Power Reactor Security Requirements [[pp. 62813-62862]]

Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.

[Federal Register: October 26, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 207)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 62813-62862]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26oc06-19]

[[pp. 62813-62862]]
Power Reactor Security Requirements

[[Continued from page 62812]]

[[Page 62813]]

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. B.4.b(4) The This documentation
The physical fitness physical fitness and attesting
qualification of each qualification of requirement would
guard, armed response each armed member be retained. This
person, armed escort, and of the security requirement would
other security force member organization must be intended to
shall be documented and be documented by a include adequate
attested to by a licensee qualified training oversight and
security supervisor. instructor and verification of
attested to by a qualification while
security supervisor. providing
flexibility to the
licensee to
determine how to
best use management
resources. The
phrase ``by a
qualified training
instructor'' would
be added to specify
the training
instructor observes
and documents that
the qualification
criteria are met
while the security
supervisor attests
to the fact that
the required
training for each
individual was
administered by a
qualified
instructor and
documentation was
obtained and
properly completed.
The word
``licensee'' would
be deleted because
the proposed rule
would permit a
contract security
supervisor to
attest to an
individual's
qualification. The
phrase ``guard,
armed response
person, armed
escort, and other
security force
member'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``each armed
member of the
security
organization'' for
consistency with
the terminology
used in the
proposed rule.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. B.5. Physical This header would be
Physical requalification-- requalification. retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. B.5.a. At least This requirement to
At least every 12 months, annually, armed and demonstrate the
central alarm station unarmed members of capability to meet
operators shall be required the security the physical
to meet the physical organization shall requirements would
requirements of B.1.b of be required to be retained. The
this section, and guards, demonstrate the phrase ``every 12
armed response personnel, capability to meet months'' would be
and armed escorts shall be the physical replaced with the
required to meet the requirements of word ``annually''
physical requirements of this appendix and to specify that
Paragraphs B.1.b (1) and the licensee annual requirements
(2), and C of this section. training and must be scheduled
qualification plan. at a nominal 12
month periodicity
but may be
conducted up to
three (3) months
prior to three (3)
months after the
scheduled date with
the next scheduled
date 12 months from
the originally
scheduled date.
This requirement
would be intended
to provide
flexibility to the
licensee to account
for those instances
when site specific
conditions, such as
outages, preclude
conducting
requalification at
the scheduled
dates, while
ensuring that the
intent of the
requirement would
be still met
without requiring
the next scheduled
date to be changed
to correspond with
the month in which
the requalification
is performed.
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. B.5.b. The physical This documentation
The physical fitness requalification of and attesting
qualification of each each armed and requirement would
guard, armed response unarmed member of be retained. This
person, armed escort, and the security requirement would
other security force member organization must be intended to
shall be documented and be documented by a include adequate
attested to by a licensee qualified training oversight and
security supervisor. instructor and verification of
attested to by a qualification while
security supervisor. providing
flexibility to the
licensee to
determine how to
best use management
resources. The
phrase ``by a
qualified training
instructor'' would
be added to specify
the training
instructor observes
and documents that
the qualification
criteria is met
while the security
supervisor attests
to the fact that
the required
documentation is
retained and
properly completed.
The phrase ``guard,
armed response
person, armed
escort, and other
security force
member'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``each armed
and unarmed member
of the security
organization'' for
consistency with
the terminology
used in the
proposed rule. The
word ``licensee''
would be deleted
because the
proposed rule would
permit a contract
security supervisor
attest to an
individual's
qualification.

[[Page 62814]]

II. Training and C. Duty training.... This new header
qualifications. would be added to
provide a section
under which the
current and
proposed non-
weapons-related
training
requirements may be
grouped.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.1. Duty training This training
Training requirements. Each and qualification requirement would
individual who requires requirements. All be retained and
training to perform personnel who are revised to combine
assigned security-related assigned to perform the two current
job tasks or job duties as any security- requirements of
identified in the licensee related duty or appendix B,
physical security or responsibility, Paragraph II.A. and
contingency plans shall, shall be trained II.B. This
prior to assignment, be and qualified to requirement would
trained to perform these perform assigned account for those
tasks and duties in duties and instances where the
accordance with the responsibilities to licensee may use,
licensee or the licensee's ensure that each in addition to
agent's documented training individual members of the
and qualifications plan. possesses the security
Appendix B, Paragraph II.B.. minimum knowledge, organization, site
Qualification requirement. skills, and personnel from
Each person who performs abilities required outside of the
security-related job tasks to effectively security
or job duties required to carry out those organization to
implement the licensee assigned duties and perform security
physical security or responsibilities. related duties,
contingency plan shall, such as, but not
prior to being assigned to limited to,
these tasks or duties, be escorts, tampering,
qualified in accordance detection, and
with the licensee's NRC- compensatory
approved training and measures. The
qualifications plan. Commission views
are that security
personnel must
obtain the
requisite
knowledge, skills,
and abilities of
all security-
related duties
prior to
unsupervised
assignment.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. C.1.a. The areas of This requirement
The areas of knowledge, knowledge, skills, would be retained
skills, and abilities that and abilities that and revised to
shall be considered in the are required to replace the current
licensee's training and perform assigned list of 100 topic
qualifications plan are as duties and areas with a
follows: responsibilities requirement for the
[NOTE: The list of 100 must be identified licensee to provide
specific training subjects in the licensee's a site specific
is omitted here for Commission-approved list in the
conservation of space.]. training and approved security
qualification plan. plans and specify
assigned duties in
the training and
qualification plan.
The Commission has
determined that the
current list would
no longer be
necessary to ensure
that the listed
topic areas are
addressed by each
licensee. In
accordance with
this proposed
appendix, all
licensees are
required to ensure
that all personnel
are trained and
qualified to
perform their
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
Those requirements
would encompass
topics that are
currently listed,
making it
unnecessary to
specifically list
the 100 areas of
knowledge, skills,
and abilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.1.b. Each This training
Each individual who individual who is requirement would
requires training to assigned duties and be retained. The
perform assigned security- responsibilities requirement would
related job tasks or job identified in the specify training of
duties as identified in the Commission-approved all individuals
licensee physical security security plans, assigned to perform
or contingency plans shall, licensee protective security functions
prior to assignment, be strategy, and required to
trained to perform these implementing implement the
tasks and duties in procedures shall, Commission-approved
accordance with the before assignment,: security plans,
licensee or the licensee's (1) be trained to licensee response
agent's documented training perform assigned strategy, and
and qualifications plan. duties and implementing
responsibilities in procedures. The
accordance with the phrase ``requires
requirements of training to perform
this appendix and assigned security-
the Commission- related job tasks
approved training or job duties as''
and qualification would be replaced
plan. with the phrase
``is assigned
duties and
responsibilities''
to reflect changes
to terminology
used. The phrase
``in the licensee
physical security
or contingency''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Commission-
approved security
plans, licensee
protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures'' to
reflect changes to
terminology used.
The phrase ``these
tasks and duties''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``assigned duties
and
responsibilities''
to reflect changes
to terminology
used. The phrase
``licensee or the
licensee's agent's
documented training
and qualifications
plan'' would be
replaced with the
phrase
``requirements of
this appendix and
the Commission-
approved training
and qualification
plan'' to reflect
changes to
terminology used.

[[Page 62815]]

Appendix B, Paragraph II.B. C.1.b. (2) meet the This qualification
Each person who performs minimum requirement would
security-related job tasks qualification be retained. The
or job duties required to requirements of requirement would
implement the licensee this appendix and specify the
physical security or the Commission- qualification
contingency plan shall, approved training standard for all
prior to being assigned to and qualification individuals
these tasks or duties, be plan. assigned to perform
qualified in accordance security functions
with the licensee's NRC- required to
approved training and implement the
qualifications plan. Commission-approved
security plans,
licensee response
strategy, and
implementing
procedures. The
phrase ``be
qualified in
accordance with''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``meet the minimum
qualification
requirements of
this appendix and''
to specify that the
approved T&Q plan
implements the
requirements of
this proposed rule.
The phrase
``licensee's NRC-
approved'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``Commission
approved'' to
reflect changes to
terminology used.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.1.b. (3) be This requirement
Training Requirements--Each trained and would be based on
individual who requires qualified in the the current
training to perform use of all appendix B,
assigned security-related equipment or Paragraph II.A. and
job tasks or job duties as devices required to specify the
identified in the licensee effectively perform requirement for
physical security or all assigned duties training in the use
contingency plans shall, and of equipment
prior to assignment, be responsibilities. required to
trained to perform these effectively perform
tasks and duties in all assigned duties
accordance with the and
licensee or licensee's responsibilities.
agent's documented training The Commission
and qualification plan. views this as
facilitating the
performance
objective of the
proposed Sec.
73.55 B.1.
C.2. On-the-job This new header
training. would be added for
consistency with
the format of this
proposed paragraph.
This new topic area
would be intended
to specify the
requirement that
the licensee
training and
qualification
program must
include an on-the-
job training
program to ensure
that assigned
personnel have
demonstrated an
acceptable level of
performance and
proficiency within
the actual work
environment, prior
to assignment to an
unsupervised
position.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. C.2.a. The licensee This new requirement
Training Requirements--Each training and would be based on
individual who requires qualification the current
training to perform program must appendix B,
assigned security-related include on-the-job Paragraph II.A. and
job tasks or job duties as training would specify the
identified in the licensee performance requirement that
physical security or standards and the licensee
contingency plans shall, criteria to ensure include on-the-job
prior to assignment, be that each training as part of
trained to perform these individual the training and
tasks and duties in demonstrates the qualification
accordance with the requisite program to ensure
licensee or licensee's knowledge, skills, each individual
agent's documented training and abilities demonstrates, in an
and qualification plan. needed to on-the-job setting,
Appendix B, Paragraph effectively carry- an acceptable level
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job out assigned duties of performance and
evaluation shall be used and proficiency to
for individuals who exhibit responsibilities in carry-out assigned
a mild color vision defect. accordance with the duties and
Commission-approved responsibilities
security plans, prior to an
licensee protective assignment. The
strategy, and expectation would
implementing be that on-the-job
procedures, before training would be
the individual is conducted by
assigned the duty qualified security
or responsibility. personnel who will
observe the
trainee's
performance and
provide input for
improvement and
final qualification
of the trainee and
allow each
individual to
develop and apply,
in a controlled but
realistic training
environment, the
knowledge, skills,
and abilities
presented in formal
and informal
classroom settings.
This requirement
would be in
addition to
licensee specific
classroom training
that may include
instruction on
security practices
and theory and
other training
activities for
security-related
duties.

[[Page 62816]]

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.2.b. In addition This new requirement
Training Requirements--Each to meeting the would be based on
individual who requires requirement stated the current
training to perform in paragraph appendix B,
assigned security-related C.2.a., before Paragraph II.A. and
job tasks or job duties as assignment, would specify the
identified in the licensee individuals requirement for on-
physical security or assigned duties and the-job training.
contingency plans shall, responsibilities to This requirement
prior to assignment, be implement the would specify that
trained to perform these Safeguards 40 hours is the
tasks and duties in Contingency Plan minimum time for
accordance with the shall complete a practical skill
licensee or licensee's minimum of 40 hours development and
agent's documented training of on-the-job performance
and qualification plan. training to demonstration
demonstrate their necessary to fully
ability to assess an
effectively apply individual's
the knowledge, knowledge, skills,
skills, and and abilities to
abilities required effectively carry-
to effectively out assigned duties
perform assigned and
duties and responsibilities
responsibilities in prior to assignment
accordance with the to an unsupervised
approved security position. This
plans, licensee requirement would
protective be in addition to
strategy, and formal and informal
implementing classroom
procedures. On-the- instruction. The
job training must phrase ``by a
be documented by a qualified training
qualified training instructor'' would
instructor and be added to require
attested to by a that the security
security supervisor. supervisor must
attest to the fact
that the required
training for each
individual was
administered by a
qualified
instructor and
documentation was
obtained and
properly completed.
Appendix B, Paragraph C.2.c. On-the-job This new requirement
I.B.1.b.(1)(a) On-the-job training for would be based on
evaluation shall be used contingency the current
for individuals who exhibit activities and requirements
a mild color vision defect. drills must appendix B,
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. include, but is not Paragraph II.A. and
The exercise program limited to, hands- appendix B,
performance objectives on application of Paragraph II.D.
shall be described in the knowledge, skills, This requirement
license training and and abilities would provide a
qualifications plan and related to: list of minimum
shall consider job-related (1) Response team generic topics
functions such as strenuous duties.. which are
activity, physical (2) Use of force.... applicable to all
exertion, levels of stress, (3) Tactical sites and must be
and exposure to the movement.. addressed, but are
elements as they pertain to (4) Cover and not intended to
each individual's assigned concealment.. limit the licensee
security job duties for (5) Defensive- such that site
both normal and emergency positions.. specific topics are
operations. (6) Fields-of-fire.. not also included.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. (7) Re-deployment... This requirement
Training Requirements--Each (8) Communications would also specify
individual who requires (primary and that the licensee
training to perform alternate).. identify and
assigned security-related (9) Use of assigned document in the
job tasks or job duties as equipment.. training and
identified in the licensee (10) Target sets.... qualification plan,
physical security or (11) Table top the specific
contingency plans shall, drills.. knowledge, skills,
prior to assignment, be (12) Command and and abilities
trained to perform these control duties.. required by each
tasks and duties in individual to
accordance with the perform their
licensee or licensee's assigned duties and
agent's documented training responsibilities
and qualification plan. and would
Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. generically include
The areas of knowledge, any specific items
skills, and abilities that that are currently
shall be considered in the listed in the
licensee's training and current appendix B,
qualifications plan are as Paragraph II.D.,
follows:. and therefore,
[NOTE: The list of one would require that
hundred specific training any applicable
subjects is omitted here topics from the
for conservation of space.]. deleted list are
addressed.
C.3. Tactical This new header
response team would be added for
drills and formatting.
exercises.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.a. Licensees This requirement
Training Requirements--Each shall demonstrate would be based on
individual who requires response the current
training to perform capabilities appendix B,
assigned security-related through a Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as performance to changes in the
identified in the licensee evaluation program threat environment,
physical security or as described in the requirement
contingency plans shall, appendix C to this would specify that
prior to assignment, be part. the licensee
trained to perform these develop and follow
tasks and duties in a performance
accordance with the evaluation program
licensee or licensee's designed to
agent's documented training demonstrate the
and qualification plan. effectiveness of
the onsite response
capabilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.b. The licensee This requirement
Training Requirements--Each shall conduct would be based on
individual who requires drills and the current
training to perform exercises in appendix B,
assigned security-related accordance with Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as Commission-approved to changes in the
identified in the licensee security plans, threat environment,
physical security or licensee protective the requirement
contingency plans shall, strategy, and would specify that
prior to assignment, be implementing the licensee
trained to perform these procedures. conduct drills and
tasks and duties in exercises to
accordance with the demonstrate the
licensee or licensee's effectiveness of
agent's documented training security plans,
and qualification plan. licensee protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures.

[[Page 62817]]

Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.b.(1) Drills and This requirement
Training Requirements--Each exercises must be would be based on
individual who requires designed to the current
training to perform challenge appendix B,
assigned security-related participants in a Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as manner which to changes in the
identified in the licensee requires each threat environment,
physical security or participant to the requirement
contingency plans shall, demonstrate would specify that
prior to assignment, be requisite the licensee
trained to perform these knowledge, skills, conduct drills and
tasks and duties in and abilities. exercises that are
accordance with the designed to
licensee or licensee's demonstrate each
agent's documented training participants
and qualification plan. requisite
knowledge, skills,
and abilities to
perform security
responsibilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. C.3.b.(2) Tabletop This requirement
Training Requirements--Each exercises may be would be based on
individual who requires used to supplement the current
training to perform drills and appendix B,
assigned security-related exercises to Paragraph II.A. Due
job tasks or job duties as accomplish desired to changes in the
identified in the licensee training goals and threat environment,
physical security or objectives. the requirement
contingency plans shall, would convey the
prior to assignment, be Commission view
trained to perform these that licensees may
tasks and duties in use tabletop
accordance with the exercises to
licensee or licensee's supplement drills
agent's documented training and exercises as a
and qualification plan. means of achieving
training goals and
objectives.
D. Duty This new header
qualification and would be added for
requalification. formatting
purposes. The word
``duty'' would be
used to clarify
that the following
sections relate to
non-weapons
training topics.
D.1. Qualification This new header
demonstration. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon D.1.a. Armed and This requirement
the request of an unarmed members of would be based on
authorized representative the security the current
of the Commission, the organization shall requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate demonstrate the CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i).
the ability of the physical required knowledge, Due to changes in
security personnel to carry skills, and the threat
out their assigned duties abilities to carry environment, it is
and responsibilities. out assigned duties the Commission's
and view that licensees
responsibilities as must be able to
stated in the demonstrate the
Commission-approved ability of security
security plans, personnel to carry
licensee protective out their assigned
strategy, and duties and
implementing responsibilities.
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon D.1.b. This This requirement
the request of an demonstration must would be based on
authorized representative include an annual the current
of the Commission, the written exam and requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate hands-on CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i)
the ability of the physical performance and would specify a
security personnel to carry demonstration. licensee
out their assigned duties requirement to
and responsibilities. perform written
examinations and
hands-on
performance tests
to demonstrate
knowledge of the
skill or ability
being tested. The
Commission's view
is that written
examinations and
hands-on
performance tests
are two components
that are necessary
to demonstrate the
overall
qualification and
proficiency of an
individual
performing security
duties.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon (1) Written Exam. This requirement
the request of an The written exams would be based on
authorized representative must include those the current
of the Commission, the elements listed in requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate the Commission- CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i).
the ability of the physical approved training Due to changes in
security personnel to carry and qualification the threat
out their assigned duties plan and shall environment, the
and responsibilities. require a minimum rule would require
score of 80 percent a minimum exam
to demonstrate an score of 80 percent
acceptable using accepted
understanding of training and
assigned duties and evaluation
responsibilities, techniques. The
to include the Commission has
recognition of determined that a
potential tampering score of 80 percent
involving both demonstrates the
safety and security minimum level of
equipment and understanding and
systems. (2) Hands- familiarity of the
on Performance material acceptable
Demonstration. and would be
Armed and unarmed consistent with
members of the minimum scores
security commonly accepted
organization shall throughout the
demonstrate hands- Nuclear Industry.
on performance for
assigned duties and
responsibilities by
performing a
practical hands-on
demonstration for
required tasks. The
hands-on
demonstration must
ensure that theory
and associated
learning objectives
for each required
task are considered
and each individual
demonstrates the
knowledge, skills,
and abilities
required to
effectively perform
the task.

[[Page 62818]]

Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon D.1.c. Upon request This requirement
the request of an by an authorized would be based upon
authorized representative representative of the current
of the Commission, the the Commission, any requirement of 10
licensee shall demonstrate individual assigned CFR 73.55(b)(4)(i)
the ability of the physical to perform any and would include,
security personnel to carry security-related upon request, that
out their assigned duties duty or an individual
and responsibilities. responsibility assigned security
shall demonstrate duties or
the required responsibilities
knowledge, skills, demonstrate
and abilities for knowledge, skills
each assigned duty and abilities
and responsibility, required for such
as stated in the assignments or
Commission-approved responsibilities.
security plans, This requirement
licensee protective would be distinct
strategy, or from the required
implementing annual written
procedures. demonstration above
and would be
necessary for
regulatory
consistency. This
rule would require
that any individual
who is assigned to
perform any
security-related
duty or
responsibility must
demonstrate their
capability to
effectively perform
those assigned
duties or
responsibilities
when requested,
regardless of the
individual's
specific
organizational
affiliation. These
demonstrations
would provide the
Commission with
independent
verification and
validation that
individuals can
actually perform
their assigned
security duties.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. D.2. Requalification This header would be
Requalification-- retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. D.2.a. Armed and This requalification
Security personnel shall be unarmed members of requirement would
requalified at least every the security be retained and
12 months to perform organization shall revised to combine
assigned security-related be requalified at two requirements of
job tasks and duties for least annually in the current
both normal and contingency accordance with the appendix B,
operations. requirements of Paragraph II.E. The
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. this appendix and rule would require
Requalification shall be in the Commission- that armed and
accordance with the NRC- approved training unarmed members of
approved licensee training and qualification the security
and qualifications plan. plan. organization must
be requalified
annually to
demonstrate that
each individual
continues to be
capable of
effectively
performing assigned
duties and
responsibilities.
The phrase
``Security
personnel'' would
be replaced with
the phrase ``Armed
and unarmed members
of the security
organization'' for
consistency with
the proposed rule.
The phrase ``every
12 months'' would
be replaced with
the word ``annual''
for consistency
with the proposed
rule.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E. D.2.b. The results The requalification
The results of of requalification requirement would
requalification must be must be documented be retained. The
documented and attested by by a qualified proposed rule would
a licensee security training instructor require that the
supervisor. and attested by a licensee provide
security supervisor. adequate oversight
and verification of
qualification
process. The phrase
``by a qualified
training
instructor'' would
be added to specify
that the training
instructor observes
and documents that
qualification
criteria is met
while the security
supervisor attests
to the fact that
the required
documentation is
retained and
properly completed.
The word
``licensee'' would
be deleted to
provide flexibility
to the licensee to
determine the best
use of management
resources and to
specify that
contract security
supervisors may be
used to satisfy
this requirement.
III. Weapons training and E. Weapons training. This header would be
Qualification. retained and
revised. The word
``Qualification''
would be deleted
because
``qualification''
is addressed
individually in
this proposed rule.
E.1. General This new header is
firearms training. added for
formatting
purposes.

[[Page 62819]]

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.a. Armed members This training
Guards, armed response of the security requirement would
personnel and armed escorts organization shall be retained and
requiring weapons training be trained and revised to specify
to perform assigned qualified in that the training
security related job tasks accordance with the be conducted in
or job duties shall be requirements of accordance with the
trained in accordance with this appendix and appendix and
the licensees' documented the Commission- training and
weapons training programs. approved training qualification
and qualification plans. The phrase
plan. ``Guards, armed
response personnel
and armed escorts''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Armed members of
the security
organization'' for
consistency with
language used in
the proposed rule.
The phrase
``requiring weapons
training to perform
assigned security
related job tasks
or job duties''
would be deleted
because that
requirement is
implied in the
proposed rule
language. The
phrase ``licensees'
documented weapons
training programs''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Commission-
approved training
and qualification
plan'' for
consistency with
language used in
the proposed rule.
E.1.b. Firearms This new header
instructors. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(1) Each armed This requirement
Each individual shall be member of the would be based on
proficient in the use of security the current
his assigned weapon(s) and organization shall appendix B,
shall meet prescribed be trained and Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following qualified by a and would be
areas: certified firearms revised to
instructor for the incorporate current
use and maintenance requirements in
of each assigned approved training
weapon to include and qualification
but not limited to, plans.
qualification
scores, assembly,
disassembly,
cleaning, storage,
handling, clearing,
loading, unloading,
and reloading, for
each assigned
weapon.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(2) Firearms This requirement
Each individual shall be instructors shall would be based on
proficient in the use of be certified from a the current
his assigned weapon(s) and national or State appendix B,
shall meet prescribed recognized entity. Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following and revised to
areas: require that
licensees only use
certified
instructors. It is
the Commission view
that certification
would be required
from a national or
State recognized
entity such as
Federal, State
military or
nationally
recognized entities
such as National
Rifle Association
(NRA),
International
Association of Law
Enforcement
Firearms
Instructors
(IALEFI).
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(3) This requirement
Each individual shall be Certification must would be based on
proficient in the use of specify the weapon the current
his assigned weapon(s) and or weapon type(s) appendix B,
shall meet prescribed for which the Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following instructor is and revised to
areas: qualified to teach. establish minimum
standards for those
conducting firearms
instruction. This
requirement would
not intend that
each firearm
instructor be
certified on the
different
manufacturers or
brands, but rather
that certification
be obtained by
weapon type such as
handgun, shotgun,
rifle, machine gun,
or other enhanced
weapons since each
type requires
different skills
and abilities.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.b.(4) Firearms This requirement
Each individual shall be instructors shall would be based upon
proficient in the use of be recertified in the current
his assigned weapon(s) and accordance with the appendix B,
shall meet prescribed standards Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following recognized by the and revised to
areas: certifying national establish minimum
or state entity, standards for those
but in no case conducting firearms
shall re- instruction.
certification Firearms instructor
exceed three (3) skills are
years. perishable and
therefore the
proposed rule would
require periodic re-
qualification to
demonstrate
proficiency. The
Commission has
determined that
three (3) years is
a commonly accepted
interval for re-
certification
throughout the
firearms community.

