March 16, 2009

Carol Rushin
Acting Regional Administrator
United States Environmental Protection Agency
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APPEAL OF TITLE V PERMIT ISSUED BY UTAH DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY TO STERICYCLE INC.

BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Section 505 (b)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C Section 7661d (b), Greenaction for Health and Environment Justice and (collectively “Petitioners”) petition the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (the “Administrator” or “EPA”) to object to the Title V operating permit issued by the Utah Division of Air Quality (Utah DAQ or DAQ) for the Stericycle Medical Waste Incinerator (“Stericycle”). The Administrator is required to object to the Stericycle Permit because, as demonstrated below:

(1) the content of the permit does not meet requirements found in the Clean Air Act,
(2) the Utah DAQ conducted a biased and tainted permit process,
(3) the Utah DAQ did not adequately respond to comments and
(4) an important recent federal court ruling in Sierra Club vs. Environmental Protection Agency, changes the law regarding emissions from the bypass stack, and the permit process should have considered and evaluated such emissions, and any permit DAQ issues must comply with this decision. The decision is attached and incorporated into our
appeal.

The Petitioners request that EPA Region 8 assume oversight and deny the approval order of Stericycle Medical Waste Incinerator (Stericycle) Permit No. 1100055002, issued by the Utah DAQ, under the Title V of the Clean Air Act. Petitioners will briefly give some background information and then state reasons that the proposed permit renewal should be denied and EPA should take oversight jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

The Division of Air Quality, Department of Environmental Quality, State of Utah submitted a request for public comments on Stericycle (August 5, 2008 closing October 13, 2008). Petitioners specifically stated in their written comments that we were requesting a response to comments that were submitted, as statutes and regulations require (U.S.C.A. Chapter 5 Section 553). A month after developing DAQ response to public comments, a Division of Air Quality Administrative Board member electronically mailed Petitioners a copy of DAQ’s response to Title V Operating Permit renewal for Stericycle. It should be noted that to this day Petitioners have not received response to comments from DAQ, even though under State of Utah regulations it requires DAQ to respond to comments before issuing an approval order. It should be noted that Stericycle has received response to public comments from DAQ.

In fact, petitioners only received notice from DAQ that this permit was issued to Sterecycle weeks after it was issued, and only pursuant to a request we made in writing. DAQ

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1 Memorandum to: Stericycle Hospital Medical Infectious Waste Incinerator; though David Beatty; From Robert Grandy; Dated December 22, 2008; Subject: Response to Public Comments-Title V operating Permit Renewal.
2 R307-401-7 (3) states: “(3) The executive secretary will consider all comments received during the public comment period and at the public hearing and, if appropriate, will make changes to the proposal in response to comments before issuing an approval order or disapproval order.”
did not bother to proactively notify appellants – and certainly did not provide notice in a timely manner - even though appellants had provided both verbal and written comments.

Petitioners attach the written comments we submitted during the public comment period and incorporate them into this appeal. These comments will document that the Utah DAQ has failed to adequately respond to comments submitted regarding the proposed permit. These comments will also document that the Utah DAQ conducted a biased and tainted process. We also attach and incorporate into this appeal our August 14, 2008 letter to Carol Rushin, Acting Regional Administrator, Region VIII, United States Environmental Protection Agency Entitled “Complaint Regarding State of Utah’s Title V Permit Process and Regulation of Stericycle Incinerator in North Salt Lake City, Utah.”

In addition, a recent U.S. Court of Appeals decision, Sierra Club versus Environmental Protection Agency, eliminated the exemption of bypass emissions from regulation and set forth a new requirement that emissions from bypass stacks during start up, shut down and upset conditions must be regulated. The DAQ permit, which was issued after this court decision, does not conform this court ruling.

III. THE STERICYCLE MEDICAL WASTE INCINERATOR

In the late 1980’s, local hospitals began to close their local incinerators, mainly due to complaints from adjacent residents, concern about dioxin and mercury emissions, as well as stronger regulation. Browning Ferris Industries (BFI) proposed to build a medical waste incinerator in North Salt Lake for the purpose of meeting hospitals’ needs. Politically speaking, this occurred at the same time the Department of Health’s various Environmental Bureaus were receiving requests for solid and hazardous waste incinerators. At the time, Legislators were also becoming concerned with the number of solid and hazardous waste incinerators being requested.
In 1989, legislation was passed that limited the number of solid and hazardous incinerators (and also created a new Department of Environmental Quality; with Divisions taken from the State Department of Health, [i.e., Air Quality, Solid and Hazardous Waste, Radiation Control, Water Quality]). This legislation became known as the “Siting Criteria”. One thing the “Siting Criteria” required was that the incinerator is not located within a one-mile radius of residential dwellings. Facilities that had their proposals into the various Divisions prior 1990 were allowed to proceed in the various permitting processes, in what came to be known as a “grandfather clause.”

BFI sold their facility to Stericycle in the late 1990’s—early 2000’s. About 2003—2004 time period, the Davis County “Planning and Zoning” Commission received a proposal from the Foxboro developer to develop the land just north and northeast of Stericycle for a large residential community. Part of the Commission’s decision to grant Foxboro approval was based on discussions with the Division of Air Quality, and the Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste. Both Divisions were not forthright with information to the Commission. Both Divisions apparently claimed there were no “upset conditions.” Foxboro’s proposal was approved and homes were built literally up against the wall of the incineration facility, resulting in families living just feet from the facility. “Upset conditions” do not include “start-up” and “shut-down” procedures, that allows emissions to bypass the pollution control devices; nor do they count for the number of “allowable” bypasses from the permit, (e.g., the permit allows Stericycle a set number of bypasses based on a given time period duration, without being in violation of their permit.) “Allowable” bypasses are Start-up, Shutdown and Malfunctions. Granted, a Malfunction is a form of “upset condition”.

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3 UAC 19-1-108.
IV. ARGUMENT

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Clean Air Act is “Congress’s response to well documented scientific and social concerns about the quality of the air that sustains life on earth and protects it from ...degradation and pollution caused by modern industrial society.” Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F. 2d 256, 260 (3rd Cir 1991). A key component of achieving the Clean Air Act’s goal of protecting our precious air is the Title V operating permit program. Title V permits are suppose to consolidate all of the requirements for the facility into a single permit and provide for adequate monitoring and reporting to ensure that the regulatory agencies and the permittee are complying with its permit. See generally S.Rep. No. 101-228 at 346-47; see also In re: Roosevelt Regional Landfill, (EPA Administrator May 11, 1999) at 64 FR 25,336.

When a state or local air quality permitting authority issues a Title V operating permit, the EPA will object if EPA determines that the permit is not in compliance with any applicable requirement or requirements under 40 CFR Part 70. 40 CFR section 70.8 (c). However, if EPA does not object on its own, then “any person may petition the Administrator within 60 days after the expiration of the Administrator’s 45 day review period to make such a objection.” 40 CFR section 70.8 (d); 42 U.S.C. section 7661d (b)(2) CAA section 505(b)(2). “To justify exercise of an objection by EPA to a [T]itle V permit pursuant to Section 505(b)(2), a petitionor must demonstrate that the permit is not in compliance with applicable requirements of the Act, including the requirements of Part 70. [40 CFR] section 70.8(d). In re: Pacificorp’s Jim Bridger and Naughton Plants, VIII-00-1 (EPA Administrator Nov.6, 2000) at 4.
B. Errors in the Permit that Warrant Objection by EPA

DAQ’s Permit Decision Did Not Properly Analyze CO2 Emissions:

Environmental Appeals Board U.S. EPA decision, Deseret Power Electric Cooperative PSD Appeal No. 07-03 has determined that CO2 emissions must be analyzed by the regulatory authority prior to the issuances of a permit. Yet DAQ made no mention and/or changes in their analysis for Stericycle Title V permit renewal, nor did DAQ comply with the determination of CO2 emissions in their public participation document that established specific conditions for approval of the permit renewal for Stericycle.

DAQ’s Permit Evaluation Failed to Consider the United States Court of Appeals Decision in Sierra Club versus Environmental Protection Agency Regarding Bypass Emissions.

In this case, petitioners challenged the final rules promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency exempting major sources of air pollution from normal emission standards during periods of startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions (“SSM”) and imposing alternative, and arguably less onerous requirements in their place. The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that this exemption violates the Clean Air Act and therefore they granted the petition and vacated the exemption. A copy of this court decision is attached and incorporated into this appeal.

The DAQ must reopen the Title V Permit process and evaluate the proposed permit renewal in light of this court decision on bypass emissions.

DAQ’s “Response to Public Comments – Title V Operating Permit Renewal” was never sent to appellants, is inadequate, contains inaccuracies and is largely non-responsive:

In addition, the response to comments that DAQ has developed demonstrates lack of
enforcement and compliance with statutes and regulations, as demonstrated in the following examples:

The DAQ never sent the “Response to Comments” to appellants despite the fact that appellants provided extensive verbal and written comments on the draft permit. We assert that DAQ was required to send the “Response to Comments” to individuals and organizations that commented but failed to do so.

The “Response to Comments” document omits the fact that organizations representing thousands of people submitted comments, not just “five people” as the “Response” states.

The DAQ claim that they “summarized and addressed” the comments is incorrect as numerous comments were not addressed at all.

DAQ failed to respond to all the legitimate issues raised by members of the public regarding the inadequate notices of the public comment period and public hearing.

DAQ’s “Response” number (4) asserts that the public comment period and public hearing were advertised as required by the law, including notifying “...persons on a mailing list developed by the Executive Secretary...” This assertion is incorrect as DAQ failed to maintain on a mailing list the names of individuals who had signed up previously at a meeting with DAQ on this issue, and also failed to notify residents who had communicated, in writing, concern to DAQ about the project.

DAQ’s “Response” (5) regarding the so-called “Stericycle information page” on DAQ’s website is non-responsive, incorrect and totally misleading. DAQ’s “Response” fails to state that comments were submitted objecting to the linking of the DAQ website to Stericycle’s own website, and also that comments documented incorrect statements on both websites.

DAQ’s “Response” omits any mention whatsoever of the linking to the Stericycle
website, a key omission that again demonstrates bias.

DAQ’s “Response” number (5) also incorrectly states that “Regardless, all records are available for the public to review on request through the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). Comments submitted document that not all records requested under the GRAMA were not made available to appellant Greenaction. For example, email documents were not provided during appellant Greenaction’s first file review pursuant to a GRAMA request.

DAQ “Response” (7) regarding stack tests asserts incorrectly that “....all tests are done under the oversight of DAQ staff.” This assertion by DAQ is contradicted on the same page in their document when they admit that “…DAQ staff may or may not be onsite at the time of testing.” A stack test done without DAQ staff present to observe what is being burned, how tests were done in accordance with or in violation of test protocols, or what happened cannot seriously be claimed to be done “under the oversight of DAQ staff.” The claim that lab results are sent to an independent laboratory using chain of custody cannot be verified by DAQ if they do not witness this.

DAQ “Response” (9) is incorrect when they assert that the comments regarding the proximity of homes to the incinerator are zoning decisions. These comments were not raised solely as to zoning, but were raised to point out that there has never been a study about the safety of having people living literally a few feet from the incinerator and that the original city approval of the incinerator was based on not having homes within one mile.

In addition, DAQ’s discussion of this topic as comments relating to the “encroachment of residential development on the industrial areas of North Salt Lake” demonstrates a bias in how they view the fact that people literally live next to the wall of the incinerator plant.
DAQ’s “Response to Comments” on bypasses are incorrect and misleading. DAQ incorrectly claims that use of the bypass stack during start-up and shut-down somehow are not bypasses. This is a convenient but inaccurate interpretation of the word bypass. As referenced above, a federal court recently ruled agencies must evaluate and consider bypasses during start up and shut down in their permits.

DAQ failed to accurately or adequately respond to comments regarding duration of bypasses, claiming they had no record of a bypass incident that went on for several hours and therefore concluding the comments on this incident were not valid.

DAQ’s “Response” (16) regarding comments documenting Stericycle’s inability to assure compliance with a new permit was totally non-responsive to the comments. Comments were submitted, based on documents in DAQ’s own files, demonstrating the DAQ was aware that Stericycle had not complied with key requirements during the current permit period. DAQ’s “Response” fails to mention any of this, only saying that Title V “...anticipate that a source could have compliance problems...” Yet DAQ fails to address the specific violations that they themselves notified Stericycle about.

DAQ wrote in their “Response” that “Comments were made that Stericycle’s Title V permit should not be renewed,” because DAQ has “failed to fulfill its regulatory and permitting authority” and “has violated key mandates of Title V and the Clean Air Act”. The comment went on to say that “Stericycle has not demonstrated that it can assure compliance with a new Title V permit”.

With respect to the comment regarding DAQ’s “failure to fulfill its regulatory and permitting authority” and having “violated key mandates of Title V and the Clean Air Act”, the commenter refers to various questions about the Stericycle facility addressed
in responses throughout this document. With respect to the comment that “Stericycle has not demonstrated that it can assure compliance with a new Title V permit”, The Clean Air Act and the Utah Administrative Code (UAC) anticipate that a source could have compliance problems, and has procedures outlined to address those problems (see R307-415-5c (8)(b)(iii) and R307-415-5c (8)(c)(iii)) both during permit renewal and during the life of the permit."

This response seems to be in response to comment made regarding warning letters the DAQ submitted to Stericycle, yet DAQ’s response is inadequate and non-responsive to comments which stated:

"DAQ Warning Letter Documents Stericycle’s Inability to Assure Compliance with new Title V Permit:

As Stericycle has not been able to comply with key requirement of their current Title V Permit, that DAQ cannot seriously argue that Stericycle will comply with a new permit. On July 1, 2008, DAQ issued a warning letter to Stericycle entitled “Warning Stericycle, Title V Permit Issued May 3, 2002.” This warning letter documented violation of the Title V Permit by Stericycle, yet DAQ has been telling the public and media that Stericycle has had no serious violations—but indeed these are serious and demonstrate non-compliance. These are not mere paperwork violations, but are serious instances of Stericycle failing to provide documentations of compliance with their permit. As Stericycle failed to submit compliance reports in accordance with their permit requirements in the required and timely manner...

The DAQ warning letter to Stericycle said: “On June 5, 2008, an inspector from Utah

\[4\] Vided footnote 1, Pgs. 6-7.
Division of Air Quality...performed an annual inspection of Stericycle...during the inspection and subsequent records review the inspector documented the following:

1. The annual compliance certification due by May 2, 2008 was not submitted to the Division.

2. Title V monitoring reports for 2008 were not submitted every six months and a reporting gap was found for August 2007.

3. Records showed an opacity observation on the emergency generator (unit EG) with performed on July 3, 2007. No record was available to show whether a opacity observation was taken (or scheduled to be taken between January and June 2008 on the EG.

4. Records showed that 5 employees obtained 24 hour HMIWI operator certification in February 2007. No records were submitted showing that these individual have completed (or are scheduled to complete) an annual 4-hour refresher course due in 2008.

5. A semi-annual report under Condition II.B.4.c.3 for period January 17, 2007 to July 16, 2007 was not submitted.

On August 12, 2008, DAO sent a follow-up letter requesting additional information. This letter also stated that Stericycle was out of compliance during this period with Conditions I.S (six month reporting) and with Condition II.B.4.c (semi-annual reporting), yet the DAO found that Stericycle submitted an annual certification listing these as “in” compliance when they were not.  

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5 Written comments submitted to Division of Air Quality, Department of Environmental Quality; By Bradley Angel, Executive Director of Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice Oct. 13, 2008, Pg 6.
It should be noted that during the public comment period (August 5, 2008 to October 13, 2008) that DAQ requested a follow-up letter stating that Stericycle was out of compliance. Yet DAQ’s response was:

*With respect to the comment that “Stericycle has not demonstrated that it can assure compliance with a new Title V permit”, The Clean Air Act and the Utah Administrative Code (UAC) anticipate that a source could have compliance problems, and has procedures outlined to address those problems (see R307-415-5c (8)(b)(iii) and R307-415-5c (8)(c)(iii)) both during permit renewal and during the life of the permit.”*

The vided regulation states R307-415-5c (8):

“8) A compliance plan for all Part 70 sources that contains all of the following:

(a) A description of the compliance status of the source with respect to all applicable requirements.

(b) A description as follows:

(i) For applicable requirements with which the source is in compliance, a statement that the source will continue to comply with such requirements.

(ii) For applicable requirements that will become effective during the permit term, a statement that the source will meet such requirements on a timely basis.

(iii) For requirements for which the source is not in compliance at the time of

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6 Vided footnote 1, Pgs.6-7.
permit issuance, a narrative description of how the source will achieve compliance with such requirements.

(c) A compliance schedule as follows:

(i) For applicable requirements with which the source is in compliance, a statement that the source will continue to comply with such requirements.

(ii) For applicable requirements that will become effective during the permit term, a statement that the source will meet such requirements on a timely basis. A statement that the source will meet in a timely manner applicable requirements that become effective during the permit term shall satisfy this provision, unless a more detailed schedule is expressly required by the applicable requirement.

(iii) A schedule of compliance for sources that are not in compliance with all applicable requirements at the time of permit issuance. Such a schedule shall include a schedule of remedial measures, including an enforceable sequence of actions with milestones, leading to compliance with any applicable requirements for which the source will be in noncompliance at the time of permit issuance. This compliance schedule shall resemble and be at least as stringent as that contained in any judicial consent decree or administrative order to which the source is subject. Any such schedule of compliance shall be supplemental to, and shall not sanction noncompliance with, the applicable requirements on which it is based.

(d) A schedule for submission of certified progress reports every six months, or more frequently if specified by the underlying applicable requirement or by the Executive
Secretary, for sources required to have a schedule of compliance to remedy a violation."

Ergo, DAQ’s own admission confirmed that Stericycle was not in compliance with DAQ’s own State regulations at the time the Stericycle’s permit renewal went out for public comment. This non-compliance has raised issues going directly to the question of Stericycle’s ability to assure compliance as required by the Clean Air Act, yet DAQ’s Response to Comments did not in any way address the comments submitted on this issue.

In addition, in light of the chronic and frequent uses of the bypass stack by Stericycle, the recent court ruling regarding these emissions may likely result in Stericycle’s inability to assure compliance if a permit were properly written to include regulating bypasses.

DAQ “Response” (17) failed to respond at all to comments alleging serious and systemic bias by DAQ towards Stericycle.

DAQ’s “Response” (19) admits they failed to process the permit application in a timely manner, and their response attempting to justify that actually documents the violation and shows our comments were correct. DAQ’s claim that they took longer than the law allows to process a permit application because they were “…transitioning to a new data system that has delayed the issuance of some permits” is completely unacceptable and not a legitimate justification. DAQ does not even bother to explain why such a transition would delay permit reviews. This delay clearly violated R307-415-7 a (e) (2) which allows the DAQ Executive Secretary 18 months – and not longer – to take final action on a permit application from the date the application was filed. DAQ’s claim that “This delay has not adversely affected the regulation of Stericycle because there have been no substantive changes in their operation” is not adequate or responsive.

DAQ’s own files show that Stericycle was in violation of compliance reporting requirements, so
it cannot be claimed that there has not been an adverse affect. In addition, DAQ’s allowing the incinerator to operate with a permit that should have expired pursuant to the law’s requirements did have an adverse affect on the surrounding community that is breathing the emissions from a facility that was not operating pursuant to the permit requirements of Title V that required timely processing of permits.

DAQ’s “Response” (22) regarding DAQ’s mischaracterization of the facility as a medical waste incinerator is non-responsive and inadequate. DAQ repeatedly has referred to this facility solely as a medical waste incinerator despite the fact it is not solely a medical waste incinerator. The Division of Environmental Quality Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste solid waste permit referred to by DAQ is not an air quality permit and should not be used to justify burning non-medical wastes, nor should it be used to disguise the true nature of the facility.

DAQ’s “Response” (21) and (23) does not address the comments about DAQ bias in the permit process, or tainting of that process, by DAQ’s use of the term “permit renewal” in the notice documents for the public comment period. The use of the words “permit renewal,” instead of “Proposed” permit renewal, does taint the process and implies a predetermined outcome. This tainting of the process could lead some members of the public to decide that there is not point in participating in a permit process and comment period because the “fix is in.”

DAQ’s “Response” (25) regarding missing files during a GRAMA file review is incorrect. DAQ admits that there were two separate reviews (conducted by appellant Greenaction), but failed to state the reason for this: a huge number of documents were not provided during the first file review.

DAQ’s “Response” (26) and (27) regarding “Actual Emissions” is inadequate. DAQ points to a definition that says “Actual Emissions” refer to “emissions from normal source
operations.” In fact, normal source operations include start up and shut down, yet these are not included in “Actual Emissions” as these emissions are not monitored. Emissions during upset conditions are not monitored, yet the pollution that results from all the uses of the bypass stack are very “actual” in their emissions of a wide range of hazardous air pollutants and particulates.

In addition, DAQ’s claim here that stack tests done once or twice a year, even without DAQ staff present, somehow is a valid representation of “actual emissions” can not be upheld. These rare – and sometimes unsupervised – tests, at best are a snapshot, but in no way can determine actual emissions.

DAQ’s “Response” (28) to comments regarding understating of emissions is incorrect and misleading. DAQ’s claim that “During periods of start-up and shut-down, no waste feed is burned is simply not correct. There is likely some waste material residue in the incinerator and stack, so emissions occur as a result of burning whatever residue may be in the incinerator chamber and stack.

DAQ’s “Response” (29) about Stericycle’s problems with bypasses only gives the number of upset bypasses for two years, yet this permit went on for seven years. The response is thus incomplete and inadequate.

DAQ’s “Response” (31) is incorrect when it states that “DAQ permitting staff were not invited to, were not aware of…” a meeting between appellants and DAQ. DAQ permitting staff certainly were invited as this meeting was specifically set up to discuss the permitting of this facility. Top DAQ officials participated as well as other staff.

DAQ’s “Response” (35) is non-responsive to the comment that DAQ staff improperly investigated a member of the public. DAQ’s “Response” that they “Googled” the name of a commenter is non-responsive to the comment that such a use of government staff time is
improper and irrelevant to the mission of the DAQ as a supposedly unbiased regulatory agency.

DAQ "Response" (36) was directed towards a comment that was made that it's not clear whether or not the facility is in compliance with PM 2.5 requirements. DAQ wrote:

As of the time of this permit there are no PM 2.5 designations. The North Salt Lake area has not been designated for PM 2.5 requirements, and Stericycle does not trigger PSD rules."7

This seems to be response to a comment regarding PM 2.5 microns.8 It should be noted DAQ monitoring section has been monitoring for PM 2.5 for years, as the EPA promulgated in 2006. It should also be noted once it was promulgated to monitor for PM 2.5, regulatory agencies are required to limit the amount of PM 2.5 in the ambient air shed such that there is no exceedance of the 35 micrograms per cubic meter concentration, average over a 24-hour period. Regulatory authorities were notified by EPA regarding this standard and were requested to place limits on industrial and vehicle emissions for PM 2.5 emissions. If, within a three-year period, this did not occur then EPA would designate the area in question as "non-attainment" for PM 2.5. Currently EPA (as of January 15, 2009) is in the process of seeking public comment for the designation of the area in which Stericycle is located (i.e., Davis County, Utah) as being in non-attainment for PM 2.5.

