BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

IN THE MATTER OF )
LOS MEDANOS ENERGY ) PETITION NO.
CENTER ) ORDER RESPONDING TO )
MAJOR FACILITY REVIEW ) PETITIONERS REQUEST THAT THE )
PERMIT No. B1866, ) ADMINISTRATOR OBJECT TO )
Issued by the Bay Area Air ) ISSUANCE OF A STATE OPERATING )
Quality Management District ) PERMIT )

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR OBJECTION TO PERMIT

On September 6, 2001, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District, (“BAAQMD” or “District”) issued a Major Facility Review Permit to Los Medanos Energy Center, Pittsburg, California (“Los Medanos Permit” or “Permit”), pursuant to title V of the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f, CAA §§ 501-507. On October 12, 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) received a petition from Our Children’s Earth Foundation (“OCE”) and Californians for Renewable Energy, Inc., (“CARE”) (collectively, the “Petitioners”) requesting that the EPA Administrator object to the issuance of the Los Medanos Permit pursuant to Section 505(b)(2) of the Act, the federal implementing regulations found at 40 CFR Part 70.8, and the District’s Regulation 2-6-411.3 (“Petition”).

The Petitioners allege that the Los Medanos Permit (1) improperly includes an emergency breakdown exemption condition that incorporates a broader definition of “emergency” than allowed by 40 CFR § 70.6(g); (2) improperly includes a variance relief condition which is not federally enforceable; (3) fails to include a statement of basis as required by 40 CFR § 70.7(a)(5); (4) contains permit conditions that are inadequate under 40 CFR Part 70, namely that certain provisions are unenforceable; and (5) fails to incorporate certain changes OCE requested during the public comment period and agreed to by BAAQMD.

EPA has now fully reviewed the Petitioners’ allegations. In considering the allegations, EPA performed an independent and in-depth review of the Los Medanos Permit; the supporting documentation for the Los Medanos Permit; information provided by the Petitioners in the Petition and in a letter dated November 21, 2001; information gathered from the Petitioners in a November 8, 2001 meeting; and information gathered from the District in meetings held on October 31, 2001, December 5, 2001, and February 7, 2002. Based on this review, I grant in part and deny in part the Petitioners’ request that I “object to the issuance of the Title V Operating Permit for the Los Medanos Energy Center,” and hereby order the District to reopen the Permit
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Section 502(d)(1) of the Act calls upon each State to develop and submit to EPA an operating permit program to meet the requirements of title V. In 1995, EPA granted interim approval to the title V operating permit program submitted by BAAQMD. 60 Fed. Reg. 32606 (June 23, 1995); 40 CFR Part 70, Appendix A. Effective November 30, 2001, EPA granted full approval to BAAQMD’s title V operating permit program. 66 Fed. Reg. 63503 (December 7, 2001).

Major stationary sources of air pollution and other sources covered by title V are required to apply for an operating permit that includes applicable emission limitations and such other conditions as are necessary to assure compliance with applicable requirements of the Act. See CAA §§ 502(a) and 504(a). The title V operating permit program does not generally impose new substantive air quality control requirements (which are referred to as “applicable requirements”), but does require permits to contain monitoring, recordkeeping, reporting, and other conditions to assure compliance by sources with existing applicable requirements. 57 Fed. Reg. 32250, 32251 (July 21, 1992). One purpose of the title V program is to enable the source, EPA, permitting authorities, and the public to better understand the applicable requirements to which the source is subject and whether the source is meeting those requirements. Thus, the title V operating permits program is a vehicle for ensuring that existing air quality control requirements are appropriately applied to facility emission units and that compliance with these requirements is assured.

Under § 505(a) of the Act and 40 CFR § 70.8(a), permitting authorities are required to submit all operating permits proposed pursuant to title V to EPA for review. If EPA determines that a permit is not in compliance with applicable requirements or the requirements of 40 CFR Part 70, EPA will object to the permit. If EPA does not object to a permit on its own initiative, section 505(b)(2) of the Act and 40 CFR § 70.8(d) provide that any person may petition the Administrator, within 60 days of the expiration of EPA’s 45-day review period, to object to the permit. To justify the exercise of an objection by EPA to a title V permit pursuant to section 505(b)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the permit is not in compliance with the requirements of the Act, including the requirements of Part 70. Part 70 requires that a petition must be “based only on objections to the permit that were raised with reasonable specificity during the public comment period. . . unless the petitioner demonstrates that it was impracticable to raise such objections within such period, or unless the grounds for such objection arose after such period.” 40 CFR § 70.8(d). A petition for administrative review does not stay the effectiveness of the permit or its requirements if the permit was issued after the expiration of EPA’s 45-day review period and before receipt of the objection. If EPA objects to a permit in response to a petition and the permit has been issued, the permitting authority or EPA will modify, terminate, or revoke and reissue such a permit using the procedures in 40 CFR §§ 70.7(g)(4) or (5)(i) and (ii) for reopening a permit for cause.
II. BACKGROUND

The Los Medanos Energy Center facility ("Facility"), formerly owned by Enron Corporation under the name Pittsburg District Energy Facility, is a natural gas-fired power plant presently owned and operated by Calpine Corporation. The plant, with a nominal electrical capacity of 555-megawatts ("MW"), is located in Pittsburg, California. The Facility received its final determination of compliance ("FDOC")\(^1\) from the District in June, 1999, and its license to construct and operate from the California Energy Commission ("CEC")\(^2\) on August 17, 1999. The Facility operates two large natural gas combustion turbines with associated heat recovery steam generators ("HRSG"), and one auxiliary boiler. The Facility obtained a revised authority to construct ("ATC")\(^3\) permit from the District in March, 2001 to increase heat input ratings of the two HRSGs and the auxiliary boiler,\(^4\) and to add a fire pump diesel engine and a natural gas-fired emergency generator. The Facility began commercial operation in July, 2001. The Facility emits nitrogen oxide ("NO\(_x\)"), carbon monoxide ("CO"), and particulate matter ("PM"), all of which are regulated under the District’s federally approved or delegated nonattainment new source review ("NSR") and prevention of significant deterioration ("PSD") programs\(^5\) or other District Clean Air Act programs.

