UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF: )
)
STEWART FURNITURE MANUFACTURING CO. )
and THE BEVERLY-MIKE COMPANY, INC., ) DKT. No. EPCRA-09-95-0010
)
Respondents )
DEFAULT ORDER AND INITIAL DECISION
This proceeding was commenced on August 1, 1995 with the
filing of a Complaint by the Complainant Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) against Respondent Stewart Furniture Manufacturing
Co. The Complaint charged the Respondent with three violations
of Section 313 of the Emergency Community Right-To-Know Act of
1986 (EPCRA), 40 C.F.R. §372.25 as a result of the Respondent's
failure to file Toxic Chemical Release Reporting Forms (Form R)
for 1,1,1-trichloroethane in 1992 and 1993 in two separate
facilities and proposed a $15,000 penalty.
On August 21, 1995, the Complainant filed a First Amended
Civil Complaint adding as an additional Respondent The Beverly-MIKE Company, Inc. Both Respondents are alleged to own and
operate two furniture manufacturing facilities which are the
subject of the Complaint.
On or about September 12, 1995, Respondent The Beverly-MIKE
Co., Inc., through counsel, filed an Answer to the First Amended
Civil Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint"). The Answer alleged
that Respondent Stewart Furniture Company and Respondent The
Beverly-MIKE Company, Inc. had merged into The Beverly-MIKE
Company, Inc. on October 20, 1993.(1) In the Answer, Respondents
denied the alleged violations, requested a hearing, set forth an
affirmative defense alleging that Respondents were not required
to file a Form R, and set forth defenses with regard to the
proposed penalty.
Pursuant to an Order, dated November 6, 1996, of the
previously designated Presiding Officer, the parties were
directed to submit prehearing exchange documents by February 15,
1997. None of the parties submitted prehearing exchange
documents by that date. On February 24, 1997, Complainant filed
a Motion to Continue the Prehearing Exchange. The following day,
Respondents' counsel submitted a letter to the undersigned
stating that Respondents concurred in the Motion to Continue,
that Respondents' counsel had joined a new firm, and that there
was a strong possibility for settlement of the matter.
Respondents' counsel stated that his failure to file the
prehearing documents was "due to a personal situation that I can
assure the court is impossible to repeat."
On February 26, 1997, the undersigned issued an Order
Reestablishing Prehearing Exchange Schedule (the Prehearing
Order) which granted the Motion to Continue, and specifically
advised the parties that "the Rules [40 C.F.R. Part 22] require
that motions for extensions of time be filed prior to the
deadline sought to be extended therein and that motions filed
after such deadline, without good cause having been shown
therefor, are automatically rejected." The parties were required
in the Prehearing Order to file prehearing exchanges in seriatim
fashion, as follows: Complainant's Initial Prehearing Exchange
was due on June 1, 1997; Respondent's Initial Prehearing Exchange
was due on July 1, 1997; and Complainant's Rebuttal Prehearing
Exchange was due on July 15, 1997.
In addition, the Prehearing Order stated as follows:
If the Respondent elects only to conduct cross-examination of Complainant's witnesses and to forgo the
presentation of direct and/or rebuttal evidence, the
Respondent shall serve a statement to that effect on or
before the date for filing its prehearing exchange.
The Respondent is hereby notified that its failure to
either comply with the prehearing exchange requirements
set forth herein or to state that it is electing only
to conduct cross-examination of the Complainant's
Witnesses, can result in the entry of a default
judgment against it. . . . THE MERE PENDENCY OF
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR
FAILING TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE PREHEARING EXCHANGE
REQUIREMENTS.
Complainant filed timely its prehearing exchange on May 30,
1997 as well as an addendum to the prehearing exchange on June 3,
1997.
To date, Respondents have not filed any prehearing exchange
nor a statement otherwise responding to the Prehearing Order.(2) Furthermore, to date, Respondents have not filed a motion to
extend the time for filing a prehearing exchange. According to
the Consolidated Rules of Practice, 40 C.F.R. section 22.07(b),
such a motion had to be filed in advance of the date on which the
prehearing exchange was due to be filed.
Section 22.17(a) of the Consolidated Rules of Practice
provides in pertinent part that:
A party may be found in default (1) after motion, upon
failure to file a timely answer to the complaint; (2)
after motion or sua sponte, upon failure to comply with
a prehearing or hearing order of the Presiding Officer
. . . . Default by Respondent constitutes, for purposes
of the pending action only, an admission of all facts
alleged in the complaint and a waiver of respondent's
right to a hearing on such factual allegations. If the
complaint is for the assessment of a civil penalty, the
penalty proposed in the complaint shall become due and
payable by respondent without further proceedings sixty
(60) days after a final order issued upon default.
* * * *
Thus, for their failure to comply with the Prehearing Order
requiring submission of a prehearing exchange or statement in
lieu thereof on or before July 1, 1997, the Respondents are
hereby found to be in default. In accordance with Rule 22.17(a),
this constitutes an admission of the facts alleged in the Amended
Complaint and for assessment of the penalty of $15,000 proposed
within.