Comments were made and questions were raised about bypasses at the Stericycle facility. A comment was made that DAQ is providing understated numbers of bypasses because Stericycle does not report bypasses associated with start up and shut down.

The DAQ Response to Comment document was not complete in regards to regulatory

7 Vide footnote 1, Pg.11.
8 Written Comments submitted to Division of Air Quality, Department of Environment of Quality: By Cindy King, Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, Oct. 13, 2008
information on Start-up, Shutdown and Malfunction plan. As matter of fact, DAQ violated the EPA rule of 1994 in regards to Start-up, Shutdown, and Malfunction plan (SSM). In brief, it requires the following: (1) SSM plan requires that source to comply during period of SSM. (2) SSM plans must be reviewed and approved by permitting authorities, like any other applicable requirements. (3) **SSM plans are unconditionally available to the public, such that they could participate in evaluating their adequacy in the permit approval process.** [emphasis added]. Finally (4) SSM plan provisions are a directly enforceable requirement. This was adjudicated in a recent U.S. Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit *Sierra Club v. EPA* [No. 02-1135]. This decision found that emissions during Start-ups, Shuddowns and Malfunctions are not exempted from meeting Clear Air Act’s requirement of MACT standards and/or another applicable requirements of the Clean Air Act.

The following is DAQ response to comment “(46) A comment was made that the bypass stack has no devices for pollution control.

*The bypass stack is used during malfunctions, start ups, and shut downs. Waste is not being fed to the incinerator during those times. During malfunctions, gaseous emissions from the remaining waste are burned-off in the secondary chamber before passing through the bypass stack. During startup and shutdown there is no waste in the incinerator.*”

This is in error, since the response is referring to a device in the bypass stack in regards to the pollution control devices for the bypass stack. As the vide mentioned EPA rule of 1994, and *Sierra Club v EPA* states controlling emission during Start-up, Shutdown and Malfunction when the bypass stack would be used, independent of the other pollution control devises. DAQ

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9 Vide footnote 1, pg 13.
failed to address the possibility that during malfunction residual materials could bypass the secondary chamber where the current pollution control devices are located, as the material passes through to the main stack. Currently, the bypass stack has no pollution control device—merely a flap. This is a direct violation of the regulatory requirement for Start-up, Shutdown and Malfunctions. Another error with DAQ analysis is that residual material could be, and are, in the bypass stack during Start-up, Shutdown, and Malfunctions.

The DAQ’s failure in enforcing the necessary statutory and regulatory requirements in reviewing of Stericycle Title V permit renewal establishes a lack of due diligence in their authorization. The DAQ has not established that Stericycle will be in compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements of the Clean Air Act Title V requirements.

DAQ’s “Response” (37) about bypass emissions during start up and shut down is simply incorrect in that DAQ claims “...there is no waste in the incinerator during those times.” While waste feeds may have been stopped during start up and shut down, there is still some waste residue in the incinerator during these times, resulting in some amount of emissions.

DAQ’s “Response” (40) clearly contradicts the explicit language of the Title V Operating Permit that they themselves cite regarding the requirement that the permittee “shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate a device or method for measuring the use of the bypass stack including date, time and duration.” The claim that somehow this language does not require monitoring of bypass emissions is without merit and clearly contradicted by the language of DAQ’s own permit.

DAQ’s “Response” (47) stating they have no record of a complaint being filed about a bypass incident that included black smoke coming out of the stack for about three hours highlights a huge problem with DAQ’s inadequate regulation of this incinerator. A complaint
was called into DAQ with several witnesses present. The fact that DAQ may not have written down the complaint information is a serious problem is a great concern.

DAQ’s “Response” (50) is incorrect about the original siting of the facility being approved partly on the basis of no residences at the time being within one mile of the incinerator. DAQ has been made aware of this document for many years.

DAQ’s “Response” (51) is non-responsive about DAQ’s misrepresentation of the nature of the facility. The canned response from DAQ does not respond to the comments submitted.

V. REQUESTED REMEDIES FROM EPA REGION 8

The remedies that the Petitioners are requesting;

(1) EPA Region 8 deny this approval order for Stericycle’s Title V permit renewal.

(2) EPA Region 8 proceeds with over-file procedures.

(3) EPA Region 8 issues an order to Stericycle to stop operation until all assurance that non-compliance issues have been address and remedied and that DAQ conducts an unbiased and properly noticed permit process.

(4) EPA Region 8 requires the pollution control devices are in place on the bypass stack prior to any Start-up, Shutdown and Malfunction occurring.

(5) EPA Region 8 requires Stericycle and DAQ to be in compliance with all statutory and regulatory requirements prior DAQ issuing any Title V permit to Stericycle with Region 8 oversight present.

Submitted by,

Cindy King
Concerned Salt Lake City Area Residents Against the Stericycle Incinerator
2963 South 2300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
And

Bradley Angel, Executive Director
Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice
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PO Box 1078
Moab, Utah 84532
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2008      Decided December 19, 2008

No. 02-1135

SIERRA CLUB,
PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
AND STEPHEN L. JOHNSON, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
RESPONDENTS

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL.,
INTERVENORS

Consolidated with Nos. 03-1219, 06-1215, 07-1201

On Petitions for Review of a Final Action
of the Environmental Protection Agency

James S. Pew and Keri N. Powell argued the cause and filed
the briefs for petitioner.

Daniel R. Dertke, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were
John C. Cruden, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Sheila
Igoe, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.


Before: ROGERS, TATEL, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Dissenting opinion by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Petitioners challenge the final rules promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency exempting major sources of air pollution from normal emission standards during periods of startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions (“SSM”) and imposing alternative, and arguably less onerous requirements in their place.1 Because the general duty that applies during SSM events is inconsistent with the plain text of section 112 of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), even accepting that “continuous” for purposes of the definition of “emission standards” under CAA section 302(k) does not mean unchanging, the SSM exemption violates the CAA’s requirement that some section 112 standard apply continuously. Accordingly, we grant the petitions and vacate the SSM exemption.

I.

1 40 C.F.R. § 63.6(e)(l)(i); (f)(1), and (h)(1).
CAA section 112 designates over one hundred pollutants as “hazardous,” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1), and directs the Administrator of EPA to list all categories of “major sources” of hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”), id. § 7412(c)(1), and to establish for each “emissions standards” requiring “the maximum degree of reduction in emissions,” id. § 7412(d)(2). These controls are referred to as maximum achievable control technology (“MACT”) standards. See Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Section 112 also sets a “MACT floor,” id., requiring that standards “shall not be less stringent than the emission control that is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar source,” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3). After eight years, under section 112(f), EPA is to revisit and potentially revise the emissions standards for each source category to ensure that they “provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health,” id. § 7412(f)(2)(A). “Emission standard” is defined in section 302(k) as “a requirement established by the State or the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis, including any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction, and any design, equipment, work practice or operational standard promulgated under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k).

In addition to revising section 112, the 1990 Amendments also added Title V, which establishes a permit program to better monitor compliance with emissions standards. “Each permit . . . shall include enforceable emission limitations and standards, a schedule of compliance, . . . and such other conditions as are necessary to assure compliance with applicable requirements of this chapter.” Id. § 7661c(a). Sources are required to certify that they are in compliance with the applicable requirements of the permit “and to promptly report any deviations from permit requirements to the permitting authority.” Id. § 7661b(b)(2).
Title V further creates a “permit shield” for sources, ensuring that compliance with the permit is “deemed compliance with other applicable provisions” of the CAA. *Id.* § 7661c(f). “Any permit application, compliance plan, permit, and monitoring or compliance report” under Title V must be “ma[d]e available to the public.” *Id.* § 7661a(b)(8).

In the 1970s EPA had determined that excess emissions during SSM periods are not considered violations of CAA emissions standards under section 111.² Although sources were “exempt[ed] from compliance with numerical emissions limits” during SSM events, 42 Fed. Reg. 57,125, EPA required that “[a]t all times, including periods of [SSM], owners and operators shall, to the extent practicable, maintain and operate any affected facility including associated air pollution control equipment in a manner consistent with good air pollution control practice for minimizing emissions,” 40 C.F.R. § 60.11(d). EPA refers to sources’ obligation to minimize emissions to the greatest extent possible as the “general duty” standard. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. 43,992, 43,993 (July 29, 2005).


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³ “The General Provisions have the legal force and effect of standards, and they may be enforced independently of relevant
limits set for emission control pursuant to section 112 and only
the general duty would apply. However, in order to avoid a
blanket exemption, EPA required each source to develop and
implement an SSM plan. “The purpose of the plan [was] for the
source to demonstrate how it will do its reasonable best to
maintain compliance with the standards, even during [SSMs].”
Id. at 12,423. Each SSM plan was to “describe[], in detail,
procedures for operating and maintaining the source during
periods of [SSM] and a program of corrective action for
malfunctioning process and air pollution control equipment used
to comply with the relevant standard.” Id. at 12,439. The EPA
Administrator could require changes to the SSM plan if it was
inadequate. Id. at 12,440. The plan was incorporated by
reference into the source’s Title V permit, 59 Fed. Reg. at
12,439, and thereby subject to prior approval by the State
permitting authority, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,760, 42,768 (Aug. 11,
1993). Under the CAA, the SSM plan was to be made publicly
available, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(8), and served as a safe harbor
during SSM events, id. § 7661c(f).

In 2002, EPA removed the requirement that a source’s Title
V permit incorporate the SSM plan, and instead determined that
a source’s Title V permit must simply require the source to
adopt an SSM plan and to abide by it.4 Because the SSM plan
was no longer itself part of the permit and could be revised

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4 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
for Source Categories: General Provisions; and Requirements for
Control Technology Determinations for Major Sources in Accordance
with Clean Air Act Sections, Sections 112(g) and 112(j), 67 Fed. Reg.
without formal revision of the permit, it was no longer subject to prior approval, and was no longer eligible for the permit shield. *Id.* Additionally, “to minimize the unnecessary production of the SSM plan,” 66 Fed. Reg. 16,318, 16,326 (Mar. 23, 2001), the SSM plan was to be made publicly available only upon request. *Id.* The Sierra Club sought reconsideration and filed a petition for review of the 2002 Rule, and as part of a settlement agreement, EPA proposed “modest” changes to the SSM plan regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,875, 72,879 (Dec. 9, 2002), namely that sources must submit their SSM plans to the permitting authority along with their Title V permit applications.

In the final rule adopted in 2003, however, EPA “decided instead to adopt a less burdensome approach,”5 requiring members of the public to make a “specific and reasonable request” of the permitting authority to request the SSM plan from the source. 68 Fed. Reg. at 32,591. The Sierra Club challenged the 2003 Rule in a new petition for review, which was consolidated with its previous challenge. The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) also filed a petition for reconsideration on the ground that any limitation on the public availability of the SSM plans was unlawful. EPA agreed to take comment on the new SSM provisions, and the consolidated cases were held in abeyance pending reconsideration.

In 2006, EPA retracted the requirement that sources

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5 *National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories: General Provisions; and Requirements for Control Technology Determinations for Major Sources in Accordance with Clean Air Act Sections, Sections 112(g) and 112(j),* 68 Fed. Reg. 32,586, 32,591 (May 30, 2003) (“2003 Rule”)
implement their SSM plans during SSM periods. According to EPA, “[t]his is consistent with the concept that the plan specifics are not applicable requirements [under Title V] and thus cannot be required to be followed. Nonetheless, the general duty to minimize emissions remains intact and is the applicable requirement.” 70 Fed. Reg. 43,992, 43,994 (Jul. 29, 2005). Post-event reporting requirements provided that sources must describe what actions were taken to minimize emissions “any time there is an exceedance of an emission limit . . . and thus a possibility that the general duty requirement was violated.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 20,448. EPA clarified that reporting and recordkeeping is only required when a start up or shut down caused the applicable emission standard to be exceeded, and “for any occurrence of malfunction which also includes potential exceedances.” Id. at 20,447. EPA also eliminated the requirement that the Administrator obtain a copy of a source’s SSM plan upon request from a member of the public and determined that the public may only access those SSM plans obtained by a permitting authority. The permitting authorities, in turn, “still have the discretion to obtain plans requested by the public, but will not be required to do so.” Id.

Petitioners now contend that the exemption from


compliance with emissions standards during SSM events is both unlawful and arbitrary, and that the 2002, 2003, and 2006 rules unlawfully and arbitrarily fail to “assure compliance” with “applicable requirements” under Title V. Upon determining that we have jurisdiction, we turn to petitioners’ challenges to the rules.

II.

The CAA provides that “[a]ny petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). EPA maintains that petitioners have waived their challenge to the SSM exemption by not challenging the 1994 Rule articulating that the general duty standard replaces section 112 emissions standards during SSM events. Petitioners, noting that “EPA received repeated comments on the illegality of its SSM exemption in the course of its rulemaking -- which covered more than six years, generated three separate proposals and necessitated three petitions for reconsideration,” Petrs. Br. 29, respond that “rulemakings that significantly change the context for a regulatory provision can re-open it for comment, even if an agency does not change the provision itself,” id., and that this is what happened here.

Under the reopening doctrine, the time for seeking review starts anew where the agency reopens an issue “by holding out the unchanged section as a proposed regulation, offering an explanation for its language, soliciting comments on its substance, and responding to the comments in promulgating the

(Apr. 18, 2007), and CFASE petitioned for review. This petition along with the other challenges to the 2006 Rule were consolidated with the previous petitions for review.
regulation in its final form.” *Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA*, 886 F.2d 390, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see *P&V Enters. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs.*, 516 F.3d 1021, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 2008); *Ohio v. EPA*, 838 F.2d 1325, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In its 2003 rulemaking, EPA discussed revisions to its SSM plan requirements, but asserted that “[n]othing in these revisions is intended . . . to change the general principle that compliance with a MACT standard is not mandatory during periods of [SSM].” 67 Fed. Reg. at 72,880. In response to Sierra Club’s comments questioning the legality of the SSM exemption, EPA stated: “We believe that we have discretion to make reasonable distinctions concerning those particular activities to which the emission limitations in a MACT standard apply, and we, therefore, disagree with the legal position taken by the Sierra Club.” *2003 Rule*, 68 Fed. Reg. at 32,590. However, “when the agency merely responds to an unsolicited comment by reaffirming its prior position, that response does not create a new opportunity for review. Nor does an agency reopen an issue by responding to a comment that addresses a settled aspect of some matter, even if the agency had solicited comments on unsettled aspects of the same matter.” *Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior*, 88 F.3d 1191, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also *Am. Iron*, 886 F.2d at 398. Moreover, when EPA received unsolicited comments on this issue in its 2006 rulemaking, it explained that “[t]hese commenters raise issues that are outside of the scope of this rulemaking. The general duty provision has been in place since 1994.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 20,449; cf. *PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC*, 198 F.3d 890, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Such agency conduct is not tantamount to an actual reopening.

However, petitioners contend that the 2006 Rule “has completely changed the regulatory context for its SSM exemption by stripping out virtually all of the SSM plan requirements that it created to contain that exemption.” Petrs.
Br. at 29. In *Kennecott*, this court established that an “agency’s decision to adhere to the *status quo ante* under changed circumstances” can “constructively reopen[]” a rule “by the change in the regulatory context.” 88 F.3d at 1214. A constructive reopening occurs if the revision of accompanying regulations “significantly alters the stakes of judicial review,” *id.* at 1227, as the result of a change that “could have not been reasonably anticipated,” *Envtl. Def. v. EPA*, 467 F.3d 1329, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Petitioners recount, and EPA does not dispute, that:

To avoid creating a “blanket exemption from emission limits,” EPA’s 1994 rule required that (1) sources comply with their SSM plans during periods of SSM; (2) SSM plans be reviewed and approved by permitting authorities like any other applicable requirement; (3) SSM plans be unconditionally available to the public, which could participate in evaluating their adequacy in the permit approval process; and (4) SSM plan provisions be directly enforceable requirements. 59 Fed. Reg. at 12423 []. In the rulemakings challenged here, however, EPA has eliminated all of these safeguards. SSM plans are no longer enforceable requirements, and EPA has expressly retracted the requirement that sources comply with them. 71 Fed. Reg. at 20447 []. EPA also has eliminated any requirement that SSM plans be vetted for adequacy and any opportunity for citizens to see or object to them. *Id.* [].

Petrs. Br. at 29-30. These are not mere “minor changes,” *Envtl. Def.*, 467 F.3d at 1333. In so modifying the SSM plan requirements, EPA has constructively reopened the SSM exemption. While the text of the general duty itself did not
change, “EPA has completely changed the regulatory context for its SSM exemption by stripping out virtually all of the SSM plan requirements that it created to contain the exemption.” Petrs. Br. at 29 (emphasis in original).

EPA’s modifications to the SSM plan requirements created a different regulatory construct as to the means of measuring compliance with the general duty. Because the general duty does not include any “numerical emissions limits,” 42 Fed. Reg. at 57,125, the general duty assumes new shape depending on the means used to capture that standard. In 1994, EPA determined that compliance with the general duty on its own was insufficient to prevent the SSM exemption from becoming a “blanket” exemption. It established the SSM plan requirements precisely because the general duty was inadequate. Now EPA has removed these necessary safeguards. Because the general duty was defined in 1994 through and housed in the four walls of the SSM plan requirements, EPA’s modifications to those requirements have eliminated the only effective constraints that EPA originally placed on the SSM exemption. The fact that the regulatory terms defining “the general duty” itself are unchanged is legally irrelevant because the other “extensive changes . . . significantly alter[ed] the stakes of judicial review,” *Kennecott*, 88 F.3d at 1226-27. Just as the court in *Kennecott* agreed with industry that the agency had constructively reopened a regulation when it incorporated amended regulations that expanded available remedies and thus altered its financial incentives for challenging the regulation, so too here from the perspective of environmental petitioners’ interests and allocation of resources the general duty “may not have been worth challenging in [1994], but the [revised] regulations gave [that duty] a new significance,” *id.* at 1227. In *Kennecott*, there were “new and potentially more onerous provisions,” *id.*, facing industry; here petitioners face a blanket exemption and a more
onerous task in effecting compliance with HAP emission standards during SSM events.

Although EPA asserts that “the duty to minimize emissions is not inextricably linked to the SSM plan,” Resp. Br. at 24, the rulemaking record shows that “the general duty requirement and the SSM plan requirements were both elements of a package deal that EPA devised and sold to the public as adequate protection from [HAPs] during SSM events,” Petrs. Reply Br. at 12. When commenters raised objections to the SSM exemption in 1994, EPA’s direct response relied upon the SSM plan as a justification for the relaxed standard:

The EPA believes, as it did at proposal, that the requirement for a[n] [SSM] plan is a reasonable bridge between the difficulty associated with determining compliance with an emission standard during these events and a blanket exemption from emission limits. The purpose of the plan is for the source to demonstrate how it will do its reasonable best to maintain compliance with standards, even during [SSMs].”

59 Fed. Reg. at 12,423. EPA attempts now to dismiss this statement as mere “inartful[] word[ing],” Resp. Br. at 27, but the fact that EPA’s entire discussion of the proper standard to apply during SSM events invoked the SSM plan provisions confirms that the SSM plan and general duty standard are inextricably linked. Indeed, the explicit purpose of the SSM plan as devised in 1994 was to “ensure” that facility owners abide by the general duty. 59 Fed. Reg. at 12,439.

Shifting from a regulatory scheme based on a mandatory SSM plan that was part of a source’s Title V permit, which is subject to prior approval with public involvement, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7661a(b)(6), to a regulatory scheme with a non-mandatory plan providing for no such approval or involvement but only after-the-fact reporting changed the calculus for petitioners in seeking judicial review, id., and thereby constructively reopened consideration of the exemption from section 112 emission standards during SSM events. Petitioners’ challenges to the SSM exemption are therefore timely.

III.

On the merits, petitioners contend that EPA’s decision to exempt major sources from compliance with section 112 emissions standards during SSM events is contrary to the plain text of the statute and arbitrary and capricious in any event. EPA and Industry Intervenor respond that EPA’s general-duty requirement during SSM events is a lawful interpretation of the statute and a reasonable way to reconcile the need to minimize emissions with the inherent technological limitations during SSM events. Challenges to EPA’s interpretation of the CAA are governed by *Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC*, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984), in which “the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Only if the statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular issue, may the court defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation. *Id.* at 844. The CAA provides that the court may reverse any agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A).

Section 112(d) provides that “[e]missions standards” promulgated thereunder must require MACT standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2). Section 302(k) defines “emission standard” as “a requirement established by the State or the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis, including
any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction, and any design, equipment, work practice or operational standard promulgated under this chapter.” Id. § 7602(k). Petitioners contend that, contrary to the plain text of this definition, “EPA’s SSM exemption automatically excuses sources from compliance with emission standards whenever they start up, shut down, or malfunction, and thus allows sources to comply with emission standards on a basis that is not ‘continuous.’” Petrs. Br. at 23.

EPA responds that the general duty that applies during SSM events “along with the limitations that apply during normal operating conditions, together form an uninterrupted, i.e., continuous, limitation because there is no period of time during which one or the other standard does not apply,” Respt.’s Br. at 31. “Although Chevron step one analysis begins with the statute’s text,” the court must examine the meaning of certain words or phrases in context and also “exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction, including examining the statute’s legislative history to shed new light on congressional intent, notwithstanding statutory language that appears superficially clear.” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

EPA suggests that the general duty is “part of the operation and maintenance requirements with which all sources subject to a section 112(d) standard must comply,” Respt.’s Br. at 33, pointing to section 302(k)’s statement that an “emission standard” includes “any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure continuous emission reduction,” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k). Section 302(k)’s inclusion of this broad phrase in the definition of “emission standard” suggests that emissions reduction requirements “assure continuous emission reduction” without necessarily
continuously applying a single standard. Indeed, this reading is supported by the legislative history of section 302(k):

By defining the terms ‘emission limitation,’ ‘emission standard,’ and ‘standard of performance,’ the committee has made clear that constant or continuous means of reducing emissions must be used to meet these requirements. By the same token, intermittent or supplemental controls or other temporary, periodic, or limited systems of control would not be permitted as a final means of compliance.

H.R. Rep. 95-294, at 92 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1170. “Congress’s primary purpose behind requiring regulation on a continuous basis” appears, as one circuit has suggested, to have been “to exclude intermittent control technologies from the definition of emission limitations,” Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444, 1452 (9th Cir. 1985).