On June 28, 2001, the District completed its evaluation of the title V application for the Facility and issued the draft title V Permit. Under the District’s rules, this action started a simultaneous 30-day public comment period and a 45-day EPA review period. On August 1, 2001, Mr. Kenneth Kloc of the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic submitted comments to the

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\(^1\) An FDOC describes how a proposed facility will comply with applicable federal, state, and BAAQMD regulations, including control technology and emission offset requirements of New Source Review. Permit conditions necessary to insure compliance with applicable regulations are also included.

\(^2\) The FDOC served as an evaluation report for both the CEC’s certificate and the District’s authority to construct ("ATC") permit. The initial ATC was issued by the District shortly after the FDOC under District application #18595.

\(^3\) ATC permits are federally enforceable pre-construction permits that reflect the requirements of the attainment area prevention of significant deterioration and nonattainment area new source review ("NSR") programs. The District’s NSR requirements are described in Regulation 2, Rule 2. New power plants located in California subject to the CEC certification requirements must also comply with Regulation 2, Rule 3, titled Power Plants. Regulation 2-3-405 requires the District to issue an ATC for a subject facility only after the CEC issues its certificate for the facility.

\(^4\) The increased heat input allowed the facility to increase its electrical generating capacity from 520 MW to 555 MW.

\(^5\) The District was implementing the federal PSD program under a delegation agreement with EPA dated October 28, 1997. The non-attainment NSR program was most recently SIP-approved by EPA on January 26, 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. 3850.
District on the draft Los Medanos Permit on behalf of OCE (“OCE’s Comment Letter”). The District responded to OCE’s Comment Letter by a letter dated September 4, 2001, from William de Boisblanc (“Response to Comments”). EPA Region IX did not object to the proposed permit during its 45-day review period. The Petition to Object to the Permit, filed by OCE and CARE and dated October 9, 2001, was received by Region IX on October 12, 2001. EPA calculates the period for the public to petition the Administrator to object to a permit as if the 30-day public comment and 45-day EPA review periods run sequentially, accordingly petitioners have 135 days after the issuance of a draft permit to submit a petition. Given that the Petition was filed with EPA on October 12, 2001, I find that it was timely filed. I also find that the Petition is appropriately based on objections that were raised with reasonable specificity during the comment period or that arose after the public comment period expired.

III. ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONERS

A. District Breakdown Relief Under Permit Condition I.H.1

Petitioners’ first allegation challenges the inclusion in the Los Medanos Permit of Condition I.H.1, a provision which incorporates SIP rules allowing a permitted facility to seek relief from enforcement by the District in the event of a breakdown. Petition at 3. Petitioners assert that the definition of “breakdown” at Regulation 1-208 would allow relief in situations beyond those allowed under the Clean Air Act. Specifically, Petitioners allege that the “definition of ‘breakdown’ in Regulation 1-208 is much broader than the federal definition of breakdown, which is provided in 40 CFR Part 70,” or more precisely, at 40 CFR § 70.6(g).

Condition I.H.1 incorporates District Regulations 1-208, 1-431, 1-432, and 1-433 (collectively the “Breakdown Relief Regulations”) into the Permit. Regulation 1-208 defines breakdown, and Regulations 1-431 through 1-433 describe how an applicant is to notify the District of a breakdown, how the District is to determine whether the circumstances meet the definition of a breakdown, and what sort of relief to grant the permittee. To start our analysis, it

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6 We note that OCE submitted its comments to the District days after the close of the public comment period established pursuant to the District’s Regulation 2-6-412 and 40 CFR § 70.7(h)(4). Though we are responding to the Petition despite this possible procedural flaw, we reserve our right to raise this issue in any future proceeding.

7 This 135-day period to petition the Administrator is based on a 30-day District public notice and comment period, a 45-day EPA review period and the 60-day period for a person to file a petition to object with EPA.

8 In its Comment Letter, OCE generally raised concerns with the draft Major Facility Review Permit that are the basis for the Petition. In regard to whether all issues were raised with ‘reasonable specificity,’ I find that claims one through four of the Petition were raised adequately in OCE’s Comment Letter. The fifth claim, that the District did not live up to its commitment to make changes to the Permit, can be raised in the Petition since the grounds for the claim arose after the public comment period ended. See 40 CFR § 70.8(d). Finally, CARE’s non-participation in the District’s notice-and-comment process does not prevent the organization from filing a title V petition because the regulations allow “any person” to file a petition based on earlier objections raised during the public comment period regardless of who had filed those earlier comments. See CAA § 505(b)(2); 40 CFR § 70.8(d)
is important to understand the impact of granting relief under the Breakdown Relief Regulations. Neither Condition I.H.1, nor the SIP provisions it incorporates into the Permit, would allow for an exemption from an applicable requirement for periods of excess emissions. An “exemption from an applicable requirement” would mean that the permittee would be deemed not to be in violation of the requirement during the period of excess emissions. Rather, these Breakdown Relief Regulations allow an applicant to enter into a proceeding in front of the District that could ultimately lead to the District employing its enforcement discretion not to seek penalties for violations of an applicable requirement that occurred during breakdown periods.

