UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
In the matter of )
)
WALLACE W. STONE ) [CWA] Docket No. VII-97-0024
)
Respondent )
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT ORDER
AND FINDING THAT COMPLAINANT'S CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
For the reasons set forth below, Complainant's motion for a default order shall be denied,
and a finding shall be made that Complainant's case should not be dismissed. In addition, this
order discusses further procedures to be followed in this case.
BACKGROUND
The Complaint in this matter was filed on August 11, 1997. The Complaint alleged that
Respondent had violated Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), by
discharging pollutants from a point source into waters of the United States without a permit as
required under Section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Complainant proposed a penalty of
$40,518. Respondent answered the Complaint, denying all of the allegations in the Complaint
and requesting a hearing.
On December 31, 1997, the undersigned issued an order setting dates for the parties to
submit their respective prehearing exchanges. Complainant submitted its initial prehearing
exchange on February 24, 1998 (C. Phe. ). On the date set for submission, Respondent submitted
neither (1) his prehearing exchange nor (2) "a statement that [he] is electing to forego the
presentation of answering evidence and is electing to cross-examine EPA witnesses." Therefore,
Respondent has failed "to comply with a prehearing or hearing order of the Presiding
Officer . . ." 40 C.F.R. § 22.17.(1) Complainant's motion for a default order followed thereafter.
EPA's consolidated rules of practice that apply to this proceeding explain, "[d]efault by
respondent constitutes, for purposes of the pending action only, an admission of all facts alleged
in the complaint and a waiver of respondent's right to a hearing on such factual allegations."
40 C.F.R. § 22.17. Because Respondent defaulted, the facts as presented by Complainant would
normally be accepted as unchallenged. A default judgment, however, must be based upon
substantial evidence in the case and must be warranted by the facts. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)&(F).
A default order must include "findings of fact showing the grounds for the order, conclusions
regarding all material issues of law or discretion, and the penalty which is recommended to be
assessed." 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(c). Even when all of Complainant's assertions are presumed true,
an order on default still requires Complainant to establish that Respondent has violated the
statute. .
DISCUSSION
The following facts are set forth in the Complaint and Complainant's initial prehearing
exchange. The Respondent, Wallace W. Stone, is an individual who owns property located at the
Lake of the Ozarks, Camden County, Missouri, near lake mile 23.7. On or about September 11,
1994, Respondent submitted an application to the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) for a permit to excavate approximately 18 cubic yards of material at the Lake of the
Ozarks near lake mile 30.9 + 0.6 in Camden County, Missouri. On or about January 6, 1995, the
Corps advised Respondent that his proposed excavation of 18 cubic yards at lake mile 30.9 + 0.6
would be authorized by nationwide permit 18. At some time between February and April 1995,
Lake Ozark Construction Company, acting on behalf of Respondent, excavated approximately
800 cubic yards of lake bed material at lake mile 30.9 + 0.6, thus greatly exceeding the volume of
18 cubic yards allowed by nationwide permit 18. Excavation was performed by the use of earth-moving equipment. By letter dated May 24, 1995, the Corps notified Respondent that the
excavation at lake mile 30.9 + 0.6 was not authorized by the Corps and directed Respondent to
do no more work in Corps jurisdiction. Contrary to this directive, Respondent , at some time in
January or February 1996, excavated lake bed material at the Lake of the Ozarks near lake mile
23.7 and redirected drainage at the head of the cove, with the use of earth-moving equipment.
Respondent did not obtain a CWA, section 404 permit authorizing it to discharge pollutants at
lake mile 23.7. It is the action allegedly taken by Respondent in January or February of 1996 that
is the violation alleged in this Complaint.