When sections 112 and 302(k) are read together, then, Congress has required that there must be continuous section 112-compliant standards. The general duty is not a section 112-compliant standard. Admitting as much, EPA states in its brief that the general duty is neither “a separate and independent standard under CAA section 112(d),” nor “a free-standing emission limitation that must independently be in compliance” with section 112(d), nor an alternate standard under section 112(h). Respt.’s Br. 32-34. Because the general duty is the only standard that applies during SSM events – and accordingly no section 112 standard governs these events – the SSM exemption violates the CAA’s requirement that some section 112 standard apply continuously. EPA has not purported to act under section 112(h), providing that a standard may be relaxed “if it is not feasible in the judgment of the Administrator to prescribe or
enforce an emission standard for control of a [HAP],” *id.* § 7412(h)(1), based on either a (1) design or (2) source specific basis, *id.* § 7412(h)(2)(A), (B).

EPA’s suggestion that it has “discretion to make reasonable distinctions concerning those particular activities to which the emission limitations in a MACT standard apply,” *68 Fed. Reg.* at 32,590, belies the text, history and structure of section 112. “In 1990, concerned about the slow pace of EPA’s regulation of HAPs, Congress altered section 112 by eliminating much of EPA’s discretion in the process.” *New Jersey*, 517 F.3d at 578.

In requiring that sources regulated under section 112 meet the strictest standards, Congress gave no indication that it intended the application of MACT standards to vary based on different time periods. To the contrary, Congress specifically permitted the Administrator to “distinguish among classes, types, and sizes of sources within a category or subcategory in establishing such standards,” *CAA § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1).* Additionally, while recognizing that in some instances it might not be feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission standard under § 112, Congress provided in section 112(h) for establishment of “work practice” or “operational” standards instead, but, as petitioners point out, “strictly limited this exception by defining ‘not feasible . . .’ to include only [two types of] situations,” *Petr. Br.* 9, and did not authorize the Administrator to relax emission standards on a temporal basis. *See NRDC*, 489 F.3d at 1374.

In sum, petitioners’ challenge to the exemption of major sources from normal emission standards during SSM is premised on a rejection of EPA’s claim of retained discretion in the face of the plain text of section 112. “Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent”. *NRDC*, 489 F.3d at 1374 (quoting
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001)). The 1990 Amendments confined the Administrator’s discretion, see New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 578, and Congress was explicit when and under what circumstances it wished to allow for such discretion, id. at 582. “EPA may not construe [a] statute in a way that completely nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit its discretion.” New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583 (quoting Whitman, 531 U.S. at 485).

Accordingly, we grant the petitions without reaching petitioners’ other contentions, and we vacate the SSM exemption. See New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583 (citing Allied Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
The majority opinion makes a factual error when it suggests that the new startup, shutdown, and malfunction regulations have eliminated a prior requirement that EPA approve startup, shutdown, and malfunction plans in the course of its review of Title V permits. Maj. Op. at 12. In fact, the plans were merely incorporated by reference into Title V permits; there has never been any requirement that EPA review or approve the plans before approving permits. See 66 Fed. Reg. 16,318, 16,326 (2001); see also 40 C.F.R. § 63.6(e)(3)(viii) (1998); 67 Fed. Reg. 16,582, 16,587 (2002).

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: I do not agree that we have jurisdiction over Sierra Club’s petition for judicial review. The original regulations at issue, 40 C.F.R. § 63.6(e)–(h) (1994), exempt periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction from opacity and non-opacity emission standards. When EPA promulgated these regulations in 1994, Sierra Club took no legal action. Yet under the Clean Air Act a petition for judicial review of an EPA regulation must be filed within 60 days of the regulation’s publication in the Federal Register. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

Of course an agency may give notice and ask for comment on whether an existing regulation should be modified or repealed or retained, or it may indicate in response to comments that it has reconsidered the regulation. See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Or an agency may give its regulation new significance by altering other regulations incorporating it by reference. See id. at 1226–27. In any one of these situations the 60-day period would begin to run again. But nothing of the sort occurred here. According to Sierra Club, EPA’s rulemakings in 2002, 2003, and 2006 rendered enforcement of the 1994 startup, shutdown, and malfunction regulations more difficult. Petr.’s Br. at 29. Even if true, that could hardly have amounted to agency “action” re-promulgating the 1994 regulations, which is what § 7607(b)(1) requires as a prerequisite for judicial review. After

1The majority opinion makes a factual error when it suggests that the new startup, shutdown, and malfunction regulations have eliminated a prior requirement that EPA approve startup, shutdown, and malfunction plans in the course of its review of Title V permits. Maj. Op. at 12. In fact, the plans were merely incorporated by reference into Title V permits; there has never been any requirement that EPA review or approve the plans before approving permits. See 66 Fed. Reg. 16,318, 16,326 (2001); see also 40 C.F.R. § 63.6(e)(3)(viii) (1998); 67 Fed. Reg. 16,582, 16,587 (2002).
all, Sierra Club’s complaint is not that the 1994 regulations are now hard to enforce; it is instead that the 1994 regulations are invalid and always have been. The recent rules did not alter the exemption for startup, shutdown, and malfunction events. The new rules simply modified requirements for each source’s plan regarding implementation of the duty to minimize pollution during the exempt periods. Sierra Club had the option – which it exercised2 – of challenging the new rules on the ground that the modifications will lead to unacceptable levels of pollution.

In Kennecott, regulated industries sought judicial review of an allegedly invalid regulation after changes in related regulations made its enforcement more likely and more punitive. Sierra Club has no comparable financial incentives capable of assessment by a court; instead, it presumably has an incentive to challenge any regulatory change that might lead to increased pollution. The majority’s rationale implies that each time EPA changes an emissions regulation, it risks subjecting every related regulation to challenges from third parties. Such a regime, and the instability it generates, is intolerable. Perhaps that is why, until today, we have limited the constructive reopening doctrine to cases involving regulated entities. See Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 467 F.3d 1329, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Although EPA did not reopen its 1994 regulations for judicial review, Sierra Club has another option: it may file a petition to rescind those regulations and, if EPA denies the petition, Sierra Club may seek judicial review of EPA’s action.

2The majority opinion does not reach Sierra Club’s argument that the recent rules fail to guarantee enforcement of applicable emissions standards and therefore violate Title V of the Clean Air Act.
The majority attempts to shoehorn its holding into Sierra Club’s “continuous basis” arguments, stating that it reads § 112 and § 302(k) together to “require[] that there must be continuous section 112-compliant standards.” Maj. Op. at 15. But the discussion of § 302(k)’s continuous basis requirement does no work in the majority’s legal analysis; without the “continuous basis” requirement, the majority would still hold that EPA’s standards must be “section 112-compliant.” The majority’s point is not that EPA has failed to regulate emissions sources on a continuous basis. See Maj. Op. at 14 (stating that EPA need not continuously apply a uniform standard). It is instead that the 1994 rule’s “general duty to minimize” does not

See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1990). There is no basis for permitting Sierra Club to circumvent that procedural requirement in this case. See Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1214.

There is another problem with the majority opinion. It disposes of the case with an argument not addressed in the brief of either party – namely, that § 112(h) of the Clean Air Act provides the only basis for EPA to impose a non-numerical emissions standard and that the 1994 regulations are unlawful because they do not comply with the requirements of § 112(h). Sierra Club mentions § 112(h), see Petr.’s Br. at 24, but its argument that the 1994 regulations are unlawful rests on § 302(k)’s requirement that “emission standards” must regulate air pollutants on a “continuous basis,” id. at 23–24. EPA refers to § 112(h) only to state that it is irrelevant to the question whether its “general duty to minimize” is an enforceable standard satisfying the statutory requirement to regulate sources on a continuous basis. Resp.’s Br. at 33 n.5. As we have recognized, a passing mention of an otherwise unbrieved issue does not normally suffice to preserve the issue. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 78 n.113 (D.C. Cir. 1976).3

3The majority attempts to shoehorn its holding into Sierra Club’s “continuous basis” arguments, stating that it reads § 112 and § 302(k) together to “require[] that there must be continuous section 112-compliant standards.” Maj. Op. at 15. But the discussion of § 302(k)’s continuous basis requirement does no work in the majority’s legal analysis; without the “continuous basis” requirement, the majority would still hold that EPA’s standards must be “section 112-compliant.” The majority’s point is not that EPA has failed to regulate emissions sources on a continuous basis. See Maj. Op. at 14 (stating that EPA need not continuously apply a uniform standard). It is instead that the 1994 rule’s “general duty to minimize” does not
Though there have been exceptions, we have generally declined to consider issues not briefed by the parties, especially when the issue is not easy or the record is long and complex, *cf. United States v. Pryce*, 938 F.2d 1343, 1347–48, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1991), when doing so would be unfair to the respondent, *Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle*, 657 F.2d 275, 284 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1981), or when the legal issue is particularly important. *Carducci v. Regan*, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Here, the question whether EPA’s interpretation of § 112 is permissible is a difficult one, and both the record and the statute are complex. Here too, EPA has never had a fair opportunity to address the issue.
(Slip Opinion)

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BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPEALS BOARD
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

In re:

Deseret Power Electric Cooperative
PSD Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00
PSD Appeal No. 07-03

[Decided November 13, 2008]

ORDER DENYING REVIEW IN PART AND
REMANDING IN PART

Before Environmental Appeals Judges Edward E. Reich, Kathie A. Stein, and Anna L. Wolgast.
Sierra Club seeks review of a prevention of significant deterioration ("PSD") permit that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 8 ("Region") issued to Deseret Power Electric Cooperative ("Deseret") on August 30, 2007. The permit would authorize Deseret to construct a new waste-coal-fired electric generating unit at Deseret's existing Bonanza Power Plant, located near Bonanza, Utah.

Sierra Club’s petition raises two issues. First, Sierra Club argues that the Region’s permitting decision violates the public participation provisions of Clean Air Act ("CAA" or "Act") section 165(a)(2), which require the Agency to consider “alternatives” to the proposed facility. Sierra Club contends that the Region erred by failing to consider alternatives to the proposed facility that are similar to alternatives U.S. EPA Region 9 recommended in comments on the draft environmental impact statement for a different facility, the White Pine Energy Station Project in Nevada.

Second, Sierra Club argues that the Region violated CAA sections 165(a)(4) and 169(3) by failing to apply “BACT,” or best available control technology, to limit carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions from the facility. Sierra Club points to the Supreme Court’s April 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), as establishing that CO2 is an "air pollutant" within the meaning of the Act. Sierra Club contends that because CO2 is an air pollutant, the permit violates the requirement to include a BACT emissions limit for “each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Clean Air Act].”

Sierra Club relies on Part 75 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which requires monitoring and reporting of CO2 emissions and was adopted in accordance with section 821 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 ("1990 Public Law"). Sierra Club asserts that the word “regulation” has a “plain and unambiguous” meaning and that, consistent with this plain meaning, CAA sections 165 and 169, section 821 of the 1990 Public Law, and EPA’s Part 75 regulations make CO2 “subject to regulation” under the CAA.

The Region disagrees that the statutory text has a plain meaning and argues instead that the Agency had discretion to interpret the term “subject to regulation” and did so by adopting an historical interpretation of the term that was “reasonable” and
“permissible.” The Region maintains that “EPA has historically interpreted the term ‘subject to regulation under the Act’ to describe pollutants that are presently subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” The Region contends that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision, it does not have the authority to impose a CO₂ BACT limit because the Part 75 regulations only require monitoring and reporting of CO₂ emissions, not actual control. The Region argues further that the Part 75 regulations implementing section 821 of the 1990 Public Law are not “under” the CAA within the meaning of CAA sections 165 and 169 because section 821 is not part of the CAA.

By order dated November 21, 2007, the Board granted review of the CO₂ BACT issue while holding under advisement the “alternatives” issue. The Board received briefs on this issue from Sierra Club, the Region, and Deseret, and six amici briefs supporting Sierra Club’s petition, and six amici briefs supporting the Region’s decision. The Board held oral argument on May 29, 2008. The Board subsequently requested clarification of certain questions arising at the oral argument, and the parties completed briefing on September 12, 2008.

Held: The Board denies review of the Region’s alleged failure to consider alternatives” to the proposed facility, but remands the permit to the Region for it to reconsider whether to impose a CO₂ BACT limit and to develop an adequate record for its decision.

- CAA section 165(a)(2), on which Sierra Club’s alternatives argument relies, provides that a PSD permit may not be issued unless “a public hearing has been held with opportunity for interested persons * * * [to] submit written or oral presentations on the air quality impact of such source, alternatives thereto * * * and other appropriate considerations.” This requirement, which the statute ties to the opportunity to comment on the draft permit, does not oblige the permit issuer to conduct an independent analysis of alternatives not identified by the public during the comment period. Here, Sierra Club does not contend that it or any other person identified during the public comment period the alternatives it raises in its petition. Further, Region 9’s comments, although submitted in the White Pines Energy Center case after the close of the public comment period in the present case, do not, in any event, present grounds for raising this new issue or argument for the first time on appeal in this case.

- The Board rejects Sierra Club’s contention that the phrase “subject to regulation” has a plain meaning and that this meaning compels the Region to impose a CO₂ BACT limit in the permit. On the contrary, the Board finds that the statute is not so clear and unequivocal as to preclude Agency interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act,” and therefore the statute does not dictate whether the Agency must impose a BACT limit for CO₂ in the permit. It does not appear that, when it enacted CAA sections 165 and 169 in 1977, Congress considered the precise issue before the Board in this case, or more significantly, drafted language sufficiently specific to address it. The Board also finds no evidence that Congress’s use of the term “regulations” in
section 821 of the 1990 Public Law was an attempt to interpret or constrain the Agency’s interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation” as used in sections 165 and 169.

- The administrative record of the Region’s permitting decision, as defined by 40 C.F.R. section 124.18, does not support the Region’s view that it is bound by an Agency historical interpretation of “subject to regulation” as meaning “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” The Region did not identify in its response to comments any Agency document expressly stating that “subject to regulation under this Act” has this meaning.

- The Board examines the two authorities the Region relied upon in its response to comments to support its contention that an historical interpretation exists. The Region argues that the constraining historical interpretation may be discerned by inference from the pollutants listed by name or descriptive category in the preamble to a 1978 Federal Register document in which the Agency first established an interpretation of the term “subject to regulation under this Act.” The Region observes that all of these pollutants were subject to emissions control and none of the listed pollutants were subject only to monitoring and reporting requirements. However, the Board finds that this interpretation provides little, if any, support for the contention that the phrase applies only to provisions that require actual control of emissions. Instead, the preamble as a whole augers in favor of a finding that the Agency expressly interpreted “subject to regulation under this Act” to mean “any pollutant regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations for any source type.” In the 1978 preamble, the Administrator stated he was making “final” an “interpretation” he believed to be correct. While the Region correctly observes that the reference to Subchapter C was not repeated in the preamble to the 1993 rulemaking adding the Part 75 regulations, neither did the preamble expressly clarify or withdraw that earlier interpretation. Thus, whatever the Agency’s intentions were relative to the Subchapter C reference in the 1978 preamble when it adopted the 1993 regulations, it did not express them.

- The second authority the Region relied upon in its response to comments as allegedly creating an historical interpretation was a 2002 rulemaking that codified the defined term “regulated NSR pollutant” to replace the previous regulatory language that was functionally equivalent to the statutory phrase “pollutant subject to regulation under this Act.” The regulatory definition added in 2002 of “regulated NSR pollutant,” however, is not limited to “actual control of emissions.” The regulatory definition contains, as its fourth part, essentially the same phrase – “that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act” – that the Region argues is ambiguous as a matter of statutory interpretation. There is no public notice in the 2002 final preamble (or in the 1996 preamble for the proposed rulemaking) of the interpretation the Region
now advocates, let alone anything approaching the same level of express notice and clear statement that is found in the preamble for the 1978 rulemaking. The preamble’s list of pollutants, which the Region again argues creates the interpretation by inference, does not indicate that the list was provided as an interpretation of the defined term “regulated NSR pollutant.” Neither the 2002 preamble nor the 1996 preamble for the proposed rulemaking expressly withdrew the 1978 interpretation. Thus, this rulemaking fails to establish or even support any binding historical interpretation.

The Board also examines two memoranda not cited in the response to comments but set forth in the Region’s appeal briefs that it contends made the Agency’s interpretation “apparent to the regulated community and other stakeholders.” These are a memorandum from Lydia N. Wegman, Deputy Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Definition of Regulated Air Pollutant for Purposes of Title V (Apr. 26, 1993) and a memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, U.S. EPA, to Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA, EPA’s Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power Generation Sources (Apr. 10, 1998). These memoranda, however, do more to confuse the historical record of the Agency’s interpretation than they do to show that it has been long-standing and consistent. They clearly are not sufficient to form an alternative basis for sustaining the Region’s conclusion that its authority was constrained by an historical Agency interpretation.

The Board rejects as not sustainable in this proceeding the Region’s alternative argument – that any regulation arising out of section 821 cannot, in any event, constitute regulation “under this Act” because section 821 is not part of the CAA. While the Region now cites textual distinctions and legislative history to argue that the term “regulations” under section 821 does not constitute regulation “under this Act” for purposes of CAA sections 165 and 169, this argument is at odds with the Agency’s prior statements regarding the relationship between section 821 and the CAA, including statements in EPA’s Part 75 regulations, and these inconsistencies preclude the Board’s acceptance of the Region’s argument in this proceeding.

Having determined that the Region has discretion under the statute to interpret the term “subject to regulation under this Act” and that the Region wrongly believed that its discretion was limited by an historical Agency interpretation, the Board remands the permit to the Region for it to reconsider whether to impose a CO₂ BACT limit and to develop an adequate record for its decision.

In remanding this permit to the Region for reconsideration of its conclusions regarding application of BACT to limit CO₂ emissions, the Board recognizes that this is an issue of national scope that has implications far beyond this individual permitting proceeding. The Board suggests that the Region consider whether interested persons, as well as the Agency, would be better served by
the Agency addressing the interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” in the context of an action of nationwide scope, rather than through this specific permitting proceeding.

Before Environmental Appeals Judges Edward E. Reich, Kathie A. Stein, and Anna L. Wolgast.

Opinion of the Board by Judge Reich:

I. INTRODUCTION

Sierra Club seeks review by the Environmental Appeals Board (“Board”) of a prevention of significant deterioration (“PSD”) permit, number PSD-OU-0002-04.00 (“Permit”), that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), Region 8 (“Region”) issued to Deseret Power Electric Cooperative (“Deseret”) on August 30, 2007. The Permit would authorize Deseret to construct a new waste-coal-fired electric generating unit at Deseret’s existing Bonanza Power Plant, located near Bonanza, Utah.1

Sierra Club’s petition raises two issues. Sierra Club argues that the Region violated the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “Act”) because its permitting decision failed to consider certain “alternatives” to the proposed facility that are similar to alternatives U.S. EPA Region 9 recommended in comments on a draft environmental impact statement in a different matter. Sierra Club also argues that the Region violated the Act because its permitting decision failed to require a best available control technology (“BACT”) emissions limit for control of carbon dioxide (“CO₂”) emissions. By order dated November 21, 2007, the Board granted review of the CO₂ BACT issue.2 Order Granting Review

1 The Region has the responsibility for issuing this permit because the Bonanza Power Plant is located within the Uintah and Ourah Indian Reservation. CAA § 301(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(4).

2 The procedural regulations governing this case allow any person who filed comments on the draft permit or participated in a public hearing on the draft permit to petition the Board to review any condition of the permit decision. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a). (continued...)
When the Board decides to grant review, section 124.19(c) provides that the persons who received notice of the draft permit shall be given notice of the Board’s order and any interested person may file an amicus brief with the Board.

As explained below in Part III.A, we now deny review of the first issue that the Region violated the Act by failing to consider the “alternatives” to the proposed facility that Sierra Club identifies in its petition. The statutory section Sierra Club relies upon, CAA section 165(a)(2), does not require the permit issuer to independently raise and consider alternatives that the public did not identify during the public comment period. Here, Sierra Club did not identify during the public comment period the alternatives it raises in its petition.

When the Board granted review of the second issue identified above, the CO₂ BACT issue, it set a briefing schedule to provide an opportunity, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(c), for interested persons to file briefs either in support of, or in opposition to, Sierra Club’s contention that the Permit must contain a CO₂ BACT limit. The Board initially received a total of seven briefs in support of Sierra Club’s Petition and eight briefs in support of the Region’s permitting decision. The interested persons who filed briefs are identified below in Part II.B (Procedural Background). The Board held oral argument on May 29, 2008, and received additional post-argument briefing, which was completed on September 12, 2008.

As explained below in Part III.B, we conclude that we cannot sustain the Region’s CO₂ BACT decision on the present administrative record, and therefore we remand this issue to the Region. Briefly, Sierra Club points to the Supreme Court’s April 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), as establishing that CO₂ is an “air pollutant” within the meaning of the Act. Pet. at 3. Sierra Club contends that the Permit violates CAA sections 165(a)(4) and 169(3), which prohibit the issuance of a PSD permit unless the permit includes

\[\text{...(continued)}\]

When the Board decides to grant review, section 124.19(c) provides that the persons who received notice of the draft permit shall be given notice of the Board’s order and any interested person may file an amicus brief with the Board.
In order for an issue to be preserved for consideration on appeal, the regulations governing PSD permitting provide that the petitioner must demonstrate that “all reasonably ascertainable issues and * * * all reasonably available arguments” were raised by the close of the public comment period. 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.13, 19(a); see also In re Kendall New Century Dev., 11 E.A.D. 40, 55 (EAB 2003) (denying review of a new argument raised for the first time on appeal). On this basis, we generally deny review where an issue was raised either not at all, or in only a general manner during the public comment period and new or much more specific arguments are introduced for the first time on appeal. See In re Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 169, 230 (EAB 2000); In re Florida Pulp & Paper Ass’n., 6 E.A.D. 49, 54-55 (EAB 1995); In re Pollution Control Indus. of Ind., Inc., 4 E.A.D. 162, 166-69 (EAB 1992); see also In re Maui Elec. Co., 8 E.A.D. 1, 11-12 (EAB 1999).

Sierra Club preserved this issue for review by stating in its comments on the draft permit that a requirement to set a CO$_2$ BACT emissions limit might be an outgrowth of the Massachusetts v. EPA case that was then still pending before the Supreme Court. The Region responded to Sierra Club’s comment by discussing the April 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), which held that CO$_2$ fits within the CAA’s definition of “air pollutant,” and explaining why it believed, notwithstanding this decision, that no CO$_2$ BACT limit was required in the Permit.

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3 In order for an issue to be preserved for consideration on appeal, the regulations governing PSD permitting provide that the petitioner must demonstrate that “all reasonably ascertainable issues and * * * all reasonably available arguments” were raised by the close of the public comment period. 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.13, 19(a); see also In re Kendall New Century Dev., 11 E.A.D. 40, 55 (EAB 2003) (denying review of a new argument raised for the first time on appeal). On this basis, we generally deny review where an issue was raised either not at all, or in only a general manner during the public comment period and new or much more specific arguments are introduced for the first time on appeal. See In re Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 169, 230 (EAB 2000); In re Florida Pulp & Paper Ass’n., 6 E.A.D. 49, 54-55 (EAB 1995); In re Pollution Control Indus. of Ind., Inc., 4 E.A.D. 162, 166-69 (EAB 1992); see also In re Maui Elec. Co., 8 E.A.D. 1, 11-12 (EAB 1999).

