Exhibit E

Louisiana State Police
Hazardous Materials Incident Report
**HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORT**

**Transportation and Environmental Safety Section**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident #</th>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Troop</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06-05324</td>
<td>S. Hopkins</td>
<td>MCSAP</td>
<td>RTK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Occurred Date**
- Date: 8/24/2006
- Time: 0830

**Notified Date**
- Date: 8/24/2006
- Time: 0854

**10-97 Date**
- Date: 8/24/2006
- Time: 0900

**10-8 Date**
- Date: 8/29/2006
- Time: 1800

**SHIPPER / FACILITY INFORMATION**

**Shipper / Facility**
- Explo Systems Inc

**Address**
- 1702 Fourth Street

**Representative**
- David Smith

**Title**
- Vice President

**Telephone**
- 318-382-8700

**CARRIER INFORMATION**

**Carrier Information**

**Address**

**City**

**State**

**Zip**

**Representative**

**Title**

**Telephone**

**DRIVER INFORMATION**

**Driver/Operators Name**

**Address**

**City**

**State**

**Zip**

**Drivers Lic #**

**State**

**Class**

**DOB**

**Telephone**

**INCIDENT TYPE**

**CONTAINER TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highway</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Rail</th>
<th>Bottle, Pail, Bag</th>
<th>Storage Tank</th>
<th>Container</th>
<th>Cylinder</th>
<th>Drum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explosive</td>
<td>Intermodal Tank</td>
<td>Portable Tank</td>
<td>Tank Truck</td>
<td>Barge, Vessel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chemical Involved**
- Tritonal

**Amount**
- unknown

**Amount Lost**

**AGENCIES ON SCENE**

**Local**

**State**

**Federal Name**
- BATFE

**Rep**

**Local**

**X**

**State**

**Federal Name**
- LA National Guard

**Rep**

**Local**

**X**

**State**

**Federal Name**
- Webster Parish Sheriffs Office

**Rep**

**HIGHWAYS CLOSED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highway #</th>
<th>Time Closed</th>
<th>Time Opened</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-20</td>
<td>0910</td>
<td>1445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US 80; LA 164; Goodwill Rd;</td>
<td>0910</td>
<td>0930 8/25/06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PROTECTIVE ACTION**

**Shelter in Place**
- X

**Evacuation**
- X

**Road Closure**
- None

**Impact Area**
- X

**Injuries**
- Fatalities

**Photographs**
- Initial Field Investigation

**Follow-up Field Investigation**
- X

**Photographs**

**Video**

**WEATHER CONDITIONS**

**Temperature**

**Wind Speed**
- mph

**Direction**

**Humidity**

**REMEDIATION/MUTUAL AID RESPONSE**

**On Scene**
- UXB International Inc

**Rep**
- Jim Tomiko

**Telephone**
- 703-724-9600

**On Scene**
- Rep

**Telephone**

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT ENFORCEMENT

VIOLATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Out of Service</th>
<th>Description of Violation</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Penalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Initial Review | Final Review | Attachments | ( ) YES ( ) NO | Photographs | ( ) YES ( ) NO

VEHICLE OUT OF SERVICE: As provided in Chapter 12 of L.R.S. line 52, the unit(s) designated above is (are) hereby declared OUT OF SERVICE at: 1823 Elton Road, Jennings

Until all noted OUT OF SERVICE (O/S) violations are corrected

ATTACHMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSDS Information</th>
<th>Notification Procedures</th>
<th>LEPC Notification Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X Site Photographs</td>
<td>Meteorological Information</td>
<td>Facility Investigative Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility Monitoring Data</td>
<td>Employee Interviews</td>
<td>Facility Drawings or Blueprints</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REVIEWED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approval</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Approval</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

INCIDENT DETAILS

On 8/24/2006 at 0900 hours Officer Hopkins was notified by Sgt Bobbitt of a fire and detonation of the Explo Systems manufacturing facility located on E-Line on the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant (LAAP) in Minden. Initial reports included multiple detonations and fires involving all of the E-line manufacturing plant including two trailers each containing 48 Bombs, 750 pound, GP, M117 located at the north receiving dock of E-line. Initial calculation of explosive weight at the dock was 36,480 pounds. The hazard area was calculated to be 2.1 miles, which included I-20; LA 80; LA 164; Goodwill Road; Town of Doyline; and all areas of the Ammo Plant. At 1000 hours evacuation began and roads were closed.