[[Page 62820]]

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. E.1.c. Annual This requirement
Qualification firing for firearms would be based upon
the handgun and the rifle familiarization. the current
must be for daylight The licensee shall appendix B,
firing, and each individual conduct annual Paragraph IV. Due
shall perform night firing firearms to changes in the
for familiarization with familiarization threat environment,
assigned weapon(s). training in the Commission
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. accordance with the seeks to establish
Each individual shall be Commission-approved minimum standards
requalified at least every training and for weapons
12 months. qualification plan. familiarization.
This requirement
would require
individuals receive
basic firearms
familiarization and
skills training
with each weapon
type such as
nomenclature,
stance, grip, sight
alignment, sight
stance, grip, sight
alignment, sight
picture, trigger
squeeze, safe
handling, range
rules, prior to
participating in a
qualifying course
of fire. The
specifics of the
familiarization
must be included in
the Commission-
approved plan.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. E.1.d. The This proposed rule
Each individual shall be Commission-approved would retain the
proficient in the use of training and current standards
his assigned weapon(s) and qualification plan listed in appendix
shall meet prescribed shall include, but B, Paragraph III.A
standards in the following is not limited to, as weapons training
areas: the following areas to be
1. Mechanical assembly, areas: addressed in the
disassembly, range (1) Mechanical Commission-approved
penetration capability of assembly, T&Q plan. Due to
weapon, and bull's-eye disassembly, range changes in the
firing.. penetration threat environment,
2. Weapons cleaning and capability of it is the
storage.. weapon, and bull's- Commission view
3. Combat firing, day and eye firing.. that additional
night.. (2) Weapons cleaning areas of
4. Safe weapons handling.... and storage.. demonstrated weapon
5. Clearing, loading, (3) Combat firing, proficiency should
unloading, and reloading. day and night.. be added to the
6. When to draw and point a (4) Safe weapons current
weapon.. handling.. regulations. The
7. Rapid fire techniques.... (5) Clearing, proposed rule would
8. Close quarter firing..... loading, unloading, require an
9. Stress firing............ and reloading.. individual
10. Zeroing assigned (6) When to draw and demonstrate
weapon(s).. point a weapon.. proficiency in the
(7) Rapid fire following areas:
techniques.. target engagement,
(8) Closed quarter weapon
firing.. malfunctions, cover
(9) Stress firing... and concealment
(10) Zeroing weapon transition
assigned weapon(s) between strong
(sight and sight/ (primary) and weak
scope adjustments).. (support) hands,
(11) Target and weapon
engagement.. familiarization
(12) Weapon (areas 11 through
malfunctions.. 15.)
(13) Cover and
concealment..
(14) Weapon
transition between
strong (primary)
and weak (support)
hands..
(15) Weapon
familiarization..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.D. E.1.e. The licensee The requirements of
Security knowledge, skills, shall ensure that appendix B,
and abilities--Each each armed member Paragraph II.D.
individual assigned to of the security would be modified
perform the security- organization is to clarify training
related task identified in instructed on the requirements
the licensee physical use of deadly force regarding the use
security or contingency as authorized by of deadly force.
plan shall demonstrate the applicable State The proposed rule
required knowledge, skill, law. would specify that
and ability in accordance the substance of
with the specified training in the use
standards for each task as of deadly force
stated in the NRC approved should be focused
licensee training and on applicable state
qualifications plan. The laws.
areas of knowledge, skills,
and abilities that shall be
considered in the
licensee's training and
qualifications plan are as
follows: The use of deadly
force.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. E.1.f. Armed members This requirement
Individuals shall be of the security would be based upon
weapons requalified at organization shall the current
least every 12 months in participate in requalification
accordance with the NRC weapons range requirements stated
approved licensee training activities on a in appendix B,
and qualifications plan, nominal four (4) Paragraph IV.D. It
and in accordance with the month periodicity. is the Commission
requirements stated in A, Performance may be view that the
B, and C of this section. conducted up to proposed rule,
five (5) weeks requiring weapons
before to five (5) range activities,
weeks after the would ensure
scheduled date. The individuals
next scheduled date maintain
must be four (4) proficiency in the
months from the use of assigned
originally weapons and
scheduled date. associated
perishable skills.
IV. Weapons qualification F. Weapons This header would be
and requalification program. qualification and retained.
requalification
program.
F.1. General weapons This header would be
qualification added for
requirements. formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.1.a. Qualification The requirement
Qualification firing for firing must be would retain the
the handgun and the rifle accomplished in qualification
must be for daylight accordance with requirements stated
firing, and each individual Commission in appendix B,
shall perform night firing requirements and Paragraph IV. The
for familiarization with the Commission- proposed rule would
assigned weapon(s). approved training specify that such
and qualification qualifications have
plan for assigned to be accomplished
weapons. in accordance with
Commission-approved
training and
qualification
plans.

[[Page 62821]]

The results of weapons F.1.b. The results This weapons
qualification and of weapons qualification and
requalification must be qualification and requalification
documented by the licensee requalification requirement would
or the licensee's agent. must be documented be retained. The
and retained as a word ``must'' would
record. be replaced with
the word ``shall''
for consistency
with this proposed
rule. The phrase
``by the licensee
or the licensee's
agent'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``and
retained as a
record'' for
consistency with
the terminology
used in the
proposed rule.
Each individual shall be F.1.c. Each This requalification
requalified at least every individual shall be requirement would
12 months. re-qualified at be retained. The
least annually. phrase ``every 12
months'' would be
replaced with the
word ``annually''
for consistency
with this proposed
rule.
Energy Policy Act of 2005... F.2. Alternate This new requirement
weapons would be added for
qualification. Upon consistency with
written request by the proposed Sec.
the licensee, the 73.19. The proposed
Commission may rule would require
authorize an the licensee to
applicant or request NRC
licensee to provide authorization to
firearms implement
qualification alternative
programs other than firearms
those listed in qualification
this appendix if programs pursuant
the applicant or to the licensee's
licensee request for
demonstrates that authorization to
the alternative use ``enhanced
firearm weapons'' as
qualification defined in the
program satisfies proposed Sec.
Commission 73.19.
requirements.
Written requests
must provide
details regarding
the proposed
firearms
qualification
programs and
describe how the
proposed
alternative
satisfies
Commission
requirements.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.3. Tactical This requirement
Qualification firing for weapons would be based upon
the handgun and the rifle qualification. The the current
must be for daylight licensee Training qualification
firing, and each individual and Qualification requirement in
shall perform night firing Plan must describe appendix B,
for familiarization with the firearms used, Paragraph IV. Due
assigned weapon(s). the firearms to changes to the
qualification threat environment,
program, and other the proposed rule
tactical training would require that
required to the licensee
implement the develop and
Commission-approved implement a site
security plans, specific firearms
licensee protective qualification
strategy, and program and other
implementing tactical training
procedures. to simulate site
Licensee developed conditions under
qualification and which the
re-qualification protective strategy
courses for each will be
firearm must implemented. The
describe the examples given
performance (lighting,
criteria needed, to elevation and
include the site fields-of-fire) are
specific conditions intended to be
(such as lighting, neither all
elevation, fields- inclusive nor
of-fire) under limiting.
which assigned
personnel shall be
required to carry-
out their assigned
duties.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4. Firearms This requirement
Qualification firing for qualification would be based upon
the handgun and the rifle courses. The the current
must be for daylight licensee shall qualification
firing, and each individual conduct the requirements in
shall perform night firing following appendix B,
for familiarization with qualification Paragraph IV. The
assigned weapon(s). courses for weapons proposed rule would
used. specify performance
expectations for
weapons courses.

[[Page 62822]]

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4.a. Annual This requirement
Qualification firing for daylight would combine the
the handgun and the rifle qualification current appendix B,
must be for daylight course. Qualifying Paragraph IV.A.,
firing, and each individual score must be an B., and C. Because
shall perform night firing accumulated total of changes to the
for familiarization with of 70 percent with threat environment,
assigned weapon(s). handgun and it is the
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. shotgun, and 80 Commission view
Handgun--Guards, armed percent with semi- that a higher
escorts and armed response automatic rifle and/ qualification
personnel shall qualify or enhanced percentage is
with a revolver or weapons, of the required. The
semiautomatic pistol firing maximum obtainable Commission has
the national police course, target score. determined that
or an equivalent nationally among law
recognized course. enforcement
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. authorities, 70
Semiautomatic Rifle-- percent is a
Guards, armed escorts and commonly accepted
armed response personnel, fire qualification
assigned to use the value requirement
semiautomatic rifle by the for handguns and
licensee training and shotguns and that
qualifications plan, shall 80 percent is the
qualify with a commonly accepted
semiautomatic rifle by value for semi-
firing the 100-yard course automatic and
of fire specified in enhanced weapons.
section 17.5(1) of the The proposed rule
National Rifle Association, would increase the
High Power Rifle Rules book acceptable level of
(effective March 15, 1976), proficiency to 70
(1) or a nationally percent for handgun
recognized equivalent and shotgun, and 80
course of fire. percent for the
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. semi-automatic
Shotgun--Guards, armed rifle and enhanced
escorts, and armed response weapons.
personnel assigned to use
the 12 gauge shotgun by the
licensee training and
qualifications plan shall
qualify with a full choke
or improved modified choke
12 gauge shotgun firing the
following course:.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4.b. Annual night This requirement
Qualification firing for fire qualification would combine the
the handgun and the rifle course. Qualifying qualification
must be for daylight score must be an standards stated in
firing, and each individual accumulated total the current
shall perform night firing of 70 percent with appendix B,
for familiarization with handgun and Paragraph IV.A.,
assigned weapon(s). shotgun, and 80 B., and C. Because
percent with semi- of changes to the
automatic rifle and/ threat environment,
or enhanced it is the
weapons, of the Commission view
maximum obtainable that a higher
target score. qualification
percentage is
required. The
Commission has
determined that
among law
enforcement
authorities, 70
percent is a
commonly accepted
night fire
qualification value
requirement for
handguns and
shotguns and that,
under the same
conditions, 80
percent is the
commonly accepted
value for semi-
automatic and
enhanced weapons.
The proposed rule
would increase the
Night Fire
qualification score
from
familiarization in
the current rule,
to an acceptable
level of
proficiency of 70
percent for handgun
and shotgun, and 80
percent for the
semi-automatic
rifle and enhanced
weapons.

[[Page 62823]]

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. F.4.c. Annual This requirement
Qualification firing for tactical would combine the
the handgun and the rifle qualification current
must be for daylight course. Qualifying qualification
firing, and each individual score must be an requirements in
shall perform night firing accumulated total appendix B,
for familiarization with of 80 percent of Paragraph IV.A.,
assigned weapon(s). the maximum B., and C. In the
obtainable score. proposed rule, the
annual tactical
course of fire
would be developed
and implemented to
simulate the
licensee protective
strategy in
accordance with the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan.
Licensees would not
be not required to
include every
aspect of its site
protective strategy
into one tactical
course of fire.
Instead, licensees
should periodically
evaluate and change
their tactical
course of fire to
incorporate
different or
changed elements of
the site protective
strategy so that
armed security
personnel are
exposed to multiple
and different site
contingency
scenarios. In the
current threat
environment, LLEA
tactical teams
typically require a
minimum
qualification score
of 80 percent to
ensure that a
higher percentage
of rounds hit the
intended target to
neutralize the
threat. This
correlates to
licensee protective
strategies in which
a higher percentage
of rounds that hit
the intended target
increase the
ability of the
security force to
neutralize the
adversarial threat
to prevent
radiological
sabotage. As a
result, the
proposed rule would
specify 80 percent
as the minimum
acceptable
qualification score
for the Tactical
Qualification
Course.
F.5. Courses of fire This heading would
be added to clarify
the subsequent
information and to
be consistent with
the remainder of
this appendix.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. F.5.a. Handgun...... This heading would
Handgun-- be brought forward
from current rule
and would be
renumbered
accordingly.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. F.5.a.(1) Armed The qualification
Guards, armed escorts and members of the requirement would
armed response personnel security be retained. The
shall qualify with a organization, phrase ``national
revolver or semiautomatic assigned duties and police course''
pistol firing the national responsibilities would be replaced
police course, or an involving the use with ``law
equivalent nationally of a revolver or enforcement
recognized course. semiautomatic course'' for
pistol shall consistency with
qualify in the terminology
accordance with used nationally in
standards and reference to
scores established firearms standards
by a law and courses.
enforcement course,
or an equivalent
nationally
recognized course.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A. F.5.a.(2) Qualifying This requirement
Qualifying score shall be scores must be an would be brought
an accumulated total of 70 accumulated total forward from
percent of the maximum of 70 percent of current rule and
obtainable score. the maximum would be renumbered
obtainable target accordingly.
score.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. F.5.b. Semiautomatic This header would be
Semiautomatic Rifle-- rifle. retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.B. F.5.b.(1) Armed The qualification
Guards, armed escorts and members of the requirement would
armed response personnel, security be retained. The
assigned to use the organization, phrase ``national
semiautomatic rifle by the assigned duties and police course''
licensee training and responsibilities would be replaced
qualifications plan, shall involving the use with ``law
qualify with a of a semiautomatic enforcement
semiautomatic rifle by rifle shall qualify course'' for
firing the 100-yard course in accordance with consistency with
of fire specified in the standards and the terminology
Section 17.5(1) of the scores established used nationally in
National Rifle Association, by a law reference to
High Power Rifle Rules book enforcement course, firearms standards
(effective March 15, 1976), or an equivalent and courses.
(1) or a nationally nationally
recognized equivalent recognized course.
course of fire.
Qualifying score shall be an F.5.b.(2) Qualifying This requirement
accumulated total of 80 scores must be an would be retained.
percent of the maximum accumulated total
obtainable score. of 80 percent of
the maximum
obtainable score.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. F.5.c. Shotgun...... This header would be
Shotgun-- retained.

[[Page 62824]]

Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. F.5.c.(1) Armed The qualification
Guards, armed escorts, and members of the requirement would
armed response personnel security be retained. The
assigned to use the 12 organization, phrase ``national
gauge shotgun by the assigned duties and police course''
licensee training and responsibilities would be replaced
qualifications plan shall involving the use with ``law
qualify with a full choke of a shotgun shall enforcement
or improved modified choke qualify in course'' for
12 gauge shotgun firing the accordance with consistency with
following course: standards and the terminology
scores established used nationally in
by a law reference to
enforcement course, firearms standards
or an equivalent and courses. The
nationally phrase ``12 gauge''
recognized course. would be deleted to
account for future
changes and because
this specific
requirement would
be no longer needed
in this proposed
appendix.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.C. F.5.c.(2) Qualifying The qualification
To qualify the individual scores must be an requirement would
shall be required to place accumulated total be retained. Due to
50 percent of all pellets of 70 percent of changes in the
(36 pellets) within the the maximum threat environment,
black silhouette. obtainable target the qualification
score. score would be
increased from 50
percent in the
current rule, to an
acceptable level of
proficiency. The
proposed 70 percent
requirement is a
commonly accepted
minimum
qualification
score, for shotguns
in the law
enforcement
community.
F.5.d. Enhanced This header would be
weapons. added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. F.5.d.(1) Armed This new requirement
Each individual shall be members of the would be added to
proficient in the use of security account for future
his assigned weapon(s) and organization, technological
shall meet prescribed assigned duties and advancements in
standards in the following responsibilities weaponry available
areas: involving the use to licensees. The
of any weapon or phrase ``national
weapons not police course''
described above, would be replaced
shall qualify in with ``law
accordance with enforcement
applicable course'' for
standards and consistency with
scores established the terminology
by a law used nationally in
enforcement course reference to
or an equivalent firearms standards
nationally and courses.
recognized course Examples of ``Law
for these weapons. enforcement course
or an equivalent
nationally
recognized course
for such weapons''
includes those by
the Departments of
Justice, Energy, or
Defense.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. F.5.d.(2) Qualifying This new 80 percent
Each individual shall be scores must be an qualification score
proficient in the use of accumulated total requirement would
his assigned weapon(s) and of 80 percent of be consistent and
shall meet prescribed the maximum comparable with the
standards in the following obtainable score. requirements for
areas: semi-automatic
rifles.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. F.6. Requalification This header would be
Requalification--. retained.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. F.6.a. Armed members This requalification
Individuals shall be of the security requirement would
weapons requalified at organization shall be retained. The
least every 12 months in be re-qualified for phrase ``every 12
accordance with the NRC each assigned months'' would be
approved licensee training weapon at least replaced with the
and qualifications plan, annually in word ``annually''
and in accordance with the accordance with for consistency
requirements stated in A, Commission with this proposed
B, and C of this section. requirements and rule. The phrase
the Commission- ``Individuals shall
approved training be weapons
and qualification requalified'' would
plan. be replaced with
the phrase ``Armed
members of the
security
organization shall
be re-qualified for
each assigned
weapon'' to reflect
changes in the
terminology used to
describe this
topic. The phrase
``the NRC approved
licensee training
and qualifications
plan, and in
accordance with the
requirements stated
in A, B, and C of
this section''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Commission
requirements and
the Commission-
approved training
and qualification
plan'' to reflect
changes in the
terminology used to
describe this
topic.
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.D. F.6.b. Firearms This requalification
Individuals shall be requalification requirement would
weapons requalified at must be conducted be retained. Due to
least every 12 months in using the courses changes in the
accordance with the NRC of fire outlined in threat environment,
approved licensee training Paragraph 5 of this the proposed rule
and qualifications plan, section. would specify the
and in accordance with the criteria for
requirements stated in A, weapons
B, and C of this section. requalification.
V. Guard, armed response G. Weapons, personal This heading would
personnel, and armed escort equipment and be retained and
equipment. maintenance. modified by adding
the word
``maintenance'' for
clarity.
G.1. Weapons........ This header was
added for
formatting
purposes.

[[Page 62825]]

Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. G.1.a. The licensee This new requirement
Each individual shall be shall provide armed would be based upon
proficient in the use of personnel with the current 10 CFR
his assigned weapon(s) and weapons that are 73.55 b.(4)(i) and
shall meet prescribed capable of appendix B,
standards in the following performing the Paragraph III.A. It
areas: function stated in also reflects new
10 CFR 73.55 b.(4)(i) The the Commission- requirements that
licensee may not permit an approved security would implement the
individual to act as a plans, licensee Energy Policy Act
guard, watchman armed protective of 2005. This
response person, or other strategy, and requirement would
member of the security implementing be intended to
organization unless the procedures. account for
individual has been technological
trained, equipped, and advancements in
qualified to perform each this area. Under
assigned security job duty the proposed rule,
in accordance with appendix licensees could
B, in accordance with request Commission
appendix B, ``General authorization to
Criteria for Security possess and use
Personnel,'' to this part.. enhanced weapons
Section 653 of the Energy that may otherwise
Policy Act of 2005.. be prohibited by
individual state
laws. This
authority has been
granted to the NRC
through Section 653
of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005.
G.2. Personal This header would be
equipment. added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A. G.2.a. The licensee This requirement
Fixed Site--Fixed site shall ensure that would be based upon
guards and armed response each individual is the current
personnel shall either be equipped or has appendix B,
equipped with or have ready access to all Paragraph V.A. This
available the following personal equipment requirement would
security equipment or devices required be intended to
appropriate to the for the effective specify that the
individual's assigned implementation of licensee is
contingency security the Commission- responsible for
related tasks or job duties approved security ensuring that each
as described in the plans, licensee individual is
licensee physical security protective provided all
and contingency plans: strategy, and personal equipment
implementing required to
procedures. effectively perform
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
The phrase ``has
ready access to''
would mean that
equipment or
devices, that are
required to perform
assigned duties,
are available as
described in the
Commission-approved
security plans,
licensee.
Appendix B, Paragraph G.2.b. The licensee This requirement
V.A.5.(a) Helmet, Combat. shall provide armed combines the
Appendix B, Paragraph security personnel, current
V.A.5.(b) Gas mask, full at a minimum, but requirements
face.. is not limited to, appendix B,
Appendix B, Paragraph the following. Paragraph V.A.5(b),
V.A.5.(c) Body armor (1) Gas mask, full 5(c), 5(g), 9, and
(bullet-resistant vest).. face.. 10. Due to changes
Appendix B, Paragraph (2) Body armor in the threat
V.A.5.(d) Flashlights and (bullet-resistant environment, the
batteries.. vest).. NRC has determined
Appendix B, Paragraph (3) Ammunition/ that this list of
V.A.5.(e) Baton.. equipment belt.. equipment would be
Appendix B, Paragraph (4) Duress alarms... the minimum
V.A.5.(f) Handcuffs.. (5) Two-way portable required to
Appendix B, Paragraph radios (handi- effectively perform
V.A.5.(g) Ammunition- talkie) 2 channels response duties.
equipment belt.. minimum, 1
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.6. operating and 1
Binoculars.. emergency..
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.7.
Night vision aids, i.e.,
hand-fired illumination
flares or equivalent..
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.8.
Tear gas or other nonlethal
gas..
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.9.
Duress alarms..
Appendix B, Paragraph
V.A.10. Two-way portable
radios (handi-talkie) 2
channels minimum, 1
operating and 1 emergency..

[[Page 62826]]

Appendix B, Paragraph G.2.c. Based upon This requirement
V.A.5.(a) Helmet, Combat. the licensee would be based upon
Appendix B, Paragraph protective strategy the current
V.A.5.(b) Gas mask, full and the specific appendix B,
face.. duties and Paragraph V.A.5.
Appendix B, Paragraph responsibilities The NRC has
V.A.5.(c) Body armor assigned to each determined that
(bullet-resistant vest).. individual, the this list of
Appendix B, Paragraph licensee should additional
V.A.5.(d) Flashlights and provide, but is not equipment must be
batteries.. limited to, the provided because
Appendix B, Paragraph following. such equipment is
V.A.5.(e) Baton.. (1) Flashlights and required to
Appendix B, Paragraph batteries.. effectively
V.A.5.(f) Handcuffs.. (2) Baton or other implement the
Appendix B, Paragraph non-lethal weapons.. licensee protective
V.A.5.(g) Ammunition- (3) Handcuffs....... strategy and the
equipment belt.. (4) Binoculars...... specific duties and
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.6 (5) Night vision responsibilities
Binoculars.. aids (e.g. goggles, assigned to each
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.7. weapons sights).. individual. The
Night vision aids, i.e., (6) Hand-fired current requirement
hand-fired illumination illumination flares appendix B,
flares or equivalent.. or equivalent.. Paragraph V.A.5.(a)
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.8. (7) Tear gas or ``Helmet, combat''
Tear gas or other nonlethal other non-lethal would be deleted
gas.. gas.. because the NRC has
Appendix B, Paragraph V.A.9. determined that
Duress alarms.. although the use of
Appendix B, Paragraph this item is
V.A.10. Two-way portable recommended it is
radios (handi-talkie) 2 an optional item
channels minimum, 1 that is not
operating and 1 emergency.. required to
effectively
implement a
protective strategy
or perform assigned
duties and
responsibilities.
The proposed
addition in (2) ``
. . . or other non-
lethal weapons''
would recognize
that the use of
batons and other
non-lethal weapons
by armed security
officers is subject
to state law.
Related to the use
of non-lethal
weapons, each state
has minimum
training
requirements for
armed private
security officers.
G.3. Maintenance.... This heading would
be added for
formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph III.A. G.3.a. Firearms This requirement
Each individual shall be maintenance would be based upon
proficient in the use of program. Each the current
his assigned weapon(s) and licensee shall appendix B,
shall meet prescribed implement a Paragraph III.A.
standards in the following firearms This proposed rule
areas: maintenance and would require a
accountability firearms
program in maintenance program
accordance with the to ensure weapons
Commission and ammunition are
regulations and the properly
Commission-approved maintained,
training and function as
qualification plan. designed, and are
The program must properly stored and
include: accounted for. In
(1) Semiannual test order to certify
firing for accuracy armorer, each
and functionality.. weapon manufacturer
(2) Firearms provides training
maintenance regarding the
procedures that maintenance, care
include cleaning and repair of
schedules and weapons they
cleaning provide to
requirements.. licensees. The
(3) Program activity Commission believes
documentation.. that armorers must
(4) Control and be certified to
Accountability ensure that the
(Weapons and quality of
ammunition).. maintenance, care
(5) Firearm storage and repair of the
requirements.. weapons are in
(6) Armorer accordance with
certification.. manufacturers
specifications.
H. Records.......... This heading would
be added formatting
purposes.
Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. H.1. The licensee This requirement
The licensee or the agent shall retain all would be added to
shall maintain reports, records, replace the current
documentation of the or other appendix B,
current plan and retain documentation Paragraph II.A, for
this documentation of the required by this consistency with
plan as a record for three appendix in the proposed Sec.
years after the close of accordance with the 73.55(r), and to
period for which the requirements of specify the records
licensee possesses the Sec. 73.55(r). retention
special nuclear material requirement. This
under each license for requirement would
which the plan was be intended to
developed and, if any consolidate all
portion of the plan is records retention
superseded, retain the requirements.
material that is superseded
for three years after each
change.