Significantly, the Breakdown Relief Regulations have been approved by EPA as part of the District’s federally enforceable SIP. 64 Fed. Reg. 34558 (June 28, 1999) (this is the most recent approval of the District’s Regulation 1). Part 70 requires all SIP provisions that apply to a source to be included in title V permits as “applicable requirements.” See In re Pacificorp’s Jim Bridger and Naughton Electric Utility Steam Generating Plants, Petition No. VIII-00-1, at 23-24 (“Pacificorp”). On this basis alone, the inclusion of the Breakdown Relief Regulations in the permit is not objectionable.

Moreover, Petitioners’ allegation that Condition 1.H.1 is inconsistent with 40 CFR § 70.6(g) does not provide a basis for an objection. 40 CFR § 70.6(g) allows a permitting authority to incorporate into its title V permit program an affirmative defense provision for “emergency” situations as long as the provision is consistent with the 40 CFR § 70.6(g)(3) elements. Such an emergency defense then may be incorporated into permits issued pursuant to that program. As explained above, these regulations provide relief based on the District’s enforcement discretion and do not provide an affirmative defense to enforcement. Moreover, to the extent the emergency defense is incorporated into a permit, 40 CFR § 70.6(g)(5) makes clear that the Part 70 affirmative defense type of relief for emergency situations “is in addition to any emergency or upset provision contained in any applicable requirement.” This language clarifies that the Part 70 regulations do not bar the inclusion of applicable SIP requirements in title V permits, even if those applicable requirements contain “emergency” or “upset” provisions such as Condition 1.H.1 that may overlap with the emergency defense provision authorized by 40 CFR § 70.6(g).

Also, a review of the Breakdown Relief Regulations themselves demonstrates that they are not inconsistent with the Clean Air Act, and therefore, not contrary to the Act. A September 28, 1982, EPA policy memorandum from Kathleen Bennet, titled Policy on Excess Emissions During Startup, Shutdown, Maintenance, and Malfunctions (“1982 Excess Emission Policy”), explains that “all periods of excess emissions [are] violations of the applicable standard.” Accordingly, the 1982 Excess Emission Policy provides that EPA will not approve automatic exemptions in operating permits or SIPs. However, the 1982 Excess Emission Policy also

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9This holds true even if the Petitioner could support an allegation that EPA had erroneously incorporated the provisions into the SIP. See Pacificorp at 23 (“even if the provision were found not to satisfy the Act, EPA could not properly object to a permit term that is derived from a provision of the federally approved SIP”). However, as explained below, EPA believes that these provisions were appropriately approved as part of the District's SIP.
explains that EPA can approve, as part of a SIP, provisions that codify an “enforcement discretion approach.” The Agency further refined its position on this topic in a September 20, 1999 policy memorandum from Steven A. Herman and Robert Perciasepe, titled State Implementation Plans: Policy Regarding Excess Emissions During Malfunctions, Startup, and Shutdown (“1999 Excess Emission Policy”). The 1999 Excess Emission Policy explained that a permitting authority may express its enforcement discretion through appropriate affirmative defense provisions approved into the SIP as long as the affirmative defense applies only to civil penalties (and not injunctive relief) and meets certain criteria. As previously explained, the Breakdown Relief Regulations approved into the District’s SIP provide neither an affirmative defense to an enforcement action nor an automatic exemption from applicable requirements, but rather serve as a mechanism for the District to use its enforcement discretion. Therefore, I find that the provision is not inconsistent with the Act.

Finally, Petitioners allege that the inclusion of Condition I.H.1 “creates unnecessary confusion and unwarranted potential defense to federal civil enforcement.” Inclusion of Condition I.H.3 in the Los Medanos Permit clarifies Condition I.H.1 by stating that “[t]he granting by the District of breakdown relief . . . will not provide relief from federal enforcement.” Contrary to Petitioners’ allegation, we find that addition of this language successfully dispels any ambiguity as to the impact of the provision, especially as it relates to federal enforceability, and therefore clears up “confusion” and limits “unwarranted defenses.” For the reasons stated above, I deny the Petition as it relates to Condition I.H.1 and the incorporation of the Breakdown Relief Regulations into the Permit.

B. Hearing Board Variance Relief Under Permit Condition I.H.2

The Petitioners’ second allegation challenges the inclusion in the Los Medanos Permit of Condition I.H.2, which states that a “permit holder may seek relief from enforcement action for a violation of any of the terms and conditions of this permit by applying to the District’s Hearing Board for a variance pursuant to Health and Safety Code Section 42350 . . . .” Petition at 3. Petitioners make a number of arguments in support of their claim that the reference to California’s Variance Law in the Los Medanos Permit serves as a basis for an objection; none of these allegations, however, serves as an adequate basis for EPA to object to the Permit.

Health and Safety Code (“HSC”) sections 42350 et seq. (“California’s Variance Law”) allow a permittee to request an air district hearing board to issue a variance to allow the permittee to operate in violation of an applicable district rule, or State rule or regulation for a limited time. Section 42352(a) prohibits the issuance of a variance unless the hearing board makes specific

10 On December 5, 2001, EPA issued a brief clarification of this policy. Re-Issuance of Clarification – State Implementation Plans (SIPs); Policy Regarding Excess Emissions During Malfunction, Startup, and Shutdown.
findings.\textsuperscript{11} Section 42352(a)(2) limits the availability of variances to situations involving non-compliance with “any rule, regulation, or order of the district.” As part of the variance process, the hearing board may set a “schedule of increments of progress,” to establish milestones and final deadlines for achieving compliance. See, e.g., HSC § 42358. EPA has not approved California’s Variance Law into the SIP or Title V program of any air district. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 60939 (Nov. 29, 1994) (proposing to approve BAAQMD’s title V program without California’s Variance Law); 60 Fed. Reg. 32606 (June 23, 1995) (granting final interim approval to BAAQMD’s title V program).