An incident command post was set up at the intersection of Goodwill Road and LA Hwy 80.

At 1330 an aerial reconnaissance was conducted by Officer Hopkins and Lt Viator. Recon revealed all of the buildings containing explosives had burned down. Small fires were still burning in numerous locations in and out of the fenced perimeter of E-line. No evidence of a large quantity of unexploded bombs massed in one area was visible.

Explo Systems employees revised the estimated number of bombs located at the loading dock to be 26 each. Based on the reconnaissance and this estimate, the hazard area was reduced to 1.5 miles. This revision allowed I-20 to be reopened but all other previously closed highways remained closed. All previously evacuated facilities remained closed. Because of the numerous fires, a ground reconnaissance was scheduled for 0700, 8/25/2006.

At 0715 hours, 8/25/2006, a ground reconnaissance was conducted by State Police Hazmat and COL Stuckey, LAAP commander. Ground recon concluded there were no large quantities of unexploded bombs in any one location. Numerous unexploded bombs were scattered about the facility. Based on the fragmentation range of one unexploded bomb, the hazard area was reduced to 1400 yards. This reduction allowed all evacuees to return. The incident command post was moved to the intersection of 4th Street and McArthur Ave.

On 8/27/06, UXB International personnel arrived on scene to assess the damage and prepare for site cleanup. An assessment of E-line and the surrounding area indicated a sweep outside the perimeter fence should be conducted for a distance of 1000 feet around the north end and a
Further investigation revealed the following information.

Bombs were brought from a magazine to the north receiving dock of E-line by truck. The bombs were moved into building 1726 where they received scores in the steel surface of the bomb by a remotely operated lathe. The bomb was then moved to a press where the 3 bomb sections were broken apart. The nose and tail were taken back to the dock to load onto a trailer. The center section was placed in another press where the explosives were pressed out of the steel case. The empty steel center section was stored in building 1726 until moved to a burn pad on another site on LAAP for burning off the explosive residue. The explosives from the center section were then taken to the trailer with the nose and tail sections. When the trailer was full it was taken to Building 1719.

At Building 1719 the nose section, tail section and bulk explosives from the center section, were taken to the third floor where they were placed on the pre-melters. Pre-melters used steam heat to heat the explosives to 220 degrees. When the explosives on the pre-melter become liquid, they drain off through pipes to the 2nd floor where they are collected into kettles. There 4 kettles, one pre-melter fills one kettle. In the kettle the explosives are heated and the aluminum settles to the bottom of the kettle and the melted tnt is sent to the flaker where it is cooled and flaked into it’s final state. Flaked tnt is boxed and sent to Building 1712 for transport to storage magazines.

On the morning of the fire, the reported quantity of explosives was 15000 pounds of flaked tnt in Building 1712; 10000 pounds of melted tnt in Building 1719; 8000 pounds of bulk explosive in Building 1724; and 36000 pounds net explosive weight in 96 bombs at the loading ramp of Building 1726.

An interview of Explo Systems employee, telephone, was conducted on 8/31/06 at 1500 hours. stated he worked for Explo Systems as lead man in the pre-melt room located on the third floor of building 1719. stated he has worked at LAAP on various lines for a number of years. He supervised one other employee that morning. The pre-melt room contained 4 pre-melters. Bomb components and explosives were on pre-melters 3 and 4. Kettle 4 had approximately 6000 and kettle 3 had approximately 3000. Kettle 1 and 2 were empty. stated they didn’t normally start the flaking process until both kettle 3 and 4 were full at 6000 pounds each. During shift, he was responsible for filling kettle 1 and 2 and the previous night shift was responsible for filling kettle 3 and 4. stated he moved the material being melted off pre-melter 4 onto pre-melter 3 to fill the partially full kettle 3. He then began cleaning pre-melter 1 and 2. stated cleaning pre-melters consisted of using a stainless steel tool to rake the residue, aluminum and tnt, from the grate that the explosives sit on while melting. Both pre-melter 1 and 2 were not being used but had liquid tnt in them. stated he had finished pre-melter 1 and was working on pre-melter 2 when he observed smoke coming from under the grate of pre-melter 1. He stated he went to look at the smoke and observed a flame inside the pre-melter. stated he sent his helper to notify the other employees while he left the area.

The fire spread from Building 1719 to other buildings on E-line by traveling the wood hallways that linked the buildings together. The only building linked by hallways that was not burned was building 1714. A section of the wooden hallway had been replaced with metal roofing and siding creating an effective fire break.