UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of )
)
Franklin and Leonhardt Excavating ) Docket No. CAA-98-011
Company, Inc., )
)
Respondent )
)
Order Denying Complainant's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses
1. Background
The Amended Administrative Complaint (Complaint) in this proceeding was filed on
September 23, 1998, alleging that Respondent, Franklin and Leonhardt Excavating Company,
Inc., violated the federal regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act, namely the National
Emissions Standards for Asbestos, at 40 C.F.R. Part 61 Subpart M. The Complaint alleged that
after Respondent demolished an elementary school building, inspectors from the local Air
Pollution Control District found regulated asbestos containing material (RACM) at the site. The
Complaint alleged three counts of violation, namely that Respondent failed to inspect the school
building for the presence of asbestos, failed to remove all RACM prior to demolition, and failed
to adequately wet the asbestos at all times until disposal. Respondent filed an Answer to the
Complaint, denying the allegations of violation and asserting four affirmative defenses.
On November 13, 1998, Complainant submitted a Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses
(Motion), requesting that all four of Respondent's affirmative defenses be stricken as
insufficient, frivolous, redundant, and/or immaterial. Respondent filed a written Response
opposing the Motion on November 30, 1998.
II. Arguments of the Parties
Complainant cites to federal caselaw interpreting the standard for striking defenses under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(f), which provides that a "court may order stricken
from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or
scandalous matter."
Respondent's Affirmative Defense labeled "A" in its Answer states as follows:
The conduct of the Air Pollution Control District, as agent for Environmental
Protection agency, as hereinafter set out, constitute a Waiver of any duty,
contractual or legal, to inspect or remove RACM material (sic).
Respondent explains in its Answer that it performed the demolition of the Lowell
Elementary School pursuant to contract for the Regional Airport Authority, site owner, and
pursuant to directions from Coradino Group, the managers of the demolition project.
Respondent asserts that it relied upon the issuance of a Demolition Permit from the City of
Louisville, which stated, "See Air Pollution Control approval in file," which had been attached to
its application for the permit. According to Respondent, it relied also upon facts stated in certain
documents, such as a Jefferson County Air Pollution Control District memorandum which stated,
"On November 8, 1993 no residue of asbestos containing material was found during a visual
inspection of the house, where Dore and Associates(1) abated asbestos containing material from
Lowell Elementary School." (Respondent's Answer, Exhibit 2). Respondent argues that the Air
Pollution Control District issued the permit approving demolition and represented to Respondent
that the building was free of RACM, so EPA waived its right to assert the charges in the
Complaint.
Complainant asserts that this defense is insufficient as a matter of law and frivolous, on
grounds that the federal regulations include requirements of inspection for asbestos and removal
of asbestos prior to demolition of a building (see, 40 C.F.R. § 61.145), and that the Air Pollution
Control District as a matter of law cannot absolve or excuse a person from performing those
requirements. Complainant points out that subsection 112(l) of the Clean Air Act, which
governs State programs for hazardous air pollutants, states in paragraph (7), "Nothing in this
subsection shall prohibit the Administrator from enforcing any applicable emission standard or
requirement under this section." Complainant points out additionally that the regulations at 40
C.F.R. Part 61 Subpart M have no provision for waiver.
Respondent's Affirmative Defense "B" states as follows:
F&L [Respondent] relies on the conduct of Air Pollution Control District, as agent
of [EPA], as hereinafter set out, in approving demolition and Complainant is
thereby estopped from asserting the allegations in the [Complaint].
Respondent explains that a demolition permit is not issued until the building is safe for
demolition, including removal of asbestos. According to Respondent, the Regional Airport
authority employed Doerr & Associates, a certified asbestos removal contractor, which reported
to the Air Pollution Control District its intent to conduct asbestos abatement starting August 2,
1993 (Response, Exhibit B-2). Respondent was not licensed for asbestos removal; thus, Doerr &
Associates had the duty to remove asbestos rather than Respondent, it asserts. After Doerr
completed its work, the owner, Doerr, Respondent and the Air Pollution Control District
inspected the building and found all asbestos containing material had been removed, Respondent
asserts. As a result of relying on issuance of the permit, approval by the Air Pollution Control
District and the inspection, Respondent believed that all RACM had been removed from the
school building and that it was free to perform the demolition without being in violation of air
pollution laws.
Complainant argues that the affirmative defense is insufficient as a matter of law and
redundant. Complainant points out that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the
Government, "affirmative misconduct" must be demonstrated. Respondent has not alleged facts
which show "affirmative misconduct," according to Complainant.