The following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are
based upon the Amended Complaint, Complainant's Prehearing
Exchange, and other documents of record in this case.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Stewart Furniture Manufacturing Company is a California
corporation.
2. The Beverly-MIKE Co., Inc. is a California corporation.
3. No documents were submitted into the record in support
of the statement in the Answer that Stewart Furniture
Manufacturing Company merged into The Beverly-MIKE Co., Inc.
4. Respondents own and operate two furniture manufacturing
facilities in California, in Pico Rivera and in the City of
Commerce ("Facility One" and "Facility Two" respectively, or
"Facilities").
5. Each of the Facilities has 10 or more "full time
employees."
6. The Facilities are classified in Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) Code 25.
7. Subsection 313 of EPCRA provides that a facility which
has 10 or more full-time employees and that is in SIC Codes 20
through 39, and which manufactured, processed or otherwise used a
toxic chemical listed under subsection 313(c) of EPCRA in excess
of the threshold quantity established under subsection 313(f) of
EPCRA, must submit a toxic chemical release form (Form R) for
each such chemical for the calendar year for which such a release
form is required.
8. Pursuant to sections 313 and 328 of EPCRA, EPA
promulgated the Toxic Chemical Release Reporting: Community
Right-to-Know Rule, 40 C.F.R. Part 372. Chemicals which are
required to be reported under section 313(c) of EPCRA are listed
in 40 C.F.R. § 372.65. Thresholds for reporting releases are
established in 40 C.F.R. § 372.25. For each chemical listed in
section 372.65 known to be manufactured, processed, or otherwise
used in excess of the applicable threshold quantity, the owner or
operator of the facility must submit to EPA and to the State in
which the facility is located a completed Form R by July 1 of the
following year, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 372.30. With respect to
a chemical "otherwise used" at a facility, the threshold amount
for purposes of reporting under section 372.30 is 10,000 pounds,
according to section 313(f) of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. § 372.25(b).
A. Count I
9. The chemical 1,1,1-trichloroethane, Chemical Abstracts
Services (CAS) No. 71-55-6, is listed in 40 C.F.R. § 372.65 as a
chemical to which 40 C.F.R. Part 372 applies.
10. During calendar year 1991, 1,1,1-trichloroethane was
"otherwise used" at Facility One, as that term is defined in 40
C.F.R. § 372.3, in quantities exceeding the threshold established
by section 313(f) of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. § 372.25.
11. Respondents were required to submit a Form R to EPA and
to the State of California, a Form R for 1,1,1-trichloroethane at
Facility One for calendar year 1992 on or before July 1, 1993.
12. Respondents failed to submit a Form R for 1,1,1-trichloroethane at Facility One for calendar year 1992 to the EPA
and to the State of California on or before July 1, 1993, and
thus violated section 313 of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. Part 372.
B. Count II
13. During calendar year 1993, 1,1,1-trichloroethane was
"otherwise used" at Facility One, as that term is defined in 40
C.F.R. § 372.3, in quantities exceeding the threshold established
by section 313(f) of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. § 372.25.
14. Respondents were required to submit to the EPA and to
the State of California, a Form R for 1,1,1-trichloroethane at
Facility One for calendar year 1993 on or before July 1, 1994.
15. Respondents failed to submit a Form R for 1,1,1-trichloroethane at Facility One for calendar year 1993 to the EPA
and to the State of California on or before July 1, 1994, and
thus violated section 313 of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. Part 372.
C. Count III
16. During calendar year 1993, 1,1,1-trichloroethane was
"otherwise used" at Facility Two, as that term is defined in 40
C.F.R. § 372.3, in quantities exceeding the threshold established
by section 313(f) of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. § 372.25.
17. Respondents were required to submit to the EPA and to
the State of California, a Form R for 1,1,1-trichloroethane at
Facility Two for calendar year 1993 on or before July 1, 1994.
18. Respondents failed to submit a Form R for calendar year
1993 to the EPA and to the State of California on or before July
1, 1994, and thus violated section 313 of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R.
Part 372.
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL PENALTY AMOUNT
19. Section 325(c) of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c),
authorizes EPA to assess a civil administrative penalty not to
exceed $25,000 for each violation of section 313 of EPCRA.
20. The Consolidated Rules of Practice provide that the
dollar amount of the civil penalty proposed in an Administrative
Complaint "shall be determined in accordance with any criteria
set forth in the Act relating to the proper amount of a civil
penalty and with any civil penalty guidelines issued under the
Act." 40 C.F.R. § 22.14(c).
21. Section 325(b)(1)(C) provides, with respect to
violations of the emergency notification requirements of section
304 of EPCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 11004, that in determining the amount
of any civil penalty assessed, the "nature, circumstances, extent
and gravity of the violation or violations, and with respect to
the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of such
violations, the degree of culpability, economic benefit or
savings (if any) resulting from the violation, and such other
matters as justice may require" shall be taken into account.
