
evaluate the
implications of the
individual's
psychological
characteristics on
his or her
trustworthiness and
reliability in a
separate sentence
for clarity. For
the same reason,
``adverse'' would
be added to more
clearly describe
the intended
purpose of the
psychological
assessment. The
proposed provision
would retain the
intent of the
current requirement
for AA programs to
include a
psychological
assessment, but
would use the
phrase, ``has been
completed,''
because licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs may not be
required to
complete the
psychological
assessment each
time that an
individual applies
for UAA.
As discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(1),
AA programs would
be permitted to
rely on
psychological
assessments that
were completed by
other AA programs.
Individuals who
have been subject
to a psychological
assessment, which
was conducted in
accordance with
requirements of
this proposed
section and
resulted in the
granting of UAA,
within the time
period specified in
the licensee's or
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan [as discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v)],
would not be
required to be
assessed again in
order to be granted
UAA.
(e)(1) A licensed Proposed Sec.
clinical 73.56(e)(1) would
psychologist or establish minimum
psychiatrist shall requirements for
conduct the the credentials of
psychological individuals who
assessment. perform the
psychological
assessments that
are required under
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(ii),
which are not
addressed in the
current rule. The
proposed provision
would require a
licensed clinical
psychologist or
psychiatrist to
conduct the
psychological
assessment, because
the extensive
education,
training, and
supervised clinical
experience that
these professionals
must possess in
order to be
licensed under
State laws would
provide high
assurance that they
are qualified to
conduct the
psychological
assessments that
are required under
the rule.
The proposed rule
would impose this
new requirement
because of the key
role that the
psychological
assessment element
of AA programs
plays in assuring
the public health
and safety and
common defense and
security when
determining whether
an individual is
trustworthy and
reliable.
Therefore, the
proposed provision
would be added to
strengthen the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
[[Page 62757]]
(e)(2) The A new Sec.
psychological 73.56(e)(2) would
assessment must be require
conducted in psychological
accordance with the assessments to be
applicable ethical conducted in
principles for accordance with
conducting such ethical principles
assessments for conducting such
established by the assessments that
American are established by
Psychological the American
Association or Psychological
American Association or the
Psychiatric American
Association. Psychiatric
Association, as
applicable. In
order to meet State
licensure
requirements,
clinical
psychologists and
psychiatrists are
required to
practice in
accordance with the
applicable
professional
standards. However,
the proposed rule
would add a
reference to these
professional
standards to
emphasize the
importance that the
NRC places on the
proper conduct of
psychological
assessments, in
order to ensure the
rights of
individuals,
consistent
treatment, and the
effectiveness of
the psychological
assessment
component of AA
programs.
(e)(3) At a minimum, Proposed Sec.
the psychological 73.56(e)(3) would
assessment must establish new
include the requirements for
administration and the psychological
interpretation of a testing that
standardized, licensees,
objective, applicants, and C/
professionally Vs would conduct as
accepted part of the
psychological test psychological
that provides assessment. The
information to proposed paragraph
identify would require the
indications of administration and
disturbances in interpretation of
personality or an objective
psychopathology psychological test
that may have that provides
implications for an information to aid
individual's in identifying
trustworthiness and personality
reliability. disturbances and
Predetermined psychopathology.
thresholds must be The proposed rule
applied in would specify
interpreting the psychological tests
results of the that are designed
psychological test, to identify
to determine indications of
whether an personality
individual shall be disturbances and
interviewed by a psychopathology
psychiatrist or because some of
licensed clinical these conditions
psychologist under may reflect
paragraph (e)(4)(i) adversely on an
of this section. individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed rule would
not prohibit the
use of other types
of psychological
tests, such as
personality
inventories and
tests of abilities,
in the
psychological
assessment process,
but would establish
the minimum
requirement for a
test that
identifies
indications of
personality
disturbances and
psychopathology
because the
identification of
these conditions is
most relevant to
the purpose of the
psychological
assessment element
of AA programs. The
proposed provision
would also require
the use of
standardized,
objective
psychological tests
to reduce potential
variability in the
testing that is
conducted under
this section.
[[Page 62758]]
Decreasing potential
variability in
testing is
important to
provide greater
assurance than in
the past that
individuals who are
applying for or
maintaining UAA are
treated
consistently under
the proposed rule.
The proposed rule
would not prohibit
the use of other
types of
psychological
tests, such as
projective tests,
in the
psychological
assessment process,
but would establish
the minimum
requirement for a
standardized,
objective test to
facilitate the
psychological re-
assessments that
would be required
under proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v).