Petitioners argue that the “variance relief issued by BAAQMD under state law does not qualify as emergency breakdown relief authorized by the Title V provisions . . . .” Petition at 4. As with the Breakdown Relief Regulations, Petitioners’ true concern appears to be that Condition I.H.2 and California’s Variance Law are inconsistent with 40 CFR § 70.6(g), which allows for the incorporation of an affirmative defense provision into a federally approved title V program, and thus into title V permits. Condition I.H.2 and California’s Variance Law, however, do not need to be consistent with 40 CFR § 70.6(g) because these provisions merely express an aspect of the District’s discretionary enforcement authority under State law rather than incorporate a Part 70 affirmative defense provision into the Permit.\textsuperscript{12} As described above, the discretionary

\textsuperscript{11} HSC section 42352(a) provides as follows:

No variance shall be granted unless the hearing board makes all of the following findings:
(1) That the petitioner for a variance is, or will be, in violation of Section 41701 or of any rule, regulation, or order of the district.
(2) That, due to conditions beyond the reasonable control of the petitioner, requiring compliance would result in either (A) an arbitrary or unreasonable taking of property, or (B) the practical closing and elimination of a lawful business. In making those findings where the petitioner is a public agency, the hearing board shall consider whether or not requiring immediate compliance would impose an unreasonable burden upon an essential public service. For purposes of this paragraph, "essential public service" means a prison, detention facility, police or firefighting facility, school, health care facility, landfill gas control or processing facility, sewage treatment works, or water delivery operation, if owned and operated by a public agency.
(3) That the closing or taking would be without a corresponding benefit in reducing air contaminants.
(4) That the applicant for the variance has given consideration to curtailing operations of the source in lieu of obtaining a variance.
(5) During the period the variance is in effect, that the applicant will reduce excess emissions to the maximum extent feasible.
(6) During the period the variance is in effect, that the applicant will monitor or otherwise quantify emission levels from the source, if requested to do so by the district, and report these emission levels to the district pursuant to a schedule established by the district.

\textsuperscript{12} Government agencies have discretion to not seek penalties or injunctive relief against a noncomplying source. California’s Variance Law recognizes this inherent discretion by codifying the process by which a source may seek relief through the issuance of a variance. The ultimate decision to grant a variance, however, is still wholly discretionary, as evidenced by the findings the hearing board must make in order to issue a variance. See HSC section 42352(a)(1)-(6).
nature of California’s Variance Law is evidenced by the findings set forth in HSC §42538(a) that a hearing board must make before it can issue a variance.\textsuperscript{13} Inherent within the process of making these findings is the hearing board’s ability to exercise its discretion to evaluate and consider the evidence and circumstances underlying the variance application and to reject or grant, as appropriate, that application. Moreover, the District clearly states in Condition I.H.3. that the granting by the District of a variance does not “provide relief from federal enforcement,” which includes enforcement by both EPA and citizens.\textsuperscript{14} As Condition I.H.2. refers to a discretionary authority under state law that does not affect the federal enforceability of any applicable requirement, I do not find its inclusion in the Los Medanos Permit objectionable.

Petitioners also argue that the “variance program is a creature of state law,” and therefore should not be included in the Los Medanos Permit. Petitioners’ complaint is obviously without merit since Part 70 clearly allows for inclusion of state- and local-only requirements in title V permits as long as they are adequately identified as having only state- or local-only significance. 40 CFR § 70.6(b)(2). For this reason, I find that Petitioners’ allegation does not provide a basis to object to the Los Medanos Permit.

Petitioners further argue that California’s Variance Law allows a revision to the approved SIP in violation of the Act. Petitioners misunderstand the provision. The SIP is comprised of the State or district rules and regulations approved by EPA as meeting CAA requirements. SIP requirements cannot be modified by an action of the State or District granting a temporary variance. EPA has long held the view that a variance does not change the underlying SIP requirements unless and until it is submitted to and approved by EPA for incorporation into the SIP. For example, since 1976, EPA’s regulations have specifically stated: “In order for a variance to be considered for approval as a revision to the State implementation plan, the State must submit it in accordance with the requirements of this section.” 40 CFR §51.104(d); 41 Fed. Reg. 18510, 18511 (May 5, 1976).

The fact that the California Variance Law does not allow a revision to the approved SIP is further evidenced by the law itself. By its very terms, California’s Variance Law is limited in application to “any rule, regulation, or order of the district,” HSC § 42352(a)(2) (emphasis supplied); therefore, the law clearly does not purport to modify the federally approved SIP. In addition, California’s view of the law’s effect is consistent with EPA’s. For instance, guidance

\textsuperscript{13} Because of its discretionary nature, California’s Variance Law does not impose a legal impediment to the District’s ability to enforce its SIP or title V program. EPA cannot prohibit the District’s use of the variance process as a means for sources to avoid enforcement of permit conditions by the District unless the misuse of the variance process results in the District’s failure to adequately implement or enforce its title V program, or its other federally delegated or approved CAA programs. Petitioners have made no such allegation.

\textsuperscript{14} Other BAAQMD information resources on variances also clearly set forth the legal significance of variances. For example, the application for a variance on BAAQMD’s website states that EPA “does not recognize California’s variance process” and that “EPA can independently pursue legal action based on federal law against the facility continuing to be in violation.”
issued in 1989 by the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), the State agency responsible for preparation of California’s SIP, titled Variances and Other Hearing Board Orders as SIP Revisions or Delayed Compliance Orders Under Federal Law, demonstrates that the State’s position with respect to the federal enforceability and legal consequences of variances is consistent with EPA’s. For example, the guidance states:

State law authorizes hearing boards of air pollution control districts to issue variances from district rules in appropriate instances. These variances insulate sources from the imposed state law. However, where the rule in question is part of the State Implementation Plan (SIP) as approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the variance does not by itself insulate the source from penalties in actions brought by EPA to enforce the rule as part of the SIP. While EPA can use enforcement discretion to informally insulate sources from federal action, formal relief can only come through EPA approval of the local variance.