4 See E-mail from Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, et al., to Mike Owens, U.S. EPA, Region 8, regarding Draft PSD Permit for Major Modifications to the Bonanza Power Plant in Utah, at 2. In our January 2008 decision in Christian County Generation, LLC, which also considered the Supreme Court’s Massachusetts decision, we noted that petitioner’s complete failure in that case to raise concerns during the public comment period regarding a BACT emissions limit for CO$_2$ precluded the petitioner from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. In re Christian County Generation, LLC, PSD Appeal No. 07-01, slip op. at 13, 19 (EAB Jan. 28, 2008), 13 E.A.D. at ___. We explained, by way of contrast, that Sierra Club’s comments regarding Deseret’s proposed facility modification in the present Deseret case were sufficient to alert the Region that the Supreme Court’s decision in the pending Massachusetts case should be taken into account in its permitting decision. Id., slip op. at 16.
Sierra Club, the Region, Deseret, and their supporting amici developed many of their arguments for the first time on appeal, and those arguments have continued to evolve during the course of this administrative appellate proceeding. While the Board normally will not entertain arguments raised for the first time on appeal, we have tailored our approach and somewhat relaxed that limitation because of the unique circumstances of this case. We have done this for two reasons. First and most important, during the comment period on the draft permit, the Supreme Court was still considering the threshold issue of whether CO₂ is an air pollutant. This led the parties to address the CO₂ BACT issue in a more cursory fashion than would otherwise be expected. Second, our order granting review recognized that this matter potentially raises issues of national significance and concluded that our decision may benefit from further briefing and argument, including from interested persons not yet before the Board in this matter. Order Granting Review at 2. The applicable procedural regulations require that the order granting review set a briefing schedule allowing any interested person to submit an amicus brief, 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(c), which implies that the Board may consider some augmentation of arguments when making its decision after granting review of a permitting decision. However, any augmentation must still be consistent with the regulatory requirement that the permit decision must be based on the administrative record defined by 40 C.F.R. § 124.18, which “shall be complete on the date the final permit is issued.” Id. § 124.18(c). As we explain below, while we consider a number of legal arguments and supporting historical Agency legal memoranda that were not part of the record for the Region’s permitting decision, ultimately we conclude that the Region’s permitting decision cannot be sustained on the administrative record defined by section 124.18.

Although the Supreme Court determined that greenhouse gases, such as CO₂, are “air pollutants” under the CAA, the Massachusetts decision did not address whether CO₂ is a pollutant “subject to regulation” under the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, slip op. at 29-30 (2007); In re Christian County Generation, LLC, PSD Appeal No. 07-01, slip op. at 7 n.12 (EAB Jan. 28, 2008), 13 E.A.D. at ___. The Region maintains that it does not now have the
authority to impose a CO₂ BACT limit because “EPA has historically interpreted the term ‘subject to regulation under the Act’ to describe pollutants that are presently subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” U.S. EPA Region 8, Response to Public Comments (Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00) at 5-6 (Aug. 30, 2007) (“Resp. to Comments”). We hold that this conclusion is clearly erroneous because the Region’s permitting authority is not constrained in this manner by an authoritative historical Agency interpretation.

By our holding today, we do not conclude that the CAA (or an historical Agency interpretation) requires the Region to impose a CO₂ BACT limit. Instead, we conclude that the record does not support the Region’s proffered reason for not imposing a CO₂ BACT limit – that although EPA initially could have interpreted the CAA to require a CO₂ BACT limit, the Region no longer can do so because of an historical Agency interpretation. Accordingly, we remand the Permit to the Region for it to reconsider whether or not to impose a CO₂ BACT limit and to develop an adequate record for its decision.

We also decline to sustain the Region’s permitting decision on the alternative grounds the Region argues in this appeal. Sierra Club contends that regulations EPA promulgated in 1993 to require monitoring and reporting of CO₂ emissions, as required by section 821 of the public law known as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, constitute “regulation” of CO₂ within the meaning of CAA sections 165 and 169. The Region argues that we should reject Sierra Club’s contention on the grounds that those regulations are not “under” the CAA within the meaning of CAA sections 165 and 169 because section 821 is not part of the CAA. As we explain below, this argument is at odds with the Agency’s prior statements regarding the relationship between section 821 and the CAA, including statements in EPA’s Part 75 regulations, and these inconsistencies preclude our acceptance of the Region’s argument in this proceeding.

In remanding this permit to the Region for reconsideration of the CO₂ BACT issue, we recognize that the issue of whether CO₂ is “subject
to regulation under [the] Act” is an issue of national scope and that all parties would be better served by addressing it in the context of an action of nationwide scope rather than in the context of a specific permit proceeding. We elaborate on this point below.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background and Identification of Issues

Congress enacted the PSD permitting provisions of the CAA in 1977 for the purpose of, among other things, “insur[ing] that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources.” CAA § 160(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3). The statute requires EPA approval in the form of a PSD permit before a “major emitting facility” may be constructed in any area EPA has classified as either “attainment” or “unclassifiable” for attainment of the national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”). CAA §§ 107, 160-169B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407, 7470-7492; see also In re EcoEléctrica, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 56, 59 (EAB 1997); In re Commonwealth Chesapeake Corp., 6 E.A.D. 764, 766-67 (EAB 1997). EPA’s regulations further provide that a PSD permit is required before a “major modification” of an existing major stationary source. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2), .21(I).

The NAAQS are “maximum concentration ‘ceilings’” for particular pollutants, “measured in terms of the total concentration of a pollutant in the atmosphere.”* U.S. EPA Office of Air Quality Planning

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5 A “major emitting facility” is any of certain listed stationary sources (including electric generating units) that emit, or have the potential to emit, 100 tons per year (“tpy”) or more of any air pollutant, or any other stationary source with the potential to emit at least 250 tpy of any air pollutant. CAA § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).

6 EPA designates areas, on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis, as being in either attainment or nonattainment with the NAAQS. An area is designated as being in attainment with a given NAAQS if the concentration of the relevant pollutant in the ambient air within the area meets the limits prescribed by the applicable NAAQS. CAA § 107(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A). A nonattainment area is one with ambient concentrations of a criteria pollutant that do not meet the requirements of the applicable...
NAAQS. Id. Areas "that cannot be classified on the basis of available information as meeting or not meeting the [NAAQS]" are designated as unclassifiable areas. Id. PSD permitting covers construction in unclassifiable areas, as well as construction in attainment areas. CAA §§ 160-169B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492; see In re Christian County Generation, LLC, PSD Appeal No. 07-01, slip op. at 5, (EAB Jan. 28, 2008), 13 E.A.D. at ___ (citing In re EcoEléctrica, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 56, 59 (EAB 1997); In re Commonwealth Chesapeake Corp., 6 E.A.D. 764, 766-67 (EAB 1997)).

The NSR Manual has been used as a guidance document in conjunction with new source review workshops and training and as a guide for state and federal permitting officials with respect to PSD requirements and policy. Although it is not a binding Agency regulation, the NSR Manual has been looked to by this Board as a statement of the Agency’s thinking on certain PSD issues. E.g., In re RockGen Energy Ctr., 8 E.A.D. 536, 542 n.10 (EAB 1999); In re Knauf Fiber Glass, GmbH, 8 E.A.D. 121, 129 n.13 (EAB 1999).

Sulfur oxides are measured as sulfur dioxide (“SO2”). 40 C.F.R. § 50.4(c).

“Particulate matter, or ‘PM,’ is ‘the generic term for a broad class of chemically and physically diverse substances that exist as discrete particles (liquid droplets or solids) over a wide range of sizes.’” In re Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 165, 181 (EAB 2000) (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,653 (July 18, 1997)). For purposes of determining attainment of the NAAQS, particulate matter is measured in the ambient air as particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 micrometers or less, referred to as PM10, and particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less, referred to as PM2.5, 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.6(c), 50.7(a).

monoxide ("CO"), ozone, and lead. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.12. There is no NAAQS for CO₂.

Deseret’s Bonanza facility is an existing “major stationary source,” and Deseret’s proposed new waste-coal combustion unit will be a “major modification” of that source as defined in 40 C.F.R. § 52.21. Final Statement of Basis for Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00, Deseret Power Electric Cooperative, at 1 (Aug. 30, 2007) (hereinafter “Statement of Basis”). In addition, the Bonanza facility is located in an area designated as attainment for all pollutants covered by a NAAQS. Id. at 6. As such, the PSD permitting requirements apply to Deseret’s proposed major modification of its Bonanza facility. There is no dispute as to any of these propositions.

Sierra Club’s argument regarding the Region’s consideration of “alternatives” to the proposed facility arises out of the Act’s public participation provisions. Specifically, the Act requires that the PSD permitting decision must be made after an opportunity for public comment on the proposed permitting decision. In particular, the decision is to be made only after careful consideration of all consequences of the decision and “after adequate procedural opportunities for informed public participation in the decisionmaking process.” CAA § 160(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(5). The CAA also requires the permitting authority to consider all comments submitted “on the air quality impacts of such source, alternatives thereto, control technology requirements, and other appropriate considerations.” CAA § 165(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (emphasis added).

The statute also prohibits the issuance of a PSD permit unless it includes “best available control technology,” or BACT, to control emissions of “each pollutant subject to regulation” under the Act. CAA § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). A central issue raised in Sierra Club’s petition and subsequent briefing is whether CO₂ is a “pollutant

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11 A facility’s compliance with respect to ozone is measured in terms of emissions of volatile organic compounds ("VOCs") or NOₓ. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(23).
subject to regulation under [the Clean Air Act].” Compare Pet. at 4 with Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 1.

Determination of the PSD permit’s BACT conditions for control of pollutant emissions is one of the central features of the PSD program. 12 In re BP West Coast Prods. LLC, Cherry Point Co-Generation Facility, 12 E.A.D. 209, 213-14 (EAB 2005); In re Knauf Fiberglass, GmbH, 8 E.A.D. 121, 123-24 (EAB 1999). “BACT is a site-specific determination resulting in the selection of an emission limitation that represents application of control technology or control methods appropriate for the particular facility.” In re Cardinal FG Co., 12 E.A.D. 153, 161 (EAB 2005); In re Three Mountain Power, L.L.C., 10 E.A.D. 39, 47 (EAB 2001); accord Knauf, 8 E.A.D. at 128-29; see also In re CertainTeed Corp., 1 E.A.D. 743, 747 (Adm’r 1982) (“It is readily apparent *** that *** BACT determinations are tailor-made for each pollutant emitting facility.”).

The BACT permitting requirements are pollutant-specific, which means that a facility may emit many air pollutants, but only one or a few may be subject to BACT review, depending upon, among other things, the amount of projected emissions of each pollutant. NSR Manual at 4. Regulated pollutants emitted in amounts defined by the regulations as “significant” must be subject to a BACT emissions limit. Id. Deseret’s proposed major modification to its facility will emit total PM, PM, SO,

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12 Other PSD permitting requirements include a review of new major stationary sources or major modifications prior to construction to ensure that emissions from such facilities will not cause or contribute to an exceedance of either the NAAQS or any applicable PSD ambient air quality “increments.” CAA § 165(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3); 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(k)-(m). Air quality increments represent the maximum allowable increase in a particular pollutant’s concentration that may occur above a baseline ambient air concentration for that pollutant. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c) (increments for six regulated air pollutants). The performance of an ambient air quality and source impact analysis, pursuant to the regulatory requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k), (l) and (m), as part of the PSD permit review process, is the central means for preconstruction determination of whether the source will cause an exceedance of the NAAQS or PSD increments. See Haw. Elec., 8 E.A.D. at 73. There are no NAAQS or PSD increments for CO. In the present case, Sierra Club has not sought review of the Region’s ambient air quality and source impact analysis.
NO\textsubscript{x}, sulfuric acid mist (“H\textsubscript{2}SO\textsubscript{4}”), and CO in amounts qualifying as “significant” under 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(23)(I). Statement of Basis at 18. There is no dispute that these pollutants are subject to regulation under the CAA, and the Permit contains BACT emissions limits for these air pollutants. Sierra Club does not challenge the Region’s BACT determination for any of these pollutants. Instead, Sierra Club contends that the modification to Deseret’s facility will emit a significant amount of CO\textsubscript{2} and that CO\textsubscript{2} is a regulated pollutant and, thus, the Permit must also contain a BACT emissions limit for CO\textsubscript{2}. Deseret did not submit a proposed BACT determination for CO\textsubscript{2} in its permit application, and the Region did not make a CO\textsubscript{2} BACT determination as part of its permitting decision. Sierra Club argues that this constitutes clear error.

The PSD provisions were enacted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). Central to the parties’ arguments in this case is a statutory phrase that appears in both CAA sections 165(a)(4) and 169(3), which provide that the permit must contain a BACT emissions limit for “each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act.” In 1978, the Agency promulgated regulations governing the PSD permitting process and, as part of the preamble for that 1978 rulemaking, the Agency stated it was making final an interpretation of what “subject to regulation under this Act” means relative to BACT determinations. Part 52 – Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388, 26,397 (June 19, 1978). EPA set forth this interpretation in the preamble, but did not make it part of the regulatory text. Subsequently, Congress amended the CAA in 1990 and, as part of the public law enacting those amendments, in section 821, Congress required EPA to promulgate regulations providing for monitoring and reporting of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions.


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\(^{13}\) Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95 § 127(a), 91 Stat. 685, 735, 741.
DESERET POWER ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE


The parties’ arguments in this case focus on these and other Agency historical statements allegedly interpreting the meaning of the statutory phrase “subject to regulation under this Act.” We consider those arguments below in Part III.B.

B. Procedural Background

On November 1, 2004, Deseret submitted to the Region a revised application for a PSD permit to construct its proposed waste-coal-fired electric generating unit at its existing Bonanza power plant. The Region and Deseret exchanged information through June 2006, and, on June 27, 2006, the Region issued the draft permit and published notice of the opportunity for the public to submit comments on the draft permit. The public comment period closed on July 29, 2006. During the public comment period, the Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, among others, submitted comments on the draft permit. In its public comments, Sierra Club stated, among other things, as follows:

We believe that the EPA has a legal obligation to regulate CO₂ and other greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. * * * This issue is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court agrees that greenhouse gases, such as CO₂, must be regulated under the Clean Air Act, such a decision may also require the establishment of CO₂ emission limits in this permit * * *.
E-mail from Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, et al., to Mike Owens, U.S. EPA, Region 8, regarding Draft PSD Permit for Major Modifications to the Bonanza Power Plant in Utah, at 2.

On August 30, 2007, the Region issued its decision to grant Deseret’s application for a PSD permit authorizing Deseret to construct its proposed waste-coal-fired electric generating unit at the Bonanza facility. The Region provided a response to Sierra Club’s comments explaining, among other things, why the Region concluded that it is not required to establish a BACT emissions limit for CO₂ in the Permit. See Resp. to Comments at 5-9. The Region’s response to public comments included a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), which determined that greenhouse gases, including CO₂, “fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’” Id., slip op. at 29-30. The Region stated that the Massachusetts decision “does not require the Agency to set CO₂ emission limits,” Resp. to Comments at 5, and that “EPA does not currently have the authority to address the challenge of global climate change by imposing limitations on emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases in PSD permits,” Resp. to Comments at 5.

On October 1, 2007, Sierra Club timely filed its Petition seeking review of the Region’s decision to issue the Permit. On November 2, 2007, the Region filed its response to the Petition, and on November 16, 2007, Deseret filed a motion requesting that it be allowed to participate in this proceeding and file a response to the Petition (hereinafter, these documents will be referred to as the Region’s or Deseret’s “Resp. to Pet.,” as appropriate). By order dated November 21, 2007, the Board granted Deseret’s request, granted review, and set a schedule for further briefing and argument on Sierra Club’s issue regarding BACT for controlling CO₂ emissions. See Order Granting Review (Nov. 21, 2007). The Board did not grant review of Sierra Club’s issue regarding “alternatives” and, instead, has held that issue under advisement. Id. at 2 n.4.

The Board’s order granting review invited briefing and argument on the CO₂ BACT issue from interested persons as provided in 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.19(c). Pursuant to that briefing schedule (as extended by subsequent order), in January 2008, the Board received from the following persons or groups a total of seven briefs in support of Sierra Club’s contention that the Region erred by not requiring a CO₂ BACT limit: 1) Sierra Club, filing a brief further developing the arguments it made in its Petition; 2) Dr. James E. Hanson; 3) National Parks Conservation Association; 4) Physicians for Social Responsibility; 5) Center for Biological Diversity; 6) the Attorneys General of the States of New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; and 7) a group of organizations that refer to themselves as the “Utah and Western Non-Governmental Organizations,” which include Mom-Ease, Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment, Wasatch Clean Air Coalition, Post Carbon Salt Lake, Grand Canyon Trust, Montana Environment Information Center, Wyoming Outdoor Council, and Western Resource Advocates. (Hereinafter, briefs filed by these persons will be referred to as the particular person’s “Jan. Brief.”)

The Board received from the following persons or groups a total of eight briefs in opposition to Sierra Club’s contention that the Permit must contain a CO₂ BACT limit: 1) the Region (in which EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation joined); 2) Deseret; 3) ConocoPhillips and WRB Refining; 4) The Heartland Institute; 5) National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; 6) the Utility Air Regulatory Group (hereinafter “UARG”); 7) a group of organizations with the American Petroleum Institute as the first named organization;¹⁴ and 8) another group of organizations with the Competitive Enterprise Institute as the

¹⁴ Other organizations in the group are as follows: American Chemistry Council, American Royalty Council, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, National Association of Manufacturers, National Oilseed Processors Association, and National Petrochemical & Refiners Association.
first named organization. (Hereinafter, briefs filed by these persons will be referred to as the particular person’s “Mar. Brief.”)

In April 2008, the Board received reply briefs from Sierra Club and Physicians for Social Responsibility (hereinafter, Sierra Club’s or Physician’s for Social Responsibility’s “April Reply”). On May 8, 2008, the Region moved to strike a portion of the April Replies to the extent that those briefs for the first time argued that CO₂ is regulated under landfill emission regulations promulgated under CAA section 111. The Board granted the motion to strike by order dated May 20, 2008.

On May 29, 2008, the Board held oral argument on Sierra Club’s contention that the Permit must contain a CO₂ BACT limit. To obtain further clarification of questions arising during oral argument, the Board issued an order dated June 16, 2008, requesting further briefing from the Region and EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation, which after requesting additional time, those offices filed on August 8, 2008 (hereinafter, the “Region’s August Brief”). Responses to the Region’s August Brief were received on or about September 12, 2008, from Sierra Club, Deseret, the American Petroleum Institute, Utah and Western Non-Governmental Organizations, and UARG.

C. Part 124 Procedural Regulations and Standard of Review

The regulations found at 40 C.F.R. part 124 govern EPA’s processing of permit applications, including PSD permits, and appeals of those permitting decisions. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 124. The Part 124 regulations cover the processing of the permit application, including issuing a draft permit and providing notice to the public and opportunity for the public to submit comments on the draft permit. Id. §§ 124.3(a), .6(c), .10(a)(ii), .10(b), .12(a). The permit issuer must

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respond to all significant comments, id. § 124.17(a), and issue a final permit decision based on the “administrative record” as defined by regulation, id. §§ 124.15(a), .18(a). The administrative record for the final permitting decision must contain the administrative record for the draft permit as well as a number of other items, including all comments received during the public comment period, any written materials submitted at a hearing (if one is conducted), and the document setting forth the permit issuer’s response to comments, all of which must be collected and considered by the permit issuer before the final permitting decision is made. Id. § 124.18(b)(1)-(7).

The regulations specifically provide that “[t]he record shall be complete on the date the final permit is issued.” Id. § 124.18(c). Questions regarding completeness of the administrative record have arisen in situations where the permit issuer either failed to issue its responses to comments until after issuing its permitting decision or where the permit issuer has sought to introduce on appeal a new or additional rationale for its permitting decision or additional information supporting its permitting decision. In rare cases, the Board has allowed a rationale to be supplemented on appeal where the missing explanation was fairly deducible from the record. See In re Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 165, 191 (EAB 2000). More typically, the Board has remanded the permit. See, e.g., In re Conocophillips Co., PSD Appeal No. 07-02, slip op. at 24-25 (EAB June 2, 2008), 13 E.A.D. __ (explaining that “allowing the permit issuer to supply its rationale after the fact, during the briefing for an appeal, does nothing to ensure that the original decision was based on the permit issuer’s ‘considered judgment’ at the time the decision was made” (citing In re Indeeck-Elwood LLC, PSD Appeal No. 03-04, slip op. at 29 (EAB Sept. 27, 2006), 13 E.A.D. at __)); In re Prairie State Generation Station, 12 E.A.D. 176, 180 (EAB 2005); In re Gov’t of D.C. Mun. Separate Sewer Syst., 10 E.A.D. 323, 342-43 (EAB 2002) (“Without an articulation by the permit writer of his analysis, we cannot properly perform any review whatsoever of that analysis * * *.”); In re Chem. Waste Mgmt, 6 E.A.D. 144, 151-52 (EAB 1995); In re Amoco Oil Co., 4 E.A.D. 954, 964 (EAB 1993); In re Waste Techs. Indus., 4 E.A.D. 106, 114 (EAB 1992).
Within thirty days of the issuance of the final permit decision, any person who filed comments on the draft permit or who participated in the public hearing may appeal the Region’s final permit decision to the Board. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a). “The Board’s review of PSD permitting decisions is governed by 40 C.F.R. part 124, which ‘provides the yardstick against which the Board must measure’ petitions for review of PSD and other permit decisions.” In re Prairie State Generating Co., PSD Appeal No. 05-05, slip op. at 13 (EAB Aug. 24, 2006), 13 E.A.D. at ___ (quoting In re Commonwealth Chesapeake Corp., 6 E.A.D. 764, 769 (EAB 1997)), aff’d sub nom. Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2007). The standard for review of a permit under part 124 requires the Board to determine whether the permit issuer based the permit on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a); In re Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC, 12 E.A.D. 490, 509 (EAB 2006); In re Inter-Power of N.Y., Inc., 5 E.A.D. 130, 144 (EAB 1994); accord, e.g., In re Zion Energy, LLC, 9 E.A.D. 701, 705 (EAB 2001); In re Knauf Fiber Glass, GmbH, 8 E.A.D. 121, 126-27(EAB 1999); Commonwealth Chesapeake, 6 E.A.D. at 769. The Board, in its discretion, may also evaluate conditions of the permit that are based on the permit issuer’s “exercise of discretion or an important policy consideration.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(2). The petitioner must describe each objection it is raising and explain why the permit issuer’s previous response to each objection is clearly erroneous or otherwise deserving of review.16 Indeck-Elwood, slip op. at 23, 13 E.A.D. at ___ (citing In re Tondu Energy Co., 9 E.A.D. 710, 714 (EAB 2001); In re Encogen Cogeneration Facility, 8 E.A.D. 244, 252 (EAB 1999)).