[[Page 62827]]

Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. H.2. The licensee This requirement
The physical fitness shall retain each would combine all
qualification of each individual's record retention
guard, armed response initial requirements
person, armed escort, and qualification currently in
other security force member record for three appendix B.
shall be documented. (3) years after
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. termination of the
The licensee shall retain individual's
this documentation as a employment and
record for three years from shall retain each
the date of each re-qualification
qualification.. record for three
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. (3) years after it
The licensee shall document is superceded.
each individual's physical
requalification and shall
retain this documentation
of requalification as a
record for three years from
the date of each
requalification..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.B.
The qualifications of each
individual must be
documented..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.B.
The licensee shall retain
this documentation of each
individual's qualifications
as a record for three years
after the employee ends
employment in the security-
related capacity and for
three years after the close
of period for which the
licensee possesses the
special nuclear material
under each license, and
superseded material for
three years after each
change..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E.
The results of
requalification must be
documented..
Appendix B, Paragraph II.E.
The licensee shall retain
this documentation of each
individual's
requalification as a record
for three years from the
date of each
requalification..
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.
The results of weapons
qualification and
requalification must be
documented by
requalification must be
documented by the licensee
or the licensee's agent..
Appendix B, Paragraph IV.
The licensee shall retain
this documentation of each
qualification as a record
for three years from the
date of the qualification
or requalification, as
appropriate..
Appendix B, Paragraph I.F. H.3. The licensee This requirement
The results of suitability, shall document data would combine two
physical, and mental and test results requirements
qualifications data and from each currently in
test results must be individual's appendix B.
documented by the licensee suitability,
or the licensee's agent. physical, and
The licensee or the agent psychological
shall retain this qualification and
documentation as a record shall retain this
for three years from the documentation as a
date of obtaining and record for three
recording these results. years from the date
of obtaining and
recording these
results.
I. Audits and This heading would
reviews. be added to ensure
consistency with
the structure of
the appendix.
The licensee shall This requirement
review the would be added for
Commission-approved consistency with
training and audit and review
qualification plan requirements of the
in accordance with proposed 10 CFR
the requirements of 73.55(n).
Sec. 73.55(n).
Definitions................. J. Definitions...... This heading would
be brought forward
from the current
rule and would be
renumbered
accordingly.
Terms defined in parts 50, Terms defined in This requirement
70, and 73 of this chapter parts 50, 70, and would be brought
have the same meaning when 73 of this chapter forward from the
used in this appendix. have the same current rule and
meaning when used would be renumbered
in this appendix. accordingly.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 62828]]

Table 7.--Part 73 Appendix C Section II
[Nuclear Power Plants Safeguards Contingency Plans]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix C.................. Section II: Nuclear This paragraph and
power plant header would be
safeguards added to
contingency plans. independently
address Nuclear
Power Reactor
Safeguards
Contingency Plan
requirements
without impacting
other licensees.
The proposed
requirements
addressed in this
proposed paragraph
retain and
incorporate the
requirements of the
appendix C.
Introduction................ (a) Introduction.... This requirement
would be retained.
The safeguards This requirement
contingency plan would be added to
must describe how generally describe
the criteria set the Commission's
forth in this expectations for
appendix will be the content of the
satisfied through safeguards
implementation and contingency plan.
must provide
specific goals,
objectives and
general guidance to
licensee personnel
to facilitate the
initiation and
completion of
predetermined and
exercised responses
to threats, up to
and including the
design basis threat
described in Sec.
73.1(a)(1).
Contents of the Plan........ Contents of the plan This requirement
would be retained.
Each licensee safeguards (b) Each safeguards This requirement
contingency plan shall contingency plan would be retained
include five categories of must include the with editorial
information: following twelve changes. The
1. Background. (12) categories of current categories
2. Generic Planning Base. information: of information (1)
3. Licensee Planning Base. (1) Background...... through (5) would
4. Responsibility Matrix. (2) Generic Planning be retained with
5. Procedures. Base.. (5) being
(3) Licensee reformatted to (12)
Planning Base.. and renamed
(4) Responsibility ``Implementing
Matrix.. Procedures'' to
(5) Primary Security update the
Functions.. terminology used to
(6) Response identify this
Capabilities.. category of
(7) Protective information. The
Strategy.. proposed categories
(8) Integrated of information (5)
Response Plan.. through (11) would
(9) Threat Warning be added to improve
System.. the usefulness and
(10) Performance applicability of
Evaluation Program.. the safeguards
(11) Audits and contingency plan.
Reviews..
(12) Implementing
Procedures..
1. Background............... (c) Background...... This header would be
retained with
editorial changes.
Under the following topics, (c)(1) Consistent This requirement
this category of with the design would be retained
information shall identify basis threat with information
and define the perceived specified in Sec. added to identify
dangers and incidents with 73.1(a)(1), specific goals,
which the plan will deal licensees shall objectives and
and the general way it will identify and general information
handle these: describe the for the development
perceived dangers, of the safeguards
threats, and contingency plan.
incidents against
which the
safeguards
contingency plan is
designed to protect.
1.b. Purpose of the Plan--A (c)(2) Licensees This requirement
discussion of the general shall describe the would be retained
aims and operational general goals and with editorial
concepts underlying operational changes. The header
implementation of the plan. concepts underlying ``Purpose of the
Introduction: The goals of implementation of Plan'' would be
licensee safeguards the approved deleted because
contingency plans for safeguards purpose is
responding to threats, contingency plan, described in the
thefts, and radiological to include, but not proposed paragraph
sabotage are: limited to the (a)(2). The phrase
following: ``A discussion of
the general aims
and'' would be
deleted because the
specific goals and
objectives
discussed in the
proposed paragraph
(c)(1) would
include ``general
aims'', therefore,
it is not necessary
to further break
this topic area
into individual
components. The
phrase ``, to
include, but not
limited to the
following'' would
be added to provide
flexibility for the
licensee to add
information not
specifically
listed.
1.c. Scope of the Plan--A (c)(2)(i) The types This requirement
delineation of the types of of incidents would be retained
incidents covered in the covered. with editorial
plan. changes. The header
``Scope of the
Plan'' would be
deleted because the
scope of the
safeguards
contingency plan
under this proposed
rule would not be
limited to only a
delineation of the
types of incidents
covered in the
plan.
Introduction: A licensee (c)(2)(ii) The This requirement
safeguards contingency plan specific goals and would be retained
is a documented plan to objectives to be with additional
give guidance to licensee accomplished. information added
personnel in order to for the
accomplish specific defined identification of
objectives * * *. specific goals and
objectives to be
accomplished to
ensure the plan is
appropriately
oriented toward
mission
accomplishment.

[[Page 62829]]

Background: Under the (c)(2)(iii) The This requirement
following topics, this different elements would be retained
category of information of the onsite with additional
shall identify and define physical protection information added
the perceived dangers and program that are to describe defense-
incidents with which the used to provide at in-depth concepts
plan will deal and the all times the as they apply at
general way it will handle capability to each site and how
these: detect, assess, the individual
intercept, components that
challenge, delay, make up the onsite
and neutralize physical protection
threats, up to and program would work
including the together to ensure
design basis threat the capability to
relative to the detect, assess,
perceived dangers intercept,
and incidents challenge, delay,
described in the and neutralize the
Commission-approved threats consistent
safeguards with the proposed
contingency plan. requirements of
Sec. 73.55.
Introduction: The goals of (c)(2)(iv) How the This requirement
licensee safeguards onsite response would be retained
contingency plans * * * effort is organized with additional
are: and coordinated to information added
(1) to organize the response ensure that to describe the
effort at the licensee licensees, elements of a site
level,. capability to integrated response
prevent significant to prevent
core damage and significant core
spent fuel sabotage damage and spent
is maintained fuel sabotage.
throughout each
type of incident
covered.
Introduction: The goals of (c)(2)(v) How the This requirement
licensee safeguards onsite response would be retained
contingency plans * * * effort is with additional
are: integrated to information
(3) to ensure the include specific provided for an
integration of the licensee procedures, integrated response
response with the responses guidance, and as addressed in the
by other entities, and; strategies to proposed paragraph
Introduction: It is maintain or restore (j). Reference to
important to note that a core cooling, appendix E to part
licensee's safeguards containment, and 50 or to Sec.
contingency plan is spent fuel pool 70.22(I) would no
intended to be cooling longer be required
complimentary to any capabilities using because the
emergency plans developed existing or readily performance
pursuant to appendix E to available resources standard for this
part 50 or to Sec. (equipment and proposed
70.22(I) of this chapter. personnel) that can requirement would
be effectively be broad enough to
implemented under include these
the circumstances references and any
associated with other emergency
loss of large areas plans developed as
of the plant due to a result of
explosions or fires. Commission mandated
enhancements.
1.d. Definitions--A list of (c)(2)(vi) A list of This requirement
terms and their definitions terms and their would be retained
used in describing definitions used in with editorial
operational and technical describing changes. The header
aspects of the plan. operational and ``Definitions'' is
technical aspects deleted because it
of the approved would no longer be
safeguards required under the
contingency plan. new format of this
proposed rule. The
phrase ``approved
safeguards
contingency'' would
be added to reflect
changes to the
terminology used to
describe this
topic.
2. Generic Planning Base.... (d) Generic planning This requirement
base. would be retained.
2. Under the following (d)(1) Licensees This requirement
topics, this category of shall define the would be retained
information shall define criteria for with editorial
the criteria for initiation initiation and changes. The phrase
and termination of termination of ``Under the
responses to safeguards responses to following topics''
contingencies together with threats to include would be replaced
the specific decisions, the specific with the phrase
actions, and supporting decisions, actions, ``The licensee
information needed to bring and supporting shall define'' to
about such responses: information needed establish the
to respond to each required action to
type of incident be taken by the
covered by the licensee. The
approved safeguards phrase ``safeguards
contingency plan. contingencies''
would be replaced
by the word
``threats'' to
reflect changes in
the terminology
used to describe
this topic. The
phrase ``together
with'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``to
include''. The
phrase ``bring
about such
responses'' is
replaced by the
phrase ``respond to
each type of
incident covered by
the approved
safeguards
contingency plan.''
2.a. Such events may include (d)(2) Licensees This requirement
alarms or other indications shall ensure early would be retained
signaling penetration of a detection of with editorial
protected area, vital area, unauthorized changes. Reference
or material access area; activities and to specific site
material control or shall respond to areas would be
material accounting all alarms or other deleted. The
indications of material indications of a licensee would be
missing or unaccounted for; threat condition required to respond
or threat indications-- such as, tampering, to unauthorized
either verbal, such as bomb threats, activities where
telephoned threats, or unauthorized detection has
implied, such as escalating barrier penetration occurred. Examples
civil disturbances. (vehicle or provided would be
personnel), missing revised for
or unaccounted for consistency with
nuclear material, the terminology
escalating civil used in the
disturbances, proposed rule and
imminent threat would not be
notification, or intended to be all
other threat inclusive.
warnings.
Appendix C--Introduction. An (d)(3) The This requirement
acceptable safeguards safeguards would be retained
contingency plan must contingency plan with editorial
contain: must:. changes. The phrase
``an acceptable''
is deleted because
the requirements of
this proposed rule
address what would
be acceptable.

[[Page 62830]]

2.a. Identification of those (d)(3)(i) Identify This requirement
events that will be used the types of events would be retained
for signaling the beginning that signal the with editorial
or aggravation of a beginning or changes. The phrase
safeguards contingency initiation of a ``according to how
according to how they are safeguards they are perceived
perceived initially by contingency event. initially by
licensee's personnel. licensee's
personnel'' would
be deleted because
the concept of
perceived is
captured through
assessment.
Introduction: The goals of (d)(3)(ii) Provide This requirement
licensee safeguards predetermined and would be retained
contingency plans * * * structured with editorial
are: (2) to provide responses to each changes. The phrase
predetermined, structured type of postulated ``safeguards
responses by licensees to event. contingencies'' has
safeguards contingencies, been replaced with
``each type of
postulated event''
to include a wider
range of potential
events.
2.b. Definition of the (d)(3)(iii) Define This requirement
specific objective to be specific goals and would be retained
accomplished relative to objectives for with editorial
each identified event. response to each changes. The word
postulated event. ``goals'' would be
added for
consistency with
the proposed
Paragraph (a)(3).
2.b.(1) a predetermined set (d)(3)(iv) Identify This requirement
of decisions and actions to the predetermined would be retained
satisfy stated objectives, decisions and with more specific
actions which are information being
required to satisfy provided to ensure
the written goals that written goals
and objectives for and objectives are
each postulated identified for each
event. postulated event.
2.b.(2) an identification of (d)(3)(v) Identify This requirement
the data, criteria, the data, criteria, would be retained
procedures, and mechanisms procedures, with editorial
necessary to efficiently mechanisms and changes. The word
implement the decisions, logistical support ``efficiently''
and; necessary to would be deleted
implement the because it is
predetermined considered to be an
decisions and arbitrary term that
actions. would not describe
the performance
standard of this
proposed
requirement.
2.b.(3) a stipulation of the (d)(3)(vi) Identify This requirement
individual, group, or the individuals, would be retained
organizational entity groups, or with editorial
responsible for each organizational changes. The use of
decision and action. entities the word
responsible for ``predetermined''
each predetermined has been inserted
decision and action. to organizationally
align decisions and
actions to
responsible
entities.
2.b.(3) a stipulation of the (d)(3)(vii) Define This requirement
individual, group, or the command-and- would be retained
organizational entity control structure with editorial
responsible for each required to changes. The
decision and action. coordinate each required elements
individual, group, of command and
or organizational control have been
entity carrying out added to establish
predetermined clear lines of
actions. authority.
Introduction: The goals of (d)(3)(viii) This requirement has
licensee safeguards Describe how been retained with
contingency plans * * * effectiveness will editorial changes.
are: (4) to achieve a be measured and A change has been
measurable performance in demonstrated to made to replace the
response capability. include the word ``response''
effectiveness of with the phrase
the capability to ``detect, assess,
detect, assess, intercept,
intercept, challenge, delay,
challenge, delay, and neutralize'' to
and neutralize provide a more
threats, up to and detailed
including the description of
design basis threat. system
effectiveness.
3. Licensee Planning Base... (e) Licensee This requirement
planning base. would be retained.
This category of information (e) Licensees shall This requirement
shall include the factors describe the site- would be retained
affecting contingency specific factors with editorial
planning that are specific affecting changes. The phrase
for each facility or means contingency ``or means of
of transportation. To the planning and shall transportation'' is
extent that the topics are develop plans for deleted because
treated in adequate detail actions to be taken this phrase does
in the licensee's approved in response to not apply to
physical security plan, postulated threats. nuclear power
they may be incorporated by The following reactor licensees.
cross reference to that topics must be The phrase ``To the
plan. The following topics addressed: extent that the
should be addressed: topics are treated
in adequate detail
in the licensee's
approved physical
security plan, they
may be incorporated
by cross reference
to that plan''
would be deleted
because this
information would
be required to be
specifically
detailed in
contingency
planning.
3.a. Licensee's (e)(1) This requirement has
Organizational Structure Organizational been retained with
for Contingency Responses. Structure. The more detailed
A delineation of the safeguards information being
organization's chain of contingency plan provided for the
command and delegation of must describe the integration of
authority as these apply to organization's command groups,
safeguards contingencies. chain of command succession of
and delegation of command, and
authority during control functions.
safeguards
contingencies, to
include a
description of how
command-and-control
functions will be
coordinated and
maintained.
3.b. Physical Layout........ (e)(2) Physical This requirement
layout. would be retained.
3.b.(i) Fixed Sites. A (e)(2)(i) The This requirement
description of the physical safeguards would be retained
structures and their contingency plan with editorial
location on the site * * *. must include a site changes. The header
description, to ``Fixed Sites''
include maps and would be deleted
drawings, of the because it would
physical structures not be necessary
and their locations. for the purpose of
this proposed rule.
Specific
information to
permit orientation
and familiarization
of the site would
also be included.

[[Page 62831]]

3.b.(i) A description * * * (e)(2)(i)(A) Site This requirement has
and a description of the Description. The been retained with
site in relation to nearby site description more detailed
towns, roads, and other must address the information being
environmental features site location in included to
important to the effective relation to nearby consider the site's
coordination of response towns, geographic
operations. transportation relationship to the
routes (e.g., rail, community and
water, air, roads), environment.
pipelines,
hazardous material
facilities, onsite
independent spent
fuel storage
installations, and
pertinent
environmental
features that may
have an effect upon
coordination of
response operations.
3.b.(i) Particular emphasis (e)(2)(i)(B) This requirement
should be placed on main Approaches. would be retained
and alternate entry routes Particular emphasis with editorial
for law enforcement must be placed on changes. The word
assistance forces and the main and alternate ``should'' has been
location of control points entry routes for replaced with the
for marshaling and law enforcement or word ``must'' to
coordinating response other offsite establish this
activities. support agencies language as a
and the location of requirement.
control points for
marshaling and
coordinating
response activities.
(e)(2)(ii) Licensees This requirement
with co-located would be retained
Independent Spent with more detailed
Fuel Storage information being
Installations shall provided for
describe response response to
procedures for both incidents occurring
the operating outside the
reactor and the protected area and
Independent Spent for the utilization
Fuel Storage of assets.
Installation to
include how onsite
and offsite
responders will be
coordinated and
used for incidents
occurring outside
the protected area.
3.c. Safeguards Systems (e)(3) Safeguards This requirement
Hardware. A description of Systems Hardware. would be retained
the physical security and The safeguards with editorial
accounting system hardware contingency plan changes to specify
that influence how the must contain a hardware for
licensee will respond to an description of the material
event. Examples of systems physical security accountability.
to be discussed are and material
communications, alarms, accounting system
locks, seals, area access, hardware that
armaments, and surveillance. influence how the
licensee will
respond to an event.
3.d. Law Enforcement (e)(4) Law This requirement
Assistance. enforcement would be retained.
assistance.
3.d. A listing of available (e)(4)(i) The This requirement
local law enforcement safeguards would be retained
agencies and a description contingency plan with more detailed
of their response must contain a information being
capabilities and their listing of provided for
criteria for response; and available local, documenting
* * *. State, and Federal supporting agency
law enforcement capabilities and
agencies and a assets.
general description
of response
capabilities, to
include number of
personnel, types of
weapons, and
estimated response
time lines.
3.d. * * * and a discussion (e)(4)(ii) The This requirement
of working agreements or safeguards would be retained
arrangements for contingency plan with the addition
communicating with these must contain a of written
agencies. discussion of information to be
working agreements included in working
with offsite law agreements with
enforcement offsite law
agencies to include enforcement
criteria for agencies.
response, command
and control
protocols, and
communication
procedures.
3.e. Policy Constraints and (e)(5) Policy This requirement
Assumptions. A discussion constraints and would be retained.
of State laws, local assumptions. The The text of 3.e.(2)
ordinances, and company safeguards ``Use of Employee
policies and practices that contingency plan property'' would be
govern licensee response to must contain a deleted because
incidents. Examples that discussion of State this information
may be discussed include: laws, local would not be
(1) Use of deadly force;.... ordinances, and considered relevant
(2) Use of employee company policies for discussion
property;. and practices that under policy
(3) Use of off-duty govern licensee constraints and
employees;. response to assumptions. The
(4) Site security incidents and must requirement would
jurisdictional boundaries.. include, but is not be added to
limited to, the implement
following. applicable
(i) Use of deadly provisions from the
force.. EPAct of 2005. This
(ii) Recall of off- requirement is not
duty employees.. applicable to
(iii) Site licensees that
jurisdictional possess such
boundaries.. weaponry under
(iv) Use of enhanced authority separate
weapons, if from EPAct 2005.
applicable..
3.f. Administrative and (e)(6) This requirement
Logistical Considerations-- Administrative and would be retained.
logistical
considerations.
3.f. Descriptions of (e)(6)(i) The This requirement
licensee practices that may safeguards would be retained
have an influence on the contingency plan with information
response to safeguards must contain a added to reflect
contingency events. The description of changes in the
considerations shall licensee practices terminology used to
include a description of which influence how describe this
the procedures that will be the licensee topic.
used for ensuring that all responds to a
equipment needed to effect threat to include,
a successful response to a but not limited to,
safeguards contingency will a description of
be easily accessible, in the procedures that
good working order, and in will be used for
sufficient supply to ensuring that all
provide redundancy in case equipment needed to
of equipment failure. effect a successful
response will be
readily accessible,
in good working
order, and in
sufficient supply
to provide
redundancy in case
of equipment
failure.
4. Responsibility Matrix.... (f) Responsibility This requirement
matrix. would be retained.

[[Page 62832]]

This category of information (f)(1) The This requirement
consists of detailed safeguards would be retained
identification of the contingency plan with information
organizational entities must describe the added to reflect
responsible for each organizational changes in the
decision and action entities that are terminology used to
associated with specific responsible for describe this
responses to safeguards each decision and topic.
contingencies. action associated
with responses to
threats.
For each initiating event, a (f)(1)(i) For each This requirement
tabulation shall be made identified would be retained
for each response entity initiating event, a with editorial
depicting the assignment of tabulation must be changes. The
responsibilities for all made for each parenthetical
decisions and actions to be response depicting phrase ``(Not all
taken in response to the the assignment of entities will have
initiating event. (Not all responsibilities assigned
entities will have assigned for all decisions responsibilities
responsibilities for any and actions to be for any given
given initiating event.). taken. initiating event)''
would be deleted
because it is
considered to be
constricting
information.
The tabulations in the (f)(1)(ii) The This requirement
Responsibility Matrix shall tabulations would be retained
provide an overall picture described in the with editorial
of the response actions and responsibility changes. The word
their interrelationships. matrix must provide ``shall'' has been
an overall replaced with
description of ``must'' to
response actions establish this
and language as a
interrelationships. requirement.
Safeguards responsibilities (f)(2) Licensees This requirement
shall be assigned in a shall ensure that would be retained
manner that precludes duties and with editorial
conflict in duties or responsibilities changes.
responsibilities that would required by the
prevent the execution of approved safeguards
the plan in any safeguards contingency plan do
contingency. not conflict with
or prevent the
execution of other
site emergency
plans.
Safeguards responsibilities (f)(3) Licensees This requirement
shall be assigned in a shall identify and would be retained
manner that precludes discuss potential with added written
conflict in duties or areas of conflict discussion (text)
responsibilities that would between site plans in the plan to
prevent the execution of in the integrated document
the plan in any safeguards response plan consideration of
contingency. required by Section other plans to
II(b)(8) of this preclude conflict
appendix. between multiple
plans.
(f)(4) Licensees This requirement
shall address would be added to
safety/security address
interface issues in communication
accordance with the between licensee
requirements of safety and security
Sec. 73.58 to entities, to ensure
ensure activities that activities
by the security involving one
organization, organizational
maintenance, entity do not
operations, and adversely affect
other onsite another. Details
entities are would be addressed
coordinated in a in the proposed
manner that Sec. 73.58 safety/
precludes conflict security interface.
during both normal
and emergency
conditions.
(g) Primary security This requirement
functions. would be added to
improve the
usefulness and
applicability of
the safeguards
contingency plan.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (g)(1) Licensees This requirement
Requiring responding guards shall establish and would be retained
or other armed response maintain at all with editorial
personnel to interpose times, the changes. The phrase
themselves between vital capability to ``radiological
areas and material access detect, assess, and sabotage'' is
areas and any adversary respond to all replaced with the
attempting entry for the threats to the phrase ``all
purpose of radiological facility up to and threats up to and
sabotage or theft of including the including the
special nuclear material design basis threat. design basis
and to intercept any person threat'' to more
exiting with special accurately
nuclear material, and, * * represent the
*. standard that the
licensee also
protect against
perceived threats
not contained in
the design basis
threat.
Sec. 73.55(h)(6) To (g)(2) To facilitate This requirement
facilitate initial response initial response to would be retained
to detection of penetration a threat, licensees with editorial
of the protected area and shall ensure the changes. Early
assessment of the existence capability to detection has been
of a threat, a capability observe all areas added to permit a
of observing the isolation of the facility in timely and
zones and the physical a manner that effective response.
barrier at the perimeter of ensures early The goal is to
the protected area shall be detection of observe and detect
provided, preferably by unauthorized potential threats
means of closed circuit activities and as far from the
television or by other limits exposure of facility as
suitable means which limit responding possible.
exposure of responding personnel to
personnel to possible possible attack.
attack.
(g)(3) Licensees This requirement
shall generally would be added to
describe how the describe the
primary security concept of defense-
functions are in-depth for
integrated to improved system
provide defense-in- effectiveness.
depth and are
maintained despite
the loss of any
single element of
the onsite physical
protection program.
(g)(4) Licensees' This requirement
description must would be added to
begin with onsite further describe
physical protection the concept of
measures defense-in-depth
implemented in the for improved system
outermost facility effectiveness.
perimeter, and must
move inward through
those measures
implemented to
protect vital and
target set
equipment.
(h) Response This requirement
capabilities. would be added.

[[Page 62833]]

Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (h)(1) Licensees This requirement
Requiring responding guards shall establish and would be retained
or other armed response maintain at all with editorial
personnel to interpose times the changes. The phrase
themselves between vital capability to ``radiological
areas and material access intercept, sabotage'' is
areas and any adversary challenge, delay, replaced with the
attempting entry for the and neutralize phrase ``all
purpose of radiological threats up to and threats up to and
sabotage or theft of up to and including including the
special nuclear material the design basis design basis
and to intercept any person threat. threat'' for
exiting with special consistency with
nuclear material, and, * * the proposed Sec.
*. 73.55.
Appendix C, Paragraph 4. For (h)(2) Licensees The requirement
each initiating event, a shall identify the would be retained
tabulation shall be made personnel, with information
for each response entity equipment, and added to identify
depicting the assignment of resources necessary the allocation of
responsibilities for all to perform the personnel and the
decisions and actions to be actions required to availability of
taken in response to the prevent significant assets required to
initiating event. core damage and be implemented in
spent fuel sabotage response to
in response to postulated events.
postulated events.
(h)(3) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added. The
predetermined word
actions can be ``predetermined''
completed under the is used to provide
postulated for the
conditions. accomplishment of
automatic actions
to achieve the
security mission.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (h)(4) Licensees This requirement
number of guards, and shall provide at would be retained
armed, trained personnel all times an armed with editorial
immediately available at response team changes. The
the facility to fulfill comprised of requirement would
these response requirements trained and be based on Sec.
shall nominally be ten qualified personnel 73.55(h)(3) and
(10), unless specifically who possess the would describe the
required otherwise on a knowledge, skills, performance
case by case basis by the abilities, and standard for
Commission; however, this equipment required personnel assigned
number may not be reduced to implement the armed response
to less than five (5) Commission-approved duties.
guards. safeguards
contingency plan
and site protective
strategy. The plan
must include a
description of the
armed response team
including the
following:
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (h)(4)(i) The This requirement
number of guards, and authorized minimum would be retained
armed, trained personnel number of armed with information
immediately available at responders, added to establish
the facility to fulfill available at all the number of
these response requirements times inside the personnel required
shall nominally be ten protected area. to be assigned
(10), unless specifically armed response
required otherwise on a duties within the
case by case basis by the protected area.
Commission; however, this This is intended to
number may not be reduced ensure that
to less than five (5) predetermined
guards. positions
documented in
approved
contingency plans
and are occupied
during threat
situations.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (h)(4)(ii) The This requirement
number of guards, and authorized minimum would be retained
armed, trained personnel number of armed with information
immediately available at security officers, added to establish
the facility to fulfill available onsite at the number of
these response requirements all times. personnel required
shall nominally be ten to be assigned
(10), unless specifically armed response
required otherwise on a duties on site.
case by case basis by the This is intended to
Commission; however, this ensure that
number may not be reduced predetermined
to less than five (5) positions
guards. documented in
approved
contingency plans
and are occupied
during threat
situations.
(h)(5) The total This requirement
number of armed would be added to
responders and document the number
armed security of armed response
officers must be personnel and their
documented in the roles and
approved security relationships to
plans and the protective
documented as a strategy.
component of the
protective strategy.
(h)(6) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
individuals ensure assigned
assigned duties and personnel are
responsibilities to trained to perform
implement the their assigned
Safeguards duties and
Contingency Plan responsibilities.
are trained and
qualified in
accordance with
appendix B of this
part and the
Commission-approved
security plans.
(i) Protective This header is added
strategy. for formatting
purposes.
(i)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall develop, would be added to
maintain, and provide tactical
implement a written planning
protective strategy information for the
that describes the armed response team
deployment of the and each individual
armed response team in response to
relative to the threats.
general goals,
operational
concepts,
performance
objectives, and
specific actions to
be accomplished by
each individual in
response to
postulated events.
(i)(2) The This header is added
protective strategy for formatting
must: purposes.