In 1993, the California Attorney General affirmed this position in a formal legal opinion submitted to EPA as part of the title V program approval process, stating that “any variance obtained by the source does not effect [sic] or modify permit terms or conditions . . . nor does it preclude federal enforcement of permanent terms and conditions.” In sum, both the federal and State governments have long held the view that the issuance of a variance by a district hearing board does not modify the SIP in any way. For this reason, I find that Petitioners’ allegation does not provide a basis to object to the Los Medanos Permit.

Finally, Petitioners raise concerns that the issuance of variances could “jeopardize attainment and maintenance of ambient air quality standards” and that inclusion of the variance provision in the Permit is highly confusing to the regulated community and public. As to the first concern, Petitioners’ allegation is too speculative to provide a basis for an objection to a title V permit. Moreover, as previously stated, permittees that receive a variance remain subject to all SIP and federal requirements, as well as federal enforcement for violation of those requirements. As to Petitioners’ final point, I find that including California’s Variance Law in title V permits may actually help clarify the regulatory scheme to the regulated community and public. California’s Variance Law can be utilized by permittees seeking relief from District or State rules regardless of whether the Variance Law is referenced in title V permits; therefore, reference to the Variance Law with appropriate explanatory language as to its limited impact on federal enforceability helps clarify the actual nature of the law to the regulated community. In short, since title V permits are meant to contain all applicable federal, State, and local requirements, with appropriate clarifying language explaining the function and applicability of each requirement, the District may incorporate California’s Variance Law into the Los Medanos Permit and other title V permits. For reasons stated in this Section, I do not find grounds to object to the Los Medanos Permit on this issue.

C. Statement of Basis
Petitioners’ third claim is that the Los Medanos Permit lacks a statement of basis, as required by 40 CFR § 70.7(a)(5). Petition at 5. Petitioners assert that without a statement of basis it is virtually impossible for the public to evaluate the periodic monitoring requirements (or lack thereof). \textit{Id.} They specifically identify the District’s failure to include an explanation for its decision not to require certain monitoring, including the lack of any monitoring for opacity, filterable particulate, or PM limits. Petition at 6-7, n.2. Additionally, Petitioners contend that BAAQMD fails to include any SO\textsubscript{2} monitoring for source S-2 (Heat Recovery Steam Generator). \textit{Id.}

Section 70.7(a)(5) of EPA’s permit regulations states that “the permitting authority shall provide a statement that sets forth the legal and factual basis for the draft permit conditions (including references to the applicable statutory or regulatory provisions).” The statement of basis is not part of the permit itself. It is a separate document which is to be sent to EPA and to interested persons upon request.\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Id.}

A statement of basis ought to contain a brief description of the origin or basis for each permit condition or exemption. However, it is more than just a short form of the permit. It should highlight elements that EPA and the public would find important to review. Rather than restating the permit, it should list anything that deviates from a straight recitation of requirements. The statement of basis should highlight items such as the permit shield, streamlined conditions, or any monitoring that is required under 40 C.F.R. 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B) or District Regulation 2-6-503. Thus, it should include a discussion of the decision-making that went into the development of the title V permit and provide the permitting authority, the public, and EPA a record of the applicability and technical issues surrounding the issuance of the permit.\textsuperscript{16} \textit{See \textit{e.g.}, In Re Port

\textsuperscript{15}Unlike permits, statements of basis are not enforceable, do not set limits and do not create obligations.

\textsuperscript{16}EPA has provided guidance on the content of an adequate statement of basis in a letter dated December 20, 2001, from Region V to the State of Ohio and in a Notice of Deficiency (“NOD”) issued to the State of Texas. <http://www.epa.gov/rgygrnj/programs/artd/air/title5/5mmemos/sbguide.pdf> (Region V letter to Ohio); 67 Fed. Reg. 732 (January 7, 2002) (EPA NOD issued to Texas). The se documents describe the following five key elements of a statement of basis: (1) a description of the facility; (2) a discussion of any operational flexibility that will be utilized at the facility; (3) the basis for applying the permit shield; (4) any federal regulatory applicability determinations; and (5) the rationale for the monitoring methods selected. \textit{Id.} at 735. In addition, the Region V letter further recommends the inclusion of the following topical discussions in a statement of basis: (1) monitoring and operational restrictions requirements; (2) applicability and exemptions; (3) explanation of any conditions from previously issued permits that are not being transferred to the title V permit; (4) streamlining requirements; and (5) certain other factual information as necessary. In a letter dated February 19, 1999 to Mr. David Dixon, Chair of the CAPCOA Title V Subcommittee, the EPA Region IX Air Division provided guidance to California permitting authorities that should be considered when developing a statement of basis for purposes of EPA Region IX’s review. This guidance is consistent with the other guidance cited above. Each of the various guidance documents, including the Texas NOD and the Region V and IX letters, provide generalized recommendations for developing an adequate statement of basis rather than “hard and fast” rules on what to include in any given statement of basis. Taken as a whole, these recommendations provide a good roadmap as to what should be included in a statement of basis considering, for example, the technical complexity of the permit, the history of the facility, and any new provisions, such as periodic monitoring conditions, that the permitting authority has drafted in conjunction with issuing the title
EPA’s regulations state that the permitting authority must provide EPA with a statement of basis. 40 CFR § 70.7(a)(5). The failure of a permitting authority to meet this procedural requirement, however, does not necessarily demonstrate that the title V permit is substantively flawed. In reviewing a petition to object to a title V permit because of an alleged failure of the permitting authority to meet all procedural requirements in issuing the permit, EPA considers whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the permitting authority’s failure resulted in, or may have resulted in, a deficiency in the content of the permit. See CAA § 505(b)(2) (objection required “if the petitioner demonstrates . . . that the permit is not in compliance with the requirements of this Act, including the requirements of the applicable [SIP]”); see also, 40 CFR § 70.8(c)(1). Thus, where the record as a whole supports the terms and conditions of the permit, flaws in the statement of basis generally will not result in an objection. See e.g., Doe Run at 24-25. In contrast, where flaws in the statement of basis resulted in, or may have resulted in, deficiencies in the title V permit, EPA will object to the issuance of the permit. See e.g., Ft. James at 8; Georgia Pacific at 37-40.

