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Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front-End Strength of Cab Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives
Note: EPA no longer updates this information, but it may be useful as a reference or resource.
[Federal Register: August 1, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 147)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 42016-42041]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr01au07-37]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Part 238
[Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AB80
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front-End Strength of Cab
Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to further the safety of passenger train
occupants by amending existing regulations to enhance structural
strength requirements for the front end of cab cars and multiple-unit
locomotives. These enhancements would include the addition of
deformation and energy absorption requirements specified in revised
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) standards for front-
end collision posts and corner posts for this equipment. FRA is also
proposing to make miscellaneous clarifying amendments to current
regulations for the structural strength of passenger equipment.
DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by October 1, 2007.
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent
possible without incurring additional expense or delay.
(2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a
public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a
public, oral hearing prior to August 31, 2007, one will be scheduled,
and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to
inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such
hearing.
ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2006-25268,
Notice No. 1, may be submitted by any of the following methods:
• Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
• Fax: 202-493-2251.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
[[Page 42017]]
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without
change to http://dms.dot.gov including any personal information. Please
see the Privacy Act heading in the Supplementary Information section of
this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted
comments or materials.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to the
Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except
Federal Holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary G. Fairbanks, Specialist, Motive
Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, Mail Stop 25,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6282); Eloy E. Martinez, Program Manager,
Equipment and Operating Practices Division, Office of Railroad
Development, RDV-32, Federal Railroad Administration, 55 Broadway,
Cambridge, MA 02142 (telephone 617-494-2243); or Daniel L. Alpert,
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad
Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202-493-6026).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents for Supplementary Information
I. Statutory Background
II. Proceedings to Date
A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate
B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking
C. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group
E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force
F. Development of the NPRM
III. Technical Background
A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service
B. Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
C. Accident History
D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front-End Frame Structures of
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
E. Testing of Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
1. Designs Evaluated by FRA
2. FRA Dynamic Impact Testing
3. Industry Quasi-Static Testing
4. Comparative Analyses
F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements
G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front-End Frame
Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Regulatory Impact and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
D. Federalism Implications
E. Environmental Impact
F. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995
G. Energy Impact
H. Trade Impact
I. Privacy Act
I. Statutory Background
In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation convened a
meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with
the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the initiatives arising
from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would
begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a
five-year period. In November of 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of
1994 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624
(November 2, 1994). Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations, as well as
issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 215 of the Act is codified at
49 U.S.C. 20133.
II. Proceedings to Date
A. Proceedings to Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate
The Secretary of Transportation delegated these rulemaking
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator, see 49 CFR
1.49(m), and FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Working Group to provide FRA advice in developing the regulations. On
June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety standards
for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM provided
background information on the need for such standards, offered
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented
questions on various passenger safety topics. Following consideration
of comments received on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger
Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on
September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive safety standards for
railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to
requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment
at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the
comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule establishing
comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, which was
published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540.
After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the
following subject areas: structural design; fire safety; training;
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective
equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and
published in the Federal Register three sets of amendments to the final
rule. Each set of amendments summarized the petition requests at issue,
explained what action, if any, FRA decided to take in response to the
issues raised, and described FRA's justifications for its decisions and
any action taken. Specifically, on July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response
to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection,
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of
defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions
related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR
41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised
in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those
relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002,
FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by
publishing a response to the petitions for reconsideration concerning
the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more
detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's
response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The
[[Page 42018]]
product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238
(part 238) and also at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.
Meanwhile, another rulemaking on passenger train emergency
preparedness produced a final rule codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63
FR 24629; May 4, 1998. The rule addresses passenger train emergencies
of various kinds, including security situations, and requires the
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains.
The rule requires railroads that operate intercity or commuter
passenger train service or that host the operation of such service to
adopt and comply with written emergency preparedness plans. The
emergency preparedness plans must address subjects such as
communication, employee training and qualification, joint operations,
tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board emergency
equipment, and passenger safety information. The rule requires each
affected railroad to instruct its employees on the applicable
provisions of its plan, and the plan adopted by each railroad is
subject to formal review and approval by FRA. The rule also requires
each railroad operating passenger train service to conduct emergency
simulations to determine its capability to execute the emergency
preparedness plan under the variety of emergency scenarios that could
reasonably be expected to occur. In addition, the rule contains
requirements for the identification and usage of emergency window
exits, rescue access windows, and door exits.
B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking
Although FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be
addressed following the completion of additional research, the
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of
industry standards, or all three. One such issue concerned enhancing
the requirements for corner posts on cab cars and MU locomotives. See
64 FR 25607; May 12, 1999. Current FRA requirements for corner posts
are based on conventional industry practice at the time, which had not
proven adequate in then-recent side swipe collisions with cab cars
leading. Id. FRA explained that the current requirements were being
adopted as an interim measure to prevent the introduction of equipment
not meeting the requirements, that FRA was assisting APTA in preparing
an industry standard for corner post arrangements on cab cars and MU
locomotives, and that adoption of a suitable Federal standard would be
an immediate priority. Id. In broader terms, this issue concerned the
behavior of cab car and MU locomotive end frames when overloaded, as
during an impact with maintenance-of-way equipment or with a highway
vehicle at a highway-rail grade crossing, and thus concerned collision
post strength as well. FRA and interested industry members also began
identifying other issues related to the passenger equipment safety
standards and the passenger train emergency preparedness regulations.
FRA decided to address these issues with the assistance of FRA's
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee.
C. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
In March 1996 FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for
developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes
representation from all of the agency's major customer groups,
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers,
and other interested parties. A list of current member groups follows:
• American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO);
• American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO);
• American Chemistry Council;
• American Petroleum Institute;
• APTA;
• American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA);
• American Train Dispatchers Association;
• Association of American Railroads (AAR);
• Association of Railway Museums;
• Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
• Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
• Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division;
• Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
• Chlorine Institute;
• Federal Transit Administration (FTA)*;
• Fertilizer Institute;
• High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
• Institute of Makers of Explosives;
• International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
• International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
• Labor Council for Latin American Advancement*;
• League of Railway Industry Women*;
• National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
• National Association of Railway Business Women*;
• National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
• National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association;
• National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
• National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*;
• Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
• Safe Travel America (STA);
• Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte*;
• Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
• Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
• Transport Canada*;
• Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
• Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC);
• Transportation Security Administration*; and
• United Transportation Union (UTU).
*Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a
given task. The task force then provides that information to the
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to
the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple
majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff
play an active role at the working group level in discussing the issues
and options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA
is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation. However,
FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency
exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended rule
achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly
[[Page 42019]]
supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal requirements.
Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in
developing the actual regulatory proposal or final rule. Any such
variations would be noted and explained in the rulemaking document
issued by FRA. If the working group or RSAC is unable to reach
consensus on recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the
issue through traditional rulemaking proceedings.
D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group
On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established
the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task
and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
• AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company, CSX
Transportation, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
• AAPRCO;
• AASHTO;
• Amtrak;
• APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., LDK
Engineering, Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Long Island Rail Road
(LIRR), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
• BLET;
• BRS;
• FTA;
• HSGTA;
• IBEW;
• NARP;
• RSI;
• SMWIA;
• STA;
• TCIU/BRC;
• TWU; and
• UTU.
Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to
the technical discussions. In addition, staff from the NTSB met with
the Working Group when possible. The Working Group has held nine
meetings on the following dates and locations:
• September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
• November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
• May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
• October 26-27, 2004, in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
• March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
• September 7, 2005, in Chicago, IL;
• March 21-22, 2006, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
• September 12-13, 2006, in Orlando, FL; and
• April 17-18, 2007, in Orlando, FL.
At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with
representatives of Tri-County Commuter Rail and Metra, respectively,
and toured their passenger equipment. The visits were open to all
members of the Working Group, and FRA believes they have added to the
collective understanding of the Group in identifying and addressing
passenger equipment safety issues.
E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force
Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting
the Working Group established four task forces--smaller groups to
develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's
particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces include
various representatives from the respective organizations that were
part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was assigned
the job of identifying and developing issues and recommendations
specifically related to the inspection, testing, and operation of
passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the attachment of
safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on these topics was
published on December 8, 2005, see 70 FR 73069, and a final rule was
published on October 19, 2006, see 71 FR 61835. Another of these task
forces was established to identify issues and develop recommendations
related to emergency systems, procedures, and equipment, and helped to
develop an NPRM on these topics that was published on August 24, 2006,
see 71 FR 50276. Another task force, the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task
Force (Task Force), was assigned the job of developing recommendations
related to glazing integrity, structural crashworthiness, and the
protection of occupants during accidents and incidents. Specifically,
this Task Force was charged with developing recommendations for glazing
qualification testing and for cab car/MU locomotive end frame
optimization. Although being developed by the same Task Force, the
glazing and cab car/MU locomotive end frame recommendations are being
handled separately, and glazing is not a subject of this NPRM. The Task
Force was also given the responsibility of addressing a number of other
issues related to glazing, structural crashworthiness, and occupant
protection and recommending any research necessary to facilitate their
resolution. Members of the Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the
following:
• AAR;
• Amtrak;
• APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., General
Electric Transportation Systems, General Motors--Electro-Motive
Division, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LDK Engineering, LIRR, LTK
Engineering Services, Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts
Bay Commuter Rail Corporation (MBCR), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern
Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD), Rotem Company, Saint
Gobian Sully NA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad (Coaster), SEPTA,
and STV, Inc.;
• BLET;
• California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
• NARP;
• RSI; and
• UTU.
While not voting members of the Task Force, representatives from
the NTSB attended certain of the meetings and contributed to the
discussions of the Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center
attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical
discussions.
The Task Force held six meetings on the following dates and locations:
• March 17-18, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
• May 13, 2004, in Schaumberg, IL;
• November 9, 2004, in Boston, MA;
• February 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
• April 21-22, 2005, in Cambridge, MA; and
• August 11, 2005, in Cambridge, MA.
F. Development of the NPRM
This NPRM was developed to address concerns raised and issues
discussed about cab car and MU locomotive front-end frame structures
during the Task Force meetings and pertinent Working Group meetings.
Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the docket in
this proceeding and are available for public inspection. With the
exception discussed below, the Working
[[Page 42020]]
Group reached consensus on the principal regulatory provisions
contained in this NPRM at its meeting in September 2005. After the
September 2005 meeting, the Working Group presented its recommendations
to the full RSAC for concurrence at its meeting in October 2005. All of
the members of the full RSAC in attendance at its October 2005 meeting
accepted the regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group.
Thus, the Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC's
recommendations to FRA in this matter. After reviewing the full RSAC's
recommendations, FRA agreed that the recommendations provided a good
basis for a proposed rule, but that test standards and performance
criteria more suitable to cab cars and MU locomotives without a flat
forward end or with energy absorbing structures used as part of a crash
energy management design (CEM), or both, should be specified. As
discussed below, the NPRM provides an option for the dynamic testing of
cab cars and MU locomotives as a means of demonstrating compliance with
the rule. However, FRA makes clear that this proposal was not the
result of an RSAC recommendation. Otherwise, FRA has adopted the RSAC's
recommendations with generally minor changes for purposes of clarity
and formatting in the Federal Register.
Overall, this NPRM is the product of FRA's review, consideration,
and acceptance of the recommendations of the Task Force, Working Group,
and full RSAC. In the preamble discussion of this proposal, FRA refers
to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by members of
the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC, as they are identified or
contained in the minutes of their meetings. FRA does so to show the
origin of certain issues and the nature of discussions concerning those
issues at the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA
believes this serves to illuminate factors it has weighed in making its
regulatory decisions, as well as the logic behind those decisions. The
reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the full RSAC makes
recommendations to FRA. However, as noted above, FRA is in no way bound
to follow the recommendations, and the agency exercises its independent
judgment on whether the recommendations achieve the agency's regulatory
goal(s), are soundly supported, and are in accordance with policy and
legal requirements.
III. Technical Background
Transporting passengers by rail is very safe. Since 1978, more than
11.2 billion passengers have traveled by rail, based on reports filed
monthly with FRA. The number of rail passengers has steadily increased
over the years, and since the year 2000 has averaged more than 500
million per year. On a passenger-mile basis, with an average of about
15.5 billion passenger-miles per year, rail travel is about as safe as
scheduled airline service and intercity bus transportation, and it is
far safer than private motor vehicle travel. Passenger rail accidents--
while always to be avoided--have a very high passenger survival rate.
Yet, as in any form of transportation, there are risks inherent in
passenger rail travel. Although no passengers died in train collision
or derailments in 2006, 12 passengers did in 2005. For this reason, FRA
continually works to improve the safety of passenger rail operations.
FRA's efforts include sponsoring the research and development of safety
technology, providing technical support for industry specifications and
standards, and engaging in cooperative rulemaking efforts with key
industry stakeholders. FRA has focused in particular on enhancing the
crashworthiness of passenger trains.
In a passenger train collision or derailment, the principal
crashworthiness risks that occupants face are the loss of safe space
inside the train from crushing of the train structure and, as the train
decelerates, the risk of secondary impacts with interior surfaces.