[[Page 62834]]

Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (i)(2)(i) Be This requirement
Requiring responding guards designed to prevent would be retained
or other armed response significant core and revised to
personnel to interpose damage and spent describe the design
themselves between vital fuel sabotage of the licensee
areas and material access through the protective strategy
areas and any adversary coordinated consistent with the
attempting entry for the implementation of proposed Sec.
purpose of radiological specific actions 73.55(b)(2). Most
sabotage or theft of and strategies significantly, the
special nuclear material required to word ``interpose''
and to intercept any person intercept, would be replaced
exiting with special challenge, delay, by the phrase
nuclear material, and, * * and neutralize ``intercept,
*. threats up to and challenge, delay,
including the and neutralize'' to
design basis threat provide a
of radiological measurable
sabotage. performance based
requirement that
identifies the
specific actions
required to satisfy
the action
``interpose'' as
required by the
current Sec.
73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)
, and to provide a
measurable
performance based
requirement against
which the
effectiveness of
the licensee
protective strategy
could be measured.
(i)(2)(ii) Describe This requirement
and consider site would be added
specific based on changes to
conditions, to the threat
include but not environment the
limited to, Commission has
facility layout, determined that it
the location of is necessary to
target set emphasize
equipment and consideration of
elements, target the listed areas
set equipment that for design and
is in maintenance planning purposes.
or out of service,
and the potential
effects that
unauthorized
electronic access
to safety and
security systems
may have on the
protective strategy
capability to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel sabotage.
(i)(2)(iii) Identify This requirement
predetermined would be added to
actions and time identify
lines for the ``predetermined
deployment of armed actions'' to
personnel. provide for
automatic actions
toward
accomplishing the
security mission.
(i)(2)(iv) Provide This requirement
bullet resisting would be added to
protected positions provide a
with appropriate performance based
fields of fire. requirement for the
placement/location
of Bullet-Resisting
Enclosures (BREs).
This proposed
requirement would
ensure that each
position would be
of sufficient
strength to enhance
survivability of
armed personnel
against the design
basis threat and
would ensure that
assigned areas of
responsibility are
clearly visible and
within the
functional
capability of
assigned weapons.
Sec. 73.55(h)(6) To (i)(2)(v) Limit This requirement
facilitate initial response exposure of would be retained
to detection of penetration security personnel with editorial
* * * which limit exposure to possible attack. changes added to
of responding personnel to describe the
possible attack. ballistic
protection or use
of available cover
and concealment for
security personnel.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (i)(3) Licensees This requirement
guard, watchman or armed shall provide a would be retained
response individual on duty command and control with editorial
shall be capable of structure, to changes added to
maintaining continuous include response by describe the
communication with an off-site law elements of
individual in each enforcement integrated incident
continuously manned alarm agencies, which command during
station required by ensures that postulated events.
paragraph (e)(1) of this decisions and
section, who shall be actions are
capable of calling for coordinated and
assistance from other communicated in a
guards, watchmen, and armed timely manner and
response personnel and from that facilitates
local law enforcement response in
authorities. accordance with the
integrated response
plan.
(j) Integrated This new header
Response Plan. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
Introduction: It is (j)(1) Licensees This requirement
important to note that a shall document, would be retained
licensee's safeguards maintain, and with editorial
contingency plan is implement an changes. The
intended to be Integrated Response requirement would
complimentary to any Plan which must describe integrated
emergency plans developed identify, describe, and coordinated
pursuant to appendix E to and coordinate responses to
part 50 or to Sec. actions to be taken threats.
70.22(i) of this chapter. by licensee
personnel and
offsite agencies
during a
contingency event
or other emergency
situation.
(j)(2) The This requirement
Integrated Response would be added to
Plan must: improve the
usefulness and
applicability of
the safeguards
contingency plan.
(j)(2)(i) Be This requirement
designed to would be added to
integrate and ensure the design
coordinate all of an integrated
actions to be taken response plan that
in response to an has been developed
emergency event in in coordination and
a manner that will conjunction with
ensure that each other plans.
site plan and
procedure can be
successfully
implemented without
conflict from other
plans and
procedures.

[[Page 62835]]

(j)(2)(ii) Include This requirement
specific would be added to
procedures, ensure the design
guidance, and of an integrated
strategies to response plan that
maintain or restore addresses a myriad
core cooling, of postulated
containment, and events within the
spent fuel pool design basis threat
cooling environment and to
capabilities using develop mitigating
existing or readily strategies for
available resources events that may
(equipment and exceed the design
personnel) that can basis threat.
be effectively
implemented under
the circumstances
associated with
loss of large areas
of the plant due to
explosions or fires.
(j)(2)(iii) Ensure This requirement
that onsite would be added to
staffing levels, describe the
facilities, and availability of
equipment required systems and assets
for response to any to ensure a high
identified event, state of readiness
are readily is maintained for
available and postulated events.
capable of
fulfilling their
intended purpose.
(j)(2)(iv) Provide This requirement
emergency action would be added to
levels to ensure ensure that event
that threats result information is
in at least a communicated in a
notification of timely and accurate
unusual event and manner.
implement
procedures for the
assignment of a
predetermined
classification to
specific events.
(j)(2)(v) Include This requirement
specific would be added to
procedures, consider advanced
guidance, and threats related to
strategies computer
describing cyber technology.
incident response
and recovery.
(j)(3) Licensees This new header is
shall: added for
formatting
purposes.
(j)(3)(i) Reconfirm This requirement
on an annual basis, would be added to
liaison with local, establish a
State, and Federal periodic standard
law enforcement for maintaining
agencies, liaison with off-
established in site law
accordance with enforcement
Sec. 73.55(k)(8), resources to ensure
to include a continual and
communication ongoing
protocols, command understanding of
and control all aspects of a
structure, response to
marshaling potential threats.
locations,
estimated response
times, and
anticipated
response
capabilities and
specialized
equipment.
(j)(3)(ii) Provide This requirement
required training would be added to
to include provide for
simulator training training of
for the operations personnel to ensure
response to they possess the
security events knowledge, skills,
(e.g. loss of and abilities
ultimate heat sink) required to perform
for nuclear power assigned duties and
reactor personnel responsibilities.
in accordance with
site procedures to
ensure the
operational
readiness of
personnel
commensurate with
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(j)(3)(iii) This requirement
Periodically train would be added to
personnel in provide training of
accordance with personnel to ensure
site procedures to they possess the
respond to a tactical and
hostage or duress negotiations
situation. skills, knowledge
and abilities
needed to respond
to a hostage or
duress situation.
(j)(3)(iv) Determine This requirement
the possible would be added to
effects that nearby provide for the
hazardous material identification of
facilities may have site specific
upon site response operational
plans and modify conditions that may
response plans, affect how the
procedures, and licensee responds
equipment as to threats.
necessary.
(j)(3)(v) Ensure This requirement
that identified would be added to
actions are ensure that actions
achievable under identified in the
postulated safeguards
conditions. contingency plan,
protective
strategy,
integrated response
plan, and any other
emergency plans,
are achievable
under postulated
conditions.
(k) Threat warning This new header is
system. added for
formatting
purposes.
(k)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall implement a would be added to
``Threat warning provide for
system'' which progressive steps
identifies specific to gradually
graduated enhance security
protective measures based on perceived
and actions to be or identified
taken to increase threat.
licensee
preparedness
against a
heightened or
imminent threat of
attack.

[[Page 62836]]

(k)(2) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
the specific ensure preplanned
protective measures actions (protective
and actions measures) are
identified for each consistent with
threat level are other plans. The
consistent with the Commission has
Commission-approved determined that
safeguards because of changes
contingency plan, to the threat
and other site environment this
security, and proposed
emergency plans and requirement would
procedures. be needed to
emphasize the
importance of
coordinating all
site plans in a
manner that
precludes conflict.
(k)(3) Upon This requirement
notification by an would be added to
authorized provide for the
representative of implementation of
the Commission, preplanned actions
licensees shall in response to
implement the specific threat
specific protective levels or
measures assigned conditions.
to the threat level
indicated by the
Commission
representative.
(l) Performance This new header
Evaluation Program. would be added for
formatting
purposes.
(l)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall document and would be added to
maintain a ensure that the
Performance licensee maintains
Evaluation Program a Performance
that describes how Evaluation Plan to
the licensee will test, evaluate,
demonstrate and determine and
assess the improve upon the
effectiveness of effectiveness of
the onsite physical onsite physical
protection program protection program
to prevent to protect the
significant core identified targets
damage and spent and target sets in
fuel sabotage, and accordance with the
to include the security mission.
capability of armed
personnel to carry
out their assigned
duties and
responsibilities.
(l)(2) The This requirement
Performance would be added to
Evaluation Program establish
must include procedures and
procedures for the frequencies for the
conduct of conduct of drills
quarterly drills and exercises to
and annual force-on- ensure that system
force exercises effectiveness
that are designed determinations are
to demonstrate the made.
effectiveness of
the licensee's
capability to
detect, assess,
intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize a
simulated threat.
(l)(2)(i) The scope This requirement
of drills conducted would be added to
for training provide for the
purposes must be conduct of drills
determined by the for training
licensee as needed, purposes only.
and can be limited
to specific
portions of the
site protective
strategy.
(l)(2)(ii) Drills, This requirement
exercises, and would be added to
other training must ensure drills and
be conducted under exercises are
conditions that realistic in that
simulate as closely they simulate as
as practical the closely as
site specific possible, the
conditions under physical conditions
which each member (running, lifting,
will, or may be, climbing) and
required to perform mental stress
assigned duties and levels (decision
responsibilities. making, radio
communications,
strategy changes)
that will be
experienced in an
actual event.
(l)(2)(iii) This requirement
Licensees shall would be added to
document each ensure that
performance comprehensive
evaluation to records are
include, but not maintained.
limited to,
scenarios,
participants, and
critiques.
(l)(2)(iv) Each This requirement
drill and exercise would be added to
must include a ensure that
documented post comprehensive
exercise critique reports are
in which developed to ensure
participants that observed
identify failures, issues are
deficiencies, or identified in the
other findings in after action
performance, plans, report.
equipment, or
strategies.
(l)(2)(v) Licensees This requirement
shall enter all would be added to
findings, ensure that
deficiencies, and corrective action
failures identified plans are developed
by each performance and tracked to
evaluation into the provide resolution.
corrective action
program to ensure
that timely
corrections are
made to the onsite
physical protection
program and
necessary changes
are made to the
approved security
plans, licensee
protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures.
(l)(2)(vi) Licensees This requirement
shall protect all would be added to
findings, provide for the
deficiencies, and appropriate level
failures relative of protection for
to the the type of
effectiveness of information being
the onsite physical developed.
protection program Information
in accordance with involving findings,
the requirements of deficiencies and
Sec. 73.21. failures is
considered
sensitive and must
be protected
accordingly.
(l)(3) For the This new header
purpose of drills would be added for
and exercises, formatting
licensees shall: purposes.

[[Page 62837]]

(l)(3)(i) Use no This requirement
more than the would be added to
number of armed ensure that
personnel specified realistic tests are
in the approved conducted against
security plans to those forces
demonstrate available onsite on
effectiveness. a routine basis.
Conducting drills
under other than
with actual or non
typical staffing
levels would not
provide for
accurate system
effectiveness
determinations.
(l)(3)(ii) Minimize This requirement
the number and would be added to
effects of ensure that
artificialities exercises are
associated with conducted as
drills and realistically as
exercises. possible.
Artificialities if
not minimized would
result in
inaccurate system
effectiveness
determinations.
(l)(3)(iii) This requirement
Implement the use would be added to
of systems or provide for the
methodologies that utilization of
simulate the technological
realities of armed advancements for
engagement through simulating live
visual and audible fire combat
means, and reflects situations in a
the capabilities of controlled
armed personnel to environment. These
neutralize a target may include but are
though the use of not limited to the
firearms during use of laser
drills and engagement systems
exercises. or dye marking
cartridges.
(l)(3)(iv) Ensure This requirement
that each scenario would be added to
used is capable of ensure that
challenging the scenarios are
ability of armed developed to stress
personnel to the protective
perform assigned strategy in manner
duties and that deficiencies
implement required or weaknesses can
elements of the be identified.
protective strategy.
(l)(4) The This requirement
Performance would be added to
Evaluation Program improve the
must be designed to usefulness and
ensure that: applicability of
the safeguards
contingency plan.
(l)(4)(i) Each This requirement
member of each would be added to
shift who is ensure that
assigned duties and individual members
responsibilities of the security
required to force participate
implement the in drills at a
approved safeguards frequency that
contingency plan provides them with
and licensee knowledge and
protective strategy performance based
participates in at experience applying
least one (1) drill the protective
on a quarterly strategy.
basis and one (1)
force on force
exercise on an
annual basis.
(l)(4)(ii) The mock This requirement
adversary force would be added to
replicates, as ensure that the
closely as mock adversary
possible, adversary force is capable of
characteristics and portraying the
capabilities in the design basis threat
design basis threat in terms of size,
described in Sec. activity, movement,
73.1(a)(1), and is tactics, equipment
capable of and weaponry.
exploiting and
challenging the
licensee protective
strategy,
personnel, command
and control, and
implementing
procedures.
(l)(4)(iii) This requirement
Protective would be added to
strategies are provide an
evaluated and opportunity to
challenged through evaluate protective
tabletop strategies focusing
demonstrations. on incident command
in an open
discussion format.
(l)(4)(iv) Drill and This requirement
exercise would be added to
controllers are ensure the use of
trained and qualified
qualified to ensure controllers who are
each controller has knowledgeable of
the requisite safety,
knowledge and environmental
experience to conditions,
control and hazards, tactics,
evaluate exercises. weapons equipment,
and physical
security systems.
(l)(4)(v) Drills and This requirement
exercises are would be added to
conducted safely in ensure licensee
accordance with safety plans are
site safety plans. considered in the
conduct of drills
and exercises.
(l)(5) Members of This requirement
the mock adversary would be added to
force used for NRC ensure that the
observed exercises mock adversary
shall be force is not
independent of both influenced by
the security security management
program management or personnel
and personnel who responsible for
have direct security. This
responsibility for mitigates the
implementation of potential for the
the security scenario to be
program, including compromised or not
contractors, to carried out to the
avoid the desired
possibility for a expectation. This
conflict-of- proposed
interest. requirement is
based on the EPAct
2005 section 651.
(l)(6) Scenarios ....................
(l)(6)(i) Licensees This requirement
shall develop and would be added to
document multiple ensure that varying
scenarios for use scenarios with
in conducting differing adversary
quarterly drills configurations are
and annual force-on- used against all
force exercises. target sets for
increased
readiness. This
permits a better
determination of
overall system
effectiveness.

[[Page 62838]]

(l)(6)(ii) Licensee This requirement
scenarios must be would be added to
designed to test ensure that
and challenge any scenarios are
component or developed in a
combination of manner that each
components, of the aspect of the
onsite physical security system and
protection program strategy will be
and protective analyzed to
strategy. determine
effectiveness.
(l)(6)(iii) Each This requirement
scenario must use a would be added to
unique target set ensure that
or target sets, and scenarios are
varying developed in a
combinations of manner that each
adversary aspect of the
equipment, security system and
strategies, and strategy will be
tactics, to ensure analyzed to
that the determine overall
combination of all system
scenarios effectiveness.
challenges every
component of the
onsite physical
protection program
and protective
strategy to
include, but not
limited to,
equipment,
implementing
procedures, and
personnel.
(l)(6)(iv) Licensees This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
scenarios used for ensure the
required drills and development of
exercises are not scenarios with
repeated within any differing adversary
twelve (12) month configurations
period for drills against varying
and three years (3) target sets. This
for exercises. promotes increased
readiness and
permits a better
determination of
overall system
effectiveness.
Audit and Review............ (m) Records, audits, This header would be
and reviews. retained and
revised to add
records retention
requirements.
App. C 5.(1) For nuclear (m)(1) Licensees This requirement
power reactor licensees shall review and would be revised to
subject to the requirements audit the ensure that the
of Sec. 73.55, the Commission-approved protective strategy
licensee shall provide for safeguards is revised as a
a review of the safeguards contingency plan in result of any
contingency plan either: accordance with the significant changes
App. C 5.(1)(i) At intervals requirements Sec. that would effect
not to exceed 12 months, or 73.55(n) of this the ability to
* * * part. respond in
App. C 5.(1)(ii) As accordance with the
necessary, based on an existing
assessment by the licensee contingency plan.
against performance
indicators, and as soon as
reasonably practicable
after a change occurs in
personnel, procedures,
equipment, or facilities
that potentially could
adversely affect security,
but no longer than 12
months after the change.
App. C 5.(1)(ii) * * * In
any case, each element of
the safeguards contingency
plan must be reviewed at
least every 24 months.
App. C 5.(2) A licensee
subject to the requirements
of either Sec. 73.46 or
Sec. 73.55, shall ensure
that the review of the
safeguards contingency plan
is by individuals
independent of both
security program management
and personnel who have
direct responsibility for
implementation of the
security program.
Appendix C Paragraph 5(3).
The licensee shall document
the results and the
recommendations of the
safeguards contingency plan
review, management findings
on whether the safeguards
contingency plan is
currently effective, and
any actions taken as a
result of recommendations
from prior reviews in a
report to the licensee's
plant manager and to
corporate management at
least one level higher than
that having responsibility
for the day-to-day plant
operation.
Appendix C Paragraph 5.(2) (m)(2) The licensee This requirement
The review must include an shall make would be revised to
audit of safeguards necessary ensure that the
contingency procedures and adjustments to the protective strategy
practices, and an audit of Commission-approved is revised as a
commitments established for safeguards result of any
response by local law contingency plan to significant changes
enforcement authorities. ensure successful that would affect
implementation of the ability to
Commission respond in
regulations and the accordance with the
site protective existing
strategy. contingency plan.
Appendix C Paragraph 5.(2) (m)(3) The This requirement
The review must include an safeguards would be revised to
audit of safeguards contingency plan ensure that an
contingency procedures and review must include audit of the
practices, and an audit of an audit of safeguards
commitments established for implementing contingency plan is
response by local law procedures and conducted to
enforcement authorities. practices, the site validate essential
protective aspects of the
strategy, and plan.
response agreements
made by local,
State, and Federal
law enforcement
authorities.

[[Page 62839]]

Appendix C Paragraph 5.(3) (m)(4) Licensees This requirement
The report must be shall retain all would be added to
maintained in an auditable reports, records, improve the
form, available for or other usefulness and
inspection for a period of documentation applicability of
3 years. required by this the safeguards
appendix in contingency plan.
accordance with the
requirements of
Sec. 73.55(r).
Appendix C Paragraph 5. (n) Implementing This requirement
Procedures. procedures. would be retained
with editorial
changes. The word
``Implementing''
has been added to
further define the
requirement.
In order to aid execution of (n)(1) Licensees This requirement
the detailed plan as shall establish and would be revised to
developed in the maintain written ensure that plans
Responsibility Matrix, this implementing are developed to
category of information procedures that cover security
shall detail the actions to provide specific force routine,
be taken and decisions to guidance and emergency,
be made by each member or operating details administrative, and
unit of the organization as that identify the other operational
planned in the actions to be taken duties.
Responsibility Matrix. and decisions to be
Contents of the Plan: made by each member
Although the implementing of the security
procedures (the fifth organization who is
category of Plan assigned duties and
information) are the responsibilities
culmination of the planning required for the
process, and therefore are effective
an integral and important implementation of
part of the safeguards the Commission-
contingency plan, they approved security
entail operating details plans and the site
subject to frequent changes. protective strategy.
Contents of the Plan: The (n)(2) Licensees This requirement
licensee is responsible for shall ensure that would be revised to
ensuring that the implementing ensure that plans
implementing procedures procedures are developed to
reflect the information in accurately reflect cover security
the Responsibility Matrix, the information force routine,
appropriately summarized contained in the emergency,
and suitably presented for Responsibility administrative, and
effective use by the Matrix required by other operational
responding entities. this appendix, the duties. The phrase
Commission-approved ``appropriately
security plans, the summarized and
Integrated Response suitably presented
Plan, and other for effective use
site plans. by the responding
entities'' would be
deleted because
this concept would
be covered under
demonstration.
Contents of the Plan: They (n)(3) Implementing This requirement
need not be submitted to procedures need not would be retained
the Commission for be submitted to the with editorial
approval, but will be Commission for changes.
inspected by NRC staff on a approval but are
periodic basis. subject to
inspection.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 8.--Part 73 Appendix G
[Reportable safeguards events]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Introductory text to App. [Introductory text This appendix would
G]
to App. G]
be revised by
Pursuant to the provisions Under the provisions adding new
of 10 CFR 73.71 (b) and of Sec. 73.71(a), requirements for
(c), licensees subject to (d), and (f) of nuclear power
the provisions of 10 CFR this part, reactor licensees.
73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.55, licensees subject Power reactor
73.60, and 73.67 shall to the provisions licensees subject
report or record, as of Sec. 73.55 of to the provisions
appropriate, the following this part shall of Sec. 73.55
safeguards events. report or record, would be required
as appropriate, the to notify the
following Commission (1)
safeguards events within 15 minutes
under paragraphs I, after discovery of
II, III, and IV of an imminent or
this appendix. actual threat
Under the against the
provisions of Sec. facility and (2)
73.71(b), (c), and within four hours
(f) of this part, of discovery of
licensees subject suspicious events.
to the provisions The proposed 15-
of Sec. Sec. minute requirement
73.20, 73.37, would more
73.50, 73.60, and accurately reflect
73.67 of this part the current threat
shall report or environment.
record, as Because an actual
appropriate, the or potential threat
following could quickly
safeguards events result in an event,
under paragraphs II a shorter reporting
and IV of this time would be
appendix. Licensees required. However,
shall make such the requirement for
reports to the Commission
Commission under notification within
the provisions of 15 minutes would be
Sec. 73.71 of applied only to
this part. nuclear power
reactor licensees,
at this time. The
Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other licensees in
future rulemaking.
The new 4-hour
notification would
be intended to aid
the Commission, law
enforcement, and
the intelligence
community in
assessing
suspicious activity
that may be
indicative of pre-
operational
surveillance,
reconnaissance, or
intelligence
gathering efforts.
Events reported
under paragraphs I
or II would require
a followup written
report. Events
reported under
paragraph III would
not require a
followup written
report.

[[Page 62840]]

I. Events to be Paragraph I would be
reported as soon as added to establish
possible, but no the type of events
later than 15 to be reported
minutes after within 15 minutes.
discovery, followed Because the
by a written report identification of
within sixty (60) information
days. relating to an
(a) The initiation actual or imminent
of a security threat could
response consistent quickly result in
with a licensee's an event, which
physical security might necessitate
plan, safeguards expedited
contingency plan, Commission action
or defensive (e.g., notification
strategy based on of other licensees
actual or imminent or Federal
threat against a authorities), a
nuclear power shortened reporting
plant.. time would be
required. This
proposed
requirement would
also ensure that
threat-related
information would
be made available
to the Commission's
threat assessment
process in a timely
manner. Initiation
of response
consistent with
plans and the
defensive strategy
that are not
related to an
imminent or actual
threat against the
facility would not
need to be reported
(e.g false, or
nuisance
responses).
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported would be
provided in
guidance.
I.(b) The licensee This provision would
is not required to be added to reduce
report security unnecessary
responses initiated regulatory burden
as a result of on the licensees to
information notify the
communicated to the Commission of
licensee by the security responses
Commission, such as initiated in
the threat warning response to
system addressed in communications from
appendix C to this the Commission
part. (e.g., changes to
the threat level).
I. Events to be reported II. Events to be This requirement
within one hour of reported within one would be retained
discovery, followed by a (1) hour of and renumbered.
written report within 60 discovery, followed
days. by a written report
within sixty (60)
days.
(a) Any event in which there II.(a) Any event in This requirement
is reason to believe that a which there is would be retained
person has committed or reason to believe with minor revision
caused, or attempted to that a person has and renumbered. The
commit or cause, or has committed or term credible would
made a credible threat to caused, or be removed. The
commit or cause: attempted to commit Commission's view
or cause, or has is that a
made a threat to determination of
commit or cause: the ``credibility''
of a threat is not
a licensee
responsibility, but
rests with the
Commission and the
intelligence
community.
(1) A theft or unlawful II.(a)(1) A theft or This requirement
diversion of special unlawful diversion would be retained
nuclear material; or of special nuclear and renumbered.
material; or
(2) Significant physical II.(a)(2) This requirement
damage to a power reactor Significant would be retained
or any facility possessing physical damage to with minor
SSNM or its equipment or any NRC-regulated editorial changes
carrier equipment power reactor or to improve clarity
transporting nuclear fuel facility possessing and readability and
or spent nuclear fuel, or strategic special renumbered. The
to the nuclear fuel or nuclear material or phrase ``NRC-
spent nuclear fuel a to carrier regulated'' would
facility or carrier equipment be added to specify
possesses; or transporting that all Commission
nuclear fuel or licensed facilities
spent nuclear fuel, and transport would
or to the nuclear be covered by this
fuel or spent requirement. This
nuclear fuel change would
facility which is simplify the
possessed by a language in this
carrier; or section while
retaining the basic
requirement.
(3) Interruption of normal II.(a)(3) This requirement
operation of a licensed Interruption of would be retained
nuclear power reactor normal operation of with minor revision
through the unauthorized any NRC-licensed and renumbered. The
use of or tampering with nuclear power word ``machinery''
its machinery, components, reactor through the would be deleted
or controls including the unauthorized use of since
security system. or tampering with ``components''
its components or includes machinery
controls, including and other physical
the security system. structures at a
licensed facility.
This proposed
requirement would
continue to be
applied only to
nuclear power
reactors licensed
by the Commission,
at this time. The
Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other classes of
licensees in future
rulemaking.
(b) An actual entry of an II.(b) An actual or This requirement
unauthorized person into a attempted entry of would be renumbered
protected area, material an unauthorized and revised to
access area, controlled person into any delete the
access area, vital area, or area or transport previously
transport. for which the specifically
licensee is mentioned areas
required by (``protected area,
Commission material access
regulations to area, controlled
control access. access area, vital
area'') requiring
access controls and
change the language
to include the
actual or attempted
entry of an
unauthorized
individual into any
area required to be
controlled by
Commission
regulations. This
change would more
accurately reflect
the current threat
environment.