III. DISCUSSION

Sierra Club argues that the Region’s permitting decision in the present case violates two PSD permitting requirements: the requirement

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16 The Agency stated in the Federal Register preamble to the part 124 regulations that the “power of review ‘should be only sparingly exercised,’ and that ‘most permit conditions should be finally determined at the [permit issuer’s] level.’” In re Cardinal FG Co., 12 E.A.D. 153, 160 (EAB 2005) (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,412 (May 19, 1980)); accord In re Kawaihae Cogeneration Project, 7 E.A.D. 107, 114 (EAB 1997).
set forth in the public participation requirements of CAA section
165(a)(2) to consider “alternatives” to the proposed facility, and the
requirement pursuant to CAA sections 165(a)(4) and section 169(3) to
apply BACT, or best available control technology, to limit CO₂
emissions from the facility. We discuss the “alternatives” issue next in
Part III.A and the BACT issues below in Part III.B.

A. Alternatives

Sierra Club argues that the Permit should be remanded on the
grounds that “in it, EPA has taken positions contrary to those it has
recently taken in another coal-fired power plant permitting matter.” Pet.
at 9. Sierra Club argues that the Region erred by failing to consider,
pursuant to CAA section 165(a), certain “alternatives” to the proposed
facility that are similar to alternatives U.S. EPA Region 9 recommended
in a different type of proceeding. Specifically, Sierra Club points to
comments Region 9 submitted on the draft environmental impact
statement for the White Pine Energy Station Project in Nevada.

Sierra Club does not argue that it, or any other person, submitted
comments during the public comment period in this case identifying the
“alternatives” to the proposed facility that it raises in its Petition.
Instead, Sierra Club argues that it is entitled to raise the issue for the first
time in its Petition on the grounds that Region 9 submitted its comments
in the White Pine Energy Station case after the public comment period
in the present case had closed.

The Region argues that Sierra Club has not satisfied the
standards for granting review of this issue. Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 21-30. We agree and deny review for the following reasons.

Sierra Club’s argument relies on CAA section 165(a)(2), which
provides that a PSD permit may not be issued unless “a public hearing
has been held with opportunity for interested persons ** to appear and
submit written or oral presentations on the air quality impact of such
source, alternatives thereto, control technology requirements, and other
appropriate considerations.” CAA § 165(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2)
Whether or not a petitioner raised an issue during the comment period is a threshold question that the Board considers prior to granting review. In re City of Phoenix, 9 E.A.D. 515, 524 (EAB 2000); In re Rockgen Energy Ctr., 8 E.A.D. 536, 540 (EAB 1999).

In In re Prairie State Generating Co., PSD Appeal No. 05-05, slip op. at 37-44 (EAB Aug. 24, 2006), 13 E.A.D. at __, aff’d sub nom. Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2007), we held that section 165(a)(2)’s requirement to consider alternatives, tied as it is by the statute to the opportunity for interested persons to comment on the draft permit, does not create an obligation for the permit issuer to “conduct an independent analysis of available alternatives” that were not identified by the public during the comment period. Id. at 39, 13 E.A.D. __. In contrast to the PSD provisions at issue in this case, the CAA clearly requires an independent review of alternatives for permits issued in nonattainment areas. CAA § 173(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(5). In Prairie State, we explained that “[b]ecause the CAA contains specific language for permits in nonattainment areas requiring the permit issuer to perform an analysis of alternative sites, sizes, and production processes, among other things, to determine whether the benefits of the proposed source outweigh its costs, and because similar specific language is not included for the issuance of a PSD permit, compare 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(5) with id. § 7475(a), the PSD permit issuer therefore is not required to perform an independent analysis of alternatives” in PSD proceedings. Prairie State, slip op. at 39, 13 E.A.D. at __.

Here, Sierra Club does not contend that the “alternatives” it identifies in its Petition were raised or identified by any interested person during the public comment period. Pet. at 9-11. Notably, Region 9’s comments submitted in the White Pine Energy Station matter were submitted to comply with Region 9’s affirmative duty under CAA section 309 and section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). In contrast, as discussed above, CAA section 165(a)(2) does not impose a similar affirmative duty on the Region in the present PSD permitting context. Accordingly, we reject Sierra Club’s Petition and deny review of this issue because CAA...
section 165(a)(2) does not impose upon the Region a duty to conduct an analysis of “alternatives” that were not identified by an interested person during public comment.

B. Best Available Control Technology Emissions Limit for Carbon Dioxide

1. Background and Overview

CAA sections 165(a)(4) and 169(3) prohibit the construction of a major emitting facility unless, among other things, the permit for the facility contains a BACT emissions limit for “each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act.” Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95 § 127(a), 91 Stat. 685, 735, 741. Sierra Club argues that the

18 Region 9’s comments, although submitted in the White Pines Energy Station matter after the close of the public comment period in the present case, would not, in any event, present grounds for raising a new issue or argument for the first time on appeal in this case. All reasonably ascertainable issues or reasonably available arguments must be raised by the petitioner or another commenter by the close of the public comment period in order for such issues or arguments to be preserved for consideration on appeal. 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.13, .19(a); see also In re Christian County Generation, LLC, PSD Appeal No. 07-01, slip op. at 12 (EAB Jan. 28, 2008), 13 E.A.D. __; In re Shell Offshore, Inc., OCS Appeal Nos. 07-01 & -02, slip op. at 52-53 (EAB Sept. 14, 2007), 13 E.A.D. __; In re Kendall New Century Dev., 11 E.A.D. 40, 55 (EAB 2003). Sierra Club does not contend that the “alternatives” it identifies in its Petition became “reasonably available” or “reasonably ascertainable” for the first time after the close of the public comment period. The mere fact that Region 9 raised the same “alternatives” in comments that it submitted in another proceeding after the close of public comment in this proceeding is not sufficient to show that Sierra Club could not have raised those same alternatives during this proceeding’s public comment period.

19 Since we are denying review on procedural grounds, we need not address the significance, or even the relevance, of Region 9’s comments on a different facility in a different legal context.

20 The phrase “each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act” appears both in section 165(a)(4) and in section 169(3)’s definition of BACT, the latter of which states:

The term “best available control technology” means an emission

(continued...)
Region clearly erred in its permitting decision by failing to require a BACT emissions limit for control of CO$_2$ emissions under CAA sections 165 and 169. Pet. at 4.

In 2003, EPA reversed a position it took in 1998 and concluded that CO$_2$ is not an “air pollutant” as defined by CAA section 302(g) and, therefore, CO$_2$ falls outside the scope of EPA’s authority to regulate under any of the CAA’s programs, including the PSD provisions in the present case. Compare Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, General Counsel, U.S. EPA, to Marianne L. Horinko, Acting Administrator, U.S. EPA, EPA’s Authority to Impose Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change under the Clean Air Act, at 10 (Aug. 23, 2003) (“Fabricant Memo”) with Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, U.S. EPA, to Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA, EPA’s Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power Generation Sources (Apr. 10, 1998) (“Cannon Memo”).

In April 2007, the Supreme Court rejected EPA’s interpretation that CO$_2$ is not an “air pollutant” within the CAA’s section 302(g) definition. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The Court explained that CO$_2$, and other greenhouse gases, “fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’” and thus “EPA

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26(...continued) limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant.

CAA § 169(3) (emphasis added). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 used the article “this” in front of “Act.” Pub. L. No. 95-95 § 127, 91 Stat. 735, 741. The parties in the present case frequently use the article “the” instead, or cite to the U.S. Code, which refers to “Chapter” instead of “Act.”
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has the statutory authority to regulate the emissions of such gases.” Id., slip op. at 29-30.

The Massachusetts case spoke directly to EPA’s authority to limit air pollutant emissions from mobile sources under CAA section 202(a)(1). In the mobile source context, before limiting pollutant emissions, the Administrator must make a “judgment” that air pollution caused by the pollutant “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Id., slip op. at 30 (quoting CAA § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). The Court remanded the Massachusetts case for EPA to make further determinations with respect to that judgment and to “ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.” Id., slip op. at 32.

The provisions that Sierra Club points to in the present case, CAA sections 165 and 169, do not contain similar language requiring a public health or welfare “endangerment” finding under the PSD program as a precondition for the CAA’s requirement that EPA apply BACT. Rather, as all parties recognize, for PSD purposes, the statutory language requires BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act.” See, e.g., Sierra Club’s Pet. at 4; Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 5-6.

The parties and amici, however, vigorously dispute what “subject to regulation under this Act” means. The Region stated in its response to comments (which the Region issued after the Supreme Court issued the Massachusetts decision) that “EPA does not currently have the authority to address the challenge of global climate change by imposing limitations on emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases in PSD permits.” Resp. to Comments at 5. The Region explained that “EPA has historically interpreted the term ‘subject to regulation under the Act’ to describe pollutants that are presently subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” Id. at 5-6.

Sierra Club contends that this response to comments constitutes clear error. It asserts that “EPA can and must impose emissions limitations on CO₂ in PSD permits for new coal-fired power plants.”
Sierra Club’s Jan. Brief at 1. Sierra Club maintains that the “plain and unambiguous” meaning of “regulation” is broader than actual control of emissions and that “carbon dioxide has been regulated under the Clean Air Act since 1993.” Pet. at 4. Sierra Club points to EPA’s 1993 amendment of 40 C.F.R. Part 75 to, among other things, require monitoring and reporting of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions. Id. EPA promulgated the Part 75 regulations in response to Congress’ direction in section 821 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2699 [hereinafter, “1990 Public Law”]. Sierra Club thus contends that the combination of CAA sections 165 and 169, section 821 of the 1990 Public Law, and EPA’s Part 75 regulations makes CO\textsubscript{2} “subject to regulation” under the CAA and therefore requires that the Permit contain a CO\textsubscript{2} BACT limit.

The basic question before the Board is whether the Region clearly erred by stating that it lacked the authority to impose a CO\textsubscript{2} BACT limit in the Permit. As explained more fully in Part III.B.2 below, we find that the statute is not so clear and unequivocal as to preclude Agency interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act,” and therefore does not dictate whether the Agency must impose a BACT limit for CO\textsubscript{2} in the Permit. More particularly, we reject Sierra Club’s contentions that either the plain meaning of the statutory phrase “subject to regulation” as used in sections 165 and 169 or the meaning of the term “regulations” as used in section 821 negates the Agency’s authority to interpret “subject to regulation” for purposes of the PSD program and compels an interpretation of the statute that necessarily requires that the Permit contain a CO\textsubscript{2} BACT limit.

In Part III.B.3, we conclude that the record of the Region’s permitting decision does not support its contention that its authority is constrained by an historical Agency interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act.” The administrative record of the Region’s permitting decision, as defined by 40 C.F.R. section 124.18, does not support the Region’s view that the Agency’s historical interpretation of “subject to regulation” means “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.”
In Part III.B.4, we reject as not sustainable in this proceeding the Region’s alternative argument—that any regulation arising out of section 821 cannot, in any event, constitute regulation “under this Act” because section 821 is not part of the CAA. While the Region now cites textual distinctions and legislative history to argue that the term “regulations” under section 821 does not constitute regulation “under this Act” for purposes of CAA sections 165 and 169, the Agency’s historical statements regarding section 821 are at odds with, and preclude our acceptance in this proceeding of, the interpretation the Region now advocates on appeal.

Finally, in Part III.B.5, we provide a summary of our conclusion that a remand is required, and we provide some direction to the Region regarding issues to consider on remand.

2. Meaning of the Statutory Text

We first “must decide, using the traditional tools of statutory construction, ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.’” *Pharmanex v. Shalala*, 221 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). The question before us is whether the text compels a particular meaning in the context of this case.

We begin by considering whether the statutory phrase “each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act,” found at two places in the statute, has a plain meaning. *Lee v. Mukasey*, 527 F.3d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 2008). Here, the parties and amici point to different dictionaries and definitions in arguing various potential “plain” meanings of “regulation.”

For example, Sierra Club argues that “Webster’s defines ‘regulation’ as ‘an authoritative rule dealing with details or procedure; (b) a rule or order issued by an executive authority or regulatory agency

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The Petition does not provide the citation for the quotes attributed to Webster's. However, Sierra Club's subsequent January Brief cites Merriam-Webster's Colloge Dictionary 1049 (11th ed. 2005) for this quote. See also Deseret's Resp. to Pet. at 4-5.

Deseret also points to Webster's II New College Dictionary as using the word “controlling” in defining “regulation.” Deseret's Mar. Brief at 8 (discussing Webster's II College Dictionary 934 (1995)). Deseret also argues that the dictionary cited by Petitioner includes an alternative definition of “regulation” that, among other things, refers to regulation as meaning bringing “under the control of law or constituted authority.” Id. (quoting Merriam-Webster's Colloge Dictionary 1049 (11th ed. 2005) (emphasis added by Deseret)). Deseret also argues that “[t]he plain meaning of the phrase ‘subject to’ also requires control * * *.” Deseret's Mar. Brief at 8. Deseret observes that Webster's defines “subject” as “being under domination, control, or influence (often fol. by to).” Id. (quoting Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1893 (2d ed. 2001)).
The critical term here is “subject to regulation under this Act,” and we do not accept Sierra Club’s argument that the single word “regulation” can be extracted and parsed separate from that phrase, rather than focusing on the meaning of the phrase as a whole.

The parties have not drawn our attention to any relevant legislative history concerning the meaning of “subject to regulation under this Act,” and we have found none.

As part of its argument, Sierra Club contends that the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” must mean something different than what Congress defined “emissions limitation” and “emissions standard” to mean. See Pet. at 8 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k)). It asserts the fact that Congress enacted both these two defined terms – which specifically speak to control of “the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions...”
We reject Sierra Club’s contention that the Region’s interpretation “runs afoul of the holding in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F. 2d 323, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1979),” Pet. at 9. *Alabama Power* rejected the “Industry Groups” effort to compel EPA “to lessen the regulatory burden” because, in their view, “subject to regulation” meant that BACT applied immediately only to the two pollutants, sulfur dioxides and particulates, which were already regulated by EPA’s pre-existing PSD regulations. *Id.* The “Industry Groups” argued that, because CAA section 166 required EPA to complete studies before promulgating PSD regulations for certain pollutants identified in section 166, Congress did not intend those additional pollutants to be “subject to regulation” for purposes of applying BACT until those studies were completed. *Id.* The D.C. Circuit rejected the “Industry Groups” effort to compel a narrow interpretation, stating that “[t]he statutory language leaves no room for limiting the phrase ‘each pollutant subject to regulation’ to sulfur dioxides and particulates.” *Alabama Power*, 636 F.2d at 406. All of the pollutants identified in section 166 and at issue in *Alabama Power* were already subject to regulation under other (non-PSD) provisions of the CAA. Region’s Mar. Brief at 16 n.6 & at 28. The *Alabama Power* court thus did not consider, and therefore did not decide, Sierra Club’s argument here in which it seeks to compel the Region to apply the PSD Program to a pollutant that is neither mentioned in CAA section 166 nor subject to emissions control under another provision of the Act.

21(...continued)
of air pollutants” – and did not use those terms in establishing the BACT requirement implies that Congress meant something different by the phrase it chose to use in sections 165 and 169. Even if this observation were correct, an issue we do not decide, it does not lead to the conclusion that the much broader meaning Sierra Club has put forward for the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” is necessarily what Congress intended. As the Region observes, the meaning of “subject to regulation under this Act” that the Region has put forward differs from the defined terms without embracing the full breadth of the meaning that Sierra Club advocates. Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 14 (noting that its interpretation would apply the control of ozone depleting substances through production or import restrictions that do not limit the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions); Region’s Mar. Brief at 22.
Further, we find that the lack of clarity of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” as applied in these circumstances is not definitively resolved by the terms of section 821 of the 1990 Public Law, as Sierra Club argues. See Pet. at 5-9; Sierra Club’s April Reply at 3. As explained below, we conclude that in enacting section 821, Congress did not negate the Agency’s authority or discretion to interpret CAA sections 165 and 169. This determination is distinct from the question of whether section 821 is part of the CAA, an issue that we do not decide here.

As noted above, the scope of PSD regulatory authority, as set forth in sections 165 and 169 of the CAA, extends to “any pollutant subject to regulation under this Act.” Sierra Club argues that the use of similar, but not identical, language in section 821 of the 1990 Public Law, which requires the Agency to promulgate “regulations,” constrains the Agency’s ability to interpret sections 165 and 169. Pet. at 5-9; Sierra Club’s Jan. Brief at 16-18; Sierra Club’s Apr. Reply at 3. That is, according to Sierra Club, the only supportable reading of sections 165 and 169 mandates that PSD regulatory authority extends to any pollutant subject to “a” or “any” regulation promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations because that is the meaning of section 821’s direction to promulgate regulations. The question before us is not whether this is a plausible reading, but rather whether Sierra Club’s interpretation is compelled under the statutory terms. We conclude that the statutory language does not compel this meaning.

Our conclusion that the statutory language is broad enough to embrace different meanings, or shades of meaning, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation in other contexts that the same or similar words may be construed differently “not only when they occur in different statutes, but when used more than once in the same statute or even in the same section.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S.

28 Although Sierra Club’s argument primarily focuses on Congress’s directive in section 821 of the 1990 Public Law that EPA promulgate “regulations” to implement that section’s requirements, Sierra Club also points to Congress’ similar instructions elsewhere that EPA promulgate “regulations” to implement various CAA provisions. See, e.g., Pet. at 7-8 (citing references to “regulations” in CAA § 165(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(1)).
Section 821 of the 1990 Public Law is included in the United States Code as a note attached to 42 U.S.C. § 7651k. For purposes of facilitating our analysis of Sierra Club’s position on this issue, we assume that section 821 is part of the CAA although, as discussed subsequently in section III.B.4, we actually do not decide that issue.

Although there is a presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same statute have the same meaning, courts recognize that this presumption can yield to a different interpretation in appropriate circumstances. As Sierra Club acknowledges, “EPA may interpret the same word differently based on statutory context.” Sierra Club’s April Reply at 4 (citing Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 127 S.Ct. 1423, 1433 (2007)); see also Sierra Club’s Jan. Brief at 16.

Section 821 of the 1990 Public Law is included in the United States Code as a note attached to 42 U.S.C. § 7651k.

For purposes of facilitating our analysis of Sierra Club’s position on this issue, we assume that section 821 is part of the CAA although, as discussed subsequently in section III.B.4, we actually do not decide that issue.

As discussed above, the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” is not so clear and unequivocal as Sierra Club suggests. While it may mean “subject to a regulation” as Sierra Club argues, the statute by its terms does not foreclose the narrower meaning suggested by the Region and Deseret, “subject to control” (by virtue of a regulation or otherwise). Compare Pet. at 5 n.2 & at 6 with Deseret’s Mar. Brief at 7-8; Region’s Mar. Brief at 13.

In arguing that sections 165 and 169 have only one proper interpretation, Sierra Club ignores the fact that section 821, which was enacted 13 years after sections 165 and 169, uses different terminology, “regulations,” from that used in the PSD provisions of sections 165 and 169, “subject to regulation.” We find no evidence that Congress’s addition of section 821 in 1990 was an attempt to interpret or constrain the Agency’s interpretation of the broader phrase “subject to regulation”.

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33 We agree with the Region that the difference in terminology is potentially significant. Notably, when read in the context of the phrases in which they are used, possible alternative meanings of “regulation” and “regulations” become apparent. In the phrase “the Administrator * * * shall promulgate regulations * * * to require [sources to monitor CO],” in section 821, the term “regulations” is understood to be the end product of the administrative rule making process. Thus, Congress’ direction that EPA promulgate “regulations” found at various places in the CAA and in section 821 is most naturally read to mean that Congress directed EPA to use its legislative rule making authority to implement the statutory requirements, filling in necessary specificity and detail. Section 112 of the Act uses the term “subject to regulations,” referring to “regulations” in the plural. CAA sections 112(r)(3) and 112(r)(7)(F). This evidences that Congress may not have meant “subject to regulation” (singular) to have the same meaning.
as used in sections 165 and 169. Sierra Club does not address the fact that section 821 bears no facial relationship to the PSD provisions of sections 165 and 169. Congress’s subsequent use of the word “regulations” in a section of the 1990 Public Law that bears no explicit relationship with the earlier-enacted sections would not appear sufficient, on its own, to implicitly constrain EPA’s authority to interpret the PSD provisions of section 165 and 169. This is particularly true where, as here, the two sections were enacted 13 years apart, bear no obvious relationship, and are not even placed in close proximity. Moreover, the Agency did determine, in 1978 that the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” used in the PSD provisions requires interpretation to properly implement the PSD program, and Congress did not evidence an intent in section 821 to alter the Agency’s determination. Normally, more express terminology would be expected if Congress intended to alter an established meaning.

See Catron County Bd. of Comm’rs v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1438-39 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting the difficulty in ascertaining Congressional intent from subsequent legislative action in the face of a pre-existing administrative or court precedent). We note that the circumstances of this case are an inverse of those at issue in a case cited by Sierra Club, Merrill Lunch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 (2006). There, the Court found that a subsequently enacted legislative provision should be interpreted in light of, and consistent with, a pre-existing judicial interpretation of an earlier enacted phrase used in the same statute. To follow that logic, section 821 should be read consistently with any definitive interpretation of sections 165 (continued...)
Thus, we reject Sierra Club’s argument that either the plain meaning of “regulation,” or the wording of section 821, compels a particular interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” for purposes of the PSD provisions of sections 165 and 169.

Accordingly, we next turn to the Region’s arguments regarding the allegedly constraining effect of the Agency’s “historical” interpretation.

3. The Agency’s Historical Interpretation of “Subject to Regulation”

Because the statute does not compel Sierra Club’s proffered interpretation, we now consider whether the Region correctly stated in its response to comments that a historical Agency interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation” constrained its discretion to impose a CO\textsubscript{2} BACT limit in the Permit. As we explain below, the record for the Region’s permitting decision is insufficient to support the Region’s conclusion that its discretion is constrained in this manner.

Notably, the Region did not identify in its response to comments any Agency document expressly stating that “subject to regulation under this Act”\textsuperscript{37} means “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant” (or any other clearly worded statement expressly connecting the meaning of the

\textsuperscript{36}(...continued) and 169. This also is not a circumstance where the language of the later enactment makes plain a Congressional intent to express an interpretation of the earlier enactment. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).