Section 301(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), prohibits the discharge of pollutants
from a point source into the waters of the United States except when in compliance with, inter
alia, a permit to discharge dredged or fill material issued by the Corps pursuant to section 404 of
the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
Respondent, an individual, is a "person" within the meaning of section 502(5) of the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). The lake bed material that was excavated by Respondent, or one
acting on behalf of Respondent, at lake mile 23.7, is dredged material and a "pollutant" within
the meaning of section 502(6) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The earth-moving equipment
used by Respondent, or one acting on behalf of Respondent, at lake mile 23.7, is a "point source"
within the meaning of section 502(14) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). At all times relevant
to this administrative action, the Lake of the Ozarks has been "waters of the United States," as
defined by 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2 and 230.3(s), and "navigable waters" within the meaning of
Section 502(7) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
The problem with Complainant's case arose from the assertion that Respondent
discharged a pollutant into a water of the United States. The CWA defines a "discharge of a
pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently
concluded that the redeposit of incidental fallback resulting from dredging activities is not
considered a discharge under the CWA. National Mining Assoc. et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, et al., No. 97-5099, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13009 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Upholding the
district court's decision, which invalidated regulations known as "the Tulloch Rule," the court of
appeals explained, ". . . the straightforward statutory term 'addition' cannot reasonably be said to
encompass the situation in which material is removed from the waters of the United States and a
small portion of it happens to fall back. Because incidental fallback represents a net withdrawal,
not an addition, of material, it cannot be a discharge." National Mining Assoc. et al., 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS at *13. There cannot be an addition of dredged material, therefore, when there is
no addition of material. Id. at *14.
Complainant asserts that "the excavation of lake bed material at lake mile 23.7 with
earth-moving equipment resulted in the discharge of dredged and fill material into waters of the
United States." Complaint at ¶14. Excavation of dredged material is regulated by the Corps
pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403, which makes it
illegal "to excavate or fill" in the navigable waters of the United States without the Corps'
approval. However, in order to establish a violation of the Clean Water Act, the National Mining
Assoc. decision makes it clear that Complainant must allege facts to show that an addition larger
than incidental fallback occurred.
In an order issued September 4, 1998 by the undersigned, it was noted that
Complainant's prehearing exchange indicates that witnesses viewed "a considerable amount of
lake bed material pushed upon the bank of the lake" and that the area where the material was
discharged may have been wetlands, which are also waters of the United States. See, e.g.,
C. Phe. at 3, 5-6, 10. Although the court of appeals recognized that such "sidecasting" of
excavated material into a wetland is regulated under the CWA, it was not clear from the
Complaint in this proceeding that Complainant is alleging such a violation. See, National
Mining Assoc. et al., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS at *7. The September 4 order noted further that
Complainant's summaries and documents did not, by themselves, show that any regulated
discharge occurred. Because the Complaint and prehearing exchange did not adequately describe
Respondent's discharges, the September 4 order found that liability could not be established by
the record as it then existed. Accordingly, Complainant was ordered, no later than October 5,
1998, either to: (1) show cause why the case, as pled, should not be dismissed, or (2) file a
motion to amend the Complaint and/or supplement its prehearing exchange to support the
assertion that Respondent violated the CWA. Complainant was also ordered to explain how its
filings would affect the proposed penalty. Respondent was permitted to respond to
Complainant's submission no later than October 22, 1998. Pending receipt of further
information from Complainant, action on the motion for default was deferred. By order issued
October 8, 1998 , Complainant's request to extend the two response dates was granted such that
Complainant's submission was now due on or before October 19, 1998 and Respondent's answer
thereto was now due on or before November 5, 1998.
Complainant filed its response to the September 4 order on October 19, 1998. Therein
Complainant proposed to supplement its prehearing exchange with the additional testimony of
Mr. Mark Frazier, Regulatory Project Manager in the Kansas City district office of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. Complainant states the supplemental testimony would establish that
the use of the bulldozer per se and the manner in which the bulldozer was operated indicate that
sidecasting and redepositing of material had occurred which was more than incidental fallback.
In addition, the supplemental testimony would allege that "lake bed material was redeposited in a
location different from the place where it had been dredged." Therefore, Complainant argues
that, under applicable precedent, the actions of Respondent, or one under his control, were done
"without a permit issued by the Corps under Section 404 of the CWA, in violation of Section 301
of the CWA." In addition, Complainant asserts that Respondent failed to comply with Rule
22.17(a)(2). Accordingly, Complainant again requests that its motion for a default order be
granted.
