UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF )
)
HENRY VELLEMAN, individually, ) DOCKET NO. 5-CAA-97-008
AND d/b/a PROGRESSIVE )
POLETOWN PROPERTIES, )
)
RESPONDENT )
ORDER COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH PREHEARING ORDER
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE PROPOSED WITNESSES
This matter arises under the authority of Section 113(d)(1) of
the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1), and was initiated
by the May 30, 1997, filing of an administrative Complaint by the
Director of the Air and Radiation Division of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5. The undersigned, having
been designated as presiding officer on July 23, 1997, issued a
Prehearing Order on August 6, 1997, directing the parties to
exchange prehearing information, including, among other things, the
names of all intended witnesses and brief narratives of their
expected testimony.
Procedural History
Complainant timely filed its prehearing exchange on October 3,
1997. In a letter dated October 28, 1997, from Complainant to the
undersigned, Complainant reported that its prehearing exchange
served on Respondent had been returned by the Postal Service and
marked "refused." In response to Complainant's letter, Respondent
on November 9, 1997, replied that no mail was "refused" as reported
by Complainant but that Respondent had been unavailable for several
weeks due to travel and surgery. Meanwhile, Respondent failed to
meet its prehearing exchange filing deadline of November 6, 1997,
and, on November 18, 1997, the undersigned ordered Respondent to
show cause, on or before December 12, 1997, why it had failed to
meet its prehearing exchange filing deadline.(1)
On November 18, 1997, William A. Wichers, Esquire,
telephonically contacted the undersigned's office and requested an
extension of time for Respondent based on his recent appointment as
counsel for Respondent. In a letter dated November 20, 1997,
counsel for Complainant stated that it interpreted Respondent's
letter of November 9, 1997, to be a request for an extension of
time for filing its prehearing exchange and that Complainant took
no position on this request other than to request an extension for
the filing of Complainant's rebuttal prehearing exchange if
Respondent's request was granted by the undersigned. On
November 26, 1997, the undersigned's office telephonically advised
both parties that Respondent's request for an extension of time was
granted.
On December 5, 1997, Respondent submitted a Response to the
Order to Show Cause and a Motion for an Extension of Time until
January 6, 1998, to file its prehearing exchange. Complainant did
not oppose this motion. On December 23, 1997, Respondent again
moved for an extension of time to file its prehearing exchange,
this time until January 30, 1998. Again, Complainant did not
oppose the motion.
Respondent submitted its prehearing exchange on January 6,
1998, and Complainant filed its rebuttal prehearing exchange on
January 20, 1998. On February 10, 1998, the undersigned entered an
Order Scheduling Hearing in this matter for July 28-30, 1998, in
Detroit, Michigan.
On February 13, 1998, Complainant filed a Motion to Compel
Compliance with the Prehearing Order that is at issue here. In
addition, new counsel for Complainant entered her appearance on
February 13, 1998. On March 3, 1998, the undersigned received
Respondent's Response to Motion to Compel Compliance with
Prehearing Order. Finally, on March 10, 1998, Complainant filed
its Reply to Response to Motion to Compel Compliance with
Prehearing Order and Motion to Strike Proposed Witnesses.
Arguments
In its motion to compel, Complainant lists a number of
objections to Respondent's prehearing exchange, all of which flow
from an alleged lack of substantive information in the narratives
for the proposed witnesses. First, Complainant argues that the
lack of substantive information suggests that the named witnesses
will offer duplicative testimony. Second, Complainant argues that
Respondent's failure to specify the involvement of various
witnesses with the renovation activities at the site in question
provides Complainant no opportunity to prepare for such witnesses.(2)
Third, Complainant argues that the lack of substantive information
in Respondent's narratives compels the conclusion that certain
witnesses will provide irrelevant character and business practice
information. These infirmities, argues Complainant, make it
impossible for Complainant to prepare adequately for the hearing.
Finally, Complainant insinuates that Respondent's delay in meeting
the filing deadline of the Prehearing Order and/or Respondent's
failure to adequately respond to the Order to Show Cause merit
default.
In its response to Complainant's motion, Respondent first
suggests that, because Complainant's narratives occupy fewer pages
than Respondent's narratives, Complainant cannot attack the
sufficiency of Respondent's narratives. Respondent asserts that
Complainant's narratives are "not appreciably more detailed."
Respondent also argues that it cannot predict the substantive
testimony of nondeposed witnesses that have signed no affidavits.
Respondent responds to Complainant's assertions that certain
witnesses will offer only irrelevant testimony by claiming that
those witnesses will be called as adverse witnesses or will be
called only to rebut challenges to Respondent's credibility.
Complainant's reply to Respondent's response rearticulates its
claim of insufficient narratives and its concern that certain of
Respondent's witness may be introduced as expert witnesses.