Therefore, the principal goals of the crashworthiness research
sponsored by FRA are twofold: First, to preserve a safe space in which
occupants can ride out the collision or derailment, and, then, to
minimize the physical forces to which occupants are subjected when
impacting surfaces inside a passenger car as the train decelerates.
Though not a part of this NPRM, other crashworthiness research focuses
on related issues such as fuel tank safety, for equipment with a fuel
tank, and the associated risk of fire if the fuel tank is breached
during the collision or derailment.
The results of ongoing research on cab car and MU locomotive front-
end frame structures help demonstrate both the effectiveness and the
practicality of the structural enhancements proposed in this NPRM to
make this equipment more crashworthy. This research is discussed below,
along with other technical information providing the background for
FRA's proposal.
A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service
FRA's focus on cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness should be
considered in the context of the predominant types of passenger rail
service in North America. The first involves operation of passenger
trains with conventional locomotives in the lead, typically pulling
consists of passenger coaches and other cars such as baggage cars,
dining cars, and sleeping cars. Such trains are common on long-
distance, intercity rail routes operated by Amtrak. On a daily basis,
however, most passenger rail service is provided by commuter railroads,
which typically operate one or both of the two most predominant types
of service: Push-pull service and MU locomotive service.
Push-pull service is passenger train service typically operated in
one direction of travel with a conventional locomotive in the rear of
the train pushing the consist (the ``push mode'') and with a cab car in
the lead position of the train; and, in the opposite direction of
travel, the service is operated with the conventional locomotive in the
lead position of the train pulling the consist (the ``pull mode'') and
with the cab car in the rear of the train. (A cab car is both a
passenger car, in that it has seats for passengers, and a locomotive,
in that it has a control cab from which the engineer can operate the
train.) Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical
lines providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes.
MU locomotive service is passenger rail service involving trains
consisting of self-propelled electric or diesel MU locomotives. MU
locomotives typically operate semi-permanently coupled together as a
pair or triplet with a control cab at each end of the consist. During
peak commuting hours, multiple pairs or triplets of MU locomotives, or
a combination of both, are typically operated together as a single
passenger train in MU service. This type of service does not make use
of a conventional locomotive as a primary means of motive power. MU
locomotive service is very similar to push-pull service as operated in
the push mode with the cab car in the lead.
By focusing on enhancements to cab car and MU locomotive
crashworthiness, FRA seeks to enhance the safety of the two most
typical forms of passenger rail service in the U.S.
[[Page 42021]]
B. Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU locomotives
Structurally, MU locomotives and cab cars built in the same period
are very similar, and both are designed to transport and be occupied by
passengers. The principal distinction is that cab cars do not have
motors to propel themselves. Unlike MU locomotives and cab cars,
conventional locomotives are not designed to be occupied by
passengers--only by operating crewmembers. Concern has been raised
about the safety of cab car-led and MU locomotive train service due to
the closer proximity of the engineer and passengers to the leading end
of the train than in conventional locomotive-led service.
The principal purpose of cab car and MU locomotive end frame
structures is to provide protection for the engineer and passengers in
the event of a collision where the superstructure of the vehicle is
directly engaged and the underframe is either not engaged or only
indirectly engaged in the collision. In the event of impacts with
objects above the underframe of a cab car or MU locomotive, the end
frame members are the primary source of protection for the engineer and
the passengers. There are various types of cab cars and MU locomotives
in current use. As discussed below, a flat-nosed, single-level cab car
has been used for purposes of FRA-sponsored crashworthiness research.
(The cab car was originally constructed as an MU locomotive but had its
traction motors removed for testing.) Flat-nosed designs are representative
of a large proportion of the cab car and MU locomotive fleet.
In a typical flat-nosed cab car, the end frame is composed of
several structural elements that act together to resist inward
deformations under load. The base of the end frame structure is
composed of the end/buffer beam, which is directly connected to the
draft sill of the vehicle. For cars that include stepwells, the side
sills of the underframe generally do not directly connect to the end/
buffer beam. There are four major vertical members connected to the
end/buffer beam: two collision posts located approximately at the one-
third points along the length of the beam, and two corner posts located
at the outermost points of the beam. These structural elements are also
connected together through two additional lateral members: a lateral
member/shelf located just below the window frame structure, and an
anti-telescoping plate at the top. The attachment of the end frame
structure to the rest of the vehicle typically occurs at three
locations. The first location is at the draft sill at the level of the
underframe. This is the main connection where a majority of any
longitudinal load applied to the end frame is reacted into the
underframe of the vehicle. There are two other connections at the cant/
roof rail located at either side of the car just below the level of the
roof. When a longitudinal load is applied to the end frame, it is
reacted by the draft sill and the cant rails into the main carbody
structure. A schematic of a typical arrangement is depicted in Figure 1.
[[Page 42022]]
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.000
C. Accident History
In a collision involving the front end of a cab car or an MU
locomotive, it is vitally important that the end frame behaves in a
ductile manner, absorbing some of the collision energy in order to
maintain sufficient space in which the engineer and passengers can ride
out the event. An example of a collision where the end frame did not
effectively absorb collision energy occurred in Portage, IN, in 1998
when a NICTD train consisting of MU locomotives struck a tractor-tandem
trailer carrying steel coils that had become immobilized on a grade
crossing.\1\ The leading MU locomotive impacted a steel coil at a point
centered on one of its collision posts, the collision post failed, and
the steel coil penetrated into the interior of the locomotive,
resulting in three fatalities. Little of the collision energy was
absorbed by the collision post, because the post had failed before it
could deform in any significant way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision of
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Train 102 with a
Tractor-Trailer Portage, Indiana, June 18, 1998,'' RAR-99-03, 07/26/1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are additional examples of incidents where the end frame of a
cab car or an MU locomotive was engaged during a collision and a loss
of survivable volume ensued due to the failure of end frame structures.
As detailed in the NTSB accident reports referenced below, one such
incident was the 1996 Secaucus, NJ collision between a cab car-led
consist with a conventional locomotive-led consist,\2\ in which the
right corner post of the cab car and its supporting end frame structure
had separated from the car.
[[Page 42023]]
Another such incident was the 1996 Silver Spring, MD collision between
a cab car-led consist with a locomotive-led consist, in which the cab
car's left corner post and its supporting end frame structure had
separated from the car.\3\ Although the speeds associated with certain
past events are greater than what can be fully protected against, and
even though enhancements to passenger train emergency features and
other requirements unrelated to crashworthiness, such as fire safety,
may overall do as much or more to prevent or mitigate the consequences
of these types of events, they do provide indicative loading conditions
for developing structural enhancements that can improve crashworthiness
performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Railroad Accident
Report: Near Head-On Collision and Derailment of Two New Jersey
Transit Commuter Trains Near Secaucus, New Jersey, February 9,
1996,'' RAR-97-01, 03/25/1997.
\3\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision and
Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC Train 286 and National
Railroad Passenger Corporation AMTRAK Train 29 Near Silver Spring,
Maryland, February 16, 1996,'' RAR-97-02, 06/17/1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA also notes that on January 26, 2005 in Glendale, CA, a
collision involving an unoccupied sport utility vehicle (SUV) that was
parked on the track, two Metrolink commuter trains, and a standing
freight train resulted in 11 deaths and numerous injuries. Eight of the
fatalities occurred on a cab car-led passenger train which derailed
after striking the SUV, causing the cab car to be guided down a
railroad siding, which resulted in an impact at an approximate speed of
49 mph with the standing freight train. After the collision with the
standing freight train, the rear end of the lead cab car buckled
laterally, obstructing the right-of-way of an oncoming, conventional
locomotive-led passenger train. The rear end of the cab car raked the
side of the conventional locomotive-led train, which was moving at an
approximate speed of 51 mph, crushing occupied areas of that train.
This incident involved enormous quantities of kinetic energy, and the
underframe of the leading cab car crushed more than 20 feet inward.
Because the strength of the end frame is ultimately dependent on the
strength of the underframe, which failed, stronger collision posts and
corner posts on the front end of the leading cab car would have been,
in themselves, of little benefit in absorbing the collision energy. For
this reason, as discussed below, FRA has been exploring other
crashworthiness strategies, such as CEM, to help mitigate the effects
of collisions involving higher impact speeds. Nevertheless, CEM will
also require proper end frame performance in order to function as intended.
D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front-End Frame Structures of Cab
Cars and MU Locomotives
Both the Federal government and the passenger railroad industry
have been working together to improve the crashworthiness of cab cars
and MU locomotives. As noted above, in 1999, after several years of
development and in consultation with a working group comprised of key
industry stakeholders, FRA promulgated the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards final rule. The rule included end frame structure
requirements and other crashworthiness-related requirements for cab
cars, MU locomotives, and other passenger equipment. In particular, the
final rule provided for strengthened collision posts for new cab cars
and MU locomotives (i.e., those ordered on or after September 8, 2000,
or placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002).
APTA also issued industry standards in 1999, in furtherance of its
initiative to continue the development and maintenance of voluntary
industry standards for the safety of railroad passenger equipment. In
particular, APTA Standards SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 included
provisions on end frame designs for cab cars and MU locomotives.\4\
Specifically, APTA's standards included increased industry requirements
for the strength of cab car and MU locomotive vertical end frame
members--collision posts and corner posts. The 1999 APTA standards also
included industry requirements for the deformation of these end frame
vertical members, specifying that they must be able to sustain ``severe
deformation'' before failure of the connections to the underframe and
roof structures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ American Public Transportation Association, Member Services
Department, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices for
Passenger Rail Equipment, Issue of July 1, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2000, APTA requested that FRA develop information on the
effectiveness of APTA's then-recently introduced Manual of Standards
and Recommended Practices for passenger rail equipment, which included
APTA SS-C&S-013-99 and APTA SS-C&S-014-99, and FRA's then-recently
issued Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule. This review was
intended to look in particular at what increase in crashworthiness was
obtained for cab cars and MU locomotives through the combination of
these standards and regulations. FRA shared APTA's interest and
included full-scale impact tests and associated planning and analysis
activities in its overall research plan to gather this information. FRA
then developed the details of the testing process in conjunction with
APTA's Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Construction-
Structural (C&S) Subcommittee.
Around this same time, questions arose in the passenger rail
industry in applying the APTA standards for collision posts and corner
posts to new cab cars and MU locomotives. Views differed as to what the
standards actually specified-namely, the meaning of ``severe
deformation'' in the provisions calling for corner and collision posts
to sustain ``severe deformation'' before failure of the posts'
attachments. Consequently, there was not common agreement as to whether
particular designs met the standards. On May 22, 2003, APTA's PRESS
Committee accepted the recommendation of its C&S Subcommittee to
replace these provisions in the standards with a recommended practice
that the corner and collision post attachments be able to sustain
minimum prescribed loads with negligible deformation.\5\ Both APTA
Standards SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 were then otherwise
incorporated in their entirety into APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Standard for
the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock. (APTA
combined these and other structural standards for the design of rail
passenger equipment into a single document, for ease of reference for
railroads and car builders.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ American Public Transportation Association, Member Service
Department, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices for
Passenger Rail Equipment, Issue of May 1, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, when the decision to turn these provisions into a
recommended practice was made, ongoing research from full-scale impact
tests was showing that a substantial increase in cab car and MU
locomotive crashworthiness could be achieved by designing the posts to
first deform and, thereby, absorb collision energy before failing.\6\
As discussed below, in August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S Subcommittee
accepted a revised ``severe deformation'' standard for collision and
corner posts. The standard includes requirements for minimum energy
absorption and maximum deflection. The standard thereby eliminates a
deficiency in the 1999 APTA standards by specifying test criteria to
objectively measure ``severe
[[Page 42024]]
deformation.'' This NPRM proposes to codify this standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Mayville, R., Johnson, K., Tyrell, D., Stringfellow, R.,
``Rail Vehicle Cab Car Collision and Corner Post Designs According
to APTA S-034 Requirements,'' American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Paper No. MECE2003-44114, November 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Testing of Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU locomotives
This section summarizes the work done by FRA and the passenger rail
industry on developing the technical information to make
recommendations for regulations requiring that corner and collision
posts in cab car and MU locomotive front-end frames fail in a
controlled manner when overloaded. Due to the collaborative work of FRA
with the passenger rail industry, APTA's current passenger rail
equipment standards include deformation requirements, which prescribe
how these vertical members should perform when overloaded.
1. Designs Evaluated by FRA
Two end frame designs were developed for purposes of evaluating
incremental improvements in the crashworthiness performance, in
highway-rail grade crossing collision scenarios, of modern corner and
collision post designs when compared against the performance of older
designs. The first end frame design was representative of typical
designs of passenger rail vehicles in the 1990s prior to 1999. (The
first end frame design is referred to as the ``1990s design.'') The
second end frame design incorporated all the enhancements required
beginning in 1999 by FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule in
part 238 and also recommended beginning in 1999 by APTA's standards for
corner post and collision post structures, respectively, SS-C&S-013 and
SS-C&S-014. (The second end frame design is referred to as the State-
of-the-Art (SOA) design.) The two end frame designs developed were then
retrofitted onto two Budd Pioneer passenger rail cars for testing.