[[Page 62841]]

The revision also
reflects Commission
experience with
implementation of
the 2003 security
order's
requirements and
review of revised
license security
plans. Licensee's
defensive
strategies and
revised Safeguards
Contingency Plans
have introduced
additional
significant
locations (e.g.
target sets) that
may not be limited
to the previously
specified areas.
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
(c) Any failure, II.(c) Any failure, This requirement
degradation, or the degradation, or the would be renumbered
discovered vulnerability in discovered and revised to
a safeguard system that vulnerability in a delete the
could allow unauthorized or safeguard system previously
undetected access to a that could allow specifically
protected area, material unauthorized or mentioned areas
access area, controlled undetected access (``protected area,
access area, vital area, or to any area or material access
transport for which transport for which area, controlled
compensatory measures have the licensee is access area, vital
not been employed. required by area'') requiring
Commission access controls and
regulations to to broaden the
control access and language to include
for which any area required
compensatory to be controlled by
measures have not the Commission
been employed. regulations (see
considerations for
paragraph II.(b)
above). Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
(d) The actual or attempted II.(d) The actual or This requirement
introduction of contraband attempted would be renumbered
into a protected area, introduction of and revised to
material access area, vital contraband into any delete the
area, or transport. area or transport previously
for which the specifically
licensee is mentioned areas
required by requiring access
Commission controls and change
regulations to the language to
control access. include the actual
or attempted entry
of an unauthorized
individual into any
area or transport
required to be
controlled by
Commission
regulations (see
considerations for
paragraph II.(b)
above). Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
NRC Information Assessment III. Events to be This paragraph would
Team (IAT) Advisories dated reported within add a requirement
October 16, and November four (4) hours of for power reactor
15, 2001; May 20, 2003; discovery. No licensees to report
March 1, 2004; and October written followup suspicious
5, 2005. report is required. activities,
FBI's ``Terrorist Threats to (a) Any other attempts at access,
the U.S. Homeland: information etc., that may
Reporting Guide for received by the indicate pre-
Critical and Key Resource licensee of operational
Owners and Operators'' suspicious surveillance,
dated January 24, 2005, surveillance reconnaissance, or
(Official Use Only).. activities or intelligence
attempts at access, gathering targeted
including:. against the
(1) Any security- facility. This
related incident change would more
involving accurately reflect
suspicious activity the current threat
that may be environment; would
indicative of assist the
potential pre- Commission in
operational evaluating threats
surveillance, to multiple
reconnaissance, or licensees; and
intelligence- would assist the
gathering intelligence and
activities directed homeland security
against the communities in
facility. Such evaluating threats
activity may across critical
include, but is not infrastructure
limited to, sectors. The
attempted reporting process
surveillance or intended in this
reconnaissance proposed rule would
activity, be similar to the
elicitation of reporting process
information from that the licensees
security or other currently use under
site personnel guidance issued by
relating to the the Commission
security or safe subsequent to
operation of the September 11, 2001,
plant, or and would formalize
challenges to Commission
security systems expectations;
(e.g., failure to however, the
stop for security reporting interval
checkpoints, would be lengthened
possible tests of from 1 hour to 4
security response hours. The
and security Commission views
screening this length of time
equipment, or as reasonable to
suspicious entry of accomplish these
watercraft into broader objectives.
posted off-limits This reporting
areas).. requirement does
(2) Any security- not include a
related incident followup written
involving report. The
suspicious aircraft Commission believes
overflight that a written
activity. report from the
Commercial or licensees would be
military aircraft of minimal value
activity considered and would be an
routine by the unnecessary
licensee is not regulatory burden,
required to be because the types
reported.. of incidents to be
reported are
transitory in
nature and time-
sensitive. The
proposed text would
be neither a
request for
intelligence
collection
activities nor
authority for the
conduct of law
enforcement or
intelligence
activities. This
paragraph would
simply require the
reporting of
observed
activities.

[[Page 62842]]

Paragraphs III(a)(1)
and (2) provide
broad examples of
events that should
be reported, or
need not be
reported.
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance. The
Commission may
consider the
applicability of
this requirement to
other licensees in
future rulemaking.
III.(a)(3) Incidents This paragraph would
resulting in the be added to
notification of establish a
local, State or performance
national law standard for
enforcement, or law additional types of
enforcement incidents or
response to the activities
site not included involving law
in paragraphs I or enforcement
II of this authorities not
appendix; otherwise specified
in paragraphs I and
II of this
appendix.
Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
reported will be
provided in
guidance.
III.(b) The This paragraph would
unauthorized use of be added to address
or tampering with ``tampering''
the components or events that do not
controls, including rise to the
the security significance of
system, of nuclear affecting plant
power reactors. operations as
specified in
paragraph II.(a)(3)
and would use
similar language to
the proposed
paragraph
II.(a)(3).
III.(c) Follow-up This requirement
communications would be added to
regarding these establish a
incidents will be performance
completed through standard for any
the NRC threat follow-up
assessment process communication
via the NRC between licensees
Operations Center and the Commission
\1\. regarding the
Footnote: 1. initial report of
Commercial (secure ``suspicious''
and non-secure) activity. This
telephone numbers process has been
of the NRC set forth in
Operations Center guidance documents
are specified in and the Commission
appendix A of this intends that
part.. licensees would
continue to
implement the
existing process
with little change.
II. Events to be recorded IV. Events to be This requirement
within 24 hours of recorded within 24 would be retained
discovery in the safeguards hours of discovery and renumbered.
event log. in the safeguards
event log.
(a) Any failure, IV.(a) Any failure, The current
degradation, or discovered degradation, or requirement would
vulnerability in a discovered be renumbered and
safeguards system that vulnerability in a revised to delete
could have allowed safeguards system the previously
unauthorized or undetected that could have specifically
access to a protected area, allowed mentioned areas
material access area, unauthorized or (``protected area,
controlled access area, undetected access material access
vital area, or transport to any area or area, controlled
had compensatory measures transport in which access area, vital
not been established. the licensee is area'') requiring
required by access controls and
Commission change the language
regulations to to include the
control access had actual or attempted
compensatory entry of an
measures not been unauthorized
established. individual into any
area required to be
controlled by
Commission
regulations (see
considerations for
paragraph II.(b)
above). Additional
information
regarding
identification of
events to be
recorded will be
provided in
guidance.
(b) Any other threatened, IV.(b) Any other This requirement
attempted, or committed act threatened, would be renumbered
not previously defined in attempted, or and retained with
appendix G with the committed act not minor revisions.
potential for reducing the previously defined This paragraph
effectiveness of the in this appendix would be changed to
safeguards system below with the potential replace ``the
that committed to in a for reducing the physical protection
licensed physical security effectiveness of system'' with ``the
or contingency plan or the the physical safeguards system''
actual condition of such protection program and ``described''
reduction in effectiveness. below that for ``committed.''
described in a These changes would
licensee physical reflect Commission
security or experience with
safeguards implementation of
contingency plan, security order
or the actual requirements and
condition of such a reviews of
reduction in revisions to
effectiveness. licensee security
plans.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Guidance

The NRC is preparing new regulatory guides that will contain
detailed guidance on the implementation of the proposed rule
requirements. These regulatory guides, currently under development,
will consolidate and update or eliminate previous guidance that was
used to develop, review, and approve the power reactor security plans
that licensees revised in response to the post-September 11, 2001,
security orders. Development of the regulatory guides is ongoing and
the publication of the regulatory guides is planned after the
publication of the final rule. Because this regulatory guidance may
contain Safeguard Information (SGI) and/or classified information,
these documents would only be available to those individuals with a
need-to-know, and are qualified to have access to SGI and/or classified
information, as applicable. However, the NRC has determined that access
to these guidance documents is not necessary for the public or other
stakeholders to provide informed comment on this proposed rule.

VI. Criminal Penalties

For the purposes of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act, as
amended, the Commission is proposing to amend 10

[[Page 62843]]

CFR parts 50, 72, and 73 under sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA.
Criminal penalties, as they apply to regulations in part 73, are
discussed in Sec. 73.81. The new Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58
are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not
included in Sec. 73.81(b).

VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations

Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20,
1997, and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3,
1997), this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility
is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program
elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of
regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), and although an Agreement
State may not adopt program elements reserved to NRC, it may wish to
inform its licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is
consistent with the particular State's administrative procedure laws,
but does not confer regulatory authority on the State.

VIII. Availability of Documents

The following table indicates which documents relating to this
rulemaking are available to the public and how they may be obtained.
Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC's Public Document Room is
located at the NRC's headquarters at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
MD 20852.
Rulemaking Web site (Web). The NRC's interactive rulemaking Web
site is located at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. These documents may be
viewed and downloaded electronically via this Web site.
NRC's Electronic Reading Room (ERR). The NRC's electronic reading
room is located at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document PDR Web ERR (ADAMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental Assessment....................... X X ML061920093
Regulatory Analysis
Regulatory Analysis--appendices................ X X ML061920012
ML061380796
ML061440013
Information Collection Analysis................ X X ML062340362
ML062830016
NRC Form 754................................... X X ML060930319
Memorandum: Status of Security-Related X X ML041180532
Rulemaking (July 19, 2004).
Commission SRM (August 23, 2004)............... X X ML042360548
Memorandum: Schedule for Part 73 Rulemakings X X ML043060572
(November 16, 2004).
Revised Schedule for Completing Part 73 X X ML051800350
rulemaking (July 29, 2005).
COMSECY-05-0046 (September 29, 2005)........... X X ML052710167
SRM on COMSECY-05-0046 (November 1, 2005)...... X X ML053050439
EA-02-026, ``Interim Compensatory Measures X X ML020520754
(ICM) Order''(67 FR 9792).
EA-02-261, ``Issuance of Order for Compensatory X X ML030060360
Measures Related to Access Authorization'' (68
FR 1643).
EA-03-039, ``Issuance of Order for Compensatory X X ML030980015
Measures Related to Training Enhancements on
Tactical and Firearms Proficiency and Physical
Fitness Applicable to Armed Nuclear Power
Plant Security Force Personnel'' (68 FR 24514).
NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness X X ML051740058
and ResponseActions for Security-based
Events''.
Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-50-80)............ X X ML031681105
SECY-05-0048, Petition for Rulemaking on X X ML051790404
Protection of U.S.Nuclear Power Plants Against
Radiological Sabotage (PRM-50-80).
SRM-SECY-05-0048, Staff Requirements on SECY-05- X X ML053000500
0048.
Table 9 Cross-walk table for proposed Sec. X X ML060910004
73.55.
Table 10 Cross-walk table for proposed 10 CFR X X ML060910006
part 73 appendix B.
Table 11 Cross-walk table for proposed 10 CFR X X ML060910007
part 73 appendix C.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX. Plain Language

The Presidential memorandum dated June 1, 1998, entitled ``Plain
Language in Government Writing'' directed that the Government's writing
be in plain language. This memorandum was published on June 10, 1998
(63 FR 31883). In complying with this directive, the NRC made editorial
changes to improve the organization and readability of the existing
language of the paragraphs being revised. These types of changes are
not discussed further in this document. The NRC has used the phrase
``may not'' throughout this proposed rule to indicate that a person or
entity is prohibited from taking a specific action. The NRC requests
comments on the proposed rule specifically with respect to the clarity
and reflectiveness of the language used. Comments should be sent to the
address listed under the ADDRESSES caption of the preamble.

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards

The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub.
L. 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless
using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is
otherwise impractical. The NRC is not aware of any voluntary consensus
standard that could be used instead of the proposed Government-unique
standards. The NRC will consider using a voluntary consensus standard
if an appropriate standard is identified.

XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact

The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not
required.
The determination of this environmental assessment is that there
will be no significant offsite impact to

[[Page 62844]]

the public from this action. However, the general public should note
that the NRC is seeking public participation; availability of the
environmental assessment is provided in Section VIII. Comments on any
aspect of the environmental assessment may be submitted to the NRC as
indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.
The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this
proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their
comments on the environmental assessment.

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This proposed rule contains new or amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office
of Management and Budget for review and approval of the information
collection requirements.
Type of submission, new or revision: Revision and new.
The title of the information collection: 10 CFR part 73, ``Power
Reactor Security Requirements'' proposed rule, and NRC Form 754,
``Armed Security Personnel Background Check.''
The form number if applicable: NRC Form 754.
How often the collection is required: Collections will be initially
required due to the need for power reactor licensees to revise security
plans and submit the plans for staff review and approval. New records
requirements are imposed to: document target sets in procedures,
maintain records of storage locations for unirradiated MOX fuel,
document the onsite physical protection system review, document
problems and deficiencies, implement a cyber security program including
the requirement to develop associated implementing procedures,
implement a cyber incident response and recovery plan, implement a
cyber security awareness and training plan, and implement the access
authorization program. New annual collection requirements will be
imposed including requirements to maintain a record of all individuals
to whom access control devices were issued. Collections will also be
required on a continuing basis due to new proposed reporting
requirements which include: to notify the NRC within 72 hours of taking
action to remove security personnel per proposed Sec. 73.18, to notify
the NRC within 15 minutes after discovery of an imminent threat or
actual safeguards threat against the facility including a requirement
to follow this report with a written report within 60 days, and a
requirement to report to NRC within 4 hours of incidents of suspicious
activity or tampering. A new NRC form 754 background check would be
required to be completed by all security personnel to be assigned armed
duties.
Who will be required or asked to report: Power reactor licensees
will be subject to all the proposed requirements in this rulemaking.
Category I special nuclear material facilities will be required to
report for only the collections in proposed Sec. 73.18 and Sec. 73.19.
An estimate of the number of annual responses: 10 CFR part 73--
15,156 (8,523 annualized one-time plus 6,644 annual responses).
The estimated number of annual respondents: 65 to 68 and,
additionally, decommissioning sites for Sec. 73.55(a)(1).
An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to
complete the requirement or request: 10 CFR 73--145,613 hours (84,190
hours annualized one-time and 49,013 hours annual recordkeeping [732
hours per recordkeeper]
plus 821 hours annualized one-time and 11,590
hours annual reporting [173 hours per licensee]; NRC form 754--1,250
hours (or an average of 18.7 hours per site) for one-time collections
and 261 hours (or an average of 3.9 hours per site) annually.
Abstract: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to
amend the current security regulations and add new security
requirements pertaining to nuclear power reactors. Additionally, this
rulemaking includes new security requirements for Category I strategic
special nuclear material (SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced
weapons and firearms background checks. The proposed rulemaking would:
(1) Make generically applicable security requirements imposed by
Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission
during implementation, (2) fulfill certain provisions of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, (3) add several new requirements that resulted from
insights from implementation of the security orders, review of site
security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection
program and force-on-force exercises, (4) update the regulatory
framework in preparation for receiving license applications for new
reactors, and (5) impose requirements to assess and manage site
activities that can adversely affect safety and security.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on
the potential impact of the information collections contained in this
proposed rule and on the following issues:
1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the
information will have practical utility?
2. Estimate of burden?
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized,
including the use of automated collection techniques?
A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at
the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and
rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/
public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html for 60 days after the
signature date of this notice and are also available at the rule forum
site, http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the
above issues, by November 27, 2006 to the Records and FOIA/Privacy
Services Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to
INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV and to the Desk Officer, John A. Asalone, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0002 and 3150-
new), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments
received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do
so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received
after this date. You may also e-mail comments to
John_A._Asalone@omb.eop.gov or comment by telephone at (202) 395-4650.

XIII. Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.

XIV. Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The Commission requests
public comments on the draft regulatory analysis. Availability of the
regulatory analysis is

[[Page 62845]]

provided in Section VIII. Comments on the draft analysis may be
submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule would not, if
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing and
operation of nuclear power plants, production facilities, spent fuel
reprocessing or recycling facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, and
uranium enrichment facilities. The companies that own these plants do
not fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set
forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the size standards
established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).

XVI. Backfit Analysis

The NRC evaluated the aggregated set of requirements in this
proposed rulemaking that constitute backfits in accordance with 10 CFR
50.109 to determine if the costs of implementing the rule would be
justified by a substantial increase in public health and safety or
common defense and security. The NRC finds that qualitative safety
benefits of the proposed part 73 rule provisions that qualify as
backfits in this proposed rulemaking, considered in the aggregate,
would constitute a substantial increase in protection to public health
and safety and the common defense and security, and that the costs of
this rule would be justified in view of the increase in protection to
safety and security provided by the backfits embodied in the proposed
rule. The backfit analysis is contained within Section 4.2 of the
regulatory analysis. Availability of the regulatory analysis is
provided in Section VIII.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 50

Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.

10 CFR Part 72

Administrative practice and procedure, Criminal penalties, Manpower
training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health,
Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel, Whistleblowing.

10 CFR Part 73

Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the AEA, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended;
and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to adopt the following
amendments to 10 CFR parts 50, 72, and 73.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES

1. The authority citation for part 50 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68
Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234,
83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201,
2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy Policy Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). Section 50.7 also
issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C.
5841). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 185, 68 Stat. 955,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83
Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), and 50.103
also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
Sections 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued under sec.
185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 50.55a and
appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853
(42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued under sec.
204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5844). Sections 50.58, 50.91, and
50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.S.C.
2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42
U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 68
Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Appendix F also issued under
sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).

2. In Sec. 50.34, footnote 9 is removed and reserved, and
paragraph (d) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 50.34 Contents of applications; technical information.

* * * * *
(d) Safeguards contingency plan. (1) Each application for a license
to operate a production or utilization facility that will be subject to
Sec. Sec. 73.50 and 73.60 of this chapter must include a licensee
safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the criteria set forth
in section I of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter. The
``Implementation Procedures'' required per section I of appendix C to
part 73 of this chapter do not have to be submitted to the Commission
for approval.
(2) Each application for a license to operate a utilization
facility that will be subject to Sec. 73.55 of this chapter must
include a licensee safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the
criteria set forth in section II of appendix C to part 73 of this
chapter. The ``Implementation Procedures'' required in section
II(g)(12) of appendix C to part 73 of this chapter do not have to be
submitted to the Commission for approval.
* * * * *
3. In Sec. 50.54, paragraph (p)(1) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 50.54 Conditions of licenses.

* * * * *
(p)(1) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards
contingency plan procedures in accordance with appendix C of part 73 of
this chapter for affecting the actions and decisions contained in the
Responsibility Matrix of the safeguards contingency plan. The licensee
may make no change which would decrease the effectiveness of a physical
security plan, or guard training and qualification plan, prepared under
Sec. 50.34(c) or part 73 of this chapter, or of any category of
information with the exception of the ``Implementation Procedures''
category contained in a licensee safeguards contingency plan prepared
under Sec. 50.34(d) or part 73 of this chapter, as applicable, without
prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make such a
change shall submit an application for an amendment to the licensee's
license under Sec. 50.90.
* * * * *
4. In Sec. 50.72, paragraph (a), footnote 1 is revised and the
heading of paragraph (a) is republished for the convenience of the user
to read as follows:

Sec. 50.72 Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear
power reactors.

(a) General Requirements.\1\ * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ Other requirements for immediate notification of the NRC by
licensed operating nuclear power reactors are contained elsewhere in
this chapter, in particular Sec. Sec. 20.1906, 20.2202, 50.36,
72.216, and 73.71, and may require NRC notification before that
required under Sec. 50.72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

[[Page 62846]]

PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-
RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE

5. The authority citation for part 72 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183,
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953,
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233,
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat.
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102-
486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135,
137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148,
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153,
10155, 10157, 10161, 10168); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C.
3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat.
549 (2005).
Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d),
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b),
10168(c), (d). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat.
955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42
U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub.
L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g). Subpart J also
issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42 U.S.C. 10101,
10137(a), 10161(h). Subparts K and L are also issued under sec. 133,
98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42
U.S.C. 10198).

6. In Sec. 72.212, paragraphs (b)(5)(ii), (b)(5)(iii), (b)(5)(iv),
and (b)(5)(v) are revised to read as follows:

Sec. 72.212 Conditions of general license issued under Sec. 72.210.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) * * *
(ii) Storage of spent fuel must be within a protected area, in
accordance with Sec. 73.55(e) of this chapter, but need not be within
a separate vital area. Existing protected areas may be expanded or new
protected areas added for the purpose of storage of spent fuel in
accordance with this general license.
(iii) For purposes of this general license, personnel searches
required by Sec. 73.55(h) of this chapter before admission to a new
protected area may be performed by physical pat-down searches of
persons in lieu of firearms and explosives detection equipment.
(iv) The observational capability required by Sec. 73.55(i)(7) of
this chapter as applied to a new protected area may be provided by a
guard or watchman on patrol in lieu of closed circuit television.
(v) For the purpose of this general license, the licensee is exempt
from Sec. Sec. 73.55(k)(2) and 73.55(k)(7)(ii) of this chapter.
* * * * *

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

7. The authority citation for part 73 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 149, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended,
sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2169, 2201); sec. 201,
as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106
Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112
Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,
96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also
issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841
note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100
Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

8. In Sec. 73.2, definitions for covered weapon, enhanced weapon,
safety/security interface, security officer, standard weapon, and
target set are added in alphabetical order to read as follows:

Sec. 73.2 Definitions.

* * * * *
Covered weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled
shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-automatic assault weapon,
machinegun, ammunition for any such gun or weapon, or a large capacity
ammunition feeding device as specified under section 161A of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. As used here, the terms ``handgun,
rifle, shotgun, short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-
automatic assault weapon, machinegun, ammunition, or large capacity
ammunition feeding device'' have the same meaning as set forth for
these terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a). Covered weapons include both
enhanced weapons and standard weapons. However, enhanced weapons do not
include standard weapons.
* * * * *
Enhanced weapon means any short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled
rifle, or machinegun. Enhanced weapons do not include destructive
devices, including explosives or weapons greater than 50 caliber (i.e.,
weapons with a bore greater than 1.27 cm [0.5 in]
diameter).
* * * * *
Safety/Security interface (SSI) means the actual or potential
interactions that may adversely affect security activities due to any
operational activities, or vice versa.
* * * * *
Security officer means a uniformed individual, either armed with a
covered weapon or unarmed, whose primary duty is the protection of a
facility, of radioactive material, or of other property against theft
or diversion or against radiological sabotage.
* * * * *
Standard weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic
assault weapon, or a large capacity ammunition feeding device.
* * * * *
Target set means the combination of equipment or operator actions
which, if all are prevented from performing their intended safety
function or prevented from being accomplished, would likely result in
significant core damage (e.g., non-incipient, non-localized fuel
melting, and/or core disruption) barring extraordinary action by plant
operators. A target set with respect to spent fuel sabotage is draining
the spent fuel pool leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a period of
time, allowing spent fuel heat up and the associated potential for
release of fission products.
* * * * *
9. In Sec. 73.8, paragraph (b) is revised and paragraph (c) is
added to read as follows:

Sec. 73.8 Information collection requirements: OMB approval.

* * * * *
(b) The approved information collection requirements contained in
this part appear in Sec. Sec. 73.5, 73.18, 73.19, 73.20, 73.21, 73.24,
73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.56,
73.57, 73.58, 73.60, 73.67, 73.70, 73.71, 73.72, 73.73, 73.74, and
Appendices B, C, and G to this part.
(c) This part contains information collection requirements in
addition to those approved under the control number specified in
paragraph (a) of this section. These information collection requirements
and control numbers under which they are approved are as follows:
(1) In Sec. 73.18, NRC Form 754 is approved under control number
3150-xxxx;
(2) In Sec. 73.71, NRC Form 366 is approved under control number
3150-0104; and

[[Page 62847]]

(3) In Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.57, Form FD-258 is approved under
control number 1110-yyyy.
10. Section 73.18 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 73.18 Firearms background check for armed security personnel.