In this case, as discussed below, the permitting authority’s failure to adequately explain its permitting decisions either in the statement of basis or elsewhere in the permit record is such a serious flaw that the adequacy of the permit itself is in question. By reopening the permit, the permitting authority is ensuring compliance with the fundamental title V procedural requirements of adequate public notice and comment required by sections 502(b)(6) and 503(e) of the Clean Air Act and 40 CFR § 70.7(h), as well as ensuring that the rationale for the selected monitoring method, or lack of monitoring, is clearly explained and documented in the permit record. See 40 CFR §§ 70.7(a)(5) and 70.8(c); Ft. James at 8.

For the proposed Los Medanos Permit, the District did not provide EPA with a separate statement of basis document. In a meeting with EPA representatives held on October 31, 2001, at the Region 9 offices, the District claimed that it complied with the statement of basis requirements for the Los Medanos Permit because it incorporated all of the necessary explanatory information either directly into the Permit or it included such information in other supporting documentation. As such, the District argues, at a minimum, it complied with the substantive requirements of a statement of basis.
In responding to the Petition, we reviewed the final Los Medanos Permit and all supporting documentation, which included the proposed Permit, the FDOC drafted by the District for purposes of licensing the power plant with the CEC, and the “Permit Evaluation and Emission Calculations” (“Permit Evaluation”) which was developed in March 2001 as part of the modification to the previously issued ATC permit. Although the District provided some explanation in this supporting documentation as to the factual and legal basis for certain terms and conditions of the Permit, this documentation did not sufficiently set forth the basis or rationale for many other terms and conditions. Generally speaking, the District’s record for the Permit does not adequately support: (1) the factual basis for certain standard title V conditions; (2) applicability determinations for source-specific applicable requirements, such as the Acid Rain requirements and New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”); (3) exclusion of certain NSR and PSD conditions contained in underlying ATC permits; (4) recordkeeping decisions and periodic monitoring decisions under 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B) and District Regulation 2-6-503; and (5) streamlining analyses, including a discussion of permit shields.

EPA Region 9 identified numerous specific deficiencies falling under each of these broad categories. For example, the District’s permit record does not adequately support the basis for certain source-specific applicable requirements identified in Section IV of the Permit, especially those regarding the applicability or non-applicability of subsections rules that apply to particular types of units such the as NSPS for combustion turbines or SIP-approved District Regulations. For instance, in table IV-B and D of the Permit, the District indicates that subsection 303 of District Regulation 9-3, which sets forth NOx emission limitations, applies to certain emission units. However, the permit record fails to describe why subsection 601 of the same District Regulation, an otherwise seemingly applicable provision, is not included in the tables as an applicable requirement. Subsection 601 establishes how exhaust gases should be sampled and analyzed to determine NOx concentrations for purposes of compliance with subsection 303. Similarly, in the same tables, the District lists certain applicable NSPS subsections, such as those in 40 CFR Part 60 Subparts Da and GG, but does not explain why these subsections apply to those specific emission units nor why other seemingly applicable subsections of the same NSPS regulations do not apply to those units.

The permit record also fails to explain the District’s streamlining decisions of certain

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18 EPA Region 9 Permits Office described these areas of concern in greater detail in a memorandum dated March 29, 2002, “Region 9 Review of Statement of Basis for Los Medanos title V Permit in Response to Petition to Object.” This memorandum is part of the administrative record for this Order and was reviewed in responding to this Petition.

19 The tables in Section IV pertaining to certain gas turbines located at the Facility cite to 40 CFR 60.332(a)(1) as an applicable requirement. However, these same tables fail to cite to subsections 40 CFR 60.332(a)(2) through 60.332(l) of the same NSPS program even though these provisions also apply to gas turbines. The District’s failure to provide any sort of discussion or explanation as to the applicability or non-applicability of the subsections of 40 CFR 60.3.32 makes it impossible to review the District’s applicability determinations for this NSPS.
underlying ATC permit conditions as set forth in Section VI of the Permit. The District apparently modified or streamlined the ATC conditions in the context of the title V permitting process but failed to provide an explanation in the permit record as to the basis for the change to the conditions. For instance, Condition 53 of Section VI states that the condition was “[d]eleted [on] August, 2001,” but the District fails to discuss or explain anywhere in the permit record the basis for this deletion or the nature of the original condition that was deleted.

As a final example of the District’s failure to provide a basis or rationale for permit terms, in accordance with Petitioner’s claim, the permit record is devoid of discussion pertaining to how or why the selected monitoring is sufficient to assure compliance with the applicable requirements. See 69 Fed. Reg. 3202, 3207 (Jan. 22, 2004). Most importantly, for those applicable requirements which do not otherwise have monitoring requirements, the Permit fails to require monitoring pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B), and the permit record fails to discuss or explain why no monitoring should be required under this provision. As evidenced by these specific examples, I find the District did not provide an adequate analysis or discussion of the terms and conditions of the proposed Los Medanos Permit.