The SOA design differed principally from the 1990s design by having
higher values for static loading of the end structure and by
specifically addressing the performance of the collision and corner
posts when overloaded. As noted above, the 1999 APTA standards for cab
car and MU locomotive end structures included the following statement
for both corner and collision posts:
[The]
post and its supporting structure shall be designed so
that when it is overloaded * * * failure shall begin as bending or
buckling in the post. The connections of the post to the supporting
structure, and the supporting car body structure, shall support the
post up to its ultimate capacity. The ultimate shear and tensile
strength of the connecting fasteners or welds shall be sufficient to
resist the forces causing the deformation, so that shear and tensile
failure of the fasteners or welds shall not occur, even with severe
deformation of the post and its connecting and supporting structural
elements.
(See paragraph 4.1 of APTA SS-C&S-013-99, and paragraph 3.1 of APTA
SS-C&S-014-99.) Although the term ``severe deformation'' was not
specifically defined in the APTA standards, discussions with APTA
technical staff led to specifying ``severe deformation'' in the SOA
design as a horizontal crush of the corner and collisions posts for a
distance equal to the posts' depth. Some failure of the parent material
in the posts was allowable, but no failure would be allowed in the
welded connections, as the integrity of the welded connections prevents
complete separation of the posts from their connections.
An additional difference in the designs was the exclusion of the
stepwells for the SOA design, to allow for extended side sills from the
body bolster to the end/buffer beam. By bringing the side sills forward
to support the end/buffer beam directly at the corners, the end/buffer
beam can be developed to a size similar to the one for the 1990s
design. In fact, recent cab car procurements have provided for
elimination of the stepwells at the ends of the cars.
As compared to the 1990s design, the SOA design had the following
enhancements: More substantial corner posts; a bulkhead sheet
connecting the collision and corner posts, extending from the floor to
the transverse member connecting the posts; and a longer side sill that
extended along the engineer's compartment to the end beam, removing the
presence of a stepwell. In addition to changes in the cross-sectional
sizes and thickness of some structural members, another change in the
SOA design was associated with the connection details for the corner
posts. In comparison to the corner posts, the collision posts of both
the 1990s and SOA designs penetrated both the top and bottom flanges of
both the end/buffer beam and the anti-telescoping plate. This was based
upon typical practice in the early 1990s for the 1990s design, and a
provision in the APTA standard for the SOA design. Yet, the corner
posts differed in that the corner posts for the 1990s design did not
penetrate both top and bottom flanges of the end/buffer and anti-
telescoping beams, while those in the SOA design did. The SOA design
therefore had a significantly stiffer connection that was better able
to resist torsional loads transferred to the anti-telescoping plate.
2. FRA Dynamic Impact Testing
Two full-scale, grade crossing impact tests were conducted as part
of an ongoing series of crashworthiness tests of passenger rail
equipment. The grade crossing tests were designed to address the
concern of occupant vulnerability to bulk crushing resulting from
offset/oblique collisions where the primary load-resisting-structure is
the equipment's end frame design. Both tests were conducted in June
2002, and in each test a single cab car impacted a 40,000-lb steel coil
resting on a frangible table at a nominal speed of 14 mph. The steel
coil was situated such that it impacted the corner post above the cab
car's end sill. The principal difference between the two tests involved
the end frame design tested: in one test, the cab car was fitted with
the 1990s end frame design; in the other, the cab car was fitted with
the SOA end frame design.
Prior to the tests, the crush behaviors of the cars and their
dynamic responses were simulated with car crush and collision dynamics
models. The car crush model was used to determine the force/crush
characteristics of the corner posts, as well as their modes of
deformation.\7\ The collision dynamics model was used to predict the
extent of crush of the corner posts as a function of impact velocity,
as well as the three-dimensional accelerations, velocities, and
displacements of the cars and coil.\8\ Pre-test analyses of the models
were used in determining the initial test conditions and
instrumentation test requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J., ``Rail-Car Impact
Tests with Steel Coil: Car Crush,'' American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1656, April 2003.
\8\ Jacobsen, K., Tyrell, D., Perlman, A.B., ``Rail-Car Impact
Tests with Steel Coil: Collision Dynamics,'' American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1655, April 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The impact speed of approximately 14 mph for both tests was chosen
so that there would be significant intrusion (more than 12 inches) into
the engineer's cab in the test of the 1990s design, and limited
intrusion (less than 12 inches) in the test of the SOA design. This 12-
inch deformation metric was chosen to demarcate the amount of intrusion
that leaves sufficient space for the engineer to ride out the collision
safely.
During the full-scale tests, the impact force transmitted to the
1990s design end structure exceeded the corner post's predicted
strength, and the corner post separated from its upper attachment. Upon
impact, the corner post began to hinge near the contact point with the
coil; subsequently, tearing at the upper connection occurred. The
intensity of
[[Page 42025]]
the impact ultimately resulted in the failure of the upper connection
of the corner post to the anti-telescoping plate. More than 30 inches
of deformation occurred.
The SOA design performed very closely to pre-test predictions made
by the finite element and collision dynamics models. See Figure 2. The
SOA design crushed approximately 9 inches in the longitudinal direction.
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.001
Pre-test analyses for the 1990s design using the car crush model
and collision dynamics model were in close agreement with the
measurements taken during the actual testing of the cab car end frame
built to this design. The pre-test analyses also nearly overlay the
test results for the force/crush characteristic of the SOA design. As a
result, FRA believes that both sets of models are capable of predicting
the modes of structural deformation and the total amount of energy
consumed during a collision. Careful application of finite-element modeling
allows accurate prediction of the crush behavior of rail car structures.
Both the methodologies used to design the cab car end frames and
the results of the tests show that significant increases in rail
passenger equipment crashworthiness can be achieved if greater
consideration is given to the manner in which structural elements
deform when overloaded. Modern methods of analysis can accurately
predict structural crush (severe deformation) and consequently can be
used with confidence to develop structures that collapse in a
controlled manner. Modern testing techniques allow the verification of
the crush behavior of such structures.
3. Industry Quasi-Static Testing
While FRA's full-scale, dynamic testing program was being planned
and conducted with input from key industry representatives, several
passenger railroads were incorporating in procurement specifications
the then-newly promulgated Federal regulations and industry standards
issued in 1999. Specifically, both LIRR and Metro-North had contracted
with Bombardier for the development of a new MU locomotive design, the
M7 series. Bombardier conducted a series of qualifying quasi-static
tests on a mock-up, front-end structure of an M7, including a severe
deformation test of the collision post. In addition to the severe
deformation test, the other end frame members were also tested
elastically at the enhanced loads specified in the APTA standards. The
severe deformation qualification test was conducted on February 20, 2001.
The quasi-static testing of the M7 collision post was conducted on
a mock-up test article. The first 19.25 feet of the car structure was
fabricated, from the car's body bolster to the front end, so that the
mock-up contained all structural elements. Load was applied at
incrementally increasing levels with hydraulic jacks while being
measured by load cells at the rear of the longitudinal end frame
members. Initially, the elastic limit was determined for the post, and
then the large deformation test was conducted. The test was stopped,
for safety considerations, prior to full separation of the collision
post with the end/buffer beam.
The maximum deflection in the collision post before yielding
occurred at a position 42 inches above the end beam, near the top of
the plates used to reinforce the collision post. The plastic shape the
collision post acquired during testing was `V'-shaped, with a plastic
hinge occurring at 42 inches above the end beam. Some cracking and
material failure occurred at the connection of the post with the end
beam. The anti-telescoping plate was pulled down roughly three inches,
and load was shed to the corner post via the shelf member and the
bulkhead sheet. The shape that the collision post experienced is very
similar to what was observed from the dynamic testing of the SOA corner
post, as discussed above.
4. Comparative Analyses
Under FRA sponsorship, the Volpe Center, with cooperation from
Bombardier, conducted non-linear, large deformation analyses to
evaluate the performance of the cab car corner and collision posts of
the SOA end frame design and the Bombardier M7 design under dynamic
test conditions. One of the purposes of this research was to determine
whether the level of crashworthiness demonstrated by the SOA prototype
design could actually be achieved by a general production design--here,
the M7 design. Pre-test
[[Page 42026]]
analysis predictions of the dynamic performance of the SOA corner post
closely matched test measurements.\9\ A similar analysis of the corner
post was performed on the M7 design, and the results compared closely
with the SOA design test and analysis results. Overall, the
crashworthiness performance of the collision posts of the SOA and M7
designs were found to be essentially the same, and the M7 corner post
design was even found to perform better than the SOA corner post
design. This latter difference in performance is attributable to the
sidewall support in the M7 design, which is not present in the SOA design.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J. Brassard, J., ``Review
of Severe Deformation Recommended Practice Through Analyses--
Comparison of Two Cab Car End Frame Designs,'' American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. IMECE2005-70043, March 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Having established the fidelity of the models and modeling
approach, a number of comparative simulations were conducted of both
the SOA end frame and the M7 end frame under both dynamic and quasi-
static test conditions to assess the equivalency of the two different
tests for demonstrating compliance with the severe deformation
standard. For both sets of tests, the modes of deformation were very
similar at the same extent of longitudinal displacement, and the
locations where material failure occurred were also similar. In
addition, the predicted force-crush characteristics showed reasonable
agreement within the repeatability of the tests. Figure 3, below, shows
a comparison of the deformation modes for the M7, as observed from the
quasi-static testing and as predicted for the dynamic coil loading
condition.
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.002
F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements
As discussed above, APTA's initial ``severe deformation'' standard,
published in 1999, did not contain specific methodologies or criteria
for demonstrating compliance with the standard. Consequently, the
dynamic tests performed by FRA and the Volpe Center, static tests
performed by members of the rail industry, and analyses conducted by
the Volpe Center and its contractors all helped to develop the base of
information needed to identify the types of analyses and test
methodologies to use. Further, evaluation of the test data, with the
analyses providing a supporting framework, allowed development of
appropriate criteria to demonstrate compliance.
The principal criteria developed involve energy absorption through
end frame deformation and the maximum amount of that deformation. As
shown by FRA and industry testing, energy can be imparted to
conventional flat-nosed cab cars and MU locomotives either dynamically
or quasi-statically. As shown by Volpe Center analyses, currently
available engineering tools can be used to predict the results of such
tests. Given the complexity of such analyses, and commensurate
uncertainties, there is a benefit to maintaining dynamic testing as an
option for evaluating compliance with any ``severe deformation'' standard.
There are tradeoffs between quasi-static and dynamic end frame
testing of cab cars and MU locomotives. Both sets of tests prescribe a
minimum amount of energy for end frame deformation. However, the manner
in which the energy is applied is different, and the setup of the two
types of tests is different. As demonstrated by the tests
[[Page 42027]]
conducted by Bombardier, quasi-static tests can be conducted by rail
equipment manufacturers at their own facilities. Dynamic tests require
a segment of railroad track with appropriate wayside facilities; there
are few such test tracks available. Nevertheless, dynamic tests do not
require detailed knowledge of the car structure to be tested, and allow
for a wide range of structural designs. Quasi-static tests require
intimate knowledge of the structure being tested, to assure appropriate
support and loading conditions, and development of quasi-static test
protocols requires assumptions about the layout of the structure,
confining structural designs. In addition, dynamic tests more closely
approximate accident conditions than quasi-static tests do.
In August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S Subcommittee accepted a revised
``severe deformation'' standard for collision and corner posts. The
standard includes requirements for minimum energy absorption and
maximum deflection. The form of the standard is largely based on the
testing done by Bombardier, and therefore is quasi-static. The standard
eliminates a deficiency of the 1999 standards by specifying test
criteria to objectively measure ``severe deformation.'' The standard
can be readily applied to conventional flat-end cab cars and MU
locomotives, but is more difficult to apply to shaped-nosed cab cars
and MU locomotives or those with crash energy management designs.
In addition, APTA as well as several equipment manufacturers have
expressed an interest in maintaining the presence of a stairwell on the
side of the cab car or MU locomotive opposite from where the locomotive
engineer is situated. This feature enables multi-level boarding from
both low and higher platforms. As such, FRA and the APTA PRESS C&S
group worked together to develop language associated with providing a
safety equivalent to the requirements stipulated for cab car and MU
locomotive corner posts in terms of energy absorption and graceful
deformations. The group agreed that for this arrangement there is
sufficient protection afforded by the presence of two corner posts (an
end corner post and an internal adjacent body corner post) that are
situated in front of the occupied space. The load requirements
stipulated for such posts differ in that longitudinal requirements are
not equal to the transverse requirements. This in effect changes the
shape of these posts so that they are not equal in both width and
height. For the end corner post the longitudinal loads are smaller than
the transverse loads. The opposite is true for the body corner post.
Despite the changes in the loading requirements from longitudinal to
transverse, it was agreed to allow for the combined contribution of
both sets of corner posts to provide an equivalent level of protection
to that required for corner posts in other cab car and MU locomotive
configurations. See the discussion in the section-by-section on the
structural requirements for cab cars and MU locomotives with a
stairwell located on the side of the equipment opposite from where the
locomotive engineer is situated.