(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the requirements for
completion of firearms background checks on armed security personnel at
selected NRC-regulated facilities. Firearms background checks are
intended to verify that armed security personnel whose duties require
access to covered weapons are not prohibited from receiving,
possessing, transporting, importing, or using such weapons under
applicable Federal or State law. Licensees and certificate holders
listed under paragraph (c) of this section who have applied for
preemption authority under Sec. 73.19 (i.e., Sec. 73.19 authority),
or who have been granted preemption authority by Commission order, are
subject to the requirements of this section.
(b) General requirements. (1) Licensees and certificate holders
listed in paragraph (c) of this section who have received NRC approval
of their application for preemption authority shall ensure that a
firearms background check has been satisfactorily completed for all
security personnel requiring access to covered weapons as part of their
official security duties prior to granting access to any covered
weapons to those personnel. Security personnel who have satisfactorily
completed a firearms background check, but who have had a break in
employment with the licensee, certificate holder, or their security
contractor of greater than one (1) week subsequent to their most recent
firearms background check, or who have transferred from a different
licensee or certificate holder (even though the other licensee or
certificate holder satisfactorily completed a firearms background check
on such individuals), are not excepted from the requirements of this
section.
(2) Security personnel who have satisfactorily completed a firearms
background check pursuant to Commission orders are not subject to a
further firearms background check under this section, unless these
personnel have a break in service or transfer as set forth in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section.
(3) A change in the licensee, certificate holder, or ownership of a
facility, radioactive material, or other property designated under
Sec. 73.19, or a change in the security contractor that provides
security personnel responsible for protecting such facilities,
radioactive material, or other property, shall not constitute `a break
in service' or `transfer,' as those terms are used in paragraph (b)(2)
of this section.
(4) Licensees and certificate holders listed in paragraph (c) of
this section may begin the application process for firearms background
checks under this section for security personnel whose duties require
access to covered weapons immediately on application to the NRC for
preemption authority.
(5) Firearms background checks do not replace any other background
checks or criminal history checks required for the licensee's or
certificate holder's security personnel under this chapter.
(c) Applicability. This section applies to licensees or certificate
holders who have applied for or received NRC approval of their
application for Sec. 73.19 authority or were issued Commission orders
requiring firearms background checks.
(d) Firearms background check requirements. A firearms background
check for security personnel must include--
(1) A check of the individual's fingerprints against the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) fingerprint system; and
(2) A check of the individual's identifying information against the
FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).
(e) Firearms background check submittals. (1) Licensees and
certificate holders shall submit to the NRC, in accordance with Sec.
73.4, for all security personnel requiring a firearms background check
under this section--
(i) A set of fingerprints, in accordance with paragraph (o) of this
section, and
(ii) A completed NRC Form 754.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall retain a copy of all
NRC Forms 754 submitted to the NRC for a period of one (1) year
subsequent to the termination of an individual's access to covered
weapons or to the denial of an individual's access to covered weapons.
(f) NICS portion of a firearms background check. The NRC will
forward the information contained in the submitted NRC Forms 754 to the
FBI for evaluation against the NICS. Upon completion of the NICS
portion of the firearms background check, the FBI will inform the NRC
of the results with one of three responses under 28 CFR part 25;
``proceed,'' ``denied,'' or ``delayed,'' and the associated NICS
transaction number. The NRC will forward these results and the
associated NICS transaction number to the submitting licensee or
certificate holder. The submitting licensee or certificate holder shall
provide these results to the individual who completed the NRC Form 754.
(g) Satisfactory and adverse firearms background checks. (1) A
satisfactorily completed firearms background check means a ``proceed''
response for the individual from the FBI's NICS.
(2) An adversely completed firearms background check means a
``denied'' or ``delayed'' response from the FBI's NICS.
(h) Removal from access to covered weapons. Licensees or
certificate holders who have received NRC approval of their application
for Sec. 73.19 authority shall ensure security personnel are removed
from duties requiring access to covered weapons upon the licensee's or
certificate holder's knowledge of any disqualifying status or the
occurrence of any disqualifying events under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n),
and the ATF's implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 478.
(i) [Reserved].
(j) Security personnel responsibilities. Security personnel
assigned duties requiring access to covered weapons shall promptly
[within three (3) working days]
notify their employing licensee's or
certificate holder's security management (whether directly employed by
the licensee or certificate holder or employed by a security contractor
to the licensee or certificate holder) of the existence of any
disqualifying status or upon the occurrence of any disqualifying events
listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and the ATF's implementing
regulations in 27 CFR part 478 that would prohibit them from possessing
or receiving a covered weapon.
(k) Awareness of disqualifying events. Licensees and certificate
holders who have received NRC approval of Sec. 73.19 authority shall
include within their NRC-approved security training and qualification
plans instruction on--
(1) Disqualifying status or events specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)
and (n), and ATF's implementing regulations in 27 CFR part 478
(including any applicable definitions) identifying categories of
persons who are prohibited from possessing or receiving any covered
weapons; and
(2) The continuing responsibility of security personnel assigned
duties requiring access to covered weapons to promptly notify their
employing licensee or certificate holder of the occurrence of any
disqualifying events.
(l) [Reserved].
(m) Notification of removal. Within 72 hours after taking action to
remove security personnel from duties requiring access to covered
weapons, because of

[[Page 62848]]

the existence of any disqualifying status or the occurrence of any
disqualifying event--other than due to the prompt notification by the
security officer under paragraph (j) of this section--licensees and
certificate holders who have received NRC approval of Sec. 73.19
authority shall notify the NRC Operations Center of such removal
actions, in accordance with appendix A of this part.
(n) Reporting violations of law. The NRC will promptly report
suspected violations of Federal law to the appropriate Federal agency
or suspected violations of State law to the appropriate State agency.
(o) Procedures for processing of fingerprint checks. (1) Licensees
and certificate holders who have applied for Sec. 73.19 authority,
using an appropriate method listed in Sec. 73.4, shall submit to the
NRC's Division of Facilities and Security one (1) completed, legible
standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint record for each individual requiring a
firearms background check, to the NRC's Director, Division of
Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T6-E46, ATTN: Criminal History
Check. Copies of this form may be obtained by writing the Office of
Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001, by calling (301) 415-6157, or by e-mail to
FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what alternative formats, including
electronic submissions, may be practicable are referenced in Sec. 73.4.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall indicate on the
fingerprint card or other fingerprint record that the purpose for this
fingerprint check is the accomplishment of a firearms background check.
(3) Licensees and certificate holders shall establish procedures to
ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing
the rejection rate of fingerprint cards or records due to illegible or
incomplete information.
(4) The Commission will review fingerprints for firearms background
checks for completeness. Any Form FD-258 or other fingerprint record
containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the licensee
or certificate holder for corrections. The fee for processing
fingerprint checks includes one (1) free re-submission if the initial
submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions
cannot be classified. The one (1) free re-submission must have the FBI
Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as an
initial submittal and require a second payment of the processing fee.
The payment of a new processing fee entitles the submitter to an
additional free re-submittal, if necessary. Previously rejected
submissions may not be included with the third submission because the
submittal will be rejected automatically. Licensees and certificate
holders may wish to consider using different methods for recording
fingerprints for re-submissions, if difficulty occurs with obtaining a
legible set of impressions.
(5)(i) Fees for the processing of fingerprint checks are due upon
application. Licensees and certificate holders shall submit payment
with the application for the processing of fingerprints, and payment
must be made by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check,
money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' \1\
Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ For guidance on making electronic payments, contact the
NRC's Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, Office
of Adminsitration at (301) 415-7404.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) The application fee is the sum of the user fee charged by the
FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by
the NRC on behalf of a licensee or certificate holder, and an
administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC processing
fee covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of
licensee and certificate holder fingerprint submissions. The Commission
publishes the amount of the fingerprint check application fee on the
NRC's public Web site.\2\ The Commission will directly notify licensees
and certificate holders who are subject to this regulation of any fee
changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ For information on the current fee amount, refer to the
Electronic Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html
and select the link for the Criminal History Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(6) The Commission will forward to the submitting licensee or
certificate holder all data received from the FBI as a result of the
licensee's or certificate holder's application(s) for fingerprint
background checks, including the FBI's fingerprint record.
(p) Appeals and correction of erroneous system information. (1)
Individuals who require a firearms background check under this section
and who receive a ``denied'' NICS response or a ``delayed'' NICS
response may not be assigned duties requiring access to covered weapons
during the pendency of an appeal of the results of the check or during
the pendency of providing and evaluating any necessary additional
information to the FBI to resolve the ``delayed'' response, respectively.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders shall provide information on
the FBI's procedures for appealing a ``denied'' response to the denied
individual or on providing additional information to the FBI to resolve
a ``delayed'' response.
(3) An individual who receives a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS
response to a firearms background check under this section may request
the reason for the response from the FBI. The licensee or certificate
holder shall provide to the individual who has received the ``denied''
or ``delayed'' response the unique NICS transaction number associated
with the specific firearms background check.
(4) These requests for the reason for a ``denied'' or ``delayed''
NICS response must be made in writing, and must include the NICS
transaction number. The request must be sent to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; NICS Section; Appeals Service Team, Module A-1; PO Box
4278; Clarksburg, WV 26302-9922. The FBI will provide the individual
with the reasons for the ``denied'' response or ``delayed'' response.
The FBI will also indicate whether additional information or documents
are required to support an appeal or resolution, for example, where
there is a claim that the record in question does not pertain to the
individual who was denied.
(5) If the individual wishes to challenge the accuracy of the
record upon which the ``denied'' or ``delayed'' response is based, or
if the individual wishes to assert that his or her rights to possess or
receive a firearm have been restored by lawful process, he or she may
make application first to the FBI. The individual shall file an appeal
of a ``denied'' response or file a request to resolve a ``delayed''
response within 45 calender days of the date the NRC forwards the
results of the firearms background check to the licensee or certificate
holder. The appeal or request must include appropriate documentation or
record(s) establishing the legal and/or factual basis for the
challenge. Any record or document of a court or other government entity
or official furnished in support of an appeal must be certified by the
court or other government entity or official as a true copy. The
individual may supplement their initial appeal or request--subsequent
to the 45 day filing deadline--with additional information as it
becomes available, for example, where obtaining a true copy of a court
transcript may take longer than 45 days. The individual should note in
their appeal or request any information or

[[Page 62849]]

records that are being obtained, but are not yet available.
(6) If the individual is notified that the FBI is unable to resolve
the appeal, the individual may then apply for correction of the record
directly to the agency from which the information forming the basis of
the denial was originated. If the individual is notified by the
originating agency, that additional information or documents are
required the individual may provide them to the originating agency. If
the record is corrected as a result of the appeal to the originating
agency, the individual may so notify the FBI and submit written proof
of the correction.
(7) An individual who has satisfactorily appealed a ``denied''
response or resolved a ``delayed'' response may provide written consent
to the FBI to maintain information about himself or herself in a
Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) to be established by the FBI and checked by
the NICS for the purpose of preventing the erroneous denial or extended
delay by the NICS of any future NICS checks.
(8) Individuals appealing a ``denied'' response or resolving a
``delayed'' response are responsible for providing the FBI any additional
information the FBI requires to resolve the ``delayed'' response.
11. Section 73.19 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 73.19 Authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of
enhanced weapons.

(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the requirements for licensees
and certificate holders to obtain NRC approval to use the expanded
authorities provided under section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (AEA), in protecting NRC-designated facilities, radioactive
material, or other property. These authorities include ``preemption
authority'' and ``enhanced-weapons authority.''
(b) General requirements. Licensees and certificate holders listed
in paragraph (c) of this section may apply to the NRC, in accordance
with the provisions of this section, to receive stand-alone preemption
authority or combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority.
(1) Preemption authority, as provided in section 161A of the AEA,
means the authority of the Commission to permit licensees or
certificate holders, or the designated security personnel of the
licensee or certificate holder, to transfer, receive, possess,
transport, import, or use one (1) or more category of standard and
enhanced weapons, as defined in Sec. 73.2, notwithstanding any local,
State, or certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations).
(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as provided in section 161A of the
AEA, means the authority of the Commission to permit licensees or
certificate holders, or the designated security personnel of the
licensee or certificate holder, to transfer, receive, possess,
transport, import, and use one (1) or more category of enhanced
weapons, as defined in Sec. 73.2, notwithstanding any local, State, or
certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations).
(3) Prior to receiving NRC approval of enhanced-weapons authority,
the licensee or certificate holder must have applied for and received
NRC approval for preemption authority, in accordance with this section
or under Commission orders.
(4) Prior to granting either authority, the NRC must determine that
the proposed use of this authority is necessary in the discharge of
official duties by security personnel engaged in protecting--
(i) Facilities owned or operated by a licensee or certificate
holder and designated by the Commission under paragraph (c) of this
section, or
(ii) Radioactive material or other property that is owned or
possessed by a licensee or certificate holder, or that is being
transported to or from an NRC-regulated facility. Before granting such
approval, the Commission must determined that the radioactive material
or other property is of significance to the common defense and security
or public health and safety and has designated such radioactive
material or other property under paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) Applicability. (1) The following classes of licensees or
certificate holders may apply for stand-alone preemption authority--
(i) Power reactor facilities; and
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or greater
of strategic special nuclear material with security plans subject to
Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.
(2) The following classes of licensees or certificate holders may
apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption authority--
(i) Power reactor facilities; and
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or greater
of strategic special nuclear material with security plans subject to
Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.
(3) With respect to the possession and use of firearms by all other
NRC licensees or certificate holders, the Commission's requirements in
effect before [effective date of final rule]
remain applicable, except
to the extent those requirements are modified by Commission order or
regulations applicable to such licensees and certificate holders.
(d) Application for preemption authority. (1) Licensees and
certificate holders listed in paragraph (c) of this section may apply
to the NRC for the preemption authority described in paragraph (b)(1)
of this section. Licensees and certificate holders seeking such
authority shall submit an application to the NRC in writing, in
accordance with Sec. 73.4, and indicate that the licensee or
certificate holder is requesting preemption authority under section
161A of the AEA.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for
preemption authority under this section may begin firearms background
checks under Sec. 73.18 for their armed security personnel.
(3) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied for
preemption authority under this section and who have satisfactorily
completed firearms background checks for a sufficient number of
security personnel (to implement their security plan while meeting
security personnel fatigue requirements of this chapter or Commission
order) shall notify the NRC, in accordance with Sec. 73.4, of their
readiness to receive NRC approval of preemption authority and implement
all the provisions of Sec. 73.18.
(4) Based upon the licensee's or certificate holder's readiness
notification and any discussions with the licensee or certificate
holder, the NRC will document in writing to the licensee or certificate
holder that the Commission has approved or disapproved the licensee's
or certificate holder's application for preemption authority.
(e) Application for enhanced-weapons authority. (1) Licensees and
certificate holders listed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section may
apply to the NRC for enhanced-weapons authority described in paragraph
(a)(2) of this section. Licensees and certificate holders applying for
enhanced-weapons authority shall have also applied for preemption
authority. Licensees and certificate holders may make these
applications concurrently.
(2) Licensees and certificate holders seeking enhanced-weapons
authority shall submit an application to the NRC, in accordance with
Sec. 73.4, indicating that the licensee or certificate holder is
requesting enhanced-weapons authority under section 161A of the AEA.
Licensees and certificate holders shall also include with their
application--

[[Page 62850]]

(i) The additional information required by paragraph (f) of this
section;
(ii) The date they applied to the NRC for preemption authority (if
not concurrent with the application for enhanced weapons authority);
and
(iii) If applicable, the date when the licensee or certificate
holder received NRC approval of their application for preemption
authority under this section or by Commission order.
(3) The NRC will document in writing to the licensee or certificate
holder that the Commission has approved or disapproved the licensee's
or certificate holder's application for enhanced-weapons authority. The
NRC must approve, or have previously approved, a licensee's or
certificate holder's application for preemption authority under
paragraph (d) of this section, or via Commission order, to approve the
application for enhanced weapons authority.
(4) Licensees and certificate holders who have applied to the NRC
for and received enhanced-weapons authority shall then apply to the
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for a
federal firearms license (FFL) and also register under the National
Firearms Act (NFA) in accordance with ATF's regulations under 27 CFR
parts 478 and 479 to obtain the enhanced weapons. Licensees and
certificate holders shall include a copy of the NRC's written approval
with their NFA registration application.
(f) Application for enhanced-weapons authority additional
information. (1) Licensees and certificate holders applying to the
Commission for enhanced-weapons authority under paragraph (e) of this
section shall also submit to the NRC for prior review and written
approval new, or revised, physical security plans, security personnel
training and qualification plans, safeguards contingency plans, and
safety assessments incorporating the use of the specific enhanced
weapons the licensee or certificate holder intends to use. These plans
and assessments must be specific to the facility, radioactive material,
or other property being protected.
(2) In addition to other requirements set forth in this part, these
plans and assessments must--
(i) For the physical security plan, identify the specific types or
models, calibers, and numbers of enhanced weapons to be used;
(ii) For the training and qualification plan, address the training
and qualification requirements to use these specific enhanced weapons;
and
(iii) For the safeguards contingency plan, address how these
enhanced and any standard weapons will be employed by the licensee's or
certificate holder's security personnel in meeting the NRC-required
protective strategy, including tactical approaches and maneuvers.
(iv) For the safety assessment--
(A) Assess any potential safety impact on the facility, radioactive
material, or other property from the use of these enhanced weapons;
(B) Assess any potential safety impact on public or private
facilities, public or private property, or on members of the public in
areas outside of the site boundary from the use of these enhanced
weapons; and
(C) Assess any potential safety impact on public or private
facilities, public or private property, or on members of the public
from the use of these enhanced weapons at training facilities intended
for proficiency demonstration and qualification purposes.
(3) The licensee's or certificate holder's training and
qualification plan on possessing, storing, maintaining, qualifying on,
and using enhanced weapons must include information from applicable
firearms standards developed by nationally-recognized firearms
organizations or standard setting bodies or standards developed by
Federal agencies, such as: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. Department of
Energy's National Training Center, and the U.S. Department of Defense.
(4) Licensees or certificate holders shall submit any new or
revised plans and assessments for prior NRC review and written approval
notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. Sec. 50.54(p), 70.32(e), and
76.60 of this chapter which otherwise permit a license or certificate
holder to make changes to such plans ``that would not decrease their
effectiveness'' without prior NRC review.
(g) Completion of training and qualification prior to use of
enhanced weapons. Licensees and certificate holders who have applied
for and received enhanced-weapons authority under paragraph (e) of this
section shall ensure security personnel complete required firearms
training and qualification in accordance with the licensee's or
certificate holder's NRC-approved training and qualification plan. Such
training must be completed prior to security personnel's use of
enhanced weapons to protect NRC-designated facilities, radioactive
material, or other property and must be documented in accordance with
the requirements of the licensee's or certificate holder's training and
qualification plan.
(h) Use of enhanced weapons. Requirements regarding the use of
enhanced weapons by security personnel in the performance of their
official duties are contained in Sec. Sec. 73.46 and 73.55 and in
appendices B and C of this part, as applicable.
(i) [Reserved].
(j) Notification of adverse ATF findings or notices. NRC licensees
and certificate holders with an ATF federal firearms license (FFL) and/
or enhanced weapons shall notify the NRC, in accordance with Sec.
73.4, of instances involving any adverse ATF findings or ATF notices
related to their FFL or such weapons.
12. Section 73.55 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

[[Page 62851]]

design construct, and equip the central alarm station and secondary
alarm station to equivalent standards.
(i) Licensees shall apply the requirements for the central alarm
station listed in paragraphs (e)(6)(v), (e)(7)(iii), and (i)(8)(ii) of
this section to the secondary alarm station as well as the central
alarm station.
(ii) Licensees shall comply with the requirements of paragraph
(i)(4) of this section such that both alarm stations are provided with
equivalent capabilities for detection, assessment, monitoring,
observation, surveillance, and communications.
(b) General performance objective and requirements. (1) The
licensee shall establish and maintain a physical protection program, to
include a security organization which will have as its objective to
provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear
material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
(2) The physical protection program must be designed to detect,
assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to and
including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in
Sec. 73.1(a), at all times.
(3) The licensee physical protection program must be designed and
implemented to satisfy the requirements of this section and ensure that
no single act, as bounded by the design basis threat, can disable the
personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to prevent significant core
damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(4) The physical protection program must include diverse and
redundant equipment, systems, technology, programs, supporting
processes, and implementing procedures.
(5) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the
Commission, the licensee shall demonstrate the ability to meet
Commission requirements through the implementation of the physical
protection program, including the ability of armed and unarmed
personnel to perform assigned duties and responsibilities required by
the approved security plans and licensee procedures.
(6) The licensee shall establish and maintain a written performance
evaluation program in accordance with appendix B and appendix C to this
part, to demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of armed responders
and armed security officers to perform their assigned duties and
responsibilities to protect target sets described in paragraph (f) of
this section and appendix C to this part, through implementation of the
licensee protective strategy.
(7) The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow an access
authorization program in accordance with Sec. 73.56.
(i) In addition to the access authorization program required above,
and the fitness-for-duty program required in part 26 of this chapter,
each licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain an insider
mitigation program.
(ii) The insider mitigation program must be designed to oversee and
monitor the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of
individuals granted or retaining unescorted access authorization to a
protected or vital area and implement defense-in-depth methodologies to
minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either
directly or indirectly, the licensee capability to prevent significant
core damage or spent fuel sabotage.
(8) The licensee shall ensure that its corrective action program
assures that failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations,
defective equipment and nonconformances in security program components,
functions, or personnel are promptly identified and corrected. Measures
shall ensure that the cause of any of these conditions is determined
and that corrective action is taken to preclude repetition.
(c) Security plans. (1) Licensee security plans. Licensee security
plans must implement Commission requirements and must describe:
(i) How the physical protection program will prevent significant
core damage and spent fuel sabotage through the establishment and
maintenance of a security organization, the use of security equipment
and technology, the training and qualification of security personnel,
and the implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies;
and
(ii) Site-specific conditions that affect implementation of
Commission requirements.
(2) Protection of security plans. The licensee shall protect the
approved security plans and other related safeguards information
against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 73.21.
(3) Physical security plan. (i) The licensee shall establish,
maintain, and implement a Commission-approved physical security plan
that describes how the performance objective and requirements set forth
in this section will be implemented.
(ii) The physical security plan must describe the facility location
and layout, the security organization and structure, duties and
responsibilities of personnel, defense-in-depth implementation that
describes components, equipment and technology used.
(4) Training and qualification plan. (i) The licensee shall
establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-approved training and
qualification plan, that describes how the criteria set forth in
appendix B ``General Criteria for Security Personnel,'' to this part
will be implemented.
(ii) The training and qualification plan must describe the process
by which armed and unarmed security personnel, watchpersons, and other
members of the security organization will be selected, trained,
equipped, tested, qualified, and re-qualified to ensure that these
individuals possess and maintain the knowledge, skills, and abilities
required to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities
effectively.
(5) Safeguards contingency plan. (i) The licensee shall establish,
maintain, and implement a Commission-approved safeguards contingency
plan that describes how the criteria set forth in section II of
appendix C, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,'' to this part
will be implemented.
(ii) The safeguards contingency plan must describe predetermined
actions, plans, and strategies designed to intercept, challenge, delay,
and neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage.
(6) Implementing procedures. (i) The licensee shall establish,
maintain, and implement written procedures that document the structure
of the security organization, detail the specific duties and
responsibilities of each position, and implement Commission
requirements through the approved security plans.
(ii) Implementing procedures need not be submitted to the Commission
for prior approval, but are subject to inspection by the Commission.
(iii) Implementing procedures must detail the specific actions to
be taken and decisions to be made by each position of the security
organization to implement the approved security plans.
(iv) The licensee shall:
(A) Develop, maintain, enforce, review, and revise security
implementing procedures.
(B) Provide a process for the written approval of implementing
procedures and revisions by the individual with overall responsibility
for the security functions.
(C) Ensure that changes made to implementing procedures do not

[[Page 62852]]

decrease the effectiveness of any procedure to implement and satisfy
Commission requirements.
(7) Plan revisions. The licensee shall revise approved security
plans as necessary to ensure the effective implementation of Commission
regulations and the licensee's protective strategy. Commission approval
of revisions made pursuant to this paragraph is not required, provided
that revisions meet the requirements of Sec. 50.54(p) of this chapter.
Changes that are beyond the scope allowed per Sec. 50.54(p) of this
chapter shall be submitted as required by Sec. Sec. 50.90 of this
chapter or Sec. 73.5.
(d) Security organization. (1) The licensee shall establish and
maintain a security organization designed, staffed, trained, and
equipped to provide early detection, assessment, and response to
unauthorized activities within any area of the facility.
(2) The security organization must include:
(i) A management system that provides oversight of the onsite
physical protection program.
(ii) At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who
has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization
and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this
individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the
approved security plans and licensee protective strategy.
(3) The licensee may not permit any individual to act as a member
of the security organization unless the individual has been trained,
equipped, and qualified to perform assigned duties and responsibilities
in accordance with the requirements of appendix B to part 73 and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(4) The licensee may not assign an individual to any position
involving detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities
unless that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56.
(5) If a contracted security force is used to implement the onsite
physical protection program, the licensee's written agreement with the
contractor must be retained by the licensee as a record for the
duration of the contract and must clearly state the following conditions:
(i) The licensee is responsible to the Commission for maintaining
the physical protection program in accordance with Commission orders,
Commission regulations, and the approved security plans.
(ii) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and remove all
reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations,
orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and
documents are kept by the licensee or the contractor.
(iii) An individual may not be assigned to any position involving
detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless
that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56.
(iv) An individual may not be assigned duties and responsibilities
required to implement the approved security plans or licensee
protective strategy unless that individual has been properly trained,
equipped, and qualified to perform their assigned duties and
responsibilities in accordance with appendix B to part 73 and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(v) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the
Commission, the contractor security employees shall demonstrate the
ability to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities effectively.
(vi) Any license for possession and ownership of enhanced weapons
will reside with the licensee.
(e) Physical barriers. Based upon the licensee's protective
strategy, analyses, and site conditions that affect the use and
placement of physical barriers, the licensee shall install and maintain
physical barriers that are designed and constructed as necessary to
deter, delay, and prevent the introduction of unauthorized personnel,
vehicles, or materials into areas for which access must be controlled
or restricted.
(1) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans, the
design, construction, and function of physical barriers and barrier
systems used and shall ensure that each barrier and barrier system is
designed and constructed to satisfy the stated function of the barrier
and barrier system.
(2) The licensee shall retain in accordance with Sec. 73.70, all
analyses, comparisons, and descriptions of the physical barriers and
barrier systems used to satisfy the requirements of this section, and
shall protect these records as safeguards information in accordance
with the requirements of Sec. 73.21.
(3) Physical barriers must:
(i) Clearly delineate the boundaries of the area(s) for which the
physical barrier provides protection or a function, such as protected
and vital area boundaries and stand-off distance.
(ii) Be designed and constructed to protect against the design
basis threat commensurate to the required function of each barrier and
in support of the licensee protective strategy.
(iii) Provide visual deterrence, delay, and support access control
measures.
(iv) Support effective implementation of the licensee's protective
strategy.
(4) Owner controlled area. The licensee shall establish and
maintain physical barriers in the owner controlled area to deter,
delay, or prevent unauthorized access, facilitate the early detection
of unauthorized activities, and control approach routes to the facility.
(5) Isolation zone. (i) An isolation zone must be maintained in
outdoor areas adjacent to the protected area perimeter barrier. The
isolation zone shall be:
(A) Designed and of sufficient size to permit unobstructed
observation and assessment of activities on either side of the
protected area barrier.
(B) Equipped with intrusion detection equipment capable of
detecting both attempted and actual penetration of the protected area
perimeter barrier and assessment equipment capable of facilitating
timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before
completed penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier.
(ii) Assessment equipment in the isolation zone must provide real-
time and play-back/recorded video images in a manner that allows timely
evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before and after
each alarm annunciation.
(iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or other obstructions that
could provide concealment or otherwise interfere with the licensee's
capability to meet the requirements of paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) and (B)
of this section, must be located outside of the isolation zone.
(6) Protected area. (i) The protected area perimeter must be
protected by physical barriers designed and constructed to meet
Commission requirements and all penetrations through this barrier must
be secured in a manner that prevents or delays, and detects the
exploitation of any penetration.
(ii) The protected area perimeter physical barriers must be
separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area physical
barrier, unless otherwise identified in the approved physical security plan.
(iii) All emergency exits in the protected area must be secured by
locking devices that allow exit only and alarmed.
(iv) Where building walls, roofs, or penetrations comprise a
portion of the protected area perimeter barrier, an isolation zone is
not necessary, provided that the detection, assessment, observation,
monitoring, and