Respondent's Affirmative Defense labeled "C" states:
An unreasonably long time passed between the alleged act and the
commencement of this action, F&L relying on failure to notice F&L and the
occurrence of events as hereinafter set out, pleads laches as a bar to the claims set
out against F&L.
Respondent explains that EPA failed to prosecute for four years after knowing the facts described
in the Complaint and that during that time persons with knowledge of the facts alleged in the
Answer have died, moved, decreased in memory and are no longer available as witnesses, and
that documents have been lost, mislaid or destroyed.
Complainant asserts that Affirmative Defense "C" is legally insufficient, redundant and
frivolous. Complainant points out that, as stated in its Answer, Respondent knew of the
violations when the Air Pollution Control District discovered asbestos at the site three months
after demolition of the school building.
Respondent argues that Respondent only received notice of one alleged violation, failure
to wet the asbestos. Respondent asserts that two of the firms involved in the demolition no
longer exist and a bonding firm is in receivership, and that it has been unable to obtain records of
those firms.
Respondent's final Affirmative Defense, labeled "D," states as follows:
License, Authority, Justification - Issuance by Complainant through its agent, Air
Pollution Control District, of a certificate for demolition of the Lowell School
Building, authorized F&L to demolish without inspection and/or removal of
RACM before demolition. . . . Receipt by F&L of an Order from [Regional
Airport Authority] to vacate the premises, required F&L to vacate.
Respondent asserts that Complainant is barred from enforcing the allegations of the Complaint,
because the Air Pollution Control District certified that the building is free from asbestos. The
Air Pollution Control District's approval for demolition in the permit, and its memorandum
report that Doerr and Associates had abated asbestos containing material from the school
building, was a license and authority for Respondent to demolish and that Respondent was
justified in relying on these documents. Respondent asserts that upon its employee's report to
the Regional Airport Authority of his suspicion that a pile of debris contained asbestos,
Respondent was instructed by the Regional Airport Authority to leave the site and not contact the
suspected substances. Respondent states that it was forbidden by its contract from removing
RACM.
Complainant asserts that no action of the Air Pollution Control District can serve to give
Respondent authority to ignore the requirements of the Federal regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 61
Subpart M. Complainant asserts further that the Answer indicates that Respondent was legally
and contractually responsible for the demolition debris, so the "Order"to vacate is immaterial.
III. Discussion
The Federal courts assert principles which discourage application of affirmative defenses,
such as laches and estoppel, against the Government when acting to protect the public interests:
The Government, which holds its interests in trust for all the people, is not to be
deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for
private disputes . . . [and] . . . cannot . . . lose its valuable rights by . . .
acquiescence, laches, or failure to act.
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 141
(1983); Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59-61
(1984)(the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant; official
misconduct and detrimental reliance must be shown); United States v. Administrative
Enterprises, Inc., 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995)(discussing availability of laches as a defense against
the Government). Similarly, a waiver of enforcement of a statute or its requirements to protect
public health and the environment is not easily construed against the Government.(2) See, United
States v. Noble Oil Co., 28 ERC 1460, 1469, 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11526 (D. N.J. 1988).
Nevertheless, the facts in this proceeding have not yet been developed, as the prehearing
exchange has not yet been completed. It is observed that subsection 112(l) of the Clean Air Act
provides that "A program submitted by a State . . . may provide for partial or complete delegation
of the Administrator's authorities and responsibilities to implement and enforce emissions
standards and prevention requirements . . . ." Paragraph (8) of that subsection provides that "The
Administrator may . . . approve a program developed and submitted by a local air pollution
control agency . . . and any such agency implementing an approved program may take any action
authorized to be taken by a State under this section." The Jefferson County Air Pollution
Control District's authority in relation to EPA is not clear from the record as it now stands.
Where the case record is largely undeveloped and any evidence relating to the defenses
may be relevant to the determination of a penalty, such evidence should be heard. Motions to
strike are not favored and will be denied "unless the legal insufficiency of the defense is 'clearly
apparent' . . . the underpinning of this principle rests on a concern that a court should refrain
from evaluating the merits if a defense where . . . the background of a case is largely
undeveloped." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3rd Cir. 1988), on remand,
649 F. Supp. 238, motion denied, 802 F.2d 658, on remand, 649 F. Supp. 644, cert. denied, 107
S.Ct. 907. The Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses will be denied.
Order
Accordingly, Complainant's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses is DENIED.
_____________________________
Stephen J. McGuire
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: December 7, 1998
Washington, D.C.
1. The memorandum refers to the company "Dore & Associates," but Respondent spells
the company name as "Doerr & Associates Contracting, Inc."
2. Waiver means an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege. Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1970). Any waiver to be implied
from conduct must be "clear, decisive and unequivocal of purpose." Id.
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