G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front-End Structures of
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
Research has shown that passenger rail equipment crashworthiness in
train-to-train collisions can be significantly increased if the
equipment structure is engineered to crush in a controlled manner. One
manner of doing so is to design sacrificial crush zones into unoccupied
locations in the equipment. These crush zones are designed to crush
gracefully, with a lower initial force and increased average force.
With such crush zones, energy absorption is shared by multiple cars
during the collision, consequently helping to preserve the integrity of
the occupied areas. While developed principally to protect occupants in
train-to-train collisions, such crush zones can also potentially
significantly increase crashworthiness in highway-rail grade-crossing
collisions.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Tyrell, D.C., Perlman, A.B., ``Evaluation of Rail Passenger
Equipment Crashworthiness Strategies,'' Transportation Research
Record No. 1825, pp. 8-14, National Academy Press, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The approach of including crush zones in passenger rail equipment
is termed CEM, and it extends from current, conventional practice.
Current practice for passenger equipment operated at speeds not
exceeding 125 mph (i.e., Tier I passenger equipment under part 238)
requires that the equipment be able to support large loads without
permanent deformation or failure, but does not specifically address how
the equipment behaves when it crushes. CEM prescribes that car
structures crush in a controlled manner when overloaded and absorb
collision energy. In fact, for passenger equipment operating at speeds
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph (i.e., Tier II passenger
equipment under part 238), FRA requires that the equipment be designed
with a CEM system to dissipate kinetic energy during a collision, see
Sec. 238.403, and Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets were designed with
a CEM system complying with this requirement.
FRA notes that Metrolink is in the process of procuring a new fleet
of cars utilizing CEM technology. As part of its response to the
Glendale, CA train incident on January 26, 2005, Metrolink determined
that CEM design specifications should be included in this planned
procurement, and, in coordination with APTA, approached FRA and FTA to
draft such specifications. In turn, FRA and FTA formed the ad hoc Crash
Energy Management Working Group in May 2005. This working group
included government engineers and participants from the rail industry,
including passenger railroads, suppliers, labor organizations, and
industry consultants, many of whom also participated in the
Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force. The working group developed a
detailed technical specification for crush zones in passenger cars for
Metrolink to include in its procurement specification, as well as for
other passenger railroads to include in future procurements of their
own. Metrolink released its specification as part of an invitation for
bid, and then awarded the contract to manufacture the equipment to
Rotem, a division of Hyundai.
Rotem is currently developing a shaped-nose, CEM design for new
Metrolink cab cars. Because of the shaped-nose, it is more difficult to
engineer structural members identifiable as full-height collision posts
and corner posts that extend from the underframe to the cantrail or
roofline at the front end, as specified in the current APTA standard.
Consequently, to meet the APTA standard, FRA believes that Rotem will
need to locate the collision and corner posts inboard of the crush
zone, rather than place them at the extreme front end of the cab car.
Further, as currently written, the APTA quasi-static standard does not
expressly take into account the energy absorption capability of the
crush zone, even if the crush zone would likely be engaged in a grade-
crossing impact. Although the APTA standard acknowledges the use of
shaped-nose and CEM designs, there remains uncertainty in the standard
associated with demonstration of compliance with such designs. (The
APTA standard does provide that on cars with CEM designs, compliance be
demonstrated either through analysis or testing as agreed to by the
vehicle builder and purchaser, but no test methodology or criteria are
provided.)
A dynamic test standard would place fewer constraints on the layout
of the cab car end structure and would allow
[[Page 42028]]
the energy absorption capability of the crush zone to be expressly
taken into account in the design of the collision and corner post
structures. As noted, the NPRM provides an option for the dynamic
testing of cab cars and MU locomotives. Nevertheless, FRA makes clear
that the Task Force did not reach consensus on recommending the
inclusion of dynamic testing in this NPRM. However, FRA believes that
the results of the crashworthiness research discussed above provide
strong support for including dynamic testing in the rule, and that it
is particularly necessary to address what FRA believes will be a
growing number of cab cars and MU locomotives utilizing CEM designs.
This need has become more apparent since the Task Force meetings
occurred, and FRA has scheduled additional, full-scale crash testing to
facilitate the use of both quasi-static and dynamic test standards.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 238, Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards
Subpart A--General
Section 238.13 Preemptive Effect
Existing Sec. 238.13 informs the public as to FRA's views
regarding the preemptive effect of this part by citing and restating
the statutory provision that governed the regulation's preemptive
effect at the time that it was promulgated (49 U.S.C. 20106). See 64 FR
25581. This statutory provision was amended by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2319 (November 25,
2002), subsequent to the issuance of the May 12, 1999 final rule
promulgating the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. Consequently,
FRA is proposing to amend Sec. 238.13 so that it is more consistent
with the revised statutory language expressly addressing railroad security.
As amended to date, 49 U.S.C. 20106 provides that all regulations
and orders prescribed or issued by the Secretary of Transportation
(with respect to railroad safety matters) and the Secretary of Homeland
Security (with respect to railroad security matters) preempt any State
law, regulation, or order covering the same subject matter, except an
additional or more stringent provision necessary to eliminate or reduce
an essentially local safety or security hazard that is not incompatible
with a Federal law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably
burden interstate commerce. The Congressional intent behind the statute
is to promote national uniformity in railroad safety and security
standards and to avoid subjecting the railroads to a variety of
enforcement in 50 different State judicial and administrative systems.
The courts have construed the ``essentially local safety or security''
exception very narrowly, holding that it is designed to enable States
to respond to local situations which are not statewide in character and
not capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform national
standards. With the exception of such a provision directed at an
essentially local safety or security hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 preempts
any State statutory, regulatory, or common law standard covering the
same subject matter as a Federal law, regulation, or order, including
an FRA regulation or order.
In addition, since issues have arisen regarding the preemptive
effect of this part on the safety of operating a cab car as the leading
unit of a passenger train, FRA believes that clarification of its views
on the matter is needed to address any misunderstanding. As described
below, through a variety of initiatives spanning more than a decade,
FRA has comprehensively and intentionally covered the subject matter of
the requirements for passenger equipment, planning for the safe use of
passenger equipment, and the manner in which passenger equipment is
used. In so doing, FRA believes that it has preempted any State law,
regulation, or order, including State common law, concerning the
operation of a cab car or MU locomotive as the leading unit of a
passenger train. This NPRM on cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness
further refines FRA's comprehensive regulation of passenger equipment
safety and serves to show that the operation of cab cars and MU
locomotives is a matter regulated by FRA, and not one which FRA has
left subject to State statutory, regulatory, or common law standards
covering that subject matter.
Emergency Order No. 20
In the wake of two serious accidents, each involving a passenger
train operating with a cab car in the lead position in ``push-pull
service,'' FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (EO 20) on February 22,
1996 (61 FR 6876), amended on March 5, 1996 (61 FR 8703). EO 20
generally required passenger railroads operating push-pull or MU
locomotive service to have in their operating rules a delayed-in-block
rule and a rule requiring communication of wayside signals, and
required passenger railroads to mark and test exits used for emergency
egress. EO 20 also required passenger railroads which operated push-
pull or MU locomotive service to develop and submit interim system
safety plans for the purpose of enhancing the safety of such
operations. FRA noted that it would review the plans submitted and,
based on that review, it would ``determine whether other mandatory
action appears necessary to address hazards associated with the subject
rail passenger service.'' 61 FR 6882. Thus, FRA's approach was to have
passenger railroads review their approach to push-pull and MU
operations, and FRA would then review the railroads' plans and
determine what further action to take. FRA ultimately did take further
action to regulate push-pull and MU operations as part of its overall
regulation of passenger equipment safety.
Passenger Safety Rulemakings
At the time EO 20 was issued in February 1996, FRA had been moving
forward with rulemakings to establish comprehensive safety standards
for railroad passenger equipment. As noted above, the rulemakings arose
out of the Secretary of Transportation's commitment in 1994 to develop
safety standards for railroad passenger equipment, soon followed by
enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994. In
Section 215 of the Act, Congress directed the Secretary to specifically
consider a number of matters before prescribing regulations, such as
the crashworthiness of the cars, interior features (including luggage
restraints, seat belts, and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger
safety, and any operating rules and conditions that directly affect
safety not otherwise governed by regulations. Congress granted the
Secretary the authority to make applicable some or all of the standards
to cars existing at the time the regulations were prescribed, as well
as to new cars. Moreover, as noted above, Congress authorized the
Secretary, when prescribing regulations, issuing orders, and making
amendments under this section, to consult with Amtrak, public
authorities operating railroad passenger service, other railroad
carriers transporting passengers, organizations of passengers, and
organizations of employees. 49 U.S.C. 20133. As delegated from the
Secretary, FRA has exercised these grants of authority.
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
Using the consultative authority granted by Congress, FRA convened
the first meeting of the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working
[[Page 42029]]
Group in August 1995, focused on the development of emergency
preparedness planning requirements for commuter and intercity passenger
train operations. The rulemaking culminated in the publication of a
final rule on Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness on May 4, 1998. 63
FR 24630.
As described above, this regulation requires railroads that operate
intercity or commuter passenger train service or that host the
operation of such service to adopt and comply with written emergency
preparedness plans approved by FRA. In addition, as noted above, the
regulation specifies marking and instruction requirements for emergency
window and door exits, and provides for the inspection, maintenance,
and repair of emergency window and door exits. The regulation therefore
codified and expanded EO 20's requirements to mark and inspect
emergency exits.
In formalizing a planning requirement for emergency preparedness,
FRA acknowledged that the plans would be integrated into commuter
railroads' overall system safety planning efforts. 63 FR at 24636. FRA
announced that it would monitor the implementation of the rule and
evaluate whether further rulemaking or other action were necessary to
achieve the desired improvements in emergency preparedness. Id.
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Using the same consultative authority granted by Congress, FRA
convened the first meeting of the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Working Group in June 1995, as mentioned above. Thereafter in June
1996, FRA issued an ANPRM on Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. 61
FR 30672. In that notice, FRA stated its views and solicited comments
on possible safety regulations, including requirements addressing
inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures, equipment design and
performance criteria related to passenger and crew survivability in the
event of a train accident, and the safe operation of passenger train
service. FRA considered system safety planning to be the heart of its
approach to passenger equipment safety. 61 FR 30684.
In the ANPRM, FRA stressed the need for flexibility in the
development of system safety plans, noting that they could range from a
relatively simple document to a detailed document laying out a
comprehensive approach for designing, testing, and operating state-of-
the-art high-speed passenger rail systems. In this regard, FRA provided
an example of how system safety could be approached, breaking down the
railroad system into four major component systems: interfaces; right-
of-way; equipment; and transportation. 61 FR 30685. FRA noted that many
passenger railroads operate at least partially as a tenant on the
right-of-way and property of another railroad, and may have little or
no control over some of the major risk components of the risk analysis,
such as the interfaces and right-of-way components. 61 FR 30686.
Nevertheless, FRA explained that the ``systems'' methodology still has
considerable merit when applied to the remaining subsystems, in that
the analysis could help define the equipment crashworthiness features
required for its intended purpose or the operational limitations needed
to improve or retain safety levels, but that a true system safety
approach cannot be applied to a system that has major risk components
that are constrained.
FRA also solicited comments on various aspects of system safety
planning, including information regarding any existing plans in use at
the time. FRA was particularly interested in ways to tailor system
safety programs to fit individual situations, so that the process made
good business sense and addressed safety needs, and was not a
regulatory burden that did not benefit safety.
Following the consideration of comments received on the ANPRM and
recommendations of the Working Group, FRA issued an NPRM to establish
comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, including cab
cars, as discussed above. 62 FR 49728; September 23, 1997. Among FRA's
proposals in the NPRM were requirements for system safety plans and
programs which would apply to both Tier I and Tier II passenger
equipment. FRA indicated that through the system safety process,
railroads would be required to identify, evaluate, and seek to
eliminate or reduce the hazards associated with the use of passenger
equipment over the railroad system. FRA noted that the importance of
system safety planning had been recognized in EO 20, and that the
commuter railroads had subsequently committed to the development of
comprehensive system safety plans, which went beyond the limited scope
of the interim system safety plans that had been required by EO 20. 62
FR 49733.
In the NPRM, FRA explained that while consensus was reached within
the Working Group on system safety planning requirements as they would
apply to Tier II passenger equipment, the Working Group did not reach
consensus on the requirements as they would apply to Tier I passenger
equipment. 62 FR 49760. Although the Working Group agreed that
passenger rail systems should apply system safety planning to Tier I
passenger equipment, some members of the Working Group questioned
whether this should be required by law. In particular, FRA noted the
position of the American Public Transit Association (now American
Public Transportation Association, APTA), which objected to FRA's
regulation of any aspect of system safety planning. 62 FR 49734. APTA
suggested that the commuter railroads be allowed to regulate themselves
in this area because the system safety efforts they were undertaking
were more comprehensive in nature than anything FRA sought to require,
and were not limited to rail equipment issues. FRA therefore invited
comment on APTA's suggestion and on a number of other issues with
respect to system safety planning requirements, so that it could decide
what approach to take in the final rule with respect to system safety
plans. In addition, FRA proposed numerous other requirements for the
safe operation of passenger train service, including equipment design
and performance criteria related to passenger and crew survivability in
the event of a train accident, and inspection, testing, and maintenance
procedures.