Complainant argues that its motion to compel is not an attempt to
circumvent the discovery requirements of the Consolidated Rules of
Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties
and the Revocation or Suspension of Permits ("Rules of Practice"),
but rather is an effort to enforce the prehearing requirements of
the Prehearing Order and as prescribed by the Rules of Practice.(3)
Finally, Complainant requests that it be given the opportunity to
depose the witnesses it suspects to be expert if their narratives
are not sufficiently supplemented.
Discussion
The governing Rules of Practice state that each party's
prehearing exchange shall include "[t]he names of the expert and
other witnesses he intends to call, together with a brief narrative
summary of their expected testimony." 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(b). The
purpose of the prehearing exchange is to afford the parties a fair
and full opportunity to prepare for and to participate in the
hearing. Such purpose can be achieved only if the prehearing
exchange conveys sufficient information concerning the testimony of
each witness and each proposed witness' connection to the case at
hand.
Complainant's assertion that Respondent's narratives are
inadequate is persuasive. As stated, the purpose of a prehearing
exchange is to provide the opposing party an opportunity to prepare
generally to respond to each witness and exhibit. Although it
would not be reasonable to expect a detailed preview of the
testimony of each witness, some information must be shared.
Moreover, Respondent's argument that Complainant's narratives are
"not appreciably more detailed" is rejected. Complainant's
narratives suffice to notify the Respondent of the general
substance and context of the testimony of each witness, information
lacking in many of Respondent's narratives.(4) As specified below,
Respondent is directed to supplement the witness narratives whose
generality imparts little, if any, useful information. Failure to
provide the requisite supplementary information for each witness
can result in the exclusion of that witness from testifying at the
hearing.
As for Complainant's other objections to Respondent's
prehearing exchange and its Motion to Strike Witnesses, the
undersigned agrees that Respondent's narratives do suggest
potentially duplicative or irrelevant witnesses. It would be
premature, however, to strike any witnesses at this time,
particularly given the paucity of information about them.
Arguments considering the propriety of witnesses may be renewed
upon the submission of the supplemented narratives for the proposed
witnesses or at the hearing and, if appropriate, witnesses will be
stricken at that time.
Complainant is correct in noting that Respondent has failed to
meet the requirements of the Prehearing Order in a timely manner.
The undersigned, however, notes that Complainant construed
Respondent's letter of November 9, 1997, as a request for an
extension of time and that Complainant did not oppose Respondent's
requests for extensions of time. Moreover, a default order is
deemed an inappropriate response to this minor procedural
infraction.(5) With regard to Complainant's assertion that
Respondent's response to the Order to Show Cause is inadequate, the
undersigned disagrees. Respondent, however, is admonished to
strive for greater success in following proper procedure, as
delineated in the orders of the undersigned and in the Rules of
Practice.
ORDER
Respondent is directed to amend its prehearing exchange so as
to supplement its narrative summaries, indicating the general
substance and context of the expected testimony, for the following
proposed witnesses:
1) Henry Velleman
2) Max Tarrance
3) Todd Sachse
4) Paul Jacoby
5) Gary Chrostowski
6) Thomas Vincent
7) Gerald Krawiec
8) Kenneth Lawler
9) Joseph Konrad
10) Stuart Yankee(6)
The amendments specified above or any desired supplements to
Respondent's prehearing exchange material shall be filed by April 30,
1998. Complainant's rebuttal Prehearing exchange, if necessary,
shall be filed by May 14, 1998.
Complainant's Motion to Strike Proposed Witnesses is Denied.
Original signed by undersigned
________________________
Barbara A. Gunning
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: 3/18/98
Washington, D.C.
1. The Order to Show Cause entered on November 18, 1997, was
returned to the undersigned's office as undeliverable mail.
2. Complainant states that these witnesses appear to be expert
witnesses and that Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
entitles Complainant to a written report concerning these
witnesses' testimony. The undersigned notes that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are not binding on administrative agencies, but
that many times these rules provide useful and instructive guidance
in applying the Rules of Practice. See Oak Tree Farm Dairy, Inc.
v. Block, 544 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Wego
Chemical & Mineral Corporation, TSCA Appeal No. 92-4, 4 EAD 513, n.
10 (EAB Feb. 24, 1993).
3. Discovery beyond prehearing exchange requirements is
controlled by 40 C.F.R. § 22.19(f), which allows additional
discovery only when the presiding officer has determined that:
1) the discovery will not unreasonably delay the proceeding, 2) the
information is not otherwise obtainable, and 3) the information has
significant probative value.
4. Likewise, Respondent's argument that the fact that its
narratives cover more pages than Complainant's somehow suggests
that its narratives are sufficient is rejected. Such a claim
merits no response.
5. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that
Complainant did not move for a default order, but merely implied
that one might be appropriate. Furthermore, at no point in this
proceeding has Complainant indicated that it has suffered prejudice
from Respondent's untimely responses.
6. Should the supplemented narratives indicate that one or more
of the listed witnesses will be employed as an expert, or should
the narratives compel such an inference due to their inadequacy,
Complainant may renew its discovery request through a proper
motion.
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