Comparing scores on
a standardized,
objective test to
identify
indications of any
adverse changes in
the individual's
psychological
status is
simplified when the
testing that is
performed for a re-
assessment is
similar to or the
same as previous
testing that was
conducted under
this section,
particularly when
the clinician who
conducts the re-
assessment did not
conduct the
previous testing.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to establish
thresholds in
interpreting the
results of the
psychological test,
to aid in
determining whether
an individual would
be required to be
interviewed by a
psychiatrist or
licensed clinical
psychologist under
proposed paragraph
(e)(4)(ii) of this
section.
The NRC is aware of
substantial
variability in the
thresholds used by
authorization
programs in the
past to determine
whether an
individual's test
results provided
indications of
personality
disturbances or
psychopathology.
Different clinical
psychologists
providing services
to the same or
different AA
programs would vary
in the thresholds
they applied in
determining whether
an individual's
test results
indicated the need
for further
evaluation in a
clinical interview.
As a consequence,
whether or not
individuals who had
the same patterns
of scores on the
psychological test
would be subject to
a clinical
interview would
vary both within
and between AA
programs. The
proposed rule would
add a requirement
for predetermined
thresholds to
reduce this
variability in
order to protect
the rights of
individuals who are
subject to AA
programs to fair
and consistent
treatment.
[[Page 62759]]
(e)(4) The A new Sec.
psychological 73.56(e)(4) would
assessment must establish
include a clinical requirements for
interview-- the conditions
(i) If an under which the
individual's scores psychological
on the assessment must
psychological test include a clinical
in paragraph (e)(3) interview. Proposed
of this section Sec.
identify 73.56(e)(4)(i)
indications of would require a
disturbances in clinical interview
personality or if an individual's
psychopathology scores on the
that may have psychological test
implications for an identified
individual's indications of
trustworthiness and disturbances in
reliability; or. personality or
(ii) If the psychopathology
licensee's or that would
applicant's necessitate further
Physical Security assessment. The
Plan requires a clinical interview
clinical interview would be performed
based on job by a licensed
assignments.. clinical
psychologist or
psychiatrist,
consistent with the
ethical principles
for conducting
psychological
assessments that
are established by
the American
Psychological
Association or the
American
Psychiatric
Association. The
purposes of the
clinical interview
would include, but
would not be
limited to,
validating the test
results and
assessing their
implications for
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(e)(4)(ii)
would also require
a clinical
interview for some
individuals who
would be identified
in the licensee's
or applicant's
Physical Security
Plan. In general,
the individuals who
would always
receive a clinical
interview before
being granted UAA
would be those who
perform critical
operational and
security-related
functions at the
licensee's site.
The proposed
requirements are
necessary to ensure
that any noted
psychological
characteristics of
individuals who are
applying for or
maintaining UAA do
not adversely
affect their
trustworthiness and
reliability.
(e)(5) If, in the A new Sec.
course of 73.56(e)(5) would
conducting the require the
psychological psychologist or
assessment, the psychiatrist who
licensed clinical conducts the
psychologist or psychological
psychiatrist assessment to
identifies report to the
indications of, or reviewing official
information related any information
to, a medical obtained through
condition that conducting the
could adversely assessment that
impact the indicates the
individual's individual may have
fitness for duty or a medical condition
trustworthiness and that could
reliability, the adversely affect
psychologist or his or her fitness
psychiatrist shall for duty or
inform the trustworthiness and
reviewing official, reliability. For
who shall ensure example, some
that an appropriate psychological tests
evaluation of the identify
possible medical indications of a
condition is substance abuse
conducted under the problem. Or, an
requirements of individual may
part 26 of this disclose during the
chapter. clinical interview
that he or she is
taking prescription
medications that
could cause
impairment. In
these instances,
the proposed rule
would require the
reviewing official
to ensure that the
potential impact of
any possible
medical condition
on the individual's
fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and
reliability is
evaluated. The
term,
``appropriate,''
would be used with
respect to the
medical evaluation
to recognize that
healthcare
professionals vary
in their
qualifications.
[[Page 62760]]
For example, a
psychiatrist who
conducts the
assessment would be
qualified to assess
the potential
impacts on an
individual's
fitness for duty of
any psychoactive
medications the
individual may be
taking, whereas a
substance abuse
professional, nurse
practitioner, or
other licensed
physician may not.
The NRC is aware of
instances in which
indications of a
substance problem
or other medical
condition that
could adversely
affect an
individual's
fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and
reliability were
identified during
the psychological
assessment, but
were not
communicated to
fitness-for-duty
program personnel
and, therefore,
were not evaluated
as part of the
access
authorization
decision. The
proposed paragraph
would be added to
ensure that
information about
potential medical
conditions is
communicated and
evaluated. This
provision would be
added to strengthen
the effectiveness
of the access
authorization
process.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(iii) (f) Behavioral Proposed Sec.