FRA received extensive comments on the NPRM, including comments
regarding the question of system safety planning. Some comments
suggested that system safety planning should be completely voluntary,
to allow for maximum flexibility. Other commenters, however, argued
that FRA had to prescribe specific mandatory requirements for those
aspects of system safety that it chose to address. All of the comments
received on the proposed rule, both written and oral, were considered
by FRA in promulgating the final rule on May 12, 1999. 64 FR 25540.
FRA's ultimate regulatory decision in issuing a final rule on passenger
equipment safety standards was to address only certain aspects of
system safety planning, focused primarily on rail passenger equipment,
rather than to require generally that the railroads implement
comprehensive system safety plans. 64 FR 25549. While FRA acknowledged
that the plans required by the regulation would be part of larger
system safety planning efforts, only the elements specifically
addressed in the rule would be enforced. As with most of FRA's
regulations, the final rule prescribed minimum Federal safety
[[Page 42030]]
standards and did not restrict a railroad and other persons subject to
the regulation from adopting additional or more stringent requirements
not inconsistent with the final rule. 64 FR 25575.
FRA made a conscious decision to regulate in a way that allowed
greater flexibility in overall system safety planning for Tier I
passenger equipment, stating in the final rule that:
FRA will closely monitor Tier I railroad operations in their
development and adherence to voluntary, comprehensive system safety
plans. FRA has already established a liaison relationship with APTA
and has already begun participating in system safety plan audits on
commuter railroads. FRA is using this involvement to enrich FRA's
Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP) efforts on these
railroads-which, unlike the triennial audit process for system
safety plans, is a continuous activity with frequent on-property
involvement by FRA safety professionals. FRA will reconsider its
decision not to impose a general requirement for system safety plans
on Tier I railroad operations if the need to do so arises. 64 Fed.
Reg. at 25549.
FRA's participation in the APTA audit process was intended to
complement FRA's regulatory requirements, and other initiatives such as
the SACP process. It was not, however, a delegation of responsibility
to the industry to regulate itself.
FRA did not impose system safety planning requirements that
specifically addressed push-pull or MU locomotive operations for Tier I
passenger equipment. However, FRA considered the proper scope of system
safety planning requirements that it should impose for such operations,
and chose not to impose general system safety requirements for this
equipment. Instead, in the 1999 final rule FRA imposed a myriad of
substantive requirements intended to ensure the safety of the equipment
in whatever operational mode it is used. For instance, using the
statutory authority to apply requirements of the final rule to existing
passenger equipment, FRA generally required that all Tier I passenger
equipment, including both new and existing cab cars, have a minimum
buff strength of 800,000 pounds, as specified in 49 CFR 238.203. FRA
also noted that these substantive requirements, like the system safety
planning requirements, might be further addressed in subsequent
rulemaking. For example, FRA specifically stated in the final rule that
additional effort needed to be made to enhance corner post safety
standards for cab cars and MU locomotives--leading to the NPRM that FRA
is issuing today. 64 FR at 25607. However, FRA made clear that the very
fact that it identified the possibility of specifying additional
regulations did not nullify the preemptive effect of the final rule,
both in terms of the issues addressed by the specific requirements
imposed, and those as to which FRA considered specific requirements but
ultimately chose to allow a more flexible approach.
FRA extended additional requirements to Tier II passenger
equipment, both in terms of system safety planning and substantive
requirements that eliminated the possibility of operating Tier II
passenger equipment in the push-pull mode, or in any mode with
passengers occupying the leading car in a train. In addition to the
specific system safety planning requirements generally applicable to
all passenger equipment (fire safety; hardware and software safety;
inspection, testing, and maintenance; training, qualifications, and
designations; and pre-revenue service testing), FRA required additional
system safety planning for Tier II passenger equipment. Railroads are
required to have a written plan for the safe operation of the
equipment, both prior to its operation and also before introducing new
technology in the equipment that affects a safety system on the
equipment. These plans may be combined with the other plans required
for all passenger equipment. See 64 FR 25646-25647; 49 CFR 238.601 and
238.603. Although the rule does not require FRA approval of the plans,
it does generally require FRA approval of Tier II passenger equipment
operations, pursuant to 49 CFR 238.111(b)(7).
FRA also adopted structural requirements for Tier II passenger
equipment that require the equipment to withstand collision forces not
possible for conventional cab cars or MU locomotives to withstand, thus
effectively prohibiting the use of such equipment in Tier II passenger
trains. FRA specifically stated with regard to Tier II passenger
equipment that the crash energy management requirements ``will
effectively prevent a conventional cab car from operating as the lead
vehicle in a Tier II passenger train because such equipment cannot
absorb 5 MJ of collision energy ahead of the train operator's
position.'' 64 FR at 25630. Morever, FRA expressly prohibited passenger
seating in the leading unit of Tier II passenger trains, see 49 CFR
238.403(f), which, in turn, effectively prohibits the operation of
push-pull or MU locomotive service-methods of operation in which
passengers can occupy the lead unit of a train. In fact, FRA
specifically stated that cab cars ``should not be used in the forward
position of a train that travels at speeds greater than 125 mph.'' Id.
FRA imposed no such prohibition on passenger seating in the lead unit
of a Tier I passenger train.
FRA's decisions to require more general system safety planning for
Tier II passenger operations, and to impose substantive requirements
that in both effect and application prohibit passenger seating in the
leading unit of Tier II passenger trains, make clear that these issues
were carefully considered in the 1999 final rule. Of course, by virtue
of imposing stricter standards on Tier II passenger equipment than Tier
I passenger equipment, FRA did not intend States to step in and
regulate Tier I passenger equipment. On the contrary, FRA recognized
the operational differences between Tier I and Tier II passenger
equipment, and purposely chose to address these two types of equipment
differently. Where FRA has prohibited one thing and chosen not to
prohibit another, such as prohibiting cab car-forward operations for
Tier II and not for Tier I, FRA intended to allow a railroad to do that
which FRA did not prohibit. FRA's regulatory choice was intended to be
preemptive of State standards with regard to both Tier I and Tier II
passenger equipment.
As FRA understands the Supreme Court's standard for covering the
subject matter, State or local governments, courts or litigants may not
carve out subsets of subject matters FRA has covered. Accordingly, when
FRA has regulated the construction of a railcar, FRA clearly permits
its operation on the general system of railroad transportation unless
FRA explicitly sets limits on its operation, and State or local
governments may not prohibit certain of those operations or impose an
independent duty of care with respect to those operations. FRA's
comprehensive regulation of this area has covered the subject matter of
all aspects of the safe operation of cab cars and MU locomotives,
leaving no room for State standards. States are free of course to craft
standards to address the extremely rare ``essentially local safety or
security hazard,'' so long as the standards otherwise meet the three
part test of 49 U.S.C. 20106.
Nevertheless, as explained below, a State or local entity which
owns or controls a railroad may direct that railroad to exceed FRA's
requirements, provided that it does so in a capacity that is wholly
distinct, and does not derive, from the statutory provision governing
the preemptive effect of FRA's regulation of this area. Commuter rail
service is typically provided by
[[Page 42031]]
public benefit corporations chartered by State or local governments,
whereas freight rail service is provided almost exclusively by non-
governmental entities. Just as the owner of a freight railroad may
direct that its railroad's operations exceed FRA's minimum safety
standards, so may a State or local body, acting through the public
benefit corporation that it has chartered, direct its railroad to
operate in a manner more restrictive than, but not inconsistent with,
FRA's requirements. FRA makes clear that, when a State or local
government entity acts in this capacity, it is not acting as a
regulator of railroad operations. It is effectively acting in a private
capacity concerning the operation of its own railroad, and the fact
that it is a public entity does not somehow change its action into a
law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security that
invokes the statutory provision governing the preemptive effect of
FRA's regulation of this area. A State or local entity's ability to act
in this capacity concerning its own railroad is wholly distinct, and
does not derive, from any provision of 49 U.S.C. 20106.
Because FRA's safety standards are minimum safety standards, a
State or local entity's ability to act in this manner is the same
ability that a non-governmental entity which owns a freight railroad
would have, should it decide to provide passenger service, to direct
its passenger operations in a manner more stringent than, but not
inconsistent with, FRA's requirements. The fact that a State or local
entity is involved--and not a private entity--does not alter in any way
FRA's views as to the preemptive effect of FRA's comprehensive
regulation of passenger equipment safety, and the safe operation of cab
cars and MU locomotives in particular.
Similarly, where FRA has required passenger railroads to engage in
system safety planning or has not required such planning because the
passenger railroads, in FRA's judgment, are doing an adequate job of
system safety planning, FRA intends to preempt State and local
regulation precisely because FRA has already decided what system safety
planning each railroad should be doing based on its own circumstances.
The relevant circumstances vary more widely among passenger railroads
than among freight railroads and, at this level of specificity, the
best and most effective planning is aimed squarely at the circumstances
of each individual passenger railroad. Therefore, State or local
regulation of such system safety planning is also preempted.
Further, FRA's decision to revisit in this NPRM subjects addressed
in the 1999 final rule does not change the preemptive effect of the
comprehensive requirements imposed in that rule. As noted earlier,
FRA's recognition in the 1999 final rule that additional work needed to
be completed to enhance the crashworthiness of cab cars and MU
locomotives does not nullify the preemptive effect of the standards
then imposed for this equipment. In the same way, FRA's recognition in
this NPRM that fuller application of crash energy management
technologies to cab cars and MU locomotives could enhance their safety
would not nullify the preemptive effect of the standards arising from
the rulemaking. FRA continually strives to enhance railroad safety, has
an active research program focused on doing so, and sets safety
standards that it believes are necessary and appropriate for the time
that they are issued with a view to amending those standards as
circumstances change. The proposed imposition of enhanced
crashworthiness requirements for cab cars and MU locomotives in Tier I
passenger trains, and the specific recognition that this equipment will
be operated cab car forward in the push mode, demonstrate that FRA has
imposed, and will continue to impose, the requirements that it deems
necessary for the safe operation of cab cars and MU locomotives in all
of the configurations in which they will be operated. FRA is thoroughly
familiar, through the inspections it performs regularly, with the
physical properties and operating characteristics of each passenger
railroad. FRA has applied that knowledge in deciding to permit those
railroads to operate cab cars and MU locomotives as the leading units
of Tier I passenger trains, and FRA is not aware of any circumstances
on any of those passenger railroads which would qualify under the statute
as essentially local safety or security hazards affecting those operations.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
Section 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism
FRA is proposing to amend paragraph (a) of this section to correct
an error in the rule text. In the relevant part, this paragraph
currently states that ``all passenger equipment * * * shall have at
both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing mechanism capable of
resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds
without failure.'' However, FRA had intended that the words ``without
failure'' actually read as ``without permanent deformation,'' as stated
in the preamble accompanying the issuance of this paragraph.
Specifically, FRA explained in the accompanying preamble that the anti-
climbing mechanism must be capable of resisting an upward or downward
vertical force of 100,000 pounds ``without permanent deformation.'' See
64 FR 25604; May 12, 1999. Use of the ``without permanent deformation''
criterion is consistent with North American industry practice, and FRA
had not intended to relax that practice. Consequently, FRA is proposing
to correct Sec. 238.205(a) to expressly require that the anti-climbing
mechanism be capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force
of 100,000 pounds without permanent deformation.
Section 238.211 Collision posts
FRA is proposing to adopt the provisions of paragraphs (a) through
(d) of section 5.3.1.3.1, Cab-end collision posts, of APTA Standard SS-
C&S-034-99, Rev. 1. FRA is also proposing to modify these provisions
for purposes of their adoption as a Federal regulation.
This proposal would enhance current requirements for collision
posts at the forward ends of cab cars and MU locomotives. In sum,
paragraph (b) currently requires that each locomotive, including a cab
car and an MU locomotive, ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or
placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002,
have two collision posts at its forward end, each post capable of
withstanding a 500,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with
the top of the underframe and a 200,000-pound longitudinal force
exerted 30 inches above the joint of the post to the underframe. These
requirements were based on AAR Standard S-580, and had been the
industry practice for all locomotives built since August 1990. See 64
FR 25606. Subsequently, industry standards for locomotive
crashworthiness have been enhanced, with APTA focusing on standards for
passenger-occupied locomotives, i.e., cab cars and MU locomotives, and
the AAR focusing on standards for freight locomotives. The AAR's
efforts helped support development of the Locomotive Crashworthiness
rulemaking, published as a final rule on June 28, 2006. See 71 FR
36887. That final rule specifically addresses the safety of freight
locomotives and does not apply to passenger-occupied locomotives (i.e.,
cab cars and MU locomotives). Nevertheless, FRA believes that
conceptual approaches taken in the
[[Page 42032]]
Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule are applicable to this
rulemaking, as discussed below. To clearly delineate the relationship
between the Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule and part 238, FRA
proposes that a cross-reference be inserted in the introductory
language of paragraph (b) to indicate that as the locomotive
requirements for collision posts become effective for locomotives
manufactured on or after January 1, 2009, those more stringent
requirements will apply to conventional locomotives (though not to cab
cars or MU locomotives).
