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Science Advisory Board
Q: And the Science Advisory Board (SAB) played that function?
MR. COSTLE: Very much so. I had a wonderful man running that, Dick Dowd, whom I had originally met in Connecticut. Dick was one of those rare scientists who could explain the most complex scientific issues in language that everybody could understand, and do so in an intellectually honest way. He had a genuine sense of humility. Everybody thought of him as a very important resource and potential ally. I always knew I could turn to him in a crunch, and get really good, solid advice. Steve Gage was that way, too. Steve had actually served on a nuclear submarine and had taught classes for converting nuclear engineers to civilian power plant operators. Dick was a high-energy physicist by training.
Dick and Steve proved their value continuously, not just to me but to other government officials. I remember when Peter Bradford and Victor Delinsky, from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, came over and said, "We have this incident at Three Mile Island that you ought to know about." I asked Dick and Steve what they thought had happened. Simultaneously they told me that there had probably been a disintegration in the core, and hydrogen gas was building up. That was exactly the case. During this entire event, by the way, EPA's role was primarily to monitor the ambient atmosphere for any signs of radioactive leakage. Thank God, the container held. But being able to pinpoint the scientific and technological facts, and give a precise assessment of potential effects, severity, etc., is only one illustration of their value, as scientists and as advisors.
Q: What about your relationship to the general scientific community, outside the Science Advisory Board and ORD (Office of Research and Development)?
MR. COSTLE: The SAB was my most effective way of connecting with the outside science community. But we also set up ad hoc committees to provide vehicles for addressing specific issues. When I wanted outside advice, for example, about air quality standards, we could convene five or six of the best scientists in the country and talk it over. They would review the studies, and I was able to interrogate them. "If we set the standard here, would you be comfortable? Why, or why not?" With the ozone standard, for instance, once I knew that the leading scientists were comfortable that we had defined the range, the upper and lower bounds, adequately, I then felt on defensible ground in setting the standard within that boundary. That might still leave a $1 or $2 billion difference in cost between the upper and lower bounds. That had to be viewed within the architecture of the Clean Air Act, which requires EPA to build in an adequate margin of safety. How do you define that? Interesting issues, and challenging to puzzle over. It was also a pleasure to have very bright people around to help you think it through.