22. There are no criteria in EPCRA for determining the
amount of civil penalty for violations of section 313 of EPCRA.
22. For determining penalties to be proposed in
Administrative Complaints, Complainant has issued the Enforcement
Response Policy for Section 313 of EPCRA (ERP), dated August 10,
1992.
23. Having found that Respondents violated 40 C.F.R. Part
372 and section 313 of EPCRA in three instances, I have
determined that $15,000, the penalty proposed in the Amended
Complaint, is the appropriate civil penalty to be assessed
against Respondents.
24. In making this determination, I have taken into account
the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violations,
the penalty considerations described in the ERP, and the
Complainant's rationale for its proposed penalty determination
stated in its prehearing exchange.
25. Complainant stated in its prehearing exchange the
following: as to the circumstances of the violation, the failure
to file Form R constitutes the most serious circumstance level
for EPCRA 313 violations. As to the extent of the violations,
The quantity of 1,1,1-trichloroethane used by Respondents was
less than ten times the reporting threshold. Complainant
considered also that Respondent[s] had less than $10 million in
total corporate entity sales and 50 or more employees at the time
the Complaint was filed. Consequently, Complainant deemed the
extent of the violation to be at the lowest of the three levels
described in the ERP. A "gravity-based" penalty of $5,000 for
each violation was chosen from a penalty matrix in the ERP (at p.
11), which amount corresponds to the highest circumstance level
and the lowest extent level shown in the matrix. Thus, the total
"gravity-based" penalty for the three violations is $15,000
according to the ERP.
26. Complainant stated in its prehearing exchange that no
adjustment to the "gravity-based" penalty of $15,000 was
warranted, based on the factors stated in the ERP, namely,
voluntary disclosure, history of prior violations, delisted
chemicals, attitude, ability to pay and other factors as justice
may require.
27. Respondents stated in their opposition to the proposed
civil penalty that the penalty should be reduced because, inter
alia, they voluntarily provided information with regard to
Facility Two, they were diligent in providing information
requested from EPA and cooperating with ascertaining and
complying with reporting requirements, and that they will suffer
financial hardship should the requested penalty be imposed.
However, without evidence or documentation in the record to
support these assertions, the penalty cannot be reduced.
28. The ERP provides that reductions to the penalty for
voluntary disclosure are not warranted if the facility has been
contacted by EPA for the purpose of determining compliance with
EPCRA § 313. The ERP further provides that reduction of a
penalty for "other factors as justice may require . . . [is]
expected to be rare and the circumstances justifying its use must
be thoroughly documented in the case file." (ERP p. 18).
29. The Consolidated Rules of Practice provide, with
respect to penalty assessment where a Respondent is found in
default, that "the penalty proposed in the complaint shall become
due and payable by respondent without further proceedings" sixty
(60) days after a default order becomes final. 40 C.F.R. §
22.17(a).
ORDER(3)
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.17, and based on the record in
this matter and the preceding Findings of Fact, I hereby find,
sua sponte, that Respondents are in default. In accordance with
40 C.F.R. § 22.17(a), Stewart Furniture Manufacturing Co. and The
Beverly-MIKE Company, Inc., are jointly and severally liable for
a penalty of $15,000.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Stewart Furniture
Manufacturing Co. and/or The Beverly-MIKE Company, Inc., shall,
within sixty (60) days from the date of this Order, submit by
cashier's or certified check, payable to the United States
Treasurer, payment in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS
($15,000). Such payment shall be sent to:
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IX Hearing Clerk
P.O. Box 360863
Pittsburgh, PA 15251-6863
A transmittal letter, containing Respondents' names, complete
addresses, and this case number, shall accompany such payment, A
copy of the check and transmittal letter shall be delivered or
mailed to the Regional Hearing Clerk at the following address:
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IX Hearing Clerk
75 Hawthorne Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
________________________________
Susan L. Biro
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Dated: ______________________
1. 1 However, no documents have been submitted to demonstrate
that Stewart Furniture Manufacturing Co. and The Beverly-MIKE Co.,
Inc. were, in fact, merged and that Stewart Furniture does not
currently exist as a lawful corporate entity. Consequently,
Respondents Stewart Furniture Manufacturing Co. and The Beverly-MIKE Co., Inc. will be referred to in the plural, as Respondents.
2. The Regional Hearing Clerk for Region IX, Steven Armsey,
reported by telephone on July 10, 1997 to the undersigned's staff
attorney that no prehearing documents were filed by either
Respondent as of that date.
3. 3 Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(d), Respondents may move to
set aside the default order for good cause and such a motion may be
filed with the undersigned in a timely manner. Furthermore, the
Respondents are hereby advised that a default order constitutes an
initial decision. An appeal of an initial decision must be filed
with the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) within twenty (20) days
of service of the initial decision, as provided in 40 C.F.R. §
22.30. An initial decision becomes the final order of the EAB
forty-five (45) days after service of the initial decision unless
it is appealed to or reviewed sua sponte by the EAB. 40 C.F.R. §§
22.17(b) and 22.27.
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