FRA is proposing to correct paragraph (b)(2) so that the rule text
is consistent with the clear intent of the provision. As explained in
the preamble accompanying the issuance of this paragraph, paragraph
(b)(2) provides for the use of an equivalent end structure in place of
the two forward collision posts described in paragraph (b)--
specifically, paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii). See 64 FR 25606. However,
the rule text makes express reference only to the collision posts in
``paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.'' This provision was not
intended to be limited to the collision posts described in paragraph
(b)(1)(i) alone, but instead to the collision posts described in
paragraph (b)(1) as a whole--both paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii). FRA
is, therefore, proposing to correct this clear error in the rule text.
FRA is proposing to redesignate current paragraph (c) as paragraph
(d) and add a new paragraph (c) in its place. Specifically, proposed
paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (ii) are similar to paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and
(ii). One principal difference is that the proposed regulation would
require that each collision post be able to support the specified loads
for angles up to 15[deg]
from the longitudinal. In effect, this would
require each post to support a significant lateral load, and is
intended to reflect the uncertainty in the direction a load is imparted
during an impact. The proposed standard is also intended to encourage
the use of collision posts with closed (e.g., rectangular) cross
sections, rather than with open (e.g., I-beam) cross sections. Beams
with open cross sections tend to twist and bend across the weaker axis
when overloaded, regardless of the direction of load. Beams with closed
cross sections are less likely to twist when overloaded, and are more
likely to sustain a higher load as they deform, absorbing more energy.
Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(iii) does not have a counterpart in
paragraph (b). This paragraph would require that the collision post be
able to support a 60,000-pound longitudinal load applied anywhere along
its length, from its attachment to floor-level structure up to its
attachment to roof-level structure. This proposed regulation is
intended to provide a minimum level of collision post strength at any
point along its full height-not only at its connection to the
underframe or at 30 inches above that point. The proposed requirement
must also be met for any angle within 15 degrees of the longitudinal axis.
Proposed paragraph (c)(2) would require that each collision post
also be able to absorb a prescribed amount of energy without separation
from its supporting structure. This proposed requirement is intended to
provide a level of protection similar to the SOA design, as discussed
in the Technical Background section of the preamble, above. A quasi-
static test, such as the test conducted by Bombardier on the M7 design,
may be used to show compliance, or the builder may utilize the dynamic
test method.
Designs without flat forward ends include shaped-nosed designs such
as those by Colorado Railcar and, as discussed above, the design being
developed by Rotem for Metrolink. Because such designs place the
engineer back from the extreme forward end of the vehicle, there is the
potential for significantly increased protection for the engineer in
collisions. In this regard, FRA is proposing to add paragraph (e) to
require an equivalent structure to be present in front of occupied
space but set back from the very end of the cab car or MU locomotive.
Such structures may be part of the nose of the equipment or the CEM
system, or both. Paragraph (e) would provide relief from utilization of
a traditional end frame structure provided that an equivalent level of
protection is afforded by the components of the CEM system. In the FRA
CEM design tested in March 2006, the end frame structure was reinforced
in order to support the loads introduced through the deformable anti-
climber. Significantly more energy was absorbed in the deformation of
the deformable anti-climber than the combined requirements outlined for
both collision and corner posts while preserving all space for the
locomotive engineer and passengers. In the design under development for
Metrolink in southern California, an equivalent end frame structure is
placed outboard of occupied space with crush elements between the very
end of the nose and the equivalent end frame. For a grade crossing
collision above the underframe of the cab car it is expected that
perhaps an order of magnitude or larger of collision energy will be
absorbed prior to any deformations into occupied space.
As noted, the APTA Standard does recognize the need to address
shaped-nosed designs and CEM designs. Specifically, the Standard
provides that cab end collision posts and corner posts (and their
supporting structure) on MU locomotives and cab cars without flat ends,
or on equipment utilizing crash energy management designs, meet the
``severe deformation'' requirements, but that compliance with the
requirements be demonstrated either through analysis or testing as
agreed to by the vehicle builder and purchaser. See paragraph (e) in
both sections 5.3.1.3.1, Cab-end collision posts, and 5.3.2.3.1, Cab
end corner posts, of APTA Standard SS-C&S-034-99, Rev. 1. While FRA
supports applying the ``severe deformation'' requirements to such
designs, FRA does not believe it viable as a Federal regulation to have
the application of these requirements essentially depend on an
agreement between the vehicle builder and the purchaser of the vehicle-
without the involvement of the Federal government or public input. In
particular, since the ``severe deformation'' requirements were
developed from research on typical flat-end cab cars and MU
locomotives, FRA believes that there may be too much uncertainty for
applying such requirements to other designs and that the industry would
benefit from the inclusion of a more specific standard.
Within the Task Force, FRA proposed that a dynamic test standard be
added to address the issue. However, as noted above, the Task Force
could not reach consensus on a recommendation for such a dynamic
standard. Concern was raised about the validity of any dynamic test
standard chosen and whether such a standard could be used for valid
comparisons with a quasi-static test standard. This concern included
the need to first conduct full-scale testing on an actual prototype for
a production design. Further, APTA was concerned that its member
railroads might feel compelled to conduct both quasi-static and dynamic
testing to demonstrate compliance, even if the regulations were
expressly written to state that compliance with only one test standard
would be required. FRA wishes to make clear that nothing in this
proposal would require that both types of qualification procedures be
used. Either may be clearly adequate for the purpose, depending on the
technical challenge presented; and conducting two analyses or types of
tests would clearly be excessive and wasteful. Again, FRA proposes two
alternative methods in order to provide maximum flexibility,
[[Page 42033]]
recognizing that other-than-flat-nosed cars will be offered in the
marketplace and further recognizing that equipment utilizing crush
zones may also present difficulties should the quasi-static test be the
only approach considered.
Concern was also raised as to the safety of conducting full-scale,
dynamic testing. The technical tradeoffs between quasi-static and
dynamic test standards are discussed in the Technical Background
section of the preamble, above. FRA notes that there are safety
concerns associated with both quasi-static and dynamic testing, and in
a quasi-static test particular care must be taken due to the potential
for the sudden release of stored energy should there be material
failure. Proper planning and execution of each test are required. (By
noting that caution must be exercised in planning and executing the
tests, FRA does not intend in any way to oust the jurisdiction of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. Department of
Labor with regard to the safety of employees performing the tests.)
FRA believes that dynamic test standards have been sufficiently
validated and that dynamic testing should be included as an option for
demonstrating compliance with the rule. For this reason, FRA is
proposing that paragraph (c)(2) include an option for the dynamic
testing of cab cars and MU locomotives. Although FRA expects that this
method will be applied to designs with shaped-nose designs or with CEM
designs, or both, it may also be used for a conventional flat-nosed
design; and the quasi-static method may be applied to shaped-nose or
CEM designs.
FRA recognizes that questions may arise in applying these methods
in situations not clearly anticipated today. FRA requests comment on
whether the final rule should include either an option or requirement
that the test methodology be submitted for FRA review prior to the
conduct of destructive testing. FRA also requests comment on whether
and under what circumstances analysis and scale model or fixture
testing might be accepted as satisfying the dynamic standard.
The dynamic standard itself is a performance standard involving
impact with a proxy object. The proxy object must have a cylindrical
shape, diameter of 48 inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight
of 10,000 pounds. The longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be
offset by 19 inches from the longitudinal axis of the cab car or MU
locomotive, which must be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000
pounds. At impact, the longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be 30
inches above the top of the finished floor. The cab car or MU
locomotive and its end structure must withstand a 21 mph impact with
the proxy object resulting in no more than 10 inches of intrusion
longitudinally into the occupied area of the vehicle, and without
separation of the attachments of any structural members. FRA is
including a graphical description of this collision scenario as Figure
1 to subpart C.
FRA notes that in the Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule, the
front-end structure requirements are principally stated in the form of
performance criteria for given collision scenarios. See Appendix E to
part 229; 71 FR 36915. In fact, the performance criteria in Appendix E
to part 229 involve dynamic loading conditions stated in a way similar
to what FRA is proposing here as the example to demonstrate compliance.
In the Locomotive Crashworthiness final rule, FRA adopted performance
criteria, rather than more prescriptive design standards, to allow for
greater flexibility in the design of locomotives and better encourage
innovation in locomotive designs. See 71 FR 36895-36898. Of course, the
requirements proposed in paragraph (c)(2)(i) are a form of performance
criteria. The distinction is that the performance criteria relate to
quasi-static loading conditions--instead of dynamic loading conditions,
which more approximate actual collision scenarios.
FRA also notes that recently adopted European standards, prEN 15227
FCD Crashworthiness Requirements for Railway Vehicle Bodies, include
four collision scenarios. Collision Scenario 3 of the European standard
involves a ``train unit front end impact with a heavy obstacle (e.g.
lorry on road crossing).'' Commuter and intercity trains are required
to be able to sustain an impact with a deformable object weighing 33
kips (15,000 kg) at 68 mph (110 kph). Calibration tests on components
and numerical simulations of the scenario are recommended for showing
compliance. Key differences between the European standard and the
dynamic testing collision scenarios FRA is proposing to apply to both
collision posts and corner posts, below, include the amount of energy
involved and the character of the object. Assuming that the mass of the
train is more than about 25 times greater than the mass of the object
(which roughly corresponds to the mass of a commuter train made up of a
cab car, four coaches, and a locomotive, or made up of six MU
locomotives) then the total energy dissipated in a prEN 15227 Scenario
3-impact is 5.0 million foot-pounds. The total energy absorbed in the
collision scenarios included in this NPRM are 135,000 foot-pounds for
the collision post and 120,000 foot-pounds for the corner post.
However, in the European standard, the impacted object is deformable
and potentially absorbs a significant amount of the available energy;
in the collision scenarios included in the NPRM, the impacted object is
rigid and all of the energy is absorbed by the cab car or MU locomotive.
FRA invites comment on the proposal to provide for dynamic testing
to demonstrate compliance by cab cars and MU locomotives. Specifically,
FRA invites comment on the dynamic testing collision scenario included
in the proposed rule for collision posts, and invites comment
suggesting any alternative collision scenario or way to address such
cab cars and MU locomotives.
Section 238.213 Corner posts
FRA is proposing to adopt the provisions of paragraph (a) through
(d) of Section 5.3.2.3.1, Cab end corner posts, of APTA Standard SS-
C&S-034-99 Rev. 1, and Section 5.3.2.3.3, Cab end-non-operator side of
cab-alternate requirements. FRA is also proposing to modify these
provisions for purposes of their adoption as a Federal regulation and
to specify standards for a cab car or MU locomotive with a stairwell
located on the side of the equipment opposite from where the locomotive
engineer is situated. Together with the proposal for collision posts,
this action would increase the strength of the front-end structure of
cab cars and MU locomotives up to what the main structure can support,
and also require explicit consideration of the behavior of the front-
end structures when overloaded.
Overall, FRA is proposing to revise this section in its entirety by
redesignating current paragraph (b) as paragraph (a)(2), making conforming
changes to paragraph (a), and adding new paragraphs (b), (c), and (d).
Proposed paragraph (b) is intended to augment the current
requirements of paragraph (a) for cab cars and MU locomotives ordered
on or after October 1, 2009, or placed in service for the first time on
or after October 2, 2011. Proposed paragraph (b) would require higher
loads at the specified locations than its counterpart in paragraph (a).
Paragraph (b)(2) addresses alternative methods of demonstrating
that the corner posts absorb energy while deforming. Proposed paragraph
(b)(2)(i) sets forth quasi-static test requirements.
[[Page 42034]]
The corner post would have to be able to absorb a prescribed amount of
energy without separation from its supporting structure. This proposed
requirement is intended to provide a level of protection similar to the
SOA design, as described in the Technical Background section of the
preamble, above. A quasi-static test, similar to the test conducted by
Bombardier on the M7, may be used to demonstrate compliance.
Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(ii) would provide for alternative dynamic
qualification. The end structure would need to be capable of
withstanding a frontal impact with a proxy object that is intended to
approximate lading carried by a highway vehicle under the following
conditions. The proxy object must have a cylindrical shape, diameter of
48 inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds.
The longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be aligned with the
outboard edge of the side of the cab car or MU locomotive, which must
be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the
longitudinal axis of the proxy object must be 30 inches above the top
of the finished floor. The cab car or MU locomotive and its end
structure must withstand a 20 mph impact with the proxy object
resulting in no more than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally into
the occupied area of the cab car or MU locomotive, and without
separation of the attachments of any structural members. FRA is
including a graphical description of this collision scenario as Figure
2 to subpart C.
Paragraph (c) prescribes the corner post standards for cab cars and
MU locomotives ordered on or after October 1, 2009, or placed in
service for the first time on or after October 2, 2011, utilizing low-
level passenger boarding on the side of the equipment opposite from
where the locomotive engineer is seated. In this arrangement the non-
operating side of the vehicle is protected by two corner posts (an end
corner post and an internal adjacent body corner post) that are
situated in front of occupied space and provide protection for the
occupied space; the proposed rule allows for the combined contribution
of both sets of corner posts to provide an equivalent level of protection
to that required for corner posts in other cab car configurations.