Behavioral observation, observation. Access 73.56(f)
conducted by supervisors authorization [Behavioral
and management personnel, programs must observation]
would
designed to detect include a replace current
individual behavioral behavioral Sec.
changes which, if left observation element 73.56(b)(2)(iii),
unattended, could lead to that is designed to which requires
acts detrimental to the detect behaviors or licensees' AA
public health and safety. activities that may programs to include
constitute an a behavioral
unreasonable risk observation
to the health and element, to be
safety of the conducted by
public and common supervisors and
defense and management
security, including personnel, and
a potential threat designed to detect
to commit individual
radiological behavioral changes
sabotage. which, if left
unattended, could
lead to acts
detrimental to the
public health and
safety. The
proposed paragraph
would amend the
requirements of the
current paragraph
and add others.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(f) would
amend the objective
of the behavioral
observation element
of AA programs in
the current
provision. The
proposed paragraph
would eliminate the
current reference
to behavior changes
which, if left
unattended, could
lead to detrimental
acts. Although
detecting and
evaluating behavior
changes in order to
determine whether
they may lead to
acts detrimental to
the public health
and safety is
important, the
behavioral
observation element
of fitness-for-duty
programs that is
required under 10
CFR 26.22(a)(4)
also addresses this
objective.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would be revised,
in part, to
eliminate this
redundancy.
[[Page 62761]]
In addition, the
current provision's
requirement for
behavioral
observation to
focus only on
detecting behavior
changes is too
narrow. The NRC
intends that
behavioral
observation must
also be conducted
in order to
increase the
likelihood that
potentially adverse
behavior patterns
and actions will be
detected and
evaluated before
there is an
opportunity for
such behavior
patterns or acts to
result in
detrimental
consequences. For
example, experience
in other industries
has shown that an
individual's
unusual interest in
an organization's
security activities
and operations that
are outside the
scope of the
individual's normal
work assignments
may be an
indication that the
individual is
gathering
intelligence for
adversarial
purposes. If the
behavioral
observation element
of AA programs
focuses only on
behavior changes,
and an individual
has demonstrated a
pattern of
``unusual
interest'' since
starting work for
the licensee, other
persons who are
aware of the
individual's
behavior pattern
may not consider
the behavior to be
a potential concern
and, therefore, may
not raise the
concern. As a
result, an
opportunity to
detect and evaluate
this behavior
pattern would be
lost.
Therefore, in order
to increase the
effectiveness of
the behavioral
observation element
of AA programs and
more clearly convey
the NRC's intent,
the proposed
paragraph would be
revised to clarify
that the objective
of behavioral
observation is to
detect behavior or
activities that
have the potential
to constitute an
unreasonable risk
to the health and
safety of the
public and common
defense and
security, including
a potential threat
to commit
radiological
sabotage. The
portion of current
Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(iii)
that addresses who
must conduct
behavioral
observation (i.e.,
supervisors and
management
personnel) would be
moved to a separate
paragraph for
increased
organizational
clarity in this
section, and would
be amended for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2).
(f)(1) The Proposed Sec.
licensees, 73.56(f)(1) would
applicants, and C/ clarify the intent
Vs specified in of the current
paragraph (a) of requirement by
this section shall specifying the
ensure that the individuals who
individuals must be subject to
specified in behavioral
paragraph (b)(1) of observation. The
this section and, proposed paragraph
if applicable, would be added to
(b)(2) of this address stakeholder
section are subject requests at the
to behavioral public meetings
observation. discussed in
Section IV.3, for
increased
specificity in the
language of the
rule.
[[Page 62762]]
(f)(2) The The proposed
individuals paragraph would
specified in amend the portion
paragraph (b)(1) of current Sec.
and, if applicable, 73.56(b)(2)(iii)
(b)(2) of this that requires only
section shall supervisors and
observe the management
behavior of other personnel to
individuals. The conduct behavioral
licensees, observation by
applicants, and C/ requiring all
Vs specified in individuals who are
paragraph (a) of subject to an
this section shall authorization
ensure that program to conduct
individuals who are behavioral
subject to this observation.
section also Increasing the
successfully number of
complete behavioral individuals who
observation conduct behavioral
training. observation would
enhance the
effectiveness of AA
programs by
increasing the
likelihood of
detecting behavior
or activities that
may be adverse to
the safe operation
and security of the
facility and may,
therefore,
constitute an
unreasonable risk
to the health and
safety and common
defense and
security. This
change is necessary
to address the
NRC's increased
concern with a
potential insider
threat discussed in
Section IV.3.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2) also
would require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to ensure that
individuals who are
subject to an
authorization
program
successfully
complete behavioral
observation
training. The means
by which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would
demonstrate that an
individual has
successfully
completed the
training would be
through the
administration of
the comprehensive
examination
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec.
73.56(f)(2)(iii).
Because all
individuals who are