To conclude, by failing to draft a separate statement of basis document and by failing to include appropriate discussion in the Permit or other supporting documentation, the District has failed to provide an adequate explanation or rationale for many significant elements of the Permit. As such, I find that the Petitioners’ claim in regard to this issue is well founded, and by this Order, I am requiring the District to reopen the Los Medanos Permit, and make available to the public an adequate statement of basis that provides the public and EPA an opportunity to comment on the title V permit and its terms and conditions as to the issues identified above.

D. Inadequate Permit Conditions

Petitioners’ fourth claim is that Condition 22 in the Los Medanos Permit is unenforceable. The Petitioners claim that this condition “appears to defer the development of a number of permit conditions related to transient, non-steady state conditions to a time after approval of the Title V permit.” Petition at 7. The Petitioners recommend that “a reasonable set of conditions should be defined” and amended through the permit modification process to conform to new data in the future. I disagree with the Petitioners on this issue.

As Petitioners correctly note, Part 70 and the Act require that “conditions in a Title V permit... be enforceable.” However, they argue that “Condition 22 is presently unenforceable and must be deleted from the permit.” I find that the condition challenged by the Petitioners is enforceable.

Conditions 21 and 22 establish NOx emissions levels for units P-1 and P-2, including limits for transient, non-steady state conditions. Condition 22(f) requires the permittee to gather data and draft and submit an operation and maintenance plan to control transient, non-steady
state emissions for units P-1 and P-2 within 15 months of issuance of the permit. Condition 22(g) creates a process for the District, after consideration of continuous monitoring and source test data, to fine-tune on a semi-annual basis the NO\textsubscript{X} emission limit for units P-1 and P-2 during transient, non-steady state conditions and to modify data collection and recordkeeping requirements for the permittee.

These requirements are enforceable. EPA and the District can enforce both Condition 22(f)’s requirement to draft and submit an operation and maintenance plan for agency approval and the control measures adopted under the plan after approval. For Condition 22(g), the process for the District to modify emission limits and/or data collection and recordkeeping requirements is clearly set forth in the Permit and the modified terms will be federally enforceable. Moreover, the circumstances that trigger application of Condition 22 are specifically defined since Condition 22(c) precisely defines “transient, non-steady state condition” as when “one or more equipment design features is unable to support rapid changes in operation and respond to and adjust all operating parameters required to maintain the steady-state NO\textsubscript{X} emission limit specified in Condition 21(b).” As such, I find that Condition 22 is federally and practically enforceable. Therefore, Petitioners’ claim on this count is not supported by the plain language of the Permit itself.

Moreover, to the extent that Petitioners are concerned that Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (“LAER”\textsuperscript{21}) emission standards are being set through a process that does not incorporate appropriate NSR, PSD, and title V public notice and comment processes, such concerns are not well-founded. By its very terms, the Permit prohibits relaxation of the LAER emissions standards set in the permitting process. Condition 21(b) of the Permit sets a LAER-level emission standard of 2.5 ppmv NO\textsubscript{X}, averaged over any 1-hour period, for units P-1 and P-2 for all operational conditions other than transient, non-steady state conditions. Condition 22(a) sets the limit for transient, non-steady state conditions of 2.5 ppmv NO\textsubscript{X}, averaged over any rolling 3-hour period.\textsuperscript{22} Implementation of Condition 22 cannot relax the LAER-level emission limits. Condition 22(f) merely requires further data-collecting, planning, and implementation of control

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\textsuperscript{20}Unit P-1 is defined as “the combined exhaust point for the S-1 Gas Turbine and the S-2 HRSG after control by the A-1 SCR System and A-2 Oxidation Catalyst” and unit P-2 is defined as “the combined exhaust point for the S-3 Gas Turbine and the S-4 HRSG after control by the A-3 SCR System and A-4 Oxidation Catalyst.” Permit, Condition 21(a).

\textsuperscript{21}LAER is the level of emission control required for all new and modified major sources subject to the NSR requirements of Section 173, Part D, of the CAA for non-attainment areas. 42 U.S.C. § 7501-15. Since the Bay Area is non-attainment for ozone, the Facility must meet LAER-level emission controls for NO\textsubscript{X} emission since NO\textsubscript{X} is a precursor of ozone. California uses different terminology than the CAA when applying LAER, however. In California, best available control technology (“BACT”) is consistent with LAER-level controls, and California and its local permitting authorities use this terminology when issuing permits.

\textsuperscript{22}The District determined this limit to be LAER for transient, non-steady state conditions because, as the District stated in its Response to Comments, “the NO\textsubscript{X} emission limit (2.5 ppmv averaged over one hour) during load changes has not yet been achieved in practice by any utility-scale power plant.”
measures for transient, non-steady state emissions that go beyond those already established to comply with LAER requirements. While Condition 22(g) does allow the District to modify the emission limit during transient, non-steady state conditions, this new limit cannot exceed the “backstop” LAER-level limit set by Condition 22(a). As such, Condition 22(g) serves to only make overall emission limits more stringent. The District itself recognized the “no backsliding” nature of Conditions 22(f) and (g) on page 3 of its Response to Comments where it stated that the Facility “must comply with ‘backstop’ NO\textsubscript{X} emission limit of 2.5 ppmv, averaged over 3 hours, under all circumstances and comply with all hourly, daily and annual mass NO\textsubscript{X} emission limits.”