[[Page 62853]]

surveillance requirements of this section are met, appropriately
designed and constructed barriers are installed, and the area is
described in the approved security plans.
(v) The reactor control room, the central alarm station, and the
location within which the last access control function for access to
the protected area is performed, must be bullet-resisting.
(vi) All exterior areas within the protected area must be
periodically checked to detect and deter unauthorized activities,
personnel, vehicles, and materials.
(7) Vital areas. (i) Vital equipment must be located only within
vital areas, which in turn must be located within protected areas so
that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two
physical barriers designed and constructed to perform the required
function, except as otherwise approved by the Commission in accordance
with paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
(ii) More than one vital area may be located within a single
protected area.
(iii) The reactor control room, the spent fuel pool, secondary
power supply systems for intrusion detection and assessment equipment,
non-portable communications equipment, and the central alarm station,
must be provided protection equivalent to vital equipment located
within a vital area.
(iv) Vital equipment that is undergoing maintenance or is out of
service, or any other change to site conditions that could adversely
affect plant safety or security, must be identified in accordance with
Sec. 73.58, and adjustments must be made to the site protective
strategy, site procedures, and approved security plans, as necessary.
(v) The licensee shall protect all vital areas, vital area access
portals, and vital area emergency exits with intrusion detection
equipment and locking devices. Emergency exit locking devices shall be
designed to permit exit only.
(vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be locked.
(8) Vehicle barrier system. The licensee must:
(i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle access or proximity to any area
from which any vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could disable
the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance
objective and requirements described in paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) Limit and control all vehicle approach routes.
(iii) Design and install a vehicle barrier system, to include
passive and active barriers, at a stand-off distance adequate to
protect personnel, equipment, and systems against the design basis threat.
(iv) Deter, detect, delay, or prevent vehicle use as a means of
transporting unauthorized personnel or materials to gain unauthorized
access beyond a vehicle barrier system, gain proximity to a protected
area or vital area, or otherwise penetrate the protected area perimeter.
(v) Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and
provide a secondary power source or a means of mechanical or manual
operation, in the event of a power failure to ensure that the active
barrier can be placed in the denial position within the time line
required to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required
standoff distance.
(vi) Provide surveillance and observation of vehicle barriers and
barrier systems to detect unauthorized activities and to ensure the
integrity of each vehicle barrier and barrier system.
(9) Waterways. (i) The licensee shall control waterway approach
routes or proximity to any area from which a waterborne vehicle, its
personnel, or its contents could disable the personnel, equipment, or
systems necessary to meet the performance objective and requirements
described in paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) The licensee shall delineate areas from which a waterborne
vehicle must be restricted and install waterborne vehicle control
measures, where applicable.
(iii) The licensee shall monitor waterway approaches and adjacent
areas to ensure early detection, assessment, and response to
unauthorized activity or proximity, and to ensure the integrity of
installed waterborne vehicle control measures.
(iv) Where necessary to meet the requirements of this section,
licensees shall coordinate with local, State, and Federal agencies
having jurisdiction over waterway approaches.
(10) Unattended openings in any barrier established to meet the
requirements of this section that are 620 cm2 (96.1
in2) or greater in total area and have a smallest dimension
of 15 m (5.9 in) or greater, must be secured and monitored at a
frequency that would prevent exploitation of the opening consistent
with the intended function of each barrier.
(f) Target sets. (1) The licensee shall document in site procedures
the process used to develop and identify target sets, to include
analyses and methodologies used to determine and group the target set
equipment or elements.
(2) The licensee shall consider the effects that cyber attacks may
have upon individual equipment or elements of each target set or grouping.
(3) Target set equipment or elements that are not contained within
a protected or vital area must be explicitly identified in the approved
security plans and protective measures for such equipment or elements
must be addressed by the licensee's protective strategy in accordance
with appendix C to this part.
(4) The licensee shall implement a program for the oversight of
plant equipment and systems documented as part of the licensee
protective strategy to ensure that changes to the configuration of the
identified equipment and systems do not compromise the licensee's
capability to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(g) Access control. (1) The licensee shall:
(i) Control all points of personnel, vehicle, and material access
into any area, or beyond any physical barrier or barrier system,
established to meet the requirements of this section.
(ii) Control all points of personnel and vehicle access into vital
areas in accordance with access authorization lists.
(iii) During non-emergency conditions, limit unescorted access to
the protected area and vital areas to only those individuals who
require unescorted access to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(iv) Monitor and ensure the integrity of access control systems.
(v) Provide supervision and control over the badging process to
prevent unauthorized bypass of access control equipment located at or
outside of the protected area.
(vi) Isolate the individual responsible for the last access control
function (controlling admission to the protected area) within a bullet-
resisting structure to assure the ability to respond or to summon
assistance in response to unauthorized activities.
(vii) In response to specific threat and security information,
implement a two-person (line-of-sight) rule for all personnel in vital
areas so that no one individual is permitted unescorted access to vital
areas. Under these conditions, the licensee shall implement measures to
verify that the two person rule has been met when a vital area is accessed.
(2) In accordance with the approved security plans and before granting
unescorted access through an access control point, the licensee shall:
(i) Confirm the identity of individuals.
(ii) Verify the authorization for access of individuals, vehicles,
and materials.

[[Page 62854]]

(iii) Search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and
materials in accordance with paragraph (h) of this section.
(iv) Confirm, in accordance with industry shared lists and
databases, that individuals have not been denied access to another
power reactor facility.
(3) Access control points must be:
(i) Equipped with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment,
and monitoring, observation, and surveillance equipment, as appropriate.
(ii) Located outside or concurrent with, the physical barrier
system through which it controls access.
(4) Emergency conditions. (i) The licensee shall design the access
control system to accommodate the potential need for rapid ingress or
egress of authorized individuals during emergency conditions or
situations that could lead to emergency conditions.
(ii) Under emergency conditions, the licensee shall implement
procedures to ensure that:
(A) Authorized emergency personnel are provided prompt access to
affected areas and equipment.
(B) Attempted or actual unauthorized entry to vital equipment is
detected.
(C) The capability to prevent significant core damage and spent
fuel sabotage is maintained.
(iii) The licensee shall ensure that restrictions for site access
and egress during emergency conditions are coordinated with responses by
offsite emergency support agencies identified in the site emergency plans.
(5) Vehicles. (i) The licensee shall exercise control over all
vehicles while inside the protected area and vital areas to ensure they
are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.
(ii) Vehicles inside the protected area or vital areas must be
operated by an individual authorized unescorted access to the area, or
must be escorted by an individual trained, qualified, and equipped to
perform vehicle escort duties, while inside the area.
(iii) Vehicles inside the protected area must be limited to plant
functions or emergencies, and must be disabled when not in use.
(iv) Vehicles transporting hazardous materials inside the protected
area must be escorted by an armed member of the security organization.
(6) Access control devices. (i) Identification badges. The licensee
shall implement a numbered photo identification badge/key-card system
for all individuals authorized unescorted access to the protected area
and vital areas.
(A) Identification badges may be removed from the protected area
only when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and
authorization for unescorted access of the badge holder before allowing
unescorted access to the protected area.
(B) Except where operational safety concerns require otherwise,
identification badges must be clearly displayed by all individuals
while inside the protected area and vital areas.
(C) The licensee shall maintain a record, to include the name and
areas to which unescorted access is granted, of all individuals to whom
photo identification badge/key-cards have been issued.
(ii) Keys, locks, combinations, and passwords. All keys, locks,
combinations, passwords, and related access control devices used to
control access to protected areas, vital areas, security systems, and
safeguards information must be controlled and accounted for to reduce
the probability of compromise. The licensee shall:
(A) Issue access control devices only to individuals who require
unescorted access to perform official duties and responsibilities.
(B) Maintain a record, to include name and affiliation, of all
individuals to whom access control devices have been issued, and
implement a process to account for access control devices at least annually.
(C) Implement compensatory measures upon discovery or suspicion
that any access control device may have been compromised. Compensatory
measures must remain in effect until the compromise is corrected.
(D) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable
access control devices that have been, or may have been compromised.
(E) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable all
access control devices issued to individuals who no longer require
unescorted access to the areas for which the devices were designed.
(7) Visitors. (i) The licensee may permit escorted access to the
protected area to individuals who do not have unescorted access
authorization in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.56 and
part 26 of this chapter. The licensee shall:
(A) Implement procedures for processing, escorting, and controlling
visitors.
(B) Confirm the identity of each visitor through physical
presentation of a recognized identification card issued by a local,
State, or Federal Government agency that includes a photo or contains
physical characteristics of the individual requesting escorted access.
(C) Maintain a visitor control register in which all visitors shall
register their name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment
affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited
before being escorted into any protected or vital area.
(D) Issue a visitor badge to all visitors that clearly indicates
that an escort is required.
(E) Escort all visitors, at all times, while inside the protected
area and vital areas.
(ii) Individuals not employed by the licensee but who require
frequent and extended unescorted access to the protected area and vital
areas shall satisfy the access authorization requirements of Sec.
73.56 and part 26 of this chapter and shall be issued a non-employee
photo identification badge that is easily distinguished from other
identification badges before being allowed unescorted access to the
protected area. Non-employee photo identification badges must indicate:
(A) Non-employee, no escort required.
(B) Areas to which access is authorized.
(C) The period for which access is authorized.
(D) The individual's employer.
(E) A means to determine the individual's emergency plan assembly area.
(8) Escorts. The licensee shall ensure that all escorts are trained
in accordance with appendix B to this part, the approved training and
qualification plan, and licensee policies and procedures.
(i) Escorts shall be authorized unescorted access to all areas in
which they will perform escort duties.
(ii) Individuals assigned to escort visitors shall be provided a
means of timely communication with both alarm stations in a manner that
ensures the ability to summon assistance when needed.
(iii) Individuals assigned to vehicle escort duties shall be
provided a means of continuous communication with both alarm stations
to ensure the ability to summon assistance when needed.
(iv) Escorts shall be knowledgeable of those activities that are
authorized to be performed within the areas for which they are assigned
to perform escort duties and must also be knowledgeable of those
activities that are authorized to be performed by any individual for
which the escort is assigned responsibility.
(v) Visitor to escort ratios shall be limited to 10 to 1 in the
protected area and 5 to 1 in vital areas, provided that the necessary
observation and control requirements of this section can be

[[Page 62855]]

maintained by the assigned escort over all visitor activities.
(h) Search programs. (1) At each designated access control point
into the owner controlled area and protected area, the licensee shall
search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials in
accordance with the requirements of this section and the approved
security plans, before granting access.
(i) The objective of the search program must be to deter, detect,
and prevent the introduction of unauthorized firearms, explosives,
incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and devices into
designated areas in which the unauthorized items could be used to
disable personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to meet the
performance objective and requirements of paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) The search requirements for unauthorized firearms, explosives,
incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and devices must be
accomplished through the use of equipment capable of detecting these
unauthorized items and through visual and hands-on physical searches,
as needed to ensure all items are identified before granting access.
(iii) Only trained and qualified members of the security
organization, and other trained and qualified personnel designated by
the licensee, shall perform search activities or be assigned duties and
responsibilities required to satisfy observation requirements for the
search activities.
(2) The licensee shall establish and implement written search
procedures for all access control points before granting access to any
individual, vehicle, package, delivery, or material.
(i) Search procedures must ensure that items possessed by an
individual, or contained within a vehicle or package, must be clearly
identified as not being a prohibited item before granting access beyond
the access control point for which the search is conducted.
(ii) The licensee shall visually and physically hand search all
individuals, vehicles, and packages containing items that cannot be or
are not clearly identified by search equipment.
(3) Whenever search equipment is out of service or is not operating
satisfactorily, trained and qualified members of the security
organization shall conduct a hands-on physical search of all
individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials that would
otherwise have been subject to equipment searches.
(4) When an attempt to introduce unauthorized items has occurred or
is suspected, the licensee shall implement actions to ensure that the
suspect individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials are
denied access and shall perform a visual and hands-on physical search
to determine the absence or existence of a threat.
(5) Vehicle search procedures must be performed by at least two (2)
properly trained and equipped security personnel, at least one of whom
is positioned to observe the search process and provide a timely
response to unauthorized activities if necessary.
(6) Vehicle areas to be searched must include, but are not limited
to, the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area.
(7) Vehicle search checkpoints must be equipped with video
surveillance equipment that must be monitored by an individual capable
of initiating and directing a timely response to unauthorized activity.
(8) Exceptions to the search requirements of this section must be
submitted to the Commission for prior review and approval and must be
identified in the approved security plans.
(i) Vehicles and items that may be excepted from the search
requirements of this section must be escorted by an armed individual
who is trained and equipped to observe offloading and perform search
activities at the final destination within the protected area.
(ii) To the extent practicable, items excepted from search must be
off loaded only at specified receiving areas that are not adjacent to a
vital area.
(iii) The excepted items must be searched at the receiving area and
opened at the final destination by an individual familiar with the items.
(i) Detection and assessment systems.
(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain an intrusion
detection and assessment system that must provide, at all times, the
capability for early detection and assessment of unauthorized persons
and activities.
(2) Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate, and video
assessment equipment images shall display, concurrently in at least two
continuously staffed onsite alarm stations, at least one of which must
be protected in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs
(e)(6)(v), (e)(7)(iii), and (i)(8)(ii) of this section.
(3) The licensee's intrusion detection system must be designed to
ensure that both alarm station operators:
(i) Are concurrently notified of the alarm annunciation.
(ii) Are capable of making a timely assessment of the cause of each
alarm annunciation.
(iii) Possess the capability to initiate a timely response in
accordance with the approved security plans, licensee protective
strategy, and implementing procedures.
(4) Both alarm stations must be equipped with equivalent
capabilities for detection and communication, and must be equipped with
functionally equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation, and
surveillance capabilities to support the effective implementation of
the approved security plans and the licensee protective strategy in the
event that either alarm station is disabled.
(i) The licensee shall ensure that a single act cannot remove the
capability of both alarm stations to detect and assess unauthorized
activities, respond to an alarm, summon offsite assistance, implement
the protective strategy, provide command and control, or otherwise
prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(ii) The alarm station functions in paragraph (i)(4) of this
section must remain operable from an uninterruptible backup power
supply in the event of the loss of normal power.
(5) Detection. Detection capabilities must be provided by security
organization personnel and intrusion detection equipment, and shall be
defined in implementing procedures. Intrusion detection equipment must
be capable of operating as intended under the conditions encountered at
the facility.
(6) Assessment. Assessment capabilities must be provided by
security organization personnel and video assessment equipment, and
shall be described in implementing procedures. Video assessment
equipment must be capable of operating as intended under the conditions
encountered at the facility and must provide video images from which
accurate and timely assessments can be made in response to an alarm
annunciation or other notification of unauthorized activity.
(7) The licensee intrusion detection and assessment system must:
(i) Ensure that the duties and responsibilities assigned to
personnel, the use of equipment, and the implementation of procedures
provides the detection and assessment capabilities necessary to meet
the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section.
(ii) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and
location of the alarm.
(iii) Ensure that alarm devices, to include transmission lines to

[[Page 62856]]

annunciators, are tamper indicating and self-checking.
(iv) Provide visual and audible alarm annunciation and concurrent
video assessment capability to both alarm stations in a manner that
ensures timely recognition, acknowledgment and response by each alarm
station operator in accordance with written response procedures.
(v) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a
component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on
the backup power supply.
(vi) Maintain a record of all alarm annunciations, the cause of
each alarm, and the disposition of each alarm.
(8) Alarm stations. (i) Both alarm stations must be continuously
staffed by at least one trained and qualified member of the security
organization.
(ii) The interior of the central alarm station must not be visible
from the perimeter of the protected area.
(iii) The licensee may not permit any activities to be performed
within either alarm station that would interfere with an alarm station
operator's ability to effectively execute assigned detection,
assessment, surveillance, and communication duties and responsibilities.
(iv) The licensee shall assess and respond to all alarms and other
indications of unauthorized activities in accordance with the approved
security plans and implementing procedures.
(v) The licensee's implementing procedures must ensure that both
alarm station operators are knowledgeable of all alarm annunciations,
assessments, and final disposition of all alarms, to include but not
limited to a prohibition from changing the status of a detection point
or deactivating a locking or access control device at a protected or
vital area portal, without the knowledge and concurrence of the other
alarm station operator.
(9) Surveillance, observation, and monitoring. (i) The physical
protection program must include the capability for surveillance,
observation, and monitoring in a manner that provides early detection
and assessment of unauthorized activities.
(ii) The licensee shall provide continual surveillance,
observation, and monitoring of all areas identified in the approved
security plans as requiring surveillance, observation, and monitoring
to ensure early detection of unauthorized activities and to ensure the
integrity of physical barriers or other components of the physical
protection program.
(A) Continual surveillance, observation, and monitoring
responsibilities must be performed by security personnel during routine
patrols or by other trained and equipped personnel designated as a
component of the protective strategy.
(B) Surveillance, observation, and monitoring requirements may be
accomplished by direct observation or video technology.
(iii) The licensee shall provide random patrols of all accessible
areas containing target set equipment.
(A) Armed security patrols shall periodically check designated areas
and shall inspect vital area entrances, portals, and external barriers.
(B) Physical barriers must be inspected at random intervals to
identify tampering and degradation.
(C) Security personnel shall be trained to recognize indications of
tampering as necessary to perform assigned duties and responsibilities
as they relate to safety and security systems and equipment.
(iv) Unattended openings that are not monitored by intrusion
detection equipment must be observed by security personnel at a
frequency that would prevent exploitation of that opening.
(v) Upon detection of unauthorized activities, tampering, or other
threats, the licensee shall initiate actions consistent with the
approved security plans, the licensee protective strategy, and
implementing procedures.
(10) Video technology. (i) The licensee shall maintain in operable
condition all video technology used to satisfy the monitoring,
observation, surveillance, and assessment requirements of this section.
(ii) Video technology must be:
(A) Displayed concurrently at both alarm stations.
(B) Designed to provide concurrent observation, monitoring, and
surveillance of designated areas from which an alarm annunciation or a
notification of unauthorized activity is received.
(C) Capable of providing a timely visual display from which
positive recognition and assessment of the detected activity can be
made and a timely response initiated.
(D) Used to supplement and limit the exposure of security personnel
to possible attack.
(iii) The licensee shall implement controls for personnel assigned
to monitor video technology to ensure that assigned personnel maintain
the level of alertness required to effectively perform the assigned
duties and responsibilities.
(11) Illumination. (i) The licensee shall ensure that all areas of
the facility, to include appropriate portions of the owner controlled
area, are provided with illumination necessary to satisfy the
requirements of this section.
(ii) The licensee shall provide a minimum illumination level of 0.2
footcandle measured horizontally at ground level, in the isolation
zones and all exterior areas within the protected area, or may augment
the facility illumination system, to include patrols, responders, and
video technology, with low-light technology capable of meeting the
detection, assessment, surveillance, observation, monitoring, and
response requirements of this section.
(iii) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans
how the lighting requirements of this section are met and, if used, the
type(s) and application of low-light technology used.
(j) Communication requirements. (1) The licensee shall establish
and maintain, continuous communication capability with onsite and
offsite resources to ensure effective command and control during both
normal and emergency situations.
(2) Individuals assigned to each alarm station shall be capable of
calling for assistance in accordance with the approved security plans,
licensee integrated response plan, and licensee procedures.
(3) Each on-duty security officer, watchperson, vehicle escort, and
armed response force member shall be capable of maintaining continuous
communication with an individual in each alarm station.
(4) The following continuous communication capabilities must
terminate in both alarm stations required by this section:
(i) Conventional telephone service.
(ii) Radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication,
either directly or through an intermediary.
(iii) A system for communication with all control rooms, on-duty
operations personnel, escorts, local, State, and Federal law
enforcement agencies, and all other personnel necessary to coordinate
both onsite and offsite responses.
(5) Non-portable communications equipment must remain operable from
independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power.
(6) The licensee shall identify site areas where communication could
be interrupted or can not be maintained and shall establish alternative
communication measures for these areas in implementing procedures.
(k) Response requirements. (1) Personnel and equipment.
(i) The licensee shall establish and maintain, at all times, the
minimum number of properly trained and

[[Page 62857]]

equipped personnel required to intercept, challenge, delay, and
neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage as defined in Sec. 73.1, to prevent significant
core damage and spent fuel sabotage.
(ii) The licensee shall provide and maintain firearms, ammunition,
and equipment capable of performing functions commensurate to the needs
of each armed member of the security organization to carry out their
assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the approved
security plans, the licensee protective strategy, implementing
procedures, and the site specific conditions under which the firearms,
ammunition, and equipment will be used.
(iii) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans,
all firearms and equipment to be possessed by and readily available to,
armed personnel to implement the protective strategy and carry out all
assigned duties and responsibilities. This description must include the
general distribution and assignment of firearms, ammunition, body
armor, and other equipment used.
(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all firearms, ammunition, and
equipment required by the protective strategy are in sufficient supply,
are in working condition, and are readily available for use in accordance
with the licensee protective strategy and predetermined time lines.
(v) The licensee shall ensure that all armed members of the
security organization are trained in the proper use and maintenance of
assigned weapons and equipment in accordance with appendix B to part 73.
(2) The licensee shall instruct each armed response person to
prevent or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by
using force sufficient to counter the force directed at that person,
including the use of deadly force, when the armed response person has a
reasonable belief that the use of deadly force is necessary in self-
defense or in the defense of others, or any other circumstances as
authorized by applicable State law.
(3) The licensee shall provide an armed response team consisting of
both armed responders and armed security officers to carry out response
duties, within predetermined time lines.
(i) Armed responders. (A) The licensee shall determine the minimum
number of armed responders necessary to protect against the design
basis threat described in Sec. 73.1(a), subject to Commission
approval, and shall document this number in the approved security plans.
(B) Armed responders shall be available at all times inside the
protected area and may not be assigned any other duties or
responsibilities that could interfere with assigned response duties.
(ii) Armed security officers. (A) Armed security officers
designated to strengthen response capabilities shall be onsite and
available at all times to carry out assigned response duties.
(B) The minimum number of armed security officers must be
documented in the approved security plans.
(iii) The licensee shall ensure that training and qualification
requirements accurately reflect the duties and responsibilities to be
performed.
(iv) The licensee shall ensure that all firearms, ammunition, and
equipment needed for completing the actions described in the approved
security plans and licensee protective strategy are readily available
and in working condition.
(4) The licensee shall describe in the approved security plans,
procedures for responding to an unplanned incident that reduces the
number of available armed response team members below the minimum
number documented by the licensee in the approved security plans.
(5) Licensees shall develop, maintain, and implement a written
protective strategy in accordance with the requirements of this section
and appendix C to this part.
(6) The licensee shall ensure that all personnel authorized
unescorted access to the protected area are trained and understand
their roles and responsibilities during security incidents, to include
hostage and duress situations.
(7) Upon receipt of an alarm or other indication of threat, the
licensee shall:
(i) Determine the existence of a threat in accordance with
assessment procedures.
(ii) Identify the level of threat present through the use of
assessment methodologies and procedures.
(iii) Determine the response necessary to intercept, challenge,
delay, and neutralize the threat in accordance with the requirements of
appendix C to part 73, the Commission-approved safeguards contingency
plan, and the licensee response strategy.
(iv) Notify offsite support agencies such as local law enforcement,
in accordance with site procedures.
(8) The licensee shall document and maintain current agreements
with local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, to include
estimated response times and capabilities.
(l) Facilities using mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel assemblies. In addition
to the requirements described in this section for protection against
radiological sabotage, operating commercial nuclear power reactors
licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52 and using special nuclear material
in the form of MOX fuel assemblies shall protect unirradiated MOX fuel
assemblies against theft or diversion.
(1) Licensees shall protect the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies
against theft or diversion in accordance with the requirements of this
section and the approved security plans.
(2) Commercial nuclear power reactors using MOX fuel assemblies are
exempt from the requirements of Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46 for
the physical protection of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(3) Administrative controls. (i) The licensee shall describe in the
approved security plans, the operational and administrative controls to
be implemented for the receipt, inspection, movement, storage, and
protection of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(ii) The licensee shall implement the use of tamper-indicating
devices for unirradiated MOX fuel assembly transport and shall verify
their use and integrity before receipt.
(iii) Upon delivery of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies, the
licensee shall:
(A) Inspect unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies for damage.
(B) Search unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies for unauthorized materials.
(iv) The licensee may conduct the required inspection and search
functions simultaneously.
(v) The licensee shall ensure the proper placement and control of
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies as follows:
(A) At least one armed security officer, in addition to the armed
response team required by paragraphs (h)(4) and (h)(5) of appendix C to
part 73, shall be present during the receipt and inspection of
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(B) The licensee shall store unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies only
within a spent fuel pool, located within a vital area, so that access
to the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies requires passage through at
least three physical barriers.
(vi) The licensee shall implement a material control and
accountability program for the unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies that
includes a predetermined and documented storage location for each
unirradiated MOX fuel assembly.