\textsuperscript{37} A memorandum issued on April 26, 1993, by Lydia N. Wegman, Deputy Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, discussed below, did refer to the absence of “actual control of emissions” in connection with CO\textsubscript{2}. Memorandum from Lydia N. Wegman, Deputy Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Definition of Regulated Air Pollutant for Purposes of Title V (Apr. 26, 1993). The Region did not identify this memorandum in the Region’s response to comments as support for the Region’s decision, and we explain below in Part III.B.3.c that, at best, it provides only weak support for the interpretation the Region advocates.
statutory phrase to “actual control of emissions”). Instead, the response to comments derives by inference what the Region views as the Agency’s historical interpretation. The Region, in its response to comments, cited as sources for what it referred to as the Agency’s historical interpretation the Federal Register preambles for two Agency rulemakings – one issued in 1978 and the other issued in 2002. Resp. to Comments at 5-6. Among other things, these rulemaking preambles listed pollutants, either by name or by descriptive category, that the Agency considered at the time to be subject to regulation purposes of PSD permitting. The Region explains in its appellate briefs that the historical interpretation it believes constrains its authority may be discerned by observing that the listed pollutants were subject to emissions control and none of the listed pollutants were subject to only monitoring and reporting requirements. Region’s Mar. Brief at 31, 43. In other words, the logic the Region apparently relied upon in its response to comments was an inference based on the regulatory status of the pollutants listed in the two rulemaking preambles and is not found in any affirmative or direct Agency statement. See, e.g., Id. at 31 (“This list did not include carbon dioxide or any other pollutant that was not subject

38 In its response to comments, the Region identified the following as sources for what the Region characterized as EPA’s historical interpretation: Part 52 – Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388, 26,397 (June 19, 1978) (describing pollutants then subject to BACT requirements); Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38,309-10 (proposed July 23, 1996) (listing pollutants then subject to PSD review); Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR): Baseline Emissions Determination, Actual-to-Future-Actual Methodology, Plantwide Applicability Limitations, Clean Units, Pollution Control Projects, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,240 (Dec. 31, 2002) (defining term “regulated NSR pollutant” and stating that BACT is required for each regulated NSR pollutant).

In its response to comments, the Region also pointed to In re North County Res. Recovery Assocs., 2 E.A.D. 229, 230 (Adm’r 1986), for the proposition as stated in that decision that “EPA lacks the authority to impose [PSD permit] limitations or other restrictions directly on the emission of unregulated pollutants.” Resp. to Comments at 5 (quoting North County, 2 E.A.D. at 230); see also Region’s Mar. Brief at 9. This quote from North County does not answer the question of what “pollutant subject to regulation” means.
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to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.”).

The Region is correct that none of the Agency’s historical pollutant lists included pollutants that were regulated solely by monitoring or reporting requirements. Thus, such lists are not facially inconsistent with the interpretation that the Region articulated in its response to comments. However, the mere absence of inconsistency does not demonstrate that those historical lists constrained the Region to adhere to the interpretation it advocates, especially where, as here, the two preambles at issue do not purport to limit EPA’s PSD regulatory authority to those lists.

On appeal, the Region further asserts that “EPA has never interpreted” the phrase subject to regulation under the Act “to cover pollutants subject only to monitoring and reporting requirements.” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 7-8. The Region also cites a number of additional documents not identified in its response to comments that it contends show the Agency had a “traditional practice” of treating “subject to regulation” as meaning “actual control of pollutant emissions.” Significantly, the Agency did not develop the factual predicates for these statements in the record of this permitting proceeding.

Thus, for the reasons explained in detail below, we cannot conclude on the record for the Permit in this case that the historical Agency statements the Region identified in its response to comments are sufficiently clear and consistent articulations of an Agency interpretation to constrain the authority the Region acknowledges it would otherwise have under the terms of the statute. Thus, we must find that the Region committed clear error.

a. The Agency’s 1978 Federal Register Preamble

We begin our analysis of the Agency’s historical interpretation by looking first at the statements the Agency made in 1978, essentially contemporaneous with the enactment of CAA sections 165 and 169.
Courts often accord a high degree of deference to agency interpretations that are made contemporaneous with the legislative enactment, especially when the agency clearly articulates and consistently follows the interpretation over a long period of time. *Rosette, Inc. v. United States*, 277 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (“great deference is given to the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration, this respect is particularly due where the administrative practice is a contemporaneous construction of the statute”); *New Mexico Env't Improvement Div. v. Thomas*, 789 F.2d 825, 831-32 (10th Cir. 1986) (“The court will defer to the agency's interpretation when an agency is charged with enforcing a statute, when such an interpretation is not contrary to clear statutory intent or the plain language of the statute, when the interpretation is contemporaneous with the legislation’s enactment, and when such interpretation has been consistently adhered to by the agency over time.”).

In 1978, soon after Congress amended the CAA to add the PSD provisions at issue in this case, the Administrator set forth in the preamble to a final rulemaking an interpretation of the meaning of “subject to regulation under this Act” as used in CAA sections 165 and 169. In the 1978 preamble, the Administrator stated as follows:

Some questions have been raised regarding what “subject to regulation under this Act” means relative to BACT determinations. The Administrator believes that the proposed interpretation published on November 3, 1977, is correct and is today being made final. As mentioned in the proposal, “subject to regulation under this Act” means any pollutant regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations for any source type. This then includes * * *.
As background, in the preamble issued in 1977 for the proposed rule, the Administrator stated as follows:

The Amendments require BACT for all pollutants regulated under this Act. Thus, any pollutant regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations will be subject to a case-by-case BACT determination. These include * * *.

Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 42 Fed. Reg. 57,479, 57,481 (proposed Nov. 3, 1977). The preamble went on to describe in general categories the pollutants then regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40. Id.

The Region’s response to comments correctly pointed to the 1978 Federal Register preamble as establishing an Agency interpretation of “subject to regulation under this Act” – the 1978 preamble expressly states that it “made final” an “interpretation” the Administrator concluded was correct. Id. This statement in the 1978 Federal Register also possesses the hallmarks of an Agency interpretation that courts would find worthy of deference – the Agency issued it with a high degree of formality (the Agency published notice of the proposed interpretation in the Federal Register, followed by a subsequent Federal Register notice finalizing the interpretation); the Agency received questions on the interpretation as part of the rulemaking process thus indicating that the Agency carefully considered the interpretation; the Administrator who is charged with implementing and enforcing the statute issued the interpretation; and the Administrator issued the interpretation relatively contemporaneous with the statutory enactment and along with the original regulations implementing the statute. See,

39 As background, in the preamble issued in 1977 for the proposed rule, the Administrator stated as follows:

The Amendments require BACT for all pollutants regulated under this Act. Thus, any pollutant regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations will be subject to a case-by-case BACT determination. These include * * *.

Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 42 Fed. Reg. 57,479, 57,481 (proposed Nov. 3, 1977). The preamble went on to describe pollutants then regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 with somewhat greater detail than the description in the 1978 final rulemaking preamble.

40 The Region cited this 1978 Federal Register preamble as authority for what the Region described as the Agency’s historical interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act.” Resp. to Comments at 5-6.
e.g., Rosette, 277 F.3d at 1230; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

Nevertheless, we must reject the Region’s current characterization of the Agency’s 1978 preamble statement. The Region now contends that only the pollutants identified in the preamble by general category define the scope of the Administrator’s 1978 interpretation. Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 11 & n.6. However, as quoted above, the 1978 preamble stated that “‘subject to regulation under this Act’ means any pollutant regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations” and introduced the list of pollutant categories with the word “includes.” That word generally “is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle.” Fed. Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941); see also Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001); Penncro Assoc., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Webster’s defines the term ‘to include’ as meaning ‘to place, list, or rate as a part or component of a whole or of a larger group, class, or aggregate.’” (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1143 (2002))). “We note that, generally, to say A includes B does not exclude the possibility that A also includes C and D.” Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974, 989 (9th Cir. 2001). Nothing in the 1978 preamble (or the 1977 preamble to the proposed rule) indicates that the Agency intended to depart from the normal use of “includes” as introducing an illustrative, and non-exclusive, list of pollutants subject to regulation under the Act.

Thus, it strikes us as inappropriate to look to the pollutant categories that follow the word “includes” as providing a comprehensive list from which to discern an unstated, unifying rule (such as “actual control of emissions”). This is especially true where, to the contrary, a plain and more natural reading of the preamble’s interpretative statement suggests a different unifying rule, i.e., the one expressly stated in the text.

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41 The preamble to the proposed rule issued in 1977 also introduced the pollutant list with the word “include.” See note 39 above.
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Accordingly, the 1978 Federal Register preamble does not lend support to the Region’s conclusion that its authority was constrained by an historical Agency interpretation to apply BACT only to pollutants that are “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” Instead, the 1978 Federal Register notice augers in favor of a finding that, in 1978, the Agency interpreted “subject to regulation under this Act” to mean “any pollutant regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations for any source type.” 43 Fed. Reg. at 26,397.

When EPA issued regulations in 1993 implementing the 1990 Public Law and in particular section 821’s CO₂ monitoring and reporting requirements, EPA did so by amending Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Acid Rain Program: General Provisions and Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, Excess Emissions and Administrative Appeals, 58 Fed. Reg. 3590, 3650 (Jan. 11, 1993). As a result of that rulemaking, the Subchapter C regulations now require CO₂ emissions monitoring (40 C.F.R. §§ 75.1(b), .10(a)(3)), preparing and maintaining monitoring plans (40 C.F.R. § 75.53), maintaining records (40 C.F.R. § 75.57), and reporting such information to EPA (40 C.F.R. §§ 75.60-.64), and those regulations provide that a violation of any Part 75 requirement “is a violation of the Act” (40 C.F.R. § 75.5(a)). Sierra Club points to this rulemaking in arguing that “carbon dioxide has been regulated under the Clean Air Act since 1993.” Pet. at 4; see also id. at 5 n.2.

The Region observes that the reference the 1978 preamble made to Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations was not repeated in the preamble to the 1993 rulemaking. The Region contends that this “is consistent with the Agency view that ‘subject to regulation’ describes only pollutants subject to regulations requiring actual control of emissions.” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 11 n.6. The preamble to the 1993 rulemaking did not reaffirm the Agency’s earlier 1978 statement
that “subject to regulation under this Act” means “any pollutant regulated in Subchapter C of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations for any source type.” However, the 1993 preamble also did not expressly clarify or withdraw that earlier interpretation. Whatever the Agency’s intentions were relative to the Subchapter C reference in the 1978 preamble when it adopted the 1993 regulations, it did not express them. Moreover, for the reasons discussed earlier in this section, the 1978 preamble provides little, if any, support for the Region’s argument that it is bound by an historical interpretation. Because the Region did not rely on the 1978 preamble as the sole support for its characterization of the historical EPA interpretation, but also referred to the Agency’s 2002 rulemaking, we consider it next.

b. The Agency’s 2002 Rulemaking

In its response to comments, the Region pointed to the Agency’s 2002 rulemaking as further support for its conclusion that an historical Agency interpretation of “subject to regulation under this Act” as meaning “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant” constrains its authority to impose a BACT emissions limit for CO₂. Resp. to Comments at 5-6.

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42 43 Fed. Reg. at 26,397.

43 Without more, one could argue, as does Sierra Club, that based on the Agency’s public interpretive statements and regulations as of the effective date of the 1993 rulemaking, CO₂ became subject to regulation under the Act in 1993 when the Agency included provisions relating to CO₂ in Subchapter C. We also recognize that one could argue, as does the Region, that the reference to Subchapter C in the 1978 preamble was only intended to apply to the then-current Subchapter C and not necessarily to any future additions to that Subchapter.

44 In any event, in 1993, the Agency apparently would not have viewed CO₂ as a pollutant subject to regulation under the Act. As discussed in the following subpart, on April 26, 1993, Lydia N. Wegman, Deputy Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, issued a memorandum stating, among other things, that CO₂ is not an “air pollutant” as defined by CAA section 302(g). Memorandum from Lydia N. Wegman, Deputy Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Definition of Regulated Air Pollutant for Purposes of Title V (Apr. 26, 1993).
The Region explained that the 2002 rulemaking “codified” the Agency’s historical interpretation “by defining the term ‘regulated NSR pollutant.’” Id. at 6. As we explain in this subpart, although the 2002 rulemaking did codify a definition for “regulated NSR pollutant,” we are not persuaded that the Agency’s 2002 rulemaking restricts the permitting authority the Region would otherwise have under the statute.

i. The 2002 Rulemaking’s Regulatory Text

EPA included a definition for “regulated NSR pollutant” in the 2002 rulemaking and explained in the preamble that this definition “replaces the terminology ‘pollutants regulated under the Act.’” Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR): Baseline Emissions Determination, Actual-to-Future-Actual Methodology, Plantwide Applicability Limitations, Clean Units, Pollution Control Projects, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,240 (Dec. 31, 2002). Thus, the 2002 rulemaking did codify the term “regulated NSR pollutant” to replace the previous regulatory language that was functionally equivalent to the statutory phrase “pollutant subject to regulation under this Act.” However, the regulatory text does not clearly articulate a definition limited to “actual control of emissions.” Upon consideration, we are not persuaded that the Agency’s statements regarding the regulatory definition have been sufficiently clear and consistent to limit the regulation’s meaning and constrain the Region’s authority in the manner the Region argues.

As the Region summarizes, the definition’s text identifies pollutants falling within its scope “by referencing pollutants regulated in three principal program areas * * * as well as any pollutant ‘that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act.’” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 7 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(i) - (iv)). The Region stated in its response to comments that “[a]s used in this provision, EPA continues to interpret the phrase ‘subject to regulation under the Act’ to refer to pollutants that are presently subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” Id. The Region’s response to comments did not explain its rationale for reaching
The Region stated, without elaboration, that “because EPA has not established a NAAQS or NSPS for CO₂, classified CO₂ as a title VI substance, or otherwise regulated CO₂ under any other provision of the Act, CO₂ is not currently a ‘regulated NSR pollutant’ as defined by EPA regulations.” Resp. to Comments at 6.

In responding to the Petition, the Region states that “EPA has never interpreted” the regulatory provision “to cover pollutants subject only to monitoring and reporting requirements” and that when EPA adopted the regulatory definition, it published a list of pollutants described as “currently regulated under the Act.”” Sierra Club’s Jan. Brief at 23 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(iv)). The regulatory text simply does not refer to “actual control of emissions,” and it contains essentially the same phrase – “subject to regulation under the Act” – that the Region argues is ambiguous as a matter of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 13; Region’s Mar. Brief at 13.

The difficulty the Region faces in relying on the regulatory definition’s text is aptly described by Sierra Club: the definition “says nothing about CO₂ specifically” and the fourth part of the definition “merely parrots the statutory language, requiring BACT for ‘[a]ny pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act.’” See, e.g., Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 13; Region’s Mar. Brief at 13.

This conclusion. 45 In its appellate briefs, although the Region contends that its interpretation of the definition can be discerned from the regulatory text, the Region also appears to acknowledge that the regulatory text is not sufficient, on its own, to establish the meaning the Region advocates. Compare Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 7-8 46 with Region’s Mar. Brief at 32. 47

In its March brief, the Region argues that the general words used in the last of the four-part regulatory definition are most naturally construed as applying only to pollutants similar to those identified by the first three parts of the definition.

45 The Region stated, without elaboration, that “[b]ecause EPA has not established a NAAQS or NSPS for CO₂, classified CO₂ as a title VI substance, or otherwise regulated CO₂ under any other provision of the Act, CO₂ is not currently a ‘regulated NSR pollutant’ as defined by EPA regulations.” Resp. to Comments at 6.

46 In responding to the Petition, the Region states that “EPA has never interpreted” the regulatory provision “to cover pollutants subject only to monitoring and reporting requirements” and that when EPA adopted the regulatory definition, it published a list of pollutants described as “‘currently regulated under the Act.’” which “did not include carbon dioxide or any other pollutant that was not subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 7-8. The Region argues that “[t]hrough the contemporaneous adoption of the regulatory language and publication of a definitive list of pollutants subject to regulation at the time, EPA established its interpretation of the phrase ‘pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation’ in section 52.21(b)(50)(iv).” Id. at 8.

47 In its March brief, the Region argues that the general words used in the last of the four-part regulatory definition are most naturally construed as applying only to pollutants similar to those identified by the first three parts of the definition.
The Region appears to contend that, although the phrase “subject to regulation” is ambiguous as a matter of statutory construction, the Agency resolved the ambiguity in the regulatory definition by including the statutory phrase as the last of a four-part definition. In particular, the Region argues that “EPA’s interpretation of the last clause in the definition of ‘regulated NSR pollutant’ has consistently followed the rule of construction known as *ejusdem generis*, which provides that ‘where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words are most naturally construed as applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated.’” Region’s Mar. Brief at 32 (emphasis added) (quoting *Am. Mining Congr. v. U.S. EPA*, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

The Region, however, has provided no evidence or citation supporting its assertion that, prior to the Region’s appellate briefs in this case, the Agency ever, much less “consistently,” followed the *ejusdem generis* canon when interpreting the last clause of the regulatory definition. Accordingly, without any support for the Region’s assertion, we cannot find that application of the *ejusdem generis* canon to the term “regulated NSR pollutant” has been the Agency’s historical interpretation of this provision.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently explained that *ejusdem generis* and other similar statutory interpretive principals should not be “woodenly” applied every time a general phrase is used along with more limiting ones. *Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 128 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2008). Like other statutory interpretive canons, *ejusdem generis* should not be followed if there are good reasons not to apply it. E.g., *Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n*, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). In other words, as a matter of statutory interpretation (or, here, regulatory interpretation), *ejusdem generis* functions as only one, and not necessarily the best, means for discerning the text’s intent where the words do not have a plain meaning.

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48 The Region introduced this argument for the first time in its March Brief – it did not include it in its response to comments or in its initial response to the Petition.
In the present context, we do not think it is appropriate to use the *ejusdem generis* canon to interpret an otherwise ambiguous or indeterminate regulatory text. The Supreme Court observed recently that “the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.” *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).

The Region essentially argues that by “parroting” the statutory language as the last part of a four-part definition, EPA both exercised its expertise as to the first three parts of the definition and narrowed the meaning that could otherwise be accorded the parroted statutory phrase thereby supplanting its earlier interpretation of the statutory phrase set forth in the 1978 preamble. Without a clear and sufficient supporting analysis or statement of intent in the regulation’s preamble, we cannot ground our decision on the *ejusdem generis* canon of interpretation to determine that the Agency did in fact exercise expert judgment in that manner. We thus conclude that the regulatory text, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish that the authority the Region admits it would otherwise have under the statute is constrained by the 2002 rulemaking such that the Region was required to apply BACT only to pollutants “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” Resp. to Comments at 5-6.

ii. **Regulatory Text and Preamble Read Together**

In its appellate briefs, the Region does not rely solely on the regulatory text, but also argues that the meaning it advocates is apparent from reading the regulatory text in conjunction with statements made in the preamble to the 2002 rulemaking. Specifically, in responding to the

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Petition, the Region states that when EPA adopted the regulatory definition of “regulated NSR pollutant,” it published a list of pollutants described as “currently regulated under the Act,” which “did not include carbon dioxide or any other pollutant that was not subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 7-8. The Region also cited, in its response to comments, the preamble to the proposed rulemaking, which contained a similar list of pollutants described as currently regulated under the Act. Resp. to Comments at 6 (citing Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38,309-10 (proposed July 23, 1996)); see also Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 9. Based on this background, the Region argues that “[t]hrough the contemporaneous adoption of the regulatory language and publication of a definitive list of pollutants subject to regulation at the time, EPA established its interpretation of the phrase ‘pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation’ in section 52.21(b)(50)(iv).” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 8.

We are not persuaded that the publication of this pollutant list was sufficient to establish a definitive Agency interpretation of the fourth and last part of the regulatory definition allegedly constraining the authority the Region admits it would otherwise have under the same language in the statutory text. We do not see in either the 2002 final preamble, or in the 1996 preamble for the proposed rulemaking, any public notice of the interpretation the Region now advocates, let alone anything approaching the same level of express notice and clear statement that is found in the preamble for the 1978 rulemaking, in which the Administrator stated he was making “final” an “interpretation” he believed to be correct. 43 Fed. Reg. at 26,397. Moreover, as explained infra, because the Agency did not seek comment on the regulatory definition, and in particular on part (iv) of the definition, it

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50 We reject the Region’s contention that Sierra Club is barred from contesting the Region’s interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(iv) on the grounds that it had an opportunity to contest that interpretation at the time the regulations were promulgated. Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 8. As explained below, we find instead that the preamble did not provide notice of the interpretation the Region now advocates.
was reasonable for the public to conclude that the Agency was merely mirroring the statutory language, not narrowing or putting a particular gloss on it.

The Region explains in its appellate briefs that the Agency’s use of an “actual control of pollutant emissions” interpretation in creating the 2002 preamble’s pollutant list is apparent by observing that the listed pollutants were subject to emissions controls and that none of the listed pollutants were subject to only monitoring and reporting requirements. See, e.g., Region’s Mar. Brief at 31 (“This list did not include carbon dioxide or any other pollutant that was not subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant.”). The Region correctly states that the 2002 preamble’s pollutant list did not include any pollutants that were regulated solely by monitoring or reporting requirements and, standing alone, the list is not inconsistent with the interpretation that the Region articulated in its response to comments. However, as noted in the previous section, the mere absence of inconsistency is not sufficient to show that the Region’s permitting authority was constrained by the interpretation the Region advocates, particularly since the 2002 preamble does not contain any language clearly and unambiguously stating that the list was intended to be exclusive or to be an interpretation of the defined term.

The context of the pollutant list also does not indicate that the list was provided as an interpretation of the defined term “regulated NSR pollutant.” Both the 1996 preamble for the proposed rulemaking and the 2002 preamble for the final rule included the pollutant list under a general discussion of regulatory changes made to exclude hazardous air pollutants listed under CAA section 112 from PSD review as required by the 1990 Public Law. 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,309-10; 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,239-40. Because the 1996 proposed rulemaking did not propose to promulgate “regulated NSR pollutant” as a defined term, the inclusion of the pollutant list in a discussion of hazardous air pollutants in the 1996 Federal Register cannot be viewed as indicating the Agency’s interpretation of regulatory text. In the 2002 preamble, the pollutant list appears several paragraphs before the preamble discusses a commenter’s suggestion to “amend the regulations to include a definition of pollutants
regulated under the Act.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,239-40. Indeed, the 2002 preamble does not even mention in its narrative description the last part of the four-part definition. Id. at 80,240. This context, divorced as it is from any mention of the last clause of the regulatory definition, does not support the Region’s contention that the pollutant list constituted the Agency’s interpretation of the phrase “pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation” in section 52.21(b)(50)(iv). Because the Agency apparently chose not to make its interpretation explicit in the wording of the last part of the four-part definition, but instead chose to parrot the statutory language, which it now admits is potentially subject to a broader interpretation, the Agency failed to articulate, or give clear notice of its interpretation.

c. The Wegman Memo and the Cannon Memo

In its appellate briefs, the Region discusses two memoranda EPA issued over the years that the Region describes as making the Agency’s interpretation “apparent to the regulated community and other stakeholders.” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 9; Region’s Mar. Brief at 35-38, 41-42. The Region cites the following documents: 1) Memorandum

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51 We reject the Region’s contention that the list of pollutants set forth in the preamble provided notice to the public, as the Region now contends, of all pollutants falling within the definition of “regulated NSR pollutant.” Region’s Resp. to the Pet. at 8 & n.3.