Finally, for any control measures; further data collection, recordkeeping or monitoring requirements; new definitions; or emission limits established pursuant to Conditions 22(f) or (g) that are to be incorporated into the permit, the District must utilize the appropriate title V permit modification procedures set forth in 40 CFR § 70.7(d) and the District’s Regulation 2-6-415 to modify the Permit. The District itself recognizes this in Condition 22(g) by stating that “the Title V operating permit shall be amended as necessary to reflect the data collection and recordkeeping requirements established under 22(g)(ii).” For the reasons described above, we do not find Conditions 22(f) and (g) unenforceable or otherwise objectionable for inclusion in the Los Medanos Permit.

E. Failure to Incorporate Agreed-to Changes

The final claim by the Petitioners is that the District agreed to incorporate certain changes into the final Los Medanos Permit but failed to do so. Namely, Petitioners claim that the District failed to keep its commitments to OCE to add language requiring recordkeeping for stipulated abatement strategies under SIP-approved Regulation 4 and to add clarifying language about NO\textsubscript{X} monitoring requirements. The District appeared to make these commitments in its Response to Comment Letter. These allegations do not provide a basis for objecting to the Permit because neither change is necessary to ensure that the District is properly including all applicable requirements in the permit nor are they necessary to assure compliance with the underlying applicable requirements. CAA § 504(a); 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3).

The first change sought by OCE during the comment period was a requirement that the

23 The District may modify the emission limit during transient, non-steady state conditions every 6 months for the first 24 months after the start of the Commissioning period. The Commissioning period commences “when all mechanical, electrical, and control systems are installed and individual system start-up has been completed, or when a gas turbine is first fired, whichever comes first.” The Commissioning period terminates “when the plant has completed performance testing, is available for commercial operation, and has initiated sales to the power exchange.” Permit, at page 34.

24 The purpose of Condition 22, as stated by the District, is to allow for limited “excursions above the emission limit that could potentially occur under unforeseen circumstances beyond [the Facility’s] control.” This is the rationale for the three hour averaging period for transient, non-steady state conditions rather than the one hour averaging period of Condition 21(b) for all other periods.
Facility document response actions taken during periods of heightened air pollution. The District’s Regulation 4 establishes control and advisory procedures for large air emission sources when specified levels of ambient air contamination have been reached and prescribes certain abatement actions to be implemented by each air source when action alert levels of air pollution are reached. OCE recommended that the District require recordkeeping in the title V permit to “insure that the stipulated abatement strategies [of Regulation 4] are implemented during air pollution events,” and the District appeared to agree to such a recommendation in its Response to Comments. Although the recordkeeping suggested by Petitioners would be helpful, Petitioners have not shown that it is required by title V, the SIP, or any federal regulation, and therefore, this failure to include it is not a basis for objecting to the permit.

The Part 70 regulations set the minimum standard for inclusion of monitoring and recordkeeping requirements in title V permits. See 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3). These provisions require that each permit contain “periodic monitoring sufficient to yield reliable data from the relevant time period that are representative of the source’s compliance with the permit” where the applicable requirement does not require periodic testing or instrumental or noninstrumental monitoring (which may consist of recordkeeping designed to serve as monitoring). 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B). There may be limited cases in which the establishment of a regular program of monitoring and/or recordkeeping would not significantly enhance the ability of the permit to reasonably assure compliance with the applicable requirement and where the status quo (i.e., no monitoring or recordkeeping) could meet the requirements of 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3). Such is the case here.

Air pollution alert events occur infrequently, and therefore, compliance with Regulation 4 is a minimal part of the source’s overall compliance with SIP requirements. More importantly, Regulation 4-303 abatement requirements mostly impose a ban on direct burning or incineration during air pollution alert events, activities which are unlikely to occur at a gas-fired power plant such as the Facility and in any case are easy to monitor by District inspectors. The other Regulation 4-303 requirements are mostly voluntary actions to be taken by the sources, such as reduction in use of motor vehicles, and therefore do not require compliance monitoring or recordkeeping to assure compliance. Since the activities regulated by Regulation 4 are unlikely to occur at the Facility, and compliance is easily verified by District inspectors, recordkeeping is not necessary to assure compliance with Regulation 4. Therefore, further recordkeeping requirements sought by the Petitioners are not required by 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3).

The second change sought by the Petitioners is to add language to Condition 36 clarifying why certain pollutants, such as NOX emissions, are exempt from mass emission calculations. On page 3 of the District’s Response to Comments, the District explained that the NOX emissions are exempt from the mass emission calculations because they are measured directly through CEMS monitoring, whereas the other pollutant emissions subject to the calculations do not have equivalent CEMS monitoring. Though this clarification is helpful, it does not need to be incorporated into the title V permit itself. Therefore, its non-inclusion in the Permit does not provide a basis for an EPA objection to the Permit. To the extent that such
clarifying language is important, it should be included in the statement of basis, however. Since the District will be drafting a statement of basis for the Los Medanos Permit due to the partial granting of the Petition, we recommend that the clarifying language for Condition 36 be included in the newly drafted statement of basis.

Though we hope that permitting authorities would generally fulfill commitments made to the public, we find that the Petitioners’ fifth claim does not provide a basis for an objection to the Los Medanos Permit for the reasons described above. The mere fact that the District committed to make certain changes, yet did not follow through on those commitments, does not provide a basis for an objection to a title V permit. Petitioners have provided no other reason why the agreed upon changes must be made to the permit beyond the District’s commitments. I accordingly deny Petitioners’ request to veto the permit on these grounds.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and pursuant to Section 505(b)(2) of the Clean Air Act, I am granting the Petitioners’ request that the Administrator object to the issuance of the Los Medanos Permit with respect to the statement of basis issue and am denying the Petition with respect to the other allegations.

May 24, 2004
Date

/S/
Michael O. Leavitt
Administrator