[[Page 62858]]

(vii) Records that identify the storage locations of unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies are considered safeguards information and must be
protected and stored in accordance with Sec. 73.21.
(4) Physical controls. (i) The licensee shall lock or disable all
equipment and power supplies to equipment required for the movement and
handling of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(ii) The licensee shall implement a two-person line-of-sight rule
whenever control systems or equipment required for the movement or
handling of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must be accessed.
(iii) The licensee shall conduct random patrols of areas containing
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies to ensure the integrity of barriers
and locks, deter unauthorized activities, and to identify indications
of tampering.
(iv) Locks, keys, and any other access control device used to
secure equipment and power sources required for the movement of
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or openings to areas containing
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must be controlled by the security
organization.
(v) Removal of locks used to secure equipment and power sources
required for the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or
openings to areas containing unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must
require approval by both the on-duty security shift supervisor and the
operations shift manager.
(A) At least one armed security officer shall be present to observe
activities involving the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies
before the removal of the locks and providing power to equipment
required for the movement or handling of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(B) At least one armed security officer shall be present at all
times until power is removed from equipment and locks are secured.
(C) Security officers shall be trained and knowledgeable of authorized
and unauthorized activities involving unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
(5) At least one armed security officer shall be present and shall
maintain constant surveillance of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies when
the assemblies are not located in the spent fuel pool or reactor.
(6) The licensee shall maintain at all times the capability to
detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats to
unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in accordance with the requirements of
this section.
(m) Digital computer and communication networks. (1) The licensee
shall implement a cyber-security program that provides high assurance
that computer systems, which if compromised would likely adversely
impact safety, security, and emergency preparedness, are protected from
cyber attacks.
(i) The licensee shall describe the cyber-security program
requirements in the approved security plans.
(ii) The licensee shall incorporate the cyber-security program into
the onsite physical protection program.
(iii) The cyber-security program must be designed to detect and
prevent cyber attacks on protected computer systems.
(2) Cyber-security assessment. The licensee shall implement a
cyber-security assessment program to systematically assess and manage
cyber risks.
(3) Policies, requirements, and procedures. (i) The licensee shall
apply cyber-security requirements and policies that identify management
expectations and requirements for the protection of computer systems.
(ii) The licensee shall develop and maintain implementing
procedures to ensure cyber-security requirements and policies are
implemented effectively.
(4) Incident response and recovery. (i) The licensee shall
implement a cyber-security incident response and recovery plan to
minimize the adverse impact of a cyber-security incident on safety,
security, or emergency preparedness systems.
(ii) The cyber-security incident response and recovery plan must be
described in the integrated response plan required by appendix C to
this part.
(iii) The cyber-security incident response and recovery plan must
ensure the capability to respond to cyber-security incidents, minimize
loss and destruction, mitigate and correct the weaknesses that were
exploited, and restore systems and/or equipment affected by a cyber-
security incident.
(5) Protective strategies. The licensee shall implement defense-in-
depth protective strategies to protect computer systems from cyber
attacks, detecting, isolating, and neutralizing unauthorized activities
in a timely manner.
(6) Configuration and control management program. The licensee
shall implement a configuration and control management program, to
include cyber risk analysis, to ensure that modifications to computer
system designs, access control measures, configuration, operational
integrity, and management process do not adversely impact facility
safety, security, and emergency preparedness systems before
implementation of those modifications.
(7) Cyber-security awareness and training. (i) The licensee shall
implement a cyber-security awareness and training program.
(ii) The cyber-security awareness and training program must ensure
that appropriate plant personnel, including contractors, are aware of
cyber-security requirements and that they receive the training required
to effectively perform their assigned duties and responsibilities.
(n) Security program reviews and audits.
(1) The licensee shall review the physical protection program at
intervals not to exceed 12 months, or
(i) As necessary based upon assessments or other performance indicators.
(ii) Within 12 months after a change occurs in personnel,
procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely
affect security.
(2) As a minimum, each element of the onsite physical protection
program must be reviewed at least every twenty-four (24) months.
(i) The onsite physical protection program review must be
documented and performed by individuals independent of those personnel
responsible for program management and any individual who has direct
responsibility for implementing the onsite physical protection program.
(ii) Onsite physical protection program reviews and audits must
include, but not be limited to, an evaluation of the effectiveness of
the approved security plans, implementing procedures, response
commitments by local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities,
cyber-security programs, safety/security interface, and the testing,
maintenance, and calibration program.
(3) The licensee shall periodically review the approved security
plans, the integrated response plan, the licensee protective strategy,
and licensee implementing procedures to evaluate their effectiveness
and potential impact on plant and personnel safety.
(4) The licensee shall periodically evaluate the cyber-security
program for effectiveness and shall update the cyber-security program
as needed to ensure protection against changes to internal and external
threats.
(5) The licensee shall conduct quarterly drills and annual force-
on-force exercises in accordance with appendix C to part 73 and the
licensee performance evaluation program.
(6) The results and recommendations of the onsite physical
protection program reviews and audits, management's findings regarding

[[Page 62859]]

program effectiveness, and any actions taken as a result of
recommendations from prior program reviews, must be documented in a
report to the licensee's plant manager and to corporate management at
least one level higher than that having responsibility for day-to-day
plant operation.
(7) Findings from onsite physical protection program reviews,
audits, and assessments must be entered into the site corrective action
program and protected as safeguards information, if applicable.
(8) The licensee shall make changes to the approved security plans
and implementing procedures as a result of findings from security
program reviews, audits, and assessments, where necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of Commission regulations and the licensee
protective strategy.
(9) Unless otherwise specified by the Commission, onsite physical
protection program reviews, audits, and assessments may be conducted up
to thirty days prior to, but no later than thirty days after the
scheduled date without adverse impact upon the next scheduled annual
audit date.
(o) Maintenance, testing, and calibration. (1) The licensee shall:
(i) Implement a maintenance, testing and calibration program to
ensure that security systems and equipment are tested for operability
and performance at predetermined intervals, are maintained in operable
condition, and are capable of performing their intended function when
needed.
(ii) Describe the maintenance, testing and calibration program in
the approved physical security plan. Implementing procedures must
specify operational and technical details required to perform
maintenance, testing, and calibration activities to include, but not
limited to, purpose of activity, actions to be taken, acceptance
criteria, the intervals or frequency at which the activity will be
performed, and compensatory actions required.
(iii) Document problems, failures, deficiencies, and other
findings, to include the cause of each, and enter each into the site
corrective action program. The licensee shall protect this information
as safeguards information, if applicable.
(iv) Implement compensatory measures in a timely manner to ensure
that the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection program is not
reduced by failure or degraded operation of security-related components
or equipment.
(2) Each intrusion alarm must be tested for operability at the
beginning and end of any period that it is used for security, or if the
period of continuous use exceeds seven (7) days, the intrusion alarm
must be tested at least once every seven (7) days.
(3) Intrusion detection and access control equipment must be
performance tested in accordance with the approved security plans.
(4) Equipment required for communications onsite must be tested for
operability not less frequently than once at the beginning of each
security personnel work shift.
(5) Communication systems between the alarm stations and each
control room, and between the alarm stations and offsite support
agencies, to include back-up communication equipment, must be tested
for operability at least once each day.
(6) Search equipment must be tested for operability at least once
each day and tested for performance at least once during each seven (7)
day period and before being placed back in service after each repair or
inoperative state.
(7) All intrusion detection equipment, communication equipment,
physical barriers, and other security-related devices or equipment, to
include back-up power supplies must be maintained in operable condition.
(8) A program for testing or verifying the operability of devices
or equipment located in hazardous areas must be specified in the
approved security plans and must define alternate measures to be taken
to ensure the timely completion of testing or maintenance when the
hazardous condition or radiation restrictions are no longer applicable.
(p) Compensatory measures. (1) The licensee shall identify measures
and criteria needed to compensate for the loss or reduced performance
of personnel, equipment, systems, and components, that are required to
meet the requirements of this section.
(2) Compensatory measures must be designed and implemented to
provide a level of protection that is equivalent to the protection that
was provided by the degraded or inoperable personnel, equipment,
system, or components.
(3) Compensatory measures must be implemented within specific time
lines necessary to meet the requirements stated in paragraph (b) of
this section and described in the approved security plans.
(q) Suspension of safeguards measures. (1) The licensee may suspend
implementation of affected requirements of this section under the
following conditions:
(i) In accordance with Sec. Sec. 50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of this
chapter, the licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to
this section in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to
protect the public health and safety and no action consistent with
license conditions and technical specifications that can provide
adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This
suspension of safeguards measures must be approved as a minimum by a
licensed senior operator prior to taking this action.
(ii) During severe weather when the suspension is immediately
needed to protect personnel whose assigned duties and responsibilities
in meeting the requirements of this section would otherwise constitute
a life threatening situation and no action consistent with the
requirements of this section that can provide equivalent protection is
immediately apparent. Suspension of safeguards due to severe weather
must be initiated by the security supervisor and approved by a licensed
senior operator prior to taking this action.
(2) Suspended security measures must be reimplemented as soon as
conditions permit.
(3) The suspension of safeguards measures must be reported and
documented in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 73.71.
(4) Reports made under Sec. 50.72 of this chapter need not be
duplicated under Sec. 73.71.
(r) Records. (1) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and
remove copies of all records required to be kept by Commission
regulations, orders, or license conditions whether the records are kept
by the licensee or a contractor.
(2) The licensee shall maintain all records required to be kept by
Commission regulations, orders, or license conditions, as a record
until the Commission terminates the license for which the records were
developed and shall maintain superseded portions of these records for
at least three (3) years after the record is superseded, unless
otherwise specified by the Commission.
(s) Safety/security interface. In accordance with the requirements
of Sec. 73.58, the licensee shall develop and implement a process to
inform and coordinate safety and security activities to ensure that
these activities do not adversely affect the capabilities of the
security organization to satisfy the requirements of this section, or
overall plant safety.
(t) Alternative measures. (1) The Commission may authorize an
applicant or licensee to provide a measure for protection against
radiological sabotage other than one required by this section if the
applicant or licensee demonstrates that:

[[Page 62860]]

(i) The measure meets the same performance objective and
requirements as specified in paragraph (b) of this section and
(ii) The proposed alternative measure provides protection against
radiological sabotage or theft of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies,
equivalent to that which would be provided by the specific requirement
for which it would substitute.
(2) The licensee shall submit each proposed alternative measure to
the Commission for review and approval in accordance with Sec. Sec.
50.4 and 50.90 of this chapter before implementation.
(3) The licensee shall submit a technical basis for each proposed
alternative measure, to include any analysis or assessment conducted in
support of a determination that the proposed alternative measure
provides a level of protection that is at least equal to that which
would otherwise be provided by the specific requirement of this section.
(4) Alternative vehicle barrier systems. In the case of alterative
vehicle barrier systems required by Sec. 73.55(e)(8), the licensee
shall demonstrate that:
(i) The alternative measure provides substantial protection against
a vehicle bomb, and
(ii) Based on comparison of the costs of the alternative measures
to the costs of meeting the Commission's requirements using the
essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, the costs of fully meeting the
Commission's requirements are not justified by the protection that
would be provided.
13. Section 73.56 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 73.56 Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear
power plants.

(a) Introduction. (1) By [date--180 days--after the effective date
of the final rule published in the Federal Register], each nuclear
power reactor licensee, licensed under 10 CFR part 50, shall
incorporate the revised requirements of this section through amendments
to its Commission-approved access authorization program and shall
submit the amended program to the Commission for review and approval.
(2) The amended program must be submitted as specified in Sec.
50.4 and must describe how the revised requirements of this section
will be implemented by the licensee, to include a proposed
implementation schedule.
(3) The licensee shall implement the existing approved access
authorization program and associated Commission orders until Commission
approval of the amended program, unless otherwise authorized by the
Commission.
(4) The licensee is responsible to the Commission for maintaining
the authorization program in accordance with Commission regulations and
related Commission-directed orders through the implementation of the
approved program and site implementing procedures.
(5) Applicants for an operating license under the provisions of
part 50 of this chapter, or holders of a combined license under the
provisions of part 52 of this chapter, shall satisfy the requirements
of this section upon receipt of an operating license or upon notice of
the Commission's finding under Sec. 52.103(g) of this chapter.
(6) Contractors and vendors (C/Vs) who implement authorization
programs or program elements shall develop, implement, and maintain
authorization programs or program elements that meet the requirements
of this section, to the extent that the licensees and applicants
specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(5) of this section rely upon
those C/V authorization programs or program elements to meet the
requirements of this section. In any case, only a licensee or applicant
shall grant or permit an individual to maintain unescorted access to
nuclear power plant protected and vital areas.
(b) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program. (1)
The following individuals shall be subject to an authorization program:
(i) Any individual to whom a licensee or applicant grants
unescorted access to nuclear power plant protected and vital areas.
(ii) Any individual whose assigned duties and responsibilities
permit the individual to take actions by electronic means, either
onsite or remotely, that could adversely impact a licensees or
applicants operational safety, security, or emergency response
capabilities; and
(iii) Any individual who has responsibilities for implementing a
licensee's or applicant's protective strategy, including, but not
limited to, armed security force officers, alarm station operators, and
tactical response team leaders; and
(iv) The licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's reviewing official.
(2) At the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's discretion, other
individuals who are designated in access authorization program
procedures may be subject to an authorization program that meets the
requirements of this section.
(c) General performance objective. Access authorization programs
must provide high assurance that the individuals who are specified in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this
section are trustworthy and reliable, such that they do not constitute
an unreasonable risk to public health and safety or the common defense
and security, including the potential to commit radiological sabotage.
(d) Background investigation. In order to grant unescorted access
authorization to an individual, the licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that the
individual has been subject to a background investigation. The
background investigation must include, but is not limited to, the
following elements:
(1) Informed consent. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified
in paragraph (a) of this section may not initiate any element of a
background investigation without the knowledge and written consent of
the subject individual. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall inform
the individual of his or her right to review information collected to
assure its accuracy and provide the individual with an opportunity to
correct any inaccurate or incomplete information that is developed by
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs about the individual.
(i) The subject individual may withdraw his or her consent at any
time. The licensee, applicant, or C/V to whom the individual has applied
for unescorted access authorization shall inform the individual that--
(A) Withdrawal of his or her consent will withdraw the individual's
current application for access authorization under the licensee's,
applicant's, or C/V's authorization program; and
(B) Other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs will have access to
information documenting the withdrawal through the information-sharing
mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this section.
(ii) If an individual withdraws his or her consent, the licensees,
applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section may not
initiate any elements of the background investigation that were not in
progress at the time the individual withdrew his or her consent, but
shall complete any background investigation elements that are in
progress at the time consent is withdrawn. In the information-sharing
mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this section, the
licensee, applicant, or C/V shall record the individual's application
for unescorted access authorization; his or her withdrawal of consent
for the background investigation; the reason given by the individual
for the withdrawal, if any; and any pertinent information collected
from the

[[Page 62861]]

background investigation elements that were completed.
(iii) The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph
(a) of this section shall inform, in writing, any individual who is
applying for unescorted access authorization that the following actions
related to providing and sharing the personal information under this
section are sufficient cause for denial or unfavorable termination of
unescorted access authorization:
(A) Refusal to provide written consent for the background investigation;
(B) Refusal to provide or the falsification of any personal history
information required under this section, including the failure to
report any previous denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted
access authorization;
(C) Refusal to provide written consent for the sharing of personal
information with other licensees, applicants, or C/Vs required under
paragraph (d)(4)(v) of this section; and
(D) Failure to report any arrests or formal actions specified in
paragraph (g) of this section.
(2) Personal history disclosure. (i) Any individual who is applying
for unescorted access authorization shall disclose the personal history
information that is required by the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
authorization program and any information that may be necessary for the
reviewing official to make a determination of the individual's
trustworthiness and reliability.
(ii) Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs may not require an individual
to disclose an administrative withdrawal of unescorted access
authorization under the requirements of paragraphs (g), (h)(7), or
(i)(1)(v) of this section, if the individual's unescorted access
authorization was not subsequently denied or terminated unfavorably by
a licensee, applicant, or C/V.
(3) Verification of true identity. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
shall verify the true identity of an individual who is applying for
unescorted access authorization in order to ensure that the applicant
is the person that he or she has claimed to be. At a minimum,
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall validate the social security
number that the individual has provided, and, in the case of foreign
nationals, the alien registration number that the individual provides.
In addition, licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall also determine
whether the results of the fingerprinting required under Sec. 73.21
confirm the individual's claimed identity, if such results are available.
(4) Employment history evaluation. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
shall ensure that an employment history evaluation has been completed,
by questioning the individual's present and former employers, and by
determining the activities of individuals while unemployed.
(i) For the claimed employment period, the employment history
evaluation must ascertain the reason for termination, eligibility for
rehire, and other information that could reflect on the individual's
trustworthiness and reliability.
(ii) If the claimed employment was military service, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V who is conducting the employment history evaluation
shall request a characterization of service, reason for separation, and
any disciplinary actions that could affect a trustworthiness and
reliability determination.
(iii) Periods of self-employment or unemployment may be verified by
any reasonable method. If education is claimed in lieu of employment,
the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall request information that could
reflect on the individual's trustworthiness and reliability and, at a
minimum, verify that the individual was actively participating in the
educational process during the claimed period.
(iv) If a company, previous employer, or educational institution to
whom the licensee, applicant, or C/V has directed a request for
information refuses to provide information or indicates an inability or
unwillingness to provide information within 3 business days of the
request, the licensee, applicant, or C/V shall document this refusal,
inability, or unwillingness in the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
record of the investigation, and obtain a confirmation of employment or
educational enrollment and attendance from at least one alternate
source, with questions answered to the best of the alternate source's
ability. This alternate source may not have been previously used by the
licensee, applicant, or C/V to obtain information about the
individual's character and reputation. If the licensee, applicant, or
C/V uses an alternate source because employment information is not
forthcoming within 3 business days of the request, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V need not delay granting unescorted access
authorization to wait for any employer response, but shall evaluate and
document the response if it is received.
(v) When any licensee, applicant, or C/V specified in paragraph (a)
of this section is legitimately seeking the information required for an
unescorted access authorization decision under this section and has
obtained a signed release from the subject individual authorizing the
disclosure of such information, a licensee, applicant, or C/V who is
subject to this section shall disclose whether the subject individual's
unescorted access authorization was denied or terminated unfavorably.
The licensee, applicant, or C/V who receives the request for
information shall make available the information upon which the denial
or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization was based.
(vi) In conducting an employment history evaluation, the licensee,
applicant, or C/V may obtain information and documents by electronic
means, including, but not limited to, telephone, facsimile, or e-mail.
The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall make a record of the contents of
the telephone call and shall retain that record, and any documents or
files obtained electronically, in accordance with paragraph (o) of this
section.
(5) Credit history evaluation. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that the full
credit history of any individual who is applying for unescorted access
authorization has been evaluated. A full credit history evaluation must
include, but would not be limited to, an inquiry to detect potential
fraud or misuse of social security numbers or other financial
identifiers, and a review and evaluation of all of the information that
is provided by a national credit-reporting agency about the
individual's credit history.
(6) Character and reputation. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ascertain the
character and reputation of an individual who has applied for
unescorted access authorization by conducting reference checks.
Reference checks may not be conducted with any person who is known to
be a close member of the individual's family, including but not limited
to, the individual's spouse, parents, siblings, or children, or any
individual who resides in the individual's permanent household. The
reference checks must focus on the individual's reputation for
trustworthiness and reliability.
(7) Criminal history review. The licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's
reviewing official shall evaluate the entire criminal history record of
an individual who is applying for unescorted access authorization to
assist in determining whether the individual has a record of criminal
activity that may adversely impact his or her

[[Page 62862]]

trustworthiness and reliability. The criminal history record must be
obtained in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.57.
(e) Psychological assessment. In order to assist in determining an
individual's trustworthiness and reliability, the licensees,
applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall
ensure that a psychological assessment has been completed of the
individual who is applying for unescorted access authorization. The
psychological assessment must be designed to evaluate the possible
adverse impact of any noted psychological characteristics on the
individual's trustworthiness and reliability.
(1) A licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist shall conduct
the psychological assessment.
(2) The psychological assessment must be conducted in accordance
with the applicable ethical principles for conducting such assessments
established by the American Psychological Association or American
Psychiatric Association.
(3) At a minimum, the psychological assessment must include the
administration and interpretation of a standardized, objective,
professionally accepted psychological test that provides information to
identify indications of disturbances in personality or psychopathology
that may have implications for an individual's trustworthiness and
reliability. Predetermined thresholds must be applied in interpreting
the results of the psychological test, to determine whether an
individual shall be interviewed by a psychiatrist or licensed clinical
psychologist under paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section.
(4) The psychological assessment must include a clinical interview--
(i) If an individual's scores on the psychological test in
paragraph (e)(3) of this section identify indications of disturbances
in personality or psychopathology that may have implications for an
individual's trustworthiness and reliability; or
(ii) If the licensee's or applicant's Physical Security Plan
requires a clinical interview based on job assignments.
(5) If, in the course of conducting the psychological assessment,
the licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist identifies
indications of, or information related to, a medical condition that
could adversely impact the individual's fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and reliability, the psychologist or psychiatrist shall
inform the reviewing official, who shall ensure that an appropriate
evaluation of the possible medical condition is conducted under the
requirements of part 26 of this chapter.
(f) Behavioral observation. Access authorization programs must
include a behavioral observation element that is designed to detect
behaviors or activities that may constitute an unreasonable risk to the
health and safety of the public and common defense and security,
including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage.
(1) The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a)
of this section shall ensure that the individuals specified in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this
section are subject to behavioral observation.
(2) The individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) and, if
applicable, (b)(2) of this section shall observe the behavior of other
individuals. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph
(a) of this section shall ensure that individuals who are subject to
this section also successfully complete behavioral observation training.
(i) Behavioral observation training must be completed before the
licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an initial unescorted access
authorization, as defined in paragraph (h)(5) of this section, and must
be current before the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an unescorted
access authorization update, as defined in paragraph (h)(6) of this
section, or an unescorted access authorization reinstatement, as
defined in paragraph (h)(7) of this section;
(ii) Individuals shall complete refresher training on a nominal 12-
month frequency, or more frequently where the need is indicated.
Individuals may take and pass a comprehensive examination that meets
the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of this section in lieu of
completing annual refresher training;
(iii) Individuals shall demonstrate the successful completion of
behavioral observation training by passing a comprehensive examination
that addresses the knowledge and abilities necessary to detect behavior
or activities that have the potential to constitute an unreasonable
risk to the health and safety of the public and common defense and
security, including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage.
Remedial training and re-testing are required for individuals who fail
to satisfactorily complete the examination.
(iv) Initial and refresher training may be delivered using a
variety of media (including, but not limited to, classroom lectures,
required reading, video, or computer-based training systems). The
licensee, applicant, or C/V shall monitor the completion of training.
(3) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program under
this section shall report to the reviewing official any concerns
arising from behavioral observation, including, but not limited to,
concerns related to any questionable behavior patterns or activities of
others.
(g) Arrest reporting. Any individual who has applied for or is
maintaining unescorted access authorization under this section shall
promptly report to the reviewing official any formal action(s) taken by
a law enforcement authority or court of law to which the individual has
been subject, including an arrest, an indictment, the filing of
charges, or a conviction. On the day that the report is received, the
reviewing official shall evaluate the circumstances related to the
formal action(s) and determine whether to grant, maintain,
administratively withdraw, deny, or unfavorably terminate the
individual's unescorted access authorization.
(h) Granting unescorted access authorization. The licensees,
applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall
implement the requirements of this paragraph for granting initial
unescorted access authorization, updated unescorted access
authorization, and reinstatement of unescorted access authorization.
(1) Accepting unescorted access authorization from other
authorization programs. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are seeking
to grant unescorted access authorization to an individual who is
subject to another authorization program that complies with this
section may rely on the program elements completed by the transferring
authorization program to satisfy the requirements of this section. An
individual may maintain his or her unescorted access authorization if
he or she continues to be subject to either the receiving licensee's,
applicant's, or C/V's authorization program or the transferring
licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's authorization program, or a
combination of elements from both programs that collectively satisfy
the requirements of this section. The receiving authorization program
shall ensure that the program elements maintained by the transferring
program remain current.
(2) Information sharing. To meet the requirements of this section,
licensees, applicants, and C/Vs may rely upon the information that
other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are subject to

[[Continued on page 62863]]

Notices For
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994

Power Reactor Security Requirements [[pp. 62813-62862]]

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