By letter received in this office on November 3, 1998, Respondent states that he is
"financially unable to secure the services of an attorney to represent me in this issue. My only
alternative is to write you (the undersigned) and attempt to explain my position." Respondent
states that "there was no intention of dredging any portion of the Lake of the Ozarks." He states
further that " the intent was to clear my lot for the construction of my home on the Lake." He also
states that "[n]either depth of the lake nor the width of the cove area was altered by this work and
subsequent work on [the] shoreline restored [the] area to its natural beauty." Respondent
included several photographs said to be of the site in question. By letter dated November 4, 1998,
my Legal Assistant, Marion Walzel, sent the original of the letter and copies of the photographs
to the Regional Hearing Clerk, with a copy being retained by the undersigned, and a copy of the
letter and the original copies of the photographs being sent to Complainant. The letter stated
further that if the undersigned needed actual photographs at a future date, Respondent would be
contacted to provide them.
Complainant filed a response to Respondent's submission on November 19, 1998.
Complainant argues that nothing in Respondent's submission is sufficient to rebut the evidence
submitted by Complainant. Accordingly, Complainant again urges that a default order be issued
against Respondent.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
For the reasons stated above, Complainant has supplemented its prehearing exchange to
allege that more than incidental fallback of dredged material occurred. Complainant has now
alleged that sidecasting and redeposit of material occurred. Thus, the actions alleged to have
been taken by Respondent now are consistent with the National Mining Assoc. decision.
Accordingly, Complainant's case shall not be dismissed.
MOTION FOR DEFAULT
Thus, the issue once again arises as to whether a default judgment should be entered
against Respondent. Unlike the situation that existed when the motion for default was filed,
Respondent has belatedly become active in this proceeding. This is no longer such a case.
Accordingly, Respondent's letter is hereby construed as to be in substantive compliance with the
original prehearing order issued by the undersigned. Accordingly, Complainant's motion for a
default order is denied. However, while somewhat more lenient standards apply to a pro se
Respondent, Respondent is put on notice that he is responsible for "complying with the
procedural rules and may suffer adverse consequences in the event of noncompliance." In re
Rybond, Inc., 1996 EPA App. Lexis 16, 31 (1996).
CONCLUSION
In the first or second week of January, the undersigned will schedule a telephone
conference to determine the next step to be taken in this proceeding. At that conference, the
undersigned will strongly urge that the parties avail themselves of this office's Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures and agree to have this case referred to another
Administrative Law Judge for mediation. Should the parties not agree to engage in ADR, then
further procedures shall be discussed to resolve this case on the merits.
_________________________
Charles E. Bullock
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: December 17, 1998
Washington, D.C.
1. "A party may be found to be in default . . . (2) after motion or sua sponte, upon failure
to comply with a prehearing or hearing order of the Presiding Officer."
IN THE MATTER OF WALLACE W. STONE
, Respondent
CWA Docket No. VII-97-0024
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that the foregoing Order Denying Motion for
Default Order and Finding that Complainant's Case Should Not Be
Dismissed, dated December 17, 1998, was sent in the following
manner to the addressees listed below:
Original by Regular Mail to:
Ms. Venessa Cobbs
Regional Hearing Clerk
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region VII
726 Minnesota Avenue
Kansas City, KS 66101
Copy by Regular Mail to:
Counsel for Complainant:
Audrey Asher, Esquire
Senior Assistant Regional Counsel
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region VII
726 Minnesota Avenue
Kansas City, KS 66101
Copy by Certified Mail, Return
Receipt Requested and by
Regular Mail to:
Respondent:
Mr. Wallace W. Stone
Route 1, Box 732
Osage Beach, MO 65065
_______________________
Marion Walzel
Legal Assistant
Dated: December 17, 1998
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