52 In its appellate briefs, the Region also cites two previous Board decisions as support for its interpretation of a historical Agency interpretation. Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 10 (citing In re Inter-Power of N.Y., Inc., 5 E.A.D. 130 (EAB 1994); In re Kawaihae Cogeneration Project, 7 E.A.D. 107 (EAB 1997)); Region’s Mar. Brief at 38-41; see also UARG Mar. Brief at 34-36. We reject the Region’s characterization of these decisions. The Inter-Power case involved a permit that was issued before EPA promulgated the part 75 CO₂ monitoring and reporting requirements in 1993. Inter-Power, 5 E.A.D. at 131 (noting that the permit was issued on October 26, 1992). The Kawaihae case also does not represent a determination by this Board regarding the meaning of “subject to regulation under this Act” in CAA sections 165 and 169 – the petitioner in that case raised concerns that the permit ignored greenhouse gas emissions “contrary to international agreements concerning global warming.” Kawaihae, 7 E.A.D. at 132. The Kawaihae decision was also issued at a time when the Wegman Memo would suggest the EPA viewed CO₂ as not being an “air pollutant.”
The Wegman Memo may also have been effectively negated, at least as to what the Region terms the first premise, by General Counsel Jonathan Z. Cannon’s 1998 memo, which concluded that CO\textsubscript{2} falls within the definition of “air pollutant” under CAA section 302(g). Cannon Memo at 2-3.

The Region characterizes the Wegman Memo as describing “the scope of pollutants covered by the Title V program on the basis of a two-step line of reasoning.” Region’s Mar. Brief at 35. The Region acknowledges that, since the first step “interpreted the section 302(g) definition of ‘air pollutant’ more narrowly than the broad reading recently adopted by the Supreme Court, OAR and Region VIII do not dispute that Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the first premise of that memorandum.” Id. at 36. The Region argues that the Massachusetts decision did not address the second step of the Wegman Memo’s discussion and, thus, the second step “remains a viable interpretation of the phrase ‘subject to regulation.’” Id.\textsuperscript{53}

The Wegman Memo, however, offered no legal support or reasoned analysis for what the Region describes as the second step. The Region describes the second step as “starting after the first sentence in the second paragraph” of the Wegman Memo’s discussion of the meaning of “air pollutant.” Significantly, the second step, as the Region identifies it, is still part of the analysis of why CO\textsubscript{2} and methane do not come within the meaning of “air pollutant” as defined by CAA section 302(g). This is precisely the issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts, and on which the Supreme Court held that a broader meaning was intended by Congress. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, slip op. at 29-30 (2007).

\textsuperscript{53} The Wegman Memo may also have been effectively negated, at least as to what the Region terms the first premise, by General Counsel Jonathan Z. Cannon’s 1998 memo, which concluded that CO\textsubscript{2} falls within the definition of “air pollutant” under CAA section 302(g). Cannon Memo at 2-3.
Moreover, the Wegman Memo’s second step, as the Region identifies it, began by stating that the memo’s approach “would include, of course, all regulated air pollutants plus others specified by the Act or EPA rulemaking.” Wegman Memo at 4 (emphasis added). The term “regulated air pollutants” as used in the Wegman Memo specifically referred to the definition set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 70.2. Id. at 1. The definition of “regulated air pollutant” in 40 C.F.R. § 70.2, by its plain terms, applies only to Part 70 permits and does not include the catch-all phrase at issue in this case specifically included in 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(iv). Thus, at best, the Wegman Memo does not appear to provide an interpretation that can be applied beyond the specific circumstances of the Title V program it expressly addressed.

The Wegmen Memo did state that because section 821 of the 1990 Public Law only required monitoring and reporting of CO₂ and did not require actual control of emissions, “these provisions do not preempt EPA’s discretion to exclude these pollutants” from the definition of “air pollutant.” Wegman Memo at 5. The memo then compared its approach to “the traditional practice of the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program,” but provided no legal support or analysis for what it terms “the traditional practice” of the PSD program. Id. at 5. At bottom, the complete absence of any legal analysis supporting its conclusory statements, its questionable status in light of the Massachusetts decision, and its grounding in the Title V program rather than PSD make the Wegman Memo a weak reed to support an Agency historical interpretation.

The Cannon Memo, issued in 1998, stated that “[w]hile CO₂ emissions are within the scope of EPA’s authority to regulate, the Administrator has made no determination to date to exercise that authority under the specific criteria provided under any provision of the Act.” Cannon Memo at 5. That memo arguably could support the Region’s position that despite the CO₂ monitoring and reporting requirements promulgated in Part 75 in 1993, the Agency did not
consider CO₂ to be “regulated” for purposes of the PSD program. However, the Cannon Memo was “formally” withdrawn by General Counsel Robert E. Fabricant. See Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, General Counsel, U.S. EPA, to Marianne L. Horinko, Acting Administrator, U.S. EPA. EPA’s Authority to Impose Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change under the Clean Air Act at 1 (Aug. 23, 2003). The Fabricant Memo concluded that EPA did not have the statutory authority to regulate CO₂. The reasoning of the Fabricant Memo was subsequently rejected and overruled by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, slip op. at 29-30 (2007). Thus, at bottom, both the Wegman and Cannon memos were either expressly withdrawn or in some manner subsequently significantly undermined.

Tellingly, the Region states on appeal that “[t]he Supreme Court decision effectively forced EPA to return to the interpretation (and distinction) reflected in the [Cannon Memo].” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 17. The Region, however, has not pointed to any instance where the Agency has announced its decision to return to, or to re-adopt, the Cannon Memo’s analysis prior to the Region’s appellate brief in this case. This chronology consists of the Fabricant Memo’s reversal of the earlier Cannon Memo, followed by a Supreme Court decision that negated the Fabricant Memo. This history does not support an historical Agency interpretation.

In addition, it is questionable whether the Wegman Memo or the Cannon Memo can be viewed as articulating the Agency’s interpretation of CAA sections 165 and 169, particularly since the Agency had already articulated an interpretation of those provisions in 1978. See, e.g., Farmers Tel. Co. v. FCC, 184 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999); Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Cannon Memo did not mention the PSD provisions at issue in this case, and the Wegman Memo mentioned the PSD program only in passing as support for its approach, and did not state that it was announcing an Agency interpretation of the provisions at issue here.
Neither mentioned the Administrator’s interpretation announced and made final in the 1978 Federal Register.

In sum, the Wegman Memo, the Cannon Memo, the 1996 preamble, and the 2002 rulemaking are, at best, weak authorities upon which to anchor the Region’s conclusion stated in its response to comments that its authority to require a CO₂ BACT limit is constrained by an historical Agency interpretation of CAA sections 165 and 169. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Region’s rationale for not imposing a CO₂ BACT limit in the Permit – that it lacked the authority to do so because of an historical Agency interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” as meaning “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant” – is not supported by the record. Thus, we cannot sustain the Region’s permitting decision on the grounds stated in its response to comments.

On appeal, but not in its response to comments, the Region suggests that its approach is grounded in a traditional practice of the PSD program. Specifically, the Region argues that its conclusion regarding the meaning of “the Agency’s regulatory definition of ‘regulated NSR pollutant’ * * * is consistent with nearly 30 years of EPA practice and is not precluded by the terms of the Clean Air Act.” Region’s Mar. Brief at 12 (emphasis added); see also id. at 6. Authorities the Region cites do make reference to a “traditional practice.” For example, the Wegman Memo states that its approach “is similar to the traditional practice” of the PSD program. Wegman Memo at 5 (emphasis added). Likewise, although the Cannon Memo does not specifically mention the PSD program, or sections 165 and 169, the broad statements of that memo also suggest the Agency has not treated CO₂ as a “regulated” pollutant.

55 Similarly, the Region argues that “EPA has never interpreted” the phrase subject to regulation under the Act “to cover pollutants subject only to monitoring and reporting requirements.” Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 7-8.
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under any of the CAA provisions, including PSD. Significantly for our purposes, however, neither memo cites to specific evidence of such a practice and the factual predicate for such a finding has not been developed in the record of the Region’s permitting decision as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 124.18. See, e.g., In re ConocoPhillips Co., PSD Appeal No. 07-02, slip op. at 24-25 (EAB June 2, 2008), 13 E.A.D. __; In re Indeck-Elwood, LLC, PSD Appeal No. 03-04, slip op. at 29 (EAB Sept. 27, 2006), 13 E.A.D. __; In re Gov’t of D.C. Mun. Separate Sewer Sys., 10 E.A.D. 323, 342-43 (EAB 2002); In re Chem. Waste Mgmt, 6 E.A.D. 144, 151-52 (EAB 1995); In re Amoco Oil Co., 4 E.A.D. 954, 964 (EAB 1993); In re Waste Techs. Indus., 4 E.A.D. 106, 114 (EAB 1992).

Moreover, to the extent such a practice exists, the record for the Region’s permitting decision does not include an analysis of whether recognizing such a practice as the Agency’s interpretation of sections 165 and 169 would require withdrawal, amendment, modification, or clarification of the Agency’s earlier interpretive statements. To the extent that any practice upon which the Region now relies is inconsistent with the Agency’s previous interpretive statements published in the Federal Register, there is no analysis in the record regarding whether formalizing such a practice as a controlling interpretation may be accomplished through this permitting proceeding, which falls within the definition of an adjudication and licensing proceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, or whether a rulemaking under APA section 553 may be required. See, e.g., Farmers Tel. Co., v. FCC, 184 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999); Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we conclude that the Wegman Memo and Cannon Memos are not sufficient to form an alternative basis for sustaining the Region’s conclusion that its authority was constrained by an historical agency interpretation.

56 UARG argues a similar point that “[s]ince at least 1993, [EPA] has consistently rejected any notion that CO₂ is subject to regulation for PSD purposes[.]” UARG Mar. Brief at 32.
4. Whether EPA’s CO₂ Monitoring and Reporting Regulations Are Not “Under” the CAA

The Region argues, “even if the Board were to find error in EPA’s historic interpretation and consider pollutants for which sources need only monitor and report emissions to be ‘subject to regulation,’ that premise alone would not make carbon dioxide regulated ‘under the Act’ for PSD purposes * * *.” Region’s Mar. Brief at 46. In particular, the Region argues that EPA’s CO₂ monitoring and reporting regulations are not “under this Act” within the meaning of CAA sections 165 and 169 because section 821’s text and context, including legislative history, demonstrates that Congress did not intend section 821 of the 1990 Public Law to amend the CAA and thus became part of the CAA. Id. at 45-53. If this interpretation were correct, it would support the Region’s contention that section 821 is not a basis for finding that CO₂ is subject to regulation “under the Act.”

While section 821’s text contains some features that support the Region’s argument that Congress intended section 821 not to be part of the CAA, the text also contains some features that subvert the Region’s contention. Significantly, as we explain below, the Agency’s prior statements interpreting and applying section 821, including statements made in the Agency’s regulations, are inconsistent with or contradict the interpretation advocated by the Region in this proceeding. Because the Region’s and Sierra Club’s arguments regarding section 821 have continued to evolve during the course of this appellate proceeding, it is clear that the Region did not fully consider these issues regarding section 821 in making its permitting decision. Further, the Agency has

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57 This argument would not dispose of Sierra Club’s contention that CO₂ is regulated under the CAA because CO₂ is regulated in some form under several State Implementation Plans promulgated under the CAA and approved by the EPA. Because, as discussed in the text, we do not sustain the Region’s permitting decision on the alternative ground it argues, and because the Region did not have the opportunity to fully consider Sierra Club’s arguments regarding the State Implementation Plans, we do not rule on Sierra Club’s argument at this time, but instead direct that the Region consider in the first instance on remand the State Implementation Plans, along with other potential avenues of regulation of CO₂.
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published in the regulations themselves interpretive statements that conflict with, or contradict, the interpretation the Region advocates on appeal. For these reasons, as well as the reasons articulated below, we decline to rely on the Region’s interpretive arguments regarding section 821 as grounds to sustain the Region’s permitting decision, and we remand the section 821 issues to the Region to consider more fully in making its permitting decision on remand.

In considering the parties’ arguments regarding the import of section 821 in this proceeding, we observe at the outset that section 821 is not a model of drafting clarity. The reporter’s notes for the United States Code compilation indicate that, in a number of respects, section 821’s literal words are not what Congress apparently intended. For example, section 821 refers to Title V, which the reporter’s notes state was probably intended to be Title IV; likewise, section 821 refers to CAA section 511, which the reporter’s notes state was probably intended to be section 412. 42 U.S.C. § 7651k note. These obvious errors make more difficult the task of analyzing whether textual features the parties identify support the inferences regarding congressional intent they advocate.

In addition, section 821’s text contains features both supporting and subverting the arguments the Region advances. For example, the language of the statute contains some indication that Congress did not intend section 821 to amend the CAA. Specifically, the Region correctly observes that numerous provisions of the 1990 Public Law expressly state an intention to amend the CAA, but that section 821 did not contain such language. Region’s Mar. Brief at 47-48 (observing that sections 822 and 801 of the 1990 both stated “the Clean Air Act is amended * * *” but that no similar language is included in section 821); see also Deseret’s Mar. Brief at 26-27; UARG’s Mar. Brief at 8.58 Similarly,

58 The Region argues that these distinctions show that “in passing the public law known as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress gave clear indication which sections were and were not to be treated as a part of the Clean Air Act, and this clear language trumps any presumption that section 821 is a part of the Act.” Region’s Mar. Brief at 48. The Region observes that this Congressional intent is recognized both (continued...
Deseret correctly observes that many of the 1990 Public Law’s provisions containing language expressly amending the CAA also referred to the CAA as “this Act,” whereas section 821 refers to the CAA as “the Clean Air Act,” which may suggest that the CAA is a separate statute from section 821. Deseret’s Mar. Brief at 27 (citing section 701 of the 1990 Public Law as an example of a provision that expressly amended the CAA and referred to it as “this Act”); see also UARG’s Mar. Brief at 9-10. The Region, Deseret, and UARG also point to statements in the legislative history and other statements made after the 1990 Public Law was enacted, which they argue show that Congress did not intend section 821 to amend the CAA. Region’s Resp. to Pet. at 18; Region’s Mar. Brief at 46; Deseret Mar. Brief at 28-29; UARG Mar. Brief at 11-20.59

Sierra Club, however, correctly points out, based on the statutory text, that Congress intended section 821 to be enforceable under and otherwise entwined with the CAA, and in that sense arguably a part of the CAA. Specifically, section 821 of the 1990 Public Law made an enforcement provision of the CAA, section 412(e), “apply for purposes of this section [821] in the same manner and to the same extent as such provision applies” to monitoring and reporting required under CAA section 412. 1990 Public Law § 821(b). Based on this enforcement provision, Sierra Club argues that “Congress clearly intended section 821

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59 (...continued)

to be an enforceable part of the Act.” Sierra Club’s April Reply Brief at 17. Sierra Club argues further that section 821’s monitoring requirements are intrinsic to the CAA in that they apply to sources regulated under CAA Title IV and are “inextricably tied to the framework in section 412 of the Act.” Id. at 16-17.

In its appellate briefs, the Region responds to Sierra Club’s observations regarding section 821’s enforcement provision by suggesting that enforcement may proceed either under a theory that section 821 incorporates by reference the CAA’s enforcement mechanisms or under a theory that section 821 expands the CAA’s enforcement provisions to cover section 821’s monitoring requirements. The Region contends that neither of these interpretations “make carbon dioxide regulated ‘under the Act,’ because such a result would be inconsistent with the clear Congressional intent to exclude the requirements of section 821 of [the 1990 Public Law] from the Clean Air Act.” Region’s Aug. Brief at 24.60

Against this background of a lack of legislative clarity as described above, the Agency’s historical statements regarding section 821 preclude our acceptance of the interpretation the Region now advocates, at least in the context of this appeal. While the Agency has not heretofore expressly addressed the relationship between section 821 and the Clean Air Act, its past actions certainly seem to treat section 821 as if it were part of the Act. For example, the Agency did not distinguish between section 821 of the 1990 Public Law and the CAA (1) in statements EPA made when it issued regulations implementing the 1990 Public Law, (2) in the text of those regulations, and (3) in enforcing the regulation’s CO₂ monitoring and reporting requirements. In a number of

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60 The Region argues further that “enforcement does not automatically equate to ‘regulation’” because “EPA has long-interpreted the phrase ‘regulation’ for PSD permitting purposes to require actual control of emissions of a pollutant.” Region’s Aug. Br. at 24 n.6. This argument, of course, begs the very question which we consider in Part III.B.3 above, namely whether the Agency in fact has clearly and consistently articulated an interpretation of “subject to regulation” as tied to “actual control of emissions.” As discussed in that Part, we find that the record of the Region’s permitting decision is not sufficient to support the Region’s contention.
instances, EPA referred to section 821 of the 1990 Public Law as part of the CAA. For example, in EPA’s 1991 notice of proposed rulemaking to implement part of the 1990 Public Law, EPA stated that the rule would “establish requirements for the monitoring and reporting of CO₂ emissions pursuant to Section 821 of the Act.” Acid Rain Program: Permits, Allowance Sys. Continuous Emissions Monitoring, and Excess Emissions, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,002, 63,291 (proposed Dec. 3, 1991) (emphasis added). 61

Further, in the text of the rule EPA promulgated in 1993, EPA referred to section 821 as part of the CAA: “The purpose of this part is to establish requirements * * * pursuant to Sections 412 and 821 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q as amended by Public Law 101-549 (Nov. 15, 1990).” 40 C.F.R. § 75.1(a) (emphasis added). The regulations also provide that a violation of the regulations is “a violation of the Act.” 40 C.F.R. § 75.5(a).

In its brief before the Supreme Court in the Massachusetts case, the United States stated that “[t]hree provisions added to the CAA in 1990 specifically refer to carbon dioxide or global warming,” and the Agency identified “Section 821 of the CAA Amendments of 1990” as one of those provisions. Brief of the Federal Respondent at 26 in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120) (emphasis added).

The Region also acknowledges that EPA’s enforcement actions have not distinguished section 821 as separate from the CAA. The Region states as follows:

With respect to the CO₂ monitoring and reporting requirements in particular, EPA’s pleadings in these enforcement actions generally exhibit the same imprecision found in EPA’s references to section 821

CO\textsubscript{2} requirements in the preamble and regulatory text promulgating the CO\textsubscript{2} requirements in the Part 75 regulations. * * * EPA generally referred to the CAA § 113 authority to bring the claims but did not clarify exactly how the authority provided by CAA § 113 applied to enforce the specific requirements of section 821 of [the 1990 Public Law] and the corresponding regulations in Part 75 implementing these requirements.

Region’s August Brief at 21. For example, in In re Indiana Municipal Power Agency, Docket No. CAA-05-2000-0016, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4 (Sept. 29, 2000), U.S. EPA Region 5 stated that the case was “an administrative proceeding to assess a civil penalty under Section 113(d) of the Clean Air Act (the Act)” and that “[p]ursuant to Section 412 and 821 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, as amended by Public Law 101-549 (November 15, 1990) the Administrator established requirements for the monitoring, record keeping, and reporting of * * * carbon dioxide emissions * * *.” Id. (emphasis added); see also In re IES Utilities, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Docket No. VII-95-CAA-111, Compl. ¶ 3 (June 15, 1995) (alleging that carbon dioxide emissions monitoring is required “[u]nder Section 412 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k, and 40 C.F.R. Part 75” (emphasis added)).

We recognize that the Region argues in its August Brief that each of the enforcement actions it has identified arises in a context where the emissions source failed to comply with all of the Part 75 monitoring and reporting requirements and not just the CO\textsubscript{2} requirements and that, therefore, “EPA’s citation of section 113 in these cases does not necessarily demonstrate that the Agency adopted any specific interpretation” regarding the precise relationship between section 821’s enforcement authority and the Part 75 regulations. Region’s Aug. Brief at 20-21. In its brief, the Region offers alternative theories to fill the gap: the Region suggests that enforcement may proceed either under a theory that section 821 incorporates by reference the CAA’s enforcement mechanisms or alternatively under a theory that section 821 expands the CAA’s enforcement provisions to cover section 821’s monitoring requirements. Id. at 11-20.
With respect to the second of these alternatives, the Region argues that "expansion of the enforcement authority found in sections 412(e) and 113 of the Act * * * does not sweep either section 821 or the regulations implementing it into the Act." *Id.* at 19; *see also id.* at 24. The Region makes this argument despite the fact that EPA has invoked section 113 as the jurisdictional basis for enforcing Part 75 monitoring and reporting violations, including violations with respect to CO₂. The Region’s proposition is not self-evident, and the only legal support the Region offers for this contention is that, in its view, “such a result would be inconsistent with the clear congressional intent to exclude the requirements of section 821 of [the 1990 Public Law] from the Clean Air Act.” *Id.* at 24. This, of course, begs the very questions at issue regarding whether a Congressional intent on this question can be determined from the textual features identified above and whether the Agency’s own previous interpretive statements that conflict with or contradict the interpretation the Region now advocates precludes our acceptance of the Region’s current position.

In view of the foregoing, including the Agency’s admission that even now it has not yet determined on what jurisdictional theory enforcement of Part 75 CO₂ requirements may proceed, we question how much respect or deference a reviewing court would give the interpretation the Region now advocates, particularly given the history of previous Agency statements regarding “section 821 of the Act.”62 It is well recognized that “the consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.” *Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala*, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993); *see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n.30 (1987) (“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.” (quoting *Watt v. Alaska*, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981))); *Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis*, 442 U.S. 397, 411 n.11 (1979) (fact that the agency’s interpretation was “neither consistent nor longstanding” which “substantially diminishes the deference to be given to [the agency’s] present interpretation of the statute”); *Gen. Elec. Co.*

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v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (“We have declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency.”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such [an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).