Paragraph (c) would require that the corner post load requirements
of paragraph (b) be met for the corner post on the operating side of
the cab. The requirements for the two corner posts on the opposite side
of the operator control stand are described in paragraphs (c)(1) and
(2). The structural requirements for the end corner post are described
in paragraph s (c)(1)(i) through (vii). The longitudinal load
requirements for the end corner post as set forth in paragraph (c)(1)
are as follows: (1)(i) is a 150,000-pound shear load applied at the
base of the corner post with its connection with the underframe where
the load must not exceed the shear strength of the post; (1)(ii) is a
30,000-pound bending load applied 18 inches above the top of underframe
and no permanent deformation can occur; (1)(iii) is a 30,000-pound
shear load applied at the attachment point with the roof structure,
again without permanent deformations; and (1)(iv) is a 20,000-pound
bending load applied anywhere between the underframe connection up to
the roof structure connection without permanent deformation. The
transverse load requirements for the end corner post are described in
paragraph (c)(1) as follows: (1)(v) is a 300,000-pound shear load
applied at a point even with the top of the underframe without
exceeding the shear strength of the post or the carbody supporting
structure; (1)(vi) is a 100,000-pound bending load applied 18 inches
above the top of underframe and no permanent deformation can occur; and
(1)(vii) is a 45,000-pound shear load at the connection between the
corner post and the roof structure without deforming the post or the
supporting structure. The higher magnitude loads applied in the
longitudinal direction will result in a corner post that is wider than
it is deep.
The structural load requirements for the body corner post are
described in paragraphs (2)(i) through (vi). The longitudinal load
requirements are as follows: (2)(i) is a 300,000-pound shear load
applied at the base of the body corner post with its connection with
the underframe where the load must not exceed the shear strength of the
post; (2)(ii) is a 100,000-pound bending load applied 18 inches above
the top of underframe and no permanent deformation can occur; (2)(iii)
is a 45,000-pound bending load applied anywhere between the underframe
connection up to the roof structure connection without permanent
deformation. The transverse load requirements for the body corner post
are described in paragraph (2) are as follows: (2)(iv) is a 100,000-
pound shear load applied at a point even with the top of the underframe
without exceeding the shear strength of the post or the carbody
supporting structure; (2)(v) is a 30,000-pound bending load applied 18
inches above the top of underframe and no permanent deformation can
occur; and (2)(vi) is a 20,000-pound shear load applied at the
connection between the body corner post and the roof structure without
deforming the post or the supporting structure. The higher magnitude
loads applied in the transverse direction will result in a corner post
that is deeper than it is wide.
FRA is also proposing that the combination of the corner post and
the adjacent body corner post be capable of absorbing collision energy
prior to or during structural deformation, as demonstrated by either a
quasi static test or alternative dynamic qualification similar to the
provisions set out for qualification under paragraph (b).
FRA notes that it is proposing different speeds and different
points of contact for the dynamic testing alternatives given for
collision post equivalents and corner post equivalents. The collision
post equivalents are to be tested at 21 mph, and the corner post
equivalents at 20 mph--a difference of about 10% in total energy
involved. As the dynamic testing alternatives are intended to provide
an equivalent level of safety, the higher speed for dynamically testing
the collision posts reflects the more stringent quasi-static testing
requirements for collision posts. The collision posts have more
available space and a stronger support structure; hence, they can
absorb more energy than the corner posts. Nevertheless, the proposed
requirements for corner posts would more than double the amount of
energy required for the posts to fail, when compared to current FRA
requirements. Together, the proposed requirements for collision posts
and corner posts would significantly enhance the performance of the
posts in protecting occupants of cab cars and MU locomotives.
As noted above, FRA invites comment on the proposal to provide for
dynamic testing to demonstrate compliance by cab cars and MU
locomotives. Specifically, FRA invites comment on the dynamic testing
collision scenario included in the proposed rule for corner posts, and
invites comment suggesting any alternative collision scenario or way to
address possible future designs. Moreover, FRA invites comment whether
the final rule should provide for all cab cars and MU locomotives to be
tested dynamically to demonstrate compliance--whether or not they have
a shaped-nosed design or a CEM design--and, if so, whether the
collision scenario included in the proposed rule is appropriate or
whether another collision scenario would be.
Paragraph (d) would provide relief from utilization of a
traditional end frame structure provided that an
[[Page 42035]]
equivalent level of protection is afforded by the components of the CEM
system. In the FRA CEM design tested in March 2006, the end frame
structure was reinforced in order to support the loads introduced
through the deformable anti-climber. Significantly more energy was
absorbed in the deformation of the deformable anti-climber than the
combined requirements outlined for both collision and corner posts
while preserving all space for the locomotive engineer and passengers.
In the design under development for Metrolink in southern California,
an equivalent end frame structure is placed outboard of occupied space
with crush elements between the very end of the nose and the equivalent
end frame. For a grade crossing collision above the underframe of the
cab car it is expected that perhaps an order of magnitude or larger of
collision energy will be absorbed prior to any deformations into
occupied space.
Appendix A to Part 238--Schedule of Civil Penalties
Appendix A to part 238 contains a schedule of civil penalties for
use in connection with this part. FRA may revise the schedule of civil
penalties in issuing the final rule to reflect revisions made to part
238. Because such penalty schedules are statements of agency policy,
notice and comment are not required prior to their issuance. See 5
U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, commenters are invited to submit
suggestions to FRA describing the types of actions or omissions for
each proposed regulatory section that would subject a person to the
assessment of a civil penalty. Commenters are also invited to recommend
what penalties may be appropriate, based upon the relative seriousness
of each type of violation.
FRA notes that in December 2006 it published proposed statements of
agency policy that would amend the 25 schedules of civil penalties
issued as appendixes to FRA's safety regulations, including part 238.
See 71 FR 70589; Dec. 5, 2006. The proposed revisions are intended to
reflect more accurately the safety risks associated with violations of
the rail safety laws and regulations, as well as to make sure that the
civil penalty amounts are consistent across all safety regulations.
Although the schedules are statements of agency policy, and FRA has
authority to issue the revisions without having to follow the notice
and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA has
provided members and representatives of the general public an
opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions before amending them.
FRA is currently evaluating all of the comments received in preparing
final statements of agency policy, and the schedule of civil penalties
to part 238 may be revised as a result, independent of this rulemaking
proceeding.
V. Regulatory Impact and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures, and it has been determined not to be
significant under either Executive Order 12866 or DOT policies and
procedures (44 FR 11034; Feb. 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in
the docket a regulatory evaluation addressing the economic impact of
this proposed rule. Document inspection and copying facilities are
available at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590. Access to the docket may
also be obtained electronically through the Web site for the DOT Docket
Management System at http://dms.dot.gov. Photocopies may also be
obtained by submitting a written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at
Office of Chief Counsel, Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590; please refer to Docket No.
FRA-2006-25268. FRA invites comments on the regulatory evaluation.
The regulatory evaluation explains that the proposed requirements
are based on industry standards, which every affected cab car or MU
locomotive from currently producing manufacturers would now meet.
Consequently, the proposed requirements are not expected to affect any
units in production by current manufacturers, and are, therefore,
estimated to have zero costs and benefits for such units. The proposed
requirements would affect cab cars and MU locomotives from other
potential manufacturers if those units were of a design which would not
meet the proposed requirements. However, it is highly speculative
whether any non-conforming cab car or MU locomotive would ever be
produced, even in the absence of this proposal. Further, as discussed
in detail above, States are preempted from imposing by regulation
other, potentially conflicting, or more burdensome requirements.
Were any cab cars or MU locomotives to be affected by this
proposal, the estimated benefits would be about $16,000 per cab car or
MU locomotive, discounted at 7% over 20 years, and the estimated costs
would be only about $2,000 per cab car or MU locomotive, also
discounted at 7% over 20 years. Therefore, FRA estimates that the net
benefit, discounted at 7% over 20 years, would be about $14,000 per
such cab car or MU locomotive. However, because FRA believes that no
units will be affected, FRA estimates that the present value of the
total 20-year costs which the industry would be expected to incur to
comply with the requirements proposed in this rule is zero, as is the
anticipated benefits.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and Executive
Order 13272 require a review of proposed and final rules to assess
their impact on small entities. FRA has prepared and placed in the
docket an Analysis of Impact on Small Entities (AISE) that assesses the
small entity impact of this proposal. Document inspection and copying
facilities are available at the Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590. Docket
material is also available for inspection on the Internet at
http://dms.dot.gov. Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a
written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at Office of Chief Counsel, Stop
10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20590; please refer to Docket No. FRA-2006-25268.
The AISE developed in connection with this NPRM concludes that this
proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. The principal entities impacted
by the rule would be governmental jurisdictions or transit
authorities--none of which is small for purposes of the United States
Small Business Administration (i.e., no entity serves a locality with a
population less than 50,000). These entities also receive Federal
transportation funds. Although these entities are not small, the level
of costs incurred by each entity should generally vary in proportion to
either the size of the entity, or the extent to which the entity
purchases newly manufactured passenger equipment, or both. Tourist,
scenic, excursion, and historic passenger railroad operations would be
exempt from the rule, and, therefore, these smaller operations would
not incur any costs.
[[Page 42036]]
The rule would impact passenger car manufacturers. In general,
these entities are principally large international corporations that
would not be considered small entities. However, it is possible that a
smaller entity, such as a small domestic manufacturer of rail cars,
could be impacted if the requirements of the final rule do not provide
sufficient flexibility for shaped-nosed MU locomotives and cab cars of
the type it manufactures.
Having made these determinations, FRA certifies that this proposed
rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act or Executive Order 13272.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
FRA has analyzed the proposed rule in accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) to determine whether it
would result in any new or additional information collection
requirements. FRA has determined that no new or additional information
collection requirements would result from the rule as proposed. FRA
invites comment on this determination and whether the proposed rule
would in fact result in any new or additional information collection
requirements. Should any new or additional information collection
requirements result from this rulemaking, FRA intends to obtain current
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control numbers for any such
collection requirement prior to the effective date of a final rule. FRA
is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB
control number, if required.
D. Federalism Implications
FRA has analyzed this proposed rule in accordance with the
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13132, issued on
August 4, 1999, which directs Federal agencies to exercise great care
in establishing policies that have federalism implications. See 64 FR
43255. This proposed rule would not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
various levels of government.
FRA does note that it is clarifying the preemptive effect of this
proposed rule and the underlying regulations it is proposing to amend.
See the discussion of Sec. 238.13, Preemptive effect, above. In
particular, FRA believes that it has preempted any State law,
regulation, or order, including State common law, concerning the
operation of a cab car or MU locomotive as the leading unit of a passenger
train. FRA has taken into account the federalism principles and criteria
contained in Executive Order 13132 in making this determination.
One of the fundamental federalism principles, as stated in Section
2(a) of Executive Order 13132, is that ``[f]ederalism is rooted in the
belief that issues that are not national in scope or significance are
most appropriately addressed by the level of government closest to the
people.'' Congress expressed its intent that there be national
uniformity of regulation concerning railroad safety matters when it
issued 49 U.S.C. 20106, which provides that all regulations prescribed
by the Secretary with respect to railroad safety matters and the
Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to railroad security
matters preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same
subject matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal
law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce. This intent was expressed even more specifically
in 49 U.S.C. 20133, which mandated that the Secretary of Transportation
prescribe ``regulations establishing minimum standards for the safety
of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers'' and
consider such matters as ``the crashworthiness of the cars'' before
prescribing the regulations. This proposed rule is intended to add to
and enhance these regulations, originally issued on May 12, 1999,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20133.
Further, federalism concerns have been considered in the
development of this NPRM both internally and through consultation
within the RSAC forum, as described in Section II of this preamble,
above. The full RSAC, which reached consensus on the proposal (with the
exception discussed above concerning cab cars and MU locomotives
without flat-ends or with CEM designs, or both) and then recommended it
to FRA, has as permanent voting members two organizations representing
State and local interests: AASHTO and ASRSM. As such, these State
organizations concurred with the proposed requirements (again, with the
exception noted above). The RSAC regularly provides recommendations to
the FRA Administrator for solutions to regulatory issues that reflect
significant input from its State members. To date, FRA has received no
indication of concerns about the Federalism implications of this
rulemaking from these representatives or from any other representative
on the Committee.
For the foregoing reasons, FRA believes that this proposed rule is
in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive
Order 13132.
E. Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated this proposed regulation in accordance with its
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures)
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999) as required by the National Environmental
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes,
Executive Orders, and related regulatory requirements. FRA has
determined that this proposed regulation is not a major FRA action
(requiring the preparation of an environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment) because it is categorically excluded from
detailed environmental review pursuant to section 4(c)(20) of FRA's
Procedures. 64 FR 28547, May 26, 1999. In accordance with section 4(c)
and (e) of FRA's Procedures, the agency has further concluded that no
extraordinary circumstances exist with respect to this regulation that
might trigger the need for a more detailed environmental review. As a
result, FRA finds that this proposed regulation is not a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Pursuant to Section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless
otherwise prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector
(other than to the extent that such regulations incorporate
requirements specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act
(2 U.S.C. 1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general
notice of proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the
promulgation of any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may
result in expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted
annually for inflation)[currently $120,700,000]
in any 1 year, and
before promulgating any final rule for which a general notice of
proposed rulemaking was published, the agency shall prepare a written
statement'' detailing the effect
[[Page 42037]]
on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector. The
proposed rule would not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of
$120,700,000 or more in any one year, and thus preparation of such a
statement is not required.