At the same time, we are mindful that the law does not require an agency to stand by its initial interpretations or policy decisions in all circumstances. Instead, “an agency changing its course * * * is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). However, as to the statements made in the text of the regulations, themselves, we question (but do not decide) whether such statements constitute “legislative rules,” which Administrative Procedure Act section 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553, requires EPA to change only through a notice and comment rulemaking; or, alternatively, we question (but do not decide) whether the combined effect of these Agency statements constitutes an authoritative “interpretive rule” meeting the characteristics for which a notice and comment rulemaking would be required in any event if the Agency were to change the interpretation. See, e.g., Farmers Tele. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 184 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999); Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999);

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63 We do, of course, recognize that if we were to adopt the Region’s interpretation, that interpretation would not be a post hoc rationalization, but instead would be the final Agency action. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (“The Secretary’s interpretation of OSH Act regulations in an administrative adjudication, however, is agency action, not a post hoc rationalization of it.”). Although we have the authority to resolve legal questions on behalf of the Agency in issuing the Agency’s final decision, even legal and interpretive questions are best resolved on the basis of a well-developed record. Here, the parties’ arguments have continued to evolve and be refined during the course of this appeal, which presents a less than full foundation for resolving such questions.
5. Summation Regarding the CO₂ BACT Limitation Issue

As explained above, we conclude that the meaning of the term “subject to regulation under this Act” as used in sections 165 and 169 is not so clear and unequivocal as to preclude the Agency from exercising discretion in interpreting the statutory phrase. Thus we find no evidence of a Congressional intent to compel EPA to apply BACT to pollutants that are subject only to monitoring and reporting requirements. Nevertheless, as explained in detail above, we conclude that the Region’s rationale for not imposing a CO₂ BACT limit in the Permit – that it lacked the authority to do so because of an historical Agency interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” as meaning “subject to a statutory or regulatory provision that requires actual control of emissions of that pollutant” – is not supported by the administrative record as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 124.18. Thus, we cannot sustain the Region’s permitting decision on the grounds stated in the Region’s response to comments.

We also decline to sustain the Region’s permitting decision on the alternative grounds it argues in this appeal, that regulations promulgated to satisfy Congress’ direction set forth in section 821 of the 1990 Public Law are not “under” the CAA. As we explain above, this argument is at odds with the Agency’s prior statements regarding the relationship between section 821 and the CAA, including statements in EPA’s Part 75 regulations, and those statements preclude our acceptance of the Region’s argument in this proceeding.

Accordingly, we remand the Permit for the Region to reconsider whether or not to impose a CO₂ BACT limit in light of the Agency’s discretion to interpret, consistent with the CAA, what constitutes a “pollutant subject to regulation under this Act.” In remanding this Permit to the Region for reconsideration of its conclusions regarding application of BACT to limit CO₂ emissions, we recognize that this is an issue of national scope that has implications far beyond this individual
permitting proceeding. The Region should consider whether interested persons, as well as the Agency, would be better served by the Agency addressing the interpretation of the phrase “subject to regulation under this Act” in the context of an action of nationwide scope, rather than through this specific permitting proceeding. In any event, the Region’s analysis on remand should address whether an action of nationwide scope may be required in light of the Agency’s prior interpretive statements made in various memoranda and published in the Federal Register and the Agency’s regulations. The Region should also consider whether development of a factual record to support its conclusions may be more efficiently accomplished through an action of nationwide scope, rather than through this as well as subsequent permitting proceedings. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise at 262-64 (3rd ed. 1994).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we remand the PSD Permit U.S. EPA Region 8 issued to Deseret Power Electric Cooperative for its proposed new waste-coal-fired electric generating unit at its existing Bonanza Power Plant. On remand, the Region shall reconsider whether or not to impose a CO₂ BACT limit in the Permit. In doing so, the Region shall develop an adequate record for its decision, including reopening the record for public comment. Petitioners or other participants in the remand proceeding who are not satisfied with the Region’s decision on remand may appeal the Region’s determination to this Board pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19. Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(f)(1)(iii), appeal of the remand decision will be required to

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64 Since these same issues have been raised in a multiplicity of permit proceedings, an action of nationwide scope would also seem more efficient than addressing the issues in each individual proceeding. Once the Agency’s position is clearly established, it could then be implemented in the various individual permit proceedings, current and future, through the Part 124 procedures.
exhaust administrative remedies. Finally, for the reasons stated above, we deny review of the “alternatives” analysis issue Sierra Club raised in its Petition.

So ordered.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Order Denying Review In Part And Remanding In Part in the matter of Deseret Power Electric Cooperative, PSD Appeal No. 07-03, were sent to the following persons in the manner indicated:

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Dated: NOV 13 2006

Annette Duncan
Secretary
Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice  
Salt Lake Area Residents Against the Stericycle Incinerator

August 14, 2008

Carol Rushin  
Acting Regional Administrator  
Region VIII  
United States Environmental Protection Agency  
1595 Wynkoop Street  
Denver, Colorado 80202-1129

RE: Complaint Regarding State of Utah’s Title V Permit Process and Regulation of  
Stericycle Incinerator in North Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Ms. Rushin,

We are writing to ask the United States Environmental Protection Agency to ensure that the State of Utah Division of Air Quality fulfills its regulatory and permitting authority regarding the Stericycle incinerator in North Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Stericycle incinerator is located in a large residential neighborhood built in the last few years. The incinerator is only a few feet from homes with children, near schools and playgrounds. Many residents stated they were never informed that they were buying homes next to a waste incinerator and were not informed about the types of toxic pollutants including dioxin that are emitted from its stacks.

The incinerator is subject to Title V of the Clean Air Act. Their last permit was issued May 3, 2002, over six years ago and the renewal date was May 3, 2007. It is now late July, 2008, almost fifteen months after the five year permit should have expired.

With curious – or questionable – timing, the State Division of Air Quality (DAQ) started the so-called public comment period for the renewal application on July 21, 2008, the very same day that DAQ staff agreed to meet the following day with us about this permit and facility.

The DAQ started the “public comment period” without fulfilling its mandate and pledge to notify Greenaction, Salt Lake Area Residents Against the Stericycle incinerator, and many dozens of residents who had signed up on a DAQ contact list for this very purpose. A public comment period that key stakeholders including residents and environmental health advocates are not informed about – especially when the DAQ had promised to inform them – is illegitimate. It was only after we challenged DAQ about the lack of public notice that the agency did send an email to us about the comment period.
In response to our request for a public hearing, DAQ has also now announced a public hearing will be held on Tuesday, September 2, 2008. In a blatant demonstration of DAQ’s complete bias towards Stericycle and in a violation of the neutral regulatory role an agency like DAQ should play, the DAQ notice stated that the purpose of the hearing was to renew the permit. The notice could have invited public comment on a draft permit, but just referred to the “permit renewal.” A legitimate would state that a hearing and comment period were being held to determine if the permit should be renewed as that is the purpose of a permit process. The notice issued by DAQ gives the appearance of an improper, pre-determined and rigged process.

We believe the DAQ’s handling of the existing and proposed Title V permit is biased towards the company and violates the Clean Air Act’s mandate for public participation.

Another indication of pro-Stericycle bias can be seen on the DAQ’s website section on the incinerator facility. DAQ had promised residents to place current information on their website, but the site is extremely outdated, with no new information apparently posted for almost two years.

Of more concern is the misleading and inaccurate information on the DAQ site. For example, the DAQ site contains what it claims is a summary of “actual emissions” when in fact those emissions are not the actual emissions. DAQ has admitted on several occasions that what they call “actual emissions” does not include emissions from upset conditions and the many other bypasses of the pollution control equipment. As this facility has had a problem with upset conditions during its operating history, a fact known to DAQ, the DAQ knows that the use of the bypass stack during upset conditions does release toxic contaminants and other pollutants directly into the air.

The DAQ is well aware that there is no monitoring of any toxic emissions on a daily, weekly, monthly or even quarterly basis, yet proclaims to the public what it says are “actual emissions.”

The DAQ is also well aware that the facility uses the bypass numerous times during the year during start up and shut down of the incinerator, resulting in unmonitored emissions. Yet there is no updated mention of bypasses on DAQ’s website.

Of additional concern is the fact that the DAQ claimed in a meeting with us on July 22nd that they were unaware of any bypasses in the last year, even though the facility uses the bypass stack as a routine measure during start up and shut down.

The DAQ’s failure to provide accurate and unbiased information, and their failure to update the website or provide the required public notice for a comment period has a direct result in undermining the public’s right to know and have a say about project’s that could impact public health and the environment.
The clear failure to process the renewal application in a timely fashion results in the incinerator operating for $6\frac{1}{2}$ years to date on a permit that was supposed to be a five year permit.

In addition, the openly hostile attitude of DAQ’s Director Cheryl Heying at our meeting on July 22nd seemed designed to send a message that the DAQ was acting to protect the incinerator company and that concerns or questions from the public would not be respected.

In light of this situation, we request that USEPA and DAQ take the following steps:

(1) Announce and provide adequate and proper notice of a fair and unbiased public comment period, including sending written notices to their contact list;

(2) Hold a USEPA-administered fair and properly advertised public hearing on the Title V permit renewal application at a time and place to maximize the opportunities for public participation – this should be different in time and date from the September 2nd DAQ hearing;

(3) Provide accurate and unbiased information to the public, including by maintaining an accurate and updated website section on the incinerator and regulatory and permitting issues related to that facility.

(4) We request that the US EPA review and oversee the State of Utah’s Title V permit process to ensure that public health is protected and so the public gets its right to an unbiased and proper permit review with full public participation.

Please use the following contact information to communicate with us.

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bradley@greenaction.org

Cindy King  
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cynthia_king_84109@yahoo.com

Thank you for your attention to this request, and we look forward to receiving your response to these important concerns.

Sincerely,

Bradley Angel  
Executive Director
Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice

Cynthia King, Salt Lake Area Residents Against the Stericycle Incinerator

cc Governor Jon Huntsman Jr.
Rick Sprott, Utah Department of Environmental Quality
RE: Comments of Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice in Opposition to Proposed Issuance of a Title V Permit Renewal for the Stericycle Incinerator, North Salt Lake City, Utah

Greenaction submits these comments to the Utah Division of Air Quality (DAQ) on behalf of and at the request of our constituents in North Salt Lake City and Salt Lake City, Utah.

These comments document why the permit must be denied. DAQ cannot issue a new Title V permit renewal to the Stericycle incinerator in North Salt Lake City, Utah because DAQ has violated key mandates of Title V and the Clean Air Act and Stericycle has not demonstrated that it can assure compliance with a new Title V permit.

The State of Utah Division of Air Quality has failed to fulfill its regulatory and permitting authority regarding the Stericycle incinerator. DAQ’s regulation of the incinerator and the existing and proposed Title V permit is biased towards the company and violates the Clean Air Act’s mandate for public participation and for a legitimate, fair and thorough permit evaluation.

**DAQ cannot claim emissions are safe without conducting a real and thorough environmental and health assessment that evaluates the impact on thousands of new residents including many living just feet from incinerator:**

The incinerator is located in a large residential neighborhood built in the last few years. The incinerator is only a few feet from homes with children and infants, near schools and playgrounds. Many residents were never informed that they were buying homes next to a waste incinerator and were not informed about the types of toxic pollutants including dioxin that are emitted from its stacks. Nor were they informed that Stericycle stored and transported hazardous waste (toxic fly ash from the incinerator) at the facility.

When this facility was first being sited, it was approved explicitly in part due to the fact that no one lived within a mile of the plant. Today, infants and children live feet from the plant. No agency, including DAQ, has done any review to assess the potential health
impacts on people, especially infants and kids, living, playing and going to school so close to the incinerator.

A DAQ evaluation of the risk posed by the incinerator should include a cumulative impact analysis. DAQ’s assurances of safety are without basis in reality unless all the incinerator emissions and their cumulative impact with the other serious nearby pollution sources are evaluated. For example, dioxin is emitted from the incinerator and is highly toxic in minute levels of exposure and has been linked to cancer, reproductive, developmental, immunological, hormonal and other illnesses. Dioxin is also a persistent, bioaccumulative toxic. Dioxin emitted from the incinerator acts in concert with other highly toxics from other nearby sources such as the refineries and freeways, as well as with dioxin in the food chain and existing body burdens. The failure to analyze these cumulative and very real impacts when setting permit limits is a serious defect that puts the public at direct risk.

**DAQ failed to process the permit application in a timely manner:**

The incinerator is subject to Title V of the Clean Air Act. Their last permit was issued May 3, 2002, over six years ago, and the renewal date was May 3, 2007. It is now October 13, 2008, over seventeen months after the five-year permit should have expired.

The public comment period for the current permit application did not start until 14 ½ months after the date the five-year permit should have expired. With curious – and we believe questionable – timing, the DAQ started the so-called public comment period for the renewal application on July 21, 2008, the very same day that DAQ staff agreed to meet the following day with Greenaction about this permit and facility.

In addition, the “public hearing” was not been scheduled until Greenaction requested it. In light of DAQ’s knowledge of community concern about this facility, DAQ should have automatically started the public comment period and scheduled a public hearing before the old permit expired so a decision could have been made in a timely manner.

Despite DAQ’s denial that they were sitting on the permit renewal application (which benefited Stericycle by turning a five year permit into a substantially longer one), it seems clear that they indeed sat on the permit until challenged.

**DAQ failure to notify their mandatory contact list and residents living next to the incinerator violates the Clean Air Act’s public participation mandate:**

The DAQ has publicly acknowledged the requirement of public participation in the Title V Clean Air Act permit process, yet unfortunately violated that requirement.

The DAQ started the “public comment period” without fulfilling its mandate and pledge to notify Greenaction, Sierra Club, Salt Lake Area Residents Against the Stericycle incinerator and residents about the public comment period. These three groups and several residents had been promised by DAQ that we would be notified of opportunities
to comment; yet we were not notified until we complained after the comment period began. This is a clear violation of Title V and the Clean Air Act’s public participation mandate.

In addition, DAQ failed to notify local residents who had contacted DAQ by email or letters expressing concern about this facility. DAQ files contain correspondence from numerous residents and other concerned citizens expressing concern about Stericycle yet who were never notified about the permit process or opportunities to comment.

In addition, DAQ failed to notify residents of the Foxboro neighborhood including residents who live just feet from the Stericycle facility. DAQ staff easily could have delivered notices to these residents in just an hour or two of effort. Is it the State of Utah’s official policy to keep its citizens in the dark about issues that affect the health of their families?

A public comment period that key stakeholders including residents and environmental health advocates are not informed about – especially when the DAQ had promised to inform them – is illegitimate and does not meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act.

**DAQ Bias and Misrepresentation of Incinerator Operations and Pre-Determined Outcome of Permit Process Reflected in the Public Notice:**

DAQ’s announcement and description of the comment period and public hearing demonstrated bias. In a blatant demonstration of DAQ’s complete bias towards Stericycle and in a violation of the neutral regulatory role an agency like DAQ should play, some DAQ notices stated that the purpose of the hearing was to renew the permit. For example, the email sent from DAQ official Ronald Reece on September 3, 2008 to newspapers stated “Public Hearing regarding the renewal of Stericycle Incorporated’s Title V Permit.”

The DAQ notice should have invited public comment on a draft permit, but just referred to the “permit renewal.” A legitimate notice would state that a hearing and comment period were being held to determine if the permit should be renewed and soliciting comment on a draft permit renewal, as that is the purpose of a permit process. Notices issued by DAQ gave the appearance of an improper, pre-determined and rigged process.

The DAQ notice for the permit application and numerous DAQ documents incorrectly state the nature of the facility and incinerator. The hearing notice refers to the “medical waste incinerator” and the DAQ website describes the facility as the “BFI Medical Waste Incinerator” (DAQ website section on Title V Permits Out For Public Comment). The truth is that the incinerator is not just a medical waste incinerator but in fact burns medical and some non-medical waste that has nothing to do with medical, hospital or infectious waste. The impact of failing to be transparent and truthful in the description of the facility is serious, as the public is not being accurately informed about what is being burned in their community.
Another Error in the Public Notice – Questions at Hearing Were Not Permitted:

The DAQ’s “Notice of Public Hearing” stated that “Those attending the hearing will be allowed an opportunity to 1) ask questions of the Division of Air Quality regarding the draft renewal, and...”

In fact, the public was not allowed to ask questions of DAQ during the public hearing on October 9, 2008. Questions were taken only prior to the hearing, and the questions and answers were unfortunately not on the record.

Failure of DAQ to fully comply with GRAMA request undermines public’s right to full public participation in Title V permit process:

Pursuant to a request under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), Greenaction went to the DAQ on September 2, 2008 to review the files on Stericycle. Unfortunately, some files were missing, including email communications. We also believe that certain inspection documents and some of the semi-annual reports that Stericycle is supposed to submit were missing. We asked to return to inspect all the files that should have been provided under the GRAMA request, and an appointment was made for October 9, 2008. While emails were provided on that date, no other files were provided at all.

The inability to review all DAQ files on this facility due to incomplete compliance with the GRAMA request makes it impossible for the public to fully exercise our right to public participation and the right to know and comment on the permit application. It interferes with our ability and right to submit thorough comments on the draft permit before the end of the public comment period on October 13, 2008.

Another indication of pro-Stericycle bias can be seen on the DAQ’s website section on the incinerator facility. DAQ had promised residents to place current information on their website, but the site is extremely outdated, with no new information apparently posted for almost two years.

DAQ repeatedly and incorrectly refers to “Actual Emissions” that are not actual emissions:

A serious problem and concern that undermines the integrity of the permit process and undermines the public’s right to informed public participation is the misleading and inaccurate information on the DAQ website and in their other public information documents. For example, the DAQ website contains what it claims is a summary of “actual emissions” when in fact those emissions are not the actual emissions.

DAQ documents given to the public and media at the hearing made the same error. One document, entitled “By-Pass Emissions as a Percent of Actuals” did not include bypasses from start up and shut down. The bypasses are given a percentage despite DAQ and Stericycle not testing the bypasses and this chart omitting many bypasses. The same error
is made in the document entitled “Actual emissions as a percent of Stericycle’s permit limits.” These DAQ documents are thus knowingly misleading and incorrect.

DAQ knows very well that this incinerator does not test for actual emissions daily, monthly or even yearly. We understand that the incinerator emissions have only been tested on one day in 2006 in at least the last three years, so this cannot seriously be claimed to represent actual emissions.

**DAQ understates bypass incidents:**

Documents submitted by Stericycle to the DAQ report a huge amount of bypasses due to upsets and emergencies during the current permit period. According to DAQ officials, Stericycle does not report to DAQ information on use of the bypass stack during start up and shut down of the incinerator.

As this facility has had a problem with upset conditions during its operating history, it is imperative that DAQ accurately reveal information about the bypasses as the use of the bypass stack releases toxic contaminants and other pollutants directly into the air without going through pollution control equipment.

The DAQ is also well aware that the facility uses the bypass stack numerous times during the year during start up and shut down of the incinerator as well as during upset conditions, resulting in unmonitored emissions. Yet the bypasses during start up and shut down are not included in DAQ references to the numbers of bypasses. The use of the bypass stack during start up and shut down also results in toxic and criteria pollutant emissions and these incidents also need to be disclosed and evaluated.

Of additional concern is the fact that the DAQ claimed in a meeting with us on July 22, 2008 that they were unaware of any bypasses in the last year, even though the DAQ was aware of emergency bypasses and DAQ knows that the facility uses the bypass stack as a routine measure during start up and shut down. We have since confirmed from DAQ files that they indeed were aware that there were a number of bypasses due to upset conditions each year in the last few years and many additional similar upset bypasses in previous years. There were, of course, uses of the bypass stack due to start up and shut down, yet DAQ omits this fact when stating how many bypasses happened and still cannot tell the public how many of these bypasses occurred and when they took place.

DAQ’s failure to provide accurate and unbiased information, the incomplete compliance with the GRAMA request, and their failure to update the website or provide the required public notice for a comment period has a direct result in undermining the public’s right to know and have a say about project’s that could impact public health and the environment.
DAQ Warning Letter Documents Stericycle’s Inability to Assure Compliance with a new Title V Permit:

As Stericycle has not been able to comply with key requirements of their current Title V Permit, the DAQ cannot seriously argue that Stericycle will comply with a new permit.


This warning letter documented violations of the Title V Permit by Stericycle, yet DAQ has been telling the public and media that Stericycle has had no serious violations – but indeed these are serious and demonstrate non-compliance. These are not mere paperwork violations, but are serious instances of Stericycle failing to provide documentation of compliance with their permit. As Stericycle failed to submit compliance reports in accordance with their permit requirements in the required and timely manner, DAQ and Stericycle cannot assure that Stericycle would comply with a new Title V permit as the Clean Air Act requires – and therefore the permit must be denied.

The DAQ warning letter to Stericycle said:

“On June 5, 2008, an inspector from the Utah Division of Air Quality...performed an annual inspection of Stericycle....During the inspection and subsequent records review the inspector documented the following:

1. The annual compliance certification due by May 2, 2008 was not submitted to the Division.

2. Title V monitoring reports for 2008 were not submitted every six months and a reporting gap was found for August 2007.

3. Records showed an opacity observation on the emergency generator (unit EG) was performed on July 3, 2007. No record was available to show whether an opacity observation was taken (or scheduled to be taken) between January and June 2008 on the EG.

4. Records showed that 5 employees obtained 24 hour HMIWI operator certification in February 2007. No records were submitted showing that these individuals have completed (or are scheduled to complete) an annual 4 hour refresher course due in 2008.

5. A semi-annual report required under Condition II.B.4.c.3 for the period January 17, 2007 to July 16, 2007 was not submitted.

On August 12, 2008, DAQ sent a follow-up letter requesting additional information. This letter also stated that Stericycle was out of compliance during this period with Condition I.S. (six-month reporting) and with Condition II.B.4.c (semi-annual reporting), yet the
DAQ found that Stericycle submitted an annual certification listing these as “in” compliance when they were not.

The compliance reports that Stericycle did manage to submit since the beginning of the current permit document a huge amount of bypasses during upset and emergency conditions.

Stericycle also cannot be trusted to comply with the proposed new Title V permit as they on several occasions did not provide accurate information to the public. For example, at the October 9th public hearing they displayed a diagram of their facility that claimed that “clean exhaust” was emitted from the incinerator. Stericycle is well aware that the exhaust from the incinerator is not “clean” but in fact contains toxic and criteria pollutants. It would have been one thing for them to try to argue that the exhaust might (or might not) meet DAQ and EPA standards, but they could not and should not have claimed the exhaust is “clean.”

Community concern in the Foxboro neighborhood continues due to excessive pollution. A resident of Foxboro emailed the DAQ on March 19, 2008 to complain about the incinerator, writing, “Every day I drive by Stericycle and see pollutants being blown out of their building.” Despite being provided her phone numbers and email address, DAQ never bothered to contact this resident about her right to participate in a public comment period on the permit application.

**Conclusion:**

In light of the above, we request that USEPA and DAQ take the following steps:

1. Deny the draft Title V permit due to the inability to assure compliance and the defects in the permit and regulatory process;

2. Provide accurate and unbiased information to the public, including by maintaining an accurate and updated website and providing accurate fact sheets and documents;

3. We renew our request that the US EPA review and oversee the State of Utah’s Title V permit process to ensure that public health is protected and so the public gets its right to an unbiased and proper permit review with full public participation.

Please use the following contact information to communicate with us.

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Sincerely,

Bradley Angel
Executive Director
Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice

cc Governor Jon Huntsman Jr.
Rick Sprott, Utah Department of Environmental Quality
US EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson
US EPA Region VIII Acting Administrator Carol Rushin