G. Energy Impact
Executive Order 13211 requires Federal agencies to prepare a
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' 66
FR 28355 ( May 22, 2001). Under the Executive Order, a ``significant
energy action'' is defined as any action by an agency (normally
published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to
lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including
notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices
of proposed rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a significant regulatory action
under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is likely
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or
use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the Administrator of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy
action. FRA has evaluated this NPRM in accordance with Executive Order
13211. FRA has determined that this NPRM is not likely to have a
significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of
energy. Consequently, FRA has determined that this regulatory action is
not a ``significant energy action'' within the meaning of Executive
Order 13211.
H. Trade Impact
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. No. 96-39, 19 U.S.C. 2501
et seq.) prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or
related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as
safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
FRA has assessed the potential effect of this rulemaking on foreign
commerce and believes that the proposed requirements are consistent
with the Trade Agreements Act. The requirements proposed are safety
standards, which, as noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to
trade. Moreover, FRA has sought, to the extent practicable, to propose
the requirements in terms of the performance desired, rather than in
more narrow terms restricted to a particular design, so as not to limit
alternative, compliant designs by any manufacturer--foreign or domestic.
For related discussion on the international effects of this part,
please see the preamble to the May 12, 1999 Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards final rule on the topic of ``United States international
treaty obligations,'' 64 FR 25545.
I. Privacy Act
FRA wishes to inform all potential commenters that anyone is able
to search the electronic form of all comments received into any agency
docket by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing
the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70;
Pages 19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 238
Passenger equipment, Penalties, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
The Proposed Rule
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA proposes to amend
part 238 of chapter II, subtitle B of Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 238--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-20303,
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49
CFR 1.49.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
2. Section 238.13 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 238.13 Preemptive effect.
Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of these regulations preempts any
State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject matter,
except an additional or more stringent law, regulation or order that is
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or
security hazard; that is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or
order of the United States Government; and that does not unreasonably
burden interstate commerce.
3. Section 238.205 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read:
Sec. 238.205 Anti-climbing mechanism.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, all passenger
equipment placed in service for the first time on or after September 8,
2000 shall have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing
mechanism capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of
100,000 pounds without permanent deformation. When coupled together in
any combination to join two vehicles, AAR Type H and Type F tight-lock
couplers satisfy this requirement.
* * * * *
4. Section 238.211 is amended by revising the introductory text of
paragraph (a), the introductory text of paragraph (b) and paragraph
(b)(2), redesignating paragraph (c) as paragraph (d) and revising it,
and by adding new paragraphs (c) and (e) to read as follows:
Sec. 238.211 Collision posts.
(a) Except as further specified in this paragraph and paragraphs
(b) through (d) of this section--
* * * * *
(b) Each locomotive, including a cab car and an MU locomotive,
ordered on or after September 8, 2000, or placed in service for the
first time on or after September 9, 2002 (except a conventional
locomotive manufactured on or after January 1, 2009, which shall be
subject to the requirements of subpart D of part 229 of this chapter),
shall have at its forward end, in lieu of the structural protection
described in paragraph (a) of this section either:
(1) * * *
(2) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of the
forces that each collision post in paragraph (b)(1) of this section is
required to withstand.
(c) Each cab car and MU locomotive ordered on or after October 1,
2009, or placed in service for the first time on or after October 2,
2011, shall have at its forward end, in lieu of the structural
protection described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, two
forward collision posts, located at approximately the one-third points
laterally, meeting the following requirements:
(1) Each collision post, with the supporting car body structure,
shall be capable of withstanding the following loads individually
applied at any angle within 15 degrees of the longitudinal axis:
(i) A 500,000-pound longitudinal force applied at the connection to
the top of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the post or supporting car body structure;
[[Page 42038]]
(ii) A 200,000-pound longitudinal force applied 30 inches above the
connection of the post to the underframe, without exceeding the
ultimate strength of the post or supporting car body structure; and
(iii) A 60,000-pound longitudinal force applied at any height along
the post above the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation
of the post or supporting car body structure; and
(2) Each collision post shall also be capable of absorbing
collision energy prior to or during structural deformation, as
demonstrated by one of the following methods:
(i) Quasi-static method. Each collision post shall be demonstrated
to absorb a minimum of 135,000 ft-lbs (0.18 MJ) of energy when loaded
longitudinally at a height of 30 inches above the connection of the
post to the underframe, while not permanently deflecting more than 10
inches longitudinally. There shall be no complete separation of the
post from its connections to the supporting structure; or
(ii) Dynamic method. The front end structure shall be demonstrated
to be capable of withstanding a frontal impact with a proxy object that
is intended to approximate lading carried by a highway vehicle under
the following conditions:
(A) The proxy object shall have a cylindrical shape, diameter of 48
inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds. The
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be offset by 19 inches from
the longitudinal axis of the cab car or MU locomotive, which shall be
ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be 30 inches above the top
of the finished floor; and
(B) The cab car or MU locomotive and its end structure must
withstand a 21 mph impact with the proxy object resulting in no more
than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally into the occupied area of
the vehicle, and without separation of the attachments of any
structural members. (A graphical description of the frontal impact is
provided in Figure 1 to subpart C.)
(d) The end structure requirements of this section apply only to
the ends of a semi-permanently coupled consist of articulated units,
provided that:
(1) The railroad submits to the FRA Associate Administrator for
Safety under the procedures specified in Sec. 238.21 a documented
engineering analysis establishing that the articulated connection is
capable of preventing disengagement and telescoping to the same extent
as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post
requirements contained in this subpart; and
(2) FRA finds the analysis persuasive.
(e) In the case of a cab car or MU locomotive designed to provide
the benefits of crash energy management, the end structure requirements
of this section are satisfied if the requirements of this section are
met with respect to the portion of the car or MU locomotive outboard of
the areas occupied by crew members and passengers.
5. Section 238.213 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 238.213 Corner posts.
(a) Except as further specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this
section, each passenger car and MU locomotive shall have at each end of
the car, placed ahead of the occupied volume, two full-height corner
posts capable of resisting:
(1)(i) A horizontal load of 150,000 pounds at the point of
attachment to the underframe, without failure;
(ii) A horizontal load of 20,000 pounds at the point of attachment
to the roof structure, without failure; and
(iii) A horizontal load of 30,000 pounds applied 18 inches above
the top of the floor, without permanent deformation.
(2) For purposes of this paragraph (a), the orientation of the
applied horizontal loads shall range from longitudinal inward to
transverse inward.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, each cab
car and MU locomotive ordered on or after October 1, 2009, or placed in
service for the first time on or after October 2, 2011, shall have at
its forward end, in lieu of the structural protection described in
paragraph (a) of this section, two corner posts ahead of the occupied
volume, meeting the following requirements:
(1) Each post, with the supporting car body structure, shall be
capable of withstanding the following loads individually applied toward
the inside of the vehicle at all angles in the range from longitudinal
to lateral:
(i) A 300,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with the
top of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the
post or supporting car body structure;
(ii) A 100,000-pound longitudinal force exerted 18 inches above the
joint of the post to the underframe, without permanent deformation of
the post or supporting car body structure; and
(iii) A 45,000-pound longitudinal force applied at any height along
the post above the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation
of the post or supporting car body structure; and
(2) Each corner post shall also be capable of absorbing collision
energy prior to or during structural deformation, as demonstrated by
one of the following methods:
(i) Quasi-static method. Each corner post shall be demonstrated to
be capable of absorbing a minimum of 120,000 ft-lbs (O.16 MJ) of energy
when loaded longitudinally at a height of 30 inches above the
connection of the post to the underframe, while not permanently
deflecting more than 10 inches longitudinally. There shall be no
complete separation of the post from its connections to the supporting
structure; or
(ii) Dynamic method. The front end structure shall be demonstrated
to be capable of withstanding frontal impact with a proxy object that
is intended to approximate lading carried by a highway vehicle under
the following conditions:
(A) The proxy object shall have a cylindrical shape, diameter of 48
inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds. The
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be aligned with the
outboard edge of the side of the cab car or MU locomotive, which shall
be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be 30 inches above the top
of the finished floor; and
(B) The cab car or MU locomotive and its end structure must
withstand a 20 mph impact with the proxy object resulting in no more
than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally into the occupied area of
the cab car or MU locomotive, and without separation of the attachments
of any structural members. (A graphical description of the frontal
impact is provided in Figure 2 to subpart C.)
(c) Each cab car and MU locomotive ordered on or after October 1,
2009, or placed in service for the first time on or after October 2,
2011, utilizing low-level passenger boarding on the non-operating side
of the cab end shall meet the corner post requirements of paragraph (b)
of this section for the corner post on the side of the cab containing
the control stand, and the following structural requirements for the
corner post and the adjacent body corner post on the opposite side of
the cab from the control stand:
(1) The corner post on the opposite side of the cab from the
control stand, with the supporting car body structure, shall be capable
of withstanding the following horizontal loads individually applied
toward the inside of the vehicle:
(i) A 150,000-pound longitudinal force at the point even with the
top of
[[Page 42039]]
the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post or
supporting car body structure;
(ii) A 30,000-pound longitudinal force at a point 18 inches above
the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation;
(iii) A 30,000-pound longitudinal force at the point of attachment
to the roof structure, without permanent deformation;
(iv) A 20,000-pound longitudinal force anywhere between the top of
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the
underframe, without permanent deformation of the post or supporting
structure;
(v) A 300,000-pound transverse force at a point even with the top
of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post
or supporting car body structure;
(vi) A 100,000-pound transverse force at a point 18 inches above
the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation; and
(vii) A 45,000-pound transverse force anywhere between the top of
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the
underframe, without permanent deformation of the post or supporting
structure.
(2) The body corner post on the opposite side of the cab from the
control stand, with the supporting car body structure, shall be capable
of withstanding the following horizontal loads individually applied
toward the inside of the vehicle:
(i) A 300,000-pound longitudinal force at a point even with the top
of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post
or supporting car body structure;
(ii) A 100,000-pound longitudinal force at a point 18 inches above
the top of the underframe, without permanent deformation;
(iii) A 45,000-pound longitudinal force anywhere between the top of
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the
underframe, without permanent deformation or supporting structure;
(iv) A 100,000-pound transverse force at a point even with the top
of the underframe, without exceeding the ultimate strength of the post
or supporting car body structure;
(v) A 30,000-pound transverse force at a point 18 inches above the
top of the underframe, without permanent deformation; and
(vi) A 20,000-pound transverse force anywhere between the top of
the post at its connection to the roof structure, and the top of the
underframe, without deformation of the post or supporting structure,
and
(3) The combination of the corner post and the adjacent body corner
post shall also be capable of absorbing collision energy prior to or
during structural deformation, as demonstrated by one of the following
methods:
(i) Quasi-static method. The two posts in combination shall be
demonstrated to be capable of absorbing a minimum of 120,000 ft-lbs
(O.16 MJ) of energy when loaded longitudinally at a height of 30 inches
above the connection of the posts to the underframe, while not
permanently deflecting the body corner post than 10 inches
longitudinally. There shall be no complete separation of the body
corner post from its connections to the supporting structure; or
(ii) Dynamic method. The front end structure on the non-operating
side of the cab shall be demonstrated to be capable of withstanding
frontal impact with a proxy object that is intended to approximate
lading carried by a highway vehicle under the following conditions:
(A) The proxy object shall have a cylindrical shape, diameter of 48
inches, length of 36 inches, and minimum weight of 10,000 pounds. The
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be aligned with the
outboard edge of the side of the cab car or MU locomotive, which shall
be ballasted to weigh a minimum of 100,000 pounds. At impact, the
longitudinal axis of the proxy object shall be 30 inches above the top
of the finished floor; and
(B) The cab car or MU locomotive and its end structure on the non-
operating side of the cab must withstand a 20 mph impact with the proxy
object resulting in no more than 10 inches of intrusion longitudinally
into the occupied area of the cab car or MU locomotive, and without
separation of the attachments of the body corner post. (A graphical
description of the frontal impact is provided in Figure 3 to subpart C.)
(d) In the case of a cab car or MU locomotive designed to provide
the benefits of crash energy management, the end structure requirements
of this section are satisfied if the requirements of this section are
met with respect to the portion of the cab car or MU locomotive
outboard of the areas occupied by crew members and passengers.
6. Add Appendix to Subpart C of Part 238, consisting of figures 1,
2, and 3, to read as follows:
Appendix to Subpart C of Part 238
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
[[Page 42040]]
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.003
[[Page 42041]]
[GRAPHIC]
[TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.004
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 26, 2007.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Federal Railroad Administrator.
[FR Doc. 07-3736 Filed 7-31-07: 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C